His name is "doubt."
At first glance, all is well. Brigades of constant readiness of the Ground Forces will be equipped with automated command and control systems, which "double their combat potential." Experimental development by leaps and bounds go to mass production, senior officers of the Ministry of Defense, responsible for the development and implementation of automated systems in the troops, in one voice with the developers of such systems declare the success of the next tests and make optimistic forecasts. Commanders of lower rank, who were fortunate enough to exploit prototypes of such systems, memorized phrases declare “on camera” that it will be better to live with such systems, and to make war more fun.
That's just all those officials who are involved in the development and testing of these systems, with rare unanimity, avoid answering questions concerning not the prospects for the development of ACCS, but the CURRENT state of affairs with them. They also shy away from voicing REAL indicators achieved through the use of samples, complexes and systems in the troops, which “in the very near future” are planned to be mass-supplied to the troops.
A military secret?
Doubt about the reliability of information regarding the true (and not declared) state of ACCS begins to seize for two reasons:
1. Complete lack of information on specific achievements in terms of meeting the most important criterion of the appropriateness of using an automated command and control system — shortening the combat command cycle.
2. Permanent postponement of the adoption of the results of one or another R & D on the automation of troop control.
But indeed, ten years have passed since the formation of the “Constellation” concern, the main purpose of which was to create the Unified Tactical Unit Management System (UES TK). Combining, so to speak, “under unified command”, within the framework of a single OCD, heterogeneous and scattered at the time elements of the automation of the armed forces, already existing in the army (as well as in the form of experimental developments).
And almost a year since the visit of Prime Minister V.V. Putin’s visit to Voronezh, devoted to the problem of automating the management of military structures, during which the leaders of the concern and senior officials of the Ministry of Defense promised that in the fall the 2M constellation system would be brought “up to standard”.
At the same time, in just ten years of work, about a trillion rubles was spent for these purposes. Of these, only this year - four billion.
"Where is the money, Zin?"
In November, 2010 of the year in Alabino near Moscow, on the basis of the 5 base of the 20 Army of the Western Military District, a command and staff research exercise was conducted using the ESU TZ Sozvezdie complex. To the public, this teaching was presented as the final event at the completion of the ROC on the topic “Constellation”. And at the end of November - during the gathering of the leadership team under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, elements of this exercise were also reproduced at the Gorokhovetsky training ground.
To show the current brigade commanders and their deputies.
So let's try to analyze the results of these activities from the point of view of these particular officials - the combined-arms commander and officers of the respective headquarters. That is, the very people who will operate ACCS (including the "Constellation - M", if adopted for service.
In order for the analysis to be as correct and “substantive” as possible, we try to consider the work of the commander and staff, say, a motorized rifle brigade equipped with an automated command and control system when it performs some specific combat mission.
So, the plan: the brigade being in the area of concentration receives the task of transition to defense and is preparing to conduct a defensive battle. For reasons of political correctness, we will not indicate an adversary. Let it be as “conditional” as possible.
Where does our brigade commander get information about upcoming actions? From the textual preliminary order of the superior staff. If this order is compiled correctly, then information about the area of the forthcoming combat operations of the brigade can be extracted from it. So, to prepare an appropriate topographical basis.
Our army headquarters have been using electronic maps of various sizes for more than ten years. All of them are represented by sets of files that reproduce individual sheets of paper topographic maps of the corresponding scale. Being properly “glued together” (which is done with the help of special software), these files (sheets) form a specific area used by the headquarters as a topographic basis on which various combat graphic documents — solutions, plans, etc. — are worked out.
What exactly are electronic card files currently used in the Russian Armed Forces? What are their features and differences from the well-known Google and Yandex maps? The fact is that electronic map files of the 2005 Map * .SXF format accepted for supplying the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (order of the Minister of Defense of 15 on July 2009 of the Russian Federation N 722) are exact copies of their paper counterparts - topographic maps of the General Staff publication . As for the nomenclature and scale, and the degree of detail of the displayed objects, as well as the year of publication (update).
That is, if on a military electronic map of scale, for example, 1: 500 000, a certain city is displayed with an orange polygon with a thin black border, then when you increase the scale (approaching the object by simply scrolling the mouse wheel), this polygon will simply increase in size. As, however, and all other map objects (roads, inscriptions, etc.). Without detailing of neighborhoods, streets and houses, as it is implemented in the mentioned Google, Yandex and the like "civilian" electronic maps.
This imperfection of electronic topographic material used by military structures leads to considerable difficulties in planning and control, since military authorities at different levels of the hierarchy are forced to use electronic maps of different scale (and therefore, in degree of detail).
In order to be able to carry out planning at one’s own level, as well as setting tasks and monitoring the implementation of these plans in subordinate structures located in the hierarchical “ladder” just one step below, each military command unit has to use at least two scales. electronic cards.
The General Staff uses 1: 1 000 000 and 1: 500 000 scale maps, military districts (operational and strategic command) headquarters - 1: 500 000 and 1: 200 000, army (operational command) - 1: OGNXXXNXXXNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNXXXNNXXXXNNXXXXNXXXNNXXXNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNXXXNNXXXNXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNXXXNXX200 000 1 100 etc:
Fig. 1 Image of the 1 scale map: 500 000 on the monitor screen
Fig. 2 Image of a fragment of the same map on a 1 scale: 50 000
In other words, in order to obtain detailed visual information about the area of the forthcoming operation, the state of the terrain and local objects, the commanders (commanders) and their headquarters are forced to simultaneously operate with several topographic areas of various scales. What makes it difficult to assess the terrain in preparation, and, especially - in the course of the operation (battle). But we are a little ahead. Let's return to our "virtual" brigade.
Fig. 3 Fragment of the 1 scale map: 100 000 is the main map used by the brigade commander and staff.
Fig. 4 Fragment of the 1 scale map: 50 000 - the main map used by the battalion (division) commanders
Fig. 5 Fragment of the 1 scale map: 25 000 - main map used by company and platoon commanders
At the moment (prior orders), the commander, chief of staff and chief of the topographic service of the brigade are forced to attend to the selection and “gluing” of not one, but several electronic areas of upcoming actions of different scale (Fig. 3-5).
That is, instead of using a “unified” topographic basis with a “through” image of terrain objects (in accordance with the chosen visualization scale), officers of our team are forced to use THRE different topographic areas of THREE of different scales. Differing degrees of detail, classifiers of displayed topographic objects, and (not least!) The year of publication of the original, i.e. printed by way of printing, sheets of topographic bases.
For example. in the above fragments of sheets (files) of electronic topographic maps, the dates of the shooting of the original topographic material are as follows: for the 1 scale map: 100 000 - 01.06.2006 of the year. The map scale is 1: 50 000 - 01.01.1996 of the year. As they say, “feel the difference.” In some sheets (files) of electronic topographic maps used in the troops, one can find such “rare” years of publication as 1992 and even 1986 years.
But that's not the point. Unfortunately, the vast territory of the Russian Federation has not yet been “digitized” on the scale of not only 1: 50 000, but even on the scale of 1: 100 000. But the normative accuracy of applying topographic signs (objects) in each map is rigidly tied to its scale. That is, the larger the scale of the map - the more accurate the application of objects.
In practice, this means that only the 1: 50 000 scale map meets the accuracy criterion for determining the coordinates established for the preparation of data for artillery firing. No sane artilleryman will determine the coordinates of firing positions and targets on the “weave” map, even enlarged to the scale of 1: 50 000 - in order to avoid firing at his troops. And the electronic "fifty" in the European part of Russia is currently "covered" with us, at best, combined-arms polygons and the Moscow region. Well, still the territory of the Chechen Republic and the adjacent areas. Also, a kind of "polygon". In the rest of the country, how are we going to shoot?
Let us assume, nevertheless, that all the sheets (files) of the required nomenclature and necessary scales are at the disposal of the brigade's top manager. And this officer is able to quickly create the corresponding areas from them. How will he give them to the performers? With the brigade headquarters - no questions.
And the units? From the command brigade to the most remote battalion battalion battalion (battalion) in the area where the brigade is concentrated, 25 and 30 kilometers can be. The size of the region file (* .map) of the 50 scale 000, consisting entirely of 8 sheets, ranges from 10 to 16 megabytes.
At the same time, as field tests have shown, the capabilities of the microwave stations with high carrying capacity used in the Sozvezdie-M complex are limited in range by three kilometers. Moreover, in the open area. Available in the complex digital radio stations VHF range have a bandwidth within 1,2 - 1,6 kilobits / second. That is, pumping files of this size via radio channels is very problematic. To drive officers of communication with flash drives on the command brigade? After all, the opportunity to lay a field cable from the command brigade to each KNP of battalions (divisions) and individual companies does not always exist.
Does it not turn out that the battalion commander will receive an electronic topographical basis of the battlefield after it is over?
2. Getting a combat mission
The commander of our "virtual brigade" can receive the combat mission for the transition to defense in various ways:
in a firm command voice of the senior commander (by telephone, or in person);
a package of textual documents (about 50 pages of А4 format in total), transmitted by telegraph, e-mail, or brought to the brigade by feldeger-postal service (liaison officer);
graphically (paper map, tracing paper, or electronic map layer).
The latter method is most preferable, as it allows the commander and headquarters to begin work on understanding the task immediately after receiving it without first deciphering and displaying the verbal constructions of textual documents on the map. The commander simply imposes the received electronic situation on his (electronic) card and immediately sees on the screen what the team should do.
How are things going with the transfer of the electronic graphic situation between the operational (army) and tactical (brigade) levels of control?
The 20 Army Management, to which 5 Omsbr is subordinate, is armed with the Acacia complex manufactured by the Moscow concern Systemprom. This complex allows you to work out the decision of the army commander (operational command) on an electronic map. Accordingly, the combat task of the subordinate brigade can also be framed as a graphic file. It is certainly possible to transfer to the brigade an electronic map layer worked out at the army headquarters, containing a graphic image of its combat mission, through the available communication channels.
There is only one small, “but.” In the “Acacia” complex, the graphic editor “Rokada”, developed in the “Systemprom” concern, is used to display the graphic situation. Naturally, the situation will be made in it.
And in the brigade, which has a complex of ESU TZ, a completely different editor of the graphic environment is used, which was created in the concern “Constellation”. It is impossible to open the file made in the army headquarters with the help of this editor, and, therefore, to see the brigade’s combat mission directly on the electronic map of the brigade commander.
Two different programs, understand? Which differ even in the PRINCIPLES of creating and displaying a graphic setting.
What to do?
If there is a terminal with loaded Rokada software from the Acacia complex in the brigade, the operating officers will have to manually transfer the situation from the screen of this terminal to the terminal screen of their own system. But so far there is no such computer with the “Rokada” installed on it in the brigade.
Option: again, manually display on the screen what is written in the textual combat order (combat disposal, preliminary combat disposal) received from the army headquarters.
Otherwise it does not work out yet.
3. Assessment of the situation.
After clarification of the combat mission, the assessment of the situation begins at the brigade headquarters. During the assessment, the commander draws conclusions, which, in fact, are elements of the battle plan. In order to evaluate quickly and at the same time, the work is distributed among the management and staff officers who work in parallel — that is, the evaluation of the enemy is made by the head of intelligence, his troops - the head of the operations department, the assessment of the state of the terrain - the head of the engineering service, etc. For each assessment point, they draw conclusions and report to their commander at the appointed time.
Stop. Who established? How do officials know when the commander will hear them? And how much time is allocated for each report?
To this end, immediately after receiving the combat mission, a small but very important document — the timing of the time — is made by the chief of staff (or, on his instructions, by the chief of the operational unit). In which it is determined who, what, when and in what sequence, reports to the commander, how much time is allotted for working out a solution, how much for planning the battle, when combat orders should be given to troops, etc. In accordance with this calculation, the whole work of preparing the battle is organized. On the basis of the calculation of time, a schedule for the work of the brigade’s management, a schedule for preparing the brigade for combat, and a personal work plan for the commander during this preparation are compiled (specified) All these documents must be interdependent on time and activities. High-quality processing of these documents is the key to the management coherence.
At the same time, the order of work of the brigade’s management in preparing it for the main tactical actions is determined by charters and instructions, and, therefore, is known in advance. And I must succumb to algorithmization!
It would seem that there is room for automation of management processes!
However, in the Sozvezdiya-M software complex, the automation of work on creating, specifying and communicating to officials of these most important organizational documents is not provided.
There are no such programs. Unfortunately.
Take a pencil, comrade boss, and manually-manually! At best, the above documents will be executed using software such as “Office” or “Open Office”. In short, the American company “Microsoft” in this regard has so far made for automation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation a little more than the Russian concern “Constellation”.
4. The idea.
In accordance with the principles of organizing work on the PU, the commander of our virtual brigade can choose several “work styles” when defining the plan and making a decision. However, the main, and most frequently used, is the following.
The commander, based on the understanding of the task, the assessment of the situation and the preliminary calculations carried out by the headquarters, single-handedly determines the plan and works on the map, putting on it, (for example, as in our case - when going to defense) the following points:
1. Direction of concentration of main efforts (NOCS).
2. Areas (areas) areas on which the stability of the defense depends.
3. The outline of the forward position, the leading edge, the trenches and the position of the second and third positions
4. Inscription cut-off positions.
5. The frontiers and directions of counterattacks, etc.
In short, all that in the staff jargon is called "red" and forms the general military basis of the plan. In essence, this is a “draft” of the plan.
Based on the standards for the development of the plan in the management of the team, no more than 20-25 minutes should be spent directly on the work of mapping these items.
At the same time, the sooner the commander brings the data to the first persons (his deputies and chiefs of arms and services), the faster, more consistently and better will be their proposals on the specific use of subordinate units of the arms and special forces, as well as the support units.
At the same time, it is IMPORTANT that NRViS would receive this data at the same time! After receiving the "draft plan" they can begin work on the preparation of their proposals.
Without automation, the process of determining the concept fell into successive operations, since it was physically impossible to make ten cripples at the same time. And it greatly slowed down the work.
Example for explanation:
In order to place an artillery group on the ground (i.e., the artillery commander to prepare the appropriate proposals to the commander), it is necessary to know the NOCS. Tracing general part of the plan of the chief of artillery.
Further. Without knowing WHERE the main MTA grouping will be placed it is impossible to determine the positions of the air defense weapons. Tracing of the combined-arms part of the plan + tracing from the map of the chief of artillery - to the chief of the air defense.
Without knowing the positions of artillery and air defense it is impossible to determine the routes for the delivery of missiles and ammunition to them. Tracing of the combined-arms part of the plan + tracing paper from the map of the chief of artillery + tracing paper from the map of the air defense chief to the deputy for armament.
Thus, as long as the commander does not “draw the red,” and the bosses one after another (that is, consistently transmitting graphic information about their proposals to each other) do not draw them on the commander’s card, the design will not be displayed in the volume necessary for further work. This means that the headquarters will not be able to prepare preliminary combat orders for the units.
Conclusion: in the course of work on the definition of the concept with the manual control method, there are three “bottlenecks”:
displaying the general part of the plan on a map and transmitting this graphic information to the deputy commanders and heads of the arms and services;
mutual informing of deputies and heads of arms of services and services about the graphic part of each other's proposals;
transfer of graphic information approved by the commander on the proposals of deputies and NRViS, as well as its display on the commander’s work card.
In the case of organizing the work of control with the use of automated control systems, the problem of fast (draft) display of the combined-arms part of the plan, in our opinion, should be solved by using an interactive whiteboard on which the commander of the electronic felt-tip pen personally puts the elements of the plan. Even if the plan at the same time will not look beautiful. So far this is only a “draft”.
The problem of the exchange and mutual coordination of graphic information between the commander and officials involved in work at this stage should be resolved as follows: the situation applied to the electronic map from any computer (including the commander himself using a felt-tip pen and an interactive whiteboard) SIMULTANEOUSLY displayed on all computers of these officials.
Those. The principle of multi-user access to the file (layers) of the situation should be implemented. Of course, with the appropriate delineation of user rights, in which everyone has the right to see all layers, but can only apply the situation in the layers assigned to him for work, without the ability to change the situation in the "neighbor" layer. The commander, of course, must have the right to make changes in any layer.
It should look like this (Fig. 6):
Fig. 6. Organization of multi-user access to the electronic card file
That is, in the presence of an automation complex, after the personal work of the commander using an interactive whiteboard and saving the drawing drawn by him personally in a file to which multi-user access is realized, the DRAFT (its combined-arms component) automatically and simultaneously must be communicated to subordinates involved in working on it stage. And in the most “easily digestible” - i.e. graphic form. At the same time, time is not spent not only on tracing paper, but also on the “beautiful” display of the general military part of the idea by the operators using a graphic editor. They will be able to "bring beauty" later - in parallel with the work of the commander with NRViS by definition design, in part regarding the branches of troops and services and fire destruction.
As a result, after the personal work on the map, the commander sees on the screen how the chiefs of the arms of services and services impose their proposals on the “draft”, and during a video conference he hears their textual part. The deputies of the commander and the heads of the branches of the armed forces and services simultaneously receive a “draft” of the plan, and also see all the details of the situation in their workplaces as they are applied by the “neighbors”. At the same time, operators working directly with the commander using the tools of a graphic editor turn his “scribbles” into readable “cilia” and “arrows”. The commander approves the proposals of NRV and C as they are considered in accordance with the calculation of time.
Everything. The idea is defined. You can report to the senior officer.
But it is - ideally.
How is it really?
Fig. 7. The commander of 5 OMSBR during the brigade research KSHU using the ESU TZ "Constellation". In the hands of the control tool - a wooden pointer
The developers of the ESU TZ naively believed that the modern brigade commander would personally use the program of the graphic editor. I dare to assure them that for many reasons, he will not do this. Neither now nor in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, the combined-arms part of the plan will be plotted onto the electronic map by operators using a graphical editor. Naturally, on the instructions of the commander. Wooden pointer. As there is no interactive board and corresponding software for maximally simplifying and speeding up the personal work of the commander on the electronic map in the ESU.
The principle of multi-user access to the file of the brigade commander’s card is also not implemented in the ESU TZ software. What forces the commander and brigade management officials to exchange e-mails with the attachment of their environments (in fact, the same tracing paper) as they are created. That is, in fact, the same sequential algorithm of work is implemented, only with the replacement of cripples with electronic files. That artificially inhibits the work of the management team.
There is no such type of connection as video conferencing. Even between brigade management officials.
If we add to the above the fact that the capabilities of the graphical editor used in the system do not allow to fully display all the tactical signs provided for by the statutes and manuals, and the officers who operate the complex are unable to create the icons missing in the classifier themselves, then the quality of the display of the commander’s idea on the electronic the card remains open.
Besides. To display on the electronic map the decision of the brigade commander, due to the imperfection of the graphic editor, will take two to three times more time than if you make the same solution “manually” on a usual paper topogram.
Thus, for example, the combination of five tactical signs depicted in the 8 picture, which in general terms indicates a motorized rifle battalion in defense, (without reference to the terrain) takes 1 minutes 10 seconds. Signs were put by a trained operator - a teacher of 732 of the Center for the combat use of ACCS of the Ground Forces.
Fig. 8. Motorized rifle battalion in defense.
The combination of three tactical signs depicted in Figure 9, denoting the combined control point of the motorized rifle brigade and the anti-aircraft division in the region (also without a specific reference to the terrain) requires 1 minutes 20 seconds.
Fig. 9. Combined control point of a motorized rifle brigade and an anti-aircraft division in the area.
Drawing a tactical mark indicating tank offensive unit (Fig. 10) - 37 seconds.
Fig. 10. Tank unit leading offensive.
At the same time, the graphical solution of the brigade commander in full defense in defense can consist of tactical signs (objects) from 1500 to 2500. If we assume that an average of 30 seconds is spent on one mark (object), then the minimum total time for putting the solution on an electronic card will be 12,5 hours (without taking into account the time it takes to link the signs to the terrain). "It will be a bit much, however!"
The imperfection of the algorithms used and used in the ESU TZ complex is also noted by the Chief of Staff of 20 Army of the Western Military District, Hero of Russia Colonel M.Yu. Teplinsky, who led the preparation and conduct of the research KSH with the 5 ombsbr in Alabino:
“During the exercise, we set the task, not to understand the expediency of the decisions made, not to apply the situation in full, but to CHECK THE PASSAGE OF INFORMATION. Namely, because knowing the capabilities of a graphic editor, and a classifier of tactical signs, to talk about drawing the situation in the “on-line” mode is to doom yourself to the absence of any result.
In order to inflict a motorized rifle squad - these are six elementary marks: a combat vehicle, a position, a direct signature to make "1 mo," and uncover the enemy in front of him, that is, a blue dash and sign that it is a motorized infantry platoon - six signs - make about thirty two mouse clicks. We win by the time of information transfer, but we lose by the time of its processing.
Therefore. Prior to the exercise, templates were made, in accordance with which the work of the brigade management was carried out. The templating was: provisions, decisions, actions. And in the course of the teachings of the very patterns were mapped, stretched, transferred, corrected, etc. "