"In Ukraine, the standard of living is higher, and the average life expectancy of a man 62 of the year, as opposed to the Russian, is 59 years".
"Most of Russia (except Moscow and St. Petersburg) lives no better than Ukraine."
"About the standard of living: it is generally higher than in the Russian Federation, you just don’t have to compare it with Moscow."
His name is legion. Thousands of inhabitants of the post-Soviet space are scouring the runet’s expanses, piously convinced that no matter how bad it was in their homeland, in Russia “everything is even worse”. Outside the Moscow Ring Road, the impoverished drunk population sits at a splinter, heated by pieces of furniture. Penza (or an arbitrary regional center) is a branch of hell on Earth. The industry is buried at the Vagankovo cemetery without an orchestra, the damned Mordor survives only at the expense of the oil pipe. The army is a kingdom of hunger and terror, unable to cope even with Monaco. Russia will soon be occupied by the Tajiks, the capital will be moved to Dushanbe, and every second will be tormented by Kadyrov personally.
Inside the country, giving the post-Soviet contingent a minute of simple human happiness, indulge in the old Russian fun - whining. "What did you think Russia was the big eight? It's all a lie ... Russia can only be compared with Afghanistan."
"Ukrainians! Do not believe that everything is so good in a race, it is a complete lie. It is a plundered, miserable country that is in complete world isolation. They certainly have friends - Tajiks, Uzbeks, ... and so on ... from all over the union. Their it’s full here - only here they feel comfortable because no country, including Ukraine, will allow them to bend their own population, as is done in the rashka ”(spelling is preserved, some incorrect formulations are removed - the author of the pearl lives in St. Petersburg). Attempts to report that somewhere to the west of Brest live worse, cause immediate cognitive dissonance and vigorous protest.
These stamps are actively used by supporters of the "European choice" and state propaganda of post-Soviet entities. Thus, the favorite thesis of domestic fans of Thor, Krylov and Kholmogorov is actively used by Ukrainian nationalists. The patriarch of the divisive Ukrainian Orthodox Church Filaret: “And in thirty years, according to scientists, Russia will not even be a Christian country. And under these conditions, Ukraine is a salvation for them as a state. They already think that Russians are ready to transfer their capital from Moscow to Kiev, but that they are led here. "
The results of this situation are quite tangible. Thus, the clear predominance in Ukraine of supporters of the "European choice" over supporters of choosing Eurasian (in particular, joining the Customs Union) was largely created by the conviction of the senselessness of unification with "the same impoverished" (if not more impoverished) Russia, and unabashed faith in the fact that joining the EU will automatically bring the West European standard of living. In other words, a specific set of anti-Russian stamps, diligently supported by propaganda, turns out to be a factor of geopolitical significance.
Meanwhile, it is the myth that works against us. Let's see what is the actual position of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space. So, get acquainted, Russia:
Russia's GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) - $ 3 trillion. 380 billion (World Bank data; lower IMF data are the result of a simple extrapolation of 2005 data of the year). Russia is the fifth largest economy in the world. GDP at purchasing power parity per capita - $ 23,549 (of course, this is precisely at purchasing power parity, and not all of this amount goes into household income). In other words, according to this indicator, the Russian Federation is approximately twice as low as Germany ($ 40,394) and the USA ($ 49,495), and is 16,8 times more than Afghanistan; Moscow's per capita GDP is roughly equal to the "German average". Of the non-Soviet countries, Russia's closest neighbors are Chile ($ 22,655, the richest of the major Latin American countries), Bahrain (23,886), Saudi Arabia (24,571), Portugal (25,305), Greece (24,667). The example of Saudi Arabia here is a good illustration of the fact that extracting oil is about the same as the Russian Federation with 27 million of people to build an oil paradise for everyone is impossible, and dreams of a carefree life for natural rent, cherished by a fair amount of the electorate, are unscientific fantasy. Ginny Index (Income Inequality Index) - 42,2 (UN data). For comparison: Germany - 27, France - 32,7, Great Britain - 40, Italy - 32, Japan - 37,6, India - 36,8, China - 47,4, Brazil - 51,9, USA - 45.
Now let's see how Russian GDP is created. Taxes - 25,1%, trade - 16,2% finance and services - 14,0%, manufacturing industry - 13,6%, mining - 9,1% (oil and gas - 6,8%), transport and communications - 7,5%, education and health care - 5,7% , construction - 5,5%, state administration and military security - 5,0%, agriculture - 3,6%, production and distribution of electricity, gas and water - 3,2%. In other words, contrary to the myth, the manufacturing industry dominates the extractive industry, creating a larger amount of GDP in 1,5. At the same time, despite the fact that oil prices from 2003-th to 2011-th increased from $ 31 to $ 97 per barrel, the share of oil and gas decreased from 8,8% to 6,8%. Mechanical engineering shows reverse dynamics. For 2011-2012, the production of machinery and equipment increased by 12%, including vehicles and equipment - by 29,6%, machine tools - by 21,9%. In physical terms, the production of passenger cars in Russia in 2012 increased by 13,3% - to 2 million, trucks by 1,5% - to 210 thousand, buses by 30,7% - to 57,1 thousand. In general, the production of cars in Russia is still more than in 2,5 times inferior to Germany and the United States, but surpasses all European countries with the exception of Germany.
Russia's exports for 2012 - $ 524 billion (minerals and fuel - 71,4%, non-oil exports, thus, about $ 150 billion), imports - $ 312,6 billion gold reserves (gold reserves) are $ 505,7 billion. Total external debt , taking into account the state and corporate - $ 703,9 billion (33,2% of GDP), only the state - $ 49,6 billion (2,36% of GDP). Domestic debt - $ 4 trillion. 57,6 billion rubles (6,5% of GDP). In other words, the total national debt of the Russian Federation is 8,86% of GDP.
The average life expectancy in the Russian Federation is 69,7. The closest neighbors of the large "non-Soviet" countries here, alas, are India (68,75), Peru (70,15), Indonesia (70,25), Iran and the Philippines (70,6).
Total fertility rate - 1,7 child per woman. This is less than in France (2,08), Great Britain (1,91), USA (1,85), Holland (1,78), at about the same level as the Scandinavian countries (1,67- 1,77) and Belgium (1,65), but much more than in Germany (1,36), Greece and Japan (1,39), Italy (1,4), Spain (1,48), Portugal (1,51). As a result, the population of the Russian Federation shows a slight natural increase.
At the same time, the standard explanation - “guest workers give birth and in the North Caucasus” does not work. So, in 2008, the registry offices registered only 1,09% of newborns born by foreigners or stateless persons. Even in Moscow, this figure does not exceed 10%. I should add that the total fertility rate in Uzbekistan, which is a record holder in the number of labor migrants to Russia, is 1,86 and is decreasing. The total fertility rate in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is quite high - 2,89 - 2,88 child per woman, but the total population of the two countries is only 13,2 million. At the same time, the birth rate in Tajikistan is falling rapidly. The share of the North Caucasian population in the total population of the Russian Federation is only 4,2%, and for most republics, except Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan, the total fertility rate is below the level of simple reproduction. In other words, the Islamization of Russia, especially during 30 years, is an example of total absurdity.
This is how the Russian Federation looks like in comparison with the outside world. If we reject the dwarf states, then it can be stated that the country is poorer than the Anglo-Saxon countries, Western Europe, the oil monarchies of the Gulf, Israel, Japan and South Korea, but richer than almost the rest of the world. Now we will try to compare the level of development of the Russian Federation with the post-Soviet space.
Let's start with Central Asia. Per capita GDP at Tajikistan's PPP - $ 2247, Kyrgyzstan - $ 2409, Uzbekistan claiming regional hegemony - $ 3591. The first two "persons involved" live, practically, in Africa - for example, Cameroon's per capita GDP is $ 2343 thousand, Nigeria - $ 2661. Uzbekistan settled approximately at the same level with India and Vietnam, which are even somewhat richer. Life expectancy everywhere is lower than in the Russian Federation. Turkmenistan stands somewhat apart in the region, which is “only” twice as poor as the Russian Federation ($ 10,583), but the life expectancy there is the lowest in the CIS - 65 years.
Kazakhstan, the most developed country in Central Asia and a serious exporter of raw materials, has a per capita GDP of $ 13892, almost X times less than the Russian Federation. Unemployment in the country is kept at a level close to the Russian - 1,7%. Life expectancy is somewhat lower than Russian - 5,3 years, but the birth rate is much higher - 68,9 child per woman. Gross foreign debt is quite large - 2,62% of GDP.
Let's move across the Caspian Sea and see how things are in Transcaucasia. The per capita GDP at PPP of Georgia is $ 5902, Armenia is $ 6645, Azerbaijan, which extracts oil per capita by 1,5 times the Russian Federation - $ 10624. At the same time, the Georgian economy is a very interesting phenomenon. The country's trade deficit is 24% of GDP, i.e. a quarter of consumption is paid by the country at the expense of foreign loans. As a result, the total external debt has already reached 83,9% of GDP (public external debt is 26,5%), and until recently showed the most rapid growth. At the same time, Georgia imports up to 60% of food consumed. The unemployment rate among the urban population is 27%, and in the whole country the youth unemployment rate is 36%. In other words, Egypt against the backdrop of Georgia is an example of economic viability and food security. At the same time, there are no prerequisites for a “breakthrough” in the country - the growth of the country's economy this year will be 3-4%. Relatively high birth rates can be attributed to the strengths of the countries of the region - Georgia 1,9, Armenia 1,74, Azerbaijan 1,92 and longer life expectancy of Armenia 73,92 than in the Russian Federation, Georgia 73,3. Azerbaijan stands apart, which, despite its status as the richest country in the region, has a life expectancy almost equal to that of Russia - 70,3 of the year.
Now look to the west. So, Moldova is Uzbekistan in Europe, per capita GDP at PPP is $ 3424. Trade balance deficit - 40,9% of GDP. Life expectancy is 69,21, the total fertility rate is 1,47.
Ukraine has per capita GDP at PPP $ 7418, more than three times less than the Russian Federation. Of the larger countries, its closest neighbors are Egypt ($ 6723) and richer Algeria ($ 8515). As a more solid example, China ($ 9233), Colombia ($ 10587), Iran ($ 11395) can be cited. In other words, on average, a Ukrainian is much poorer than the average Chinese, and only a much smaller Ginny coefficient saves him from Chinese excesses of extreme poverty.
The bizarre state of the Ukrainian economy is best illustrated by the dynamics of the local car industry. In 2012, he produced 69,7 thousand cars - almost thirty times less than the Russian, 2936 trucks (the difference in 71,5 times), 3206 buses (the difference in 17,8 times). This year, in January-May, production amounted to only 12,6 thousand. Automotive industry is not alone - 2012 in Ukraine produced 4,8 thousand tractors, which is 22,7% less than in 2011 year.
Imports chronically exceed exports - the trade balance deficit in 2012 is 8,3%, of the payment balance - 8%. The result - the growth of total debt and the "evaporation" of foreign exchange reserves. Now they make up only $ 23,1 billion. At the beginning of 2012, they amounted to $ 31,79 billion, at the end - $ 24 billion. The total external debt increased to 38%. Formally, this is not very much, but the extremely low credit rating of Ukraine (BBB with a negative outlook; the impressive part of borrowers within the country is even lower - for example, the rating of Lvov exactly corresponds to the Egyptian one) allows attracting loans only at a high percentage. As a result, the share of the cost of servicing the debt in the state budget is quite European in excess of the cost of education and health care taken together. In the first half of 2013, the growth rate of the state debt and the reduction in gold and foreign currency reserves slowed down, and the trade balance deficit decreased - but for the simple reason that Ukraine reduced purchases of Russian gas by 35%. This creates the risk of freezing themselves or / and freezing a large part of Europe in the case of the notorious “anomalous cold weather”, which has long been transformed from an “anomaly” to normal, but the administration of Viktor Yanukovych simply has no money. Future prospects of the Ukrainian economy are fairly transparent. The fall in GDP in the third quarter of 2012 amounted to 1,3%, in the fourth quarter - 2,5%, in the first and second quarter of 2013, according to 1,1%.
Demographics on this background looks like this. With almost equal life expectancy from the Russian Federation (70,81 of the year), Ukraine has a markedly lower birth rate (total coefficient -1,49). Given the differences in the age structure of the population, the country dies by 26% more than is born.
Look at the reserve "socialism". The per capita GDP of Belarus at PPP is $ 15579, twice as high as in Ukraine, slightly higher than in Kazakhstan. January-May growth - 1,1%. Contrary to the myth of the brilliant successes of the Belarusian industry, the country's trade balance is negative - which is not surprising. Thus, attempts to create an assembly production of passenger cars in the Republic of Belarus usually end with an ephemeral result. The natural effect of the foreign trade minus is the aggregate debt in 54% of GDP. Belarusian demography also does not look particularly optimistic - with a high life expectancy (72,2 of the year) by the standards of the CIS, the birth rate remains low (1,5), and by about 10% lags behind mortality. Nevertheless, before us, of course, one of the two most successful partners of the Russian Federation in the CIS - along with Kazakhstan.
Now we cross the border with the European Union. According to the myth of the post-Soviet fans of the evroshlyakh, entry into it guarantees a European standard of living, a tumultuous stream of technology, and simply a sea of donated money. The voice of the people of Kiev: "The Germans throughout stories were democrats and not greedy. They will share with us when we come to them in the EU. They used to always share. "Let's see what they actually share with new Europeans.
In Soviet times, the Baltic States had a level of economic development on 10-15% higher than the RSFSR. Since then, something has changed. Per capita GDP in PPP in Latvia is $ 21005, Estonia is $ 23024, Lithuania is $ 23487 (RF is $ 23549). In other words, the result of two decades of independent development has come down to the fact that the Baltic countries have lost their traditional head start. And this is not surprising. The Baltic Tigers, which were fundamentally deindustrialized at the request of the EU, survived the crisis extremely badly. Thus, the Estonian economy fell by 5,4% in 2008 and 13,9% in 2009 (the fall in industrial production was 4,8% and 24,3%, respectively), reaching the pre-crisis level only at the end of last year. Lithuania showed similar dynamics. By the end of 2012, Latvia, which described roughly the same “trajectory,” still did not reach 2008, while last year its economy showed zero growth, Estonian - a very modest rise of 2,4%, Lithuanian - 2,7%. Industrial production has not recovered in any of the countries - in other words, they have experienced another round of de-industrialization.
As a result, the unemployment rate is as follows: Estonia - 8,3%, Latvia - 12,4%, Lithuania - 12,5%. Compared to Germany and Russia, this is very bad, compared to Southern Europe - very optimistic, but it should be borne in mind that the well-being of the southern European class is achieved through gigantic migration to developed EU countries. Thus, according to various estimates, from 4,4 to 10% of the working-age population of Estonia are employed abroad.
Baltic demography demonstrates three distinctly different variants. Estonia is characterized by a record life expectancy for the former USSR (76,13 of the year) and a rather low birth rate (1,52). Lithuania has a relatively high birth rate (1,76) and average life expectancy (73,56 year). Latvia combines extremely low fertility (1,34) with "Lithuanian" indicators of life expectancy (73,58). However, all these nuances are leveled by emigration. As a result, the population of Lithuania decreased from 3,7 million at the time of the collapse of the Union to 3,06 million. The population of Latvia in the 2000-2012 years only decreased by at least 13%. And this process will inevitably continue. Meanwhile, the decline in the number of working-age population always additionally spins the spiral of de-industrialization.
As for the former Eastern European social camp, four groups of countries can be distinguished within its framework. The first is Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Macedonia, which settled at the "Azerbaijani" level in $ 9 thousand - $ 11 thousand. Expected to be characterized by low growth and "massive" unemployment. In addition to low incomes, this group is characterized by a low birth rate - it is predominantly Muslim Albania with a birth rate equal to Estonian (1,52).
The second group is Bulgaria ($ 15933), Romania ($ 16518) and Montenegro ($ 14206); For obvious reasons, only two relatively large countries are of interest. Formally, they are approximately at the level of Belarus and Kazakhstan, but in fact their level of development is lower, and the prospects are much worse. Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Romania are fundamentally de-industrialized. GDP growth in 2012 is 0,6% (Romania), 0,8% Bulgaria. Unemployment in Bulgaria reaches 12,03%. The logical consequence of all the above is a dubious demography, mass emigration and permanent political tensions (the latter is especially characteristic of Bulgaria). The birth rate in Romania is one of the lowest in the world (1,24), in Bulgaria (1,54) the death rate is one and a half times higher than the birth rate, which, combined with mass immigration, has already led to a completely “Baltic” decline in population.
The third group is Croatia ($ 20532), Hungary ($ 21570) and Poland ($ 21903). All three countries in the Soviet period far exceeded the RSFSR in terms of living standards; now their per capita GDP is slightly lower or about the same, despite the fact that Poland and Hungary have joined the EU against the background of its prosperity and still receive impressive subsidies. Poland has managed to integrate into the technological chains of German companies, becoming the "main German subcontractor"; This allowed, for example, to bring the capacity of local assembly plants to a million cars a year. This allowed Warsaw to reliably relive the first wave of the crisis and the beginning of the second wave (the crisis of the Eurozone).
However, for some reason, the epic jump in the standard of living to the Western European level and the radical growth of the technological level did not happen - nobody began to share technologies, profits and markets with the Poles. Poland simply returned to its traditional niche supplier of cheap labor for the German economy, frankly frozen in the same position in which Mexico is in relation to the United States. In this case, even for the role of "makiladoras" obviously have to pay. The growth of the Polish economy is steadily slowing, unemployment has reached 13,6%. The auto industry as a result of all the vicissitudes shrank in 2,5 times - up to 400 thousand cars produced per year.
Polish demography is worse than the German one (1,3 child per woman; Hungary - 1,23), between 2004 and 2012, 2,1 million people left the country. The only consolation on this background is the relatively high life expectancy (76,6 of the year).
Finally, the fifth group of countries is Slovakia ($ 24896), the Czech Republic ($ 26426) and Slovenia ($ 26801). Historically, they are the richest in the Soviet bloc, while the Czech Republic and Slovenia, moreover, belonged more to Western than to Eastern Europe. They are relatively successful. However, the fact, unpleasant for them, is that, following the results of their return to the West, they are still much closer in development to Russia than to Germany, and closer than ever before.
Something like this is happening in the post-Soviet space, ranging from very moderate success to extreme degradation of particularly persistent supporters of the “European choice” in the style of Ukraine and Georgia. We should, at least, learn from their great achievements - and stop tormenting complexes with respect to the unlucky backyards of the European Union.