Small arms of the USSR: on the way to automatic weapons

35
By the 30s of the 1th century, world military thought had finally and irrevocably established itself in the idea that a lot of troops - this, of course, was good, but even better if this mass of troops would produce as many bullets per XNUMX km as possible. front. At the same time, the struggle for rate of fire began even earlier. In the Middle Ages, there were a kind of “machine gunners” - the English yeomen who could shoot arrows with astonishing speed, the same can be said about the Mongolian horse archers. If we talk directly about the infantry weapons, then by 1910 almost all the leading designers of the world came to the conclusion that it was necessary to develop self-loading automatic rifles.

This trend has not bypassed Russia, where the work on the development of automatic systems was carried out by many designers, but the most successful of them was Vladimir Grigorievich Fedorov. Fedorov came from an ordinary teacher's family, but fate prepared him a rather interesting way of life. Vladimir Fedorov was a knight of many awards both of the Russian Empire and the USSR, including the unique title “Hero of Labor” - the predecessor of the award Hero of Socialist Labor, he managed to advance to the rank of lieutenant general of the Red Army.

Fedorov machine

Fedorov designed his machine gun as captain of the Russian Imperial Army in the 1913-1916 years. And he began the first work on a self-loading rifle in the 1906 year. His first rifle was developed under the standard cartridge of the famous Russian three-ruler 7,62x54R and was equipped with an integral magazine with 5 cartridges capacity. It was tested in the 1911 year, and in the 1912 year the Artillery Committee even approved its release, ordering 150 copies for military trials. At the same time, the designer worked on the creation of a cartridge that would initially be adapted for automatic weapons. In 1913, he proposed the design of an automatic rifle (the term “automatic” was introduced later, only in the 1920's) under a new cartridge of his own design.

Small arms of the USSR: on the way to automatic weapons

The patron of Vladimir Fedorov had a pointed bullet of a caliber 6,5-mm and a mass of 8,5 gr. The initial velocity of this bullet was approximately 850 m / s, and the muzzle energy was 3100 Joule. At the same time, the standard Russian rifle and machine-gun cartridge 7,62х54R, depending on the version of the equipment, had muzzle energy around the 3600-4000 Joule. At the same time, 6,5-mm cartridge Fedorov gave a weaker recoil impulse, compared with the standard cartridge 7,62x54R and had a smaller mass.

All these qualities, along with a smaller muzzle energy and the design of the sleeve without protruding rim, made Vladimir Fedorov's cartridge better suited for automatic weapons, allowing it to be adjusted reliably from high-capacity stores. Tests began in 1913 year, but the outbreak of the First World War has made its adjustments. By 1915, the Russian Imperial Army experienced an acute shortage of small arms. This was especially true for light machine guns. As a result, Fedorov's new automatic rifles were ordered as light weapons to support infantry units, but already under the Japanese rifle cartridge 6,5x50SR Arisaka.

He possessed characteristics similar to the patron Fedorov, and at the same time there were enough of them in Russia, since the Japanese patrons at the very beginning of the First World War were bought together with Arisaka rifles in order to compensate for the army’s losses in small arms. Fedorov’s automatic rifles that had already been manufactured under the Japanese cartridge were altered by installing a special liner in the chamber. It should be noted that both the cartridge for the Arisaka rifle and the cartridge Fedorov were typical rifle cartridges in their ballistic characteristics, although they differed in smaller caliber and, accordingly, in power. They were not an interim development, as claimed in a number of sources.


By the summer of 1916, Fedorov’s experienced assault rifles passed a series of troop tests in a special company, after which it was decided to equip them with a team from the 189 of the Izmail regiment (158 soldiers and 4 officers) who left for the Romanian front in December 1. The decision on the serial production of the Fedorov's 1916 linear rifle was made, they should have been produced at the Sestrorets Arms Factory. However, in the conditions of a large-scale war, the enterprise could not even cope with the release of its main products (rifles, model 2,5 / 1891), so mass production of Fedorov’s automatic rifle was not established.

It began to be mass produced only after the revolution at the Kovrov plant (today it is the plant named after Degtyarev). However, the order was reduced from 15 000 to 9 000 units. Until the 1924 of the year, when the release of the machine Fedorov stopped, it was possible to collect all 3 200 units of these small arms. In 1923, it was upgraded, the weapon received a new impact mechanism, a sight and a magazine. Fedorov's guns remained in service with the Red Army until 1928. After them, it was decided to remove from service because of the unification of the used cartridges. All the machines were transferred to the warehouses, but still useful to the military. In 1940, they were used in Karelia during the Winter War with Finland.

It should be noted that the development of Fedorov could not be used as a mass army small arms, since it did not ensure the reliability of work in difficult and harsh operating conditions. In addition, this machine was quite difficult to maintain and manufacture. An analysis of the only reliable source for operating the machine available at the moment, brochures from 1923, demonstrates that the main problem of Fedorov’s machine was not so much the design flaws as such, but the low quality of the construction materials used - metal influxes, sludge parts, etc. , as well as poor quality ammunition that was supplied to the troops. At the same time, Fedorov's machine gun was the first working model of an individual automatic weapon, which, moreover, was used in battles, which is the main merit of this machine gun, as well as its designer.

Tokarev self-loading rifles - SVT38 / 40

The first model of an individual automatic small arms, which was created and put into service already in the Soviet Union, was the automatic rifle design Simonov - ABC. In competition with another well-known Soviet gunsmith designer - Fyodor Vasilyevich Tokarev, Sergey Gavrilovich Simonov developed a weapon that was adopted by the Red Army in 1936, and already in 1938, the infantrymen of the 36 of the Moscow Infantry Division were armed. In 1, ABC-1939 was able to receive the first baptism of fire during the war with Finland. However, the main method of firing from ABC was shooting single rounds, shooting in bursts was possible, but only in emergency cases.


17 July 1939, guided by the desire to re-equip the Red Army with self-propelled rifles as soon as possible, the Defense Committee, following Stalin’s personal instructions, decided to concentrate all efforts of the weapons commissariat on another self-loading rifle, SVT-38. Played his role and the fact that Stalin knew Tokarev well enough, and the name of Simonov told him little.

SVT was adopted by the Red Army as early as 1938 and received the designation SVT-38; in 1940, a slightly lighter version of the rifle was adopted, which received the designation SVT-40, the rifle continued until 1945, and in the first half of the war at an increasing rate , and in the future all in smaller and smaller quantities. In total, up to 1,5 of millions of these rifles were produced, including up to 50 thousands of SVT-40, made in the sniper version.

In the army, this rifle was called "Svetka". The rifle was used during the Soviet-Finnish war, as well as during the Great Patriotic War. In a number of units of the Red Army, it was the main weapon, but in most cases only part of the infantry was armed with it. The general opinion about CBT was rather controversial. On the one hand, in the Red Army, SVT-40 has earned the reputation of not the most reliable small arms, which was sensitive to frost and dirt. On the other hand, for many infantrymen this rifle enjoyed well-deserved love and popularity, since it was significantly superior to the Mosin rifle in firepower.

The German and Finnish soldiers highly appreciated captured SVT-38 / 40, the Germans even adopted them as small arms of a limited standard. The US military also spoke fairly well about the SVT. All this can be explained primarily by the fact that the preparation of the main mass of infantrymen in the Red Army was at a low level, as well as the low level of service for small arms under front-line conditions (the use of unsuitable or low-quality lubricants), as well as the massive use of American powder in cartridges. (delivered to the USSR under the Lend-Lease), which gave a lot of soot. It should be noted that after years of 20, similar problems began to be pursued by the young American M16 automatic rifle during the Vietnam War, which, however, did not prevent her from becoming one of the best models of small arms in her class.


Many units, as well as individual fighters of the Red Army, who had a sufficient level of training, such as marines, successfully used the SVT until the end of the war. At the same time, the sniper version of the SVT-40 in terms of effective range and accuracy of shooting was inferior to the Mosin sniper rifle. 1891 / 30's, so by the middle of the Great Patriotic War, it was replaced in the production of less rapid and outdated, but more accurate Mosinkoy.

SVT-40, as its name implies, was a self-loading (semi-automatic) weapon. The rifle worked on the principle of removal of gases from the barrel and had a short stroke of the gas piston. Locking barrel by skewing the shutter in a vertical plane. The rifle had a composite wooden bed. The trigger mechanism is automatic. SVT-40 was equipped with a box-shaped, two-row, detachable magazine for 10 cartridges. The opportunity to equip stores both separately from the rifle and in the closed state was realized with the help of standard 5 holders of Mosin rifle cartridges. Sights are open, consist of a fly with a headset and a rear sight, which can be adjusted in range. The rifle had a muzzle brake and a gas regulator that allowed changing the amount of gases discharged from its barrel. Additionally, it was completed with a bayonet, which could be attached to a rifle if necessary.

The SVT-38/40 was not inferior to the American self-loading rifle M1 Garand and was clearly superior to the later German samples G.41 (M) and G.41 (W). A significant number of Soviet rifle automatic rifles (about 1 million SVT were produced before the war) came as a surprise to German soldiers at the start of the war. In the summer of 1941, a German soldier wrote in a letter home: "The Russians are fully armed with light machine guns." Famous Commander 2nd tank Heinz Guderian, in his report on the experience of conducting military operations in East Freon on November 7, 1941, wrote: "Her (Soviet infantry) weapons are inferior to German, with the exception of an automatic rifle."


However, with all the usefulness of automatic and self-loading rifles, in conditions of large-scale war, they had one serious drawback, which negated all their advantages. All of them differed technical complexity, which was beyond the control of a large number of soldiers, recruits, who got into the troops, you can say "from the plow." At the same time, in the able hands of the SVT was a very formidable weapon. And for the mass saturation of "bullets per kilometer front" during the conduct of hostilities were used other types of automatic weapons - submachine guns (PPSH, PPS).

Information sources:
-http: //voennovosti.ru/2013/08/strelkovoe-oruzhie-rossii-era-avtomatiki
-http: //www.armoury-online.ru/articles/ar/ru/Fedorov
-http: //world.guns.ru/rifle/autoloading-rifles/rus/tokarev-svt-3-svt-40-r.html
-http: //ru.wikipedia.org
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35 comments
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  1. +9
    5 September 2013 09: 00
    All of them were distinguished by technical complexity, which was not subject to the large number of new recruits who fell into the troops, one might say “from the plow”.

    This rusty bike (for the sake of liberals, coconuts and other idiots). The production of automatic rifles was curtailed due to a lack of production capacity in the first place. Instead of one SVT, the front could get something about two and a half PPSh. That's the whole "secret".
    1. Net
      Net
      +8
      5 September 2013 09: 45
      In PPSh, stamping of almost all the main parts was widely used. This was one of the main ideas of Shpagin, which sharply reduced the time for manufacturing PPSh. A fire density of up to 1000 rpm, a large drum magazine capacity is a worthy alternative to the Volmer submachine gun at distances of 200-300 m. SVT was clearly losing here.
    2. +9
      5 September 2013 11: 05
      Quote: bunta
      ... The production of automatic rifles was curtailed due to a lack of production capacity in the first place. Instead of one SVT, the front could get something about two and a half PCA ...

      PPSh and Sveta were in different tactical niches. Shpagin is a distance of 150-200 meters, SVT is 500-800. And the first could not replace the second.
      The first PPSh, by the way, were almost four times more expensive than a mosquito.
      The effect of PPSh was that it was a brilliant mobilization model of weapons that did not require highly skilled labor, sophisticated equipment and a wide variety of materials. It was generally produced at non-core enterprises and in no way intersected with SVT in production.
      But SVT, just required ten grades of steel and tens of machine hours, and high-quality lubricants at the front .., and a competent trained user with grafted skills for caring for weapons. Such a technically competent fighter of the Red Army on a millionth scale could not afford.
      Thus, the removal of CBT from production is still a complex of reasons.
      1. Avenger711
        -2
        5 September 2013 17: 55
        When the battle is at the level of dozens of artillery batteries, it is possible to suffer that the soldiers do not shoot further than 150-200 meters.
    3. Avenger711
      0
      5 September 2013 17: 05
      Expressed in rubles, this complexity calmly gave a piece for 1 vintar, a "three-line" then cost 90 rubles. PPSh was even cheaper. Plus, in the context of total war, the role of infantry personal weapons is insignificant compared to artillery.

      There were difficulties in exploitation too.
    4. Zeev
      +5
      5 September 2013 20: 08
      This rusty bike is based on the memoirs of veterans who were terribly disliked by the SVT because of its complexity (except for the marines, but those who had technical knowledge were higher)
      1. +4
        5 September 2013 23: 40
        Quote: Zeev
        the memoirs of veterans who SVT terribly did not like precisely for its complexity

        According to his father, the SVT was very good, but it required cleanliness, care, and did not tolerate excess lubrication in the cold. He left a scar on his right palm, tore off a piece of skin between the lid and the shutter handle, while jerking the shutter.
        Let those who held the AK / AKM / AKMS say - did you pinch the lower part of your palm if you twitched the bolt with the "up" grip?
        1. 0
          20 October 2019 12: 42
          Never pinched.
  2. +3
    5 September 2013 09: 13
    You are right, but SVT or SVS instead of PPSh leads to an increase in the slaughter distance to the enemy, which means it reduces its own losses and leads to a change in tactics of battles.
    1. Avenger711
      0
      5 September 2013 17: 56
      When fighters have one rifle instead of two dozen PPShs, albeit a good one, the tactics of the battle will really change, because they will have to hit enemies not even from 100 meters, but point blank with fists and stones.

      By the way, imagine what visibility is on the battlefield.
      1. +1
        5 September 2013 20: 02
        Quote: Avenger711
        When fighters have one rifle instead of two dozen PPSh

        Come on you repeat fables. What was missing and the three rulers in the USSR. Over the years of the war, more than 12 million pieces were produced! 2 times more than all the weapons factories in Europe that worked for Nazi Germany. Maybe there were several cases due to confusion, when separate units fell to the front without weapons, but no one sent them to the front line and did not force them to fight with stones and sticks. It turns out, in your opinion, we defeated the fascists with stones and sticks? A very original thought.
        1. Avenger711
          -1
          6 September 2013 01: 32
          This is during the war years, but in the 41st they weren’t released, and that the PPSh, that the three-line, is almost the same ersatz level, when modern weapons are technologically much more complicated. 1 The rifle for three is really a myth, because the weapons in the person of the same three-rulers were enough in the warehouses where they were sent when they were replaced by SVT. The army simply lasted until the moment when any weapons began to come from the evacuated factories.
          1. 0
            8 September 2013 17: 53
            It’s not quite a myth that some militia divisions should have been re-equipped on the front line, but they weren’t enough at all, although at the assembly points the rifles were piled around to be sent to the rear, but they could not be touched.
  3. +2
    5 September 2013 09: 37
    Quote: bunta
    The production of automatic rifles was curtailed due to a lack of production capacity in the first place. Instead of one SVT, the front could get something about two and a half PPSh. That's the whole "secret".

    The exact opposite.
    Quote: Bolotin

    Tokarev automatic rifle arr. 1940 was intended to perform the same tasks as
    self-loading rifle, so the main form of its fire was a single. Shooting in short bursts was allowed only with an insufficient number of light machine guns, and continuous fire - in exceptional cases at the time of the greatest tension of the battle.

    20 May 1942 g. The State Defense Committee adopted a decree on the production of automatic rifles, which in July began to enter the army *.
    The conversion of Tokarev's self-loading rifle to an automatic one was caused by an insufficient number of light machine guns and submachine guns at the beginning of the war. An automatic rifle made it possible to partially compensate for the insufficient density of infantry fire.

    * TsAMO, f. 8 1, op. 12106, d.714, l. 113



    1. Avenger711
      -1
      6 September 2013 01: 34
      How can launching an automatic rifle into production compensate for the shortage of submachine guns, which are 10+ times cheaper to machine guns on any side ??
  4. +5
    5 September 2013 09: 41
    It is worth noting that after 20 years, the young American M16 automatic rifle during the Vietnam War began to pursue similar problems, which, however, did not prevent it from becoming one of the best small arms in its class.

    M16 Americans themselves proclaimed the best assault rifle. And in Vietnam, as in Iraq, the Americans tried to pick up the AK-47, which were famous for their reliability.
    Quote: stolbovsn
    SVT or SVS instead of PPSh leads to an increase in the slaughter distance to the enemy, which means it reduces its own losses and leads to a change in tactics of combat.

    Even the Finnish War showed that machine guns were needed, although Stalin was thinking of doing simple rifles. The Soviet army due to the lack of machine guns suffered heavy losses at the beginning of the war. PPSh began to be mass-produced only in 1942. Self-loading rifles were good along with assault rifles, and not instead of them.
    1. avt
      +2
      5 September 2013 11: 07
      Quote: 0255
      although Stalin thought to do with simple rifles.

      If I thought - there would be no SVT, it’s another matter that it’s a self-loading variant, and not automatic, like that of the ABC. But bursts of fire with a rifle cartridge from a rifle is not grateful.
    2. Avenger711
      0
      5 September 2013 18: 08
      Sorry, but you yourself don’t know what you’re talking about. PPSh is not a submachine gun, but a submachine gun, which is even taken out in the name. Any self-loading rifle with a muzzle energy of up to 4 kJ covers the PPSh with its tiny pistol bullets (no more than 500 J), like a bull sheep. The Germans, contrary to the cinema stamp of the submachine guns, made less than a million, having conquered the whole war with the Mauser rifle of 1898.

      Automatic, or in English. assault rifle is already an AK in which the ammunition is noticeably more powerful, the muzzle energy is about 2 kJ. The departure from the previous powerful rifles occurred for quite objective reasons, they were designed for firing at cavalry with single fire at a long distance, when firing from them in line, not every guy just holds them.
  5. +2
    5 September 2013 10: 37
    Automatic rifle in 1913, somehow this information does not fit in my head.
    Photo of the inventor - Fedorov Vladimir Grigoryevich - what a noble face!
  6. +6
    5 September 2013 11: 00
    ... Stalin knew Tokarev well enough, and Simonov’s name didn’t tell him much ...
    From the end of the 20's in the Red Army every 2-3 of the year, contests of models of promising small arms were held, where they looked at the weapon, and not the name of the creator. Otherwise, little-known sergeant Kalashnikov never became famous with his AK.

    ... It is worth noting that, after 20 years, similar problems began to haunt the young American automatic rifle M16 during the Vietnam War ...
    Then the amers were armed with M-14 ...

    ... And for the mass saturation of "bullets per kilometer of the front" during the conduct of hostilities other types of automatic weapons were used - submachine guns (PPSh, PPS) ...
    PPSh / PPS were forced replacement of SVT-40 because of lower prime cost.

    The saturation of the first line of defense with automatic weapons capable of aiming to hit the enemy at a distance from 400 m - this is the task that the armies of the world tried to solve on the eve of the 2 World War.
    Submachine guns could solve this problem at a distance of 100-150 m and closer.
  7. 0
    5 September 2013 11: 01
    Quote: stalkerwalker
    PPSh / PPS were forced replacement of SVT-40 because of lower prime cost.

    There was no such thing.
    1. +5
      5 September 2013 11: 27
      Quote: Droid
      There was no such thing.

      "This cannot be, because it can never be!" laughing
  8. +1
    5 September 2013 12: 30
    Quote: stalkerwalker
    Quote: Droid
    There was no such thing.

    "This cannot be, because it can never be!" laughing

    Can you confirm with anything the thesis that PCA was a replacement for CBT?
    And do you generally read what they wrote to you? Copy-paste is not difficult for me ...
    Quote: Bolotin

    On May 20, 1942, the State Defense Committee adopted a decree on the production of automatic rifles, which in July began to enter the army *.
    The conversion of Tokarev's self-loading rifle to an automatic one was caused by an insufficient number of light machine guns and submachine guns at the beginning of the war. An automatic rifle partially compensated for the insufficient density of infantry fire.

    * TsAMO, f. 8 1, op. 12106, d.714, l. 113


    Everything was exactly the opposite. This SVT was converted into AVT in order to compensate for the lack of handbrake and submachine gun.
    1. +4
      5 September 2013 12: 35
      Quote: Droid
      Can you confirm with anything the thesis that PCA was a replacement for CBT?
      And do you generally read what they wrote to you? Copy-paste is not difficult for me ...

      It will be very difficult for me to "put together" A. Isaev's book "10 myths ..." ...
      Do not bother, read the relevant chapter.
      hi
    2. Avenger711
      -1
      6 September 2013 01: 35
      And who is this Bolotin? Take the trouble to cite the document itself, not quotes, and whose interpretation of this piece of paper is unknown.
  9. 0
    5 September 2013 12: 42
    Quote: stalkerwalker
    Quote: Droid
    Can you confirm with anything the thesis that PCA was a replacement for CBT?
    And do you generally read what they wrote to you? Copy-paste is not difficult for me ...

    It will be very difficult for me to "put together" A. Isaev's book "10 myths ..." ...
    Do not bother, read the relevant chapter.
    hi

    Thanks, read.
    Something about Isaev did not say anything about the disruption of the production of PCA in 41g, about the fact that because of problems with fiber, the fate of PCA was generally in the balance. It was so cheap that they couldn’t produce it at all, until in February 42 they found a replacement for fiber. And SVT was so expensive and complicated that in May 42 the production of AVT-40 was urgently launched. And they do this AVT to compensate for the lack of PPSh and handbrake.

    Myths Isaev they are such myths.
    1. +3
      5 September 2013 13: 19
      Quote: Droid
      Thanks, read.

      Inattentively read.
      The production statistics of PPSh and SVT (or AVT, with the possibility of firing bursts), as it is being heated, did not stand nearby.
      Read the comments at the beginning of the discussion - the cost of SVT and PPSh are absolutely incomparable, SVT and RPD cannot be interchangeable.
      And finally.
      If everything was so smooth, the SA would not have adopted the AK as the main infantry weapon, but would have left the upgraded SVT, as the amers did, taking the Belgian FAL as a model, renaming it M-14.
      1. Jack7691
        +2
        5 September 2013 13: 56
        So the Belgian FN FAL is a completely stripped SVT with a modified exterior
        1. +1
          5 September 2013 22: 57
          Prove the facts.
        2. +1
          5 September 2013 23: 01
          You talk nonsense. I'm at 1979. walked with FN, SVT is not even close to him.
          1. +5
            5 September 2013 23: 18
            Quote: Vitold
            You talk nonsense. I'm at 1979. walked with FN, SVT is not even close to him.

            FAL FN - an independent development, with the bolt part - THE MOST MAIN PART OF THE DESIGN, copied from SVT.
            The basis of the M-14 was taken by the G-1, using the bolt part with FAL FN.
            So it turns out that everyone, both the Belgians and the Amers, has "their own" developments only in the form of a bed and a trunk.
    2. Avenger711
      -1
      5 September 2013 18: 11
      In May of the 42nd, the evacuated factories were already working, and one could think about giving at least someone a decent trunk, and PPSh.
    3. Avenger711
      -1
      6 September 2013 01: 50
      But nothing that until the end of the year there were still weapons in stocks?
  10. erg
    +8
    5 September 2013 12: 55
    I absolutely disagree with the stupid statement that the allegedly complex models of firearms were beyond the understanding of ordinary soldiers "from the plow." Firstly, not a single sample of hand-held firearms, either standing or still in service, is a constructively complex product so that it requires a certain level of education to master it. In production, it can really be difficult for one reason or another (so the M16 is not more complicated than AK in the design of automation, but in production it is more difficult, for example, because of the more complex shape of the case, etc.) But this is a question of the availability of qualified workers in production, not conscripts in the army. As an example: in fact, everyone can quickly learn how to drive and take care of a car, but not everyone can make repairs. Secondly: those who write phrases about the insufficient technical education of Russian soldiers (as a rule, opposing him, at least in translated publications, a competent European soldier who is naturally armed with "technically more sophisticated European weapons") do not take into account the fact that earlier, yes and to this day, many so-called savage tribes in Africa, Arabia, Afghanistan, etc. are armed with the same European weapons. But for some reason, the illiteracy of the representatives of these peoples does not prevent them from owning and using this weapon in practice. Moreover, often even for children. That is, it turns out that an illiterate Afghan peasant or Bedouin or a representative of an African tribe was initially better than a Russian peasant. Complete nonsense. I repeat once again: not a single sample of hand-held firearms is structurally complex, as a rule, we can say about all of them - as simple as a stick. But due to the design features, all or individual units, it can be more expensive and more difficult to manufacture. And also in service. This is how the tendency of the German weapons school is known, so that in a product each detail performs only one function. As a result, more parts and possible complexity during assembly and disassembly. And accordingly, the apparent complexity of the product. But the Russian and American school, on the contrary, prefers that one part in the structure performs as many functions as possible (a fire translator and a fuse for an AK). In people who are far from weapons, as a rule, it is the external differences in the shape of the parts, as well as in their quantity, that give rise to the illusion of more complex designs. And yet there is simply no understanding of the principles by which certain types of weapons work. So the Nikonov assault rifle, despite the greater number of parts, is not more complicated than the Kalashnikov. It's just that in his work he uses two principles at the same time: the removal of powder gases, followed by their pressure on the piston and a short stroke of the barrel under the influence of recoil.
  11. 0
    5 September 2013 13: 33
    Quote: stalkerwalker
    Inattentively read.
    The production statistics of PPSh and SVT (or AVT, with the possibility of firing bursts), as it is being heated, did not stand nearby.
    Read the comments at the beginning of the discussion - the cost of SVT and PPSh are absolutely incomparable, SVT and RPD cannot be interchangeable.

    I read it carefully.
    Do not care about the cost. PP and self-loading are completely different weapons. PPSh could not be a replacement for the SVT in any way because of the short range of effective firing, but it could create a high density of fire, which the SVT in principle is not capable of.
    Tales of Isaev about the fact that PPSh is such an ersatz of self-loading just a fairy tale. But the documents say the opposite. To replace SVT, the release of three rubles was restored; only Izhevsk produced them 12 thousand per day. A PPSh produced to create a high density of fire.

    Quote: stalkerwalker
    If everything was so smooth, the SA would not have adopted the AK as the main infantry weapon, but would have left the upgraded SVT, as the amers did, taking the Belgian FAL as a model, renaming it M-14.

    Who said that smoothly, you?
    Based on the results of the war, we refused self-loading as the main weapon and made a bet on the machine under an intermediate cartridge.
    And the Americans did not take any FAL as a sample, the M14 dad was M1 Garand. And after 7 years, they urgently switched to M16 and 5,56.
    1. +5
      5 September 2013 14: 00
      Quote: Droid
      Do not care about the cost.

      Of course!
      When troops need weapons - is it better to give 2 SVT than 10 PCA?

      Quote: Droid
      And the Americans did not take any FAL as a sample, the M14 dad was M1 Garand. And after 7 years, they urgently switched to M16 and 5,56.

      Did you say they read A. Isaev?
      Lying is ugly, at least ...
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. 0
        5 September 2013 15: 54
        Quote: stalkerwalker
        Of course!
        When troops need weapons - is it better to give 2 SVT than 10 PCA?

        What is better to give 100 SVT or not a single PCA? Isaev and his fans somehow forget about the three-ruler, which became the replacement for the failed SVT, it was produced 12 million during the war years and it cost less than the PCA.

        While Isaev tells his tales about the cost of business, things were as follows ...
        In 41g, more than a million SVT were produced, and only 98644 units were manufactured, and on January 1, 42g there were 55147 units of all types in the troops.
        Serious problems arose with the production of PCA.
        Quote: Bolotin

        Shock absorbers for PPSh mod. 1941 were made of monolithic fiber 18 mm thick. Obtaining such a thick fiber required a lengthy process. As a result of this, our industry was not able to satisfy the sharply increased demand for fiber. On August 12, 1941, a military representative of one of the factories manufacturing submachine guns reported: “The plant completely stood up due to the lack of fiber for shock absorbers. This can only explain the failure in the implementation of the program for the first ten days of August. All our attempts, under the conditions of our capabilities to allow the replacement of fiber with some substitute, have ended unsuccessfully. Attempts to glue fiber from several sheets, as well as to rivet it with metal studs, also did nothing good. Fiber glued and riveted in the conditions of our factory is glued. Attempts to make a shock absorber from gun shock absorbers also did nothing good. The rubber has cracked ”
      3. The comment was deleted.
    2. Avenger711
      -2
      5 September 2013 18: 30
      Do you understand that 20 PPSh soldiers, especially those covered by heavy weapons, which are much more important than infantry bullets in conditions of a big war, can compete with at least close combat, and 20 soldiers from one SVT on the battlefield are useless?

      A three-line three-line, but in addition to the cost in rubles, it would be nice to estimate how much the deployment of new industries could cost. If PCA can be produced in the notorious bed workshops, then it will be stupidly faster and more profitable than building a new plant. In general, Isaev is absolutely right that this weapon is nothing more than an ersatz, and the Germans almost put a bolt on submachine guns. Firepower is provided by machine guns. As, by the way, even now, from Kalash they shoot almost always single, or short, although it is obvious that his ability to create a wall of fire is by no means worse than that of PPSh.
  12. The comment was deleted.
  13. 0
    5 September 2013 15: 56
    I wonder how Isaev thought to replace the existing ones in the production of SVT with PPSh whose production has arisen?
    Nevertheless, despite serious problems with the PPSh and a very small number of PP in the troops, on October 12, 41, an order was issued to introduce machine gunners. I draw your attention to the fact that it’s not the SVT that give them so far dofiga and whose production is ongoing, but the PCA of which they are still few.
    ORDER FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF AUTOMATIC MOTORS INTO THE STATE OF RIVER RELATIONS

    No. 0406 12 October 1941

    In modern infantry combat, massive * automatic fire represents tremendous firepower, hampering the enemy’s maneuver in defense and decisively suppressing its manpower during the offensive.

    Automatic fire, used suddenly and with a large number of machine guns, allows you to immediately upset the battle formations of the enemy and inflict a severe defeat on him.

    The organization of machine guns existing in our infantry does not give the regiment commander the opportunity to decisively influence the enemy, both during the offensive and in defense with massive automatic fire and thereby dominate him.

    The same organization does not allow the senior infantry commander to have in his hands a constant, maneuverable, strong fire fist of machine gunners, using which in any combat situation, the senior infantry chief could firmly impose his will on the enemy.

    To eliminate the existing shortcoming in the automatic fire of the state infantry division No. 04/600, I order:

    1. Enter in each rifle regiment at the disposal of the regiment commander a company of fighters armed with machine guns (PPSh) consisting of 100 people.

    2. Name a company - a company of machine gunners.

    3. To the commanders of rifle regiments, to widely use company of machine gunners to create decisive fire superiority over the enemy in close combat, in ambushes, during detours, searches, to cover maneuvers, using the suddenness and massiveness of automatic fire.

    People's Commissar of Defense I. STALIN
  14. 0
    5 September 2013 15: 56
    Further, in December 41g, Stavka distributes the PCA of which it has only 250 units in reserve. Again I draw your attention to the fact that it is not SVT that occupies it, which is simply dofiga compared to PPSh.
    Quote: Bolotin

    In his memoirs, the chief artillery marshal Voronov, referring to the supply of submachine guns (during the war they were often called machine guns) at that time in the reserve of the Supreme High Command, wrote: “A new year, 1942 was approaching. On the evening of December 31, when I was engaged in many urgent matters, they suddenly called from Stavka. They said that two ski battalions should urgently go to the front, but they do not have a single machine gun, they need to be armed urgently. I asked to let me deal with our capabilities. It turned out that we had at that moment
    only 250 assault rifles - such were our reserves of small arms then! I reported to Stavka our “automatic capabilities”. In response, he received the order: “Immediately give one hundred and sixty automatic machines to the ski battalions, and keep ninety in your reserve.” So we met in 1942. Although our capabilities were modest then, we deeply believed that a holiday would come on our street! ”

    Finally in February 42, they found a replacement for fiber ...

    In February 1942, shock absorbers made of parchment leather were tested, which showed Satisfactory results, having withstood 15 thousand shots. The technological process of obtaining parchment leather was cheaper and required less machine tool equipment. February 23, 1942 new
    shock absorbers were taken into production, thereby eliminating unexpected difficulties.

    But PPSh, as well as handbrakes, was still not enough in the troops, so on May 20, 42 the AVT-40 was launched into production. For some reason, its cost price did not bother anyone, but it was disturbed by the insufficient density of fire.

    You will not find anything of this from Isaev, because these facts directly contradict his "economic" theory.
    Quote: stalkerwalker
    Did you say they read A. Isaev?
    Lying is ugly, at least ...

    Did you read it? I quote ...
    Quote: Isaev
    In the USA, the M14 rifle was developed under the new cartridge, which is actually a modernized version of the M1 guarantor rifle.
  15. Jeka
    +1
    5 September 2013 16: 41
    The Finns simply adored SVT-40 and considered criticism of this rifle undeserved. And they were very surprised that the USSR, having such a wonderful rifle, did not continue to rearm its army during the war. Those soldiers who were not too lazy to monitor their weapons spoke well of the SVT. SVT was also adored at SHISBR
  16. 0
    5 September 2013 16: 45
    Quote: wih
    The Finns simply adored SVT-40 and considered criticism of this rifle undeserved. And they were very surprised that the USSR, having such a wonderful rifle, did not continue to rearm its army during the war.

    Here is a label from the NIPSVO Reliability Report ...
    1. Jeka
      +1
      5 September 2013 16: 52
      An interesting photo, but let's remember that the German G-43 and the Belgian FN FAL assault rifle use the SVT-40 automatics and, with some refinement, could be used as the main red army rifle. in the 60s, the SVT-40 came to the United States (the Finns sold it to them) and very flattering about this rifle, the only minor minus in the opinion of U.S. experts is the store that stands behind the box (remember Garand, but the charging system there is quite controversial).
  17. +1
    5 September 2013 17: 13
    Quote: Avenger711
    Plus, in conditions of total war, the role of personal infantry weapons is insignificant compared to artillery.

    Well, if 35% of those killed by the rifleman and 42% of the wounded are insignificant ...
    1. Avenger711
      -2
      5 September 2013 18: 33
      I have information about 80% of all artillery losses. Plus bullet wounds inflict the same numerous combat vehicles on which machine guns are installed.
  18. +1
    5 September 2013 17: 51
    And for the mass saturation of "bullets per kilometer of the front" in the course of the war, other types of automatic weapons were used - submachine guns (PPSh, PPS).
    Do not forget about PPD arr. 1934/38/40 fellow
  19. +1
    5 September 2013 17: 51
    L. B. Vannikov (People's Commissar of Armaments) wrote in his book "Notes of the People's Commissar" that the Tokarev rifle was inferior in many respects to the Simonov rifle, but during tests the Simonov rifle broke the striker, and this tipped the scales in favor of the Tokarev rifle. They write that the fact that Stalin knew Tokarev well, and the name of Simonov said little to him, also played a significant role in the adoption of the SVT.
    Perhaps if Simonov were given the opportunity to modify his model, then they would have adopted the SHS. True, many developments on SHS were implemented by Simonov in the SCS.
  20. +1
    5 September 2013 19: 40
    Quote: Avenger711
    A three-line three-line, but in addition to the cost in rubles, it would be nice to estimate how much the deployment of new industries could cost.

    Not much. For they did not have time to roll it.
    Quote: Avenger711
    If PCA can be produced in the notorious bed workshops,

    Must not produce it. Stupidly there is no fiber for the shock absorber. And SVT and three at this time are produced by the stream.
    Quote: Avenger711
    In general, Isaev is absolutely right that this weapon is nothing more than an ersatz,

    Neither in general nor in part Isaev is right. PCA was not a replacement for the SVT, it was a completely independent weapon and the tactics of its use are clearly described in the order of the People’s Commissar of Defense. No self-loading is capable of this in principle.
    Quote: Avenger711
    and the Germans almost put a bolt on the submachine guns.

    A million of their MP-38/40 and a bunch of captured software ... a good bolt!
    1. Avenger711
      -1
      6 September 2013 02: 02
      They managed to collapse, but the equipment was clearly left, only this equipment has more definitions. you won’t produce quantities and you need to build a new plant.

      By the 42nd, the SVT had not really been produced, they fought because three warehouses remained in the warehouses.

      A million MP compared to 10 million Mauser rifles is nothing more than a bolt.

      The tactics of use are determined by the very fact of the presence of weapons, and not vice versa. In general, I have Isaev’s book both in paper form and in electronic form. He does not discuss the issue of what and what was replaced there, although no, he gives armament to the Finns, who, at the expense of the military, tried to compensate for the lack of machine guns. Isaev merely states the fact that before the war the submachine gun was everywhere considered an auxiliary weapon, and the Germans essentially remained such, they generally went for an intermediate cartridge. It simply states the fact of the spread of PCA with a fair assessment of this phenomenon as negative and compelled. By the way, he mentions the company of machine gunners, but 2 companies per regiment, this does not seem to solve.
    2. +2
      6 September 2013 12: 59
      million infantry regiments for the 9-million-strong army - this is the only commander of the squad; the remaining soldiers with carbines
  21. The comment was deleted.
  22. smiths xnumx
    +1
    5 September 2013 22: 21
    The Tokarev self-loading rifle is a successful example of small arms, which, with proper care, exhibits good combat qualities. Tokarev rifle arr. 1940 took one of the first places in the world among self-loading rifles in simplicity, reliability and lightness (for example, the SVT-40 is lighter than the M1 Garand). The German self-loading rifle G43 (W) had a similar SVT system for removing powder gases.
    According to pre-war plans, in 1941 it was planned to produce 1,8 million military units, in 1942 - 2 million. By the beginning of the war more than 1 million military units had been manufactured, and many units and formations of the first line, mainly in the western military districts, received a regular number of self-loading rifles . In 1942, their production, however, amounted to only 264 thousand (and 14,2 thousand sniper rifles). Production was discontinued by order of T-bills in 1945.
    Amid the military defeats of 1941-1942, the evacuation of industry, the lack of qualified personnel and the growing needs of the front for weapons, this was completely unacceptable, and its production had to be abandoned in favor of much simpler and cheaper models - a store rifle and submachine guns. In addition, like any automatic weapon, the SVT required more careful care and careful handling than a regular rifle (therefore, the SVT remained in service with the naval units, where more technically competent fighters were called up). It was difficult to quickly train these skills in a huge number of wartime recruits, often never having to deal with sophisticated equipment. Most of the troops in the SVT troops were lost in 1941-1942.
    In addition, she retained all the flaws inherent in a self-loading rifle. In reports from the fronts of World War II, it was noted that “both self-loading (SVT-40) and automatic (AVT-40) rifles are not used in combat conditions, which the troops explain by the complexity of the design, the lack of reliability and accuracy of self-loading and automatic rifles." Due to the noted shortcomings, the production of self-loading rifles of the Tokarev system since 1942 has sharply decreased. If in 1941, 1031861 rifles were produced, then in 1942 only 264148. In those same years, 34782 and 14210 pieces were made of sniper rifles, respectively.
    Rivals:
    SVT-40

    M1 "Garand"

    G43 (W)

  23. +3
    6 September 2013 06: 31
    The tactics of use are determined by the very fact of the presence of weapons, and not vice versa.


    Dear Avenger711, let me disagree with you. During the WWII, the warring countries made sure that sitting in the trenches and quietly firing from powerful and accurate rifles with manual reloading of enemies at long distances (meanwhile, relying mainly on artillery) was unpromising. According to the Soviet concept, the fighting should have been in the form of a blitzkrieg - a quick maneuver war (even managed to fight in this way - the conflict on the CER). And here a small snag arises: first, when breaking through the enemy’s defenses, and then during the fun, situations often arise in his rear where the sides collide very close. In such a situation, the advantage will be on the side that will have available soldiers equipped with compact individual weapons of high rate of fire. This is not a machine gun - the machine gun is not a compact and not an individual weapon. This is not a rifle - it is not compact. Need a machine gun or submachine gun. The assault rifle is, of course, better, but the Fedorov assault rifle mentioned in the article was too expensive and unreliable, the STG-44 appeared in the army no earlier than 1943, and was also expensive (even its production was prohibited), so, in fact, the first assault rifle was adopted in 1949
    Thus, a submachine gun remains. Personal protective equipment was an exception at that time, so there was enough pistol bullet for close combat. You could not fight at medium distances - yes, this is really a minus. But no one even says that all the soldiers were armed with submachine guns: in reality, the Mosin rifle was the most massive weapon of the Red Army, and no one canceled the support machine guns.
    Based on the foregoing: if at close range two opponents clash, one of which will have rifles and machine guns, and the other will have the same plus submachine guns, it’s clear who will have the advantage. By the way, the Finnish campaign, in which they sat not in the trenches, but stormed the fortifications, showed the need for a compact individual rapid-fire weapon.
    By the way, historically, the Russians, although they never disdained the distant one, always loved to break the distance and engage in close combat: from the bayonet battle of Suvorov to the horse battle in the conflict on the CER, when the Soviet cavalry with drafts turned out to be more effective than the Chinese with revolvers).
    And with all the positive aspects of the SVT-40, you don’t use it instead of a submachine gun: well, you won’t let go of it for a long time in a trench or a house. The SVT-40 was supposed to replace the Mosin rifle in the army, but was more expensive to manufacture. As for its complexity: I personally do not think that the soldiers of the Red Army could not master it. They could, but like any complex weapon, any soldier needed more maintenance time and more repair costs in the event of a malfunction. They probably thought it was cheaper to rivet and contain three-rulers. A rifle and a submachine gun were regular individual weapons of the Red Army in parallel.

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