Military Review

Anatoly Wasserman: Strategy beats tactics, logistics - strategy. Why the troops did not prepare in 1941

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Anatoly Wasserman: Strategy beats tactics, logistics - strategy. Why the troops did not prepare in 1941The study of the last pre-war days in our historiography was given far less attention than the first days of the war itself. And the main share of publications is made up of the fantasies of Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun, who broke the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov and his co-religionists. They support the version that was first declared on the first day of the Great Patriotic War by Adolf Aloisovich Hitler and developed in detail by Joseph Paul Friedrich Göbbels: they say that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was preparing an attack on the Third German Empire (TGI), and it was only defended. Of course, Rezun's stories are refuted both as a whole and in all details (for which I personally am especially grateful to Aleksei Valerievich Isaev, who revealed the main reception of lies used by Rezun - applying the tactics of the events to the strategic level and vice versa). But beyond this refutation, little has been done so far.


In addition, rezunisty looking for all new loopholes. For example, Mikhail Ivanovich Meltyukhov assures: the USSR and TGI simultaneously and independently prepared for an attack on each other, and Hitler was just ahead of Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili. True, according to the data given in the works of Meltyukhov himself, it is quite obvious: the USSR had not the slightest chance of success coming before the middle of the 1942 of the year. But, according to Rezunists (including Meltyukhov), ascending to the speech of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev at the first plenary session of the Central Committee, elected by the XX Party Congress, crrrrrrrrrrrrrn ™ Stalin considered himself omnipotent and did not bother with such trifles as the balance of forces and the level of training of the troops .

True, there is an opposite extreme, which also goes back to the tales of Grandfather Nikita: all the same krrrrrovy tyrrrrran ™ sincerely believed in the impossibility of a German attack, rejected all intelligence information, forbade taking any preparatory measures. Here, however, it must be admitted: our intelligence did report the upcoming 1941.06.22/1941.06.15/1941.06.01 German attack - as it reported about the attacks coming up to 1941.05.15/1941.05.06/1939.08.23, XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX, XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX ... the scouts were not to blame. The Germans themselves several times suffered the intended date of the first strike. Yes, in addition, they used the latest disinformation technology of those times - white noise: before each significant step, so many conflicting plausible rumors spread that in their abundance it was almost impossible to identify the only true option. The leaders of the Soviet intelligence did not even try to solve this overwhelming task. They simply provided all the extensive material for study directly to the head (from XNUMX) of the government in the hope that he could connect it with information accumulated through other channels. To some extent, he succeeded: the abusive resolution of Dzhugashvili was preserved on one of the intelligence reports, usually proclaimed as an example of his faith in Germany's faithful execution of the non-aggression treaty of XNUMX, but, in fact, absolutely accurate - a source in the German Ministry aviation he reported only about two (and not about three, as it was already clear by that time) groupings of the German strike, and even in completely implausible directions. But to fully separate the truth from the noise in these circumstances could not be Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, but perhaps Yeshua Iosifovich Davidov.

True, in the end, the Soviet leadership launched a trial balloon. The Soviet Telegraph Agency 1941.06.13 reported (this message came to the newspapers the next day, so 1941.06.14 dates it in many memoirs): The USSR fully complies with its obligations to Germany, it does not make any claims against the USSR, and the accumulation of German armed forces in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet borders caused, it must be assumed (hint at the expectation of explanation), circumstances not connected with a possible conflict. When there was no reaction from the German side, it became clear: Germany no longer intends to play a diplomatic game, and the attack will take place in the coming days.

Nevertheless, there was no obvious preparation for its reflection from the Soviet side. The reason for such passivity to this day has not been clarified in due measure.

Outside of Khrushchev and Rezunistiki, he explores the prewar period in detail, as far as I can tell, except perhaps Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin. The cycle of his works "Who overslept the beginning of the war?", "Stalin. Who betrayed the leader on the eve of the war? ”,“ Myths and outright lies about the Russian stories, fabricated by our enemies "," Hitler's Lawyers. The truth about the war, or Why the historians are lying ”has already proved“ beyond all reasonable doubt ”: 1941.06.12 and 1941.06.18 The People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the USSR sent directives on increasing combat readiness to five border military districts. The content of these directives was reconstructed by the efforts of many enthusiasts, but their texts have not yet been made public.

Moreover, official military historians have long denied their very existence. However, shortly after the war, one of the staff of the General Staff sent out many dozens of top Soviet military leaders a list of five questions, in fact, aimed at clarifying the order of passage of these directives on the steps of the military service ladder and the format of their execution in different places. Alas, the publication of answers was started only in 1990, and only the answers to the first two questions were published: the following answers, classified to this day, could quite accurately indicate those guilty of non-fulfillment of the center's instructions. However, even in these matters, directives are not explicitly mentioned. But there is no longer any doubt about their presence.

Why the existence of directives is denied is understandable. The picture, known from many sources and brought together by Kozinkin in one panoramic canvas, is very expressive. In the flank districts - Leningradsky (commanded by Markian Mikhailovich Popov) and Odessa (Nikandr Evlampievich Chibisov) - the instructions were fulfilled almost in full. In the interim — the Kiev Special (Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos) and the Baltic Special (Fedor Isidorovich Kuznetsov) — far from all the points were made, and even then, what they did come to, was not quite done. In the central - Belarusian or Western Special (Dmitry G. Pavlov) - district, they not only did not take the prescribed measures, but often did the exact opposite: from removing sighting devices from guns (under the pretext of calibration in laboratories, although they usually do it completely differently and right at the shooting ranges) before the withdrawal of troops to the exercises without full equipment and even dismantling weapons from 1941.06.21 fighters - right before the German strike.

Kozinkin makes a logical conclusion from this picture. Commander key - Special! - The districts changed the oath and the military duty to different extent, prepared the ways for going over to the enemy and prevented the preparation of repelling an enemy strike. Moreover, top Soviet military leaders — People’s Commissar of Defense Semyon Tymoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov — also behaved rather strangely before the war: they drastically delayed the transfer of the pre-war directive prepared by 1941.06.21 in the evening (with Zhukov’s submission to the army) Historiography is usually referred to as directive No. XXUMX, although, most likely, it was originally included in the pre-war numbering), and even formulated it so ambiguously that as for its execution , so for non-execution it was equally easy to get under the military tribunal. Obviously, they too can be suspected of conspiracy or at least a failure to perform their official duties.

True, the subsequent fate of all those mentioned does not give additional grounds for accusations. Is that Kuznetsov in October 1941 th, commanding 51 th Separate army, failed the defense of the isthmus connecting the Crimea with the mainland, and the Germans broke into the peninsula almost unhindered (which forced the evacuation of troops from Odessa for the defense of the Crimea: in the case of the fall of Sevastopol, my hometown turned out to be cut off from supplies and doomed to a quick capture by the enemy). But Kirponos acted quite competently, defended Ukraine hard enough to have the bulk of the industry evacuated, and 1941.09.20 died when trying to withdraw several armies from the encirclement. Pavlov, though executed a month after the start of the war, was not for treason, but for the loss of control of the troops entrusted to him.

The sentence is often explained by the reluctance to raise suspicions of mass betrayal of the generals. But after 1937, it was hardly possible to surprise Soviet citizens with the fact that another accomplice in the military conspiracy temporarily escaped justice and was finally captured (whether the conspiracy itself was a separate issue; judging by the entire body of information available today, there were probably several conspiracies of various sizes - from the desire to replace the policy of Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov as the People’s Commissar of Defense with someone more loyal to the generals to the intention, together with the Germans, to overthrow the politicians in both countries and create an alliance against the Entente). The loss of control is undeniable: from the very first days of the war, Pavlov rushed around the district, trying to personally command each division and almost never giving orders, covering immediately a noticeable share of the troops subordinate to him. In my opinion, this, alas, is natural: Pavlov didn’t command more than brigade formations, and got to the rank of army general through the leadership of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (where, on the basis of experience gained during the civil war in Spain, he supported ballistic armor tanks - at the cost of abandoning the wheel drive, because wear-resistant caterpillars made of manganese steel have already appeared, and according to an analysis of the experience of fighting with the Japanese in August 1939 on the Khalkhin River, he proposed an effective structure for organizing armored forces close to that already formed during the Great Patriotic War) , so I just did not know what the real capabilities of the combined arms armies (not to mention the front as a whole) and how to use them.

There is no need to suspect Tymoshenko and Zhukov: after the start of the war, they behaved exactly as people with their military and political experience should have, and gave no more reasons for criticism than any other Soviet military leader of the same level.

However, the main reason for doubting the existence of a conspiracy, calculated by Kozinkin, was not even in the subsequent military prowess of famous commanders, but in the absence of any possible benefits for them in the event of a military defeat of the USSR. It is unlikely that at least one of the Soviet generals could hope for the inclusion of German military leaders in the closed and notoriously arrogant caste. There was no one to expect any money that could compensate for extensive material benefits (from official cars and extensive servants to country dachas, sometimes more reminiscent of a medium-sized manor: Nikita Sergeyevich Mikhalkov’s film “Burnt by the Sun”, depicting the transformation of the honored Commander of the Civil War into a new boyar , in this part of the plot is not too far from the truth). Neither were there any previous political distortions threatening severe punishments: all contacts with those executed by Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky and Iona Emmanuilovich Yakir, alternative potential leaders of any possible military conspiracies in the USSR at that time, were studied by the relevant profile and were considered harmless by the USSR, which there was no need for Pavlov and Kirponos to hide from the terrible justice (by 1941, it had already proved to the country and the world more than once, which ended XenMX – 1937’s lawlessness) . At least, my imagination was not enough to come up with at least one way to get such high-ranking personalities to profit from treason.

So, several very significant, respected and - as far as possible - experienced military leaders deliberately do nothing (and even act) contrary to unambiguous instructions, and the mere fact of non-execution of these instructions is sufficient for the most severe punishment, and the possible (and largely realized) consequences of such behavior threaten the whole country, providing - among other things - their personal well-being and prosperity, and they are not expected to have alternative sources of well-being and prosperity. It is already difficult to qualify even as treason. It is rather insane.

But, as Polonius noted about Prince Hamlet, “if this is insane, then there is still a system in it”. It is unlikely that Kirponos, Kuznetsov and Pavlov could go mad not just at the same time, but also uniformly - to the extent that Kozinkin finds obvious repeats and parallels in the actions of Kirponos and Kuznetsov.

Moreover, in the Soviet armed forces there was a rather dense system of mutual control. However, just at the beginning of 1941, one of its key links - special departments - was transferred from the jurisdiction of the National Commissariat of Internal Affairs to the competence of the Commissariat of Defense itself, that is, all reports on suspicious activity were subject to consideration within the NGO itself. But the possibility of a party report remained, and simple reports to the NKVD about suspicions could not be intercepted. In such circumstances, it is still possible to weave a conspiracy among several long and well-known generals. But open action, at best, incomprehensible to others, inevitably attracted the investigation. And one could hardly hope for the sluggishness of the NKVDistov: the removal of weapons from fighters in the morning of June 21 should have been the subject of a criminal case by the evening of the same day.

All the above leads to the conclusion that incomprehensible to us events in the border districts should be part of the plan sanctioned at the very top - not only in NGOs, but also in the politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), and in the Council of People's Commissars. It remains only to understand what was this intention.

By itself, this conclusion is pretty obvious. For example, the newest (2013) book by Boris Nikolaevich Shaptalov is entitled “Stalin's Military Conspiracy. Why the Leader planned the 1941 disaster of the year. ” I have not read this book yet. But, I suppose, the previous book by the same author, “The test of war — did Stalin withstand it?” (M., Yauza, EXMO, 2012), where two hypotheses of strange behavior of Dzhugashvili were put forward, can give some idea of ​​it. On page 279 – 285 there is a paragraph “The theory of artificial difficulties”, where the theory itself consists of three points:

“1. The artificial difficulties created by the rulers are designed to raise the tone of the people and color the national history with bright colors.

2. By virtue of the first postulate, the ruler is forced at the beginning of his reign to deal with the difficulties of the previous one, after which he will face difficulties for the successor.

3. The greatness of the ruler is directly proportional to the difficulties and disputes of historians about the meaning of the deed. ”

And on page 285 – 300 - “Application for another historical sensation”, where on page 289 Dzhugashvili was declared a former secret agent of the security department, dreaming about the restoration of capitalism. It is clear that both hypotheses do not stand up to even the most condescending criticism. Seriously speaking about artificial difficulties can only be the one who, he has never had the slightest idea of ​​the innumerable natural difficulties of national history, and all the accusations of Dzhugashvili in cooperation with the internal security services of the Russian Empire (they were repeatedly put forward both in the imperial and in the Soviet times) long, detailed and conclusively refuted.

However, Shaptalov draws parallels with Leib Davidovich Bronstein - Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin, Mikhail Pavlovich Efremov - Tomsky and Alexei Ivanovich Rykov, charged with Dzhugashvili in all the same desire for the restoration of capitalism, and Mikhail Gorbachev publicly confessed to the crime already our days. But Bronstein and his colleagues lost in the public struggle to all the same Dzhugashvili (for example, in 1927, about the position of Brunstein was voted around 1 / 200 of the USSR communists, about as many others supported the options put forward in the general party discussion, and the rest 99 / 100 unambiguously supported Dzhugashvili's proposal; in subsequent disputes, the level of support for Bukharin, Efremov and Rykov’s speeches against Dzhugashvili turned out to be about the same, all this is not surprising, since Dzhugashvili’s opponents in all these disputes offered an extreme course, but he was looking for lot), so they simply had no other way to return to power, except for betraying their own ideals. Gorbachev, until the last minute of the government, defended precisely socialism, although with obviously unsuitable means, and only after leaving power declared that his goal was precisely defeat, according to the principle “it is better to pass for a nits than a sucker.” Dzhugashvili, having a much larger experience than Gorbachev, the experience of political struggle, could hardly hope for any personal well-being after the defeat of the USSR - especially in a market society, where the service already rendered is not worth a penny. Assumptions Shaptalova have to reject. For the sake of fairness, I will only note: as far as I can tell, he is mistaken in good faith - simply because his knowledge in military affairs and in leadership of really large systems (like the state) is even weaker than mine.

But there are other possible causes. For example, arising from the comments of my more famous colleague - a member of the trade union of journalists - Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov: "Politics is a concentrated expression of the economy."

True, this consideration most often justifies Khruschev’s disbelief of Dzhugashvili in the very possibility of German aggression. They say that Germany so badly needed the Soviet supply of raw materials that the leader did not expect the Germans to make a decision to provide these supplies by force. In fact, Soviet raw materials were far from being critical for TGI.

It received the bulk of the oil from Romania. A lot went also from Hungary. Yes, and on the actual German - first of all the Austrian - the territory was oil fields, although modest. Moreover, even the United States of America (MUH) supplied TGI — through Spanish dealers — almost more oil than the USSR. Moreover, deliveries from the MUH continued until the beginning of 1944 — until the preparations for the landing of troops of English-speaking countries in France began. The main source of liquid fuel in the SIG was its synthesis from coal. True, such gasoline is several times more laborious and worse in terms of the ratio of the energy produced to the spent energy, which means that it is more expensive than that obtained from oil - and the octane number is much lower, so it requires many times more anti-knock additives. But the German chemical industry — at that time the best in the world — coped with all these difficulties. Only a few months after Romania’s run over to the Soviet side, by the end of 1944, when the Anglo-Saxons, providing their own fighting, temporarily abandoned their usual practice of aerial bombardment of residential areas only, and targeted the main German gasoline synthesis plants bombed — TGI began to feel a shortage liquid fuels.

A similar picture for other types of Soviet raw materials. Cotton lines - scraps of fibers when separated from seeds - are a convenient source of cellulose for nitration to pyroxylin, but in Germany there are many other sources of the same cellulose, so it lacked smokeless powder even after complete cessation of access to Central Asian cotton. In order for our iron ore, the Germans managed not to specify the minimum acceptable iron concentration, so they received waste from the work of our ore-dressing factories from the USSR, and ore with a high proportion of iron was transported from Sweden throughout the war. And, say, the Germans began to receive Soviet manganese in appreciable quantities only after the seizure of the Nikopol deposit (the very same Shaptalov was outraged by the Soviet frontal attacks of the Nikopol bridgehead, while the German generals in the memoirs were amazed at the exorbitant costs of the German forces to hold it; in fact, every day German possession of Nikopol allowed to take in TGI hundreds of tons of metal required for the wear resistance of tank tracks). I’m not even talking about such types of raw materials as chicken feathers and chaff: The Germans, of course, have found use for even this, but it is rather difficult to consider such supplies vital for combat operations.

Obviously, the economic considerations that kept the USSR from timely preparation for the immediate commencement of hostilities concerned the state and capabilities of the USSR itself, but not the TGI.

Back in 2005, the book of Yakov Grigorievich Verkhovsky and Valentina Tyrmos “Stalin. Secret "scenario" of the beginning of the war. In their opinion, the head of government (and the actual head of state) deliberately set the army under a crushing German blow in order to win over the public opinion of the West and thus provide the USSR with economic support in the war. I then mentioned this work in my snide note "Axioms of conspiracy." In fact, the economic potential of the USSR itself seemed to me then sufficient to cope with the enemy and without assistance. After all, all Western deliveries - both under Lend-Lease and for real money - amounted to the total 1 / 25 of Soviet own costs of the war. True, on some points (gunpowder, high-octane gasoline) supplies reached half of their own production. But before the war it was difficult to expect this: no one in the USSR thought that Germany would occupy all of White and Little Russia, and even a fair piece of Great. In addition, in the absence of supplies, some productions would have to be developed and redeployed, but on the whole, the task was completely possible then - planned, and therefore able to concentrate efforts on key sectors - the Soviet economy: in general, production had to be increased only by 1 / 25 .

Moreover, even the Anglo-Saxon military assistance, insistently demanded by the Soviet leadership from the very moment of the German attack on us, turned out to be completely unnecessary. Judging by the fighting since the Anglo-Saxon landing on the European continent (even in Italy in 1943, even in France in 1944), without this landing, the Soviet troops could cope with the Germans and their numerous allies only a few months later and additionally it is unlikely to lose more than half a million people. And this is incomparably fewer people (and means) than was required for the subsequent opposition to the same Anglo-Saxons: from showing the impracticability of the Unthinkable operation that was planned by the end of the war by Winston Leonard Randolphovich Spencer-Churchill, to the prosecution of the Unthinkable, that is, the joint attack on the USSR by the Anglo-Saxons and the captured Germans, before the prosecution of the Unthinkable, that is, the joint attack on the USSR by the Anglo-Saxons and the captured Germans, before the prosecution of the Unthinkable, that is, the joint attack on the USSR by the Anglo-Saxons and the captured Germans, before the prosecution of the Unthinkable, that is, the joint attack on the USSR by the Anglo-Saxons and the captured Germans, before the prosecution of the Unthinkable, that is, the joint attack on the USSR by the Anglo-Saxons and the captured Germans, to lead the prosecution to the Unthinkable, i.e. By the same Churchill and started by Harry S. (he did not decipher this initial, asserting that in this way he pays tribute to two relatives at once) John-Andersovich Truman of the Cold War. The geopolitical consequences of the treatment of the entire European continent in the field of cooperation with the USSR are even more innumerable.

Even subsequent publications about the true possibilities of the German bloc did not change my opinion. Almost all European industry worked in Germany. In the same ranks with the Germans (including the inhabitants of Austria, now once again separated from the rest of Germany, and Alsace, now once again entering France), not only the troops of Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Finland, Croatia that declared the USSR fought, but and volunteers from Spain (one division: Generalissimo Francisco Paulino Ermenehildo Teodulo Nicolasovich Franco Bahamonde fused everyone who was not satisfied with the civil war and intended to continue the battle), France (there were more than participants widely advertised augmented French Resistance), Belgium, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries (including neutral Sweden) ... Nevertheless, the degree of industrial restructuring for military needs and quite modest even by our (not to mention German) standards began much less than in the USSR war, the fighting capacity of the European rabble left the USSR excellent chances of victory. If we take into account the natural pre-war time, even taking into account the complex experience of the Finnish campaign, the political leadership’s confidence in the capabilities of the armed forces, there is no reason at all to place these forces under the first, obviously powerful, enemy strike.

Alas, it was only with an unpardonable delay for the analyst that I began to understand: it is not only about providing additional opportunities for myself, but also to prevent additional opportunities for the enemy. And Germany had plenty of opportunities.

Only 6 weeks before the German aggression - 1941.05.10 - Hitler's personal secretary and his official deputy for the National Socialist German Workers' Party Rudolf Walter Richard Johann-Fritsevich (Fritz - short form from Friedrich, but in Germany has long existed as an independent name) Hess at the two-engine The Messerschmitt-110 fighter flew into the British Empire (BI). Officially, he was declared insane for it, but only a few days after the flight, when they came to the conclusion in Germany that even the politicians of the second British echelon did not contact him. Soviet agents in Britain - above all the legendary Cambridge five aristocrats with left-wing convictions - undoubtedly, many significant details were reported in the USSR, but even they could not know exactly who of the British leadership hoped to meet the second person in the Nazi hierarchy, and most importantly - was not Are there any contacts through third parties that do not attract general attention?

But the whole world knew: not only Hitler himself was a fanatical angloman who used the Houston's Stuart's racial theory of William Charlesow Chamburin in his propaganda and devoted hundreds of pages of My Struggle to his admiration for the island empire, but among the British aristocrats there are a myriad of sincere supporters. . True, Arthur Neville Josephovich Cemberlen, when he was the prime minister of Britain, who had given Czechoslovakia to Hitler, was already dead. But the current Prime Minister Winston, Leonard Randolphovich Spencer-Churchill, was still in the middle of the 1930's, admiring the creator of fascism and the leader of Italy, Benito Amilcare Andrea Alessandrovich Mussolini. Osvald Ernald Osvaldovich Mosley, the founder and permanent leader of the British Fascist Union (his son Max Rufus in 1993 – 2009) was in charge of the International Motorsports Federation, was interned with the start of the war - but the baronet title made him even above Churchill even above Churchill, whose father was only the third son of Duke Malboro. And Nancy Witcher Chizuelllovna Langhorn — an American, like Churchill's mother, and the first woman elected to the British parliament — and her second husband, media mogul Waldorf William-Waldorfovich Astor, the second Viscount Astor, from the beginning of 1930, gathered in their own property. all of the British nobility, including the same Churchill (back in 1912, they exchanged legendary remarks: "If I were your wife, Winston, you would have poisoned you in coffee" - "If I were your husband, Nancy, then would drink it "), and they all stood up for everything that could prevent social lizma.

It was easy to assume: the slightest reason to declare the USSR an aggressor - and the brilliant British aristocracy will bring to a logical conclusion the plan prepared at the beginning of 1940, but frustrated by Finland’s too fast capitulation - the bombing of the Baku oil fields. It is unlikely to bring the USSR out of the war: too many pots beat two empires in the previous year, so that Britain would want to lose the counterweight to Germany. But the USSR in this case turned out to be critically dependent on the supply of Middle Eastern - British at that time - oil, and therefore would have been forced to do everything dictated from London.

And this is also the most favorable option: history knows many examples of alliance between countries that fiercely fought yesterday. I will not give them all, but I will remind you only of the domestic case. After the almost complete defeat of Prussia in the Seven Years' War, where the Russian Empire played a decisive role, Elizabeth I Petrovna Romanova died suddenly. Her son of her sister Anne was replaced by a fanatical admirer of the King of Prussia Friedrich II Friedrich Vilhelmovich Hohentsollern Peter III Fedorovich Romanov - Karl Peter Ulrich Karl-Friedrichovich zu Holstein-Gottorp von Untervalden. He returned everything won and even ordered the troops to go under the Prussian command. In a couple of months, the guards overthrew him in favor of his wife Catherine II Alexeevna - Sophia Augusta Frederika Christian Augustus Ascania von Anhalt-Zerbst. But even she could not return at least East Prussia, whose inhabitants had already sworn allegiance to Russia. Who knew: all of a sudden, Churchill's bulldog stubbornness was so sick of someone that the mistress of the seas would prefer to see his magnificent funeral and send her battleships to the Baltic?

On the other side of the Atlantic, things were, from the Soviet point of view, worse. The United States of America has not yet participated in the hostilities, but only helped the British Empire on “lend-lease” terms: the property supplied by the MUH was either to be spent during the hostilities, or, upon termination, to be returned to the MUH or paid. Moreover, conditions so favorable for the consumer arose only after the exhaustion of the British possibilities of ordinary payment for supplies: for example, for fifty squadron destroyers built by the MUH back in World War I, the BI provided the MUH naval bases in the British Virgin Islands for rent on 99 years, which international practice is usually considered a euphemism for eternity (although the same Britain in 1997-m was forced to return Hong Kong to China, taken for the same 99 years - but this is not a great empire before World War II). This is understandable: in the interwar period, MUH and BI were strategic competitors, so the MUH made considerable efforts to limit (and further, dismantle) BI.

The then competition of the two main British countries was caused by objective reasons: the vast markets of the British colonies were almost closed to non-British goods, and the MUH industry was in dire need of new consumers for its further expansion and development.

In the first half of 1930, the MUH industry dragged Soviet industrialization out of the crisis: much of the Soviet factories of that time were bought from the MUH almost turnkey, or at least designed with the participation of American specialists and equipped with a significant share of the American equipment. But at the end of the first five-year plan (1927 – 1932), dedicated to the creation of enterprises for the production of means of production, the USSR used more and more of its own products for further industrialization, and therefore it needed less and less to import. He paid off a significant part of the American loans in the second five-year period (1933 – 1937), so he almost got rid of the financial system of the MUH. Overseas, high-tech samples were now bought (primarily, aircraft and aircraft engines; I already wrote about one of the conflicts related to these purchases in the article “A crime against improvement. Big Terror is a way of preserving dual-channel control”), and then for own Soviet production, and royalties much less income from the sale of finished products in bulk.

However, in 1940, even such cooperation has ceased. After the start of the Soviet-Finnish war (alas, objectively necessary for the protection of the Leningrad industrial region and started only after the refusal of the then Finnish leadership to peacefully exchange territories in the ratio 2: 1 in favor of Finland, although the Winter War is still trying to proclaim proof of Soviet aggression) Only the British-French Entente began to prepare a blow to the USSR, but the MUH was outraged sharply. President Franklin Delano Jamesovich Roosevelt (generally pro-Soviet, and in addition he used many methods of state intervention in the economy, branded while socialism) to bring the country out of the crisis, proclaimed a moral embargo: there were no official prohibitions, so as not to introduce the state into possible costs of compensation force majeure losses of entrepreneurs, but contracts with the USSR froze.

In the middle of 1941, it was not at all clear whether the MUH would go to war explicitly and on whose side. According to the experience of the First World War one should have expected that they would wait either for the obvious superiority of one of the parties, or for complete mutual exhaustion. And in that war, the pro-German lobby turned out to be almost as strong as the pro-British one. And in 1930, German agitation in the MUH, which was imposed on traditional Anglo-Saxon racism, turned out to be so strong that in 1938, the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) had to be adopted - in its image and likeness The Russian law 2012 on non-profit organizations.

In such conditions, it is natural to expect: MUH will oppose the one whom they themselves proclaim as the aggressor. Even if they did not send their troops to the Old World (the isolation tradition was so strong in the MUH that many explain the 1941.12.07 catastrophe in Pearl Harbor when the Japanese caught the MHA fleet by surprise, despite all the preliminary information about the preparation of some drastic actions available to the Americans, Roosevelt’s desire to overcome this isolationism and force the country to begin hostilities around the world), then at least increase the supply of its goods to Germany, and even threaten BI to terminate the lend-lease in case of refusal of an honorable pass ria. And then the USSR will not just be left without outside supply, but will face the combined economic power of the rest of the world.

People of my generation well remember what efforts this confrontation demanded even in the 1960 – 1970-s successful for us and crisis for the market world. But before the Second World War, there were a dozen other socialist countries that took on a considerable share of the military burden. And the USSR itself became a great power only during this war. Suffice it to say: until the end of 1920, Poland was considered a serious opponent for us, and in 1930 the Polish-Romanian alliance was a noticeable threat to the USSR. To admit the declaration of the USSR as an aggressor in 1941 was impossible under any circumstances.

I have to - alas, with a delay of 8 years - apologize to Verkhovsky and Tyrmos. They felt more precisely the 1941 atmosphere of the year. Although they formulated their feelings somewhat one-sidedly, they considered the needs of the USSR only, but not its opponents.

Having come to this conclusion, it is already easy to understand why the command of the border districts disrupted the bringing of troops into combat readiness. It simply feared that movements in the border zone would be announced as preparations for Soviet aggression. Therefore, only what could be hidden from any observers was done.

Affected, of course, are differences in combat proficiency. For example, in the Odessa Military District on the night of June 22 almost all the aircraft flew to alternate aerodromes, and in the Western Special Flight were postponed until morning, fearing numerous accidents, because there only a small proportion of pilots could drive cars in the dark - and the equipment on the main aerodromes turned out to be under attack.

But these differences themselves are largely objectively conditioned. In the then USSR, the main industrial districts were historically formed around St. Petersburg, Moscow and the Donetsk-Dnieper interfluve. New areas — on the Volga and the Urals (where they created much more in the first two five-year plans than in all the pre-Soviet times), in Siberia, in Central Asia — they only developed and gained experience. Moreover, the Moscow-Volga industrial region is so far from the border that its capture is a long and difficult affair. Therefore, the main attacks of the enemy were expected on the flanks, and a breakthrough in the center was considered as though inevitable (which I explored in the article “Bialystok and Lviv”), but auxiliary. Soviet border forces were stationed - and more importantly, trained - in line with such expectations.

Elena Anatolyevna Prudnikova in the book “Lenin – Stalin: the technology of the impossible” proves: in itself, the successful evacuation of the bulk of industry from Ukraine already meant the failure of German plans. It is unlikely that the Germans seriously expected to exterminate all the Soviet armed forces in the border battle: this was not possible even in much smaller France, so that only its demoralization prevented further resistance. But if Germany seized such a significant share of our industry, the army would have been without an influx of weapons and ammunition. Unarmed to beat is easy.

Prudnikova notes: in the third five-year plan (1938 – 1942) it was planned to build two and a half thousand new enterprises. The specialists laughed: in the USSR there was not only their own resources for equipping all these enterprises with equipment, but even funds for purchasing the necessary amount of equipment abroad. But the one who laughs last is laughing well: in 1941, industrial sites already prepared — with railway lines, plumbing, electrical cables, foundations, concrete floors — took almost all the factories from the Soviet territories occupied or threatened with occupation. Moreover, according to Prudnikova, the schedules of such exportation themselves were developed as part of mobilization plans - as an integral part of the country's transfer to war footing.

Prudnikova also points out: in the initial period of the war, warlords punished retreats even for the sake of troops - the enemy was delayed to evacuate the factories, albeit at the cost of incredible losses. It is cruel - but, alas, inevitable: without this, the war would have been lost.

So, it was necessary to prevent any aggressive gestures, to protect the flanks even with a failure in the center (there was not enough forces to evenly protect the entire border) - and at the same time, the awareness of the reality of the threat with the blow in the center matured: the Germans still hoped cut off the bulk of our troops from the rear and then seize industrial areas that have already been deprived of serious protection. Most likely, the army — first of all, just in the Western Special District, where the accumulation of German forces was particularly obvious, and therefore the Soviet troops had tensed in advance — would respond to the very first German strike in full force. And a day or two at the border could go battles with varying success. Moreover, the higher command was expecting even more: in any army in the world, the idea of ​​their own abilities was pretty high. Yes, and in genuine circumstances far from favorable for the USSR, 1941.06.22 Soviet troops repulsed Przemysl captured by the Germans on the South-Western Front (since the outbreak of the fighting began the Kiev Special District), landed troops on the Romanian Prut (Southern Front, created from the Odessa district) . With a different level of combat readiness, they could move much wider and deeper. And then all over the world they would have screamed about Soviet aggression against peaceful Germany and Romania - how 2008.08.08 had voiced the fierce attack of the Russian Federation on the peaceful Georgia that was not guilty of anything.

Perhaps that is why Pavlov had to give clearly suicidal orders listed in detail in Kozinkin’s books. Knowing his warriors, he expected from them extremely decisive actions at the very first signs of a German strike - and took from them the very possibility of such actions so that even the most fanatical German adherents did not have the opportunity to declare her actions merely protection from the Soviet threat.

Another thing is that Pavlov, Kuznetsov, Kirponos clearly overestimated the possibility of regrouping the troops already under attack. For example, the Brest Fortress — the largest barracks in the region — turned out to be a trap: the shelling of the gate prevented the divisions there from entering the open field, and its own fortifications, last reconstructed long before the First World War, did not allow an effective fire to be fired at the enemy. Installing cannons and machine guns back to the fighters took many hours. The mechanized corps, which had already been deeply penetrated by the enemy in advance to strike the flank, did not have the necessary motor life for such a maneuver: old types of tanks were worn out for a long time, and the newest В-34 diesel engine standing on T ‑ 2 and HF didn’t break 100 hours, as it should be on passport data, and for 35 in winter and 25 in summer (the filter of the new design appeared only by the end of 1943). There was almost nothing to tow to the battlefields of guns brought to landfills: the bulk of the transport laid by the troops was mobilized, and in peacetime was in the national economy (I wrote about the ratio of transport capabilities of the Soviet and German armed forces in the article “Wheels blitzkrieg ", which later became an annex to the aforementioned" Belostok and Lviv "). In a word, the trap set by the Germans turned out to be so deep that the Soviet armed forces themselves got into it. But it could hardly have been foreseen in full, focusing only on technical characteristics and experience of maneuvers. Although it can be qualified as a loss of control, for which Pavlov was condemned.

On the flanks, the position was more favorable for us than in the center. There, they initially waited for the German strike of utmost power, and therefore did not even plan to launch an immediate counteroffensive. And there was no reason to hold back preparations for military operations. True, the Romanian troops showed traditional incapacity, so it was simply impossible to resist the landing of troops on their shore. But it didn’t become a reason for hostile propaganda: what the armed forces of Romania represent, the whole world knew from the era of the Balkan wars that preceded the First World War, and therefore it was unthinkable to declare the landing party a sign of Soviet aggression.

By the way, when during the First World War Romania decided which side to act on, then Alekseevich Mikhail Alekseevich Belyaev, then Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Empire (RI), said: “Romania’s entry into the war will in any case require us 20 divisions: if it comes against us - to break it; if you speak for us, to protect her. ” He turned out to be right: he had to leave 1916.08.10 and become a representative of the Republic of Ingushetia under the Romanian High Command; 1916.08.28 Romania entered the war and was immediately defeated by the Austro-Hungarian army, so that Russia really had to keep 20 divisions on the Romanian front.

Alas, neither the troops nor the heroic defense of Odessa from the Romanians with a small admixture of Germans (from 1941.08.05 to 1941.10.16 - almost twice as long as the whole of France held out against Germany), nor the other virtues of the Southern Front did not change the strategic position. The troops of the other four fronts incurred incomparably more losses and retreated incomparably farther than could be expected when the command of the respective military districts, to the best of their own understanding, tried to solve two opposite tasks: prepare for the inevitable impending enemy attack and at the same time prevent it from interpreting this preparation as an aggressive move.

True, the main strategic plans of the enemy still managed to disrupt. The bulk of the equipment of the old industrial regions and enterprise personnel were evacuated, so that the army and aviation already six months after the outbreak of the war - just at the time of the exhaustion of pre-war stocks - began to receive weapons and ammunition in an acceptable amountthe fleet the reserves were enough for a couple of years, because at sea the fighting was much less intense than on land). The army itself, although it suffered enormous losses, was preserved as a single organism - controlled and able to effectively use incoming replenishment and supply. And at the same time, the enemy failed to interpret these our successes as signs of Soviet aggression: the whole world, including the undoubted fans of Germany, recognized it as the aggressor. Therefore, only those who were in alliance with Germany opposed the USSR (even then, Japan abstained, because its agreement with Germany obliged each country to support another only if it turned out to be an object of aggression), and BI and SGA supported the USSR its powerful economy.

Nevertheless, the position of the USSR as a whole was dangerously close to a catastrophe in the first months of the war. The strategy of containing preparations for repelling a first strike gave rise to such dangerous consequences that the first successful ones - after a series of ineffective, and sometimes failures - the Soviet counteroffensive under Moscow and Rostov seemed a miracle (and today many people, except perhaps the heroism of General Frost, the side of the front line reigned summer and only the Germans were cold).

Military art includes several levels. If we ignore the subtleties that are important primarily to the professionals themselves, they can be summarized briefly. Tactics - actions in the course of an already established battle. Operational art (until recently it was divided between neighboring levels, and only in the writings of Soviet military theorists, it turned out to be clearly distinguished and described) - command and control of troops during a series of battles with movements resulting from the consequences of each battle. Strategy - the preparation and conduct of a sequence of operations, united by design. Logistics - supply and training of troops. The higher the level, the harder and longer the game on it, the more serious the risk - but the bigger the possible gain.

Alas, not always success at the lowest level guarantees a higher level of profit. Moreover, often for the benefit of higher levels, lower levels have to be sacrificed. For example, the chief (1891 – 1905) of the German General Staff Alfred Magnusovich von Schlieffen built the plan of the First World War in such a way that the German troops had to avoid direct clashes with the French and English or lose all the clashes where they could not avoid, but this maneuver ended with an environment Paris from the west and his capture, because all the enemy forces were fond of their own victories to the north and east. His successor, Helmut Johann Ludwig Adolfovich von Moltke, unfortunately, did not inherit the louder of the strategic talent of his uncle Helmut Karl Bernhard, Friedrich-Philippe-Viktorovich von Moltke, associate of the legendary politician Otto Eduard Leopold Karl-Wilhelm-Ferdinand the Chief of the Chief of the Netherlands, and the background of the legendary politician Otto Eduard Leopold He strengthened the Lorraine grouping of German troops and threw the French westward, that is, to defend their capital. Paris survived, the war was protracted, and eventually Germany lost.

The USSR played at the highest level - sacrificed a strategy for the sake of logistics. The risk was enormous. Losses at the strategic level are monstrous. This is also due to the fact that a significant part of the Soviet commanders did not have acceptable experience, not only strategic, but even operational (and at the lower levels - tactical) actions. But ultimately the victim was justified.
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  1. fzr1000
    fzr1000 6 August 2013 13: 22 New
    74
    Other Wassermans will be more useful to Russia than the Ivanov-Petrovs. This article once again confirms this.
    1. S_mirnov
      S_mirnov 6 August 2013 13: 55 New
      24

      Indeed, there is little research on the topic of the Second World War, frankly, our military and politicians have not learned these lessons, because the history of the Second World War is being rewritten to please the ruling regime, how can we draw conclusions if the initial data are distorted?
      I can advise the book of Yu. Mukhin "Lessons of the Great Patriotic"
      http://rutracker.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=3744659
      The only book I know where they really try to learn some lessons from the Second World War. I advise you to read, inters.
      And about "Including because a significant part of the Soviet commanders did not have acceptable experience, not only strategic, but even operational (and at the lower levels - and tactical) actions"
      then let Wasserman answer where to get experienced trained officers with a sharp increase in the number of divisions and the total army? As it was in 39-41. and how it will be in Russia in case of war. Conclusion - no lessons from the Second World War - not learned.
      1. Very old
        Very old 6 August 2013 15: 41 New
        +2
        Alexander, a large article. 5 pages on print. I'll read it in the evening. Thanks for the link to Mukhin Yu. I’ll go look
    2. Vadivak
      Vadivak 6 August 2013 14: 34 New
      +9
      Pavlov, although executed a month after the outbreak of war, was not for treason, but for the loss of control over the troops entrusted to him.


      Well, this is tantamount to treason, because on the night of June 22 "fulfilling" Directive No. 1 - Stalin, Pavlov drank with the fair sex in the buffet of the Minsk Theater
    3. ammunition
      ammunition 6 August 2013 18: 10 New
      15
      Quote: fzr1000
      Other Wassermans will be more useful to Russia than the Ivanov-Petrovs. This article once again confirms this.


      This Wasserman is more dangerous than many thousands of Ivanov-Petrovs. angry

      Whole article - This is a deliberate lie !!

      -----------------------
      I’ve been following Wasserman for a long time. And more and more convinced - how much he DANGEROUS
      It is dangerous because it has gained authority, and weaves conscious lie only for the most important the key issues.
      ------------
      So. Wasserman claims there was no conspiracy. And that Stalin, so as not to be accused of aggression CAM organized the disaster of 41.
      But. BUT!! x * r with him .. let’s say that Pavlov could take off guns from airplanes so that the valiant soldiers of the Red Army would not defeat the Germans at the very beginning, and not to give .. so to speak, an excuse for aggression.
      But! Into this picture ABSOLUTELY the fact that according to the military plans of Zhukov and Tymoshenko, the overwhelming majority of strategic reserves for the war was concentrated in border warehouses, and fell into the hands of the Germans in the very first days of the war, does not occur. So in the first year and a half of the war, the Red Army experienced a severe deficit in everything. In ammunition, weapons, food, uniforms ... etc. Moreover, the loss of most of the strategic reserves was inevitable. What is Stalin's frenzy ?? That is, Stalin was not satisfied with the loss of territories, for ... like ... so that he would not be recognized as an aggressor, but he would leave himself with his bare ass ?? So chtoli?
      Besides!
      Most Best in the worldSoviet artillery was simply presented to the Germans in the very first days .. and even the hours of the war. Yes it is! That this artillery fought FOR THE GERMANS right up to the Berlin operation.
      -----------
      Besides. Nah **** Ra Khrushchev with accomplices staged a Kharkov catastrophe in 42-m ??? Or, too, by order of the "bloody tyrant and maniac" Stalin ????? Who allegedly did not care for millions of deaths ??
      Namely, the cunning enemy - Wasserman - leads to this conclusion. angry

      Or Open Explicit Visible to the whole world, the bombing of many of our peaceful cities in the very first hours of the war is not enough for the world to understand that the USSR was attacked ????
      ---------
      Please note. In those days there was not yet such a global system of 3,14dezh, which amers have created now.
      ---------
      And further. I do not care even a thousand minuses. Truth and honor - More expensive!
      I understand the secret motives of Wasserman in this article.
      They are - Unnoticed ... quiet glanders .. But! to convince that Stalin was a monster. And also - try to bring out their "socially close" traitors of those years - ( fifth column) out of charge.
      angry angry angry
      1. slava_sherb
        slava_sherb 6 August 2013 22: 05 New
        +3
        Completely for
      2. tomket
        tomket 6 August 2013 23: 37 New
        0
        smaller Suvorov, with his chrome boots in the open
      3. poquello
        poquello 6 August 2013 23: 41 New
        +1
        "And yet. I do not care at least a thousand minuses. Truth and honor - More expensive!
        I understand the secret motives of Wasserman in this article. "

        Well, why are the minuses, + to you and Wasserman, but with the truth of a misunderstanding, they do not withstand the version of counterarguments. I wonder, will we ever find out how it happened?
        1. ammunition
          ammunition 7 August 2013 10: 31 New
          +3
          Quote: poquello
          but with the truth, they don’t stand the version of counterarguments. I wonder, will we ever find out how it happened?


          If we assume that all events are arranged by people .. and solely of their own free will. If we assume that victories in wars are achieved only by the will of people (strategists and soldiers), we will never find the truth. If the hair from the head does not fall without the Will of the Lord .. then what about Victory in the war?
          ---------
          I am a believer. But wait to smile. Because of my obstinacy, the path to Faith was a long and difficult one. And the ordeals of this journey began, when in December 86 woke up in a hospital near Moscow. And called in the fall of 84.
          -----------
          I'll try as short as possible.
          In February of the 17, the top of the generals, clergy, and high officials - Overthrew the Tsar - the Anointed One, whose allegiance was solemnly sworn in the 1613 year. Overthrown at the request and instigation of merchants and "entrepreneurs" .. as well as intellectuals who needed the Republic.
          Then the Lord sent the Bolsheviks to them. You know it yourself. The main blow the Bolsheviks inflicted exactly in the above groups of people.
          -----------
          But after 20 years (in 37), the Bolsheviks went "under the knife."
          This is a preamble.
          On the 5 of December of the 1931 of the year, the Bolsheviks blew up the Cathedral of Christ the Savior from the invasion of almost all of Europe in Russia in the 1812 - year.
          Exactly in 10 years. 5 of December 1941 of the year almost all of Europe again stood at the walls of Moscow. Closest to all. Two steps away. And of the 23-x thousand tanks at the beginning of the war, by 5-th December, only 2300 remained. 10%. But Hitler followed exactly the path of Napoleon. Through Belarus.
          No person (nor a group of people) can plan such coincidences.
          --------
          Both Stalin and the USSR were preparing for war in the most real way. Literally everything was taken into account. Everything possible was done. But if there is no Divine Will, nothing will help. There will be thousands of reasons. Conspiracies. Incredible bad luck. Inexplicable and strange deeds of the authorities. Etc.
          But in the autumn of 41, Metropolitan Eli (Greek) implored the conditions of forgiveness of Russia. And he was able to transfer them to Stalin. Stalin executed them exactly. And Moscow flew around on an airplane with the icon of the Tikhvin Mother of God.
          And precisely on the 5 of December, the counterattack was finally ready. And it was 5 that it began.
          -----------------------------
          I understand that I do not know how to talk about such things convincingly. However, if the Lord allowed the Mongols to be punished for strife, no resistance could be successful. And the Blessed Prince Alexander Nevsky understood this.
          If the Lord punished the “whites” in the Civil, then neither interventionists nor prayers for victory could help them.
          But if the Lord gives Victory, then Alexander Nevsky smashes both Swedes and Germans.
          1. alicante11
            alicante11 7 August 2013 11: 07 New
            +2
            So if the Lord is omnipotent, why didn’t he just save Niki # 2 from being overthrown by his own, whom he trusted the most? If the Lord is all-seeing, why did he not tell Nicky No. 2 that his place was at the head of the regiment, not the Empire? If the Lord is merciful, then why did several millions of Russian people - victims of the Civil and Great Patriotic War - pay for the sins of several dozen “generals and entrepreneurs”?
            Your comparisons are far-fetched. The Germans came to Moscow before the 5 of December. And Stalin’s turn to the church can have two explanations. It is possible that the IVS itself was a religious person. But, seeing how the clergy themselves violated all divine laws, he simply waited until only true believers remained faithful to her during the persecution of the church. Or the second point that the IVS was a practical man and did not neglect any of what could be allowed to propagate the holy war. Although I believe that both of these explanations have a place to be simultaneously.
            1. lexe
              lexe 8 August 2013 16: 00 New
              +1
              And Stalin’s turn to the church can have two explanations. It is possible that the IVS itself was a religious person. But, seeing how the clergy themselves violated all divine laws, he simply waited until only true believers remained faithful to her during the persecution of the church. Or the second point that the IVS was a practical man and did not neglect any of what could be allowed to propagate the holy war.

              But ...
              People with unlimited power have no right to decide spiritual matters — who is a true believer and who is not — only God decides all this ...
              In addition, any sinner is potentially a saint. A person is capable of insight, unlike an animal.
              And if he were Stalin a little more
              just waited until during the persecution of the church, only true believers will remain faithful to it

              -I think he would be left alone.
              And do not think that at that time only those who openly went to the temple believed in God. The crosses were skillfully hidden by sewing in clothes — moreover, the veterans who went through the Second World War and were in different positions after the war. Yes, and the Chekists were not all so “crystal” in this matter .
              No, and never will be, the human essence is to think 100% logically. There will always be a place secretly unexplored. This is how a person works. But with progress, old logic is no longer logic.
              And faith is always with us. This is not a deleted memory. Including for formatting outdated ideas and views through rethinking. An endless process.
              He was a practical man and did not neglect any of the things that could be allowed to propagate the holy war.

              You have a low opinion of the Russian people. Faith is not Goebel’s propaganda.
      4. Ulan
        Ulan 7 August 2013 11: 04 New
        +1
        Well, first of all, Wasserman expressed only a version. I also don’t agree with everything, and that they allegedly weren’t “obviously” preparing for war, and that Stalin had specially placed the troops of the western districts under defeat.
        As for Khrushchev, this figure also has considerable guilt for the encirclement of the troops of the Southwestern Front.
        By the way, it was not Zhukov who suggested leaving Kiev, as he writes in his memoirs and what wanders from film to film, but Budyonny commanded the southwestern direction.
        Before making a decision, Stalin called the front headquarters where Kirponos and Khrushchev, who was a member of the military council of the front, fervently convinced Stalin that they would not surrender Kiev.
        Having estimated the balance of forces, which was approximately equal, Stalin believed Khrushchev and Kirponos. But he insured himself by deploying a reserve front under the command of Eremenko against Guderian.
        1. alicante11
          alicante11 7 August 2013 13: 50 New
          +1
          Do not try to look for the guilty.
          The victim of the SWF was quite logical from a strategic point of view. The SWF hung over the GA Center flank, threatening to strike the flank and rear in case the Germans continued their attack on Moscow. YIU Germans had a choice or risk everything, or lose time. The Germans decided not to risk it. I would not risk it either. But the withdrawal of the SWF left the Germans the opportunity to launch an attack on Moscow earlier with all the consequences. Therefore, he was kept on the Dnieper.
          Well, regarding the one who persuaded whom there, read Baghramyan. Kirponos had even sent the rear units of the front, Budyonny agreed with him. But Shaposhnikov ordered to stay on the wire. I repeat. It was a difficult, but important and correct decision.
          1. Ulan
            Ulan 7 August 2013 17: 53 New
            +1
            But I’m not saying that it was wrong. Stalin did not prohibit the withdrawal of the front beyond the Dnieper, he forbade the withdrawal to unprepared positions and the surrender of Kiev.
            The Kiev SD with the existing balance of forces could well hold on for an arbitrarily long time.
            Baghramyan has his own version, of course, as the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the SWF, he could not expose his activities in the dark. But Stalin’s conversation with Khrushchev and Kirponos really took place. And they really convinced him that Kiev would not surrender.
            1. alicante11
              alicante11 8 August 2013 01: 34 New
              0
              The Kiev SD with the existing balance of forces could well hold on for an arbitrarily long time.


              Kiev UR - yes. But the Germans also broke through the front south.

              But Stalin’s conversation with Khrushchev and Kirponos really took place. And they really convinced him that Kiev would not surrender.


              And can you give me a link where exactly they convince?
      5. StolzSS
        StolzSS 12 August 2013 00: 21 New
        0
        And you read Martirosyan’s book. He very qualitatively describes the plot and the participants and all sorts of non-docking pop-up during all detective and other other events .... hi
    4. 12345
      12345 6 August 2013 18: 10 New
      +7
      Quote: fzr1000
      Other Wassermans will be more useful to Russia than the Ivanov-Petrovs.


      Wasserman is an example of a true Russian.
      If you "support the soul" for Russia, you are definitely Russian, with no options.
      1. ammunition
        ammunition 6 August 2013 19: 43 New
        +6
        Quote: 12345
        Wasserman is an example of a true Russian.


        Wassermann's nationality is irrelevant.
        Both Pavlov and Vlasov were Russian by nationality. And they also supported Russia. And the Russian Krasnov .. was also rooting for Russia .. as he imagined it .. That is, not for that Russia, which then lived and was .. worked and shed blood and sweat. And for invented .. by their selfish desire.
        -------
        Regarding Wasserman.
        Firstly: - Without glasses, it is clear that the article is due to verbosity and an extreme lack of arguments .. torment conclusions using fantasies and assumptions.
        Secondly: - The conclusions of the article do not withstand even the slightest clash with the whole picture .. with all the facts of the war of the 41-42-th years. When the USSR remained virtually with HALF of its potential. And everything hung in the balance.
        ---------
        Well, in the third. I did not say for the sake of a word that Wasserman extremely rarely (and only on the most important, key issues) resorts to falsehood.
        I’ve been following it for a long time.
        1. maxcor1974
          maxcor1974 6 August 2013 20: 26 New
          +1
          I totally agree with you. How's Wasserman: white noise technology?
          1. ammunition
            ammunition 6 August 2013 21: 08 New
            +2
            Quote: maxcor1974
            I totally agree with you. How's Wasserman: white noise technology?


            Very accurately, you have noticed the main trick of manipulation in the article.
            Even these discussions about Romania, why? -

            "" ".." Romania’s entry into the war will in any case require 20 divisions from us: if it opposes us - to break it up; if it stands for us - to defend it. "He turned out to be right: 1916.08.10 he had to leave his post and become a representative of the Republic of Ingushetia at the Romanian High Command; 1916.08.28 Romania entered the war and was immediately defeated by the Austro-Hungarian army, so Russia really had to keep 20 divisions on the Romanian front ... ""

            Why embed this purely crackling phrase?
            Okay. In World War I, the defeat of Romania did not change anything. That is, if Russia needed 20 divisions, then the Germans also had to get somewhere 20-t divisions.
            And so to the Patriotic War .. The withdrawal of Romania from the war forced the Germans to seek divisions for the defense of those sectors of the front where Roman had been before.
            Really - Typical "white noise". Belyaev’s very phrase about Romania looks witty. Every now and then that just looks.
        2. Normal
          Normal 7 August 2013 00: 03 New
          +1
          Quote: ammunition
          Whole article - This is a deliberate lie !!

          Quote: ammunition
          Firstly: - Without glasses, it’s clear that the article is due to the verbosity and the extreme lack of arguments .. it will extort conclusions using fantasies and assumptions.

          Bravo!, Nikolay. Totally agree with you.
          The new term “Wassermanshchina” can be introduced. There are many words, assumptions, false statements, and there seems to be a rejection of them, but the sediment remains. Instead of arguments and facts, the longest listings of all the names, titles and relatives of historical characters, as well as states with a deliberate distortion of the accepted pronunciation and spelling (you see erudition)
          Wasserman mockingly writes "Khrushchev and Rezunist," but he himself betrays such that Rezun and Khrushchev will smoke aside:
          and the accumulation of the German armed forces in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet borders was caused, presumably (a hint of an expectation of explanation), by circumstances not related to a possible conflict.

          Onotole apparently holds all for idiots. International politics on the eve of World War II with the prospect of a complete reconstruction of the world, and Wasserman - "a hint of an expectation of explanation." Institute blaarodnyh damsels, and more.
          Next:
          Indeed, all Western deliveries — both under Lend-Lease and for real money — amounted to only 1/25 of Soviet own expenses for the war. True, on some points (gunpowder, high-octane gasoline), deliveries reached half of our own production.

          Just think, a fifth of the cost of war. What a trifle ... Just a third of gunpowder and high-octane gasoline .... And also more than 70% of vehicles, multi-spindle machines, thanks to which it was possible to establish the production of 5-speed gearboxes for T-34 (all) and so on, and so on like that

          According to Wasserman:
          but on the whole the task was quite feasible then - planned, and therefore able to concentrate efforts on key areas - the Soviet economy: in general, it was necessary to increase production only 1/25.

          In general - Wassermanshchina ....
        3. Mikhail3
          Mikhail3 7 August 2013 14: 08 New
          0
          One question. Tell me, who, according to Wasserman, needed to deceive? Who were these people? Didn’t ask yourself such a question? But it would be worth ...
          It was not necessary to present the USSR as a victim of aggression before the "world public opinion", that is, before him either, but the arguments that suited John Sixspack didn’t really roll before the authorities, the real authorities of the West. How do you imagine this - to take the main stocks of weapons, equipment and food to the rear, and then ask these people for help? For these people to believe that we are the victim was the only way - to BE a victim.
          Khrushchev with the "accomplices"? So we really did not know how to fight in such a war, which fell into. No one except the Germans knew how, they were the best. The actions of the other commanders were also not an example, everything was clumsy, although it did not end in such horror.
          With regards to the "representation of Stalin as a monster." Well, if he had allowed Hitler’s war with the allies in the form of an Anglo-Saxon bloc with the USSR — then he would have been a monster. But he would not have been considered a monster for this at all, but for the fact that, commanding these terrifying Russian beasts, he attacked a peaceful humanity, but fortunately, all these Russian animals and the Stalin monster were all destroyed. Under the root ...
          And something else. Here we are, according to all the covenants of the dearest Trotsky, the founder and inspirer of the Red Army, we will attack the Germans on the entire front. Moving forward ... tell me how soon the veterans, having passed victories all over Europe, hardened already by the years of war, abundantly equipped with all the necessary weapons and equipment, tough people who did not break down to Berlin ... how soon our inexperienced, weakly controlled troops would be cut into pieces and mercilessly destroyed? And what would be the loss? What in general would I not say between the Germans and Moscow, and to be honest - between them and the Urals? Think about it ...
          1. Normal
            Normal 7 August 2013 23: 57 New
            +1
            Quote: Mikhail3
            One question. Tell me, who, according to Wasserman, needed to deceive? Who were these people? Didn’t ask yourself such a question? But it would be worth ...
            It was not necessary to present the USSR as a victim of aggression before the "world public opinion", that is, before him either, but the arguments that suited John Sixspack didn’t really roll before the authorities, the real authorities of the West. How do you imagine this - to take the main stocks of weapons, equipment and food to the rear, and then ask these people for help? For these people to believe that we are the victim was the only way - to BE a victim.

            You contradict Wasserman while speaking on his side. A problem with winked
            Moreover, even the Anglo-Saxon military assistance, persistently demanded by the Soviet leadership from the very moment of the German attack on us, turned out to be completely optional.

            Of course, Wasserman makes a reservation:
            Back in 2005, the book by Yakov Grigoryevich Verkhovsky and Valentina Isidorovna Tyrmos, “Stalin. Secret "scenario" of the beginning of the war. " In their opinion, the head of government (and the actual head of state) deliberately put the army under a crushing German blow in order to win over Western public opinion and thereby provide the USSR with economic support in the war. I then mentioned this work in my sarcastic article, “Axioms of conspiracy theology” ..... After all, all Western deliveries — both for Lend-Lease and for real money — amounted to only 1/25 of Soviet own expenses for the war ..... But before the war, it was hard to expect: no one in the USSR assumed that Germany would occupy the whole of White and Little Russia, and even a hefty piece of Great ..... but in general the task was quite feasible then - planned, and therefore able to focus on key sectors - the Soviet economy: in general, it was necessary to increase production only by 1/25 ......

            I have to - alas, with a delay of 8 years - apologize to Verkhovsky and Tyrmos. They felt the situation in 1941 much more accurately.


            Wassmerman lies, lies consciously and selflessly. Entering a rage loses a sense of proportion:
            Strategy to contain preparations for repelling the first strike [

            What is it like? REFLECTION PREPARATION STRATEGY ...!!! I have never seen such nonsense. Gabels weeps from the realization of her mediocrity.
            And all for what? The answer at the very beginning of the article: Reason! That's who is haunted ...
            But paradoxically, all Rezun's whistleblowers and subversors are working on his theory. So delusional, clumsy, clumsy, ridiculous and frankly stupid "work" of the anti-resunists, that against their background Rezun's concoction looks like a pretty decent dish. More thoroughly, comrades, more thoroughly ...
          2. Normal
            Normal 8 August 2013 01: 11 New
            +1
            Quote: Mikhail3
            With regards to the "representation of Stalin as a monster." Here, let him allow Hitler’s war with the allies in the form of an Anglo-Saxon bloc with the USSR

            No Wasserman-style fantasies:
            In mid-1941, it was not at all clear whether the SGA would enter the war explicitly and which side.

            Here Wasserman hints that the United States could enter the war on the side of Germany! In the middle of 1941! That is, in the month of June! Probably even before the German attack on the USSR? Or after the German attack on the USSR and Churchill's statement that Britain would support the Soviet Union? That is, Wasserman does not exclude the entry of the United States into the war against Great Britain?
            No, definitely Wasserman considers us incapable of comparing dates, events, causes and effects.
            Stalin did not allow "Hitler’s war with the allies in the form of an Anglo-Saxon bloc with the USSR" back in 1939. The Molotov-Ribentropp Pact, the partition of Poland in the Kremlin, the beginning of the 2nd MV Hitler, the declaration of war on Germany by Britain and France, and the USSR, which had remained aloof from the war while receiving territories previously torn away by Poland, didn’t hear anything and didn’t know , and you?
            Quote: Mikhail3
            And something else. Here we are, according to all the covenants of the dearest Trotsky, the founder and inspirer of the Red Army, we will attack the Germans on the entire front. Moving forward ... tell me how soon the veterans, who went through victories all over Europe, hardened by the years of war, are in abundance equipped with all the necessary weapons and equipment,

            I do not consider Trotsky to be “dearest”. I consider a ghoul and one of the most vile creatures in the history of Russia.
            But still, the Red Army was built by him and his followers. The result is known - complete inability to fight against an external enemy. But where did you get the years of war from the Wehrmacht?

            1. Polish company - 1.09.39 - 6.10 39. - 36 days.
            2. The Danish-Norwegian operation - 9.04.40 - 10.06.40.
            3. The French company - 10.05.40.- 21.06.40.- all together - 74 days
            4. The Balkans - 6.04.41 - 23.04.41. - 17 days.
            5. Crete - 20.05.41 - 2.06.41. - 13 days.

            Only 140 days of active hostilities.
            For comparison; Soviet - Finnish war - 104 days.

            Quote: Mikhail3
            And what would be the loss?


            Well, Wasserman's losses don't really bother:
            without this landing, Soviet troops could manage with the Germans and their many allies only a few months later and lose more than half a million people.
            Not only that Wasserman does not take into account the time factor at all (What could happen in a few months? Yes, a lot of things! The Germans, for example, captured Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltics in a few months, blocked Leningrad and reached Moscow), he and 500 soldiers lives is nothing.
            Overall
            Quote: ammunition
            I’ve been following Wasserman for a long time. And more and more convinced - how dangerous is it
            It is dangerous because it has gained credibility, and weaves a deliberate lie only on the most important, key issues .... the cunning enemy - Wasserman.
        4. 12345
          12345 7 August 2013 14: 08 New
          0
          Quote: ammunition
          ... Wasserman extremely rarely (and only on the most important, key issues) resorts to falsehood.


          "Every process should be considered in dynamics ..." ©

          In this regard, if you look at Wasserman, then he went a very difficult way from a fan of the so-called "liberal ideas" to their most implacable opponent. It costs a lot. I recommend to pay attention to his small TV show "Wasserman Reaction". If we put aside the excessive tinsel imposed by "effective managers from the television", then 99% of the questions that arise there are not just "exactly on target", but "exactly on RIGHT target".

          Well, the fact that the views of Comrade Wasserman do not coincide, exactly, with yours, must be reconciled. In the end, no one is perfect.
          A wise owl eats not only mice, but can, on occasion, drag away a "little one". Nevertheless, the overall balance remains with the owl, as a very, very useful bird. So that smart people forgive this "weakness".
    5. Ingvar 72
      Ingvar 72 6 August 2013 20: 20 New
      +1
      They will feed you and sing, and they will tell a fairy tale. And everything will be delicious. And then you rewrite everything on them, both the apartment and the car. So think about the benefits of the WasserMANS.
      1. 12345
        12345 7 August 2013 22: 31 New
        +1
        Quote: Ingvar 72
        So think about the benefits ...


        Well, you’ll be there! With a big gas key of the last number. And - do not let the lawlessness happen.
    6. vm68dm
      vm68dm 6 August 2013 23: 57 New
      +1
      Who overslept the beginning of the 1941 war?
    7. Corsair
      Corsair 7 August 2013 01: 05 New
      +1
      Quote: fzr1000
      Other Wassermans will be more useful to Russia than the Ivanov-Petrovs. This article once again confirms this.

      This is OUR Wasserman-RUSSIAN, but as life shows among the “Ivanov-Petrovs” there are plenty of “NOT OURS” request
    8. Timeout
      Timeout 7 August 2013 10: 28 New
      +3
      Wasserman is one of those Jews who did not betray Russia and considers himself a patriot. He tries to fully and intelligibly explain to people the clumsy things in the history of Russia and the twists of our power, as well as the strange behavior of our economy.
  2. alone
    alone 6 August 2013 13: 29 New
    16
    ETERNAL GLORY TO OUR DIED OUR GRANDFATES IN THIS WAR !!
  3. pensioner
    pensioner 6 August 2013 13: 45 New
    13
    Quote: fzr1000
    Other Wassermans will be more useful to Russia than the Ivanov-Petrovs. This article once again confirms this.

    There are no words! Wasserman is REALLY COOL !!
  4. Middle-brother
    Middle-brother 6 August 2013 13: 54 New
    19
    I like the style of the author. As they say, Wasserman is the head!
    1. Akhtuba73
      Akhtuba73 6 August 2013 14: 14 New
      14
      Exactly - the head! Sometimes it sometimes seems that he wears removable brain blocks with kilograms of information in the numerous pockets of his vest.
      It is necessary to rewrite for yourself in a little book the name of all the comrades mentioned here. One pronunciation in the company of such a full name automatically makes you at least three times educated book historian.
      I would like to hear from the lips of the respected Wasserman in the same style in more detail about Gorbachev and his subversive activities.
      1. DmitriRazumov
        DmitriRazumov 6 August 2013 16: 57 New
        +3
        The USSR played at the highest level - sacrificed a strategy for the sake of logistics. The risk was enormous. Losses at the strategic level are monstrous. This is also due to the fact that a significant part of the Soviet commanders did not have acceptable experience, not only strategic, but even operational (and at the lower levels - tactical) actions. But ultimately the victim was justified.

        This seems to be the conclusion.
        Quote: Akhtuba73
        Exactly - the head! Sometimes it sometimes seems that he wears removable brain blocks with kilograms of information in the numerous pockets of his vest.

        I propose to refrain from numerous "enthusiasm" and recall some well-known provisions that. spelled out in the relevant documents on the transfer of aircraft to the highest levels of combat readiness (BG).
        So, in short, there are 4 degrees of BG: everyday, increased, military danger and complete. Each of them involves a whole range of organizational, technical, economic, logistic and other activities that. carried out in a complex, both at the level of the command of the Army, and at the level of state, economic and other organizations. So, no matter how much the military commanders would like to, they could not fully comply with these dubious directives, especially about the transfer to the BG. Therefore, most of the units, formations and associations objectively, in fact, remained somewhere on the level between the everyday and the increased degree. And this means that there was no fuel in the tanks of the BT, nor shells and cartridges in positions, nor much more. And the time for the implementation of such events requires not 1 day, not a week, but many months. The generals are somehow not very guilty of this, since the entire state machine was not turned on, as in Germany ... So such conclusions (see the quote above) should be at least reinforced by knowledge of the basic guiding documents on troop command ...
        1. core
          core 6 August 2013 21: 40 New
          -1
          the fact that more than one day and a month, yes, our modern warriors are gathering for exercises, the enemy will reach the Urals.
    2. maxcor1974
      maxcor1974 6 August 2013 20: 22 New
      +5
      In this head, chicken droppings mixed with cow dung. After a pseudo analysis of a bunch of conspiracy theological resunoid theories, this never-served monster, who has no idea how orders are transferred to waxes of this level, advances his even more crazy idea.
      And the answer lies on the surface, Isaev writes well about this, and any employee will understand that transmitting through a secret channel with subsequent decryption at district headquarters and relaying from these headquarters to army headquarters took as much time as the Branderburg saboteurs needed to destroy wired communication channels (which were the main ones). As a result of the district and the army, they received a directive, but did not have time to transfer it to the troops. Delivery of the directive with the help of communication delegates took all day 22.06. and it took place in the conditions of intense fighting, when the situation changed hourly and could no longer be fulfilled.
      To be honest, already sick of the articles of these morons. Although he and others like them most likely specially annually update the list of conspiracy theories that, in Russia, there would never have been a single and true understanding of Russian history. It's a shame that at school the story is presented in such a castrated form that a child even with an average level of logical thinking begins to ask a rhetorical question for Soviet schoolchildren: why were we not ready even though we outnumbered the Germans in terms of number of people and equipment, why we lost 3 times more, why did the Germans reach Moscow and the Volga?
      The answers to these questions are given well by Isaev in his studies, for schoolchildren they are difficult to read, but it would be possible to make a digestible option for them. And now, after reading a history textbook, they are trying to find answers to these questions from a rezun, a Wasserman and the like.
      Wasserman is a terrible man, because it follows from him that our grandfathers retreated, were captured, leaving their wives, mothers, fathers and children in occupation in order to "The USSR played at the highest level - sacrificed a strategy for the sake of logistics." In fact, he hints that the Russian cattle - who threw millions of women and children for the sake of the favor of future allies and the salvation of enterprises, but he talks too floridly about this, you won’t understand what it’s about. To send people like him, Gozman and the like from the country, so that the brains would not be poisoned.
  5. maxvik
    maxvik 6 August 2013 14: 03 New
    +8
    Somehow I’m not making ends meet.
    To force the regiment to remove armaments from aircraft, well, how should you put pressure on it?
    They were so afraid of appearing as aggressors that they substituted all the developed industrial regions up to Moscow itself?
    And immediately after the war we were instantly recorded as aggressors. And they helped us through Lend Lease, not because we were not aggressors, but because Hitler was too strong.
    Here Putin is now generally an unmeasured aggressor, the S-300 to Syria !! Or maybe this Syria, otherwise the West will brand us.
    Perhaps this is one of the reasons, well, far from the most significant.
    1. Trapperxnumx
      Trapperxnumx 6 August 2013 14: 11 New
      11
      Quote: maxvik
      They were so afraid of appearing as aggressors that they substituted all the developed industrial regions up to Moscow itself?

      Of course, no one planned this. As follows from the article, they planned to surrender the border battle, to show that "but we didn’t even know." To Moscow, I think no one planned to retreat.
      Quote: maxvik
      And immediately after the war we were instantly recorded as aggressors. And they helped us through Lend Lease, not because we were not aggressors, but because Hitler was too strong.

      No, the aggressors began to record us only in the 90s. During the existence of the USSR, no one could even think of such a thought. At least such cases are unknown to me.

      If the author is right, but it seems to me that he is right, then Stalin is really a brilliant genius, although this genius was paid for at a very high price, but in a different scenario, we would not have left at all ...
      1. maxvik
        maxvik 6 August 2013 15: 00 New
        +2
        Quote: Trapper7
        Of course, no one planned this. As follows from the article, they planned to surrender the border battle, to show that "but we didn’t even know." To Moscow, I think no one planned to retreat.

        This is called strategic miscalculation.

        Quote: Trapper7
        No, the aggressors began to record us only in the 90s. During the existence of the USSR, no one could even think of such a thought. At least such cases are unknown to me.

        And why was the whole cold war?

        Quote: Trapper7
        If the author is right, but it seems to me that he is right

        Why does the author seem to be right? And I think I'm wrong. In my opinion, Stalin was an intelligent man. That is why the reason for the situation at the beginning of the war is different.
        1. old man54
          old man54 6 August 2013 16: 21 New
          +3
          Quote: maxvik
          This is called strategic miscalculation.

          It is called tactical miscalculation и enemy underestimation!
          Quote: maxvik
          And why was the whole cold war?

          Well this is generally a scribe question! laughing Learn Istria, and it is very desirable not to today's history books! wink
          1. maxvik
            maxvik 6 August 2013 17: 54 New
            +2
            I understand that you are quite savvy in historical matters.
            Please explain where specifically the scribe
      2. Gregazov
        Gregazov 6 August 2013 20: 42 New
        +1
        Quote: Trapper7
        No, the aggressors began to record us only in the 90s. During the existence of the USSR, no one could even think of such a thought. At least such cases are unknown to me.

        The aggressors of the USSR recorded the creation of NATO. Without proper preparation, no one will create a military-political alliance.
        1. Trapperxnumx
          Trapperxnumx 7 August 2013 10: 51 New
          0
          Quote: GregAzov
          The aggressors of the USSR recorded the creation of NATO.

          But at the same time no one said out loud that the USSR had attacked Germany. Even more than that, all historians unanimously claimed that the USSR was a victim of aggression. They laughed at the stupid Stalin and others.
          I talked about this. Even calling us the "evil empire," the historical assessment of the events of 1941 has not changed. The change of poles began to occur after the collapse of the USSR.
      3. Corsair
        Corsair 7 August 2013 01: 27 New
        0
        Quote: Trapper7
        Of course, no one planned this. As follows from the article, they planned to surrender the border battle, to show that "but we didn’t even know." To Moscow, I think no one planned to retreat.

        Just yesterday (05.08.13) on the Ukrainian TV channel Mega was broadcast d / f War. The first four hours. ALL I recommend to seegood
        URL: http://www.tamby.info/tv_radio-online/tv-ukraina_kanal_mega-online.htm
    2. S_mirnov
      S_mirnov 6 August 2013 14: 11 New
      +7
      “They were so afraid of appearing as aggressors that they got all the way to Moscow itself,” Everything is pretty simple. America officially stated that if the USSR attacks Germany, the United States will support Hitler and vice versa.
      I can recommend the video in more detail about the situation:
      http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Netr79Z5hQM
      1. maxvik
        maxvik 6 August 2013 15: 11 New
        0
        This statement by the Americans is pure chatter. Because to understand who attacked whom in the early days of the war is very difficult. And the observer decides on such issues out of personal interests, since the parties to the conflict will be able to provide a bunch of facts that the other side provoked them. Such an approach in politics is not serious. Pure American self-PR good uncle Sam.
    3. Trapperxnumx
      Trapperxnumx 6 August 2013 14: 15 New
      +2
      Quote: maxvik
      To force the regiment to remove armaments from aircraft, well, how should you put pressure on it?

      You forget the time and era. There was no need to put pressure on anyone. And there was no war yet. gave the order - removed the weapon. I didn’t follow the order - they removed shoulder straps. Or a head. The rate was very high. They did not regret Pavlov, and they certainly would not regret the regiment.
      1. maxvik
        maxvik 6 August 2013 15: 17 New
        +2
        Try to put yourself in the place of kompolka. He will not be tomorrow, so the day after tomorrow into battle with his officers on planes without weapons. And everyone understood that. Yes, the commander will find a bunch of excuses of a technical or organizational nature, so as not to remove weapons from the sides. Will do this only if it is pressed firmly.
        And if something happens, the regiment’s combat mission is set in advance or will be quickly set. And if it is not fulfilled, then the head will also be removed. And you have machine guns in stock !!
        1. Stasstoychev
          Stasstoychev 6 August 2013 16: 56 New
          +2
          Quote: maxvik
          Try to put yourself in the place of kompolka. He will not be tomorrow, so the day after tomorrow into battle with his officers on planes without weapons. And everyone understood that. Yes, the commander will find a bunch of excuses of a technical or organizational nature, so as not to remove weapons from the sides. Will do this only if it is pressed firmly.
          And if something happens, the regiment’s combat mission is set in advance or will be quickly set. And if it is not fulfilled, then the head will also be removed. And you have machine guns in stock !!

          This is all the argument of the series “if only, if only”. Your arguments are no more obvious than your opponent’s. Both statements are valid. But what is more relevant for us to learn rather not given. There are no such people and asking them will not work.
    4. old man54
      old man54 6 August 2013 16: 24 New
      +4
      Quote: maxvik
      Somehow I’m not making ends meet. To force a regiment to remove armaments from airplanes, is this how you need to put pressure on it?

      you apparently did not serve in the army, my dear, that's not clear to you! lol The district air force commander gave a direct order and the regiment commander himself would run the weaponry to remove, if such an order was spelled out! Even if I did not agree! hi
  6. Makarov
    Makarov 6 August 2013 14: 10 New
    +2
    Wow, the whole book ... will have to read in the evening))))
  7. il grand casino
    il grand casino 6 August 2013 14: 19 New
    +3
    Wasserman, ... as always smart (but not abstruse) and interesting!
  8. alone
    alone 6 August 2013 14: 27 New
    +1
    Germany had no chance of winning the war. It was even scientifically proven, not to mention the fact that history too.
    1. Djozz
      Djozz 6 August 2013 15: 28 New
      +4
      Read Mukhin "Crusade to the East" to attack the USSR, Germany was pushed, not only England and France and the Zionists put their hands on.
    2. Bigriver
      Bigriver 6 August 2013 15: 32 New
      +4
      Quote: lonely
      Germany had no chance of winning the war ...

      They did not seek war.
      The entire strategy of the Third Reich was built on a series of lightning and short-term campaigns.
      The eastern company was supposed to end in late September-mid-October of the 1941 year.
      But it did not grow together and turned into a war.
      Neither economically, nor in terms of troop readiness, Germany was not ready and was not preparing for a major war.
      1. old man54
        old man54 6 August 2013 16: 33 New
        +2
        Quote: BigRiver
        The eastern company was supposed to end in late September-mid-October of the 1941 year.

        yes, Hitler did not intend to mess with the USSR for a long time
        Quote: BigRiver
        Neither economically, nor in terms of troop readiness, Germany was not ready and was not preparing for a major war.

        Rave! She was ready for war, more than the USSR even! But ... not to the war on the 2 front, which was much better understood by I.V. Stalin than you, why he didn’t really believe that Germany would attack before it ended with England. But .. the card otherwise lay down, alas
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 6 August 2013 16: 48 New
          +1
          Quote: old man54

          Brad! She was ready for war, more than the USSR even! But ... not to war on 2 fronts ...

          You are more accurate with bright words. Tea is not a boy? After all, I can back up my assertion about the unpreparedness of German industry for a big war with facts. And you?
          Already during the decay of the Typhoon, at the end of November 41st, Minister of Arms Todt told Adolf that the war was lost from an economic point of view.
          In December, the Germans suffered a transport collapse on the railway due to the difficulties of winter operation. And the latter was simply not planned, and reserves in the form of rolling stock and steam locomotives were not created.
          Again, in December, the crisis in the Deutschland with ammunition and fuel for the Eastern Front. Oil "on parole" (we will return later) all raked out from Romania.
          The beginning of the 42nd is the beginning of the global crisis in the industry with non-ferrous metals.
          Do you need numbers? Or will you find it yourself?
          1. old man54
            old man54 6 August 2013 17: 16 New
            +3
            Quote: BigRiver
            You are more accurate with bright words.

            if offended, sorry, did not want to! drinks
            Quote: BigRiver
            In December, the Germans suffered a transport collapse on the railway due to the difficulties of winter operation.

            With these words you confirm both my and your previous statement:
            Quote: BigRiver
            The entire strategy of the Third Reich was built on a series of lightning and short-term campaigns. The Eastern company was supposed to end in late September-mid-October of the 1941 year.

            but this does not mean at all that Germany was not ready for a short-term, victorious war (blitzkrieg) with the USSR? Naturally, no one was preparing for the winter company, and even more so for a protracted war of attrition (especially on the 2 front)!
            Quote: BigRiver
            Yet again, December, Deutschland crisis with ammunition and fuel for the Eastern Front. Oil "on parole" (we will return later) all raked out from Romania.

            I agree, but I did not argue with this. But to say that "Germany was not ready and was not preparing for a big war" is strange if she was going to attack such a small state like the USSR? Or am I wrong? hi
            1. Bigriver
              Bigriver 7 August 2013 07: 55 New
              +2
              Quote: old man54

              but this does not mean at all that Germany was not ready for a short-term, victorious war (blitzkrieg) with the USSR?
              ... is it strange if she was going to attack such a small state like the USSR? Or am I wrong? hi

              And I'm talking about the same thing. For a short-term campaign - was ready. TO MULTIPLE campaigns in the East - no.
              We now know how immense and powerful we are. But Adolf at a meeting of the command staff of the Wehrmacht said in the spring of the 41st that the East Company would rise to Germany cheaper and bloodless than even the campaign in France.
              There was a global underestimation of the potentials of the USSR.
          2. Ulan
            Ulan 7 August 2013 17: 56 New
            +1
            More precisely, the cavalry - Germany was not ready for a long war. And the fact that the USSR turned the war into a protracted war meant the inevitable collapse of Germany.
      2. alone
        alone 6 August 2013 16: 53 New
        +3
        Arms Minister Todt told Adolf that the war was economically lost.
        In December, the Germans suffered a transport collapse on the railway due to the difficulties of winter operation. And the latter was simply not planned, and reserves in the form of rolling stock and steam locomotives were not created.
        Again, in December, the crisis in the Deutschland with ammunition and fuel for the Eastern Front.

        all of what you said once again confirms my opinion. even after the economy was put on a military footing, sane Germans understood that this would not lead to anything. Germany did not have sufficient resources to win, no matter what
      3. zmey_gadukin
        zmey_gadukin 6 August 2013 17: 31 New
        0
        Quote: BigRiver
        Neither economically, nor in terms of troop readiness, Germany was not ready and was not preparing for a major war.

        why then didn’t prepare for lightning fast?
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 7 August 2013 08: 22 New
          +1
          Quote: zmey_gadukin
          .
          why then didn’t prepare for lightning fast?

          Get ready! It is to her and because of the possibilities.
          The bottleneck of Germany (in the sense of waging a great war) was the resources. The economy of the Deutschland was not self-sufficient in any type of raw material and was approximately 2/3 dependent on exports. Yes, during the capture of Europe and especially France, the Germans captured a lot of resources in the form of cargo in ports and strategic reserves of the states. But, they were exhaustible. That is, these were not deposits.
          The campaign to the East, to a very large extent, pursued this goal.
          The Germans planned in August-September to exploit the resources of the USSR: oil, metals, coal, agricultural products.
          But, having made a mistake in assessing the defensive potential of the Stirana Soviets, they came to a protracted war. And the whole "house of cards" began to stagger. They didn’t take the resources they wanted, and the wide and protracted war in the East required the restructuring of all industry and an increase in output.
          Thus, the resistance force of the Red Army and the failure of all terms of the Wehrmacht campaign in the East led Germany to a strategic defeat.
    3. old man54
      old man54 6 August 2013 16: 29 New
      +4
      not true, there were chances, and even were very! And the existence of these chances is proved even by the fact that the Germans were in 50 km from Moscow in November. To be honest, they did not have a month before the frosts of 1, and fortunately for us and for our grandfathers. request
      1. alicante11
        alicante11 7 August 2013 09: 31 New
        +1
        Regarding the chances, taking into account the evacuation of the industry, they had no chance. Even if they had taken Moscow, even if they crossed the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, the war would have ended in Berlin anyway.
        And so they did not even manage to fulfill their own plans. After all, Moscow was not even the final and even the most important point of their advancement according to the Barbarossa plan. And this is very well proved by the fact that after the Smolensk battle Hitler turned the moving parts of the GA Center to help those who could not cope with their tasks on the flanks of the GA South and North. But he did not rush headlong into Moscow.
  9. knn54
    knn54 6 August 2013 14: 30 New
    14
    JV Stalin had his own plans and vision for a "map of the world." And he was preparing to solve the plan very seriously. But based on the capabilities of the country.
    In solving strategic tasks it is IMPOSSIBLE to take into account ALL “tactical” nuances. Yes, and the Germans, at that time, were very strong + "work ahead of the curve."
    Now about the army. Zhukov, AS the chief of the General Staff, is a complete zero. Tymoshenko is an uncontrollable tyrant. At the plenum of the Central Committee on April 9, 1941. An assessment was given to the Air Force commander. They put Tymoshenko, the drug addict, who covered the b.a. to the troops. And he just transferred the Air Force Commander-in-Chief to another position.
    A defensive operation was being prepared a week before the Germans' likely attack - there were still Directives of June 13 and June 17.
    ALL three directives are implemented by the Navy, the Kiev Special and Odessa Special Districts. The enemy was met still in the air, and on land and at sea the hostilities were even on enemy territory.
    In May 1941, (when Stalin headed the Council of People's Commissars), Tymoshenko and Zhukov came to him with a "Plan from Vatutin" - "Strategic deployment considerations ...", which suggested that the Germans be given a preventive strike. Stalin rejected the plan - then we would not only the Yankees became acidified, but ALL of Europe. What is the "Thunderstorm."
    Stalin and members of the Central Committee learned about the fall of Minsk from British radio programs, and not from Zhukov and Tymoshenko. The Supreme Command Headquarters was created, headed by Stalin, and he was also the People's Commissar of Defense. The chief of the General Staff was the experienced staff officer Shaposhnikov. And all the "strategists" were sent by "representatives of the Headquarters".
    PS ALREADY July 13 (six months before the defeat near Moscow) Hitler was informed that the physical and moral condition of the German troops was MUCH worse than in the campaign on the Western Front.
    PPS And the transfer of the date of the attack from May 5 to June 22, not least, was due to the Yugoslavs. And if not for the betrayal of the Croats .... but history does not recognize the subjunctive mood.
    1. old man54
      old man54 6 August 2013 16: 39 New
      -1
      You "+", well spelled out! But ...
      Quote: knn54
      What a thunderstorm.

      Thunderstorm plan is very wise and from a military point of view, everything worked out and really feasible! And its essence is not in the first preemptive strike against the Germans, even for self-defense (the best defense is an attack), but a bit of its zest.
      Quote: knn54
      PPS And the transfer of the date of the attack from May 5 to June 22, not least, was due to the Yugoslavs. And if not for the betrayal of the Croats .... but history does not recognize the subjunctive mood.

      what it is about, apparently I don’t know what. Excuse me, but can you give more details, or some link?
      1. Ulan
        Ulan 7 August 2013 18: 01 New
        0
        Well, firstly, there was no Thunderstorm plan.
        The plan submitted by Zhukov in May was called "Deployment Considerations ..."
        By design, this was a pure gamble, which Zhukov himself later admitted.
        In May 1941, the Red Army under no circumstances could be ahead of the Wehrmacht in strategic deployment.
        1. old man54
          old man54 7 August 2013 19: 20 New
          0
          in response to your minus, you minus for your ignorance, but I will not bet on you to argue! If you are talking about this plan, Thunderstorm, you don’t know, doesn’t mean that it didn’t exist! wink
          Quote: Ulan
          In May 1941, the Red Army under no circumstances could be ahead of the Wehrmacht in strategic deployment.

          First, look for a description of this genral plan. and then write these statements here! hi
          1. Ulan
            Ulan 9 August 2013 11: 22 New
            +1
            Sorry, but I don’t know what the "general plan" is. I don’t need to write your advice. As an officer in military communications, I know exactly why in May of the 41st USSR I could not get ahead of Germany in strategic deployment on our western borders.
            Zhukov’s recognition and Stalin’s reaction also confirm what was said.
            And if there is a “Thunderstorm” plan then please give a link, but it is to the “Thunderstorm” plan that it should be entitled.
            The reference to Rezun is not accepted, let his illiterate inhabitants indulge in his opuses.
    2. alone
      alone 6 August 2013 16: 56 New
      0
      PS ALREADY July 13 (six months before the defeat near Moscow) Hitler was informed that the physical and moral condition of the German troops was MUCH worse than in the campaign on the Western Front.

      and I’ll add to what you said and the fact that, at the same time, it was announced that the supply of shells for artillery was exhausted hi
    3. grafrozow
      grafrozow 6 August 2013 21: 30 New
      +3
      Quote: knn54
      In May 1941, (when Stalin headed the Council of People's Commissars), Tymoshenko and Zhukov came to him with a "Plan from Vatutin" - "Strategic deployment considerations ...", which suggested that the Germans be given a preventive strike. Stalin rejected the plan - then we would not only the Yankees became acidified, but ALL of Europe. What is the "Thunderstorm."

      Neither against, my mother-in-law, born in 1923. She said that before the war at Mostyska station in the Lviv region, everything was packed with trains with troops and equipment. Stacks of boxes, mountains of uniforms lay on the ground covered with tarpaulin, there were a lot of tanks with gasoline. It makes no sense to lie to her, just a woman. And why did they remove the weapons from old border? Why instead of the T-34 produced BT-5 and BT-7? There are a lot of questions and one article will not answer them. There are no living participants in those events, and Wasserman is still that “shot.” ​​But the result is known - May 9, 1945. By the way, Wasserman is translated from German as a water man, an interesting coincidence.
      1. old man54
        old man54 6 August 2013 22: 43 New
        +1
        put vm "+" hi
        Quote: grafrozow
        By the way, Wasserman is translated from German as a water man, an interesting coincidence.

        According to “isoterics” and a number of spiritual practices, water is not only energy, but first of all information! That's it, isn't it? :))
        and about equipment and ammunition pulled to the border ... so we, the USSR, and Stalin, of course, waited for Hitler to force La Mash and get stuck in a head-on battle with the Germans, so that at this very vulnerable moment for Germany to strike her , i.e. to attack. This is briefly the essence of the Thunderstorm master plan. When Canaris, through a special operation of the British intelligence Mi-6, found out about this, and more than six months before the June 22, he instructed his intelligence service to check this, and then it was also confirmed that the USSR was pulling troops to the border, then he really felt bad . In his memoirs described! hi
        1. grafrozow
          grafrozow 7 August 2013 02: 52 New
          +1
          Quote: old man54
          , they were waiting for Hitler to force La-mash and get stuck in a head-on battle with the Germans, so that at this very vulnerable moment for Germany to strike her, i.e. to attack. This is briefly the essence of the Thunderstorm master plan.

          Yes, but why are they denying it now? Recall our Comintern and what he was doing, who planned the world revolution? It’s not so simple, we still don’t know everything. Each of our new rulers is trying to remake history for himself, his head goes around from everyone new "historians", Bardaks ... drinks
        2. old man54
          old man54 7 August 2013 19: 25 New
          0
          Quote: old man54
          Hitler forces La Mash and gets stuck in a frontal battle with the Germans

          in the background with the English Of course, I'm sorry, I described! repeat
        3. Trapperxnumx
          Trapperxnumx 8 August 2013 08: 37 New
          0
          Quote: old man54
          When Canaris, through a special operation of the British intelligence Mi-6, found out about this, and more than six months before June 22 instructed his intelligence service to check it, and then it was also confirmed that the USSR was pulling troops to the border, then he really felt bad . In his memoirs described! hi

          Canaris? The same "great and almighty" who did not know how many tanks and planes in the USSR? That we got T34, although they have already swept through Red Square. And then - bang, and the secret plan "Thunderstorm" found out! Well, the head of this Canaris. For small things in the form of a pair of tens of thousands of tanks does not climb.
          In the memoirs, by the way, you can write whatever you want, the paper will endure everything.

          Quote: grafrozow
          Recall our Comintern and what he did, who planned the world revolution?


          You forget who was behind all this. And the main ideologist of the Comintern was the "Leninist Guard" in general and Trotsky in particular. That is, all those people who were destroyed by Stalin in the 30s. So it is not necessary all from a sick head to a healthy one.

          Why instead of the T-34 produced BT-5 and BT-7?


          Have you read anything besides Rezun and Latynina at all? What are BT instead of T34 ??? You’re talking about freeway tanks here. wassat Laughter alone
          1. old man54
            old man54 9 August 2013 21: 26 New
            0
            Quote: Trapper7
            Canaris? The same "great and almighty"

            yeah, he is the most! Head of Wehrmacht intelligence.
            Quote: Trapper7
            who did not know how many tanks and aircraft in the USSR? That we got T34, although they have already swept through Red Square.

            after the Second World War, to this day, our domestic islands are, as it were, softer ... our very warm and friendly relations with the then Germany, the front of the Second World War, do not appear. And they were very trusting, until the 41 year, and ours and their of. delegations constantly visited each other, secret military provinces showed theirs and they to us. The relationship was quite warm. There was a secret order to Canaris, the very one that would not conduct intelligence activities against the USSR in general, an order from Hitler himself, so as not to spoil relations. He did it. Therefore, information about the Red Army was very inaccurate and structural. When, already less than a year before June 22, they tried to deploy a network of spies, it was both late and difficult, the USSR had already prepared for this and launched the powerful SMERSH activity, replaying the Germans. Anyway, in those years it was very difficult for us to spy! Therefore, such gaps in the information about the Red Army among them, + ours consciously began to hide and mislead much from them.
            Quote: Trapper7
            And then - bang, and the secret plan "Thunderstorm" found out! Well, the head of this Canaris. For small things in the form of a pair of tens of thousands of tanks does not climb.

            Are you joking? come on, come on! bully Well, once again, it just doesn’t reach! hi I, it seems, wrote in Russian and clearly wrote that the Anglo-Saxons handed over this plan to the Germans, who somehow got it through their agents, and through their other agents, in Germany, they already planted it on Abwehr and someone else. Neither Abwehr nor Canaris nor Hitler believed this infe, of course, just as Stalin thought about the outbreak of war, not without reason, that they were fooling him. The Germans also decided that it was disa from the Britons, and that the Britons were saving their opa so, the Germans and we were biting! What’s true in principle, if you didn’t translate your accent in Hitler’s 41 from England to us, I wouldn’t put England at all and give it a maximum of one year of existence. And the Germans nevertheless, not immediately, but decided through Canaris to check, indirectly, whether the Russians were preparing to attack them, or not? And when they received evidence that the troops were slowly pulling toward the border, then they had a shock, especially from the number of divisions in the border districts. So England once again pissed herself, at our expense, of course!
      2. Ulan
        Ulan 7 August 2013 18: 03 New
        +1
        What kind of rezunovschina? Dear, well, why write an obvious lie. This is to say the least. Just instead of the BT, the T-34 and KV were launched. You have all mixed up. Well, study at least a little topic and a chronology of events before writing.
    4. Gato
      Gato 7 August 2013 10: 58 New
      +1
      Quote: knn54
      then not only the Yankees would be spoiled for us, but also ALL Europe.

      I completely agree with you, with the exception of ALL Europe. What is the whole of Europe in May 1941? All of Europe and so under Hitler. Sweden with Switzerland?
  10. sapsan14
    sapsan14 6 August 2013 14: 31 New
    +7
    Good afternoon!
    Nice to read the article.
    I respect Wasserman for being able to admit his mistakes and draw the right conclusions. (He was an ardent anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinist)
    When a person respects Russia, its people, its feat, you completely do not pay attention to its name.
    + + +
    1. grafrozow
      grafrozow 6 August 2013 21: 34 New
      +2
      Quote: sapsan14
      When a person respects Russia, its people, its feat, you completely do not pay attention to its name.

      Fear Danians offering gifts.
    2. ramzes1776
      ramzes1776 6 August 2013 23: 50 New
      -1
      Quote: sapsan14
      When a person respects Russia, its people, its feat - you completely do not pay attention to its name

      But Rezun wrote something bad about our people and the army in his books ??? Very much the other way around. So it’s not a fact that Wasserman is our man. In the article "it pours a lot of water."
      1. Ulan
        Ulan 7 August 2013 18: 07 New
        -2
        Everything is exceptionally bad. According to Rezun, our fathers and grandfathers are exclusively ur..da and yes..uny. Having such overwhelming superiority over the Germans as Rezun convinces, they took and pros..li summer campaign. Do you think this is “good” about our Motherland and a story?
        You are behind his hypocritical statements as he is FOR us, you do not see the essence of his story.
        1. ramzes1776
          ramzes1776 7 August 2013 20: 34 New
          +2
          Quote: Ulan
          Everything is exceptionally bad. According to Rezun, our fathers and grandfathers are exclusively ur..da and yes..una.

          Quite the contrary. In an example of a Finnish company, he wrote that no army in the world would take the Mannerheim line in such conditions, and we took despite the heavy losses and forty-degree frost. He writes that if we hit the first, then the Germans there were the same losses as ours, at least in the border zone. According to his version, our troops were located so as to defeat tank wedges according to the German group in the center, and located by a large group in the south, to capture the oil field in Romania. And in the official version they make us ur ... mi and daw ... us. So we are poorly prepared for the fact that the tanks and planes are outdated and unsuitable for war with German models and there were fewer than Germans and in general we were “poor lambs”. And I am more inclined towards Rezun’s version. We just literally didn’t have enough years to prepare, and there we would have arranged, like with the Finns, the type of the “Maynil incident” and forward. Now, minus the supporters of Wassermanovskaya version.
          1. Ulan
            Ulan 9 August 2013 11: 31 New
            +1
            As for the Finnish campaign, I agree here. And I do not consider it a failure, a failure, etc.
            But as for the outbreak of war, Rezun is far-fetched. If you admit that in June of the 41st Red Army it was completely ready for war, then it remains to admit that we .... well, of course.
            Now for the "official" version. You repeat the version of Khrushchev, it has been revised for a long time because among historians it has long been unofficial.
            The fact that the army was not ready by June 41st many works have been written about this for a long time, and here on the forum many authors write about the same.
            Actually, you wrote that the year was not enough, that is, contradict yourself and refute Rezun.
            This is the main reason - they did not have time to complete the rearmament and reform of the army, as they did not have time to prepare the western theater of operations.
            1. The comment was deleted.
            2. ramzes1776
              ramzes1776 10 August 2013 00: 25 New
              +1
              Quote: Ulan
              Actually, you wrote that the year was not enough, that is, contradict yourself and refute Rezun.
              This is the main reason - they did not have time to complete the rearmament and reform of the army, as they did not have time to prepare the western theater of operations.


              The fact is that our troops were located in the border areas so (on the example of the Bialystok ledge) that they would advance, but did not defend themselves. And if we had another year to prepare, the alignment would be completely different.
              1. Ulan
                Ulan 11 August 2013 12: 42 New
                +2
                Perhaps, but here we enter the realm of speculation. We cannot know how the situation would have developed by the middle of the 42nd year.
                Only one thing is known - by the middle of the 42nd they managed to carry out all the planned activities
                But how the enemy and possible allies would behave, and what the situation was like by the middle of 42nd year there was complete fog.
                I do not rule out the possibility of the USSR entering the war (it was still inevitable sooner or later), but under certain conditions.
                But this is not Rezun’s fantasies that the USSR, by its nature, was an aggressor and was planning to conquer all of Europe in the summer of 41, and the unfortunate peace-loving Hitler was “forced” to deliver a preventive strike.
                My opinion is that, based on the results of the First World War, Stalin wanted to repeat approximately the option that the United States did when they entered the war at the last moment and received maximum benefits for the country.
                But the quick defeat of France confused all the cards.
                1. ramzes1776
                  ramzes1776 11 August 2013 23: 19 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Ulan
                  My opinion is that, based on the results of the First World War, Stalin wanted to repeat approximately the option that the United States did when they entered the war at the last moment and received maximum benefits for the country.

                  Totally agree with you. good
    3. Gato
      Gato 7 August 2013 11: 03 New
      0
      Quote: sapsan14
      I respect Wasserman for being able to admit his mistakes and draw the right conclusions. (He was an ardent anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinist)

      Somehow I do not really believe in such pirouettes. He was an ardent anti-Soviet - and suddenly he regained his sight!
  11. Konstantm
    Konstantm 6 August 2013 14: 32 New
    +1
    Clever Onotole. Good girl.
  12. smiths xnumx
    smiths xnumx 6 August 2013 14: 32 New
    17
    It is a great merit of the USSR and specifically of Stalin that they prepared the country for war. Of course, there is Stalin’s fault that he did not foresee the possibility of Hitler’s first strike, since he did not expect Germany after the WWII to be ready to wage war on two fronts, but it should be borne in mind that Stalin was essentially a civilian (drafted into the tsarist army in late 1916 of the year). As the head of state, he did everything he could, completely provided the army with weapons, including those that had no analogues in the world (T-34, KV tanks, Il-2 attack aircraft, etc.), and officers. Much of the blame for the defeats of 1941 lies with the military. The same Tukhachevsky, before being shot in 1937, almost completely thwarted the armament of the Red Army with anti-aircraft weapons, trying to introduce the so-called "universal guns" (guns capable of playing the role of a gun, howitzer and anti-aircraft artillery); equipped the army with multi-tower tanks (T-35 and T-28), as well as a large number of tanks with bulletproof armor (T-26, a series of wheeled-tracked BT). Another “innocent victim of Stalinist repressions” Uborevich slowed down the armament of the army with automatic weapons (machine guns), so much so that in 1939 they had to be assembled almost one by one, and sent by air to the front to Finland. Few people recall that on June 22, 1941 the Red Army did not have ONE armored personnel carrier, although the Germans in each AP had a battalion for armored personnel carriers, or a specialized army truck, and the three-tonnes ZiS-5 and one-and-a-half GAZ-AAs (analogous to Gazelles) were available ), most of which should also come by mobilization, could not satisfy the needs of the military. The situation was similar with artillery; the main tractors were collective farm tractors and horses. In the vast majority of cases, artillery was transported by couples (45-mm guns), fours (76-mm regimental guns, model 1927), sixes (divisional 76-mm guns and 122-mm howitzers) and eights (152-mm howitzers and guns howitzers) of horses, as well as agricultural tractors STZ-Z, S-60 and S-65, developing a maximum speed of 6-8 km / h. A significant part of our artillery did not have any thrust at all on June 22-29. In the novel, Living and Dead, there is an episode in which soldiers dragged a 45-mm cannon several hundred kilometers on themselves. But the howitzer is far from being dragged away. Compare this to the Germans. which had magnificent semi-tracked tractors, as well as a bunch of captured equipment. Or did Stalin himself have to develop armored personnel carriers and artillery tractors?
    1. maxvet
      maxvet 6 August 2013 14: 42 New
      +3
      I note only about submachine guns, self-loading rifles were actively developed and adopted, therefore it was believed that submachine guns were not needed in the army (in firing range), although they were also adopted
      1. smiths xnumx
        smiths xnumx 6 August 2013 16: 42 New
        +7
        Dear maxvet. To begin with, the first Fedorov assault rifle of 6,5 × 50 mm Arisaka was adopted in 1916, released in the amount of more than 3000 units, and was last used during the Winter War with Finland.
        In the summer of 1930, a commission led by Uborevich examined 4 samples of a submachine gun: 2 Tokarevs, one of them chambered for Nagan, Degtyarev and Korovin chambered for Mauser. None of the presented samples were adopted.
        The grounds for refusal were as follows:
        1. The presented samples had a too high rate of fire - 1000 rounds per minute.
        2. At distances of 200-300 meters, aiming fire cannot be conducted.
        In 1934, the PPD-34 was adopted in half with the sin in half. However, the pace of its release left much to be desired: In 1934, the Kovrov Plant No. 2 produced 44 copies of PPD, in 1935 - only 23, in 1936 - 911, in 1937 - 1 291, in 1938 - 1 115 , in 1939 - 1, in total - a little more than 700 copies. By order of the Art Directorate of February 5, 000, the RPM was removed from the 10 production program, orders for the factories for its production were canceled, and the copies available in the Red Army were concentrated in warehouses for better preservation in the event of a military conflict, and the submachine guns stored it was prescribed “to provide [with] the appropriate amount of ammunition” and “to keep in order” (ibid.). A certain number of infantry and military operations was used to equip border and convoy troops. And only the war with Finland changed the attitude towards submachine guns: in 1939, 1939 RPAs were already issued. And on December 1940, 81, the famous PPSh was adopted, with a rate of 118 rounds per minute, that is, the very one against which Uborevich so opposed.
        Simonov’s automatic rifle (ABC-36) proved to be difficult to manufacture and not reliable enough for mass operation in the army. ABC had a very complicated design and many parts of complex shape, the production of which required high qualifications, a large investment of time and resources. The design made it possible to assemble a rifle without a locking unit and then fire a shot; if by mistake the arrow happened, the receiver was destroyed, the bolt group flew back and the arrow was injured .. The original wedge locking did not justify itself. The survivability of the USM also left much to be desired. Therefore, a total of 65 were produced.
        Tokarev's self-loading rifle, in turn, consisted of 143 parts (of which 22 springs), for the production of which 12 steel grades were required (including two special ones). This explains the high cost of the SVT (higher than the DP light machine gun and an order of magnitude greater than the rifle model 1891/30). Amid the military defeats of 1941-1942, the evacuation of industry, the lack of qualified personnel and the growing needs of the front for weapons, this was completely unacceptable, and its production had to be abandoned in favor of much simpler and cheaper models - a store rifle and submachine guns. In addition, like any automatic weapon, the SVT required more careful care and careful handling than a regular rifle (therefore, the SVT remained in service with the naval units, where more technically competent fighters were called up). It was difficult to quickly train these skills in a huge number of wartime draftees, who often never dealt with sophisticated equipment. Most of the troops in the army were lost in 1941-1942. Something like this! Yours faithfully! hi
        1. maxvet
          maxvet 7 August 2013 09: 25 New
          +1
          because I don’t argue, I mean that, most likely, the submachine guns were forced back because they could not create a reliable and simple self-loading rifle (under the standard rifle cartridge). As a result, it was not the submachine guns that were further developed, but the creation " intermediate "cartridge and weapons to it.
          After all, why did Fedorov take the cartridge of Arisak? It was less powerful than our trilinear, and therefore did not become mass-WWI, civilian, not until the development of a new cartridge, although its version seems to me to be the most successful of all of you listed
      2. grafrozow
        grafrozow 6 August 2013 22: 10 New
        -1
        Quote: maxvet
        I note only about submachine guns, self-loading rifles were actively developed and adopted, therefore it was believed that submachine guns were not needed in the army (in firing range), although they were also adopted

        Yes, but the leadership of the Red Army considered the submachine gun to be unprofitable because of its high rate of fire, such as the high consumption of ammunition at low efficiency.
    2. smiths xnumx
      smiths xnumx 6 August 2013 14: 59 New
      22
      I will continue: Therefore, at the beginning of the war, it turned out that the Soviet mechanized corps, breaking through the German defense, simply stopped without ammunition and fuel, which simply had nothing to give; without infantry, in order to consolidate success, she could not accompany the advancing tanks, for the same reason, there was nothing; without artillery, she simply did not have time. That allowed the Germans to pull up fresh forces and defeat. And about this, too, Stalin had to think?
      The situation was the same in aviation, the famous order of yet another “victim” of Rychagov, limiting the training of a cadet in the air of a bomber to 20 hours, and a fighter to 30-35 hours. Removing radio stations from fighter jets. In June 1941, an order was given to disperse aircraft, mask aircraft and runways, which were not completed as a result. Or did Stalin himself have to walk around each airfield and check how the planes were disguised?
      The order to deploy troops, put them on alert and occupy defensive lines was issued a week before the start of the war. And was he fulfilled ?. The same commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov gave the order to put the fleets on alert and not ONE warship was sunk by the Germans on the first day of the war. The famous bombing of Berlin in the summer of 1941 was also conducted by naval pilots, and not their army colleagues ...
      About the border troops of the NKVD, subordinate to the "executioner, rapist and child molester" Beria generally keep silent ...
      It’s just that after the death of Stalin, the generals and marshals shoved all their mistakes and miscalculations against Stalin, and they themselves were, as it were, not at work ... Regards! hi
    3. Djozz
      Djozz 6 August 2013 15: 37 New
      0
      Stalin was a dry hand, therefore, was not subject to draft in the army.
      1. smiths xnumx
        smiths xnumx 6 August 2013 16: 18 New
        0
        In October 1916, the government decided to call on all administrative exiles to serve. In December 1916, Stalin, as a conscript, was transferred to the city of Krasnoyarsk [55], however, in early February 1917 he was released from conscription due to health reasons, due to incomplete extension of his left arm at the elbow. Stalin's exile continued in the city of Achinsk, from where he returned to Petrograd on March 12, 1917 through Krasnoyarsk.
        http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BD,_%D0%98%D0%BE%
        D1%81%D0%B8%D1%84_%D0%92%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D
        0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87 С уважением! hi
        1. Djozz
          Djozz 6 August 2013 18: 08 New
          0
          Stalin was political, condemned by the "Special Conference" on a political article, and sending political ones to the front, and even in the year 16, didn’t keep idiots in the guards!
      2. Gato
        Gato 7 August 2013 11: 35 New
        +1
        Quote: Djozz
        Stalin was a dry hand, therefore, was not subject to draft in the army.

        Nevertheless, he had combat experience during the Civil War - the siege of Tsaritsyn, etc. And the level is much higher than that of Hitler - the trench gefreyter PMV.
        And who of the serious politicians of that time had combat experience?
        Roosevelt is a lawyer and former naval minister. Churchill held a similar position, although he was a military man, but as a military journalist. Mussolini - just like Hitler - corporal during WWI. You can not talk about France at all, only the cavalry guard Mannerheim and Franco remain. The latter really had combat experience, apparently therefore he did not get involved in the war, having bought off all kinds of trash in the form of a blue division from Hitler.
    4. grafrozow
      grafrozow 6 August 2013 22: 03 New
      -2
      Quote: smiths xnumx
      Few people recall that on June 22, 1941 the Red Army didn’t have ANY armored personnel carrier,

      Do not smack nonsense, BA-10, BA-20, Ba-27 ... Armored personnel carriers have been mass-produced since 1928. Participated in all conflicts-Halkin-Gol, Finnish. This is BA-10, serial production began in 1938. Give an example of facts and not fiction. hi
      1. smiths xnumx
        smiths xnumx 6 August 2013 22: 58 New
        +1
        Teach materiel do not grind rubbish and carefully read books.
        Armored personnel carrier (armored personnel carrier, armored personnel carrier) - an armored fighting vehicle, a carrier designed for the delivery of personnel (riflemen) of motorized rifle (infantry, motorized infantry, landing and so on) units, materiel to the place of the mission and evacuation of the wounded and injured battlefield.
        http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Бронетранспортер
        Armored car, armored car (abbreviated as armored car, articulated armored car, vernacular. Armored car, later an armored car) - a car is usually taken as a truck, later a special car equipped with armor and weapons, machine gun or cannon. The difference between an armored car and a wheeled armored personnel carrier is the purpose of the car. The armored conveyor is designed to transport (transport) shooters (infantry) to the battlefield or to the immediate battlefield, where it is possible to fire at an enemy vehicle, while an armored car is used to detect and destroy the enemy with fire from onboard weapons.
        http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Бронеавтомобиль
        I explain on fingers: an armored personnel carrier serves to transport infantry and deliver it to the battlefield; and an armored car for reconnaissance, communications, fire support.
        So the USSR since 1928 produced ARMORED CARS, and the first Soviet armored personnel carriers (not delivered by Lend-Lease) appeared in 1947.
        The BA-10 depicted in your picture and the mentioned BA-27s, Ba-20s are just armored vehicles and are not suitable for transporting infantry. If you do not believe me, Google will help you. Minus for arrogance and complete absolute ignorance of the materiel.
      2. Denis
        Denis 6 August 2013 23: 47 New
        +3
        Quote: grafrozow
        Armored personnel carriers have been mass-produced since 1928
        That armored cars, armored personnel carriers were not. The role of motorized infantry was played by the cavalry
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 7 August 2013 08: 42 New
          +1
          Quote: Denis
          ... The role of motorized infantry was played by the cavalry

          Well, you’re in vain so laughing
          See the states of the Red Army TD on the 41st, or the staff of the tank brigade on the 41-42th.
          Motorized rifle battalion in motor vehicles (before deployment).
          Next is the tank landing company.
          The Germans also did not have everything in chocolate. For one TD, as a rule, only 1 battalion at the Ganomag. The rest are in trucks.
          Cavalry was used in mixed groups, but its tasks were somewhat different from MTB.
          1. smiths xnumx
            smiths xnumx 7 August 2013 09: 49 New
            +1
            Dear BigRiver, the difference is that in the German TD there is one battalion on the Hanomahs, all artillery on half-tracked tractors, and the rest of the infantry in vehicles (albeit different, albeit trophy, albeit not suitable for Russian roads), I do not consider the armored personnel carrier in the reconnaissance battalion and motorcycle battalion, and what we have: in 1941-1942 (before massive deliveries of cars by Lend-Lease): there is no armored personnel carrier at all, artillery is at best on tractors, the battalion you point to ZiS-5 or GAZ-AA (I hope a few ZiS-6, GAZ-AAA, GAZ-M42 we don’t take into account), and most of them came or should have come from the national economy for mobilization. In the German TD, from 147 to 209 cars in the state, there were: 561 cars, 1402 trucks and special vehicles, 1289 motorcycles (711 of them with wheelchairs). Actually, in the tank divisions there were up to 2300 cars, 1570 motorcycles. In the Soviet TD, 63 Heavy tanks, 210 Medium, 26 BT, 22 T-26, 54 chemical (flamethrower), 56 BA-10, 39 BA-20, 1360 vehicles, 84 tractors (this is ideal, as in 43 TD 19 MK instead of 1360 cars in the state there were only 630, 571 trucks, 150 of them were faulty, and instead of 83 tractors in the state there were only 15) .If mobilization was carried out before the war, the total number of mobilized cars and tractors would be much larger. And one more thing - as of June 22, there were 44 horses in the Red Army, designed to replace the missing cars and tractors. That is, the Germans have 874-1 vehicles per tank, and we have 11 tanks per tank. Well, then compare. The tank-landing company you mentioned was a purely Soviet invention and was forced to move around in tanks, for which purpose brackets were welded on the T-16, IS and self-propelled guns, and in factories. But on the “Shermans” there were no braces, so the soldiers had to fasten their belts to the protruding parts of the tower and the hull. Not a single army of the world has reached such a point during the war. The same applies to the total number of cars. In mid-March 1, there were 3,6 thousand vehicles for 34 million Wehrmacht personnel. Every tenth person was a car driver. By the time of the attack on the USSR, the Wehrmacht had half a million cars and half-track tractors. In 1940, 4,2 thousand cars were produced in Germany, 420 thousand in the occupied countries, and the Third Reich satellites produced another 1941 thousand cars. Until June 333, 268, mobilization was not announced in the USSR and mechanized corps did not even receive their imperfect organization of cars and tractors from the national economy. Because of this, such "bricks" as artillery and foot soldiers were without transport, could not act as a whole with the mechanized corps. In Germany, the process of seizing civilian vehicles took place as early as 75. Yours faithfully! hi
            1. Bigriver
              Bigriver 7 August 2013 10: 58 New
              0
              Quote: smiths xnumx
              Dear BigRiver, the difference is that in the German TD there is one battalion on the Hanomahs, all artillery on half-tracked tractors, and the rest of the infantry in vehicles (albeit different, albeit trophy, albeit not suitable for Russian roads), I do not consider the armored personnel carrier in the reconnaissance battalion and motorcycle battalion, and what we have: in 1941-1942 ...

              Thank you, Kanesha, for the educational post. laughing
              But, I know the development of the German and Red Army compounds well. As well as the real situation with the materiel at the beginning of the invasion.
              According to various sources and memoirs of the tankers of the 41st, there was such a feeling ... As a rule, in the tank division of the TK model of the summer of the 41st there was the opportunity to put only one battalion in the SME on cars. Others stomped on foot.
              But this is something else. About: "cavalry played the role of motorized infantry" in the message from Denis (3). What was not.
              1. smiths xnumx
                smiths xnumx 7 August 2013 12: 26 New
                -1
                Dear BigRiver, Soviet cavalry usually fought on foot, using horses as a means of delivery to the battlefield. Read the memoirs of veterans. Therefore, I to some extent agree with the opinion of Denis (3) that, given the complete absence of armored personnel carriers and lack of vehicles, especially in the initial period of the war, the Soviet cavalry played the role of motorized infantry. Remember that in the German army at the end of the war, when fuel disruptions began, cavalry divisions in the SS troops also began to be created, the same 8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Gayer, 22nd SS Volunteer Cavalry Division Maria Theresa, 37 SS Volunteer Cavalry Division “Luttsov.” Respectfully! hi
                1. Bigriver
                  Bigriver 7 August 2013 15: 45 New
                  +1
                  Quote: smiths xnumx
                  Dear BigRiver, Soviet cavalry usually fought on foot, using horses as a means of delivery to the battlefield. Therefore, I to some extent agree with the opinion of Denis (3) that in the absence of armored personnel carriers and lack of vehicles, especially in the initial period of the war, the Soviet cavalry played the role of motorized infantry ...

                  Depending on the prevailing situation, she fought on horseback and on foot. If the enemy recoils, has not yet caught on abroad and has not built a fire system - why dismount?
                  But, I propose not to engage in crioring and inventing love , and speak objectively, relying on real combat experience. Take the period of 41-43th, for example.
                  Until Stalingrad, the cavalry corps served as a substitute for the TC and MK, as mobile maneuvering units and were the "fire teams" of the RGC. There are no facts of submission of the cavalry corps to the tank brigade (!). And they tried not to pull out the corps in the division. The main thing here is that the corps is more powerful in every sense than even two TBs. And more cannot be used in the interests of less.
                  During Stalingrad, we continued experiments with the states of tank corps and TA. Here, along with the usual SD, they attached cavalry corps. There were precedents. But! The Corps, was in the second wave behind the TC or MK, which had their own motorized infantry. The Cavalry Corps was not broken up to support the tanks, and it was a mobile and integral UNION tool to develop success, bypass, block a counterattack, etc.
                  In a word, the nature of the use of cavalry does not allow them to be awarded the title "ersatz-motorized infantry". These were very combat-ready mobile units which, incidentally, often had TB in their staff.
                  In the second half of the war, KMG was developed. Excuse me, but there is nothing like a motorized infantry smile
                  If you find something, a link, evidence of the facts of the systematic use of dismounted horsemen to support "naked" tanks - please! With me a bottle of brandy laughing
                  1. smiths xnumx
                    smiths xnumx 7 August 2013 16: 39 New
                    -1
                    Dear BigRiver, let's start with the regular structure of the cavalry division of the Red Army on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX. She, as you know, was:
                    4 cavalry regiments,
                    tank regiment (64 BT tanks),
                    horse artillery and anti-aircraft divisions,
                    communications squadron
                    sapper squadron
                    degassing squadron
                    http://istmat.info/node/26049

                    As you noticed, there is no hint of infantry, but there is a tank regiment in which there is also no infantry. Since the Red Army was defending itself at the beginning of the war, its divisions, including the cavalry, defending themselves, acted on foot, for there is no particular defense in the horse. In rare cases of counterattacks, such as the tankers Katukov and the cavalrymen Belov on the Guderian TGr near Romny in September 1941, the Soviet cavalry acted in both horse and foot formations.
                    There are no facts of submission of the cavalry corps to the tank brigade (!).
                    Forgive this fact, no one disputes, because even my modest knowledge of the reserve sergeant of the Internal Troops Ministry of Internal Affairs is enough to understand that the corps, even the cavalry, can in no way obey the brigade, even the tank. The scale is not the same.
                    In the second half of the war, KMG was developed. Excuse me, but there’s nothing like motorized infantry either :)
                    KMG was developed in the second half of the war, when the Red Army was advancing and it already had enough vehicles, so there is a special need for application, as you put it
                    ersatz-motorized infantry
                    was gone. Although in those cases when the Germans inflicted a counterattack. such as in Hungary, in the fall of 1944, cavalry had to be used as infantry. Otherwise, we have no particular disagreements. Yours faithfully! hi
  13. omsbon
    omsbon 6 August 2013 14: 37 New
    0
    As always, Wasserman is accurate and logical. Everything is laid out on shelves.
    Genius I.V. Stalin, as a politician and strategist, once again, received his confirmation.
  14. Shadowcat
    Shadowcat 6 August 2013 14: 39 New
    +1
    In! Man! It is reasonable and with the facts, and it is very reasonable and not clever. You can talk about anything a thousand times, but you can’t blame your army, your team and talk about it badly.
    This is precisely what we must hammer into everyone’s head, introduce it into history textbooks, shout at every corner, and print in billions of copies. Let them hear, even if you don’t believe at least something and put aside. Then put off something else.

    Including because a significant part of the Soviet commanders did not have acceptable experience, not only strategic, but even operational (and at the lower levels - and tactical) actions. But in the end, the victim was justified.

    What can be done about this war, here ... people are killed, not fed with sweets. Yes, I had to sacrifice people. But the honor of a war that says that a partner needs a throat is torn, and the honor of a ruler who is responsible for the whole nation is different. Could we confront Germany? Could. Could resist the whole world? No. Everyone knows what W. Churchill wanted and what he thought was the ideal story, and what the Yankee clique wanted. (I remind U. Churchill "The ideal story for us will be when the last Russian kills the last German and dies nearby"; Yankee "If the Russians win, we must support the Germans, and vice versa")
    So it was necessary to sacrifice people and reputation, but to introduce themselves as innocent lambs or to let the whole country under a knife in order to maintain a stupid reputation? In my opinion, the answer is obvious.
  15. smart ass
    smart ass 6 August 2013 14: 41 New
    -15
    Article - a set of words
    1. Russ69
      Russ69 6 August 2013 19: 46 New
      +2
      Quote: Clever man
      Article - a set of words

      Comment, a set of not even words, bukoff ... smile
  16. IRBIS
    IRBIS 6 August 2013 14: 43 New
    +6
    It is written well. And yet - all this is just a hypothesis, an attempt to make sense. There are facts, and their presentation and, most importantly, the purpose of the author in this presentation, determine the meaning of the written. If what Wasserman relies on is turned from a different angle, the conclusions will be completely different.
    1. Gato
      Gato 7 August 2013 11: 46 New
      0
      Quote: IRBIS
      If what Wasserman relies on is turned from a different angle, the conclusions will be completely different.

      That's it. hi
      With all due respect to Wasserman, he simply misses some facts that are uncomfortable for his hypothesis, according to the favorite habit of all publicists.
      I mean the concentration of strategic reserves in the immediate vicinity of the border, the location of the Red Army formations at the time the war began, and much more, already mentioned in the comments above.
  17. pensioner
    pensioner 6 August 2013 14: 53 New
    +3
    Quote: smiths xnumx
    Or did Stalin himself have to develop armored personnel carriers and artillery tractors?

    And what happened in aviation? His words that the designers of the old school led the country to a standstill were not born from scratch. And in fact they managed to rebuild. Another six months of confusion and vacillations - and all: there would be no new aircraft.
    1. smiths xnumx
      smiths xnumx 6 August 2013 17: 06 New
      13
      Let's remember what happened after the shooting of the "great strategists and commanders" Tukhachevsky and Co.
      Adopted: developed and from March 1940 began to be produced medium tank T-34; developed, passed combat tests in Finland and began to be produced in March 1940, the KV heavy tank.
      In artillery: in 1938, the 122-mm M-30 howitzer, still in service, was adopted;
      in 1939, the 76-mm USV division gun was adopted in service, which was a logical continuation of the F-22 gun and became the forerunner of the famous ZiS-3. The very one that the Germans immediately adopted after taking over into service and on the basis of which they created the Marder 2 tank destroyer;
      in 1940, the 107-mm M-60 gun was adopted;
      in 1938, a 152-mm howitzer of the 1938 M-10 model, which the Finns did not remove from service until 2000;
      in 1937, the ML-20 howitzer gun was adopted for service, 100 units of which are still in service;
      in the same year the famous "forty-five" was adopted.
      In 1937, an 82-mm mortar was adopted, in 1939 a 120-mm mortar, capturing the drawings of which the Germans began to produce a copy of it, in 1940 50-mm mortars.
      The anti-aircraft artillery was practically created anew: 25-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun of the 1940 model (72-K); The 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun of the 1939 model (61-K); the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun of the 1939 model (52-K).
      In 1941, the famous Katyusha BM-13 was adopted.
      Aviation: MiG-3, LaGG-3, Yak-1 fighters
      Bombers: Pe-2, Su-2, Ar-2 (upgraded SB with the ability to dive)
      IL-2 attack aircraft
      And this is not counting the mass production of submachine guns, which is higher.
      This is just a tiny fraction of what was created, and Stalin’s tremendous merit lies in this. Yours faithfully! hi
      1. Quzmi4
        Quzmi4 7 August 2013 01: 37 New
        0
        Dear Kuznetsov 1977!
        Do not forget the golden rule of logic:
        "After that - does not mean therefore"!

        The commanders at all times had plenty of lying ideas to avoid going far - the Doctrine of the Douai, the German super tank, next to which the Mouse really seemed like a mouse ...
        The real merit of Tukhachevsky was the development of a deep tank breakthrough, brilliantly carried out subsequently by the Panzerwaffers.
        Domestic work on helicopters went to the tail of Tukhachevsky, and Katyush almost lost it - after all, their development was supervised by Tukhachevsky.
        And there is nothing to blame with armored vehicles - the anti-shell armor appeared only just before the war on Soviet and French tanks; Soviet industry simply did not master the armored personnel carriers and artillery tractors in the required quantities. By the way, in the GERMAN newsreel of 1941-42. you are surprised to notice a strangely large number of horses in the "super-motorized" Wehrmacht.
        1. smiths xnumx
          smiths xnumx 7 August 2013 11: 38 New
          -1
          Dear Quzmi4
          The commanders at all times had plenty of lying ideas to avoid going far - the Doctrine of the Douai, the German super tank, next to which the Mouse really seemed like a mouse ...
          . I do not argue, but they all did not go beyond a purely theoretical framework. Although the Douai doctrine is now actively used by mattresses and other gay Europeans. As for Tukhachevsky, I already wrote about how he, being the deputy people's commissar for defense for armaments, became interested in "universal guns," so much so that he plucked the armament of the Red Army with anti-aircraft weapons. And besides this, there were also DRP (dynamo-jet cannons) of Kurchevsky, with which it was planned to arm the entire army, which spent enormous amounts of money, but there was no sense. And the projections of Bekauri with its radio-controlled boats and planes, etc. etc.
          In order not to be unfounded, I quote Wikipedia, an article about Tukhachevsky:
          In January 1930, he submitted to Voroshilov a report on the reorganization of the Armed Forces, containing proposals to increase the number of divisions to 250, on the development of artillery, aviation, and tank forces and on the basics of their use. The calculations presented in the report, based on the experience of Germany and France during the First World War, contained, for example, the production of one hundred thousand tanks per year. Stalin did not approve of Tukhachevsky’s proposal, preferring the modernization of industry over mass construction of 1929 tanks. He insisted on the use of dual-use equipment (ground-based anti-aircraft artillery, armored tractors), and the mass replacement of all artillery with dynamo-reactive (recoilless guns).

          That is, being responsible for the armament of the Red Army, Tukhachevsky was engaged in projection, doing nothing ...
          The real merit of Tukhachevsky was the development of a deep tank breakthrough, brilliantly carried out subsequently by the Panzerwaffers.

          Tukhachevsky had nothing to do with the development of the theory of a deep tank breakthrough. The origin of the theory of deep operations dates back to the late 1920s. It was a revision of the idea of ​​massaging mobile units invented by Budyonny and successfully used by the Red Army during the Civil War (First Horse Army). The main prerequisite for its appearance was the large-scale rearmament of the Red Army after the end of the Civil War. "The theory of the offensive of modern armies in modern warfare," was developed by Vladimir Triandafillov, deputy chief of staff of the Red Army, and Kalinovsky, chief inspector of tank troops. The essence of this theory was to achieve two main objectives during the battle:
          1. Hacking the front of the enemy with a simultaneous blow to its entire tactical depth;
          2. Immediate entry into the breakthrough of mechanized troops, which should advance to the entire depth of the enemy’s operational defense before the defeat of his entire group.
          Thus, this theory reflected the modification of military and military operations that occurred due to the appearance of mechanized forces: the theory of successive operations, where military operations are conducted mainly on the line of contact with the successive displacement of the enemy from occupied lines, replaced a highly maneuverable war.
          And this theory of "deep operation", first applied by Zhukov at Khalkhin-Gol, was subsequently developed by the Panzerwaffers.
          1. smiths xnumx
            smiths xnumx 7 August 2013 12: 03 New
            0
            I will continue:
            Domestic work on helicopters went to the tail of Tukhachevsky, and Katyush almost lost it - after all, their development was supervised by Tukhachevsky.
            . I do not know what relation Tukhachevsky had to work on domestic helicopter construction. If you have any data on this. please share the link. At least I know that Tukhachevsky had nothing to do with the work on the first domestic gyroplane A-7, designed by N. I. Kamov.
            http://www.airwar.ru/enc/spyww2/a7.html

            As regards Tukhachevsky’s participation in the development of Katyusha, the VNIK Gasdynamic Laboratory (GDL) of the All-Russian Academy of Strategic Forces, which was involved in the development of a rocket, was created on his initiative and has not created a single sample in NINE years. Although in Germany, work on the creation of rockets was quite successful, which was reported by intelligence, and of which Tukhachevsky knew, being the first deputy people's commissar of defense. And already after the removal and execution of Tukhachevsky, in December 1937, 82-mm rockets were adopted by the USSR Air Force. In July 1938, after successful military trials, the PC-132 rockets, which were first used in combat in August 1939 at Khalkhin-Gol, were adopted by bomber and attack aircraft. received the designation BM-1941 (combat vehicle with shells of caliber 13 mm). The RS-132 missile of 132 mm caliber and the launcher based on the ZIS-132 BM-6 truck were put into service on June 13, 21; it was this type of combat vehicles that received the first nickname "Katyusha". So, the merit of Tukhachevsky in this is very doubtful. especially since the work did not stop.
            And there is nothing to blame with armored vehicles - the anti-shell armor appeared only just before the war on Soviet and French tanks; Soviet industry simply did not master the armored personnel carriers and artillery tractors in the required quantities. By the way, in the GERMAN newsreel of 1941-42. you are surprised to notice a strangely large number of horses in the "super-motorized" Wehrmacht.

            Well, here I’ll just offer you a more thorough study of the materiel. The FIRST Soviet tank with anti-shell armor T-46-1 was made in April 1938, that is, BEFORE the beginning of the Second World War. It had a cast tower, reinforced suspension, for the first time in world practice, a new technology for the electrical welding of armor plate joints was applied. With a total weight of 28–32 tons, it had armor 60 mm thick and developed a speed of 30 km / h, which provided an engine with a capacity of 300 liters. with.
            http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A2-46-5
            . By the beginning of the war, the Red Army already had 2040 tanks with anti-shell armor KV and T-34. The English "Matilda2 with anti-shell armor was developed by Vickers in 1935-1936 and was produced since 1937. The French B1 was developed from 1921. It was adopted only in March 1934. During mass production, from 1935 to June 15 1940, produced 403 tanks B1 in various versions.
            http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Char_B1
            Learn the materiel. Yours faithfully! hi
        2. Gato
          Gato 7 August 2013 11: 54 New
          +1
          Quote: Quzmi4
          The real merit of Tukhachevsky is the development of a deep tank breakthrough

          laughing laughing laughing
          Do not make me laugh. Name at least one work by Tukhachevsky in which he develops the theory of a tank breakthrough. In general, I recommend reading the works of this "outstanding theoretician."
          And the merit in the development of the theory of deep operation to a greater degree belongs to V.K. Triandafillov.
          1. Shadowcat
            Shadowcat 9 August 2013 15: 25 New
            +1
            In general, the real merit of Tukhachevsky is the development of the theory of "Squandering funds" which is often used now, for example, an excellent follower of this theory - Serdyukof
    2. Ulan
      Ulan 7 August 2013 15: 22 New
      +1
      I do not agree. Who led to a dead end? Polikarpov created an excellent I-180 fighter, but the intrigues of some "comrades" were not launched into the series, although the SNK decree to launch this excellent fighter into the series. An installation series of 10 machines was released, all the equipment was created and 100 more car kits were prepared for assembly.
      Few people know that the MiG-1 is Polikarpov’s car.
      And finally, the best fighter of the Red Army (and not only) I-185 was created precisely by Polikarpov.
      Just someone really wanted to become the "king of fighters".
      Maybe Tupolev led to a standstill? Tupolev who created the best front-line bomber Tu-2?
      Even Stalin admitted by mistake that in the 42nd he was removed from production.
  18. kartalovkolya
    kartalovkolya 6 August 2013 14: 54 New
    +2
    The article is very good! The analysis is brilliant! Yes ... Wasserman is the HEAD! The main thing is for the youth to carefully read the article and then any linden from all the Rezuns there is not afraid.
  19. Setrac
    Setrac 6 August 2013 15: 01 New
    -1
    "As a result, the Brest Fortress turned out to be a trap!"
    Please explain to me after what such maneuvers did the Brest Fortress turn out to be a trap? She (Brest Fortress) abruptly maneuvered westward? Or didn’t they know where she was, and after discovery she was a trap?
    1. Setrac
      Setrac 6 August 2013 22: 09 New
      +1
      Quote: Setrac
      "As a result, the Brest Fortress turned out to be a trap!"

      AAA, I'm a loser repeat , not a west but a trap belay
      1. Very old
        Very old 7 August 2013 10: 24 New
        0
        In the Russian alphabet there is a letter "E" we write carelessly, it misled you
  20. Reserve buildbat
    Reserve buildbat 6 August 2013 15: 12 New
    +3
    Great article. The name of the author can not even be read. By style of presentation, Wasserman is absolutely clearly visible in any topic.
  21. Monster_Fat
    Monster_Fat 6 August 2013 15: 13 New
    +9
    Well, why the article? Yes, nothing. We learned new things from it, in addition to simple, long-known truths, "framed" in abstruse words. This is the misfortune of all modern amateur historians: once they like a theory, it forces them to frame everything in the framework of this theory. Also with the “theory” that “logistics beats strategy”. Rave. It is clear that without the provision of raw materials, there will be no strategy. But is that a “discovery”? That is why we lost the first period of the war in 1941, has long been chewed point by point:
    1) A cumbersome and inefficient decision-making and command and control system.
    2) Lack of modern communications, intelligence and control.
    3) Accelerated rearmament not prepared: neither from the point of view of the material part, logistics, training of personnel, etc.
    4) Low morale and training, both troops and command personnel, lack of initiative.
    5) Retarded and unworked methods of warfare.
    6) The absence of any interaction between the military branches.
    7) The shock of the attack.
    8) And so forth and so forth.
    No need to look for intricacies and conspiracy theories where they do not and never have been. Nobody thought about the "logistics", that it would have to be protected, exported, etc. Everyone thought as they said: "We will not fight long, with little blood and on foreign territory." And the fact that military operations developed in the initial period of the war is not the result of some cunning plan based on the task of exporting enterprises, but the result is quite logical, given the quality and quantity of troops that the opponents had.
    Most of all I liked the answer of Gorbatov, Alexander Vasilyevich to the question of how it so happened that, despite such a number of weapons and such an army, in 1941 we almost lost Moscow and stopped the Germans only near Stalingrad: "How, how ... Yes, it’s very simple — we slept through the war, thanked, thought that the German wouldn’t attack us. Yes, and they were preparing for the war badly, very poorly, one might say, they were not at all prepared .... The Finnish war showed how poorly prepared our units were, but nothing was done to fix everything and there wasn’t enough time, our natural laziness let us down while we were swinging ... In general, the delay ... and we started the war. It's a shame and it's bitter, but it's true ... "
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 6 August 2013 16: 16 New
      -6
      Well, what is the article about? Yes, nothing.
      --
      100% agree. Yes, it’ll do for a history book. All right. But there is no answer to the main question.
    2. old man54
      old man54 6 August 2013 16: 55 New
      +1
      Well, what are you writing !!! negative
      Quote: Monster_Fat
      4) Low morale and training, both troops and command personnel, lack of initiative.

      Yes? And all the rest in chorus say the opposite! I believe that this is the main thing we left, in the first six months of the war!
      Quote: Monster_Fat
      5) Retarded and unworked methods of warfare.

      in fact, the "German" theory of "blitzkrieg" was borrowed from us, during the time of the close interaction of our countries in the field of military-technical cooperation in the 30-s, the beginning of the 40-s. This strategy was developed by the red commanders based on the results of the fighting during the Civil War and was actively developed and tested on the exercises of the Red Army, where representatives of the German military command were regularly invited. In Europe, there was no place to draw such an experience, because in the tradition and sv-vakh mentality of the European tedious trench-frontal war. hi
    3. Bigriver
      Bigriver 6 August 2013 16: 59 New
      +3
      Quote: Monster_Fat
      ... That is why we lost the first period of the war in 1941, has long been chewed point by point:
      1) A cumbersome and inefficient decision-making and command and control system.
      2) Lack of modern communications, intelligence and control.
      3) Accelerated rearmament not prepared: neither from the point of view of the material part, logistics, training of personnel, etc.
      4) Low morale and training, both troops and command personnel, lack of initiative.
      5) Retarded and unworked methods of warfare.
      6) The absence of any interaction between the military branches.
      7) The shock of the attack.
      8) And so forth and so forth.

      But the lead in mobilization, deployment, the lack of operational communication between the echelons, the overall balance of troops in the first line - does not matter? repeat
      In general, the fact that at the time of the attack we had a Red Army peacetime - does it matter?
      1. maxvik
        maxvik 6 August 2013 17: 59 New
        +1
        The question matters:
        why did we have peacetime at the time of the attack of the Red Army?
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 7 August 2013 07: 47 New
          +1
          Quote: maxvik
          The question matters:
          why did we have peacetime at the time of the attack of the Red Army?

          The wartime red army is about 8,5 million people. That is, MOBILIZATION.
          And on what basis?
          There was an agreement with Germany. Japan also did not show us anything. So, we could interpret our mobilization as preparation for aggression. But, it would be a “gift” for our opponents.
          Then, Goebbels-Rezun supporters would have really FACTS.
      2. Gregazov
        Gregazov 6 August 2013 21: 10 New
        +2
        mobilization worked only in Japan and partly in the First World War. Currently, only a very naive person can expect from this system.
  22. aviator65
    aviator65 6 August 2013 15: 18 New
    0
    A worthwhile article. That is what the ability to compare and analyze facts without regard to political weather means.
  23. Djozz
    Djozz 6 August 2013 15: 21 New
    +4
    Perhaps there are a lot of reasons, all the archives concerning the pre-war situation and the reaction of I. Stalin to it have not yet been opened. And I cannot guarantee that from the beginning of the Khrushchev era and later, fakes of the “Katyn” type were not thrown into archives of various kinds. Unfortunately, a peculiar conjuncture has now taken shape, “exposing” and “spitting” on Stalin’s actions. Few historians, such as Wasserman, Mukhin, etc. They are trying to objectively understand historical conflicts, but the truth will triumph! Victory will be ours!
    1. Ulan
      Ulan 7 August 2013 15: 12 New
      +1
      I can name one fake, supposedly a telegram from Ramzai (Richard Sorge) where he gave the exact date of the attack on the USSR.
      Today, this telegram was deemed unreliable (to put it mildly) and it was not included in the list of documents on the activities of Sorge.
      It seems even Svanidze stopped talking about her.
      I think there were a lot of concoctions in the days of Khrushchev, and they were added to Yeltsin’s times.
  24. Black
    Black 6 August 2013 15: 37 New
    +3
    Well .... Something like that, something is possible and not so. BUT!!! One more time and one more time:
    The Kremlin knew how to Think, Act, Anticipate. That's for sure.
    And he had the right to make mistakes, for he was moving forward. And I won! And this is the main criterion for what the state lives (should live) for.
  25. makst83
    makst83 6 August 2013 15: 41 New
    +2
    I don’t really like Jews, but I respect Anatoly Aleksandrovich, for his Marxism - Stalinism, an adequate perception of the world and for being a supporter of Ukraine’s joining Russia! In general, a great guy!)))
  26. Raptor75
    Raptor75 6 August 2013 15: 54 New
    +8
    Quote: DC 3
    Hitler was also led by inability, like Napoleon's, to give, if the situation requires it. The only difference is that Napoleon is really a great strategist and tactician. If Hitler had not climbed with his "advice" and "opinions" to the highest officers in what generation he knows, then the price for the war would have been worse. That’s exactly what you need to remember - so that stupidity does not prevail over the matter, and stupidity expels the matter and makes the army and country strong.

    Hitler from the moment he came to power did everything contrary to the opinion of the military and always turned out to be right. Why did he climb with his advice and opinion? So the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht hung him up noodles - "colossus with feet of clay", 100500 tanks destroyed, millions killed and taken prisoner. Hitler made decisions not from the bulldozer, but based on the data that was reported to him. Essentially after the first defeats, his opinion of the Abwehr and the leadership of the Wehrmacht sank even lower.
    And read the letters of German generals ... It is not difficult to guess who is to blame for them in everything.
    Stalin is to blame for our defeats as well as for all victories. He was responsible for everything. Having accepted the destroyed and plundered country, he took upon himself a huge burden of responsibility for everything. And he carried it with dignity, leaving behind a huge superpower.
    Churchill was right - it’s our happiness that in such a difficult time Stalin was the head of state.
  27. alicante11
    alicante11 6 August 2013 16: 05 New
    +6
    Something too complicated. Wouldn't it be easier then to deploy the main forces of the front-line districts on the old border, since they did not want instant counterattack? The benefits are all around. The main directions of enemy attacks are revealed, which makes it possible to transfer the mechanized corps for counterattacks not on their own, but on the railway, there is time to mobilize the formations. Well, so substitute your troops, this is how much you need not respect your fellow citizens who serve in them and will fight and die. In general, a defeat in a cross-border battle has fairly normal real explanations. There is nothing to involve conspiracy theology.
    1. ramzes1776
      ramzes1776 7 August 2013 00: 30 New
      +1
      Quote: alicante11
      Something too complicated. Wouldn't it be easier then to deploy the main forces of the front-line districts on the old border, since they did not want an instant counterattack?

      I also think so. Not for that, warehouses with weapons, ammunition and fuel and lubricants, as well as district hospitals were equipped directly next to the border so that in the first days of the war they would lose all this. This also applies to aviation at border airports and divisions (for example, the Brest Fortress) that were destroyed in the first hours of the outbreak of the war. What is he holding us all for fools? And were there some stupid people and "enemies of the people" in the leadership of the country and the army in general? Such a "strategy" in which you must sacrifice the main stockpiles of weapons, ammunition, as well as all artillery and aviation, only a patient can come to a head.
  28. tverskoi77
    tverskoi77 6 August 2013 16: 09 New
    +3
    Every year more and more information leaks out to reflect on the beginning of the Second World War. And if you understand the golden words about the two allies of Russia, it reflects even better.
  29. Alexandr0id
    Alexandr0id 6 August 2013 16: 10 New
    +6
    very strange style of the article. for some reason, everyone is given a middle name. Is this Wasserman humor? and phrases like "in addition, it is unlikely to lose more than half a million people" is also humor? strange dude this wasserman and his scribble is strange.
  30. Andrey77
    Andrey77 6 August 2013 16: 10 New
    +8
    The article is interesting. But this is more about the beginning of the war. I did not receive the answer "Why troops were not preparing in 1941". Wasserman has a lot of distractions, irrelevant. Mindflow.
    1. Ulan
      Ulan 7 August 2013 15: 08 New
      0
      You won’t get an answer to this question, because the troops were preparing.
    2. old man54
      old man54 7 August 2013 22: 20 New
      0
      Quote: Andrey77
      Well, what is the article about? Yes, nothing. --100% agree. Yes, it’ll do for a history book. All right. But there is no answer to the main question.

      Well, you really decide on the opinion, like - do not like, otherwise it’s not serious! hi
  31. maestro123
    maestro123 6 August 2013 16: 14 New
    +1
    Wasserman threw the brain a direction to think about, it is a pity that under the heading "Secret" many more documents are stored about the Second World War.
  32. pinecone
    pinecone 6 August 2013 16: 16 New
    +1
    The article is cumbersome, not for the forum, as it seems to me. It is not clear why Hitler, and even by name, middle name. And to it, in addition to the mythical Yeshua Iosifovich Davidov, whom we so lacked in 1941. Perhaps this is purely Odessa humor. However, the topic is serious and there is no need to scoff.
  33. Lukich
    Lukich 6 August 2013 16: 20 New
    +2
    ... Well, firstly, Anatoly Wasserman-Odessa. Well, and secondly, he is one of the smartest among the Odessans ... it's like an entry ...

    ... I liked the article - briefly, succinctly and conclusively, I don’t think that reared and others like them will have the strength to argue with the author, all the more so since Rezun is a traitor and understands a lot of things, but just wants to lower everyone to his level ...
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 6 August 2013 16: 25 New
      0
      Everything has been put on Rezun for a long time. Already about 5 years ago. The author does not open the question. Interestingly, in 20 years you will still remember Rezun?
      1. kush62
        kush62 7 August 2013 09: 18 New
        +1
        Everything has been put on Rezun for a long time. Already about 5 years ago. The author does not open the question. Interestingly, in 20 years you will still remember Rezun?

        Traitors must be remembered for a lifetime. Today you forgot about him, tomorrow you forgave him, and the day after tomorrow your children will ask: Why did the USSR attack Germany. And they didn’t do it very well. Here on the site are constantly links to his cunningly opus.
      2. maxvet
        maxvet 7 August 2013 09: 33 New
        0
        Most likely they will. Ved writes that it’s mostly “honey” - “Hitler was 10 days late and they would have hacked him a bit ...” And after all, not everyone will be interested in anything else — how, where, when, because there in general, it’s written that we are stronger, and what follows from this is that Stalin started the whole world carnage, it’s somehow in between, it seems there’s nothing wrong with that. This is the main evil of the cutter (necessarily with a small letter)
  34. Mareman Vasilich
    Mareman Vasilich 6 August 2013 16: 29 New
    0
    Well done Anatoly, logically stated everything, understandably.
  35. rennim
    rennim 6 August 2013 16: 33 New
    +1
    On June 1941.06.12, 1941.06.18 and June XNUMX, XNUMX, the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the USSR sent directives to increase combat readiness to the five border military districts. The content of these directives was reconstructed by the efforts of many enthusiasts, but their texts have not been published to this day..

    My grandfather was just called up on 17.06.41/37/XNUMX at the age of XNUMX.
  36. kush62
    kush62 6 August 2013 16: 40 New
    0
    The author is a smart and respected person. But the traitor rezun by name, patronymic in vain. Just a traitor rezun.
  37. waisson
    waisson 6 August 2013 16: 54 New
    +3
    It seems like Wasserman’s fans gathered here silently ................................ otherwise they’ll ban you really lead the same way of life as he is where I am ..................................... hit
    1. Ulan
      Ulan 7 August 2013 15: 06 New
      0
      Probably more precisely not the “Wasserman fans” but the “fans” of the truth about the holy war and its early days.
      And Wasserman’s lifestyle has nothing to do with it. We don’t discuss Wasserman but the topic.
  38. pinecone
    pinecone 6 August 2013 17: 03 New
    0
    Quote: Raptor75

    Churchill was right - it’s our happiness that in such a difficult time Stalin was the head of state.


    The statement belongs to V.M. Molotov.
    Literally :: "It is our happiness that in the difficult years of the war, the Red Army and the Soviet people were led forward by the wise and experienced leader of the Soviet Union - the great Stalin."
    1. Raptor75
      Raptor75 6 August 2013 19: 29 New
      +2
      You're right, I messed up something.
      Russia was very lucky that when it was agonized, it was led by such a tough military leader. This is an outstanding personality, suitable for harsh times. A man is inexhaustibly bold, domineering, direct in actions and even rude in his statements ... However, he retained a sense of humor, which is very important for all people and nations, and especially for big people and great nations. Stalin also impressed me with his cold-blooded wisdom, in the complete absence of any illusions. I hope that made him believe that we will be faithful and reliable comrades in this war, but this, in the end, is proved by deeds, not words.
      It
      From Churchill's speech in parliament in 1942.
      1. Peaceful military
        Peaceful military 6 August 2013 19: 59 New
        +2
        On this occasion, I remembered Count Burchard Christoph von Münnich aka Christopher Antonovich Minich, the Russian Field Marshal who did not lose a single battle. His adage that God Himself truly rules directly Russia, otherwise it is not clear how it exists at all. lol
    2. Very old
      Very old 7 August 2013 10: 38 New
      0
      Yet Churchill said it
  39. Stasstoychev
    Stasstoychev 6 August 2013 17: 03 New
    +1
    The author’s argument is more than interesting, but still somewhat complicated. Not the desire to look like aggressors, as one of the reasons explaining the disaster of the summer of 1941, of course has a place to be, but in my opinion the significance of this factor is somewhat exaggerated, and it’s not new. But for a reminder of the source data and an attempt to push to look at the story from different angles, a very useful note. IMHO, of course.
  40. lexe
    lexe 6 August 2013 17: 10 New
    -5
    Wassermann's whole argument can be summarized as follows:
    By 1941, Stalin had given the Red Army a hara-kiri knife instead of a combat blade. Moreover, only one enemy, Germany, could intentionally see this act of sacrifice. Why, then, did the USA and England take part in this massacre on the side of Germany? Like with this hara-kiri we reduced the number of possible enemies. ..
    It's true ... little-studied military practice.
    I think if there are experts on the military art of Japan, let them clarify.
    But I think the argument that the world was potentially preparing to fight against us is flawed.
    In 1914, the Russian army in response to Schlieffen’s plan responded with its blitzkrieg against Austria-Hungary. Moreover, with all the energy and material reserves invested in this strike. fought in parts. And the Austrians were so kicked in 1914 that she strategically “got hooked” until the end of the war without her own personnel army. The Balkans were given a respite from the already Austrian blitzkrieg. Romania and Italy thought ... Turkey postponed the time of entering the war ... Principle dominoes from hitting a pain point.
    Moreover, the blow in 1914. included an element of the acting genre laughing
    Namely, East Prussia. 2 general antipodes of the Russian army attacked in diverging directions laughing expanding front laughing
    Yes, our General Staff knew that there was nothing to provide this auxiliary strike with everything necessary!But did the enemy know this?
    In addition, the king didn’t knowingly advance peacemaking initiatives, humane treatment of prisoners laughing I recall in East Prussia, the main losses of the Russian army are prisoners (lack of ammunition).
    So without a preemptive strike, military thought is a dead end.
    But I am not a supporter of Rezun, for he is not at all original in history.
    One of the main reasons for the defeat in 1941:
    An officer cannot be a worker or a peasant (named after the Red Army).
    This is how the epaulettes were introduced, things went. But how much did we pay for this decision?
    And on pages 285–300 - “Application for another historical sensation”, where on page 289 Dzhugashvili was declared a former secret agent of the security department, dreaming of the restoration of capitalism. Clearly, both hypotheses do not withstand even the most condescending criticism.

    It can withstand ...
    There are facts. Stalin's support for comfortable conditions during concessions in the Far East. So the leader understood what labor productivity depends on ...
    Mass production is another matter. You won’t give comfort all at once ...
    By the way, developed capitalism through planned communism is possible. China.
    So maybe Stalin? ...
    When the Stalinists understand this, then there will be mutual understanding in Russia on the basis of the acceptance of the fact that humane capitalismwith the Christian faith, this is the best universal means of human progress.
    But in terms of war, the great strategist Stalin in 1941. lost to the great tactics of Hitler. And we were on the edge.
    Nevertheless, Tsar Nikolai, the 2nd great strategist and tactician, was the ideal leader for us, but evil rock interfered in the fate of Russia.
    1. Russ69
      Russ69 6 August 2013 19: 37 New
      +3
      Quote: Lexi
      But in terms of war, the great strategist Stalin in 1941. lost to the great tactics of Hitler. And we were on the edge.
      Nevertheless, Tsar Nikolai, the 2nd great strategist and tactician, was the ideal leader for us, but evil rock interfered in the fate of Russia.


      Stalin won the war, built a country - a tyrant, etc.
      Nikolashka lost the war, lost the Empire, and after that the great strategist and tactician ... smile
      Discretion ...
      1. sergey72
        sergey72 6 August 2013 19: 52 New
        +1
        Do not pay attention ... for the monarchists Nikolashka the light in the window!
      2. lexe
        lexe 6 August 2013 21: 49 New
        -1
        Stalin won the war

        The Russian people won that war.
        Moreover, if we compare him (Stalin) with a surgeon, he first took out the Russian heart and then implanted it again. And in the winter of 1941, the Russian heart gave the desired rhythm.
        Strategically and tactically, Russia has only one way to repeat the plan of Tsar Nicholas 2, but without getting involved in wars, because war, as practice has shown, is the food environment for parasites.
        1. Ulan
          Ulan 7 August 2013 14: 57 New
          0
          Of course, the Russian people and the army of this people, commanders and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, rear workers, are components of the Russian people (in the broad sense of the word) who won the great Victory.
    2. Peaceful military
      Peaceful military 6 August 2013 21: 18 New
      +1
      Colleague!
      You are absolutely confused, even cooler than A. Wasserman.
      All you tell is bullshit.
      The story is much simpler.
      Well, "Tsar Nikolai 2-great strategist and tactician", this is not even funny. Nicky has missed everything. Absolutely EVERYTHING. This is a genius!
      By the way, since you mentioned the “humane capitalism of the Christian faith”, I am forced to disappoint you. They are not combined in any way, because the Bible clearly prohibits giving money "in growth", and this is the basis of capitalism (modern loan interest).
      If you talk about Christianity, then besides the Bible, read, at least Gilbert (a) Clive (a) Chesterton (a), or Clive (a) Staple (a) Lewis (a). There they will tell you very reasonably about modern economic slavery, which is much worse, because the scale of past slavery.
      God bless you and God.
      1. lexe
        lexe 6 August 2013 22: 51 New
        -2
        The Bible clearly prohibits giving money "in growth",

        The Bible says about repentance of sin. And humanity is already in sin from birth.
        The main thing is to enclose the loan interest with flags so that greed does not go through the roof. Well, to realize sin, since we cannot live without progress. And progress without credit is a lever ... is not possible. A loan was also in the USSR for legal entities.
        Well, "Tsar Nikolai 2-great strategist and tactician", this is not even funny

        This is what our historians need to study more carefully.
        The king is only the messenger of God on earth but not God. (Unlike the mausoleum of mummies).
        All decisions and ideas are based on supporters, while supporters then betrayed the king or fell victim.
        Tsar Nicholas 2 could not allow the Iron Curtain to appear. Berlin-Vienna-Istanbul. By the way, Syria today is only a repetition of the Kaiser’s intention to fence Europe off Russia.
        And the story repeated itself - they betrayed the tsar for the same 30 pieces of silver. Moreover, supporters ... when the victory was close, they wanted to get all the laurels but without the tsar. But the adversary, after all, is cunning and betrayal always beating the betrayers.
    3. lexe
      lexe 6 August 2013 21: 51 New
      +3
      So where are you supporters of Wasserman?
      Less is not the best argument.
    4. Very old
      Very old 7 August 2013 10: 59 New
      0
      LEXEY: "... the ideal leader we had was Tsar Nikolai the 2nd great strategist and tactician" Mr. Lexey, the "great" strategist removed V.K. from leadership of the army Nikolai Nikolaevich, the "ideal leader" of the Russian generals was replaced by the Ostsee barons. It was the most mediocre king (here is the father of A-III well done, albeit a drunkard) Lexei, YOU just showed your gut. I don’t know where, how and what you studied, life-mate and obscurantist
      1. lexe
        lexe 8 August 2013 14: 20 New
        +1
        It was the most mediocre king

        So it will be for people who showed their guts in 1917. as well as all those who believe that 1917 is Russia's turn in the right direction.
  41. Ulysses
    Ulysses 6 August 2013 17: 43 New
    0
    He is a smart man
    And a patriot of Russia.
    The country can be proud of such Jews.
    As always, clearly, clearly, logically laid out everything on the shelves. hi
  42. Gomunkul
    Gomunkul 6 August 2013 17: 47 New
    +2
    Why troops did not prepare in 1941
    An interesting version from Anatoly Wasserman. But if we carefully analyze the militarization path of Germany’s development with Hitler coming to power (after the Nazis came to power, the military-technical cooperation of the two countries began to decline), then probably even a blind person would understand why this military power is being built up, i.e. for war. And they were preparing for war in the USSR, the support of the Republicans in Spain, the conclusion of an agreement on military assistance with Czechoslovakia (in the 30s the army and industry of Czechoslovakia were not inferior to Germany), but our future allies had their own game, using the new Napoleon to destroy Russia. once again clearly visible, when the allies surrendered Poland, so that the two countries had a common border, a simple coincidence this can not be called. And the non-aggression pact with Germany was an attempt to delay the impending war. Hitler's miscalculation was that declaring war on the allies, defeating France and letting the British evacuate troops from Dunkirk, he expected England to agree to a truce, but this did not happen. And Stalin was sure that Gemania would not attack the USSR until it got away with England, plus a pact not to attack. hi
    PS But it would be best to read the General Staff’s real plans for this period of time.
    1. Ulan
      Ulan 6 August 2013 20: 26 New
      +1
      The General Staff plans are published. "Deployment Considerations" from the 40th year with clarifications of the 41st, MP-41 and plans for covering the border of the districts.
      The mythical plan "Thunderstorm" exists only in the sick brain of Bogdanych (Rezun).
      1. Very old
        Very old 7 August 2013 11: 06 New
        0
        Boris, can you give a more accurate link? Interested in
  43. Cherdak
    Cherdak 6 August 2013 17: 57 New
    +4
    I was always curious that no one compares the beginning of the war against France.
    German troops launched an offensive on France on May 10, 1940, and France was forced to sign a "truce" on June 22.
    French troops totaled more than 2 million people and 3609 tanks
    Belgian troops totaled 600 thousand people and almost 300 tanks
    Netherlands Armed Forces amounted to 400 thousand people and 0 tanks
    as well as the English armed forces were located almost evenly along the entire border ...

    During the first five days of the war, the Netherlands was withdrawn from the war (we repeated this record in Georgia)

    As early as May 18, the English commander demanded that his troops be evacuated from France by sea!
    By June 4, Belgium and the Netherlands were completely occupied by the Germans.
    On June 17, the French government rejected the offer of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to join France in the British Empire as a dominion (that would be a number!).
    The German army, acting almost perfectly, was able to defeat the Belgian, Dutch, British expeditionary and most combat-ready French troops in less than a month.

    June 10 freeloader Benito Mussolini, realizing that the defeat of France is inevitable, also declared war on her.

    As a result of the war, the French army lost 84 people killed and more than a million prisoners. The Air Force and tank forces were partially destroyed, partially came into service with the Wehrmacht. By the end of July, the British destroyed almost the entire French fleet.
    German troops lost 45 people killed, 074 wounded and 110 missing.

    PARIS FOR GERMANS BECOMES A RECREATION PLACE (i.e. the official brothel) ...

    And an amazing result: Basically, the Reichstag and the Reich Chancellery were defended by the SS troops: units of the SS division “Nordland”, [b] SS French Battalion Fenay from the Charlemagne Division [/ b] and the Latvian battalion of the 15th SS Grenadier Division (Latvian SS Division), as well as the SS guard units of the Fuhrer Adolf Hitler
    1. lexe
      lexe 6 August 2013 18: 17 New
      -2
      England and France took into account the experience of World War I — the irreparable human losses of the trench warfare.
      In addition, if the Germans were stopped in France in 1940, the scenario of that war would be repeated with the main winner in the final scene, the USSR. And they would rather merge France ... by temporarily

      PARIS FOR GERMANS BECOMES A RECREATION PLACE (i.e. the official brothel) ...

      Only Stalin did not understand this in time - France will not drag chestnuts out of the fire for him as it was before ...
      1. Ulan
        Ulan 6 August 2013 20: 23 New
        +2
        And when is France "dragging chestnuts out of the fire" for Stalin? Something you are in the wrong steppe, dear.
        1. lexe
          lexe 6 August 2013 21: 42 New
          -3
          And when did France "carry chestnuts out of the fire" for Stalin?

          for Russia 1914 and not for Stalin. Digest the meaning of what is written more carefully.
          1. maxvet
            maxvet 7 August 2013 11: 53 New
            +1
            But didn’t Russia "drag the chestnuts" by launching an unprepared offensive in East Prussia in 1914? How many times did the paddlers respond to the requests of the Russian General Staff for help? Not once!
            The Italians responded to the request for help once, though pursuing their own intires
          2. Ulysses
            Ulysses 7 August 2013 12: 51 New
            0
            What are you confusing.
            The Russian Expeditionary Force (1916-18gg) dragged the French from the fire chestnuts.
            But what France helped Russia is not remembered for. sad
          3. Ulan
            Ulan 7 August 2013 14: 38 New
            +1
            I read it carefully, but you don’t seem to remember what you wrote 5 minutes ago.
            "Only Stalin did not understand this in time - France will not drag chestnuts out of the fire for him ..." Did you write this or will you refuse? And the further “as before” does not change the meaning of the phrase. In 1914 France, too, didn’t carry chestnuts for Stalin from the fire, and for Russia too. On the contrary, during the “miracle on the Marne”, the French screamed for help. After which they had no time mobilize the Russian acrmia struck. It was also during the period of the Verdun meat grinder to delay the German troops, the South-Western Front went on the offensive, the Brusilovsky Breakthrough. The Germans removed 10 divisions from Verdun and transferred them to the Eastern Front. The French received the coveted respite.
            So it’s still not known who dragged the chestnuts for whom.

            And finally, in the 1940th, France and England had to protect themselves, their homes, wives, mothers, children, as in the 1914th.
            1. maxvet
              maxvet 8 August 2013 08: 30 New
              0
              Quote: Ulan
              And finally, in the 1940th, France and England had to protect themselves, their homes, wives, mothers, children, as in the 1914th.

              I’ll add on my own, and I OBLIGED to fulfill my allied duty to Poland, but fidelity to my obligations is apparently not included in the priorities of “Western democracies”, so Stalin was 100% right when he refused to negotiate with them in 1939.
              1. Ulan
                Ulan 9 August 2013 11: 58 New
                +1
                That's right. I missed it. In fact, England and France betrayed Poland, because they hoped that after the fall of Poland Hitler would continue the campaign to the east, that is, he would attack the USSR.
                So the reason for the defeat of Poland in the 39th is not the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact as our "sworn friends" try to imagine in the West, but the failure to fulfill their allied obligations by England and France, which in the 39th could crush Germany without any problems, but they let the Hitler wolf swear .
            2. lexe
              lexe 8 August 2013 12: 39 New
              +1
              Just compare the losses of the German army on the Western Front in 2 wars. The interests of France and Russia in World War I coincided.
              But the fact that
              The French received a welcome respite.

              met our strategic interests, despite the losses. The French caution can be understood, because they could even substitute the slightest weakening - and then what? And then all German corps would collapse in the east.
              But by the time of World War II, France did not have clear plans and tasks to protect its interests. Rather, it was a plan ... to survive demographically. And they could well be understood and forgiven for this. But this in practice meant only one loss of authority in world affairs ... Although approaches in foreign policy also change over time. The defense of national interests of states has also changed ... through the loss of "unshakable" foundations.
              And the direct military dominance of the United States is an example. Almost all the states have bent under the United States and are waiting for something. They are waiting for the denouement of the dispute between the powers that be.
  44. Motors1991
    Motors1991 6 August 2013 18: 21 New
    +9
    Хотелось бы сказать пару слов про неготовность Красной Армии к отпору немцам.Кто служил в армии знает обычно ,если предстоят учения,все о них знают заранее,т.е.командиры начинают гонять солдат,готовить технику,на момент объявления ,,неожиданной тревоги,,солдатики лежат одетые,только сапоги натянуть,прапорщики сидят в караулке с ключами от складов,только прозвучал сигнал ,все дружно бегут получают оружие,заводят технику , вперед и танки наши быстры.Один раз мне пришлось участвовать в по настоящему неожиданных учениях,я думаю немногие кадровые военные принимали участие в таких.По порядку.В марте 1987 года я работал в АТП,у нас была военизированная коллонна приписанная к танковому полку,11 или 12 марта Маршал Советского Союза Куликов прибыл в штаб Киевского военного округа,ткнул пальцем,попал в наш полк и приказал разворачивать.К нам поступил сигнал на ,,подъем,,коллонны по которому через шесть часов наша авторота ,в колличестве 76-ти автомобилей, должна была прибыть в пгт Черкасское Новомосковского района,примерно в 50-ти км от нас.Поскольку мы не ожидали,много машин было в разъездах,пришлось собирать что под руку попало,в итоге кое-как насобирав около 80-ти едениц,выехали в полк.К воротам части мы подошли минут за пятнацать до конца указанного срока по мобилизации.Естественно нас никто не встречал,и вместо того,чтобы ехать под загрузку боеприпасами, мы целую ночь простояли перед воротами.Утром нас наконец нашли и приказали ехать грузиться,там было еще масса всяких неурядиц,но это мелочи.Полк разворачивался четверо суток вместо положенных одних или полтора суток точно не знаю.Наконец через четыре дня дан приказ выдвигаться на танковый полигон под Переяслав-Хмельницким,километров 400.Основную часть наших автомобилей отправили обратно домой,а один взвод во главе со мной должен был ехать на учения.Мы должны были ехать на Красноград и далее в сторону Киева,танки пошли на прямую.Добавлю,был март месяц,ночью мороз -20,а днем все таяло.Начали мы движение,до Краснограда я насчитал под сотню наших машин стоящих на обочине с задранными капотами,потом сбился и бросил считать,за полторы суток добрались до полигона.Мы приехали примерно около четырех утра,танков еще не было,хотя они должны были прибыть раньше нас.Часов восемь вечера солдатское радио донесло прибыл первый танк.К утру пришло 46 танков,ровно половина ,остальные остались на дороге,затем их два дня свозили Ураганами.Потом мы дня четыре повоевали,к чести танкистов и артилеристов,отстрелялись они хорошо,тут были свои приколы,в спешке погрузили снаряды ,никто их не записывал,где какие,долго не могли найти мины к минометной батарее.Затем пришел приказ на марш в обратную сторону.Назад уже шел совершенно другой полк,если бы в боевой обстановке мы встретились со своим же полком в том состоянии,который он имел до учений,участь последнего была печальна.Мы бы его размазали и никакой героизм не помог.А теперь представьте,что творилось 22июня 1941 года,когда отмобилизованные ,сколоченные части ударили по таким же ,но не отмобилизованным.Разгром неминуем .
    1. Peaceful military
      Peaceful military 6 August 2013 19: 06 New
      +3
      Laughter through tears. You reminded me of a case in the 3rd year. There was a check from the district and it ended with an alarm by night, with a move to the concentration area. So, at the evening calibration it was announced (strictly confidential) that "the alarm will be suddenly, at 5 in the morning." As you understand, by 5 a.m. we were, albeit under blankets, but dressed and shod, and the company commander, together with the platoon commanders, in every possible way distracted the attention of the officer from the inspection group (each company was assigned one). In short, we not only met the standards, but even blocked them. Since then, I have become the most peaceful military.
      Already being an officer, he himself was forced to arrange similar screenings ...
      Therefore, I completely understand the factor of surprise for an army fighting for a victory in social services. competition in military and political (window dressing), while mired in households. works.
      This is already after the war, in some units and formations in groups of troops they did not get out of the ranges (my friend got into the GSVG, in Ludwigslust, told), and so ...
    2. Raptor75
      Raptor75 6 August 2013 19: 33 New
      -1
      Whatever the century, the Russian army remains true to itself. Alas.
      1. Peaceful military
        Peaceful military 6 August 2013 19: 53 New
        +4
        ALAS sad Although I love my Army, as well as my power.
        1. Alex 241
          Alex 241 6 August 2013 20: 10 New
          +1
          Andrei, you yourself know where the ears grow from, the main thing is not the real state of affairs, but snow in cubes, and a mowed lawn. When I was a lieutenant, one infantry general got to the static arrester of a tanker, if you remember there the chain hung. The level of competence as they say on the face . Unfortunately I found only air, but that notorious chain is visible. laughing
          1. Peaceful military
            Peaceful military 6 August 2013 20: 49 New
            +1
            Yes, Aleksadr, unfortunately I know very well, from which he became the most peaceful military. BUT, I love the Army. smile
            1. Alex 241
              Alex 241 6 August 2013 20: 56 New
              +1
              and who doesn’t love her laughing
  45. Vitmir
    Vitmir 6 August 2013 18: 42 New
    -2
    Nonsense Wasserman writes. Stalin himself prepared a rout in the borderlands? Do not tell my slippers, they also found a suicide for me.
    "Why didn’t the troops prepare in 1941?" Yes, because they drank a lot, but they were preparing to throw their hats. Both workers and peasants are mostly officers, and the "gray mass". They were preparing to fill up with riveted tanks - "There we have them, it will hurt us to attack us?"
    Unfortunately, in the 41st army in the country, there was, with the rare exception of a few surviving old military experts, a crowd of untrained, illiterate spaks ...
    1. Ulan
      Ulan 7 August 2013 14: 29 New
      0
      Well, yes, these “shpaks” withstood the first strongest blow, staged a Wehrmacht bashing which he did not know in Europe and thwarted the Barbarossa plan, preparing the future Victory.
      However, you have a good opinion about our fathers and grandfathers.
      1. Vitmir
        Vitmir 8 August 2013 13: 50 New
        0
        The opinion is only realistic.
        The pre-war army just could not stand the first blow, and in the Borderlands, along with the masses of equipment, it completely died / ran / surrendered ...
        After this, the Wehrmacht was really opposed by those who were brought to the war in the huts after June 22.
        And the Barbarossa plan was already frustrated by other people - millions of mobilized civilians with rare patches of surviving personnel.
        If not for this human resource, thrown into the furnace of a steam locomotive, there would have been no Victory.
        So they learned in 1942-1945. to fight, then reaching Berlin.
  46. Peaceful military
    Peaceful military 6 August 2013 18: 51 New
    +5
    I respect A. Wasserman, but, in my opinion, he overdid himself here, like V. S. Vysotsky’s: “He broke all the brains into pieces, knitted all the gyrus ...” Although, a rational grain is visible, for the sake of logistics (moving industry ) decisions were made that doomed hundreds of thousands to death, environment, and captivity. As stated, the forest is cut, chips fly. The war proved the correctness of these decisions. Could it have been otherwise? I don’t know, but I think that most likely not.
    Another remark, logistics, is still part of the strategy, and not a category over the strategy.
    1. old man54
      old man54 6 August 2013 23: 09 New
      +2
      Quote: Peaceful military
      Another remark, logistics, is still part of the strategy, and not a category over the strategy.

      Ltd., your golden words! I wanted to write this the afternoon, but something became lazy, there were too many smarts on the branch, the hunt was fought off! Of course, what Wasserman calls "logistics," according to the theory of commerce, is an integral part of the strategy. And I am sure that Wasserman is knowingly misleading here. he cannot fail to understand this, this is his way of adapting the real to the desired, one of his particular moments. And it was precisely in the name of strategy, the general strategy of the war, that tactical tasks were deliberately neglected and given in the name of the main thing! In the name of Victory! Otherwise, they would have fled to the Urals, the entire industry built after the 30's would have been left to the Germans, but what would have been the point of such a competent, planned retreat?
  47. Ulan
    Ulan 6 August 2013 19: 10 New
    +1
    There are Wassermans, and there are Gozmans. The first is respect, and the second is contempt.
    1. Ulan
      Ulan 7 August 2013 14: 23 New
      +1
      It's funny The zaminusovy thinks that Gozman is worthy of respect for watering our veterans with lighter weight? Nda ... the clinic is clear.
  48. sergey72
    sergey72 6 August 2013 19: 13 New
    +2
    Now on the site "Alternative History" hangs an interview with Wasserman: "Former Liberal Wasserman: Yes, I'm a Stalinist." Check it out ....
  49. Motors1991
    Motors1991 6 August 2013 19: 36 New
    0
    I agree with A. Wasserman that Stalin would not attack Hitler either in the 41st or in the 42nd. He could attack only in one case if Germany attacked England. The situation can be represented as follows: sitting in a cage in one corner A bear (Russia) in another Leo (England) lies in the middle of Python (Germany), they all hate each other mortally. At the same time, Python inflicted serious wounds on Leo, it remains only to finish off, but in the back Bear, who understands perfectly well, if only Python rumbles Leo , our Toptygin will be next. But there’s no reason for the Bear to attack Python before the snake catches the cat, for if the Bear was the first to deliver a mortal blow to Python, then the next would be Leo, in which case Leo would have nothing to do but support everyone By the forces of Python, and not far from the American Bison and the Japanese Tiger, if the Bear crushes Python and Leo, then they will be the next. So in this case, the Tiger will cling to Bear’s ass only for the sake of preserving its own skin. And Lend-Lease will not go to the USSR, and to Germany. Here is the zoo that was the first to attack, it lost everything, because in this case the whole flock flew at him, and they did this not because of some lofty considerations, but only out of a sense of self-preservation. Therefore, the USSR could attack Germany only in one case, if she began the invasion of England. Yes, holding Python by the tail is much safer than by the head, as a result, this role went to the United States and Britain.
    1. Peaceful military
      Peaceful military 6 August 2013 19: 50 New
      +1
      In my opinion, you are broadcasting rezunovschina. The story is such that I.V.Dzhugashvili / Stalin and his associates a priori could not have plans to attack anyone. Moreover, he (they) spent many years, efforts and human destinies to overcome the theories of permanent revolution and world revolution. I.V.Dzhugashvili / Stalin became the ideologist of the possibility of building socialism in one, a single country and the peaceful coexistence of this country with cap. countries. So ideologically, he and his associates had no reason to plan aggression against Germany.
      1. old man54
        old man54 6 August 2013 23: 13 New
        +1
        Quote: Peaceful military
        The story is such that I.V.Dzhugashvili / Stalin and his associates a priori could not have plans to attack anyone

        here you are mistaken! negative
      2. family
        family tree 7 August 2013 00: 28 New
        +3
        Quote: Peaceful military
        The story is such that I.V.Dzhugashvili / Stalin and his associates a priori could not have plans to attack anyone.

        Bullshit is that any general staff, any country, has developed plans for both defense and attack, from and on all likely, if this is a normal general staff hi
        1. Alex 241
          Alex 241 7 August 2013 00: 33 New
          +2
          Romania, led by Ion Antonescu, attacked the USSR without declaring war on the morning of June 22, 1941, simultaneously with German troops. In the morning of June 22, shelling and aerial bombardment of Soviet cities on the banks of the Danube (Reni, Izmail, Kiliya Novaya, Vilkovo) and the main base of the Danube Flotilla were carried out. Also on June 22, Romanian troops tried to force the Danube in several places, but were driven back to their territory. Relative calm was established in this area, since the main blow of the German troops was delivered much to the north.
          The Danube Flotilla (Commander Rear Admiral N.O. Abramov) consisted of a division of monitors (5 monitors), a division of armored boats (22 boats), a detachment of boat minesweepers (7 boats), a detachment of half-gliders (6 units), 1 mine loader, auxiliary ships (1 headquarters ship, 1 floating workshop, 1 hospital ship, 2 wheeled tugboats, 12 different boats and schooners). The flotilla also included a separate rifle company, the 17th machine gun company, the 46th separate anti-aircraft artillery division, the Danube coastal defense sector consisting of six batteries of various calibers, the 96th fighter air squadron (14 fighters).
          The defense was occupied by the 79th border detachment (which included the NKVD maritime border guard division - 4 “sea hunter” boats, 25 small river boats, which on the first day of the war became the operational subordination of the flotilla) and the 51st Perekop infantry division (commander Major General P. G. Tsirulnikov), including the 23rd rifle regiment of this division in the area of ​​Kili.
          After the failure on June 22, the enemy significantly increased the shelling of Soviet territory. According to the insistent requirements of the commander of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, Major P.N. Sirota, on June 23, General P.G. Tsirulnikov gave permission to land an assault in the area of ​​the city of Kiliya-Veke on the Romanian coast of the Danube and to destroy the artillery batteries that stood there. The fact that since June 22 sabotage and reconnaissance groups of border guards have already successfully crossed the Danube several times, capturing prisoners and destroying small units, has also played a role in this decision.
          1. Alex 241
            Alex 241 7 August 2013 00: 33 New
            +1
            The landing on June 24 [edit | edit source]

            The purpose of the landing was to formulate the capture of enemy fortified positions in the area of ​​Cape Satul-Nou. The landing landing detachment consisted of 4 armored boats, and the artillery support detachment — the Monitors “Udarny” and “Martynov” closely interacted with it. A combined company of border guards, one machine gun and a rifle company, were allocated to the composition of the assault force; three batteries on the east coast were to the composition of the artillery support forces for the landing. The concentration of landing forces was carried out in the Kislice duct of the Danube.
            On the morning of June 24, after artillery preparation at the appointed point, the landing was landed. In a swift battle, the Romanian troops in this sector (two companies) were defeated, 70 soldiers and officers were captured. To develop success, one infantry battalion of the 51st division was immediately landed on the captured bridgehead. Cape Satul-Nou has been completely cleared. On our side, there were no killed; up to 10 people were injured.
            The Soviet command immediately decided to build on the success achieved and set about preparing to land a second landing directly in Kiliya Vek. The landing squad - 4 armored boats, 10 border boats. The landing commander is the commander of the Kiliya group of ships captain-lieutenant I.K. Kubyshkin. Significant artillery forces were allocated for artillery support. Landing forces - three battalions of the 23rd Infantry Regiment.
            1. Alex 241
              Alex 241 7 August 2013 00: 34 New
              +1
              The main landing and further actions on the bridgehead [edit | edit source]

              The battle to capture Kiliya Veke began late in the evening of June 25. Due to the small number of ships, the landing force was lined up, one battalion in each echelon. The night attack was unexpected for the enemy. Romanians noticed the approach of Soviet boats too late. Despite the open artillery fire (two boats damaged), the landing party managed to land on the Romanian coast. The garrison of organized resistance could not provide, panic arose. In the night battle, the city was busy. By 1 o’clock in the morning on June 10, the landing party had completely taken over the fortified area and occupied a foothold up to 26 kilometers deep and up to 3 kilometers along the front. The infantry battalion and frontier guard reinforced by artillery were defeated, the enemy lost more than 4 soldiers and officers killed, about 200 (according to other sources 500) people were captured, 720 guns, 8 machine guns, over a thousand rifles were captured. In this battle, the landing party lost 30 killed and 5 wounded.
              During the day on June 26, on the Romanian coast, flotilla boats landed small units of the 51st division, occupying military-important villages and islands, which made it possible to combine both bridgeheads into one. As a result, both banks of the Kiliysky bungle from the mouth of the Rapida River to Periprav (about 70 kilometers long) were in the hands of the Soviet troops. The Ishmael group of ships received freedom of action and could provide effective support to ground units. Since the general situation on the Soviet-German front developed in favor of the enemy, it was impossible to count on the arrival of reinforcements and the development of the offensive deep into Romanian territory. The division commander gave the order to firmly hold the occupied bridgehead and gain a foothold on the achieved lines. To strengthen the defense, several more units of the 23rd Infantry Regiment were transported to Kiliya Vek.
              The first attempts to liquidate the bridgehead were repelled on June 27 and 29. Since July 1, the enemy went on the offensive. Bloody battles unfolded (especially fierce on July 3, 4 and 6). In total, 18 large attacks of the Romanian troops were repulsed with significant losses. Only when the Romanian-German troops, using successes in Ukraine, began to threaten the northern flank and the rear of the Southern Front, on the orders of the command, the bridgehead was abandoned. On July 19, the last ships of the Danube Flotilla with the personnel of the troopers left the Danube and went to Odessa.
              When landing, there were no losses in the ships. Then, with the support of troops on the bridgehead and their evacuation, the flotilla lost 4 boats killed by enemy artillery fire and 1 from an air strike.
              1. Alex 241
                Alex 241 7 August 2013 00: 35 New
                +1
                Results of the operation [edit | edit source]

                The Danube landing became the first Soviet landing during the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet military-historical literature, the importance of a successful landing on the Danube is often exaggerated; he is attributed to the disruption of the enemy offensive on the coastal flank to Odessa. In reality, the actions of the landings had only tactical significance (the cessation of shelling of coastal cities and the main base of the flotilla, as a result of which was the preservation of the property and the bulk of the naval composition of the flotilla, the attraction of significant enemy forces). The moral importance of this successful operation also played a major role in the general catastrophic development of events on the Soviet-German front.
                The sensible initiative of the Soviet commanders is noteworthy - in essence, the airborne operation was carried out by three chiefs: the commander of the flotilla, the division commander and the head of the border detachment. Higher commanders and staffs did not intervene in the landing, joining only later in resolving issues on the defense and evacuation of the bridgehead.
                1. Alex 241
                  Alex 241 7 August 2013 00: 37 New
                  +2
                  Monument to the first landing.
                  1. maxvet
                    maxvet 7 August 2013 11: 59 New
                    0
                    An article in the studio !!!!!
    2. Ulan
      Ulan 7 August 2013 14: 26 New
      0
      One more condition is necessary, not only that Hitler attacked England, but also that between England and the USSR at this moment an agreement on an alliance must exist.
      Without allies, Stalin would not have moved to Europe otherwise there would have been a clear threat that the opponents would conclude a separate peace and could fall upon the “aggressor” invading Europe. Stalin could enter Europe only at the request of the allies.
  50. Ulan
    Ulan 6 August 2013 19: 45 New
    +5
    Now a few remarks. With all due respect to Anatoly Wassermana, an undoubted patriot of Russia, he was wrong to say that they were clearly not preparing for the attack. They were preparing as well. You just need to see how the Red Army increased in just a few years. It is connected with this that sometimes the combatants quickly grew up to the divisional commanders, because the number of units and formations more than doubled, respectively, and the need for commanders, so I had to call from the reserve and make accelerated graduations from schools. This is due to the rapid career growth of many officers and not with repressions, according to Gozmans and Novodvorsky.
    Any preparation for war has several aspects and components. Economic, that is, the creation of a defense industry capable of providing the army with modern weapons and in the required quantity.
    Was this done? Yes, undoubtedly.
    The next component is diplomatic. That is to prevent a war on two fronts and the acquisition of potential allies. Was this done? Within the limits of available possibilities (politics is the art of the possible), no doubt yes too.
    The technical aspect is the creation of the latest weapons. They were created, another thing is that it was not possible to completely rearm the army. But then the time factor played its role.
    We will come back to this.
    And the military aspect, which is completely dependent on the military. That is, it is the readiness of the army, its training, diligence, etc. etc.
    And then our military showed themselves to put it mildly not at the height. The same Zhukov and Tymoshenko.
    There are of course objective reasons, but their fault is also beyond doubt.
    But also the fault of their subordinates. For example, the order to disperse aviation around Polevytsy airfields and to disguise was given THREE !!! And three times it was not executed by the leadership of KOVO and BelOVO. Is that why the commander of the aviation of the Western Front, General Kopets, shot himself because he knew that he would be asked for failure to comply with the order.
    Some justify it, but new aerodromes were not built, and therefore there was crowding of aviation. Excuse me, but who prevented the dispersal of aviation from field airfields?
    Throughout the war they flew from the field sites and then give concrete strips and nothing more.
    So at least negligence, a mess, non-performance ... it is, to put it mildly, really took place.
    For example, in some aviation regiments, they didn’t even leave the duty units. I don’t remember which regiment the sergeant left on duty for the regiment and the commanders rested in the neighboring town.
    But there were also air regiments in which the pilots met the dawn of the 22nd in the cockpits of fighter jets.
    Wasserman quite rightly writes that the order to put the troops on alert from June 18 was !!! Only here in the Odessa district, Leningrad it was executed. In Kiev and the Baltic, it was partially executed and in Belarus completely ignored.
    Another point, some refer to the said TASS statement, which supposedly had a dampening effect on the troops.
    Again, allow me, but people who served in the army are well aware that the army is guided by the Charter and orders and not newspaper articles.
    If one of the commanders took the article as a signal that you can relax, such commanders should be immediately demoted.
    Another point. Zhukov himself admitted that in the leadership of NPOs and the General Staff there was an erroneous opinion that the war should begin with the aggravation of the political situation, the presentation of claims and ultimatums.
    The invasion itself will be carried out as part of the enemy’s forces allocated to it for the invasion echelon. And only then will the main forces be brought into battle. As we know, the Germans struck with almost all available forces.
    What was a surprise for our military and political leadership. The General Staff and NGOs believed that cross-border operations would last about two weeks, which is enough to mobilize and concentrate.
    Zhukov said that they convinced the political leadership of the country in such a scenario.