Military Review

ACCS: Unanswered Questions (part of 1)

56
When reading triumphant reports about our achievements in the field of automating the control of troops (especially land forces, especially at the tactical level), which have recently appeared massively in the military and near-war press, you feel, besides a sense of pride in our country and its military-industrial complex some strange feeling.


His name is "doubt."

At first glance, all is well. Brigades of constant readiness of the Ground Forces will be equipped with automated command and control systems, which "double their combat potential." Experimental development by leaps and bounds go to mass production, senior officers of the Ministry of Defense, responsible for the development and implementation of automated systems in the troops, in one voice with the developers of such systems declare the success of the next tests and make optimistic forecasts. Commanders of lower rank, who were fortunate enough to exploit prototypes of such systems, memorized phrases declare “on camera” that it will be better to live with such systems, and to make war more fun.

That's just all those officials who are involved in the development and testing of these systems, with rare unanimity, avoid answering questions concerning not the prospects for the development of ACCS, but the CURRENT state of affairs with them. They also shy away from voicing REAL indicators achieved through the use of samples, complexes and systems in the troops, which “in the very near future” are planned to be mass-supplied to the troops.

A military secret?

Doubt about the reliability of information regarding the true (and not declared) state of ACCS begins to seize for two reasons:

1. Complete lack of information on specific achievements in terms of meeting the most important criterion of the appropriateness of using an automated command and control system — shortening the combat command cycle.

2. Permanent postponement of the adoption of the results of one or another R & D on the automation of troop control.

But indeed, ten years have passed since the formation of the “Constellation” concern, the main purpose of which was to create the Unified Tactical Unit Management System (UES TK). Combining, so to speak, “under unified command”, within the framework of a single OCD, heterogeneous and scattered at the time elements of the automation of the armed forces, already existing in the army (as well as in the form of experimental developments).

And almost a year since the visit of Prime Minister V.V. Putin’s visit to Voronezh, devoted to the problem of automating the management of military structures, during which the leaders of the concern and senior officials of the Ministry of Defense promised that in the fall the 2M constellation system would be brought “up to standard”.

At the same time, in just ten years of work, about a trillion rubles was spent for these purposes. Of these, only this year - four billion.

"Where is the money, Zin?"

In November, 2010 of the year in Alabino near Moscow, on the basis of the 5 base of the 20 Army of the Western Military District, a command and staff research exercise was conducted using the ESU TZ Sozvezdie complex. To the public, this teaching was presented as the final event at the completion of the ROC on the topic “Constellation”. And at the end of November - during the gathering of the leadership team under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, elements of this exercise were also reproduced at the Gorokhovetsky training ground.

To show the current brigade commanders and their deputies.

So let's try to analyze the results of these activities from the point of view of these particular officials - the combined-arms commander and officers of the respective headquarters. That is, the very people who will operate ACCS (including the "Constellation - M", if adopted for service.

1. Cards

In order for the analysis to be as correct and “substantive” as possible, we try to consider the work of the commander and staff, say, a motorized rifle brigade equipped with an automated command and control system when it performs some specific combat mission.

So, the plan: the brigade being in the area of ​​concentration receives the task of transition to defense and is preparing to conduct a defensive battle. For reasons of political correctness, we will not indicate an adversary. Let it be as “conditional” as possible.

Where does our brigade commander get information about upcoming actions? From the textual preliminary order of the superior staff. If this order is compiled correctly, then information about the area of ​​the forthcoming combat operations of the brigade can be extracted from it. So, to prepare an appropriate topographical basis.

Our army headquarters have been using electronic maps of various sizes for more than ten years. All of them are represented by sets of files that reproduce individual sheets of paper topographic maps of the corresponding scale. Being properly “glued together” (which is done with the help of special software), these files (sheets) form a specific area used by the headquarters as a topographic basis on which various combat graphic documents — solutions, plans, etc. — are worked out.

What exactly are electronic card files currently used in the Russian Armed Forces? What are their features and differences from the well-known Google and Yandex maps? The fact is that electronic map files of the 2005 Map * .SXF format accepted for supplying the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (order of the Minister of Defense of 15 on July 2009 of the Russian Federation N 722) are exact copies of their paper counterparts - topographic maps of the General Staff publication . As for the nomenclature and scale, and the degree of detail of the displayed objects, as well as the year of publication (update).

That is, if on a military electronic map of scale, for example, 1: 500 000, a certain city is displayed with an orange polygon with a thin black border, then when you increase the scale (approaching the object by simply scrolling the mouse wheel), this polygon will simply increase in size. As, however, and all other map objects (roads, inscriptions, etc.). Without detailing of neighborhoods, streets and houses, as it is implemented in the mentioned Google, Yandex and the like "civilian" electronic maps.

This imperfection of electronic topographic material used by military structures leads to considerable difficulties in planning and control, since military authorities at different levels of the hierarchy are forced to use electronic maps of different scale (and therefore, in degree of detail).

In order to be able to carry out planning at one’s own level, as well as setting tasks and monitoring the implementation of these plans in subordinate structures located in the hierarchical “ladder” just one step below, each military command unit has to use at least two scales. electronic cards.

The General Staff uses 1: 1 000 000 and 1: 500 000 scale maps, military districts (operational and strategic command) headquarters - 1: 500 000 and 1: 200 000, army (operational command) - 1: OGNXXXNXXXNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNXXXNNXXXXNNXXXXNXXXNNXXXNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNXXXNNXXXNXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNNXXXNXXXNXX200 000 1 100 etc:

ACCS: Unanswered Questions (part of 1)

Fig. 1 Image of the 1 scale map: 500 000 on the monitor screen


Fig. 2 Image of a fragment of the same map on a 1 scale: 50 000

In other words, in order to obtain detailed visual information about the area of ​​the forthcoming operation, the state of the terrain and local objects, the commanders (commanders) and their headquarters are forced to simultaneously operate with several topographic areas of various scales. What makes it difficult to assess the terrain in preparation, and, especially - in the course of the operation (battle). But we are a little ahead. Let's return to our "virtual" brigade.


Fig. 3 Fragment of the 1 scale map: 100 000 is the main map used by the brigade commander and staff.


Fig. 4 Fragment of the 1 scale map: 50 000 - the main map used by the battalion (division) commanders


Fig. 5 Fragment of the 1 scale map: 25 000 - main map used by company and platoon commanders

At the moment (prior orders), the commander, chief of staff and chief of the topographic service of the brigade are forced to attend to the selection and “gluing” of not one, but several electronic areas of upcoming actions of different scale (Fig. 3-5).

That is, instead of using a “unified” topographic basis with a “through” image of terrain objects (in accordance with the chosen visualization scale), officers of our team are forced to use THRE different topographic areas of THREE of different scales. Differing degrees of detail, classifiers of displayed topographic objects, and (not least!) The year of publication of the original, i.e. printed by way of printing, sheets of topographic bases.

For example. in the above fragments of sheets (files) of electronic topographic maps, the dates of the shooting of the original topographic material are as follows: for the 1 scale map: 100 000 - 01.06.2006 of the year. The map scale is 1: 50 000 - 01.01.1996 of the year. As they say, “feel the difference.” In some sheets (files) of electronic topographic maps used in the troops, one can find such “rare” years of publication as 1992 and even 1986 years.

But that's not the point. Unfortunately, the vast territory of the Russian Federation has not yet been “digitized” on the scale of not only 1: 50 000, but even on the scale of 1: 100 000. But the normative accuracy of applying topographic signs (objects) in each map is rigidly tied to its scale. That is, the larger the scale of the map - the more accurate the application of objects.

In practice, this means that only the 1: 50 000 scale map meets the accuracy criterion for determining the coordinates established for the preparation of data for artillery firing. No sane artilleryman will determine the coordinates of firing positions and targets on the “weave” map, even enlarged to the scale of 1: 50 000 - in order to avoid firing at his troops. And the electronic "fifty" in the European part of Russia is currently "covered" with us, at best, combined-arms polygons and the Moscow region. Well, still the territory of the Chechen Republic and the adjacent areas. Also, a kind of "polygon". In the rest of the country, how are we going to shoot?

Let us assume, nevertheless, that all the sheets (files) of the required nomenclature and necessary scales are at the disposal of the brigade's top manager. And this officer is able to quickly create the corresponding areas from them. How will he give them to the performers? With the brigade headquarters - no questions.

And the units? From the command brigade to the most remote battalion battalion battalion (battalion) in the area where the brigade is concentrated, 25 and 30 kilometers can be. The size of the region file (* .map) of the 50 scale 000, consisting entirely of 8 sheets, ranges from 10 to 16 megabytes.

At the same time, as field tests have shown, the capabilities of the microwave stations with high carrying capacity used in the Sozvezdie-M complex are limited in range by three kilometers. Moreover, in the open area. Available in the complex digital radio stations VHF range have a bandwidth within 1,2 - 1,6 kilobits / second. That is, pumping files of this size via radio channels is very problematic. To drive officers of communication with flash drives on the command brigade? After all, the opportunity to lay a field cable from the command brigade to each KNP of battalions (divisions) and individual companies does not always exist.

Does it not turn out that the battalion commander will receive an electronic topographical basis of the battlefield after it is over?

2. Getting a combat mission

The commander of our "virtual brigade" can receive the combat mission for the transition to defense in various ways:

in a firm command voice of the senior commander (by telephone, or in person);

a package of textual documents (about 50 pages of А4 format in total), transmitted by telegraph, e-mail, or brought to the brigade by feldeger-postal service (liaison officer);

graphically (paper map, tracing paper, or electronic map layer).

The latter method is most preferable, as it allows the commander and headquarters to begin work on understanding the task immediately after receiving it without first deciphering and displaying the verbal constructions of textual documents on the map. The commander simply imposes the received electronic situation on his (electronic) card and immediately sees on the screen what the team should do.

How are things going with the transfer of the electronic graphic situation between the operational (army) and tactical (brigade) levels of control?

Not yet.

The 20 Army Management, to which 5 Omsbr is subordinate, is armed with the Acacia complex manufactured by the Moscow concern Systemprom. This complex allows you to work out the decision of the army commander (operational command) on an electronic map. Accordingly, the combat task of the subordinate brigade can also be framed as a graphic file. It is certainly possible to transfer to the brigade an electronic map layer worked out at the army headquarters, containing a graphic image of its combat mission, through the available communication channels.

There is only one small, “but.” In the “Acacia” complex, the graphic editor “Rokada”, developed in the “Systemprom” concern, is used to display the graphic situation. Naturally, the situation will be made in it.

And in the brigade, which has a complex of ESU TZ, a completely different editor of the graphic environment is used, which was created in the concern “Constellation”. It is impossible to open the file made in the army headquarters with the help of this editor, and, therefore, to see the brigade’s combat mission directly on the electronic map of the brigade commander.

Two different programs, understand? Which differ even in the PRINCIPLES of creating and displaying a graphic setting.

What to do?

If there is a terminal with loaded Rokada software from the Acacia complex in the brigade, the operating officers will have to manually transfer the situation from the screen of this terminal to the terminal screen of their own system. But so far there is no such computer with the “Rokada” installed on it in the brigade.

Option: again, manually display on the screen what is written in the textual combat order (combat disposal, preliminary combat disposal) received from the army headquarters.

Otherwise it does not work out yet.

3. Assessment of the situation.

After clarification of the combat mission, the assessment of the situation begins at the brigade headquarters. During the assessment, the commander draws conclusions, which, in fact, are elements of the battle plan. In order to evaluate quickly and at the same time, the work is distributed among the management and staff officers who work in parallel — that is, the evaluation of the enemy is made by the head of intelligence, his troops - the head of the operations department, the assessment of the state of the terrain - the head of the engineering service, etc. For each assessment point, they draw conclusions and report to their commander at the appointed time.

Stop. Who established? How do officials know when the commander will hear them? And how much time is allocated for each report?

To this end, immediately after receiving the combat mission, a small but very important document — the timing of the time — is made by the chief of staff (or, on his instructions, by the chief of the operational unit). In which it is determined who, what, when and in what sequence, reports to the commander, how much time is allotted for working out a solution, how much for planning the battle, when combat orders should be given to troops, etc. In accordance with this calculation, the whole work of preparing the battle is organized. On the basis of the calculation of time, a schedule for the work of the brigade’s management, a schedule for preparing the brigade for combat, and a personal work plan for the commander during this preparation are compiled (specified) All these documents must be interdependent on time and activities. High-quality processing of these documents is the key to the management coherence.

At the same time, the order of work of the brigade’s management in preparing it for the main tactical actions is determined by charters and instructions, and, therefore, is known in advance. And I must succumb to algorithmization!

It would seem that there is room for automation of management processes!

However, in the Sozvezdiya-M software complex, the automation of work on creating, specifying and communicating to officials of these most important organizational documents is not provided.

There are no such programs. Unfortunately.

Take a pencil, comrade boss, and manually-manually! At best, the above documents will be executed using software such as “Office” or “Open Office”. In short, the American company “Microsoft” in this regard has so far made for automation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation a little more than the Russian concern “Constellation”.

4. The idea.

In accordance with the principles of organizing work on the PU, the commander of our virtual brigade can choose several “work styles” when defining the plan and making a decision. However, the main, and most frequently used, is the following.

The commander, based on the understanding of the task, the assessment of the situation and the preliminary calculations carried out by the headquarters, single-handedly determines the plan and works on the map, putting on it, (for example, as in our case - when going to defense) the following points:

1. Direction of concentration of main efforts (NOCS).

2. Areas (areas) areas on which the stability of the defense depends.

3. The outline of the forward position, the leading edge, the trenches and the position of the second and third positions

4. Inscription cut-off positions.

5. The frontiers and directions of counterattacks, etc.

In short, all that in the staff jargon is called "red" and forms the general military basis of the plan. In essence, this is a “draft” of the plan.

Based on the standards for the development of the plan in the management of the team, no more than 20-25 minutes should be spent directly on the work of mapping these items.

At the same time, the sooner the commander brings the data to the first persons (his deputies and chiefs of arms and services), the faster, more consistently and better will be their proposals on the specific use of subordinate units of the arms and special forces, as well as the support units.

At the same time, it is IMPORTANT that NRViS would receive this data at the same time! After receiving the "draft plan" they can begin work on the preparation of their proposals.

Without automation, the process of determining the concept fell into successive operations, since it was physically impossible to make ten cripples at the same time. And it greatly slowed down the work.

Example for explanation:

In order to place an artillery group on the ground (i.e., the artillery commander to prepare the appropriate proposals to the commander), it is necessary to know the NOCS. Tracing general part of the plan of the chief of artillery.

Further. Without knowing WHERE the main MTA grouping will be placed it is impossible to determine the positions of the air defense weapons. Tracing of the combined-arms part of the plan + tracing from the map of the chief of artillery - to the chief of the air defense.

Without knowing the positions of artillery and air defense it is impossible to determine the routes for the delivery of missiles and ammunition to them. Tracing of the combined-arms part of the plan + tracing paper from the map of the chief of artillery + tracing paper from the map of the air defense chief to the deputy for armament.

Thus, as long as the commander does not “draw the red,” and the bosses one after another (that is, consistently transmitting graphic information about their proposals to each other) do not draw them on the commander’s card, the design will not be displayed in the volume necessary for further work. This means that the headquarters will not be able to prepare preliminary combat orders for the units.

Conclusion: in the course of work on the definition of the concept with the manual control method, there are three “bottlenecks”:

displaying the general part of the plan on a map and transmitting this graphic information to the deputy commanders and heads of the arms and services;

mutual informing of deputies and heads of arms of services and services about the graphic part of each other's proposals;

transfer of graphic information approved by the commander on the proposals of deputies and NRViS, as well as its display on the commander’s work card.

In the case of organizing the work of control with the use of automated control systems, the problem of fast (draft) display of the combined-arms part of the plan, in our opinion, should be solved by using an interactive whiteboard on which the commander of the electronic felt-tip pen personally puts the elements of the plan. Even if the plan at the same time will not look beautiful. So far this is only a “draft”.

The problem of the exchange and mutual coordination of graphic information between the commander and officials involved in work at this stage should be resolved as follows: the situation applied to the electronic map from any computer (including the commander himself using a felt-tip pen and an interactive whiteboard) SIMULTANEOUSLY displayed on all computers of these officials.

Those. The principle of multi-user access to the file (layers) of the situation should be implemented. Of course, with the appropriate delineation of user rights, in which everyone has the right to see all layers, but can only apply the situation in the layers assigned to him for work, without the ability to change the situation in the "neighbor" layer. The commander, of course, must have the right to make changes in any layer.

It should look like this (Fig. 6):


Fig. 6. Organization of multi-user access to the electronic card file

That is, in the presence of an automation complex, after the personal work of the commander using an interactive whiteboard and saving the drawing drawn by him personally in a file to which multi-user access is realized, the DRAFT (its combined-arms component) automatically and simultaneously must be communicated to subordinates involved in working on it stage. And in the most “easily digestible” - i.e. graphic form. At the same time, time is not spent not only on tracing paper, but also on the “beautiful” display of the general military part of the idea by the operators using a graphic editor. They will be able to "bring beauty" later - in parallel with the work of the commander with NRViS by definition design, in part regarding the branches of troops and services and fire destruction.

As a result, after the personal work on the map, the commander sees on the screen how the chiefs of the arms of services and services impose their proposals on the “draft”, and during a video conference he hears their textual part. The deputies of the commander and the heads of the branches of the armed forces and services simultaneously receive a “draft” of the plan, and also see all the details of the situation in their workplaces as they are applied by the “neighbors”. At the same time, operators working directly with the commander using the tools of a graphic editor turn his “scribbles” into readable “cilia” and “arrows”. The commander approves the proposals of NRV and C as they are considered in accordance with the calculation of time.

Everything. The idea is defined. You can report to the senior officer.

But it is - ideally.

How is it really?


Fig. 7. The commander of 5 OMSBR during the brigade research KSHU using the ESU TZ "Constellation". In the hands of the control tool - a wooden pointer

The developers of the ESU TZ naively believed that the modern brigade commander would personally use the program of the graphic editor. I dare to assure them that for many reasons, he will not do this. Neither now nor in the foreseeable future.

Consequently, the combined-arms part of the plan will be plotted onto the electronic map by operators using a graphical editor. Naturally, on the instructions of the commander. Wooden pointer. As there is no interactive board and corresponding software for maximally simplifying and speeding up the personal work of the commander on the electronic map in the ESU.

The principle of multi-user access to the file of the brigade commander’s card is also not implemented in the ESU TZ software. What forces the commander and brigade management officials to exchange e-mails with the attachment of their environments (in fact, the same tracing paper) as they are created. That is, in fact, the same sequential algorithm of work is implemented, only with the replacement of cripples with electronic files. That artificially inhibits the work of the management team.

There is no such type of connection as video conferencing. Even between brigade management officials.

If we add to the above the fact that the capabilities of the graphical editor used in the system do not allow to fully display all the tactical signs provided for by the statutes and manuals, and the officers who operate the complex are unable to create the icons missing in the classifier themselves, then the quality of the display of the commander’s idea on the electronic the card remains open.

Besides. To display on the electronic map the decision of the brigade commander, due to the imperfection of the graphic editor, will take two to three times more time than if you make the same solution “manually” on a usual paper topogram.

Thus, for example, the combination of five tactical signs depicted in the 8 picture, which in general terms indicates a motorized rifle battalion in defense, (without reference to the terrain) takes 1 minutes 10 seconds. Signs were put by a trained operator - a teacher of 732 of the Center for the combat use of ACCS of the Ground Forces.


Fig. 8. Motorized rifle battalion in defense.

The combination of three tactical signs depicted in Figure 9, denoting the combined control point of the motorized rifle brigade and the anti-aircraft division in the region (also without a specific reference to the terrain) requires 1 minutes 20 seconds.


Fig. 9. Combined control point of a motorized rifle brigade and an anti-aircraft division in the area.

Drawing a tactical mark indicating tank offensive unit (Fig. 10) - 37 seconds.


Fig. 10. Tank unit leading offensive.

At the same time, the graphical solution of the brigade commander in full defense in defense can consist of tactical signs (objects) from 1500 to 2500. If we assume that an average of 30 seconds is spent on one mark (object), then the minimum total time for putting the solution on an electronic card will be 12,5 hours (without taking into account the time it takes to link the signs to the terrain). "It will be a bit much, however!"

The imperfection of the algorithms used and used in the ESU TZ complex is also noted by the Chief of Staff of 20 Army of the Western Military District, Hero of Russia Colonel M.Yu. Teplinsky, who led the preparation and conduct of the research KSH with the 5 ombsbr in Alabino:

“During the exercise, we set the task, not to understand the expediency of the decisions made, not to apply the situation in full, but to CHECK THE PASSAGE OF INFORMATION. Namely, because knowing the capabilities of a graphic editor, and a classifier of tactical signs, to talk about drawing the situation in the “on-line” mode is to doom yourself to the absence of any result.

In order to inflict a motorized rifle squad - these are six elementary marks: a combat vehicle, a position, a direct signature to make "1 mo," and uncover the enemy in front of him, that is, a blue dash and sign that it is a motorized infantry platoon - six signs - make about thirty two mouse clicks. We win by the time of information transfer, but we lose by the time of its processing.

Therefore. Prior to the exercise, templates were made, in accordance with which the work of the brigade management was carried out. The templating was: provisions, decisions, actions. And in the course of the teachings of the very patterns were mapped, stretched, transferred, corrected, etc. "
Originator:
http://dragon-first-ru.livejournal.com/
Articles from this series:
ACCS: Unanswered Questions (part of 1)
ACCS: Unanswered Questions (part of 2)
ACCS: Unanswered Questions (last part of 3)
56 comments
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  1. corn
    corn 2 September 2013 08: 38
    0
    I didn’t really understand what was going on, about the commander’s working card or about some other document.
    1. aviamed90
      aviamed90 2 September 2013 10: 19
      +4
      corn

      It is about making a decision by the commander on the BD (the algorithm is given in the Battle Manuals of all levels) upon receipt of the base order. from a superior commander and staging of base troops subordinate commanders.

      From myself, I can add: the situation with ASUV and ASU aviation in the Air Force is the same, if not worse.

      And the article, of course - "+".

      Opinions, of course, may be different and the conclusions are ambiguous, but the topic is raised painful and very important.
      These are the issues worth discussing.
      1. Alez
        Alez 2 September 2013 12: 07
        0
        As for the wooden pointer, what can I say. In some parts, as I understand it, fathers EXEL table commanders on monitors manually draw with chalk or pencil, delete numbers with an eraser. Then they write a report, I ask you to send a new monitor, since the previous one has broken.
    2. svp67
      svp67 2 September 2013 10: 57
      0
      Quote: corn
      I didn’t really understand what was going on, about the commander’s working card or about some other document.
      Such a complex should provide everything for planning and maintaining operational documents ... This is where one more point of application of the efforts of "scientific companies of hackers" is - make a reliable and effective system and the Motherland, represented by commanders of all levels and staff workers, will not forget you. Each time they will remember "not an evil, kind word ...", and this is not enough. and how many lives it will help to save ...
      1. aviamed90
        aviamed90 2 September 2013 11: 09
        0
        svp67

        For this, there are corresponding research institutes (for aviation, for example, the Air Force Research Institute of the city of Noginsk).
        You just need to set them a specific task, finance and demand the result, and not engage in "Serdyukov's" business.

        And "scientific companies of hackers", in this sense, are just as useful for the RF Ministry of Defense as for the RF Ministry of Agriculture.
        The level of their competence in both the first and second cases is approximately the same.
      2. roial
        2 September 2013 11: 18
        +5
        This is where another point of application of the efforts of the "scientific mouth of hackers" - make a reliable and efficient system


        In order to make a "reliable and efficient system" you need at least an idea of ​​how it should work. Judging by the fact that the ACCS has been developed for 10 years, and neither the military nor the developers can find a common language, then this task will not be feasible for these guys (try to explain to an 18-year-old boy what principle of ACCS work).
        1. aviamed90
          aviamed90 2 September 2013 11: 37
          0
          roial

          Of course you're right.

          But ACCS also existed in the Soviet Army (for example, ACCS "Maneuver"). Of course, at that time it was an almost perfect system (in theory).
          But time passes, and this system (or its individual subsystems), as far as I know, is still in service. Or am I wrong?

          In 90, all this useful work slowly died - not before that.

          The principles of the construction and operation of an ASUV have long been developed, but the execution and degree of application in the troops ...

          I think so, at the present time, no one is dealing with this problem. Hence the "misunderstandings" between the military and the developers of ACCS.
          Nobody just gives them specific and clearly formulated TK. Therefore, they are forced to offer a product that is effective from their point of view and without taking into account the views of the military.
          They feel that, in theory, this technique should be in demand - that’s what they offer their vision of solving the problem.
          1. roial
            2 September 2013 12: 22
            +2
            It is in service - it does not mean that it is used. I had to dock with the "Maneuver" I will tell you that there is nothing perfect there, neither in theory nor in practice.
            I didn’t see the whole complex in action, but it worked tightly with the data transmission equipment, it is a block 50x25x40 cm in size. On the front panel a keyboard is folded under which there is a 20x5 cm board. And you type all the commands in one line (there is a limit on the number of characters) after pressing the enter button, the packet is shot on the air, on the receiving side of the codegram it came to the same set and the soldier, reading from the display, manually copied it into a notebook and carried it to the commander, in other words, a large pager.
            1. svp67
              svp67 2 September 2013 13: 12
              +1
              Quote: roial
              It is in service - this does not mean that it is used.

              This "Brontosaurus" is even very, very intensively used now in the Russian army, especially at the level of the district - division (brigade) and higher, since there is nothing else yet ... except experimental ones.
          2. Max otto
            Max otto 2 September 2013 13: 07
            0
            They cannot develop, because there is nobody. There are no military research institutes, everything has been outsourced (fu, what a nasty word), and only military specialists can develop an intelligent automated control system. No civilian will do what is needed, because they have all their lives in an office chair, just a worldview will not allow everything to be done as it should, well, he doesn’t imagine what kind of dick it is for. Yes, and probably no one can formulate an assignment from the military (I mean, from those who should do this). And here the scientific companies will not help, here the research institutes need to be formed.
            1. cdrt
              cdrt 3 September 2013 06: 34
              0
              Hmm ... the article, in my opinion, is just a copy ... ng from the Dragon blog of the first - an explicit request ... polymer.
              Although on the topic of ASUV it is apparently in the subject.
              If you believe him, then technical problems (in particular the use of an absolutely inappropriate GIS) is one side of the problem (by the way, it is precisely because of this part that doubts arise about its impartiality). The second problem is precisely that the military is not able to correctly set the task. Either you want a crop crop (combat Internet), then they begin to rave about the revolution (C4I on a tactical level), then they completely tear the cover - they want to replace the insufficient qualifications of the staff with a prompting system.
              In short - always, the fish begins to rot from the head. Which is sad, because Iraqi 2003 quite graphically showed how to speed up the decision-making cycle by winning the pace one by one to a state where the opponent simply has cereal in his head (i.e., paralysis in making adequate decisions due to the constant lag in information about the enemy, and his reaction to his actions).
        2. avdkrd
          avdkrd 3 September 2013 00: 25
          +1
          The problem with the cards and the system as a whole, as it seems to me, lies in the plane of cutting money and the elementary incompetence of both the contractor and the customer.
          To create a visualization, including all possible graphic icons, a satellite map combined with topographic designations even from the times of "Tsar Gorokh", not to mention the maps of the general staff of the Soviet era, is a task for the 4th-5th year of the mathematics department of any university. What is the problem to make a competition (the issue price is 100 thousand - 1 million rubles) among students, who with soul and spark will write 1000 options for such a combination and additional. a graphical editor in android and the same number of options for converting or simulating the operating system used in the ACCS.
          I can imagine how the task of plotting information about the enemy was solved - I probably can’t even talk about automation or just the operational introduction of data from reconnaissance and surveillance means.
          The order of the Minister of Defense of July 15, 2009 of the Russian Federation N 722 was probably something useful at that time, although hardly meaningful, but now 2013 - that the current minister does not have competent advisers and deputies to indicate the insanity of the situation? Is the developer satisfied with the unreality of the terms of reference? It’s the same as designing contemporary art. a gun with a bronze barrel .... A trillion rubles ....., it's just beyond good and evil.
          1. cdrt
            cdrt 3 September 2013 06: 40
            0
            I completely agree - a trillion delinquency ... is a limit.
            Although - I watched here close how such money is mastered. Real performers (usually small small regional IT companies with a skill level near the baseboard, but cheap) reach somewhere around 20% of the funds.
            The rest is deposited in the form of salaries and profits of holdings that are at the trough (by the way - it was this approach that essentially killed the ability to work competitively in all court IT holdings - AFC, NKA, Technoserv, IBS).
            But what students can easily write is not a problem in writing, it’s easy to find decent programmers. And in the organization of the project, or rather the architecture of the system, and in fact, in competent military directors. With this, apparently, quite a disaster. GIS is just a pretty small technical failure in architecture
            1. E.S.A.
              E.S.A. 16 June 2017 16: 35
              0
              Tell me, if instead of "drawing" you enter standard symbols (with graduation in service - NachArt uses its abbreviations, and NachInzh its own; with gradation in scale - the brigade headquarters can track the actions of battalions, companies and platoons, and the squads are already "not its scale, t .k. too many objects ") by the abbreviation (msr, pmb, pcb, etc.) - can the input system speed up the work?
        3. Mairos
          Mairos 3 September 2013 10: 22
          0
          Gold words. First, the military should attract sensible developers and plant them together with their analysts - at the exit, get a clear statement of work, where all the aspects are written down and only then start all sorts of tenders to develop such a topic
    3. AVV
      AVV 2 September 2013 12: 09
      0
      There are more problems than answers !!!
  2. Akim
    Akim 2 September 2013 08: 40
    0
    Thank you for the article! Yesterday with Lopatov There was a dispute about the loss of time, in the presence of an ASUV, for counter-battery fire. I did not continue the argument because there really should have been a voluminous answer. Here it is stated.
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 2 September 2013 10: 16
      +3
      I apologize, but I do not see a "voluminous answer" here. Do not forget that the ACS of artillery does not work with maps, not with graphic information. They work with target coordinates. And there are only three of them, XYh. Accordingly, even ancient automated control systems processed them quickly.
      You're talking about an incredible 10 minutes. Even without the use of automation tools, this is not a "two" result, this is a "minus 10" result. On a C grade in time it is 5 minutes during the day and 6 minutes at night.
      1. Akim
        Akim 2 September 2013 11: 02
        +2
        Uv. Lopatov. You are an artilleryman, I am a RAVist. And I know how what interacts well, because because of mutual dislike with the teacher, I twice sat on vacation on retake and my "three" is stronger in knowledge than the "five" classmates. The point here is not in maps or in information processing, but in the data transmission system at the brigade / regiment-battery link.
        1. aviamed90
          aviamed90 2 September 2013 11: 18
          +3
          Akim

          Theory is theory, but you need to start with the elemental base (which we don’t have) and domestic technologies. That is, from their development and production.
          But we won’t get much on Chinese components - we have to do our own thing.

          Otherwise, whatever we come up with, in the end the output with a high degree of probability will give "0", or even "-".
          1. Akim
            Akim 2 September 2013 11: 22
            +1
            Quote: aviamed90
            Theory - Theory

            So I say. In theory, counter-battery fire in the presence of ASUv can be applied after 1,5 minutes, but in practice it will be much longer, and without ASUv - let Lopatov tell me.
            1. Lopatov
              Lopatov 2 September 2013 11: 48
              +1
              In practice, when tested in Afghanistan, the military was outraged for 40 seconds. hardware delay introduced by developers. Without it, the system could work in almost real time.
          2. yanus
            yanus 2 September 2013 11: 57
            +3
            Quote: aviamed90
            Theory is theory, but you need to start with the elemental base (which we don’t have) and domestic technologies.

            In ASUV, the deductions are minimal; our base will still be enough.
            The article shows the most typical situation when the customer does not really need it (in civilian life it is usually "the boss strained"), and the performer saves on everything that is possible and impossible ("one fig will not be used").
            By the way, the article misses one point - "self-binding" of units. It always seemed to me that the subordinate units automatically send their coordinates and are automatically displayed on the map. The commander only has to right-click and select the required order for the subordinate unit.
            And then they put it on the card manually, some insanity. In fact, an electronic editor for maps, plus a built-in electronic. No automation ....
            1. aviamed90
              aviamed90 2 September 2013 12: 04
              0
              yanus

              In your opinion, the element base is needed only for performing calculations?
              These are not only microprocessors, but also much more.
              1. yanus
                yanus 2 September 2013 13: 00
                +3
                Quote: aviamed90
                yanus

                In your opinion, the element base is needed only for performing calculations?
                These are not only microprocessors, but also much more.

                ACCS - collection, processing, transmission of data. All this is quite undemanding to the "hardware".
                The main problem is always in software.
                1. aviamed90
                  aviamed90 2 September 2013 13: 20
                  +1
                  yanus

                  All right
                  And what is the software based on? On arithmometers and accounts?
                  How and what is the task of information processing solved?
                  The solution of informational and computational problems is one of the advantages of ACS.

                  Here is an example - KSHM “SLEPOK” (designed for automated and non-automated control of a missile brigade armed with the 9K79 “POINT” complex and comprising up to three military regiments, up to three battalions in the division.)

                  Its structure includes the E715-1.1 / 03 “ULAN” SCMS (it is the main technical tool providing automated control operations in the KShM and is designed to solve special calculation and information problems, process, store and distribute information received from communication channels and entered from the display , control of input-output devices and organization of functional test control of TSA serviceability.)

                  STsVM consists of a control panel, a processor, random access memory (RAM), read-only programmable memory (ROM), read-only memory (ROM), power supply and has the following technical characteristics:

                  Type - synchronous, unicast, parallel action;
                  Representation of numbers - in binary, fixed-point, in additional code;
                  Bit depth of numbers 24 * 48 of double digit capacity (+ 2 control);
                  Number of teams - 44;
                  Input - output of information - automatic, through the highway;
                  Interchange Highway: 36 information bus, 9 control bus;
                  Exchange rate - 500000 words / sec;
                  Performance:
                  - for combined mode - 500 t.kor. operations;
                  - for not combined mode - 250 t.kor. operations;
                  The amount of RAM - 32 Kslov;
                  The amount of permanent memory - 96 Kslov;
                  The amount of programmable memory - 128 Kslov;
                  Supply voltage - 27 V;
                  Mean time between failures - at least 1000 hours.

                  Information tasks:

                  The task of organizing and interacting AWP - 1 and AWP - 2;
                  The task of the initial formation of the database with AWP - 1,2 and its correction;
                  The task of correcting the database with input messages;
                  The task of organizing and storing data, addressing tables and tables of constants;
                  The task of formation and automatic adjustment of frames, status scoreboard;
                  The task of managing locking and unlocking jobs;
                  The task of semantic and syntactic control of the information part of messages;
                  The task of synthesizing messages;
                  The task of functional control of automation equipment;
                  Unpacking and stitching messages.

                  Settlement tasks:

                  I. Operational and tactical tasks:
                  The solution of the task of fixing;
                  The task of checking the possibility of fixing PU for the goal;
                  The task of planning concentrated fire;
                  The task of calculating the planning of fire on columns;
                  The task of calculating the expected effect of the lesion.

                  II. Topographic, meteorological and calculated:
                  1. Calculation of geodata (Dg, ag);
                  2. Monitoring the correctness of the calculation of Dg;
                  3. The task of calculating the calculated launch settings (flight mission data for six BM);
                  4. Compilation of meteorological bulletins according to the weather station;
                  5. Solution of PPZ, OGZ, backsection, transformation of rectangular coordinates into an adjacent zone, calculation of the approximation value of meridians;
                  6. The task of calculating the directional reference direction to the sun;
                  7. Calculation of the start time and automatic replacement of the EXPLOSION command with the START command;
                  8. Flight time calculation;
                  9. The task of the consumption of missiles at the facilities;
                  10. The task of calculating the height of the flight path;
                  11. The task of calculating the possibility of shooting through the crest of the shelter.

                  And to solve these problems can not be used computer technology?

                  So it’s not clear what you meant.
                  1. yanus
                    yanus 2 September 2013 13: 48
                    +2
                    Quote: aviamed90
                    So it’s not clear what you meant.

                    I meant that the computing power of the "hardware" produced in Russia is sufficient and redundant for calculations and encryption within the ACCS.
                    There is simply no special or specific "hardware" in the ACCS.
                    Simplified, ASUV is a network of computers with an industrial level of protection and a wireless encrypted communication system. Military requirements do not greatly complicate the system.
                    But software must be written from scratch without experience and special desire. As a result, such problems ....
                    1. aviamed90
                      aviamed90 2 September 2013 14: 45
                      +1
                      yanus

                      It turns out an amazing situation!

                      Russia has everything for the development and production of ASUV. There is no desire only to do this.

                      Speaking of software.
                      Can it really be that the software written for Soviet ASUVs can not be brought to modern requirements?
                      Or is it so hard?
                      1. roial
                        2 September 2013 15: 14
                        +2
                        It turns out an amazing situation!
                        Russia has everything for the development and production of ASUV. There is no desire only to do this.


                        There are problems with hardware, though not the same as with software but significant

                        - existing AWPs rather poorly "digest" work with electronic cards - VISNUT
                        - T-235 data transmission equipment (in addition to data transfer, it also encrypts them) has a data transfer rate of 9,6 - 12 kbit / s, which is not enough for card exchange and video transmission.
                        - There are more problems with the development of ADF and broadband radio stations for transmitting high-speed traffic, and in my opinion this equipment has not been adopted yet.

                        Can it really be that the software written for Soviet ASUVs can not be brought to modern requirements?
                        Or is it so hard?


                        It’s easier to create a new one than to adapt an old one.
                      2. svp67
                        svp67 2 September 2013 15: 21
                        +1
                        Quote: roial
                        T-235 data transmission equipment
                        You are dealing with "serious" devices ...
                      3. aviamed90
                        aviamed90 2 September 2013 16: 20
                        +1
                        roial

                        1. And this is what I spoke about - the elemental base. What is the reason? Processors or something else? Or are the cards themselves of this quality?

                        2. You assured that there are no problems with ADF. Problems with software only?

                        In addition, see below my post about APD "ASHPRD-E" (transmission of voice and data through 4 independent communication channels with a total exchange rate of up to 48 kbit / s).
                        So, after all, is there something?

                        3. And to rewrite old software in a new programming language (digestible for current Russian computers) is an impossible task for our military-industrial complex? Or do you have to reinvent the wheel?
                    2. svp67
                      svp67 2 September 2013 15: 20
                      +1
                      Quote: aviamed90
                      Russia has everything for the development and production of ASUV. There is no desire to do this
                      And there is a desire - there is no main thing, the one who will lead this business and the main thing is ready to bear responsibility for this ...
                    3. yanus
                      yanus 2 September 2013 16: 25
                      +1
                      Quote: aviamed90
                      It turns out an amazing situation!

                      Russia has everything for the development and production of ASUV. There is no desire only to do this.

                      Specialists will not work for the desire. ASUV is interesting to me, but I need to buy food for something.
                      And for the development, very good specialists are needed, which means that they do not pay attention to a salary of less than 100tr in civilian life. Remind me what is the average salary in the research institute now?
                      And this is a citizen. And what to do everything was of high quality, they need every other day and every day to go on business trips to units, training grounds, etc. Accordingly, s / n is multiplied by k.

                      Quote: aviamed90

                      Can it really be that the software written for Soviet ASUVs can not be brought to modern requirements?
                      Or is it so hard?

                      Firstly, it’s easier from scratch.
                      Secondly, ASUV tactical level like u was not
                    4. aviamed90
                      aviamed90 2 September 2013 16: 31
                      +1
                      yanus


                      See the post below about ACCS "Maneuver":

                      "By the end of 1991, the following State tests were developed and successfully passed:
                      1.TZU ASUV “Maneuver”;
                      2. RAM ACS "Maneuver"; ... "
                    5. yanus
                      yanus 2 September 2013 19: 33
                      +1
                      Quote: aviamed90

                      "By the end of 1991, the following State tests were developed and successfully passed:
                      1.TZU ASUV “Maneuver”;
                      2. RAM ACS "Maneuver"; ... "

                      Now I came across an extremely interesting article about the development of "Maneuver".
                      Specifically, on this page, a description of the attitude of the military to ASUV -http: //otvaga2004.ru/kaleydoskop/kaleydoskop-c4/k-istorii-sozdaniya-tz-asuv-man
                      evr-chast-7 /
                      On the rest - also a lot of interesting things))
                    6. cdrt
                      cdrt 3 September 2013 10: 55
                      0
                      Just from the recollections of how the ACS Maneuver was created, the role of the military in its creation is clearly visible. And this is still under Ogarkov, in the prime of the SA. About the role of the Head of Communication SA is generally just a song. It is surprising that the Maneuver with such that attitude of the Customer was molested.
          3. aviamed90
            aviamed90 2 September 2013 13: 51
            +1
            But the use of computer technology in the ADF:

            "Equipment for encryption of speech and data transmission" ASHPRD-E ".
            Provides:
            • voice and data transmission via 4-m independent communication channels with a total exchange rate of up to 48 kbit / s
            • adaptation of the transmission speed to the quality of the communication channel
            • software switching modems and channels
            • work in "harsh climatic conditions"
            • built on the basis of a specialized computer "Baguette" with a set of processor modules and specialized software "
            (site "bnti.ru", products)
    2. Mairos
      Mairos 3 September 2013 10: 26
      +1
      The method proposed by the author - everyone works with one card in real time - has one, but a very big drawback - communication channels. In reality, they will be "killed" with electronic warfare very hard. As a result, there will be no work at all. You need standalone databases of different tiers with the ability to replicate in batch changes. I think so..
  • Lopatov
    Lopatov 2 September 2013 11: 46
    +1
    SW Akim, counter-battery combat is such an important thing that in order to reduce response time, divisions are allocated for it that work directly with ARSOM radar and with sound reconnaissance stations.

    In addition, the transfer of 3 digits can in no way take 5 minutes.
    1. Akim
      Akim 2 September 2013 12: 02
      +1
      Quote: Spade
      that to reduce the response time for it, divisions are allocated that work directly with ARSOM radar

      This is acceptable for an artillery regiment. And then it takes up to 7 minutes. 6 minutes - if there is a direct transfer from the reconnaissance division, he removed the link of the KP regiment.
      There is no direct chain in the brigade battery intelligence. Data processing - seconds. Then the fire control machine transmits the data above - the command of the division - the headquarters of the brigade. The decision made goes back down. In the CPN division decide on the issuance of the order and target designation of a particular or all batteries. Now I don’t know, but before that the battery commander participated in this business. In general, this happens faster than I wrote and corrected errors.
      So throughout the ASUv brigade.
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 2 September 2013 12: 26
        +1
        Quote: Akim
        This is acceptable for an artillery regiment. And then it takes up to 7 minutes. 6 minutes - if there is a direct transfer from the reconnaissance division, he removed the link of the KP regiment.

        Well, where did these wild numbers come from? Once again, work with detection tools is underway directly... 6 minutes is two points for a division with all the consequences. In addition, this is the time without the use of automation tools. Commands - voice, calculations for the SCP using shooting tables. Even the ancient "Electronics" microcomputers with programs in castrated BASIC reduce this time significantly.

        Quote: Akim
        There is no direct reconnaissance-battery circuit in the brigade. Data processing - seconds. Then the fire control machine transmits the data above - the command of the division - the headquarters of the brigade. The decision made goes back down. In the CPN division decide on the issuance of the order and target designation of a particular or all batteries. Now I don’t know, but before that the battery commander participated in this business. In general, this happens faster than I wrote and corrected errors.

        What kind of game? Coordinates from reconnaissance equipment arrive at the command post of the brigade’s chief of artillery, where a decision is made and the NSh division is transferred to the firing squad. After 5 minutes, the target is hit by three points.
        1. roial
          2 September 2013 12: 58
          +3
          Well, don’t tell me, if the T-235 ADF is used to transmit reconnaissance coordinates, then it’s quite real time. Try to manually enter the target data manually on the keyboard: coordinates, card number, a brief description of what they found, well, the recipient’s address, signature stamp, urgency, be sure to duplicate the telegram in the outgoing telegram, manually rewrite the received code from the display on the receiving side, register it on the telegram form and hand over to the expedition, by the way, also for signing and registration, after which the forwarding agent will bring it to the commander. so 10-15 minutes is real.
          1. Lopatov
            Lopatov 2 September 2013 16: 06
            +1
            I will convey this in my voice. So that 15 minutes do not look for letters on the keyboard.
            1. roial
              2 September 2013 16: 13
              +2
              That’s why ASUV is a suitcase without a handle - it’s hard to carry but it’s a pity to drop it (it’s unmeasured money)
              1. Lopatov
                Lopatov 2 September 2013 18: 39
                +2
                Well, of course a suitcase. At the end of the last century, the American automated control system "Takfaer" calculated data for 1.5 batteries for 10 targets in 35 minutes and transmitted the calculated data for firing on fire. Maybe they quickly learned to press the buttons?
                1. hiocraib
                  hiocraib 2 September 2013 23: 39
                  +1
                  Quote: Spade
                  At the end of the last century, the American automated control system "Takfaer" calculated data for 1.5 batteries for 10 targets in 35 minutes and transmitted the calculated data for firing on fire.

                  you are confusing soft with warm. I think even the 286th processor coped with this in a matter of seconds. but the hit-and-hit cycle is only 1,5 minutes faster.
                  but much more interesting is how much time the Americans spent on the whole cycle - from detection to defeat.
                2. Lopatov
                  Lopatov 2 September 2013 23: 46
                  +1
                  Quote: hiocraib
                  you confuse soft with warm.

                  No, you read it inattentively. The system not only counts, but also transfers data to the fire, moreover, it automatically distributes these goals.
                3. hiocraib
                  hiocraib 3 September 2013 00: 39
                  +1
                  Quote: Spade
                  The system not only counts, but also transfers data to the fire, moreover, it automatically distributes these goals.

                  286 cope with this in a couple of seconds.
                  I wrote about the "find-hit" cycle for a reason, and not about the "figured out".
                4. Lopatov
                  Lopatov 3 September 2013 08: 29
                  +1
                  Quote: hiocraib
                  I wrote about the "find-hit" cycle for a reason, and not about the "figured out".

                  And it is not in vain that when creating 2C19, the TTZ introduced requirements for mobility and rate of fire, providing a one and a half minute time of fire raid and leaving a firing position.

                  "Takfaer" provided a 10-second calculation of installations for a new target and its transfer to firing.
      2. hiocraib
        hiocraib 2 September 2013 23: 36
        +1
        Quote: Spade
        I will convey this in my voice. So that 15 minutes do not look for letters on the keyboard.

        those. you include a lot of extra links:
        his telephone operator,
        the telephone operator on the other end,
        and the one who will enter data into the computer.
        and there may also be a messenger from the telephone operator to the typist.
        1. Lopatov
          Lopatov 2 September 2013 23: 59
          +1
          Telephone operators will remain. And I have a big suspicion that a normal operator will enter and transmit this message faster than they agree.
          Moreover, I have a great suspicion that nothing will need to be entered. Like and take.

          Roughly: the ARSOM radar will give the coordinates of the target → the equipment at the battalion's NSh will receive them and drop the calculated settings for firing directly onto the guns → there the equipment will enter individual corrections and automatically aim the guns. The battalion commander will decide on the type of ammunition, the installation of the fuse and the number of them in the fire raid, and the ASUNO equipment will drop this on the guns. Then the CD will heroically command "fire".
          1. hiocraib
            hiocraib 3 September 2013 00: 44
            +1
            Quote: Spade
            And I have a big suspicion that a normal operator will enter and transmit this message faster than they agree.

            unfortunately this is the case when a user to whom the system should greatly facilitate life is thrown out of this very system ...

            Quote: Spade
            ARSOM radar will give the coordinates of the target →
            the operator will check and give the go-ahead
            - equipment from the NS division will receive them
            the operator will check and give the go-ahead
            and reset the calculated settings for firing directly on guns →
            the operator will check and give the go-ahead
            there the equipment will introduce individual amendments
            the operator will check and give the go-ahead
            and automatically aim guns.

            something like that, while we are talking about an ideal case.
            in reality it looks like "add at each step on the problem" ...
          2. Lopatov
            Lopatov 3 September 2013 08: 44
            +1
            Quote: hiocraib
            the operator will check and give the go-ahead

            What will he check? Does the operator manually calculate the projectile's departure point from several of his serifs on the trajectory and compare with the machine data? The next operator will manually recalculate the settings for shooting and compare with the data of the machine? The next operator will crawl out of the self-propelled guns, bind it, calculate the ind. corrections and compare with machine data?

            What do you mean by the phrase "the operator will check and give the go-ahead"?

            And by the way, when you typed the text of your post, did you check the correctness of its translation into binary code?
  • Mairos
    Mairos 3 September 2013 10: 23
    0
    These are completely different things !!
  • Sirs
    Sirs 2 September 2013 09: 21
    +1
    And what about our probable opponents?
    1. Akim
      Akim 2 September 2013 09: 30
      +2
      Quote: Sirs
      And what about our probable opponents?

      A little better, and then depending on who.
  • tttttt
    tttttt 2 September 2013 09: 45
    +1
    It seems that all these modern Gadgets are made in order to make human life more and more problematic. Well, in the army, this is completely unacceptable, is it that you can spend hours poking around in different editors just to outline the combat situation, and probably only in a static form, although everything should be reflected in dynamics for a correct understanding of the situation? Do I understand the military comrades correctly? + time for reaction - passing the order to the executors and seeing the situation through the eyes of the headquarters? So you can just sit at the computer in the tent and draw pictures until "darlings" in NATO camouflages and M-16 rifles appear behind their backs and point their fingers at the monitor from behind and laugh ... Disorder. The article raised a problematic issue: the military displeased, oh, they did not. To be tethered by such a brake ACCU is like standing and waiting for you to be shot. Guys, the military of the platoon and company level, throw ratsuhi, without you in the general staffs they will think of such crap, mom don't cry.
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 2 September 2013 10: 39
      +3
      The problem is that drawing in editors is much faster than gluing cards and drawing on them. That is why the "probable partners" have 6-8 hours to make a decision for the operation, while we have 15-16.

      http://general-skokov.livejournal.com/2691.html#cutid1
  • Nayhas
    Nayhas 2 September 2013 10: 06
    +2
    Please correct me if I'm wrong. The developer had no idea what was required of him or the customer inaudibly painted what was needed?
  • shurup
    shurup 2 September 2013 10: 10
    0
    ASUV is really useful when it operates in real time, which is always lacking.
    Indeed, it is not always possible to stretch a fiber-optic field cable, use satellite communication channels or a military cellular communication system, but connected service dogs with flash drives are just one type of communication.
    It does not make sense to bow to B. Gates for the operating system and user-friendly interface. he seeks the required in Russia by industrial espionage methods.
    ASUV is positive in contact with a low-tech enemy. Confrontation with an equal or stronger one, which, as you know, will interfere and interfere with false goals, will drive the ASUV into a minus.
    I came to the conclusion that at least half of the funding should be directed to the means of combating the ACCS of a potential enemy, and the "conditional" should be in the laboratory behind the wall.
  • roial
    2 September 2013 10: 29
    +2
    At the same time, in just ten years of work, about a trillion rubles was spent for these purposes. Of these, only this year - four billion.


    It was cheaper to buy from amers.
    1. svp67
      svp67 2 September 2013 10: 53
      +1
      Quote: roial
      It was cheaper to buy from amers.
      So what is the problem? Take money and buy for your army, as far as I know you have things there, in this matter is even worse. So, thanks for the care, but we’ll somehow decide in our own place in Russia ourselves
      1. roial
        2 September 2013 11: 36
        +2
        in this matter is even worse


        Didn't say worse
        Now in test mode, several complexes work, but the problems are the same:
        - no mapping (got to the point where Googl Maps are integrated)
        - clumsy interface
        - the components are joined together clumsily, it seems that the developers themselves decide what and how it should work
        1. svp67
          svp67 2 September 2013 16: 14
          +2
          Quote: roial
          Didn't say worse
          You know, this is your image, a true specialist suits you better. And it’s interesting to talk and read interestingly, I learned something for myself - THANKS.
  • Letterksi
    Letterksi 2 September 2013 11: 34
    +2
    Yes Yes. I readily believe in difficulties with information technology))) Which often add problems, than solve them.

    A computer is a device that allows you to solve problems that, without it, would not even have risen. )))

    And I am also very interested in security in terms of hacking all this "Constellation"
  • aviamed90
    aviamed90 2 September 2013 11: 55
    +1
    Material on the topic.

    "By the end of 1991, the following State tests were developed and successfully passed:
    1.TZU ASUV “Maneuver”;
    2. RAM ASUV “Maneuver”;
    3.KSA KP missile brigade (division, batteries) - product "Slepok-M";
    4.KSA KP artillery division (artillery brigade, artillery regiment) - product "Unifier";
    5.KSA PU AR of the artillery brigade (artillery regiment, motorized rifle division, tank division) - product “Batya”;
    6.complexes of control vehicles (CMU) of the division (battery) of self-propelled artillery - products "Machine" and "Falsetto";
    7.KMU towed artillery division (battery) - “Machine-B” product;
    8.KShM of the headquarters (PU) of the self-propelled artillery division and KShM of the headquarters (PU) of the towed artillery division, ensuring compatibility of the Falcet and Mashina-B complexes with the KSA of higher command and control links - Funicular-S and Funicular-B products respectively;
    9.KSA KP anti-aircraft missile regiment;
    10. BKP “Ranzhir” (product 9С737), controlling short-range air defense missile systems (TOR), “Tunguska”, “Strela-10M”, and BKP PU12М7, controlling short-range air defense systems of the type “Arrow-10М” and PEP;
    11. AOD 9П9082 for equipping communication centers.

    All listed objects and systems were developed on the basis of common principles of communication organization, information, linguistic and software. The use of the same type of APD T-235 at all levels provided the possibility of technical interaction of all automated objects with each other through the base SOD "Redut-2DB".

    .
    1. aviamed90
      aviamed90 2 September 2013 11: 56
      0
      The automatic control system of the Maneuver front was the base for all other subsystems and control objects that were “tied” to the system and included in the corresponding paths on the basis of compliance with certain rules and standards defined by the pairing protocols. In total, more than 200 of such protocols were developed, which made it possible to have a practically unified system of command and control of troops and weapons.

      The established principles made it possible to quickly ensure the organization of communications and automated control of temporary formations (army, divisional, regimental artillery groups, anti-tank reserves, etc.), organized on the basis of full-time formations equipped with automation and communication equipment from the ASUE “Maneuver” and compatible with her systems and objects.

      The tests and command-and-staff exercises confirmed the correctness of the chosen path for the creation of automatic control systems in terms of system solutions based on unified TTTs, as well as solutions for organizing IWPs, optimizing information flows and the composition of automated control rooms, and building SOD.

      The tests and command-and-staff exercises confirmed the correctness of the chosen path for the creation of automatic control systems in terms of system solutions based on unified TTTs, as well as solutions for organizing IWPs, optimizing information flows and the composition of automated control rooms, and building SOD.

      Thus, by 1991 on the basis of the ACS “Maneuver”, an automated command and control system for general forces was actually developed, covering the existing system of command and control of troops both vertically and horizontally, including all control units from the army to the battalion and all subsystems of control of subordinate forces and means of all military branches and services. It was necessary to work out issues of organizational interaction, the planned increase in the number of operational and tactical tasks to be solved, verification of interaction with surveillance, reconnaissance and defeat means, the evolutionary replacement of obsolete technical equipment with modern ones. For a comprehensive solution to these issues in 1988 - 1990 years. A system project of the EASU by troops and weapons of the Avangard front was completed, the main result of which was the development of a comprehensive program for the creation, improvement and development of the EASU, including the creation of new technical means, automation of new facilities and their inclusion in nuclear power plants, the introduction of new information technologies. However, as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the violation of the cooperation that existed between industrial enterprises and military scientific institutions within their frameworks, the serial production of most of the developed KSA and PE was not mastered, the AS did not enter the control of troops, reconnaissance and weapons.


      ... coordination of control automation in the tactical link was practically not carried out. Such work requires the participation of a large number of performers and a coordinating body to organize interaction between them, and after the collapse of the USSR, cooperation ties between industrial enterprises and military scientific institutions of the former USSR were destroyed. Since the beginning of the 90's, research and development in the field of new information technologies and their use in the troops at the system level have actually been stopped. For various reasons, since the end of the 80-ies there has been a practice of developing in each type of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and branches of the armed forces independent technical solutions and software and hardware in the interests of the corresponding control systems of the automatic control system, not provided with system-wide technological work or hardware neither in software nor in the element base of automation and communication tools, which leads to the impossibility of creating an integrated AS in the future.

      10.02.2006
      The rights to this material belong to Ivan
      The material was posted by the copyright holder in the public domain. "

      (site "vpk.name", article "Future - past ACCS" Maneuver "- conclusions" dated 11.02.13)
  • leon-iv
    leon-iv 2 September 2013 12: 13
    +4
    The author of the article on a certain infe relates to competitors of the constellation.
    There is the usual problem of incorrect formulation of TK at the initial level.
    If you take the system itself, it is VERY simple in terms of data center programming and quite complicated for those who will work with data transfer protocols. For the volumes of transmission of information are large. But transmission channels are a problem more important than cards. And until this problem is solved it will not work in full.
    1. Andreas
      Andreas 2 September 2013 15: 19
      +1
      I support, communication channels is the key to the problem.

      The rest (including competent TK) is elementarily developed by specialists in their field.
      1. roial
        2 September 2013 16: 10
        +2
        communication channels are the key to the problem


        That there is no problem, now only the lazy does not do microwave stations, why give birth to a hedgehog and come up with a bicycle ?? If you can’t make a NORMAL station, buy a pair of such radio stations in the west and JUST COPY.
    2. commentor
      commentor 2 September 2013 15: 20
      +1
      That is, a freely scalable asynchronous multi-level model of a system that ensures the transfer of data, queues of requests and commands in any direction with a delivery guarantee, dynamic decentralization of data processing nodes, the main requirement for fault tolerance in case of failure of intermediate links, concentration and subsequent cataloging of data, including including in offline mode, taking into account the "aging" of data, self-diagnostics, combining a modular platform with priorities of rights and access of various levels, guaranteeing the security of transmission, excluding the possibility of sending false signals, attacks from outside and attacks like mid ... etc. etc. etc.

      Is this a very simple system?

      This is not a civilian system in which data centers, computing nodes and data buses are designed according to some standard such as BICSI.

      Why did you have to abandon the developments of the USSR in terms of automation? The architecture of Soviet systems, although it had a high degree of redundancy, was completely unusable in the event of the failure of at least one of the components. It did not allow to dock the levels of reporting commands "through the level", for example, from the VO headquarters to the battalion.


      Today's requirements for such systems require backups not only of the physical layer, but also of all the others, including data on intermediate nodes. High decentralization of computing nodes, automatically adjusting the topology depending on the available network configuration. The system must take into account the specifics of different data transmission channels: delays, segmentation, transmission volumes, etc. At the same time, the task of optimizing the transport level should be solved when duplicate data from different nodes are classified and combined.

      If you imagine this simple, then you need to try yourself in the role of an architect.
      Elements of American systems for this purpose have a thirty-year history of development and still do not fully fulfill the initial requirements.

      The author of the article is seriously mistaken in some points. He describes the problems that have long been resolved. In particular, the scale.
      1. aviamed90
        aviamed90 2 September 2013 16: 28
        0
        commentor

        I rather agree with you than with the opinion that there are no problems, except with software.

        And as it turns out later, they are with collection, with processing, and with the transfer of information.
      2. Andreas
        Andreas 2 September 2013 17: 06
        +1
        The problem is not as complicated as it seems, if you entrust its solution to groups of specialists:
        - communication group (possible solution is CDMA2000 broadband technology and zone transceiver stations on board helicopter-UAVs with wired power supply);
        - a group of information transfer protocols (a possible solution is fault-tolerant Internet technology);
        - a group of data presentation formats (a single data transmission format, a single sound transmission format, a single image transmission format, a single geo-information transmission format, a single video transmission format);
        - a task group to automate the actions of riflemen, tankers, artillerymen, rocket launchers, staff operators;
        - A group of system and applied programmers to implement these tasks.

        The project manager is the Special Deputy Minister of Defense, the project coordinator is the special department of the Ministry of Defense under his leadership.

        After the automatic control system is put into operation, it is transferred to its constituent parts in the specialized heads of the Moscow Oblast - GABTU, GRAU, etc. The overall responsibility is on the communications and automation department.
  • max702
    max702 2 September 2013 19: 42
    +4
    All this is very strange, for a start you need normal walkie-talkies for the troops (let them buy, steal, kill someone if they refuse to sell but do it) and only then talk about all the systems listed above, did Grozny take the cards? No! war 08.08.08 were maps? .. The same picture with communication, again, no progress, the artillerymen in real life (and not at the proving grounds) had all the calculations manually, a programmed calculator like God's revelation. in aviation, the main instrument of the navigator NL-10 (personally saw in the report on the flight of the 160) what are we talking about? what control automation systems? And if 10 trillion rubles was spent on all these "developments" within 1 years !! That Serdyukov and Co. smoking nervously in the corner gagging with envy.
  • Muadipus
    Muadipus 2 September 2013 23: 06
    +1
    In the hands of a control - a wooden pointer
    not a pointer - but a stylus. And not a map - but a super-energy-intensive, ultra-thin, absolutely flexible, multi-functional navigation device. and not a single ipad box can replace our old, good card for reliability and usefulness. do not steal plans drawn on it through the Internet and you can’t crack it on Wi-Fi. Only melee and only personal valor.
  • Cpa
    Cpa 3 September 2013 01: 38
    +2
    At the operational level, the problem can be solved now, at this level standardization and unification are the main thing. The guys wrote above - the key point - communication channels, and at the operational link level, you can use wired and fiber-optic lines. The old ASUV systems did not crash when an element dropped out or host, routers solved this problem. The main problem of older systems is the interface and data transfer speed.
    But at the level of the tactical link management system, there’s a complete circus. The ACU TK has American protocols, roughly WI-Fi, with all its problems. The lack of high-speed broadband radio channels ruins the whole idea.
    Regarding the risks, a separate song. Who cares, go to the "constellation" website and download the equipment to the suppliers of the element base. All questions will disappear by yourself. The main thing is that the party has the MO stamp.
    The operating system is Linux-based?! Without comment.
    If you add to this the lack of pairing tactical WI-FI with special forces (aviation, reconnaissance, DRG, etc. far from the wi-fi reception area), then you can forget about their interaction on the battlefield.
    My opinion of the systems developed now is wretchedness, due to the lack of a master in this sphere. Everything has been left to the mercenaries, impunity, desire to curry favor.
    He himself participated in the introduction of new channel-forming systems on new principles. It is not possible to offer anything for improvement, they crushed shoulder straps and demanded that it work. And the systems are not even tested for electromagnetic compatibility to drown out, you don’t even have to try.
    They already wrote here, you don’t need half measures, you can’t do it yourself - copy it. You won’t be able to cheat all the time, and it’s good if everything comes out in peacetime.