Military Review

Bad communist, but good commander

The death of Marshal Alexander Egorov was a real loss for the Red Army

Of the five first Soviet marshals, Alexander Egorov - the only one who had reached the rank of colonel of the Imperial Army, had real team experience gained in the fields of the First World War. But, unlike other fascinating books, they did not write about him, didn’t see Napoleon in him, didn’t add up to his popularly favorite songs, and didn’t say that the Red Army suffered an irreparable loss with his death. His name did not cause much interest after the rehabilitation of the enemies of the people. So was Alexander Ilyich a real military professional? And why was subjected to repression?

The theme of repression among the higher commanders of the Red Army is not new, for the last twenty years many books and articles have been written about this, both scientific and journalistic. They argued and argue about the true level of military training of the “demons of the revolution” Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Blucher, break their spears in the discussions: “What would have happened to meet the Red Army 1941 with the military elite not destroyed three or four years before?”.

In recent years, these disputes have become more meaningful. Already unpopular opuses with peremptory: "The destruction of the" genius "Tukhachevsky and his comrades - also" genius "- led to the victory in the Red Army of the" stupid "pioneer".

Alexander EgorovThe idea of ​​military professionalism of Uborevich is nothing more than a myth. And how can you seriously talk about Tukhachevsky as a talented commander after becoming acquainted with his heavy, in terms of the Russian style, writings on class strategy and the uselessness of reserves? About Yakir, we believe, it makes no sense at all to speak in detail: he did not have a military education, he did not command anything in the Civilian, but only butchered with enthusiasm.

One of the five first marshals of the Red Army, Alexander Ilyich Egorov, stands apart in this unflattering row. He belonged to a group of pioneer sisters, most of whom, led by Budyonny, avoided repression. The only daughter raised by her adoptive parents after her father was arrested did not become a well-known dissident and historian like the sons of Yakir or Antonov-Ovseenko, who diligently exposed Stalinism, but at the same time took care of the return of the “good” memory of the popes - the same executioners, only on a smaller scale.

Finally, Egorov was not a strong personality. He did not possess either the charisma of Tukhachevsky, or the apparent intelligence of Uborevich.

The Russian military emigration was closely following the activities of Tukhachevsky and saw in him the "Russian Bonaparte." The motives here were rather psychological: like many white generals, the red commander was in the past a guards officer. This allowed the prominent figure of the Russian military emigration, General Alexei von Lampe, even in the years of the Civil War, to write with some enthusiasm: "Our Guardsman of the Semenov beats the army soldier Liberal Denikin."

In fairness, we note that Tukhachevsky did not beat Denikin, but this is a topic for another conversation. Again, it was the emigre writer Roman Gul who dedicated the book to Tukhachevsky. Yes, and talented Soviet writers have bothered to create positive images of the listed Bolshevik military leaders - Ilya Dubinsky above all.

Polish question

The path of Yegorov as commander-strategist began in the Civil War on the Southern Front. On the rainy October of 1919, the Kornilovites took the Eagle. As written in Soviet textbooks, mortal danger hung over the Bolshevik capital. All this tales for an uninformed audience and ideological cliches. The exhausted and small regiments of the Volunteer Army were on their last legs. By the autumn of the 1919, the troops of the Red Southern Front had a tremendous numerical advantage. On this basis, Egorov decided to surround and crush the enemy. Neither one nor the other failed. Whites were neither surrounded nor defeated, but turned out to be ousted by a huge mass of reds, who won by number, and not by art.

More successfully, Yegorov commanded the troops of the South-Western Front in the Polish campaign of 1920, and the defeat of the Red Army near Warsaw was not his fault.

Perhaps that is why, after the war, he headed the Kiev Military District, then the Petrogradsky District, then commanded the Western Front, and finally, led consistently the Ukrainian and Belarusian military districts. At that time, the only serious opponent of Russia was Poland, with the dictator Pilsudski’s ambitious plans to revive the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth “from sea to sea”, which inevitably caused territorial claims to the USSR.

Western direction for the Kremlin was then the most important. It was there that was in 20-egorov. The war did not happen, and Alexander Ilyich went on increasing, having headed the Red Army Headquarters in 1931. Headed a turning point for the world stories a time when the Japanese began the invasion of China. Cloud was looming over Europe: in 1932, at the Conference on Disarmament, the Germans demanded that restrictions on Germany’s rearmament rights be lifted. Hitler was already eager for power.

But the main enemy of the USSR to 1931 was still Poland, led by an aging, but still firm hand of Pilsudski. According to Mikhail Meltyukhov, author of the fundamental work “Soviet-Polish Wars”, in 1932, the second Rzeczpospolita was ready to set up 60 divisions against the USSR. Her military doctrine, based on the experience of a maneuverable and victorious war with the Soviets in 1920, was built on the offensive and was skeptical about the prospects of a positional war.

Warsaw was aware that cavalry would play an important but not decisive role in a future war. Contrary to popular belief, the Polish cavalry brigades were supposed to move in horseback, and attack on foot. They also understood in Warsaw that the future war was a war of motors. In 1935, the Poles launched an army motorization program, for the implementation of which the National Defense Committee was formed, which was in charge of the supply of military equipment. Two years earlier, Polish designers developed one of the best for their time. tanks - 7TR, which was highly praised by the Germans in September 1939.

The Poles gave a lot of effort and the development of the Air Force. Already in 1936, one of the most modern bombers of the initial period of the Second World War - the P-37 "Elk" - took off.

Thus, despite all the talk about the military-technical backwardness of Poland, the country was a very serious opponent and only a short-sighted person could underestimate its power. Yegorov did not belong to those.

For the modernization of the army

By the beginning of 30, Germany was a weak, humiliated and disarmed country. However, the military thought in her worked very hard. The German military doctrine was significantly influenced by the views of General Hansaphon Sect, whose strategic concepts were based on the principle "The soldier knows only one goal of the war: defeat the enemy army." The main means of achieving it are offensive and maneuvering. And the victory was achieved, according to the German strategist, not by number, but by mobility.

Hitler, who had come to power, adopted the strategic views of von Sect, and the generals of the Wehrmacht embodied them in the theory of blitzkrieg. Our probable adversaries, as far as they could, relied on the modernization and motorization of the armed forces.

What point of view did Egorov follow on this issue? What was his true attitude towards the modernization of the Red Army? According to the once popular authors of Rappoport and Geller, Egorov, like Budyonny and Voroshilov, was going to fight with a sword and a rifle. The biggest domestic expert on the history of the military elite of the Red Army during the interwar period, Sergey Minakov, is arguing with this unwarranted view. In the work “Soviet military elite 20's. Composition, sociocultural features, political role "he writes:" Egorov was not at all an apologist for the cavalry. He actively advocated the introduction of armored vehicles in the troops. " These words are confirmed in the facts. In 1931, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army Vladimir Triandafilov presented Yegorov with his theory of the “deep operation”, which he had developed, and received “good”. And next year, Alexander Ilyich submitted to the Revolutionary Military Council theses on new operational and technical problems arising in connection with the technical reconstruction of the Armed Forces. These theses served as the basis for the “Interim Instructions on the Organization of Deep Battle”, which were published later.

In his works, Egorov emphasized: modern battle is the deployment of hostilities to a great depth, and this requires a motorized army. A supporter of the modernization of the Red Army was Egorov’s associate Semyon Budyonny, about whom so many fictions had been invented at one time.

In 1933, on the basis of the Privolzhsky military district, under the leadership of Egorov, pilot exercises were conducted on the practical development of issues related to the organization and conduct of a deep all-arms battle, that is, a "deep operation."

When Alexander Ilyich was the Chief of Staff of the Red Army (and from the 1935 of the General Staff), there was an active rearmament and reorganization of the Red Army. A few examples: in 1932, the first two mechanized corps in the USSR were created, which were armed with the T-28 tanks - the strongest at that time in the world. There was a development of the Air Force, equipped with high-speed bombers SB. Yegorov approached the modernization of the Red Army quite professionally and as the chief of staff was in his place.

On the threshold of war

What were the views of this military leader on a future war? He reasonably saw Poland as the main opponent of the USSR, believing that Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia would remain neutral. At the same time, Alexander Ilyich believed that Berlin in the conflict with Poland would take a benevolent stance towards the USSR and a hostile attitude towards the Poles. In fact, Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany developed close trade, economic and even military cooperation. At the same time, both countries had tense relations with Poland, which, after the First World War, the Germans were forced to give up part of their territory. In addition, the Danzig Corridor deprived Germany of direct communication with East Prussia.

Yegorov allowed the performance on the side of Poland of Romania, but, probably, did not attach any serious significance to this because it could not form a united front with Poland. The isolated actions of the weak Romanian army could not lead to serious success.

After Hitler came to power, the situation changed and Germany became one of the enemies of the USSR. According to Yegorov, shared by the military elite of the Red Army as a whole, the Germans could oppose the Soviets together with Poland. Alexander Ilyich believed that the Wehrmacht occupied the Baltic States, opening its way to Leningrad. However, while he moves through the so-called limitropic states, the Red Army will have time to turn around the border and repel the enemy invasion.

Probably, Egorov also underestimated the possibilities of the latent concentration of the Germans and the swiftness of the actions of their tank wedges supported by the Luftwaffe. But after all, what happened on the fronts of Europe in 1939 – 1941 was not expected by anyone: neither the Poles, nor the French, nor the British, nor even the Germans. It is enough to read Guderian with his criticism of fellow generals who were at least skeptical of the lightning-fast tank breaks of the "Fast Heinz".

So why did Stalin decide to get rid of Egorov, his combat ally on the Southern Front? Yes, the leader had reason to distrust Tukhachevsky and his entourage. The fundamental reason for the destruction of the marshal and his entourage was named by Serey Minakov: “The presence of living“ former ”political“ leaders ”in the USSR (including Trotsky outside) who maintained the reputation of potential leaders of an alternative political elite in public opinion, turned them into real candidates for political leadership instead of Stalin and the "Stalinists." Therefore, the repression was preventive in nature. In the current system, any “leader” who grew out of the Russian Revolution became a “banner” and a “slogan”. In such a system there could be no “former leaders” or “retired leaders”. Any opposition party, especially the “leader” alternative to Stalin, could not be put in prison, sent to the camp as a convict, but left alive. "The temple is abandoned - all the temple, the idol of the prostrate - all is god." He had the only alternative to power — death, oblivion, and “tabooing” his name. To do this, it was not enough to accuse him of all mortal sins and condemn in the media, propaganda and agitation, prohibit his mention, including in oral, even private and confidential conversations, it was not enough to physically destroy it, it was necessary to completely “clean out” all social the space around it, real, perceived and suspected, as a potential oppositional information medium. Otherwise, even the physically destroyed, informationally forbidden and informationally destroyed “leader” retained the potential of its oppositional ideological “galvanization” and secret “resurrection” in the minds and worldview of its silent but still living supporters or suspects in it. This, in particular, was one of the reasons for the transformation of political repression into mass ones. ”

These original arguments are not applicable to Egorov, for he was no leader.

Crossed out of mythology

Minakov notes that the British General General Wavell Egorov, who visited the Red Army maneuvers in 1936, did not make an impression of a “strong personality”. From the point of view of an Englishman, Yegorov is “quite satisfactory as a nominal leader if he has a really good headquarters behind him, but not a person who can enter and accomplish anything significant coming from himself”. Further, Wavell adds: “It should be noted that at that time practically all foreign observers, including those in the Russian military abroad, and the higher command of the Red Army itself, had such an opinion about Egorov.”

After the 1936 maneuvers of the year, Yegorov organized a strategic game in which the commander of the Belarusian Military District Uborevich did not want to participate. “Given the undoubted exaggerations in describing the behavior of Uborevich,” writes Minakov, “we can nevertheless state that Uborevich did not want to take part in a strategic game. The motivation was indicated only: "Who will teach us there?". Was Tukhachevsky meant in this case? Obviously, first of all, it was about Egorov and Voroshilov, since the development of the game and the management of the game were carried out by Marshal Egorov, and his authority among a considerable part of the then Soviet military elite was very low. ”

Such behavior of Uborevich emphasizes in him the arrogance of the amateur who is unfamiliar with the military subordination of the amateur, but the main thing is that we are convinced once again: Egorov did not enjoy authority in the military elite of the Red Army and therefore could not participate in any conspiracy.

Another possible reason for the massacre of the marshal was named by Nikolai Cherushev in his book “1937 Year. Elite of the Red Army on Calvary ":" There was something to cling to: an officer of the old army; active member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party; a wife accused of spying for Italian and Polish intelligence services; testimony on him by the arrested military leaders as a participant in the conspiracy. "

It is difficult to call these arguments exhaustively convincing. After all, Boris Shaposhnikov was an officer of the Imperial Army in the past, but he was not something that was not repressed - Stalin treated him with great respect. Wife? So the wife, for example, Budyonny was arrested, but the marshal himself was not touched. Socialist past? Stalin was notable for practicality, and who had his past in essence was the least interested. So, in 1921, he stood up for Alexander Ilyich at the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets, when some delegates were opposed to a former colonel, an “alien class element”, becoming a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

Then Stalin wisely replied: “They say that Yegorov is a bad communist. So what? Uborevich is also a bad communist, but we nominated him for membership in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Yegorov is a bad communist, but a good commander, and as a good commander he must be elected. ” Perhaps, in the last words of the leader lies the answer about the reasons for the execution of the marshal? He stopped in the eyes of Stalin to be a good commander.

Stalin himself attributed the successful defense of Tsaritsyn and the defeat of Denikin on the Southern Front, where Egorov was the commander. They said that in private conversations with colleagues Alexander Ilyich expressed his displeasure with such statements, for which he paid with his life. But could Egorov, who was a clever man and who understands what such talkativeness can lead to, afford criticism of Stalin? Hardly.

Probably, creating a myth about his own revolutionary past, Stalin understood that Egorov did not fit into it. And so he got rid of the marshal. However, we will probably never know about the true motives that made Stalin shoot his former comrade-in-arms. But one thing is certain: the death of Marshal Alexander Yegorov was a real loss for the Red Army.
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  1. ruslan207
    ruslan207 24 August 2013 08: 29
    19 th
    Well, Tukhachevsky was not a talented military leader, but what about yesterday’s lieutenants who commanded regiments with no experience of delirium and not an article
    1. tilovaykrisa
      tilovaykrisa 24 August 2013 12: 10
      Indeed, he was not, he has no military achievements other than conducting terror against his own people and using mustard gas. But ambitions and ambition were more than enough.
      1. Beard
        Beard 26 August 2013 09: 45
        The theme of the mythology of the use of poisonous gases in the Tambov region has long been disassembled and one should not repeat the tales of liberalists.
    2. Dovmont
      Dovmont 24 August 2013 15: 14
      No! Of course, Tukhachevsky was a brilliant strategist, and therefore neglected the rear and reserves. Because crap and crap near Warsaw! And then, you see, Budyonny is guilty of turning to Lviv, although Tukhachevsky was not going to wait for him! To see all the laurels near Warsaw I wanted to appropriate myself!
      1. tilovaykrisa
        tilovaykrisa 24 August 2013 16: 43
        Look at his career, in fact the ensign became Marshall, he proved the party’s devotion to the genocide, which he himself arranged without instructions, served himself, the Warsaw operation showed his complete unsuitability. He snatched part of the glory, but he couldn’t take this charisma away, wrote denunciations, broke his life to many people, and such ambitious mediocrity wanted power, Stalin simply wrote it off because before the war it was necessary to remove the foam from the Red Army command, and yet from the excessive zeal of the workers The NKVD also suffered innocent people, but they were not given a tower (as an example, General Gorbatov). In fact, it’s very difficult to understand the logic of the events, there may have been a conspiracy, but Hitler said that he wants that he didn’t arrange 38 years in his army and that would have given him a victory.
        1. Day 11
          Day 11 24 August 2013 16: 51
          I absolutely agree with you! And there was a conspiracy !!! Once again I am convinced of the genius of Stalin. 37-38 were simply necessary!
          1. I'm Russian
            I'm Russian 1 September 2013 19: 02
            It was agreed that there was a conspiracy. Cosmopolitans needed a world fire, and Stalin wanted to pull out the country. And those sentenced to the highest degree stipulated all whom they could, and perhaps Yegorov was hooked.
    3. sdv68
      sdv68 25 August 2013 10: 44
      I agree. Yesterday's lieutenants had little experience, but Tukhachevsky (if he had not organized a conspiracy) would not have been a regiment commander and not a division commander (where the newly-made letekhi often ended up). Incl. your thesis turned out to be "neither to the countryside nor to the city" (c). And if you remember that from 37 to 41 the Red Army also grew almost 4 times, then many lieutenants were forced to take command of a platoon or company.
  2. 6216390
    6216390 24 August 2013 08: 37
    even the physically destroyed, informationally forbidden and informationally destroyed “leader” retained the potential of his opposition ideological “galvanization” and secret “resurrection” in the consciousness and worldview of those who were silent but still alive or suspected of it.

    Parallels are verified, confirming the truth of the statement.
  3. solomon
    solomon 24 August 2013 10: 49
    "It is known that we have five Marshals of the Soviet Union. Of these, Yegorov deserved this title least of all, I am not talking about Tukhachevsky ... Yegorov is a native of an officer's family, a colonel in the past - he came to us from another camp and relatively to the listed comrades less had the right to be awarded the rank of marshal, nevertheless, for his services in the civil war, we conferred this rank ... "
    - From the speech of Stalin 22.01.1938/XNUMX/XNUMX.
    1. grafrozow
      grafrozow 24 August 2013 17: 07
      Quote: solomon
      he came to us from another camp and relative to the listed comrades had less right to receive the rank of marshal,

      Let's give up the periodic table, it is the same from the "other camp".
  4. knn54
    knn54 24 August 2013 12: 22
    Yegorov was shown the painting "Stalin on the Southern Front". Alexander Ilyich could not restrain himself and half-jokingly noticed that he was not even in the background. Three hours later he was arrested.
    And the Red Army, indeed, lost a talented commander.
    1. sdv68
      sdv68 25 August 2013 10: 45
      Quote: knn54
      Yegorov was shown the painting "Stalin on the Southern Front". Alexander Ilyich could not restrain himself and half-jokingly noticed that he was not even in the background. Three hours later he was arrested.
      Good joke. But no more than that.
    2. tilovaykrisa
      tilovaykrisa 27 August 2013 23: 48
      And the Red Army, indeed, lost a talented commander.

      There is an article about him even here on VO, do not talk nonsense about "Talented" rather mediocre.
      There are examples of the losses of generals who were precisely talented and, due to their army mentality and lack of ability to wage a carpet fight, were knocked out by such talents as Yegorov and Tukhachevsky. Forgive me the blessed memory of G.K. Zhukov, but at that time, following the results of his report to the General Staff, those who disagree with his doctrine were sent to the wall. Everything was extremely severe, there were no stools, and before the war they removed all those who did not agree with the unified idea of ​​the party, mediocrity, drunkards, unreliable, including in the Red Army. The close war everyone felt and cleared the rear.
  5. konvalval
    konvalval 24 August 2013 13: 48
    In any case, they were all shot illegally.
    1. sdv68
      sdv68 25 August 2013 10: 48
      The verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR may be erroneous (if there were frauds in the case), but to call it illegal is fundamentally not true.
    2. tilovaykrisa
      tilovaykrisa 27 August 2013 23: 56
      It is absolutely legal, moral standards may have been violated, but the rules of law have been met 100%.
  6. sdv68
    sdv68 24 August 2013 14: 27
    At one time, Anatoly Wasserman said that Stalin twice deleted Yegorov from the death lists, because he knew him well and did not believe in his betrayal. But then he nevertheless signed the verdict. Probably the proof was reinforced concrete. I don’t know what evidence was presented to Stalin, but I managed to find the protocols for interrogating Yezhov ( on the network and he accused Yegorov of spying for Germany. I don’t know whether it is possible to trust these indications, but bОI couldn’t find anything more on Egorov. Because he was sentenced by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR already when the repressions had already begun to decline, and the triples had already been eliminated, it seems to me that without sufficient grounds he would hardly have been shot.
    1. ruslan207
      ruslan207 24 August 2013 15: 00
      What can’t you say under torture Beria had everything under suspicion and how they wanted to shoot Admeral Kuznetsov after the war and Zhukov
      1. sdv68
        sdv68 25 August 2013 18: 50
        Quote: ruslan207
        What You Can't Say Under Beria's Torture
        Beria just stopped Yezhov's lawlessness. As for Vyshinsky, he’s in his work "Theory of forensic evidence in Soviet law" 1946 wrote in black and white that the recognition of the defendant cannot be the basis for a sentence.
      2. I'm Russian
        I'm Russian 1 September 2013 19: 08
        The heyday of torture was in Yezhov time.
    2. Dovmont
      Dovmont 24 August 2013 15: 28
      In the 30s, the highest command staff of the Red Army was fermenting among the "heroes" of the Civil War. I do not doubt this at all, tk. In a turbid wave of fratricidal war, a lot of crooks with little talents, but for that big ambitions, brought to the Soviet Olympus. They did not like the rigid centralization of power introduced by Stalin with high discipline and responsibility of performers from the lowest to the highest. Therefore, the purge of the Red Army was necessary, but how many innocent people suffered in it is another question.
  7. smiths xnumx
    smiths xnumx 24 August 2013 15: 03
    It is a great merit of the USSR and Stalin in particular that they were preparing the country for war. Stalin's fault, of course, is that he did not foresee the possibility of hitting Hitler first, because he did not expect that after WWI Germany would be ready to wage a war on two fronts, but we must take into account that Stalin was essentially a civilian man (drafted into the tsarist army at the end of 1916 of the year). As the head of state, he did everything he could, fully providing the army with weapons, including those that had no analogues in the world (T-34, KV tanks, Il-2 attack aircraft, etc.), and officers. Much of the blame for the defeat of 1941 lies with the military. The same Tukhachevsky, before the execution in 1937, almost completely tore off the armament of the Red Army with anti-aircraft weapons, trying to introduce the so-called. "universal weapons" (weapons capable of performing the role of a cannon, howitzer and antiaircraft artillery); equipped the army with multi-turret tanks (T-35 and T-28), as well as a large number of tanks with bulletproof armor (T-26, a series of wheeled-tracked BTs). Another "innocent victim of Stalin's repressions" Uborevich slowed down the arming of the army with automatic weapons (submachine guns), so much so that in 1939 they had to be assembled almost one at a time, and sent by air to the front in Finland. Few remember that on June 22, 1941, the Red Army did not have a SINGLE armored personnel carrier, although the Germans in each TD had a battalion on an armored personnel carrier, or a specialized army truck, and the available three-ton ZiS-5 and one and a half GAZ-AA (analogue of the Gazelle) ), most of which, moreover, must come upon mobilization, could not meet the needs of the military. The situation was similar with artillery, the main tractors were collective farm tractors and horses. In the overwhelming majority of cases, artillery was carried by pairs (45-mm cannons), fours (76-mm regimental cannons model 1927), sixes (divisional 76-mm cannons and 122-mm howitzers) and eights (152-mm howitzers and cannons -howitzers) horses, as well as agricultural tractors STZ-Z, S-60 and S-65, developing a maximum speed of 6-8 km / h. A significant part of our artillery on June 22-29 had no thrust at all. In the novel "The Living and the Dead" there is an episode in which soldiers dragged a 45-mm cannon on themselves for several hundred kilometers. But you can't carry a howitzer far on yourself. Compare this to the Germans. which had excellent half-track tractors, as well as a bunch of captured equipment. Or was Stalin himself supposed to develop armored personnel carriers and artillery tractors?
    1. bairat
      bairat 25 August 2013 20: 52
      In the state of the German PD of the 1941 model there were no tractors at all, all on horseback.
      1. Day 11
        Day 11 25 August 2013 21: 03
        No, well, there were probably a certain number of Ganomags. In general, yes, the main burden fell on the horses. No wonder the number of cavalry divisions among the Hans only grew (like Florian Heyer)
  8. smiths xnumx
    smiths xnumx 24 August 2013 15: 14
    In order not to be unfounded, I quote Wikipedia, an article about Tukhachevsky:
    In January 1930, he submitted to Voroshilov a report on the reorganization of the Armed Forces, containing proposals to increase the number of divisions to 250, on the development of artillery, aviation, and tank forces and on the basics of their use. The calculations presented in the report, based on the experience of Germany and France during the First World War, contained, for example, the production of one hundred thousand tanks per year. Stalin did not approve of Tukhachevsky’s proposal, preferring the modernization of industry over mass construction of 1929 tanks. He insisted on the use of dual-use equipment (ground-based anti-aircraft artillery, armored tractors), and the mass replacement of all artillery with dynamo-reactive (recoilless guns).

    That is, being responsible for the armament of the Red Army, Tukhachevsky was engaged in projecting, doing nothing ... As for Tukhachevsky's participation in the development of Katyusha, the Gas Dynamic Laboratory (GDL) created on his initiative at the USSR Revolutionary Military Council, which was engaged in the development of a rocket projectile, for For NINE years I have not created a single sample. Although in Germany, work on the creation of rockets was quite successful, as the intelligence reported, and what Tukhachevsky knew about, being the first deputy commissar of defense. And now, after the removal and execution of Tukhachevsky, in December 1937, 82-mm rockets were adopted by the USSR Air Force. In July 1938, after successful military trials, PC-132 rockets were adopted by the bomber and assault aviation, which were first used in a combat situation in August 1939 at Khalkhin Gol. In March 1941, field tests of the installations were successfully carried out. received the designation BM-13 (combat vehicle with 132 mm projectiles). The RS-132 rocket of 132 mm caliber and the launcher based on the ZIS-6 BM-13 truck were put into service on June 21, 1941; It was this type of combat vehicles that received the nickname "Katyusha" for the first time. So, the merit of Tukhachevsky in this is very doubtful. moreover, the work has not stopped.
    Tukhachevsky had nothing to do with the development of the theory of a deep tank breakthrough. The origin of the theory of deep operations dates back to the late 1920s. It was a revision of the idea of ​​massaging mobile units invented by Budyonny and successfully used by the Red Army during the Civil War (First Horse Army). The main prerequisite for its appearance was the large-scale rearmament of the Red Army after the end of the Civil War. "The theory of the offensive of modern armies in modern warfare," was developed by Vladimir Triandafillov, deputy chief of staff of the Red Army, and Kalinovsky, chief inspector of tank troops. The essence of this theory was to achieve two main objectives during the battle:
    1. Hacking the front of the enemy with a simultaneous blow to its entire tactical depth;
    2. Immediate entry into the breakthrough of mechanized troops, which should advance to the entire depth of the enemy’s operational defense before the defeat of his entire group.
    Thus, this theory reflected the modification of military and military operations that occurred due to the appearance of mechanized forces: the theory of successive operations, where military operations are conducted mainly on the line of contact with the successive displacement of the enemy from occupied lines, replaced a highly maneuverable war.
    1. ABV
      ABV 24 August 2013 15: 49
      We quote well the traitor of the Motherland - Vitya Suvorov (Rezun)! 10 points
      1. smiths xnumx
        smiths xnumx 24 August 2013 15: 56
        Firstly, in a decent society, it is not accepted to refer to Rezun. Secondly, if you have evidence of Tukhachevsky's "genius", present them, preferably with reference to a respected source, and not just "I think so." Thirdly, how can you explain the absence of armored personnel carriers on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, as well as the lack of vehicles. Yours faithfully! hi
        1. Day 11
          Day 11 24 August 2013 16: 23
          Great Roma! What are you trying to explain to him? Children of perestroika!
          1. smiths xnumx
            smiths xnumx 24 August 2013 16: 34
            Great, buddy. I don’t explain anything to him, just if you want to say something, say, confirm your words with a link, photo, video. And blurt out like
            We quote well the traitor of the Motherland - Vitya Suvorov (Rezun)! 10 points

            and a foolish person can. Not a single link to Suvorov, only to Wikipedia, but people do not want to read, they believe only in what suits them.
        2. builder
          builder 24 August 2013 17: 45
          Quote: Kuznetsov 1977
          Thirdly, how can you explain the absence of armored personnel carriers on June 22.06.1941, XNUMX, as well as the lack of vehicles.

          As well as modern means of communication, according to the remarks by the artillery designer Grabin, if Tukhachevsky remained a little more as deputy commissar, then the Red Army would not have artillery.
        3. ABV
          ABV 24 August 2013 17: 55
          I do not understand ... me chtol ?? Duc, I do not mind that Tukhachevsky is a warrior and it is correct that Stalin shot them all))) and during the perestroika period I studied at MISI ... while Gorbachev’s country was ruining .... and where WE ALL used to be ... ??
  9. Day 11
    Day 11 24 August 2013 16: 40
    But Tukhachevsky’s enemy is still the same! Bonaparte failed! On Tambov gas poisoned people. And I believe that he was in a conspiracy!
    1. sdv68
      sdv68 24 August 2013 21: 09
      Quote: Den 11
      Gas poisoned people in Tambov

      In fact, the effectiveness of using OM in the suppression of the Tambov uprising is greatly exaggerated.
      lzovanii-udushayushhix-gazov /
      vice_error = 1

      PS: And the fact that Tukhachevsky was in a conspiracy against Stalin even begins to talk on ORT
    2. I'm Russian
      I'm Russian 1 September 2013 19: 16
      And so it was !!! I recommend reading the series of books by Sergei Tarasovich Kremlev (Brezkun) "Russia and Germany: Together or Separately?", "Russia and Germany: Stalin's USSR and Hitler's Reich" and Russia and Germany: Set It Off! "
  10. Day 11
    Day 11 24 August 2013 17: 07
    Well, gentlemen, minusers, justify weakly?
  11. omsbon
    omsbon 24 August 2013 17: 52
    When I read about the "genius" of M. Tukhachevsky, I immediately remember his multi-pound tanks and large-caliber guns, the weight of which could not be supported by any bridge in Russia!
    1. Day 11
      Day 11 24 August 2013 17: 56
      How much did he offer to produce tanks (licensed Renault)?
  12. voliador
    voliador 24 August 2013 19: 26
    It is very difficult to judge Stalin’s motives for choosing the candidates for execution, especially when everyone who starts research on this topic already has their own opinion, under which, often, they begin to attract documented facts in an attempt to show that their opinion is the most correct .
  13. individual
    individual 24 August 2013 19: 27
    Publication raises issues that have long been in society.
    Answers to questions are always opportunistic and depend on the ideology of the publicist.
    I would like to hear the answer of an independent historian based on the archive and documentary facts without the author's speculations and assumptions.
    One gets the impression that the muddy presentation is beneficial to everyone, but the truth is "sealed".
    1. Day 11
      Day 11 24 August 2013 19: 46
      Now they will mend it, but Joseph Vissarionovich will always be the GREAT leader for me (the head of the GREAT country)! Everyone who was after him was not close to his level!
      1. Mareman Vasilich
        Mareman Vasilich 24 August 2013 20: 42
        why they will be minded, no, you told the truth. Egorov got what he deserved.
    2. sdv68
      sdv68 25 August 2013 10: 39
      Yes, the fact of the matter is that, most likely, the archives on Egorov have not yet been opened. Otherwise, he was either unambiguously in the "innocent repressed", or just as unambiguously was recorded in Tukhachevsky's digging. As I wrote a little higher, I have managed to find only one version of Egorov's spies today ( But I don’t know how much you can trust her. And since Until now, there is nothing definite, then there are more questions than answers.
      1. I'm Russian
        I'm Russian 1 September 2013 19: 19
        Either those people or their children are alive who have tapped Yegorov, and therefore do not open the archives.
  14. Drosselmeyer
    Drosselmeyer 24 August 2013 20: 34
    The author of the article somehow bends. Yegorov was not the only colonel in the tsarist army to become a marshal of the USSR. There was also Shaposhnikov. The 7TP tank was not a Polish design and far from the best. It was a rehash of the English "Vickers 6 tons", in the USSR it was also T-26. The "Los" bomber was only a Polish aircraft at the level of modern technology and more. I'm not even talking about the erroneous concept of the T-28.
    Regarding the conspiracy of the Marshals, my opinion, based on open materials, the conspiracy was real. The question is why the materials of the investigation are still classified ...
    One can say about Egorov, he was an ordinary mediocrity, it would be better if he remained a colonel in the tsarist army.
    1. Day 11
      Day 11 24 August 2013 20: 38
      They also forgot Baghramyan! He also fought for the Tsar and the Fatherland half a civilian! When he realized what’s happening --- he turned over
    2. Karlsonn
      Karlsonn 25 August 2013 14: 45
      Quote: Drosselmeyer
      The author of the article somehow bends. Egorov was not the only colonel in the tsarist army who became the marshal of the USSR. There was also Shaposhnikov.

      Tongue removed hi .
      By the way, I have already quoted here a list of the generals of the imperial army and the general staff of Russia who fought against the whites, as well as three "red" tsarist generals who, once captured by the "whites", refused to change and were destroyed.
  15. ammunition
    ammunition 25 August 2013 01: 06
    Quote: Den 11
    They also forgot Baghramyan! He also fought for the Tsar and the Fatherland half a civilian! When he realized what’s happening --- he turned over

    But the "whites" in the Civil War did not fight for the Tsar and the Fatherland. In February 17th, all the leaders of the "white" movement wore red bows on their tunics. And no one (almost) stood up for the Tsar. On the contrary. The leaders of the "white" movement just overthrew the Tsar. And then there were no Bolsheviks in Russia. Stalin was at that time in Turukhansk. Others are abroad. what
    1. Karlsonn
      Karlsonn 25 August 2013 14: 59
      Quote: ammunition
      But the "whites" in the Civil War did not fight for the Tsar and the Fatherland.

      The White movement as a single one never existed, as a general "white" idea, as well as a general vision of the future of Russia:
      - when Kolchak and Semenov squandered the land to the Japanese and Americans, Denikin and Wrangel fought for a single and indivisible; Before the Versailles peace, an idiotic situation developed in general — some of the whites supported the Entente, and part Germany (see the Cossacks and the Caucasus); some whites generally became separatists and so on. etc.

      Quote: ammunition
      In February 17th, all the leaders of the "white" movement wore red bows on their tunics.

      the red bow during the bourgeois revolution is not the red bow during the socialist. wink

      Quote: ammunition
      And no one (almost) stood up for the Tsar. On the contrary. The leaders of the "white" movement just overthrew the Tsar.

      I agree that liberoid democrats always forget that the February Revolution overthrew the tsar, to which the Bolsheviks have little to do.

      Quote: ammunition
      But there were no Bolsheviks in Russia at that time.

      You are mistaken, the Bolsheviks were, but at that time they were not a political force.
  16. 123tank
    123tank 25 August 2013 08: 08
    Yes, our story is full of many secrets. I remember how the teacher forced us to ink the portraits of the first marshals-enemies of the people with ink in a textbook. Comrade Stalin had a weak conscience. I hope he was not allowed to go to paradise.
    1. Day 11
      Day 11 25 August 2013 10: 21
      Is it like you joked like that? Not very successful
    2. Karlsonn
      Karlsonn 25 August 2013 15: 07
      Quote: 123tank
      I remember how the teacher forced us to ink the portraits of the first marshals-enemies of the people with ink in the textbook.

      If you take a lie, then at least do it not childishly. fool
      Are you a respected high school student in 1938?
      Or did the bloody ghouls manage to overlook that portraits of the enemies of the people were preserved in Soviet history textbooks?
      What did you do with the text? Pages from textbooks pulled out?

      Quote: 123tank
      Comrade Stalin had a weak conscience.

      You, dear with your conscience, figure out first how to lie in public ...

      Quote: 123tank
      I hope he was not allowed into paradise.

      Hope !!! laughing

      By the way, the fate of the anti-Stalinists is about one
    3. sdv68
      sdv68 25 August 2013 19: 03
      Quote: 123tank
      . I remember how the teacher forced us to ink the portraits of the first marshals-enemies of the people with ink in the textbook.
      Do not specify in what year it was? For, if this event took place with you, then you should now not less than 80-85 years.
      1. Day 11
        Day 11 25 August 2013 19: 18
        You’re still reacting to his! A young jerk, they allowed
  17. Captain45
    Captain45 25 August 2013 14: 51
    Quote: voliador
    It is very difficult to judge Stalin’s motives for choosing the candidates for execution, especially when everyone who starts research on this topic already has their own opinion, under which, often, they begin to attract documented facts in an attempt to show that their opinion is the most correct .

    A respected opponent in this phrase mixed sour with insipid, because at first he says that Stalin chose candidates, and then that "everyone who begins to conduct research on this topic already has their own opinion, under which, often, they begin to attract documented facts to an attempt to show that it is their opinion that is the most correct "ie. with his own phrase he casts doubt on the beginning of the phrase. I'm trying to formulate my opinion on the choice of candidates for execution. Interested in this topic and other things connected with the name of I.V. Stalin, I learned that it turns out that all decisions were made collectively at a meeting of the Politburo and there were moments when Stalin found himself in the minority when making decisions and this referred exactly to the 30-40s, i.e. then when the "flywheel of repression" was spinning, as the gozmans and others like them like to say. So my question is, how could Stalin choose candidates for execution if decisions were made collectively at the Politburo? It may be enough to indiscriminately hang all the dogs on Stalin .The decisions to bring to trial major party, Soviet leaders, military leaders were given by their immediate leaders, in particular, regarding the military, the People's Commissar of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, the Collegium of the People's Commissariat, and if they argued that the accused enemy, and even the Politburo, would make a decision, then drain everything. water, take out the basin. And under the guise of many of their affairs, perhaps Yegorov fell under such a batch.
  18. bairat
    bairat 25 August 2013 15: 40
    Quote: Kuznetsov 1977
    Compare this to the Germans. which had magnificent semi-tracked tractors, as well as a bunch of captured equipment.

    at least at the beginning of the war, German artillery up to the regimental was also horse-drawn.
  19. smiths xnumx
    smiths xnumx 25 August 2013 17: 50
    in the German TD, there is one battalion on "Hanomags", all the artillery on half-track tractors, and the rest of the infantry on vehicles (albeit different, albeit trophy ones, albeit not suitable for Russian roads), I do not consider an armored personnel carrier in a reconnaissance battalion and a motorcycle battalion, but what about us: in 1941-1942. (before the massive deliveries of cars under Lend-Lease): there are no armored personnel carriers at all, artillery, at best, on tractors, the battalion to which you point to ZiS-5 or GAZ-AA (hopefully few ZiS-6, GAZ-AAA, GAZ-M42 do not take into account a buoy), and most of them came or should have come from the national economy for mobilization. In the German TD for the number of 147 to 209 cars in the state there were: 561 passenger cars, 1402 trucks and special vehicles, 1289 motorcycles (of which 711 with sidecars). In reality, the tank divisions had up to 2300 cars, 1570 motorcycles. In the Soviet TD for 63 Heavy tanks, 210 Medium tanks, 26 BT, 22 T-26, 54 chemical (flamethrower), 56 BA-10, 39 BA-20, 1360 vehicles, 84 tractors (ideally, 43 TD 19 MK instead of 1360 cars in the state there were only 630, 571 trucks, of which 150 are faulty, and instead of 83 tractors in the state there were only 15) If the mobilization had been carried out before the start of the war, the total number of mobilized cars and tractors would have been much higher. And one more thing - as of June 22, the RKKA had 44 horses available to replace the missing cars and tractors. That is, the Germans have 874-1 vehicles for 11 tank, and we have 16 for 1 tank. Well, compare. The tank landing company you mentioned was a purely Soviet invention and was forced to move in tanks, for which brackets were welded on T-3,6s, ISs and self-propelled guns, even at factories. But on the "Shermans" there were no quiet brackets, so the soldiers had to fasten with belts to the protruding parts of the tower and hull. Not a single army in the world has ever gotten to this during the war. The same applies to the total number of cars. In mid-March 34, there were 1940 thousand vehicles for 4,2 million of the Wehrmacht personnel. Every tenth person was a car driver. By the time of the attack on the USSR, the Wehrmacht had half a million cars and half-track tractors. In 420, 1941 thousand cars were produced in Germany, 333 thousand in the occupied countries, the satellites of the Third Reich produced another 268 thousand cars. Until June 75, 22, mobilization was not announced in the USSR and the mechanized corps did not even receive cars and tractors from the national economy due to their imperfect organization. Because of this, such "bricks" as artillery and infantry were left without transport, could not act as a whole with mechanized corps. In Germany, the process of seizing civilian vehicles took place back in 1941. Yours faithfully!
  20. Vadim2013
    Vadim2013 25 August 2013 18: 08
    The repression of the commanding staff of the Red Army undoubtedly did her harm. The command structure of the army should be selected only by war.
    1. sdv68
      sdv68 25 August 2013 18: 57
      Quote: Vadim2013
      The repression of the commanding staff of the Red Army undoubtedly did her harm.

      Write more precisely. Repression against the innocent was harmed, and there were not so many of them among the repressed. If we talk about Tukhachevsky and Co., then they got what they deserved. If their conspiracy were successful, and they could manage to throw Stalin away, the country (with a high degree of probability) would plunge into the next Civil War (see modern examples of Libya, Syria and Iraq). Does it need to be reminded of what GW would mean on the eve of the war with Germany?
  21. bublic82009
    bublic82009 25 August 2013 18: 08
    They blame Stalin for the fact that he shot the best in 1937-1939 and we suffered such losses at the beginning of the Second World War. primitive opinion. everyone forgets to say, and how many talents were raised to the top in these years. Does anyone know what was the attitude of the executed marshals to those military leaders who became the hero of the Second World War? We do not know.
    1. sdv68
      sdv68 25 August 2013 18: 59
      But it’s true. From this angle, few people consider repression.