Implementing strategic deterrence, the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation pays close attention to strengthening the country's security by maintaining the military organization of the state, including the Armed Forces, in a high degree of combat readiness, preparing the country to repel military threats of any scale and from any direction. At the same time, nuclear weapons are considered to be the main deterrent factor for a potential adversary. However, the issue of a new strategy of organizing the armed defense of the Fatherland is on the agenda.
The United States military-political elite has recently been purposefully seeking means that strengthen their national security and allow them to rely less on nuclear weapons. As such a tool, they consider a new operational-strategic concept - a quick global strike (BSU), the use of which in interstate confrontation can allow to defeat the enemy using only existing and prospective samples of conventional long-range high-precision weapons. At the same time, anti-satellite systems and air defense systems, ballistic missiles and objects containing WMD, and other important objects can be the main targets. According to American experts, strategic means in non-nuclear equipment can be hit from 10 to 30 percent of such targets. In other words, in non-nuclear equipment, strategic carriers will have counterforce potential.
In this regard, the following questions should be asked: Does the concept of a quick global strike fit into a single large-scale range of threats to the military security of the Russian Federation and should the entire system of armed defense of the Fatherland be rebuilt or re-organized to counter this military threat? To get answers, it is necessary to understand the essence of the operational-strategic concept of BSU and to identify the tasks that are set.
Despite the loud name of this concept, the main goal of its implementation is to give the US armed forces the ability to inflict limited-scale high-precision strikes on important targets in the shortest possible time and at long range both with nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. The key points in this target installation are:
Are these targets suitable for confrontation with Russia? Let's see.
First, a limited scale and time strike on the territory of our country is unlikely to be effective from a military-strategic point of view. If the enemy unleashes aggression against the Russian Federation, then it will pursue decisive goals. And, undoubtedly, the aggressor is not limited to conducting only BSU.
Secondly, the application of BSU in Russia will in fact be the beginning of a large-scale war with the use of nuclear weapons, with all the ensuing consequences.
Thirdly, today the United States is not enough conventional high-precision long-range ammunition to solve this problem. The BSU forces can only be directed at solving a limited range of tasks in peacetime related to the struggle for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, against drug trafficking and terrorism, as well as the fight, or rather the destruction of unsuitable for the United States heads of state, as was the case in Iraq and Libya, and leaders of terrorist organizations.
Based on this, it can be stated that in the coming 10 – 15 years, the threat of BSU from the US using both non-strategic nuclear and conventional weapons is unlikely.
And BSU, and MSU
However, with the increasing potential of a quick global strike, this target can be changed. The most promising direction for solving this problem in the United States is considering the possibility of creating conditions for inflicting non-nuclear instantaneous global strikes (MGU) in order to destroy the most important and hard-to-reach targets anywhere in the world within one hour after the decision was taken by the military and political leadership of the United States .
The capacity building of Moscow State University is planned by reducing the time parameters for its implementation by using advanced hypersonic weapon systems capable of developing speeds of 8 – 21 thousand kilometers per hour, as well as retrofitting the Trident-2 SLBM with non-nuclear equipment.
In the near future (up to 2015), maneuvering and guided warheads mounted on ballistic missiles will be created.
In the medium term (2015 – 2020), unmanned transonic (2 – 4 M) and hypersonic missiles (≥ 5 M) with a range of up to 1500 kilometers, as well as planning heads with a range of up to 5000 kilometers are expected to be commissioned.
In the future (2020 – 2035), it is planned to produce a manned strategic bomber with ultra-long range up to 17 000 kilometers, and after 2030 – 2035, aerospace systems (VCS) capable of outputting payload to low-altitude orbits.
Colonel Warden's Five Rings
However, even after the accumulation of the potential of Moscow State University by conventional high-precision hypersonic means of destruction, one should hardly hope to win the war with Russia only with a short global strike. Understanding this, the US military-political leadership, in order to achieve victory in the war with any adversary, including Russia, relies on the integration of the concepts of instant global strike and network-centric war with the deployment of a missile defense system in Europe. Victory in the war with any adversary, according to the views of the Americans, will be achieved by solving problems during the two phases of hostilities.
The main content of the first phase of the aerospace phase of hostilities will be an instant global strike. Critical targets of the victim state are selected as targets for destruction. Their lists are compiled in peacetime on the basis of the concept of the so-called five rings of Colonel Warden, who considers the enemy as a system consisting of five radial rings. In the center - the political leadership, followed by a life support system, infrastructure, population, and only last of all - the armed forces. A similar scheme was already used during the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999.
The goal of the first stage of aggression is complete disorganization of the state, economic, military control system, “blinding” the intelligence, missile defense and air defense systems of the country, demoralization of the population, panic and shock, and disorganization of military activities of the victim state. The main tasks will be the strategic offensive forces delivering a preventive massive combined strike with the use of nuclear and conventional (non-nuclear) means, intercepting the survivors of the preventive strike and successfully launching nuclear weapons carriers of Russia with US anti-aircraft defenses, delivering the subsequent strike with a retained part of the US SNS. At the first stage of military operations, the main role will be played by Moscow State University and the missile defense system in Europe.
The possibility of practical implementation of the Moscow State University’s concept is evidenced by the functioning since August 2009 of the US Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), which is responsible for the use of 1 ground-based intercontinental missiles since December 2009, 450 and strategic parts aviation.
At the second stage of aggression, after reaching the goal of the first stage and if deemed necessary, the ground phase of military operations can begin, which are planned to be conducted in accordance with the concept of network-centric war, the main content of which will be strikes with precision weapons on the newly identified important enemy targets and mastering it territory.
It can be assumed that Moscow State University in aggression against Russia will not have an independent character, but will become the main component of its aerospace phase. Consequently, the problem of combating the means of defeating an instantaneous global strike must be considered in conjunction with all the problems of repelling an enemy's aerospace attack.
It follows from the above that in the long term (after 2030 – 2035), in order to defend their vital interests, the United States can unleash aggression against Russia using the forces and means of Moscow State University. Is our country ready to repel such aggression?
Need new approaches
Analysis of the characteristics of promising hypersonic aircraft (GZLA) and the capabilities of the existing RKO and air defense systems shows that the aerospace defense facilities of Russia have limited ability to detect and destroy GZLA, and in some cases are not able to do so. The radar and missile defense systems and SPRN theoretically have the ability to detect GZLA, but their software and algorithmic software does not allow to process information about targets that are not moving along ballistic trajectories. The radar equipment in service with the RTVs has limited capabilities for detecting GSPA and does not allow solving the tasks set in the entire possible range of their heights and flight speeds. Active air defense systems are also significantly limited in the shelling and destruction of the GZLA. The existing and developed prospective air defense systems are limited in height by the targets being fired to 35 kilometers, in flight speeds of targets to 5 – 6 M, and the missile armament of air defense fighters does not allow hitting targets at altitudes of their flight more than 30 kilometers and speed than 3 M. Existing automation systems command posts of all control links are not designed to process information from targets that have flight speeds greater than 4 M.
Not to mention the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation as a whole, it should be noted that to ensure the military security of our country, new approaches are needed in addressing the tasks of strategic deterrence, preventing and localizing the outbreak of aggression.
First of all, in order to more effectively solve the tasks of strategic deterrence of a potential adversary from unleashing large-scale aggression against Russia or causing Moscow State University to tighten the provisions in the basic documents (National Security Strategy, Military Doctrine, etc.) on the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to aggressive ones against the Russian Federation actions.
So, in the National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine it is advisable to make the following paragraphs:
The inclusion of these points in the basic documents will significantly affect the efficiency of solving tasks not only of strategic deterrence against unleashing large-scale aggression against Russia, but also of preventing it. The military-political leadership of the states - potential adversaries will make them think about the expediency of deploying forces and means in their countries that threaten the military security of the Russian Federation.
To ensure that these provisions of strategic deterrence and prevent aggression against the Russian Federation are feasible, parity with the United States on strategic nuclear forces is acceptable to Russia, preventing the United States from launching a full-scale missile defense system in Europe, sufficient numbers of general-purpose forces, strategic reserves and prepared for them, mobilization resources and material reserves, a highly efficient rocket and space system harrows, an adequate response of the military and political leadership of the Russian Federation on the threat of military security and high resolution to use military force.
Armed defense strategy
If the Russian Federation fails to contain and prevent aggression, it will be forced to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity by conducting military actions. Moreover, if the very existence of the state is threatened or the aggressor unleashes a war with the use of nuclear weapons, the RF Armed Forces are obliged to begin a strategic operation of nuclear forces. In the case of a nuclear-free war against Russia, which may be unleashed after 2030, a new strategy for organizing the armed defense of the Fatherland is needed.
The essence of such a strategy should consist in a systematic approach to the organization of armed defense of the state, in building both adequate and asymmetrical groups of troops (forces) of the enemy functional combat systems of the RF Armed Forces.
Considering that MSU is an integral part of an aerospace campaign or operation, countering this blow should be carried out as part of a strategic aerospace operation, and the main defensive executive system, its core, should be asymmetric with respect to the enemy’s actions Russian Federation. It needs to be deployed in peacetime, and by 2030, unlike today, it is obliged to detect and hit hypersonic aircraft. It is important to figure out which objects: carriers (hypersonic missiles, airplanes, unmanned aerial vehicles, ballistic missiles) or maneuvering and guided warheads mounted on them, head and planning units, and how to fight on them. To solve this problem, it is necessary to develop a new concept of organization of the aerospace defense of Russia and promising, capable of confrontation with hypersonic means of attacking the enemy weapons and military equipment.
At the same time, it should be realized that conducting only defensive actions is unlikely to lead to a breakdown and abandonment of further enemy aggression. It is necessary to actively counteract the actions of the enemy. In this regard, it seems expedient to accelerate work on the creation of a domestic hypersonic weapon and use it as an active way of dealing with the aerospace means of attacking the enemy in a preemptive or counter-counter strike.
Planning and repelling an aerospace attack of an adversary in the framework of a strategic operation should be carried out under the direct supervision of the strategic command of aerospace defense that was created in peacetime. Considering the defense orientation of our military policy and the fact that with the beginning of enemy aggression, the actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be directed only at disrupting the enemy’s aerospace attack, call this operation a strategic operation to repel the enemy’s aerospace attack.
At the same time, given the exceptional difficulty of actively opposing an aerospace adversary, it is important to provide for measures of passive opposition to the means of attack, including hypersonic ones. First of all, it is the protection of objects and their disguise, the dispersal of troops (forces), their timely withdrawal from attack, the rise of aircraft in the air and the launch of ships at sea, electronic, aerosol, dipole and other countermeasures of enemy reconnaissance, target designation and guidance. For the effective solution of these problems, it is advisable to clarify the requirements for the combat readiness systems of the RF Armed Forces, cantonment troops, and air and naval bases fleetand also to develop the latest means of protection, camouflage, passive and active opposition to reconnaissance and guidance of the enemy.
Thus, to counter BSU in the general idea of organizing a missile defense system of Russia, it is necessary to deploy percussion functional groups of troops (forces) that are adequate to the enemy, and to take active and passive measures to counter its reconnaissance and guidance assets. At the same time, it is important not to allow the US to again draw Russia into the conventional arms race, namely, expensive high-precision weapons and hypersonic means of delivery.