Military Review

Soviet-German non-aggression treaty of August 23 1939. Part of 2

32
The Soviet Union and the Third Reich: Causes of Convergence


Soviet-German non-aggression treaty of August 23 1939. Part of 2

The geopolitical position of the Soviet Union to the beginning of 1939 of the year


Top of 1939 The geopolitical position of the Soviet Union has become threatening. The unsuccessful outcome of attempts to create a collective security system led to the fact that the Land of the Soviets was in fact in international isolation. The leading countries of the West, Great Britain, France and the United States, showed no desire to bind themselves with treaty obligations towards the USSR. Meanwhile, the latter turned out to be face to face with the countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which by the beginning of 1939 was composed of. It included not only Germany, Italy and Japan, but also Hungary (joined the 24 pact in February 1939), Spain (26 in March 1939) and the puppet state of Manchuku (24 in February 1939), which was under Japanese control.

The first three countries posed the greatest danger. In the first half of 1939. the armed forces of Germany in peacetime consisted of 51 divisions (including 5 tank; B. Muller-Hillebrand. Land Army of Germany 1933-1945. Izographus Publishing House. Moscow, 2002. C. 15.). They could be reinforced by the armed forces of Italy, with which 22 may 1939g. The so-called “Steel Pact” was concluded, containing obligations for mutual assistance and alliance in the event of a war with a third party. By mid-April, the 1939 in the army of the metropolis in peacetime states numbered 450 thousand people - 67 divisions (of which 2 was a tank division). In addition, Italy had large Air Force and Navy, which at the beginning of the war, respectively, 2802 aircraft, 4 battleships, 22 cruisers, 128 destroyers and 105 submarines (History World War II 1939 – 1945 in 12 volumes. Ed. A. A. Grechko. M .: Voenizdat, 1973-1982. Tom 2. On the eve of the war. M .: Voenizdat, 1974. C. 382-383.). In the Far East, the threat to the national interests of the USSR was represented by Japan, whose Kwantung Army numbered about 300 thousand. To this should be added the Air Force of about 1 thousand airplanes and navy, by the end of 1939g. numbered 10 battleships, 6 aircraft carriers with 396 aircraft, 35 cruisers, 121 squadron destroyer, 56 submarines (History of the Second World War 1939 – 1945 in 12 volumes. Edited by A. A. Grechko. M .: Voenizdat, 1973-1982. Volume 2. On the eve of the war. M .: Voenizdat, 1974. C. 385-386 .).

By February 1939 the number of the Red Army was 1 910 thousand people. The number of units of armored vehicles and aviation amounted to 10 thousand and 5,5 thousand units, respectively, and continuously increased. The construction of the Navy was also intensively conducted. A comparative analysis of the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the armed forces of potential opponents is not the goal of this work. However, it is worth noting that in case of war with the countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Soviet Union would be forced to fight on two fronts. This would significantly complicate the coordination of actions, as well as the distribution of human and material resources. It should also not be forgotten that after the "purge" of 1937-1938. The Red Army was in a weakened state due to the loss of a significant number of experienced officers. In addition, the rearmament program, during which it was planned to equip the Soviet troops with automatic weapons, modern aircraft, tanks KV-1, T-34 and other types of weapons, just started. Under these conditions, a war on two fronts with the countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact was undesirable.



The fighting on Lake Hassan (1938) and the Khalkin Gol River (1939) is a test of the strength of the Red Army.

The strengthening of the countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the position of non-intervention, which Britain, France and the USA occupied, prompted the leadership of the Soviet Union to seek rapprochement with Germany.

Spring-year crisis 1939 of the year.

Meanwhile, events were taking place in Europe’s foreign policy arena, known as the spring-summer crisis of 1939. 15 March 1939. the final partition of Czechoslovakia took place: by a personal decree of Hitler, Bohemia and Moravia were declared a protectorate of Germany. However, the crisis was not caused by the order of the Führer, but by completely different reasons.

In the final division of Czechoslovakia, Germany included only a part of its territories. Slovakia was declared independent (the “Treaty on Protection” between the two states was signed on 23 in March 1939), and Transcarpathian Ukraine was occupied by Hungary during 14-17 in March on 1939. With the full occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Third Reich and the Soviet Union were divided only by the 150-kilometer strip of Polish territory. However, instead, Germany chose to keep the buffer from independent states (although their “independence” was rather conditional), thus excluding any reason for war with the Soviet Union.

Such a scenario evoked discontent in Paris, London, and Washington. The warning was a protest from France, a tough statement from Chamberlain 17 in March 1939, and a response from the American ambassador from Berlin, 20 in March 1939. in protest against the "wrong" occupation of Czechoslovakia. However, the warning had no effect, and then concrete measures were taken to worsen the German-Polish relations, which were rather warm after Hitler came to power.

On 21 March 1939. In Berlin, a meeting was scheduled between the German and Polish Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Beck. At this meeting the question of the transfer of the city of Danzig to Germany, which had the status of a “free city” and disputed territories (the so-called “corridor”), was to be resolved. In exchange, Poland was offered an extraterritorial road, preserving access to the Baltic Sea and the extension of the German-Polish non-aggression treaty. However, instead of the previously planned visit to Berlin, the Polish minister went to London. And 26 March 1936. All German proposals were categorically rejected. At the same time, 23 March in Poland was announced partial mobilization. In addition, 6 April 1939. Between England and Poland, the Polish-British Military Convention was framed. In response to this 1 April 1939g. Hitler gave the order to start developing a war plan with Poland, and 28 on April 1939. broke the German-Polish non-aggression treaty.

Spring-year crisis 1939. This is explained by the fact that Hitler actually began his game and took actions inconsistent with the UK and diverging from its geopolitical interests. However, the harsh reaction of Western countries, supported by a sharp deterioration in German-Polish relations, forced him to temporarily reconsider his foreign policy line, the leitmotiv of which was "living space in the East." At the same time, it became clear that Poland, which within a few days had changed its foreign policy line, becomes an opponent of the Third Reich. Under these conditions, Hitler began to look for ways of rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

The rapprochement of the USSR with Germany: prerequisites and first steps.

Attempts to get closer to Germany were made by the leadership of the Soviet Union with 1934, when David Kandelaki was sent to Germany as a trade representative. The “mission” of Kandelaki was to improve not only economic, but also political relations. So, back in 1936g. The Soviet side proposed Germany to conclude a non-aggression pact, which was rejected under the pretext that the contracting parties do not have a common border. In general, the Kandelaki mission, which ended in 1937, did not reach its goal.

The first prerequisites for the improvement of Soviet-German relations arose soon after the conclusion of the Munich agreements, when 22 December 1938. Germany made a declaration of readiness to conclude an economic agreement, under the terms of which Germany gave the Soviet Union a loan of 200 million marks for the purchase of industrial goods. The loan was to be repaid by the Soviet side during the 2 years with the supply of raw materials.

The next step was made by the leadership of the USSR. 21 January 1939. It was adopted by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), which read: “Oblige tg. Mikoyan, Kaganovich, L.M. Kaganovich, M.M. Tevosyan, Sergeev, Vannikov and Lvov to January 24 1939. submit a list of absolutely necessary machine tools and other types of equipment that may be ordered on a German loan " (Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of 21 in January 1939. No. 67 / 187 (quoted in the book: Bezymensky LA, Hitler and Stalin before the fight. M .: Veche, 2000. C. 184).). It is noteworthy that L.M. Kaganovich headed the People's Commissariat of Communications, Lviv - mechanical engineering, MM Kaganovich - aviation industry, Tevosyan - shipbuilding. Sergeev - ammunition, Vannikov - weapons.

The aggravation of the situation in Europe, caused by the failure of the Polish-German negotiations, prompted I. Stalin at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) 10 in March 1939. make a speech, which in Western historiography is known as "talking about roasted chestnuts." In this speech, I.Stalin assessed the events taking place in the international arena, and lined up the USSR foreign policy concept:

“... A characteristic feature of the new imperialist war is that it has not yet become a universal, world war. The aggressor states lead the war in every possible way infringing upon the interests of non-aggressive states, primarily Britain, France, and the United States, while the latter are moving backwards and retreating, giving the aggressors concession after concession.

Thus, before our eyes, there is an open redivision of the world and spheres of influence at the expense of the interests of non-aggressive states without any attempts to repulse and even with some connivance from the latter. Unbelievable, but it is a fact.

How can one explain the one-sided and strange character of the new imperialist war?

How could it happen that non-aggressive countries, which have enormous opportunities, so easily and without resistance, abandoned their positions and their obligations in favor of the aggressors?

Is this not due to the weakness of non-aggressive states? Of course not! Non-aggressive, democratic states, taken together, is indisputably stronger than the fascist states both economically and militarily.

How then can the systematic concessions of these states to the aggressors be explained?

... The main reason is the refusal of the majority of non-aggressive countries, and first of all of England and France, from the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, in their transition to the position of non-intervention, to the position of "neutrality".

Formally, the policy of non-intervention could be described as follows: “Let each country defend itself against aggressors, as it wants and as it can, our business is a party, we will trade with both the aggressors and their victims.” In fact, however, the policy of non-intervention means the indulgence of aggression, the outbreak of war, therefore, turning it into a world war. In the policy of non-interference, the desire, the desire not to interfere with the aggressors to do their dirty deed, does not interfere, say, with Japan getting involved in a war with China, and even better with the Soviet Union, not interfering, say, with Germany getting bogged down in European affairs Union, to give all war participants to get bogged down deep into the mud of the war, to encourage them in this secretly, to let them weaken and deplete each other, and then, when they are weak enough, to perform on the stage with fresh forces - to act, of course, "in the interests of peace" and dictate ass evshim belligerents conditions.

... Characterized by the noise that raised the Anglo-French and North American press about Soviet Ukraine. The workers of this press were hoarsely shouting that the Germans were going to the Soviet Ukraine, that they now had the so-called Carpathian Ukraine in their hands, numbering about 700 thousands of people, that the Germans would join the Soviet Ukraine, which has more than 30 millions, this spring, to the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It seems that this suspicious noise was intended to raise the fury of the Soviet Union against Germany, poison the atmosphere and provoke a conflict with Germany for no apparent reason.

... It is even more characteristic that some politicians and press figures in Europe and the United States, having lost patience in anticipation of the “campaign against Soviet Ukraine”, themselves begin to expose the real background of the policy of non-intervention. They directly say and write in black and white that the Germans cruelly “disappointed” them, because instead of moving further east, against the Soviet Union, they, you see, turned west and demanded colonies for themselves. One might think that the Germans were given areas of Czechoslovakia as a price for the obligation to start a war with the Soviet Union, and the Germans now refuse to pay a bill of exchange, sending them somewhere far away.

... In these difficult international conditions, the Soviet Union pursued its foreign policy, defending the cause of preserving peace. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and understandable:

1. We stand for peace and strengthening business ties with all countries, we stand and will continue to stand in this position, since these countries will maintain the same relations with the Soviet Union, since they will not try to violate the interests of our country.

2. We stand for peaceful, close and good-neighborly relations with all neighboring countries that have a common border with the USSR, and we will continue to stand in this position, since these countries will maintain the same relations with the Soviet Union, because they will not try to break, directly or indirectly, interests of integrity and inviolability of the borders of the Soviet state.

3. We stand for the support of peoples who are victims of aggression and who are fighting for the independence of their homeland.

4. We are not afraid of threats from the aggressors and are ready to respond with a double blow to the instigators of war who are trying to violate the inviolability of the Soviet borders. Such is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. ” (Stalin. IV. Complete Works. Volume 14. Report at the XVII Party Congress on the work of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 10 in March 1939. M., 1997. C. 120-176.).

J. Stalin made it clear that the goal of the West — to provoke the USSR and Germany to war, in order to take advantage of their mutual weakening — is clear to him. It also made it clear that the main goal of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is to avoid this scenario.

The next (and very important) step towards rapprochement with Germany was the resignation of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov, who was dismissed from his post on 3 on May 1939. In this post he was replaced by V. Molotov. The resignation of Litvinov, who adheres to a pro-Western orientation, had far-reaching consequences and served as a prelude to the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty.



Replacing Litvinov with Molotov as Commissar for Foreign Affairs is an important step in rapprochement with Germany.

Negotiations of the USSR with Great Britain and France in the summer of 1939.

In parallel with the rapprochement with Germany, the leadership of the Soviet Union, an attempt was made to form an alliance with Britain and France. In fact, this was the last verification of the intentions of the leadership of these states regarding their foreign policy. Following the results of this inspection, the leadership of the Soviet Union was to make a final choice.

A proposal for negotiations to discuss measures to prevent German aggression was made by the Soviet Union as early as March 18 of 1939. The offer was rejected. 15 April 1939 Britain and France voiced their proposals. The British asked the Soviet Union to come up with a declaration of readiness to provide assistance to Poland and Romania (with similar declarations made earlier by England and France). The French offered to exchange commitments of mutual support in the event of war to one of the contracting countries with Germany. In response, 17 April 1939. The Soviet government proposed the conclusion of the Triple Alliance between the USSR, Great Britain and France. The Soviet draft treaty was proposed on 2. June 1939. and included obligations of mutual assistance (including military assistance) to the parties to the treaty, as well as to Eastern European countries (it is not difficult to guess that in this case we are talking primarily about Poland). Earlier, in May 31 1939, in his first speech, V.Molotov sharply criticized the uncertain position of England and France. However, the consent of the British to begin negotiations on military issues was received only on July 20.

However, the difficulties in the negotiation process did not end there. Neither London nor Paris were in a hurry to send their ambassadors to Moscow. The Anglo-French military delegations went not on a passenger plane capable of delivering them in a few hours, not on a high-speed military cruiser, but on a slow-moving steamer “City of Exeter”, whose speed did not exceed 13 nodes. As a result, the delegation that went to the Soviet Union 5 August 1939, arrived in Moscow only 11 August 1939.

At the very first meeting of 12 August 1939. It turned out that the head of the British delegation, Admiral Drax, has no written authority to conclude agreements, and the head of the French delegation, General Dumenc, has the authority to “agree on issues related to entering into cooperation between the armed forces of both parties,” but he has no right to sign the final documents of the agreements. . Indicative was the fact that not the foreign ministers, not the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces, but the secondary military arrived at the talks. At the same time, from the side of the USSR were present the top defense commissar K.Voroshilov, the chief of the General Staff B.Shaposhnikov, the commander of the Navy N. Kuznetsov and the commander of the Air Force A.Laktionov.

The negotiations between the Anglo-French delegation and the Soviet side were reduced to the British and French avoiding specific answers to the questions that the representatives of the Soviet side asked them and actually delaying the negotiations. As a result, by August 21 (on this day, Stalin agreed to the arrival in Moscow of the German ambassador Ribbentrop) there was no clarity in any of the issues relating to military cooperation, namely:

- The number of troops that the UK and France can put up against Germany.

- The time it will take to deploy these troops after the declaration of war.

- Poland’s position: will it agree to let the Soviet troops pass through its territory?



I. Stalin has a lot to think about: negotiations with Britain and France have been going on for over a week now, and no concrete results have been achieved.

The position of the Anglo-French delegation becomes explicable when one considers that the secret instructions given to English Admiral Drax and later transmitted to the French prescribed “to negotiate very slowly and follow the discussion of political issues”, and also “act with the greatest caution, not to communicate any important information, always keep in mind the possibility of the Soviet-German collusion, and negotiate the negotiations as slowly as possible to gain time " (From Munich to Tokyo Bay: A look from the West at the tragic pages of the history of the Second World War: Translation. / Comp. E.Ya. Troyanovskaya. M .: Politizdat, 1992. From 33.). The delay in negotiations and the absence of any definite guarantees - all this was done so that by the time of the outbreak of the war between Germany and Poland (which was soon to begin), England and France would not have any obligations to the Soviet Union. And that, in turn, in the event of a common border with Germany, also had no agreements with it.

However, the calculation was not justified. 23 August 1939. the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was concluded, after which the negotiations lost their meaning.

Soviet-German negotiations in August 1939.

The talks that took place in August 1939g. between Moscow and Berlin vividly demonstrate the degree of mutual interest of the parties in rapprochement and in this respect stand in stark contrast to the Moscow talks between the USSR and Britain with France.

2 August German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop summons the plenipotentiary plenipotentiary of the USSR Astakhov and conducts negotiations with him regarding the improvement of Soviet-German relations. The next day (August 3 1939) Ribbentrop made an official statement on the subject of the Soviet-German rapprochement, which specifically stated:

“On all issues related to the territory from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea, we could easily agree” (Sluch S. Stalin and Hitler, 1933 — 1941. Kremlin calculations and miscalculations. // Domestic history. 01 / 2005. No. 1. C. 110.).

15 August 1939. At a meeting with Molotov, the German Ambassador Schulenburg read out to him Ribbentrop’s note in which he expressed his willingness to personally come to Moscow to resolve all issues. Compared with England and France, after many delays, they sent secondary soldiers without written authority, the difference was especially significant. However, by that time, negotiations with the Anglo-French delegation had not yet reached the final deadlock. In addition, it was necessary to check how serious the intentions of the Germans were. Therefore, in an interview with Schulenburg, Molotov put forward a proposal to conclude a full-fledged pact instead of a declaration on the non-use of force against each other, which was proposed by the German ambassador, that is, asked to justify the position of Germany with concrete actions. Immediately (August 17 1939.) Came the answer about the readiness to conclude a pact for a period of 25 years and the desirability of its early conclusion. The rush of the Germans is easily explained: according to the Weiss plan, the invasion of Poland was planned to start on August 26.

However, one desire to conclude a pact as soon as possible, the Soviet leadership considered insufficient basis. More weighty confirmations were required. At a meeting with Schulenburg 17 August 1939g. Molotov conveyed to the German ambassador a note according to which the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty should have been preceded by the conclusion of trade and credit agreements. Under the terms of these agreements, Germany gave the USSR a loan in 200mln. stamps on 7 years. With this money, the Soviet Union bought German machines and other industrial goods, paying for them with supplies of grain and other raw materials. In addition, Molotov proposed to postpone Ribbentrop’s arrival in Moscow on August 26-27, when the war with Poland would have already begun.

In this situation, Hitler considered it beneficial to fulfill the preliminary conditions for accepting Ribbentrop in Moscow: August 20 in 2: The 00 agreements were signed. On the same day, the Reichsfuhrer writes a personal letter to Stalin, in which he asks to accept Ribbentrop. 21 August 1939. on 15: 00 Schulenburg presents the text of the message to Molotov, and after 2 hours he receives a positive response from Stalin. At the end of August 21, Hitler learns that Ribbentrop can fly to Moscow on August 23.

At noon 23 August Ribbentrop arrives in Moscow. The three-hour talks with Stalin and Molotov were successful. In the evening of August 23 1939. The Soviet-German non-aggression treaty was signed. In this situation, negotiations with the Anglo-French delegation lost their meaning. The last meeting of the Anglo-French and Soviet delegations, at which the British and French learned about the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty, took place on August 25 1939.

Yuri Chikhichin
29 August 2013
Articles from this series:
Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939. Part of 1
Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939. Part of 2
32 comments
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  1. Aryan
    Aryan 30 August 2013 09: 53 New
    +3
    Litvinov’s resignation was also that he was a Jew
    and this, too, can be considered a curtsy towards rapprochement with National Socialism
    1. Day 11
      Day 11 30 August 2013 11: 09 New
      +3
      I would call it an annoying misunderstanding, which hinders the signing of the non-aggression and mutual assistance pact, which Hitler and I needed at that time (he, by the way, first of all)
    2. Witch
      Witch 30 August 2013 12: 05 New
      +2
      Nationality has nothing to do with it.
      Litvinov was an apologist for pro-English foreign policy, and if he were at the head of the NKID, he was unlikely to be able to sign this agreement.

      Me by the way. I have been interested in the question for a long time, but have we returned or written off 200 marks of marks under a trade agreement ?!
      1. Day 11
        Day 11 30 August 2013 13: 43 New
        +2
        Hello, arrived. How is it not to do with? Hitler PERSONALLY forbade Ribbentrop to sign anything with Litvinov (because of nats-ti). Find you his words? Read Pickler "Hitler's Table Conversations." There everything is documented, recorded by date, by time.
    3. washi
      washi 30 August 2013 20: 54 New
      0
      Quote: Aryan
      Litvinov’s resignation was also that he was a Jew
      and this, too, can be considered a curtsy towards rapprochement with National Socialism

      He also had relatives in the United States. Maybe this is more important?
  2. anip
    anip 30 August 2013 09: 54 New
    +3
    On the same day, the Reichsführer wrote a personal letter to Stalin, in which he asked to receive Ribbentrop. August 21, 1939

    Himmler did not write this letter; Hitler was a Fuhrer, not a Reichsfuhrer.
  3. knn54
    knn54 30 August 2013 11: 50 New
    +7
    The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is an UNCONDITIONAL victory for Soviet diplomacy! We moved our border "from sea to sea", on average, by 300 km, with minimal losses.
    The so-called "occupation" of part of Poland in the 39th is the return of part of the territories east of the Curzon Line. The same can be said about Bessarabia.
    1. aviator46
      aviator46 30 August 2013 17: 01 New
      -7
      "Victory" ???((
      After the partition of Poland, the distance from the German border to Moscow decreased by 550 km.
      Pushing the border ", the Red Army threw a powerful system of fortifications on the old border ..
      In September 1939, Germany had 4200 aircraft against 11 Soviet, against 100 German tanks the Union could put up 3400.  
      The Red Army was armed with the super-fast BT-7 and BT-7M with the most powerful tank engine at that time, and the heavy T-35, armed with three cannons and seven machine guns ...

      On September 29, 1939, they signed another treaty of friendship and the border, signing new secret protocols. One of them envisaged joint actions of the NKVD and the Gestapo in the fight against the Polish underground ... More than 600 Polish Jews were recognized by the German authorities as "unfit for assimilation" and actually doomed to death.
      Following the Poles and Jews, "class alien" elements from among the "brothers-Ukrainians" and "brothers-Belarusians" were sent to Siberia.
      Such accumulated 1 million 200 thousand.
      1. Aryan
        Aryan 30 August 2013 17: 30 New
        -7
        read that after the partition of Poland
        in some Polish city (forgot in which)
        there was a joint training institution
        and exchange of experience between the Gestapo and the NKVD
        and one of the results was that
        the gulag began to be protected not by labradors but by German shepherds
        as we used to see in the movie about camps and zones
        1. smile
          smile 30 August 2013 21: 54 New
          +6
          Aryan
          You clearly read the perestroika nonsense of storytellers from the Rezunov cohort; I also found this nonsense somewhere in one of them. Do not believe it. The NKVD and the German special services waged an ongoing merciless war, which reached the mutual abduction and destruction of employees. They did not pass on any experience to each other and could not pass on, the experience was tested in the case of captured fellow enemies ... :)))
          1. Aryan
            Aryan 30 August 2013 22: 06 New
            0
            smile
            they were military journalists
            which vice versa
            criticized that traitor
            I remember the source - continue the dialogue
            I was conceived then
            and one of the dog handlers had an interest in this topic
        2. The comment was deleted.
        3. Proud.
          Proud. 30 August 2013 22: 11 New
          +2
          Quote: Aryan
          in some Polish city (in which I forgot) there was a joint institution to improve personnel and exchange experience between the Gestapo and the NKVD

          Please, be so kind as to tell me where you can find such information. Out of curiosity and to close the "knowledge" gap.
          1. Aryan
            Aryan 30 August 2013 22: 41 New
            0
            Blin looking forgot where I read
            be sure to unsubscribe ...
            somewhere on the echo of Moscow in Victory Price about the 39th

            I seek truth and truth myself
            here we argue, but for any
            WE EVERYTHING WILL NEVER FORGET THE ACTION OF OUR PEOPLE
            1. chehywed
              chehywed 30 August 2013 23: 40 New
              0
              Quote: Aryan
              Blin looking forgot where I read
              be sure to unsubscribe ...
              somewhere on echo of Moscow in Victory Price about 39

              Okay, don’t worry. And so everything is clear. laughing
            2. Old scoop
              Old scoop 12 October 2013 22: 46 New
              0
              Rzhunimagu "somewhere on the echo of Moscow." You still quote Rezun.
      2. Selevc
        Selevc 30 August 2013 19: 40 New
        0
        Quote: aviator46
        After the partition of Poland, the distance from the German border to Moscow decreased by 550 km.

        So do you think that the USSR should have silently watched as Hitler invaded all of Poland? Well then, exactly, the borders of Reha would be even further from the USSR :))))))))
        Quote: aviator46
        Pushing the border ", the Red Army threw a powerful system of fortifications on the old border ..

        These URs exist only in the excited brain of historians of the Khrushchev era - from there went these tales about a powerful old border !!! And if there were any fortifications - for example, a powerful Kiev UR could only delay Blitzkrieg for a month and this delay turned into a terrible Kiev boiler !!!
        For example, I don’t understand if there were powerful URs on the old border — what did they blow up when the Red Army units were relocated to the new border? And if not, then does it really take months to bring guns and machine guns into the UR?
        The Second World War showed the complete inefficiency of the static lines of defense - especially on the huge Eastern Front - they quickly broke through and often simply bypassed ... Even such a powerful SD as the Mannerheim Line was able to delay the advance of the Red Army for only two months - and this in the face of a frontal assault and when very difficult geographical and climatic conditions of the offensive !!!
        1. chehywed
          chehywed 30 August 2013 22: 47 New
          -1
          Quote: Selevc
          For example, I don’t understand if there were powerful URs on the old border - that they were blown up when the Red Army units were relocated to the new border

          URA was really there, only the weapons were dismantled for installation on the new border. The fact that as a result of the blitzkrieg on the old border failed to gain a foothold, gave the liberals and the cutters an excuse to raise the hi, that everything was blown up (why? Sense?). Well, and where you succeeded, you already said. Unfortunately, the Kiev SD did not have regular weapons. Yes, and he fell as a result of an attack on the rear.
          1. Selevc
            Selevc 31 August 2013 10: 30 New
            0
            Can you then specifically write down what kind of special armament this is for URs that you need to dismantle for so long? And what special staffing was supposed to be in the Kiev UR-e?
            1. chehywed
              chehywed 31 August 2013 10: 49 New
              0
              Selevc , for a long time to explain, "google in Yandex" about Stalin's line, there even with pictures. And about the Kiev UR separately, too.
      3. washi
        washi 30 August 2013 21: 02 New
        +2
        More than 600 thousand Polish Jews were recognized by the German authorities as "unfit for assimilation" and actually doomed to death.
        And these Jews were handed over to the Germans by the same poor Poles.
        Following the Poles and Jews, "class alien" elements from among the "Ukrainian brothers" and "Belarusian brothers" were sent to Siberia. There were 1 million 200 thousand of them.
        Those. western Belarus and Ukraine depopulated? Who in such cases in Lviv on June 22.06.41, XNUMX were destroyed by the OUN. The Germans still remember with horror, though they all blame it on the Russians.
      4. Proud.
        Proud. 30 August 2013 22: 01 New
        +1
        Quote: aviator46
        After the partition of Poland, the distance from the German border to Moscow decreased by 550 km.

        Sly. Do not enter the spacecraft into Poland (which at that time was not, de facto), the distance to Moscow would become even smaller. Since Western Ukraine and Western Belarus would be under the protectorate of Germany.
        Quote: aviator46
        On September 29, 1939, they signed another friendship and border treaty by signing new secret protocols. One of them provided for the joint actions of the NKVD and the Gestapo in the fight against the Polish underground.

        There is only one "document", mythical, about the "joint" actions of the NKVD and the Gestapo. This is the so-called "General agreement between the NKVD and the Gestapo", dated November 38. A low-grade false, studied along and across. Further. Several secret protocols. These protocols determined the procedure for the exchange of Soviet and German citizens between both parts of divided Poland, secured the zones of Central European "spheres of interest" in accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and also established the obligation of the parties to suppress any "Polish agitation". Kindly provide evidence. " ... joint actions of the NKVD and the Gestapo in the fight against the Polish underground ... ".
  4. albanech
    albanech 30 August 2013 12: 00 New
    0
    Sorry for the expression! But again, reading about the "old fart * nov" who destroyed the army, ruined my homeland is not with my hands! It's as old as life! Every student can write more! And so there is an article - let it be! Maybe some of the schoolchildren, students and even read!
    1. aviator46
      aviator46 30 August 2013 17: 07 New
      -3
      Comment on the topic !!!!!! +++++++
  5. pinecone
    pinecone 30 August 2013 12: 00 New
    +1
    Quote: anip
    On the same day, the Reichsführer wrote a personal letter to Stalin, in which he asked to receive Ribbentrop. August 21, 1939

    Himmler did not write this letter; Hitler was a Fuhrer, not a Reichsfuhrer.


    Hitler held the highest public office of the Reich Chancellor.
  6. Day 11
    Day 11 30 August 2013 14: 09 New
    +1
    Interesting info --- More than 20 years ago, a future landscape designer from eastern Germany discovered a group of trees in the forest in the form of a swastika. Since then, similar images have been found both on the territory of this country and abroad, but the secret of their origin has not yet been revealed. Photo: spiegel.de.
  7. Day 11
    Day 11 30 August 2013 14: 14 New
    +1
    The local forester measured the trees and came to the conclusion that they were planted in the late 1930s. The fact that the swastika from the leaves remained unnoticed for a long time quickly found an explanation. The fact is that the symbol was visible only from a certain height, and passenger planes fly too high for people to notice it. Private flights were banned in eastern Germany. In 1995, foresters armed with chainsaws made their way into a grove of larch trees and cut down 40 trees. After the symbol was destroyed, talk of it began to subside, but after 5 years flared up again - in 2000, a mistake was made by lumberjacks who only slightly cut the edges of the cross.
  8. Kazakh
    Kazakh 30 August 2013 16: 24 New
    +4
    It should also not be forgotten that after the "purge" of 1937-1938. The Red Army was in a weakened state due to the loss of a significant number of experienced officers. Yes, these purges were given to everyone, and no one knows that they did more harm or benefit. God forbid now that begins, too, historians will say that purges were carried out in the Defense Ministry and even the Minister of Defense was removed laughing Yes, there were cleanings, but specifically no one was dealing with this problem, but constantly unfoundedly repeating the same thing .... tired of listening already
  9. Snoop
    Snoop 30 August 2013 17: 48 New
    +2
    Purges ... purges ... one and the same ... and what in the Red Army in 37-38. "experienced officers"?)))
    In fact, then there were commanders, command and command staff of the Red Army.
    1. Selevc
      Selevc 30 August 2013 19: 49 New
      +4
      There were experienced officers in the Red Army — those who failed the attack on Warsaw in 1920 and those who poisoned the Tambov peasants with gases? :))))))

      The purges in the upper echelons of the Red Army may even have benefited the Red Army - and the fact that they hurt her still needs to be proved !!!
      1. Day 11
        Day 11 30 August 2013 19: 56 New
        +1
        Plus you buddy! Absolutely!
  10. Day 11
    Day 11 30 August 2013 19: 25 New
    +1
    I decided to take a nap. Not bad, right?
  11. Day 11
    Day 11 30 August 2013 22: 20 New
    0
    Here is the text of a real telegram: "Answer: Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

    Telegram

    Berlin, September 3, 1939 - 18 p.m. 50 minutes

    Received in Moscow on September 4, 1939 - 0 hours. 30 minutes.

    Moscow

    Telegram No. 253 of September 3

    Very urgent!

    Personally, the ambassador.

    Top secret!

    To the head of the embassy or his representative in person.

    Secret!

    Must be decrypted personally by him!

    Top Secret!



    We certainly hope to finally defeat the Polish army in a few weeks. Then we will keep under military occupation areas that, as was established in Moscow, are part of the German sphere of influence. However, it is clear that for military reasons we will then have to act against those Polish military forces, which by then will be in the Polish territories that are part of the Russian sphere of influence.

    Please discuss this with Molotov immediately and see if the Soviet Union considers it desirable that the Russian army oppose the Polish forces in the Russian sphere of influence at the right time and, for its part, occupy this territory. For our reasons, this would not only help us, but also, in accordance with the Moscow agreements, would be in the Soviet interests.

    In this regard, please find out if we can discuss this issue with the [Soviet] officers who have just arrived here, and what, presumably, will be the position of the Soviet government.

    Ribbentrop


    38. GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GERMANY

    Telegram

    Moscow, September 5, 1939 - 14 p.m. 30 minutes.

    Very urgent!

    Top secret!

    Telegram No. 264 of September 5

    In response to your telegram No. 261 of September 4, 42



    Molotov asked me to meet with him at 12.30 today and gave me the following answer from the Soviet government:

    “We agree with you that at the right time we will absolutely need to start specific actions. We believe, however, that this time has not yet arrived. We may be mistaken, but it seems to us that excessive haste can harm us and help unite our enemies. We understand that during the operations one of the parties or both sides may be forced to temporarily cross the demarcation line between their spheres of influence, but such cases should not impede the immediate implementation of the plan. ”

    Schulenburg
  12. OPTR
    OPTR 31 August 2013 00: 05 New
    0
    At the same time, on March 23, partial mobilization was announced in Poland. In addition, April 6, 1939 between England and Poland a Polish-British military convention was drawn up. In response to this, on April 1, 1939. Hitler gave the order to begin developing a plan of war with Poland


    Here it would be necessary to edit the paragraph, otherwise it turns out that in response to the events of April 6, an order was issued on April 1. Rather, it is an answer precisely to partial mobilization.
  13. stalkerwalker
    stalkerwalker 31 August 2013 00: 19 New
    +3
    Many thanks to the author!
    A huge amount of work has been done to process (search, evaluate, analyze) a very large number of materials - links are given to almost all documents. This requires not only time, but also the desire to "get to the bottom of the truth", time, funds. I beg your pardon - I simply and impudently copied the articles, tk. I have not yet met such detailed material, articles, including those that are still ahead, clearly draw on serious historical research. And the topic has been topical in recent years, since the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact has already become the "byword".
    As for those groans that are published by the "Khrushchevites", then they can recommend "reading" from NIF.
  14. vladim.gorbunow
    vladim.gorbunow 31 August 2013 16: 08 New
    0
    Leading Western countries Great Britain, France and the USA did not show any desire to bind themselves with contractual obligations with respect to the USSR. With regard to the United States, I would be more careful in assessments. If only because the Ambassador of the USA Joseph Davis in 36-38 was awarded the Order of Lenin. 90% of Soviet aviation flew Wright-Cyclones or their clones. Soviet specialists in the aviation industry, ZiSa, GAZ traveled to the states for study if not thousands, as is evident from the published documents of the Soviet Trade Representation in 35 -38. American specialists continued to work in the Soviet economy. although on a smaller scale as in 28 - 33 g. And when the Americans decided that Japan was gaining China too quickly, Chiang Kai-shek was offered $ 140 million, migrated to the State Bank of the USSR. Soviet weapons, pilots and advisers went to China. It turns out the contract were only secret.