Military Review

Win in offices, die in battles

108
Russia has always been preparing for global wars. This conclusion can be made by looking at the cadets of military schools cramming and practicing tactical regulations on anti-nuclear and chemical defense, and students of military academies decorate maps, smashing a hypothetical enemy with dozens of nuclear strikes.


But they will have to fight according to other laws and according to other standards, which science fiction writers from the Ministry of Defense will not see in a nightmare.

Sixteen years of uninterrupted war have taught our military officials nothing (the author has in mind the period of the war in Afghanistan and armed conflicts in the post-Soviet space, the article was written in 1996 - note “Valiance”). The army repeats its mistakes from year to year, thousands of Russian guys have already paid for their blood, and the Armed Forces suffer defeat after defeat. Shame and disappointment force participants in these wars to leave the army, as a result, it loses the most important thing - carriers of combat experience.

In Russian military academies, officers with combat experience do not exceed 3-5% of the total number of students. Among the top military leaders there is not one who had the experience of commanding a platoon, company or battalion in battle, who would have experienced the pain of injuries and all the delights of fire contact with the enemy. That is why all their decisions and calculations will be easily refuted by land surveyors, shepherds and sellers of rural sellers who have combat experience.

The tasks that troops have to solve during local conflicts are not new. These include the long-term security of communications and strategic objects by guard outposts, the posting of transport convoys through the territory controlled by the enemy, the inspection of vehicles and caravans, the storming of fortified areas, ambushes and search actions, landing operations. All of them are different in nature, have their own characteristics of preparation and conduct, but, unfortunately, in our army they have become stereotyped and stencilled, which allows the enemy to take successful countermeasures.

The concept of most operations both in Afghanistan and in Chechnya and Tajikistan is reduced in an ideal model to the search for the enemy by forces of motorized rifle units acting as a live bait, stabbing the battle, and then by artillery strikes on the identified positions and targets of the enemy. The ingenious simplicity of this concept does not take into account the intellectual and combat potential of the enemy, as well as the low level of professional training of artillery spotters and the limited capabilities of artillery units for movement, placement on the ground and the supply of ammunition. In addition, the successful implementation of the plan requires the interaction of motorized rifle and artillery units, in which each motorized rifle company is supported by fire from no less than an artillery battalion (which is possible only in conditions of a positional war with an established front line).

The experience of the hostilities in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Tajikistan shows that none of the large-scale operations conducted by the troops, with the so-called blocking, despite a significant concentration of troops, was not crowned with any success.

Calculation of the forces and means necessary for the implementation of the plan of such an operation in the village with a population of up to 1000 people on 150-200 houses with an average area of ​​3 square. km, requires the involvement of up to one motorized rifle regiment. The calculation is based on the following regulatory indicators: the feasibility of removing the blocking units from the outskirts of the settlement - 800-1000 m., Which excludes the destruction of armored vehicles with grenade launcher fire, and the personnel - sighting rifle fire weapons; At the same time, such removal of troops allows for a maneuver with fire, successfully using regular fire capabilities of motorized rifle subunits.

The average size of the village to 1,5 km in diameter and the distance to the blocking units give in our case the length of the perimeter 9 km. In accordance with the tactical standards for defense (and the type of military action we are considering is defense), a motorized rifle company is defending in the area up to 1,5 km along the front. Thus, only the encirclement and settlement of the village must carry out the 6 mouth (or 2 battalion).

The settlement of the village is carried out by a reinforced company, two companies make up a reserve and guard artillery. So it turns out that the regiment of the whole conducts and ensures the operation to disarm the group not exceeding the number of the motorized rifle platoon.

Unfortunately, even this balance of forces does not guarantee the successful completion of the operation. It is impossible to conceal the preparation of such a number of servicemen for combat operations and advancement to the site of the operation from enemy reconnaissance. Only the final stage of the march - the occupation of positions around the village in the absence of fire contact with the enemy (fire resistance) - is carried out at a speed not exceeding 10 km / h. This is under favorable weather conditions and moderately rugged terrain. Thus, the time to block the settlement in two converging directions is at least half an hour. Add to this the unmasking factors accompanying the advancement of our troops - engine noise, dust plume, low communication discipline - and it turns out that the time required to evacuate ammunition depots and enemy manpower is from 2 to 3-4 hours. This allows the enemy to withdraw the main forces of the group from under the planned strike and organize fire resistance on favorable terms.

In practice, the situation is much more complicated and dramatic for the federal forces. The lack of necessary experience, and in some cases the corruption of our military officials and the skillful organization of the enemy intelligence, allow him to know about upcoming events in a few days.

The practice of patterned repetition of such operations creates an ideal opportunity for the enemy to impose a battle at the time that suits him and at his chosen place. Be sure that on the approach to the settlement, which is the object of the study, the enemy pushes the road with anti-tank mines, land mines and all sorts of explosive mine traps, and on the way back be ready to land in an ambush organized by militants from neighboring villages.

Anyone who took part in the hostilities of the past few years knows that not a single unit, not a single unit is able to provide 100% staffing and combat equipment. At best, to participate in operations, it is possible to attract up to half of the regular personnel and military equipment. This leads to a weakening of the battle formations. The distance between combat vehicles is from 200 to 500 meters, our defense is not solid positional, and the lack of a system of engineering structures, including trenches, communication routes, shelters for personnel and military equipment is an example of a focal, hastily organized motorized rifle squad. At best, the engineering equipment position system includes the 3-4 prone trench, located on either side of the combat vehicle, and several anti-personnel grenades put up for stretching. That does not provide reliable cover possible ways of withdrawal of the enemy or the elimination of the breakthrough of his group.

The insurgents break through, as a rule, with the onset of dusk, and provides for salvo fire from all available anti-tank weapons (mainly RPG-7) at the nearest armored vehicle, and then destroying stunned motorized riflemen in poorly equipped positions.

The blows are made from the shortest distance from the shelter for 3-5 minutes, and then an organized exit from the environment is carried out. During this time, our command does not have time to transfer the reserve to the breakthrough site (often it does not even bother to create it), and the preparation of artillery fire, including zeroing and adjustment, takes at best 12-15 minutes. This means 0% of the effectiveness of the shells. Exactly the same effectiveness and has the fire support of neighboring offices. In a real battle, shooting at a distance greater than 150-200 meters is a waste of ammunition.

An example of such actions is the breakthrough of the grouping of the Afghan Mujahideen from the environment in the area of ​​their training center in the village of Barmazit 17 February 1986. Then, during the breakthrough, two BMP-2 border guards were destroyed. Or a breakthrough of a group of Mujahideen of more than 200 militants in the area of ​​the fortified area in the province of Baghlan 24 March 1987. Finally, the most famous example is the breakthrough of Raduyev’s militants from May Day.

Both the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and the militants in Chechnya quickly learned how to nullify our advantage in artillery, shortening the fire contact distances to 50-200 meters, in which the artillery fire becomes disastrous for its troops. In a battle at such a distance, not a single gunner can ensure the defeat of the enemy without hitting him.

In such conditions, the one who can achieve numerical superiority on the battlefield wins and who has the advantage in portable weapons designed to defeat the enemy in shelters or armored facilities. Preference is given to their species from the bench rather than by the hinged path.

The fighting during the storming of Grozny was an excellent confirmation of the erroneous views of the Russian command, which relied solely on the use of armored objects and artillery. In conditions of limited visibility, complex rugged terrain or urban neighborhoods, maneuverability and fire capabilities of all types of military equipment are sharply limited.

The walls of buildings, dense vegetation in fast-moving combat at short distances are more preferable shelters for personnel than infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Moreover, these armored vehicles are of additional interest to the enemy, being an attractive target with extremely limited possibilities for movement, firing and surveillance. The increased engine noise, the sharp, far-reaching odor of exhaust gases are one of the main signs of revealing, allowing the enemy to easily avoid a fire collision under unfavorable conditions and strike her from the shelter from short distances.

According to the testimony of the Chechen separatists themselves, in such battles the RPG-7 and its handicraft modifications became the main means of defeating the personnel of the Russian troops. Notable is the composition of the assault groups of militants and their weapons, where on 5 there are two RPG-7 people and, in addition, one RPG-22 or RPG-18 per person. The attack of our strongholds always began with a massive strike using a large number of RPGs and RPO Bumblebee. The effectiveness of this tactic is also reflected in the analysis of our losses in Afghanistan. With the total number of people killed by 13700, direct combat losses from small arms fire were approximately 35%, and from gunshot fragmentation lesions - 40% (mainly the result of grenade launcher fire).

My personal experience also testifies to the low efficiency of small arms fire in such a battle. As deputy commander of a reconnaissance landing company in Afghanistan, I took part in an ambush on one of the rebel advance routes. 16 March 1987 was destroyed by a group of militants from 9 people. The fire was conducted on them, seemingly in ideal conditions - from top to bottom at an angle of 25 – 30 hail, from a distance of 50 – 60 m. Moonlit night, the presence of night vision devices. And thanks to the suddenness achieved, the enemy had extremely weak resistance. Despite this, each of the scouts spent at least 2 – 3 ammunition stores, that is, about 900 cartridges per group, which amounted to about 100 cartridges per killed Mujahidin. The battle was fought by well-trained soldiers who fought for at least a year, and the group included 4, a well-trained officer.

I understand only the one who himself at least once was in the thick of this battle. It is possible to brilliantly perform all exercises of firing at plywood targets, it is much more difficult to conduct aimed fire at a real armed opponent, overcoming psychological stress in oneself.

It would seem strange, but the consumption of rifle ammunition - 100 per killed enemy - for any war becomes almost perfect. For example, in the First World War on the Eastern Front, the monthly requirement of the Russian army for cartridges was 250 million units. Thus, based on each enemy who died or died from wounds (about 800 thousand people), more than 12 thousand bullets were fired. Given the artillery fire, which accounted for half of all casualties of the enemy, the consumption of rifle ammunition per killed soldier amounted to almost 25 thousand cartridges.

In such a situation, every good shot is called a sniper, no matter from what distance it was made. The author of these lines, who has spent almost three years in different wars, hasn’t had a chance to personally encounter real sniper fire (from a distance of more than 600 meters). All damage from small arms was inflicted by both us and us with dagger fire, that is, with 100 – 150 m. And if we consider the types of weapons, then the most effective fire from a pistol was fired only at close range, not further than 3 – 5 m, from an automatic weapon - 150 – 200 m, from the SVD and machine gun - up to 300 m. By the way, this is what the American experience in Vietnam says.

In no case do not think that I deny the value of a sniper in battle, on the contrary - a good shot that brought the enemy, has always been considered a sign of high professionalism. In September, in the Dohanai-Gori area, west of Pul-i-Khumri, two mojaheds successfully selected a firing position and held two battalions of the 1985 regiment for half a day until our fighters “pulled” BMP-149 and fired automatic guns are not smeared shooters over the stones.

The mistake of our military theorists lies in the fact that the sniper, as a military specialty, is considered in the complex of all fire training of motorized rifle subunits. Usually, the platoon commander shoves the first recruit into his hands with a weapon, writes the number to his military ID, and from that day on the poor fellow who received a sniper rifle is called a sniper.

In most armies of the world, snipers are trained in special training centers from three to six months. The selection is made on a competitive basis, out of the 20 – 30 candidates there is only one, but the best one.

Essentially, our units do not get snipers. The experience of recent local wars involving the Soviet and then the Russian Army suggests that all attempts to revive the sniper movement without a fairly serious professional attitude to the selection and training of specialists are doomed to failure.

All sighting devices that we have on small arms also require serious design changes. If during the day they allow the successful targeting of weapons to the target, then at dusk and at night the effectiveness of the fire decreases to zero. Numerous fires and the use of lighting bombs, mines, shells, rockets incapacitate night vision sights and preclude their effective use. The use of phosphor nozzles on the sighting device for night firing requires that the fighter carry with him a whole pocket of these fast-track wire brackets. The output is seen in the use of a double-circuit mechanical sight with tritium inserts, which allows you to shoot with high accuracy when, due to darkness, the usual sight is no longer visible.

All these low-cost measures could significantly improve the effectiveness of small arms in combat, but knowing the inertia and inertia of our military officials, we can assume that the proposals will remain on paper and will not go further than this article.

The Russian guys who are preparing to join the battle, you can advise a number of activities tested in hostilities.

Today, our politicians are unlikely to achieve "Chechenization", "Tatarisation" or "Dagestanization" of any local war and raking up the heat by proxy, as it was in Afghanistan after the 1985 year. All the brunt of the war will have to be borne on its shoulders, and in order to reduce the inevitable losses caused by poor training, understaffing and insufficient weapons of personnel, increase the number of portable heavy weapons in the units. Professionals prefer weapons with a flat trajectory of fire, which has a greater range of direct shot. With equal weight, the large-bore machine-gun “Rock” has an indisputable advantage over AGS-17. It will allow you to reach the enemy at a two-kilometer range wherever he hides, be it brickwork, armored personnel carrier armor, thick brushwood or a helicopter board.

You can talk a lot about the advantages or disadvantages of mortar fire. The main problem is the level of training of the gunner and the ability to adjust the fire. Now estimate the weight of the mortar, base plate, 2 – 3 tens of mines, and you will receive additional 120 – 150 kg of platoon loading. Think carefully if you can handle such a load. It may be easier to carry a good art corrector with you and establish a stable relationship with the artillery supporting you. The mortar is good as a partisan weapon for covertly firing at government troops sitting at roadblocks, guard posts or in places of open congestion at a distance from 2 to 4 km.

Our troops more often had to conduct combat operations at short distances with the enemy in hiding. Under other conditions, the guerrillas, as a rule, do not enter the battle and try to avoid it at any cost. In this case, our advantage in military equipment and its armament is reduced to nothing. So it was 1 in May 1986 in Panjshir, 31 in December 1994 in Grozny, in March 1996 in Yarysh-Mardy.

You can equalize the chances of the parties in such a battle by quickly dismounting the infantry and organizing fire resistance from those types of weapons that will ensure the suppression of the enemy in the shelter. The ideal could be considered the use of artillery in direct fire.

In April 1987, the commander of the 201st MSD, Colonel Shekhovtsov, during the assault on the fortified area in southern Baghlan, reinforced the assault battalions with two batteries of the Akatsiya 152-mm self-propelled artillery mounts, direct-fire them. Explosive high-explosive shell explosions broke through gaps in the walls into which they easily passed Tanks and BMP, crushed any fire resistance of the enemy and ensured the successful completion of the task. But in that battle, the distance between the defensive lines of the Mujahideen was 700–900 m and made it possible not to expose self-propelled guns to fighter fire from grenade launchers. Unfortunately, today our adversary is not so stupid as to allow himself to be smashed in this way.
Where is the way out? Based on my experience, I would advise all commanders and commanders preparing for war with partisans, firstly, to minimize large-scale operations using a large number of personnel. The most promising are the actions of small, 3-4 people, reconnaissance groups equipped with compact and reliable means of topographic location and communications, including artillery spotter or aircraft gunner, acting in collaboration with artillery units or aviation.

Their task is to detect the enemy and, avoiding fire contact with him, to ensure the most effective defeat by artillery and aviation fire. Secondly, to change the staff structure of a motorized rifle platoon by introducing a grenade launcher station armed with an RPG-7 into it. Thus bringing the number of grenade launchers in the platoon to six, we increase the firepower of this unit almost to the level of the battery 82-mm anti-tank guns. Why RPG-7, and not RPO "Bumblebee" or GP-25?

Win in offices, die in battlesThe fact is that, possessing comparable characteristics, RPO has a significant drawback - one-time use, and with fire contact it is very difficult to hit the target with the first shot. As a rule, the destruction of a target at a direct shot range is made by two shots - sighting and only then, with the amendment, to kill.

In such conditions, the destruction of the target from the RPO requires 22 kg of portable weapons, and the defeat from the RPG - 5 kg (the weight of two PG-7В). Let us add to this the indisputable advantage of the PGO-7 optical sight over the mechanical sight to the RPO and the significant difference in the cost of the shots made: PG-7В - 25 dollars, RPO - about 100 dollars. We get significant financial savings, which is also important for today's Russia.

The effectiveness of defeating lightly armored targets with RPG-7 fire is considered by our military theorists as 0,3. This means that in combat, an 3 shot must be fired from a grenade launcher to destroy an BMP-BTR.

The shelters used by militants are usually comparable in protection with armored vehicles equipped with anti-bullet armor, and the ammunition consumption for their defeat can be compared. The presence of 6 grenade launchers in the compartment with ammunition in 6 RPG shots allows you to reliably suppress 12 targets, which corresponds to the task of a motorized rifle platoon in an offensive battle.

Chechen separatists empirically reached the understanding that in urban combat (their favorite type of combat), one can achieve any significant success only by concentrating anti-tank weapons to suppress any target. Moreover, they went further, taking up the improvement of grenade launcher shots for various purposes.

Gasoline is poured into anti-tank grenades, attached to the head of a grenade on a pair of 400 gram trotyl sticks. It is difficult to judge the effectiveness of such innovations. It is problematic to hit the target with this bomb, more than 50 m, but the psychological effect of its use on the positions of government troops is undoubtedly high.

For many years we have been talking about the need to adopt a high-explosive fragmentation or incendiary grenade for an RPG. But here we are faced with the Geneva Conventions, imposing a restriction in 400 g on high-explosive fragmentation ammunition used in firing from wearable weapons and limiting the use of incendiary weapons. True, these restrictions do not apply to ammunition intended for combined exposure. For example, a cumulative anti-tank grenade with an internal notch on the metal shell of a warhead or a signal-lighting grenade with napalm or thermite filling.

Speaking about the combat use of grenade launchers and rifle grenades, it is necessary to note their main drawback - this is the difficulty of aiming fire and the low power of explosives contained. All those who have encountered the combat use of this weapon know that it is possible to effectively hit an enemy with VOG-25, GP-23 or a rifle grenade, only if they hit the enemy in the forehead, and then provided that he is without a helmet. With a mass of 320– 350 g, these grenades, if you believe the characteristics, give 200 to 800 fragments with a radius of damage of at least 10 m. Unfortunately, a fragment weighing 0,5-1,5 g can hardly inflict serious damage to the enemy’s infantry. As a rule, this weapon is used to conduct an addressless disturbing fire.

Each battle is not similar to the other, and you can only survive by fighting experience if you win it. Despite all the horror and absurdity, the war in Chechnya, in Afghanistan, Transnistria gave Russia people who know the war and know how to fight. This experience is invaluable. It can not be purchased at our military schools and academies. Therefore, if you do not have the opportunity to get extra heavy rifle armaments, night shooting attachments, a good art director, and your boss’s professional competence raises doubts about the success of the upcoming operation - try to get at least one real veteran of the recent wars into your unit. And may his experience and your military happiness help you survive and conquer.
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108 comments
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  1. serge-68-68
    serge-68-68 31 July 2013 08: 25 New
    10
    Everything was written very correctly for its time. I can add that for the period until 1998, nothing has changed in Russian military theory. Judging by the absence of special documents similar to a whole group of US army charters defining the procedures for units, subunits and military personnel in a low-intensity conflict group, our military theorists have not made much progress so far.
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 31 July 2013 08: 44 New
      +2
      Quote: serge-68-68
      I can add that for the period until 1998, nothing has changed in Russian military theory.

      Где как. В Правилах стрельбы и управления огнём артиллерии в этот период появилась глава "Особенности стрельбы и управления огнем при выполнении огневых задач во внутренних вооруженных конфликтах."

      Насчёт уставов- согласен. И кстати, не только уставов. На этой "линейной" тактике строится и тактическая подготовка. От БТУ и ниже.
      1. skeptic-
        skeptic- 31 July 2013 12: 32 New
        +9
        The most promising are the actions of small, 3-4 people, reconnaissance groups equipped with compact and reliable means of topographic location and communications, including artillery spotter or aircraft gunner, acting in collaboration with artillery or aviation units.

        Блин, Шойгу бы эти слова в уши. Когда наконец то вспомнят, что нет у России того "нескончаемого людского резерва". Давно пора вернуться к тактике воевать не числом, а умением.
    2. Alekseev
      Alekseev 31 July 2013 12: 13 New
      +2
      Probably the point is not that experience has been lost and there are no instructions.
      Всё везде прописано, главное не лениться читать и "на ус мотать".
      Скорее в том, что на командные должности, зачастую, назначают не умных боевых офицеров и генералов,а разного рада приспособленцев, "сынков" и т. д. и т. п.
      In combat operations, the personal qualities of the commander, his experience and training of troops (this is a separate song), and not all kinds of instructions (although they, of course, are also needed) play a paramount role.
      Показательно мнение одного "авторитетного" военного, Наполеона Бонапарта: "War is a simple art; I fought sixty battles and, really, did not learn anything that I did not know after the first."
      1. Djozz
        Djozz 31 July 2013 15: 57 New
        0
        Napoleon’s end is sad. In general, hopelessness blows from this article.
        1. Max_Bauder
          Max_Bauder 1 August 2013 14: 36 New
          +1
          Quote: Djozz
          Napoleon’s end is sad. In general, hopelessness blows from this article.


          No matter how sad the end, he took part in all his battles, directly in battle and stood and commanded, saw the situation, cores flew nearby, Napoleon endured all the hardships and hardships of military service together with his soldiers. There is a legend when in one battle his marshal bent down from the core, and he said to him: If this core was intended for you, you would at least charge deep into the ground and it would bother you.

          I also respect Macedon, they say that he was in the forefront and personally entered the battle during the cavalry attacks of his troops. Also did not die in battle, although he participated in many battles. I think if you are not destined you will not die.
          1. Setrac
            Setrac 1 August 2013 16: 17 New
            0
            Quote: Max_Bauder
            Napoleon carried with his soldiers.

            Napoleon was a famous PR man.
            Quote: Max_Bauder
            they say that he was in the forefront and personally led into the battle, during the cavalry attacks of his troops.

            No comment at all.
            "Пусть говорят"
            1. Max_Bauder
              Max_Bauder 2 August 2013 08: 35 New
              0
              Quote: Setrac
              Napoleon was a famous PR man.


              these are not only his words but are confirmed by others? then there was no such word PR

              Quote: Setrac
              Вообще без комментариев. "Пусть говорят"


              I propose then do not read the story at all if the movie is not confirmed by photo documents? they are falsified
              1. Setrac
                Setrac 2 August 2013 22: 37 New
                0
                Quote: Max_Bauder
                these are not only his words but are confirmed by others? then there was no such word PR

                Not in the name of the essence, but in the idea, Napoleon praised himself not childishly, on a grand scale.
                Quote: Max_Bauder
                I propose then do not read the story at all if the movie is not confirmed by photo documents? they are falsified

                The history of the ancient world is in doubt, do not refer to the Macedonian
    3. CTEPX
      CTEPX 31 July 2013 16: 19 New
      +4
      Quote: serge-68-68
      Everything was written very correctly for its time.

      The article is still relevant. It, in principle, is relevant for Russia)).
      A good officer in Russia has always been forced to fight partly contrary to the applicable charters. The most famous example is Suvorov A.V.
      Что касается современных "правил войны". Есть такой г\п-к в отставке - Щербак В.В. В дальнейшем он очень много сделал для "рязанки", да и для всего ВДВ. В Афгане, будучи комбатом, он на свой страх и риск, штатное отделение стрелков ПВО превратил во взвод снайперов). Так вот замок-срочник этого взвода имеет "личное кладбище" с двумя нолями.
  2. Valery Neonov
    Valery Neonov 31 July 2013 08: 39 New
    +5
    Quote: serge-68-68
    our military theorists

    And all because they are ONLY THEORETICS .. as the author noted:"Среди высших военных руководителей нет ни одного, кто имел бы опыт командования взводом, ротой или батальоном в бою, кто бы на своей шкуре испытал боль ранений и все прелести огневого соприкосновения с противником.". It may be an exaggeration, but 80 percent seems to me, this is true. hi
    1. Tretyakov
      Tretyakov 1 August 2013 20: 36 New
      0
      If we had introduced the norm, as in the German army, that until you serve in the infantry for 2 years, you won’t become an officer, then the deaths of soldiers would have been much less, and the fools in command were reduced!
  3. Flying Dutchman
    Flying Dutchman 31 July 2013 08: 40 New
    +4
    What can I say, even a large-scale scientific analysis of the experience of the Great Patriotic War has not yet been done. And the Afghan and Chechen wars for the general staff did not seem to exist.
    1. Avenger711
      Avenger711 31 July 2013 10: 10 New
      +4
      The whole analysis is done, if you haven’t been shown it, this does not mean that it is not there. In academies, all this is studied.
  4. ed65b
    ed65b 31 July 2013 08: 56 New
    +6
    What are theorists of Serge, if the allowance for storming the city, was brought to Grozny from the Museum of the Battle of Stalingrad in Volgograd. In general, I doubt that we still have theorists. Here they simply cannot summarize the experience of recent conflicts, or do not want to.
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 31 July 2013 09: 05 New
      +3
      If interested: American charter on this topic: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06-11/index.html
      1. serge-68-68
        serge-68-68 31 July 2013 09: 13 New
        +3
        The US Army has a whole range of charters on conflicts of low intensity (I used to know them all, now I’ve forgotten everything, I need to look through the archive :)): actions in the conditions of CPI, civil operations, psychological warfare, settlements in settlements ...
    2. Alekseev
      Alekseev 31 July 2013 12: 31 New
      +3
      Quote: ed65b
      brought from the museum of the Battle of Stalingrad in Volgograd.

      Do not support silly rumors.
      Как штурмовать города написано во всех армейских "книжках" от БУСВ до учебника сержанта.
      Why is it sometimes not used in practice?
      I have already expressed my opinion above.
      1. dustycat
        dustycat 4 August 2013 21: 46 New
        0
        Quote: Alekseev

        Как штурмовать города написано во всех армейских "книжках" от БУСВ до учебника сержанта.
        Why is it sometimes not used in practice?
        I have already expressed my opinion above.

        Do not tell me the paragraph which specifically describes the procedure and actions of each soldier during the cleaning of the building?
  5. Prapor Afonya
    Prapor Afonya 31 July 2013 09: 02 New
    +8
    Quote: Valery Neon
    Quote: serge-68-68
    our military theorists

    And all because they are ONLY THEORETICS .. as the author noted:"Среди высших военных руководителей нет ни одного, кто имел бы опыт командования взводом, ротой или батальоном в бою, кто бы на своей шкуре испытал боль ранений и все прелести огневого соприкосновения с противником.". It may be an exaggeration, but 80 percent seems to me, this is true. hi

    In his book, I.Yu. Stoderevsky, this officer who was in Afghanistan twice and participated in extremely productive battles describes that while studying at the academy he was reckless in proving to the professor the insolvency of warfare by long-recognized methods, for which the old theorist could not forgive such arrogance and Comrade Stoderevsky almost kicked out of the army!
    1. aviamed90
      aviamed90 31 July 2013 09: 46 New
      +6
      Prapor Afonya

      This is so!

      But you forget that the military academy is just an educational institution and is not called upon to improve military science. His task is training (although, if one of the students writes a diploma paper outlining new ways of doing bd, this is not forbidden).
      Есть такое понятие как "научная работа". Эффективность такой работы близка к "0" и имеет больше познавательный чем рекомендательный и новаторский характер.

      And to solve issues of military science, there is the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Academy of Military Sciences. What are they doing?

      By the way, the Academy of Military Sciences is a non-governmental research interregional public organization and conducts fundamental and applied research on defense issues.

      That is, even in this matter, as always!

      It remains to rely on theorists from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation! But against the backdrop of recent events - it seems that they are not up to military science.
  6. Valery Neonov
    Valery Neonov 31 July 2013 09: 19 New
    +1
    Quote: Prapor Afonya
    for which the old theorist could not forgive such impudence and Comrade Stoderevsky was nearly expelled from the army!

    And he was probably not the only one ... hi
  7. IRBIS
    IRBIS 31 July 2013 09: 57 New
    16
    Я хорошо помню то время, когда была написана статья. Тогда появилось очень много "новаторов" с мыслями по изменению штатной структуры, вооружению, нормативной документации. Каждый из них говорил, что у него было "вот так" и это работало. И, что если бы было еще и "такое", то было бы еще лучше.
    Однако большинство неудач проистекает все же из-за элементарной неспособности командиров организовать боевые действия. Раздолбанные колонны - следствие неорганизованного боевого охранения и взаимодействия, "внезапное" нападение - отсутствие разведки и того же боевого охранения, ночные прорывы - отсутствие светового обеспечения и подготовленной системы огня. И всегда - отсутствие взаимодействия, управления, устойчивой связи и различных видов обеспечения. Чаще всего все делалось "от балды", авось прокатит. Иногда прокатывало, чаще - нет. Там, где командиры подходили к делу серьезно, боевики всегда проигрывали. Ибо встречали organized отпор. Примеров - масса. Систематизация и изучение боевого опыта - это дело необходимое и с этим никто не спорит. Вот только не надо путать "личный" опыт с тактикой.
    1. Djozz
      Djozz 31 July 2013 16: 03 New
      -1
      I totally agree with you! And about the boys snipers, remember the Second World War, I suppose they didn’t teach there for six months, and the Germans were afraid of our Zaitsevs to diarrhea.
      1. hiocraib
        hiocraib 31 July 2013 17: 30 New
        +3
        Quote: Djozz
        boys snipers, remember the Second World War, I suppose they didn’t teach for six months there

        трёхмесячные курсы ТОЛЬКО снайперского дела. и ТОЛЬКО "прошедших конкурс" на эти курсы отправляли.
        so do not la la.
        manuals on sniper business in 1943 released for self-education.

        Quote: Djozz
        the Germans of our Zaitsevs were afraid to diarrhea.

        надо бы историю знать, особенно свою. "снайперы Сталинграда" - это дистанция максимум до 200 метров (оптики не надо), а вот прятаться, скрытно подходить и уходить именно в руинах - вот в чём проблема.
        and before Stalingrad, Zaitsev was the usual staff clerk in the Pacific Fleet, had nothing to do with sniper business ...
        1. mehmeh
          mehmeh 8 December 2014 13: 37 New
          0
          VV sniper schools were crawling for three months in the snow. during the war, the NKVD trained snipers en masse for the troops. in odon, good sniper courses were 99, they trained boys in Chechnya right now I don’t know.
    2. Max_Bauder
      Max_Bauder 1 August 2013 14: 51 New
      0
      Quote: IRBIS
      Я хорошо помню то время, когда была написана статья. Тогда появилось очень много "новаторов" с мыслями по изменению штатной структуры, вооружению, нормативной документации. Каждый из них говорил, что у него было "вот так" и это работало. И, что если бы было еще и "такое", то было бы еще лучше.
      Однако большинство неудач проистекает все же из-за элементарной неспособности командиров организовать боевые действия. Раздолбанные колонны - следствие неорганизованного боевого охранения и взаимодействия, "внезапное" нападение - отсутствие разведки и того же боевого охранения, ночные прорывы - отсутствие светового обеспечения и подготовленной системы огня. И всегда - отсутствие взаимодействия, управления, устойчивой связи и различных видов обеспечения. Чаще всего все делалось "от балды", авось прокатит. Иногда прокатывало, чаще - нет. Там, где командиры подходили к делу серьезно, боевики всегда проигрывали. Ибо встречали organized отпор. Примеров - масса. Систематизация и изучение боевого опыта - это дело необходимое и с этим никто не спорит. Вот только не надо путать "личный" опыт с тактикой.


      Partly you are right that you need to study the old material and follow it, and not act negligently. But they are wrong if you think that the tactics described in the charter will be valid for all centuries, which is now in the army, you know when it was written?

      used to fight with arrows and arrows, another tactic, then they went, muskets and spades, bombard, artillery, shrapnel, gun fire gave way to automatic fire, many people were killed when they went on a wide front in the manner of the Napoleonic wars to a gatling or maxim machine gun (as shown in the movie chapaev ), it’s the same suicide to go in a column in the gorge when they pour water from a grenade launcher from two sides from the mountains. The charters are changing, more precisely, the tactics described in it over time, with the advent of new types of weapons.

      I am absolutely sure that in the future (and already now), a drone flying with scanning infrared and other radiation will be engaged in reconnaissance, which automatically fights at the same minute where and how many (all in the picture) enemy troops. The next minute, a rocket or several missiles of a large radius of destruction (incendiary shells) are already flying there and that’s all, there are no more personnel.

      While these events do not exist, it’s still better to keep up with the times and be able to fight not by numbers but by skill, although I like the enemy but his words, General George Patton: the goal of each soldier is not to die in the name of the Motherland, but to make the enemy do it.
      1. IRBIS
        IRBIS 6 August 2013 12: 04 New
        0
        Quote: Max_Bauder
        But they are wrong if you think that the tactics described in the charter will be valid for all centuries, which is now in the army, you know when it was written?

        I know tactics, operational art and other military delights well. They laid the basic principles. Methods and methods may change, but the principles remain unshakable. And if it is supposed to organize protection, then it needs to be organized. How? Here the ways and methods that the commander owns have already gone.
        And if I start everyone to breathe in my personal experience, which was obtained in a specific situation, then this will already be too much.
  8. seller trucks
    seller trucks 31 July 2013 10: 07 New
    +4
    The experience of the hostilities in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Tajikistan shows that none of the large-scale operations conducted by the troops, with the so-called blocking, despite a significant concentration of troops, was not crowned with any success.


    according to statistics cited by Sergey Kozlov, the effectiveness of motorized rifle / SPN was 40 / 60, and the ratio of the number of people was 90 / 10.
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 31 July 2013 10: 21 New
      +4
      Мотострелков железно переоценили. Самый проблемный род войск. При этом отношение к нему "и так сойдёт"
      1. seller trucks
        seller trucks 31 July 2013 10: 49 New
        0
        Quote: Spade
        Motorized riflemen overestimated.


        Sergei Kozlov on the actions of Americans in Vietnam:

        One of the main tasks in the counter-guerrilla struggle is to tear the partisans from the population, to deprive them of the opportunity to replenish their material and human resources. The Americans divided the area of ​​counter-guerrilla operations into red, yellow, and green areas. Red, or “A,” is an area under the full control of partisan forces. It houses the headquarters and partisan bases. Any detainee here is seen as a potential member of the partisan movement. Government forces in Area A are on alert. Yellow, or “B,” is a partisan open area, but controlled by the military administration. Armed servicemen move along it only as part of groups. It introduces curfews and other measures to control the population. Motor vehicles are guarded by at least one person. Green, or “C,” is an area under the control of the military administration, but in which the actions of resistance groups are noted. Strict measures to control the population are not introduced, the carrying of personal weapons by the military is optional, but they are better off moving around two to three people. Cars can follow without security.
        Such a division means a clear regulation: where and what can be done and where not. In particular, the announcement of a locality as a red region automatically unties the hands of the troops and puts the civilian population before a choice: to leave for the yellow or green region or to share the fate of the partisans, which does not suit everyone. Thus, partisans lose their support of the population.
        The basis of the tactics of the regular troops involved in the fight against partisans is intelligence and search and search and punitive actions. Most operations (unlike the Russian army) are airborne in nature - when the maneuver in the operation area is carried out using helicopters.
        1. Lopatov
          Lopatov 31 July 2013 11: 02 New
          0
          And where does it?
          1. seller trucks
            seller trucks 31 July 2013 11: 09 New
            +2
            Quote: Spade
            And where does it?


            these are actions of motorized rifle units in occupied / controlled territories, to the fact that motorized units were most often used ineptly and for other purposes
            1. Lopatov
              Lopatov 31 July 2013 11: 15 New
              +1
              This is to the fact that in Russia and in neighboring countries there are extremely few territories covered by the jungle, do not you find?
              1. Djozz
                Djozz 31 July 2013 16: 09 New
                +1
                It’s true that I was in Vietnam for partisans, take a walk, I don’t want, at least half of the territory below 17 parallel is defoliated by 20%
  9. Avenger711
    Avenger711 31 July 2013 10: 09 New
    +8
    Yes, yes, everyone knows how to fight with us, except for the military themselves. Well, if you served somewhere as an ordinary, then you certainly know better than generals how to ensure the security of the state.

    Especially for idiots I inform you that the Soviet Army in Afghanistan dealt well with the mujahideen at the tactical level. Fights with serious losses in 10+ killed are few.

    One simple question, which is more dangerous for the state, is a full-scale war, of which 20 fell on the share of Russia in the 2th century, or a local conflict with partisans?

    An army ready for a big war is always ready for a small one, the questions of giving a platoon a grenade launcher squad (and you can also have a tank for the same purpose, it will be even more reliable) are not related to large-scale military construction and are easily organized if necessary, and the development of any specific tactics without practice is impossible.

    And it’s not necessary about the first Chechen one, no one was going to win there, its whole point was to kill people and so that the population would be ready for everything later, just so that the little sons would sit at home. The second Chechen artillery tanks did the job quickly, although the level of disintegration of the armed forces at that time was already critical.

    Article minus.
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 31 July 2013 10: 17 New
      +7
      Quote: Avenger711
      Well, if you served somewhere as an ordinary, then you certainly know better than generals how to ensure the security of the state.

      The author is not ordinary. Deputy DDR commander is clearly an officer post.
      And he is very much right.
      1. Avenger711
        Avenger711 31 July 2013 10: 46 New
        +1
        At the level of his DDR, he certainly knows better than anyone how to solve tactical tasks, which, incidentally, are difficult to unambiguously state in the charter and stomatize, but this does not mean that we should prepare specifically for counter-guerrilla, and not great wars.

        And the position of the author draws a maximum for the captain.
        1. Lopatov
          Lopatov 31 July 2013 10: 59 New
          +4
          Well, the Americans somehow manage to systematize and include it in the combat training system.
          Do you need a lot of brains to draw such a picture?

          Or this one?

          Such?

          1. Alekseev
            Alekseev 2 August 2013 12: 44 New
            0
            Quote: Spade
            Do you need a lot of brains to draw such a picture?

            Everything has been painted long ago ...
            Read.
            1. Lopatov
              Lopatov 2 August 2013 16: 26 New
              0
              Please be more specific. Where exactly?
    2. aviamed90
      aviamed90 31 July 2013 10: 23 New
      +3
      Avenger711

      I agree with you.

      The author focuses mainly on the theory of tactics, forgetting about everything else (strategy, operational art, etc.). And he concludes about the state of ALL military science!

      Безусловно, военная наука сейчас в "загоне". Но этот вывод не может быть сделан по результатам конфликтов, например, в Чечне. Как вы справедливо заметили такие конфликты внутри страны локальной войной назвать сложно. Скорее это больше партизанские действия.

      But, all the same, in his reasoning as practice there is a rational kernel.
      Put "+".
      1. hiocraib
        hiocraib 31 July 2013 14: 49 New
        +3
        Quote: aviamed90
        The author focuses mainly on the theory of tactics, forgetting about everything else (strategy, operational art, etc.). And he concludes about the state of ALL military science!

        translating into simple language - the author writes about the foundation (or rather, about the fact that it does not exist), but our house is strong and worth it :)))

        strategy, operational art - this is a loud zilch without tactics at the level of a platoon-battalion-company.
        and all the conflicts of the last 30 years have convincingly proved this. (with the participation of CA, RA, NATO)

        когда взвод тупо не обучен и не имеет средств для эффективного подавления и поражения противника - он погибает/убегает/сдаётся в плен, и пофиг солдату на "гениев оперативного исскуства".

        "тупые" натовцы перед отпрывкой в конфликт контрактников несколько месяцев готовят их именно к данному конфликту - кто у нас этим занимается?
        it’s easier to call CTO Chechnya and it will be cheeky farts.
        or rename the police in the police ...
    3. serge-68-68
      serge-68-68 31 July 2013 10: 32 New
      +6
      The question is really simple. Two full-scale wars fell on Russia. And the last ended in 1945. But low-intensity and local? A dozen starting in Korea? And the last Chechens were not dangerous for Russia? And today, Afghanistan with its drug trafficking, the Russian state is not threatened?
      "Готовая к глобальной - готова к локальной": Напомните мне - что-то я не припомню в учебных занятиях по тактике МСО, МСВ, МСР и МСБ в середине 80-х г.г. занятий по теме: наступление (оборона) в городских условиях, оказание помощи гражданскому населению, проведение досмотров граждан и техники (это мы делали, но в рамках службы и тактики ПВ), контрснайперская борьба, контртеррористические мероприятия... Зато помню таблицы по расчетам потерь личного состава от ОМП. Большая война и малая война - две очень большие разницы. Придать взводу лишних гранатометчиков - элементарная задачка для комбата, но вот понимание этой необходимости (на уровне рефлекса) ему должны были привить в училище. А этого и не делалось. И в академиях, насколько я знаю, сия премудрость не изучалась. Только после того, как комбат угробит половину взвода, он ее осознает сам. Не поздноватенько ли?
      And the Yankees are generally strange. They have instructions for every sneeze. Exaggerating: the building commander saw them - spat on the finger - opened the corresponding charter - read what was needed - formed an assault group - and off, for America ...
      1. Max_Bauder
        Max_Bauder 1 August 2013 15: 24 New
        +1
        Quote: serge-68-68
        The question is really simple. Two full-scale wars fell on Russia. And the last ended in 1945. But low-intensity and local? A dozen starting in Korea? And the last Chechens were not dangerous for Russia? And today, Afghanistan with its drug trafficking, the Russian state is not threatened?
        "Готовая к глобальной - готова к локальной": Напомните мне - что-то я не припомню в учебных занятиях по тактике МСО, МСВ, МСР и МСБ в середине 80-х г.г. занятий по теме: наступление (оборона) в городских условиях, оказание помощи гражданскому населению, проведение досмотров граждан и техники (это мы делали, но в рамках службы и тактики ПВ), контрснайперская борьба, контртеррористические мероприятия... Зато помню таблицы по расчетам потерь личного состава от ОМП. Большая война и малая война - две очень большие разницы. Придать взводу лишних гранатометчиков - элементарная задачка для комбата, но вот понимание этой необходимости (на уровне рефлекса) ему должны были привить в училище. А этого и не делалось. И в академиях, насколько я знаю, сия премудрость не изучалась. Только после того, как комбат угробит половину взвода, он ее осознает сам. Не поздноватенько ли?
        And the Yankees are generally strange. They have instructions for every sneeze. Exaggerating: the building commander saw them - spat on the finger - opened the corresponding charter - read what was needed - formed an assault group - and off, for America ...


        I absolutely agree
    4. lexe
      lexe 31 July 2013 10: 33 New
      +1
      Yes, the United States fought a new war in Afghanistan. Where could anyone want to take the young fighter with a one-way ticket. So what is more profitable for the Pentagon? Fort Knox or the mujahideen called up for propaganda? No, the technological West can push the number too. This is the new military technology -question with a number. The main thing is that AK is at hand. I’m scared ... what if there is a cheap 3D printer and a laptop with a built-in model of a Windows machine ... and consumables for production sold like toilet paper rolls in any store. Such a trunk will have enough life to fulfill your brief mission - to kill yourself and the enemy. How much time do we have before this apocalypse?
      1. Djozz
        Djozz 31 July 2013 16: 21 New
        0
        In fact, at Fort Knox, the United States holds gold reserves.
        1. lexe
          lexe 31 July 2013 16: 48 New
          0
          In fact, at Fort Knox, the United States holds gold reserves.

          In the Afghan period, an educational institution. Amers entrusted gold to their tankers - now the truth is not ... laughing
    5. Djozz
      Djozz 31 July 2013 16: 11 New
      -9
      Правильно , статья с "душком", видимо писал ее озлобленный чем то офицер.Как говорил один персонаж в романе А. Толстова "Хождение по мукам", после посещения штаба командарма Сорокина" По теории правильно,а по факту саботаж!"
    6. Max_Bauder
      Max_Bauder 1 August 2013 15: 02 New
      +2
      Quote: Avenger711
      Yes, yes, everyone knows how to fight with us, except for the military themselves. Well, if you served somewhere as an ordinary, then you certainly know better than generals how to ensure the security of the state.


      Ah, if you became a senior service general, do you know better than the ordinary who was at the battle and saw how it happened?
      I would like to be better at the time of the Napoleonic wars, when the title is given not for the fact that for so many years I sat in the headquarters, but spent several or many battles in battle successfully. All the marshals (more than the general) of Napoleon were not older than 30 years. As if when one cavalry marshal (either Lan or Sult was called) was praised for his courage, he said: the general who lived to be 30 years old is not a general but rubbish. He was 30 the next year he died in battle. I marvel at the courage and dedication of the people of those years. Well, he would hardly consider himself smarter than the other.

      You can trust the general who at least once proved that he does not care about the soldiers.
      1. Djozz
        Djozz 2 August 2013 09: 13 New
        0
        Эту фразу произнес ком. кавалерией Фридриха "Великова" Зейдлиц.
      2. Alekseev
        Alekseev 2 August 2013 12: 15 New
        +1
        Age is not a criterion at all when it comes to generals.
        Example, Suvorov and Kutuzov.
        Yes, and you need to quote for sure.
        Quote: Max_Bauder
        he said: the general who lived to be 30 is not a general but rubbish.

        To be more precise, it was not about the general, but about the hussar, and it was argued that such was not even rubbish, but r ... (also must be correctly understood in the context ...)
        1. alone
          alone 2 August 2013 12: 23 New
          +2
          Well, you compared the Kutuzov Suvorov. they didn’t ride Mercedes. They were real commanders. not like some current generals who have millions of villas and foreign cars, and wives sparkle in diamonds !!
  10. Gomunkul
    Gomunkul 31 July 2013 10: 11 New
    +4
    Therefore, if you do not have the opportunity to get additional heavy small arms, night guns, a good artillery corrector, and the professional competence of your boss casts doubt on the success of the upcoming operation, try to get at least one real veteran of the last wars in your unit.
    В 90х, когда шла война на Кавказе, разговаривал как раз с боевым офицером-вертолётчиком (человеком не любившим говорить о войне, но были моменты когда он иногда открывался)прошедшим Афган. Так вот, когда однажды из "Новостных программ" он услышал, что разгромили большую колонну наших войск, он не выдержал и сказал: "Как же так, мы в Афгане давно уже обкатали проводку и сопровождение колонн, почему на Кавказе нет вертолётного прикрытия? В Афгане всегда две вертушки прикрывали колонны, одна шла на бреющем впереди, вторая висела над колонной." hi
    1. Avenger711
      Avenger711 31 July 2013 10: 41 New
      +1
      Because it was necessary to defeat this column. And what is characteristic of the worst defeat in Afghanistan is also due to the lack of helicopter cover http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibel_1st battalion_682st motorized rifle regiment
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 31 July 2013 10: 47 New
        +2
        And who needed to smash the columns in the second Chechen or in South Ossetia?
        1. Gomunkul
          Gomunkul 31 July 2013 11: 03 New
          +2
          Unfortunately, Boris Abramovich will not tell you. hi
        2. Avenger711
          Avenger711 31 July 2013 12: 59 New
          +1
          But there were such cases in the second Chechen one, and in Ossetia I don’t remember something like that, although there was just a war with an equal enemy.
          1. Lopatov
            Lopatov 31 July 2013 13: 11 New
            +2
            Quote: Avenger711
            in Ossetia, I don’t remember something like that

            How did Denis Vetchinov die?
          2. IRBIS
            IRBIS 31 July 2013 16: 32 New
            +2
            Quote: Avenger711
            in Ossetia, I don’t remember something like that

            Headquarters Column. You can even watch the video, where the shooter very emotionally comments on what is happening and says everything he thinks about the organization of the battle.
            1. Max_Bauder
              Max_Bauder 1 August 2013 15: 30 New
              +1
              Quote: IRBIS
              Quote: Avenger711
              in Ossetia, I don’t remember something like that

              Headquarters Column. You can even watch the video, where the shooter very emotionally comments on what is happening and says everything he thinks about the organization of the battle.


              About the tactics that in the traveling serpentine column they shoot at the first and last tank, they light up and slow down everyone, and then the enemies smash everyone until the last in the middle, probably even a child knows.
          3. alone
            alone 2 August 2013 12: 21 New
            +1
            the defeat of the headquarters column of the 58th army in Tskhinval. By the way, the commander himself was injured
    2. Max_Bauder
      Max_Bauder 1 August 2013 15: 28 New
      +1
      Quote: Gomunkul
      Therefore, if you do not have the opportunity to get additional heavy small arms, night guns, a good artillery corrector, and the professional competence of your boss casts doubt on the success of the upcoming operation, try to get at least one real veteran of the last wars in your unit.
      В 90х, когда шла война на Кавказе, разговаривал как раз с боевым офицером-вертолётчиком (человеком не любившим говорить о войне, но были моменты когда он иногда открывался)прошедшим Афган. Так вот, когда однажды из "Новостных программ" он услышал, что разгромили большую колонну наших войск, он не выдержал и сказал: "Как же так, мы в Афгане давно уже обкатали проводку и сопровождение колонн, почему на Кавказе нет вертолётного прикрытия? В Афгане всегда две вертушки прикрывали колонны, одна шла на бреющем впереди, вторая висела над колонной." hi


      What is it about, the army, every soldier young in it is children and thinks that everything is done right and he also has to carry out his task correctly, and when everything has been shitty from his head, he doesn’t know how much, the authorities begin to spit on such trust, because he himself is there does not participate, it’s like grass does not grow after me.
  11. AlNick
    AlNick 31 July 2013 10: 52 New
    +7
    cadets of military schools train and practice tactical standards for antinuclear and chemical defense, and students of military academies decorate maps, smashing a hypothetical enemy with dozens of nuclear strikes


    What can teachers teach (not all, but most) of those who have not been or participated in armed conflicts, and sometimes did not serve in the army.

    There were such unfortunate teachers who taught cadets the rules of operating military equipment, organizing military facilities, who did not serve in the army for a single day, who remained to teach at higher educational institutions immediately after graduation, and then successfully graduated from the academy without leaving the gates of the higher educational institution. All knowledge was limited to retelling of charters, manuals and someone else's written textbooks.
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 31 July 2013 11: 03 New
      +2
      Quote: AlNick
      There were such unfortunate teachers who taught cadets the rules of operating military equipment, organizing military facilities, who did not serve in the army for a single day, and who remained to teach at higher educational institutions immediately after graduation

      We did not have these. No one.
      1. Joker
        Joker 31 July 2013 15: 36 New
        +4
        We did not have these. No one.

        Maybe a little off topic, but at the institutes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 99% of these. My son studied with a friend, spoke only 2 teachers for the whole study, they met with experience in organs and how they taught Pts. much different from theorists.
        1. Djozz
          Djozz 31 July 2013 16: 35 New
          +2
          У меня товарищ по прошлой работе, был зам. начальника Краснодарского института МВД, он на полном серьезе говорил "Будь моя воля, 70% студентов я бы выгнал с 1-го курса"
        2. Lopatov
          Lopatov 31 July 2013 17: 30 New
          +5
          "Повезло" МВДшникам.
          Не удивительно, что у них такой низкий уровень подготовки. Чисто по рассказам одного "синего" сужу, который на меня иногда работает: "вот при советской власти были следаки... Сядет напротив тебя, даст закурить, и через пол часа сам всё ему выложишь. А сейчас- сразу в зубы тычут"
        3. воронов
          воронов 31 July 2013 21: 30 New
          0
          Quote: Joker
          but in the institutes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 99% of such.

          The institutes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (former higher schools of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police) train lawyers and forensic experts to work in the police in operational, investigative positions, and the three men go to district police officers. They do not teach how to fight there.
          1. dustycat
            dustycat 4 August 2013 20: 48 New
            0
            Quote: voronov
            The institutes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (former higher schools of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police) train lawyers and forensic experts to work in the police in operational, investigative positions, and the three men go to district police officers. They do not teach how to fight there.

            Forensic scientists there are trained only to collect evidence.
            And it’s not very successful - you won’t learn much from the pictures.
            I saw how they work.
            He found my fingerprints on the bank submitted by me, but the fingerprints of the thief on the bank - he zalapal.

            The precinct in my area is just an excellent student.
            But troechniks are sent to the escort - there the work is breadier and the contingent is less sensitive to rudeness and stupidity.
            At work, you often have to communicate with investigators.
            More and more girls are among investigators.
            Guys only in senior positions. Apparently, the bosses are appointed only because of the presence of a member.
            1. mehmeh
              mehmeh 8 December 2014 13: 58 New
              0
              School of the Ministry of Internal Affairs))) the most corrupt organizations in the country
              Hotbed of corruption there is legal only Uch DB come or from the troops all the rest for bribes. natures product or other forms of exchange.
              Then they are surprised that the cops of prostitutes cover
              It’s necessary to beat off the grandmother
              In general, the attitude there is towards service as a business
              Cadets argue like this. I spent steadily then I’ll beat off the grandmother then then when I get out of business for senior officers I’ll twist things.
              Yes, there were darkness and prostitutes in the troops in Chechnya and business was roofed. This is the most harmless
              In general, many officers were afraid of large operations in the battalions in Chechnya.
              And we wash our ruble for a ruble
    2. Max_Bauder
      Max_Bauder 1 August 2013 15: 32 New
      0
      Quote: AlNick
      cadets of military schools train and practice tactical standards for antinuclear and chemical defense, and students of military academies decorate maps, smashing a hypothetical enemy with dozens of nuclear strikes


      What can teachers teach (not all, but most) of those who have not been or participated in armed conflicts, and sometimes did not serve in the army.

      There were such unfortunate teachers who taught cadets the rules of operating military equipment, organizing military facilities, who did not serve in the army for a single day, who remained to teach at higher educational institutions immediately after graduation, and then successfully graduated from the academy without leaving the gates of the higher educational institution. All knowledge was limited to retelling of charters, manuals and someone else's written textbooks.



      there is such an expression: knowledge that is not fixed in practice turns into a hypothesis (whether there is life on Mars or not) =)
  12. Seventh
    Seventh 31 July 2013 11: 00 New
    +3
    Во вторую кампанию вроде научились водить колонны, а вот тактика бесполезного "блокирования района" маленькой армией осталась. Был свидетелем маленькой победоносной войны в 2002, когда 58 армия ВВ огромной колонной с прикрытием вертушек прибыла в Веденский район "блокировала" его и вела "героическую" 3-х недельную войну с неизвестным противником с применением штурмовой авиации и обработкой 152 САУшек. Наши развед группы чуть с ума не сошли от безделья, за эти 3 недели. Даже сложно представить результаты этого мероприятия. Но шума было много.
  13. Massik
    Massik 31 July 2013 13: 10 New
    +1
    With equal weight, the large-caliber machine gun "Utes" has an undeniable advantage over the AGS-17. It will allow you to get the enemy at a two-kilometer range wherever he is hiding, whether it be brickwork, armored personnel carriers, dense thickets of bushes or the side of a helicopter.
    Well, first get at least 1 km, no matter what special you are, from a sniper rifle at 1 km without taking into account the wind and ballistics of a bullet, you can only accidentally hit, and then from a machine gun, in one burst and on target ....
    that it is possible to hit an enemy with VOG-25, GP-23 fire or a rifle grenade only if it hits the enemy’s forehead,
    what the fuck ****** wrote this ??? Well, let him put on a helmet and bronik, and I’ll get a couple of meters away from him and see how he will feel, the fragments from the vogue are light, but there are nothing pleasant when you get 10-15 of such gifts, digging into your arms and legs.
    1. Djozz
      Djozz 31 July 2013 16: 38 New
      -3
      Согласен, возможно "казачек" засланный.
    2. Penek
      Penek 31 July 2013 23: 20 New
      +2
      I personally watched as the escaping spirit jumped over the AGS breaks and left unharmed. At the same time, a fragment from him, when fired after repair, hit the fighter in the leg at a distance of 70 meters with a radius of expansion of 7 m as instructed. many rights.
      1. mehmeh
        mehmeh 8 December 2014 14: 37 New
        0
        AGS gp ​​on open manpower in the manual was written. and where you will find it. fools have long been gone
        During the war, first a grenade then you yourself come in. and then the turn.
        Pomegranate as a jammer is rather weak 2 3 or a saber with TNT gr 400 so that the perfume did the right thing
        AGS is a good one, but what's the point? A bumblebee is needed, or to RPG 7 high-explosive fragmentation warheads once it was beaten so that in the bushes
        With real shards, everything fell asleep. and a mortar from 82 mm, the rest as an AGS Vogue is so a donation weapon as if they could not do them in the 40s
        Could but fuck not needed. .This is a late perversion here on trucks from an ambush powerfully without armor the enemy if
    3. dustycat
      dustycat 4 August 2013 20: 29 New
      0
      Quote: Marssik
      that it is possible to hit an enemy with VOG-25, GP-23 fire or a rifle grenade only if it hits the enemy’s forehead,

      what the fuck ****** wrote this ??? Well, let him put on a helmet and bronik, and I’ll get a couple of meters away from him and see how he will feel, the fragments from the vogue are light, but there are nothing pleasant when you get 10-15 of such gifts, digging into your arms and legs.

      Well, he basically says that a direct hit is much more killer than just a close fragmentation.
      Although a close gap in the vogue (1,5-3 m), the brain shakes tremendously and rings decently in the ears .. Unless of course there are brains.
      Of course, 10-30 fragments of VOG are an unpleasant thing, especially in the face - it can deprive the eye, but not fatal enough.
  14. Seventh
    Seventh 31 July 2013 14: 54 New
    +3
    Согласен с Marssik, считаю на данный момент АГС-17 имеет неоспоримое преимущество перед "Утесом" за возможность накрыть супостата через холмик на 1700 метров. Мне нравился симбиоз БТР-80А с 30мм пушечкой 2А72 и установленным АГСом. Подствольники часто и эффективно применялись как в горах так и в городе, не помню чтобы кто то пожалел о его наличии.
    1. Max_Bauder
      Max_Bauder 1 August 2013 16: 00 New
      0
      Quote: Seventh
      Согласен с Marssik, считаю на данный момент АГС-17 имеет неоспоримое преимущество перед "Утесом" за возможность накрыть супостата через холмик на 1700 метров. Мне нравился симбиоз БТР-80А с 30мм пушечкой 2А72 и установленным АГСом. Подствольники часто и эффективно применялись как в горах так и в городе, не помню чтобы кто то пожалел о его наличии.


      If someone likes to shoot from AK74 into another from AKM, that doesn’t mean that one of them is right or not right, just both may be right.
  15. vip.da78
    vip.da78 31 July 2013 15: 43 New
    +3
    Бой в городе изучают от училища до академии ГШ, только по славянской традиции мы любим АВОСЬ, НЕБОСЬ и учиться на своих ошибках! А для тактического уровня (как понимаю выше автор и не претендовал) статья неплохая! Однозначно "+"
    1. Djozz
      Djozz 31 July 2013 16: 40 New
      0
      Well then, at the end of the Second World War, we had no one to fight!
  16. tilovaykrisa
    tilovaykrisa 31 July 2013 16: 52 New
    +1
    Quote: Djozz
    In fact, at Fort Knox, the United States holds gold reserves.

    Generally Ford Knox for tourists, and gold has long been in the basements of banks and not the fact that American, rather Chinese.
    1. Djozz
      Djozz 31 July 2013 17: 07 New
      0
      Throw a reference.
      1. tilovaykrisa
        tilovaykrisa 31 July 2013 17: 37 New
        +1
        Here is the export import schedule.
        1. Djozz
          Djozz 31 July 2013 18: 34 New
          0
          What is the share of the US gold reserve here?
        2. Russ69
          Russ69 31 July 2013 18: 52 New
          +1
          Gold reserve accumulation chart by Russia
    2. Djozz
      Djozz 31 July 2013 17: 33 New
      0
      После отмены Никсоном золотого обеспечения доллара, в китайских банках хранятся ничем не обеспеченные зеленые фантики "доллары". И так во всем мире. Когда ты должен банку 1000 долларов, ты зависишь от банка, но когда ты должен банку 100 миллиардов, то банк зависит от тебя.
      1. tilovaykrisa
        tilovaykrisa 31 July 2013 17: 35 New
        +1
        China has been the most active gold buyer on the market for more than 5 years.
        1. Alez
          Alez 31 July 2013 17: 44 New
          +2
          In the event of a financial system crash, gold is a metal that can be used in electronics. But what can you use bucks for? Tape the toilet, use instead of toilet paper, flush the stove. Moreover, the bulk of the bucks is not paper, but electronic. And what you can use the electronic bucks to even wipe out does not work.
          1. lexe
            lexe 31 July 2013 18: 03 New
            -3
            In the event of a financial system crash, gold is a metal that can be used in electronics.

            In this case, mass electronics will also collapse. And gold will be used for its intended purpose along with vodka from grief and canned goods from hunger.
            Bucks (whether we like it or not) is the basis of today's progress, based on the printing press. Yes, stability will come along with gold, but in terms of progress it will be a regression.
            1. Djozz
              Djozz 31 July 2013 18: 33 New
              +3
              Have mercy! The printing press is progress. You are apparently the investigator of Gaidar and the Higher School of Economics, where the monetarists have settled. Progress and inflation, this is complete nonsense. Remember the beginning of the 90s.
              1. lexe
                lexe 31 July 2013 19: 27 New
                -1
                Gaidar is a follower of inflation and chaos.
                A healthy printing press is growth hormones or an antibiotic depending on the situation.
                Do you think how the government of Primakov-Maslyukov has restored chaos?
                Inflation is a fall of discipline. And progress in everything is dangerous, it is a double-edged sword. Look around ... we drive and fly on explosive fuel and nothing ... and with the printing mill.
                1. 7ydmco
                  7ydmco 31 July 2013 21: 32 New
                  +1
                  Inflation is a fall in discipline - in the annals no less smile
              2. 7ydmco
                7ydmco 31 July 2013 21: 34 New
                0
                Rather, the follower smile
            2. 7ydmco
              7ydmco 31 July 2013 21: 31 New
              +2
              Утверждение что "Бакс (хотим мы этого или нет)это основа сегодняшнего прогресса" все таки стоит обосновать smile
              1. lexe
                lexe 31 July 2013 22: 38 New
                -1
                Утверждение что "Бакс (хотим мы этого или нет)это основа сегодняшнего прогресса" все таки стоит обосновать

                Bucks is a growth hormone of the world economy, there too ..
                write down laughing
                And the reverse side of this Tugrik is the Pentagon, Wall Street and Silicon Valley. This troika is an officer, a scammer, a crazy scientist (or rather scientists from all over the world) is an explosive mixture that got everything from life and they are no longer interested in living stupidly according to the old one. They need a new world with the all-conquering role of progress - and live longer and brighter. And the whole world agreed with this. And how he will not agree ...
                Inflation is a fall in discipline

                It is customary to merge toxic assets in the United States on the stock exchange in order to avoid inflation in broad layers. Because the middle class sits tightly on securities. We do not have this drain of excessive liquidity, a developed stock exchange. But we persistently invent all kinds of quasi tools to fulfill those same tasks. The oligarchs are just a quasi-tool-limitation of liquidity among the general population.
                Putin built the oligarchs-raised discipline but this discipline of low society.
                But without Putin’s actions, then we would have a guaranteed end.
    3. The comment was deleted.
    4. Alez
      Alez 31 July 2013 17: 54 New
      0
      You might think that gold is stored in our Gokhran. With the help of the Central Bank and Chubai nanotechnology, gold has turned into American bonds or NANO-GOLD, which can only be seen with an electron microscope.
      1. Russ69
        Russ69 31 July 2013 18: 47 New
        +3
        Quote: Alez
        You might think that gold is stored in our Gokhran. With the help of the Central Bank and Chubai nanotechnology, gold has turned into American bonds or NANO-GOLD, which can only be seen with an electron microscope.

        Do not confuse currency gain and gold reserves. It is just stored exactly in the bullion and today about 1000 tons. You cannot measure it with any stocks, only with living metal.
  17. klinok1
    klinok1 31 July 2013 17: 47 New
    +4
    Yes, unfortunately, we practically do not analyze, summarize the experience of military operations ... Brochures, leaflets may come out, which commander may give an example from a personal example ... but this is not at the state level. We can talk a lot about nuclear wars, but nobody knows what to do for a simple soldier during shelling or hand-to-hand combat, or how to enter a house occupied by an enemy. I remember after the first assault on Grozny, I read somewhere that the American military was struck by the inability of the Russians to fight in the city, despite the fact that they (the Russians) had colossal experience in urban fighting in the Second World War. And say that they are wrong ...
  18. Black
    Black 31 July 2013 20: 21 New
    +3
    Quote: Avenger711
    And it’s not necessary about the first Chechen one, no one was going to win there, its whole point was to ditch the people and so that the population would be ready for everything later, just so that the little sons would sit at home. ......

    Article minus.


    For the purpose of 1 FW, you are a plus. Maybe they did it unknowingly, but that's exactly what happened.
    Minus the same article - it is you, perhaps, got excited.
    The officer is right in his own right, and most importantly, the stagnation of the generals is one of the reasons (as a rule) for large losses at the first stage of the war.
    Afghanistan-Chechnya vividly demonstrated this.
    1. 7ydmco
      7ydmco 31 July 2013 21: 29 New
      +3
      Do not equate Afghanistan and Chechnya, in Afghanistan people just and so in such numbers were not laid.
  19. albai
    albai 1 August 2013 07: 06 New
    +1
    Military schools are actually a forge of personnel of the officer corps of the Armed Forces. And a lot, even it all depends on the officers whom the first applicant to enter the Higher School of Education sees for the first time. This and KV, KR cadet companies, the first teachers in the departments, etc. And you can see that the main galaxy of brilliant officers came out in the 50s and 60s. And all because their commanders and teachers were front-line officers. The author of the article is right
    Shame and frustration force the participants in these wars to leave the army; as a result, it loses the most important thing - the carriers of combat experience.
    In Russian military academies, officers with combat experience do not exceed 3-5% of the total number of students. Among the top military leaders there is not one who would have experience in command of a platoon, company or battalion in battle, who would have experienced the pain of wounds and all the charms of fire contact with the enemy.
    How many officers were out of work due to injuries and disabilities received during the fighting. But they are wonderful practices. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense needs only one thing: to carry out some personnel work, how many guys want to stay in the Army, do not think of themselves outside the Army, in the end, the entire conscious part of life was spent in the troops. Assign them to schools as commanders and teachers. And their war experience will work. When he first got into his company at the school, he directly absorbed everything: how they behave, what they do, what they say, what our commanders teach us. I tried in everything to be like them. And everything remained in me for the rest of my life. After all, cadets are like raw clay, you can dazzle and just a piece of burnt brick, or you can flint, the backbone of the invincible Army !!!!
  20. helg717
    helg717 1 August 2013 14: 58 New
    0
    Quote: serge-68-68
    Everything was written very correctly for its time. I can add that for the period until 1998, nothing has changed in Russian military theory. Judging by the absence of special documents similar to a whole group of US army charters defining the procedures for units, subunits and military personnel in a low-intensity conflict group, our military theorists have not made much progress so far.

    Not certainly in that way. And in the land charter there were relevant provisions written by officers who directly commanded companies and battalions both during the 1st and 2nd war
  21. Max_Bauder
    Max_Bauder 1 August 2013 15: 50 New
    0
    I will add from myself.

    if we choose, let’s say who to fight in Afghanistan, it would be better to be a teenager Pashtun than a young soldier of the Union. This does not mean that I am a traitor, I just want to show the advantages of one over the other.

    Sodaphon is forced to fight according to the book, and the goldfinch is fighting in Afghanistan from the experience of uncles, freedom of choice, understand?

    Back in the times (I’m just pushing Napoleon =) well, just suitable examples) Bonaparte marshals had the opportunity to complete the task as desired, but so that the result was the one Napoleon needed.
    For example, Napoleon says to take the city such-and-such (although basically its troops did not take the city, they fought in the field with the army of the enemy, it was only in Prussia) as you want, take the main thing, that's all. Marshal does not have freedom of choice, take the city to him, but so that everything would be in accordance with the charter, just so many people were allocated, the assigned number of bombs under the tower, after a certain number of days send a parliamentarian, etc. it all fetters.

    Even during WWII, our generals had freedom of choice and acted on circumstances, that is, everything depended on personal initiative. For example, if you were to follow the charter during a retreat at the beginning of the war, everyone should die trying to get out of the encirclement, as in Brest, but will you really condemn those who were captured? like this

    I believe that no charter should impede the conduct of an offensive or defense or retreat if something happens not according to the book, only on the initiative of senior management who cares about successful completion of the mission with minimal casualties, I will repeat once again the soldiers and junior officers TRUST their lives and task performance.

    PySy
    if anyone well-versed tell me about at least one successful battle or a successfully completed mission (without personal initiative) that happened directly from the book, from the understaffing of the entire army, its supply of ammunition and equipment, and nutrition, to the accuracy of the end time of the operation?

    I don’t know a single
    1. Alekseev
      Alekseev 2 August 2013 14: 39 New
      +1
      Quote: Max_Bauder
      Sodaphon is forced to fight according to the book, and the goldfinch is fighting in Afghanistan from the experience of uncles, freedom of choice, understand?

      "Солдафон", к нашему стыду, иной раз и читать-то не умеет... Будьте бли же к реальности.
      "Опыт дядек" laughing
      My old woman (looser) was completely fucked up request
      "Робячьи речи"
      It’s necessary to serve, not to read books at home, theory without practice is dead (although, of course, practice without theory is blind wink )
      The question is not at all young manthat the combat charter is bad. Everything is written correctly in it.
      It lies in the fact that some freaking (although they have reached, sometimes they neglect general ranks)
  22. Max_Bauder
    Max_Bauder 1 August 2013 15: 55 New
    +1
    all of the above should not be understood that I propose to everyone anarchistically fight as a separate subject

    Of course, there should be interaction, not imaginary but real with other parts, infantry + artillery, or infantry + aviation, but it means (I think you understand) that the one entrusted with the operation could introduce novelty, so that his actions are not read by enemies, that's all for the sake of I’ll write it again

    So that the actions are not read by enemies

    literally and figuratively

    PySy
    there is a phrase of Napoleon: if the enemy is mistaken about your actions, never bother him. =)
  23. hramckov2012
    hramckov2012 1 August 2013 18: 28 New
    +2
    в 2006 году учился на знаменитых курсах "выстрел". из всех преподавателей на тот момент в чечне ни кто ни разу даже не был не говоря уже об участии в чем то или наличии боевого опыта. а по поводу назначения на вышестоящие должности, не назначают офицеров которые понюхали пороху так как у них немного другой взгляд на жизнь и в случае чего они и на х.. послать могут. очень интересно о уровне советских офицеров говорили немецкие генералы: примерно следущее "тактический уровень очень хорош так как дураков выбивала пуля, средний(оперативный) почти все дураки, на высшем уровне жуков очень хорош"
  24. Free Island
    Free Island 1 August 2013 18: 33 New
    -3
    статья написана автором в 1996 году....а че, автор не нашел папируса написанного тысячу лет назад?????? не актуально. К тому же "позор2 нашей армии в Афганистане - это вобще из области анекдотов за которые можно в дыню словить.......
  25. Druid
    Druid 3 August 2013 04: 07 New
    +2
    Всю статью можно охарактеризовать двумя пословицами "Благими намерениями вымощена дорога в Ад", а кроме благих намерений ничего толком у автора, вторая пословица "Все новое, это хорошо забытое старое".
    The author writes about mortars and centners of weight, obviously referring to 82mm, but at one time in the Red Army there were smaller mortars - company mortars, now 60mm mortars are still in service with the armies of NATO and others, including several CIS countries. During the arrival of the commander of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs in Azerbaijan, 60mm mortars were shown to him, among other things, apparently did not impress.
    The proofreader is good, but it is worth remembering that in the same Chechnya, more than one unit, including the Pskov paratroopers, perished when it was impossible to use artillery and aircraft.
    In many wars and local conflicts, the Soviet and later Russian troops used the AGS-17 as an alternative to the light company mortar, but for all its merits, it cannot replace the mortar.
    What are the conclusions from the fresh experience of Chechnya? And I don’t have any conclusions, I’m sitting on the satellite and watching a story about new mountain parts, where the correspondent enthusiastically talks about the conclusions made in Russia, about new mountain brigades and caresses a horse with an 82mm mortar loaded on it ...
    "Недостатки" РПГ-7 всвязи с конвенцией, но раз уж шла речь про Афганистан, стоило вспомнить ветерану, что против наших(советских) войск успешно применялось БО-82 китайского производства(тип 78) с весом в 30кг, клон дедушки СПГ-9, который стоял на вооружении и имел осколочно-фугасный выстрел. Одно НО, вес за полцентнера. В России ничего не было сделано, насколько знаю СПГ-9 просто сняли с вооружения. После Афгана выпустили облегченную версию 82мм миномета и все.
    В итоге подразделения взвод-рота российской армии как не имели, так и не имеют "карманной" артилерии, термобарический и осколочный выстрелы к РПГ-7 не решают этой проблемы из-за малой дальности. Проблему судя по статье должен решить ОДИН боец с опытом одной из локальных войн, Голливуд прямо таки, "Храброе Сердце", там помоему говорилось о метании молний из задницы...
    The fact is that there was experience and school, but instead of the ordinary thing and fixing the passed, paid for with blood, only the knee again is a silent mortar for the SPN parts and again a new version of the automatic grenade launcher. Has anyone even told how much this pleasure costs - a mortar, a grenade launcher and shots to them? ...
    1. dustycat
      dustycat 4 August 2013 20: 07 New
      0
      Quote: Druid
      The proofreader is good, but it is worth remembering that in the same Chechnya, more than one unit, including the Pskov paratroopers, perished when it was impossible to use artillery and aircraft.


      The impossibility of using artillery, as far as is known, was only due to the fact that there were no targeted lines and, in general, units were outside the reach of fire from equipped positions.
      There was an ill-conceived system of organizing artillery fire and interaction.
      The Vietnamese experience of the Americans was not taken into account either in Afghanistan or in Chechnya.
      Despite the fact that the theater is very similar in tactics.
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 4 August 2013 21: 18 New
        0
        Quote: dustycat
        The impossibility of using artillery, as far as is known, was only due to the fact that there were no targeted lines and, in general, units were outside the reach of fire from equipped positions.

        ?
        In my opinion, you are confusing something.
  26. dustycat
    dustycat 4 August 2013 19: 52 New
    +1
    About artillery.

    " Гениальная простота этого замысла не учитывает интеллектуального и боевого потенциала противника, а также низкой профессиональной подготовки артиллерийских корректировщиков и ограниченных возможностей артиллерийских подразделений по передвижению, размещению на местности и подвозу боеприпасов. Кроме того, успешное осуществление замысла требует взаимодействия мотострелковых и артиллерийских подразделений, при котором каждую мотострелковую роту поддерживает огнем не менее артиллерийского дивизиона (что возможно только в условиях позиционной войны с установившейся линией фронта)."

    As far as I remember, in Vietnam, the attacking unit was accompanied by an artillery gunner of the battery that controlled the area. At the same time, the division NEVER left the zone and sector of the shelling of the battery (18-20 km).
    At the same time, the batteries were located in strong points located in the area of ​​each other’s aiming cover (15-18 km).
    What prevented the placement of batteries and strong points in Chechnya, including the strong points that were there?
    Налицо отказ от использования "чужого опыта" - "Шурик, это не наш метод!"
    The issue of the supply of ammunition and the adjustment of sectors is solved simply in this case.
    И тогда точность артприкрытия в 5 метров (что вполне обеспечивается буксируемыми и самоходными артиллерийскими орудиями) вполне можно реализовать. И выбивать противников прицельным огнем из положения "за пояс".
    Такое расположение артиллерии по опорным пунктам вместе с тем обеспечивает и готовность к прикрытию прицельным огнем в течении "разворота орудия по сектору".
    And an entire artillery battalion is also not required for this - after all, it is not necessary to shoot at areas.
    Of course, for a year of artillery (gunners and operators) to the right level for this is not prepared.
    Особенно при подготовке "по картинкам".
    To do this, shoot two or three months every day. And this may not be enough.
    Just don’t say that it’s expensive - there’s no one to give birth to soldiers!
    Again, everything depends on the need for training.

    It is also necessary to increase the stability of the BMP and MBT to concentrated anti-tank fire.
    Moreover, the characteristics of the BMP are still developed taking into account the hostilities.
    At least 2MB.
  27. dvvv
    dvvv 4 August 2013 20: 48 New
    0
    I didn’t fight, but I think the article is at least outdated. We need to learn from the Jews, who mounted drones and successfully use them against the Arabs who do not have electronic countermeasures. They sit in shelters and look where to shy away and even destroy cars with enemy leaders. There is wiretapping, there is surveillance through UAVs, and you should not send groups of 3-4 people to intelligence at great risk.