In 2000, a thermal practical hydrogen peroxide torpedo 65-76 PV exploded on the Kursk. The experts concluded that in the aggregate of the causes of the death of the boat and the crew there was a depressurization (micro leakage) of the torpedo's oxidizer tank. And a year after the death of Kursk - in August of 2001, a curious document will appear: "A temporary instruction on the procedure for re-certification of a torpedo weapons».
... The latest batches of new torpedoes entered the fleet back in Soviet times, in 1989 year. The service life of torpedo weapons - 20 years. And by 2000, the problem of repair was acute. The temporary instruction sanctioned “minimalist” repairs by the naval arsenals and a direct violation of the requirements of regulatory documents defining the procedure for extending the service life of sea underwater weapons (MPO). It was assumed that the instruction will last a couple of years until they develop a state program to restore the IGO resource.
... "Temporary instructions" extended over the long 11 years. By that time, the technical suitability of all types of MPO, which is in service with the Russian Navy, had finally expired.
Oxygen torpedo 53-65K
The state armament program has extended the service life of surface and submarine ships of the 2 and 3 generation to 2026. The reason is simple: there is no replacement. Two types of torpedoes by engine type are used on these ships: “thermal” 53-65K and “electric” SET-65, TEST-71М and USET-80.
... The 53-65K torpedo with an oxygen heat engine (not to be confused with the thermal hydrogen peroxide torpedo, which was removed from service after the Kursk) is the most popular production model among domestic torpedo weapons. The reason is the simplicity of construction and low cost (an order of magnitude less than electric torpedoes). 53-65K is considered the most reliable on navy, can carry nuclear warheads. Despite the clearly outdated characteristics, the fleet’s need for an oxygen torpedo will remain until 2026 and will amount to about 400 items.
In addition, 243 products (factory weapon code) marked “ice” must be loaded onto all Russian “strategists” without fail. In a situation of emergency ascent of a submarine rocket carrier, serving in the Arctic Ocean, a volley of oxygen torpedoes breaks through a polynya in the Arctic ice. Over the meager stocks of “ice” products, the mine-torpedo services in the fleets literally shake, relate to them individually and amicably.
In 2009, the assigned service lives of ALL torpedoes 53-65К that were in service with the Russian Navy expired.
GOST is ours, and the Chinese keep it.
The developer and manufacturer of the oxygen torpedo is the SM Machine Building Plant. Kirov "* in Alma-Ata. Only this plant has the right to carry out a refurbishment with the extension of the service life of an outdated product and produce spare parts (spare parts) for it.
This is a Russian state standard that corresponds to world practice.
China, "floating" on our boats, several years ago signed a contract with Kazakhstan for the repair of thermal torpedoes 53-65KE. In 2006, the Indian Navy placed an order at the plant for a complete upgrade of 110 products. After the modernization carried out by “Mashzavod them. Kirov ", oxygen torpedoes are superior in their tactical and technical characteristics (TTH) of our" old women ". This was convincingly demonstrated by the results of practical shooting of the Indian fleet. But Russia is not China or India. We have, as you know, your way.
Spying for Russia
In 2010, the state order for the manufacture of the 251 set of rubber components (ZIP RTDI) for re-certification of the “alien” product - the thermal torpedo 53-65K was received by the Dvigatel St. Petersburg plant (included in Concern Sea Underwater Weapon - Gidropribor **).
But Engine is not a developer, not a calculator (owner of documentation) and not a manufacturer of an oxygen torpedo. His specialization is electric torpedoes, which are fundamentally different from thermal ones. In the electric - the battery, in the heat - high-pressure tanks, which places special demands on the sealing of components and connections. Therefore, the quality and strict compliance with the State Standard of rubber technical components (gaskets, diaphragms, valves, etc.) that ensure the tightness of the connections between high-pressure units and torpedo engine assemblies are extremely important.
“Mashzavod them. Kirov ”did not give a license to use its documentation and did not certify the production of spare parts and accessories for RTDI by the“ Engine ”plant.
“Mashzavod them. Kirov ”many times tried to find a common language with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the domestic military-industrial complex, offered a program to repair and modernize the oxygen torpedo, and even conducted a series of tests at its own expense. The proposals of the Kazakh side remained unimplemented. Moreover, the rumor about the failure of the plant began to be replicated. Why?
In the middle of 2000-s, one of the employees of the “Mashzavod them. Kirov. He takes out part of the technical documentation for the product 53-65K and almost immediately finds employment in the St. Petersburg "Engine".
And now - a ticklish moment: the technical documentation for the production of components of the “Engine” almost completely coincides with the original documentation of the developer “Mashzavod them. Kirov "(both documents are available at Novaya Gazeta). Only the numbers and the name of the ZIP have changed in the documentation. Example: the "Mashzavod them. Kirov ”was the diaphragm number 243.04.006-1, the“ Engine ”plant had exactly the same diaphragm number 2563.04.006-1. And so on.
Here it is necessary to explain why in the 2009 year, the re-certification of a torpedo according to the "Interim instruction" was already illegitimate from the point of view of GOST.
Before 2009, not all torpedo systems were repaired, but its body-body parts, i.e. engine The product is disassembled and assembled as a designer. (This is called the cold bulkhead method.) Replaced the old rubber gaskets, which have a shorter shelf life than steel.
But after torpedo-retired 20-year service, it was no longer needed treatment (according to the “Interim instructions”), but full reanimation: mandatory defectation under the developer’s control, repair of all systems in the complex, and carrying out bench and hot (at the factory) and marine (on the ground) tests. Only such a repair allowed to extend the service life of the torpedo to 2026 year, guaranteed its safety and compliance with the declared TTH.
To insert new gaskets into the worn-out insides of a torpedo is the same as prescribing a condom to a patient with sexual dysfunction.
An important point: not a single torpedo, repaired by the spare parts of the plant “Engine”, did not pass full-scale marine tests.
Case of the Canadian Arsenal
JSC “Machine-building plant named after S.M. Kirov ”did not raise an international scandal over the“ counterfeit spare parts produced by the “Engine” plant ***. With this ZIP, it turned out to be some kind of strange история. In accordance with the contract, the engine plant manufactured the 251 spare parts kit. The Act of the executed works was signed by the Acting Head of the Marine Underwater Weapons and Armament Service of the Russian Navy Vitaly Garmashov. He was responsible for the distribution of spare parts to the fleet. Nevertheless, in 2011, all the arsenals thwarted the fulfillment of the state order for 53-65K re-certification due to ... lack of spare parts.
The apogee was the so-called “Kan case”, initiated by the deputy head of the military investigative department for the Krasnoyarsk garrison, Major Khalyavin, in August 2011.
In 2010, North Arsenal received a state contract for the repair of 70 products (33 combat and 15 practical torpedoes 53-65К and 22 of self-propelled 2510 mines). Semenov, director of Northern Arsenal, entered into a contract for repairing the Navy's 10 arsenal in Kansk. The terms of the contract provided for the repair of torpedoes with the use of spare parts for the Engine plant. However, his arsenals never got it. Overdue spare parts were used instead, although they wrote in the acceptance report: “Spare parts and equipment used in the course of work, raw materials and materials are certified with unexpired shelf life ...”
... The investigation established unsatisfactory technical readiness of the workshop and the equipment of the Kan arsenal for the production of works. Instead of the average repair of torpedoes, a “check of the functioning of the products” was not provided for by any regulatory documents - by ear and by eye (in the literal sense of the word: the arsenal staff explained that, for example, they check the performance of the torpedo's gearbox by ear, and to measure the axial clearances they were not measurers). Hydraulic testing of repaired products (in an autoclave) was not actually carried out, although in the technical passports “these works were shown as completed”. (A decree on initiating a criminal case is available at Novaya Gazeta.) According to regulatory data, in one month one enterprise can repair from 5 to 7 products, working in one shift. For the repair of a single torpedo you need 470 — 500 of standard hours (for mines - 422 n / h). Employees of the Cannes Arsenal set a world record, having repaired 70 torpedoes and mines in just a month and a half, spending an average of 77 n / h for each product. That is, in 6,2 times faster than the norm. At the same time, the mines were not even removed from the container, they simply applied the necessary marking and sealed the containers with new seals. The weapon certified in this way was cheerfully accepted by military acceptance and should have been put into service on the fleet.
... A year later, when loading weapons onto a submarine on the Pacific Fleet, an abnormal situation occurred: the oxygen torpedo “flowed”.
Before submission to the carrier weapon necessarily passes the rigid entrance control of mine-torpedo services in the fleets. Most of the arsenal marriage is usually able to identify and "neutralize". On the Pacific Fleet, the input control phase turned out to be ineffective. Perhaps because the torpedo “flowed” after all the checks. The cause of the abnormal situation turned out quickly: when repairing a torpedo tank, a rubber one was installed instead of a paronit gasket. It is difficult to imagine the consequences if the torpedo began to poison oxygen on a submarine during combat service.
The case of Vladimir Fitzner
You stood in my way on the fourth of January, ”said Professor Moriarty. “Twenty-three, you caused me anxiety again.” In mid-February, you already seriously disturbed me. At the end of March, you completely upset my plans, and now I am in such a position that I face a real danger of losing my freedom. This can not continue!
Five years ago, the former submariner Vladimir Fitzner had an idea: how to bring to Russia the “Mashzavod them. CM. Kirov, "if Magomed does not go to the mountain.
“None of the representatives of the fleet or enterprises engaged in work in the interests of the fleet of the Russian Federation officially addressed the plant. And only in 2009, Vladimir Fitzner, Director General of ZAO NPO Bars, visited the company on the issue of providing the Russian fleet with torpedo weapons and spare parts for them - this is how pathetic the first deputy general director of the Mashzavod them. Kirov "Sergey Nedosekin.
But it really was a turning point in the torpedo story. Energetic Fitzner proposed the idea of a joint venture - JV Arsenal-Mashzavod LLC and became the official representative of a Kazakhstan factory in Russia.
In 2010, Fitzner brought a delegation of the Russian Navy to Alma-Ata in order to personally verify that the plant was alive. The Directorate of the submarine armament of the Russian Navy gave permission to the 18 Navy Arsenal to purchase a test batch of new Kashin Machine-Building Plant 30 sets. Kirov "for the repair of oxygen torpedoes. At the end of 2010, the 18 Arsenal of the Navy was the only one who fulfilled the state defense order for 56-63K re-certification. Entrance control of the repaired products passed without a single remark and complaint. An important fact: the original spare parts kit turned out to be cheaper and cost 338 thousands of rubles, including delivery from Kazakhstan. In the same 2010-m set of spare parts of the plant “Engine” cost the Russian budget in 370 thousand rubles.
... 22 June 2011, the Minister of Defense, Anatoly Serdyukov, signed Order No. 989 “On the establishment of a working group to work out solutions for the provision of naval ships with anti-ship torpedoes”. Over the past two years, the working group (as a representative of the Mashzavod im. Kirov, it also included Vladimir Fitzner) conducted a large-scale inventory of the problem. Quoting Moriarty, many officials faced the real danger of losing their freedom.
As experts, representatives of the “Mashzavod them. Kirov ”gave their opinion on the“ Kan case ”against the“ Navy's 10 arsenal ”and the“ Navy's 15 arsenal ”. There were questions to the MPO-Gidropribor concern, in particular, to the Dvigatel plant and its spare parts, which is on paper, and did not arrive in the required amount either in 2011 or 2012.
6 December 2012 The working group on torpedo weapons is preparing recommendations for the new Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu: “Renovation repair of 243 products with the appointment of a new service life is recommended to be held by JV Arsenal-Mashzavod in cooperation with the development enterprise Mechanical Engineering Plant . CM. Kirov ", as well as with" TNK "Dastan" and "NPO" Kiev factory of automation them. G.I. Petrovsky "at the enterprises of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation."
... And on December 18 2012, Professor Moriarty made a retaliatory move.
On the homeland
On December 18, employees of UEBiPK (MIA), without presenting a search warrant, without any witnesses, and the owner himself, opened and took in an unknown direction 40 spare parts kits produced by “Mashzavod them. Kirov "on the second and, apparently, the last contract, which managed to get the enterprise Vladimir Fitzner.
The denunciation to the “competent authorities” was written shortly after the resignation of Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov - in November 2012. But on January 31, the security officer of the 1 branch of the 10 division of the ORCH (EBiPK) No. 12 of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region I.V. Godun made a decision to refuse to initiate a criminal case. Based on paragraph 2 of Article 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation: the absence of corpus delicti.
Then the FSB actively intervened in the case, and the 6 February ruling was rescinded. A March 21 opened a criminal case under article 226.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (smuggling weapons and military equipment). Three months, investigators are looking for and can not find a crime. No accusation against Fitzner.
It was 6 February (not a day later) that the media launched a harsh accusatory campaign against the MPO-Gidropribor concern. Under the distribution were people and plants who are actually trying to fix the difficult situation with sea underwater weapons. One newspaper wrote: “According to the police, LLC JV Arsenal-Mashzavod did not have licenses from the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, the Federal Service for Defense Order and the FSB to conduct foreign trade in military goods ... The components and prices for They were challenged by the military representative, Grigory Kolodyazhny. “I suspect that they are from old overdue Soviet stocks. How else to explain that the components were made by an enterprise in Kazakhstan that had no material resources? ”
In 2010, the head of the 845 military representation, the same G.V. Kolodyazhny, accepted all the 53-65K torpedo repair works carried out by the Navy's 18 arsenal using 30 spare parts kits “Mashzavod them. Kirov. That is, two years ago, he had no suspicion of either “freshness” of the spare parts kit or the prosperity of the Kazakhstan plant. And then suddenly appeared. Why did it happen?
On the instructions of the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy V. Chirkov, an expert council of the Navy was held under the chairmanship of the head of the Naval Academy Nikolai Maximov. The purpose of the expert council was declared as follows: to develop proposals for solving the problem of providing naval forces with torpedo weapons. As a result, the council recommended that the commander-in-chief of the Navy adopt and go into the sea with expired torpedoes, "minimalists" repaired the Navy's arsenals according to the "Interim Instruction" (total 355 torpedoes).
"The actual service life of the product is not limited to the service life provided, but is determined by its technical condition." So it is written in the decision of the council. In this place, I really want to spit three times over my shoulder. Because in fact, the expert council of the Navy officially proposed replacing the Russian GOSTs with the Russian one. However, the expert council still insured and recommended before loading expired torpedoes to Russian ships and boats "to inspect repaired 3 — 5 products by a special commission of the RF Ministry of Defense ... In case of non-compliance of the repaired torpedoes with technical specifications, make a separate decision ...”
Six months have passed. A commission of the Ministry of Defense has not yet been established. No control shooting is planned. I understand that if there was confidence in the quality of the repair, would the shooting have taken place long ago?
Developed by “Mashzavod them. Kirov ”a comprehensive program for the proper repair of 53-65K was transferred to the Ministry of Defense in February (available from Novaya Gazeta). She did not want to agree. According to the information of our sources, it was decided to extend the “Temporary instruction” on re-certification of the oxygen torpedo. 335 is not clear how the repaired torpedoes will be put into operation without test firing, with the motivation: to meet the needs of the fleet in 2013 — 2014. In the future, the oxygen torpedo will be repaired using rubber products of the engine plant.
The chances of repeating the tragedy of "Kursk" are higher than ever.
* JSC “Machine-building plant named after S.M. Kirov "was built in 1942 year on the basis of the plant number 182 evacuated from under Makhachkala, shortly before it was united with the Tokmak plant named after N. Kirov. In Soviet times, it was one of the leading diesel and torpedo-building plants in the USSR. Currently part of the national company Kazakhstan Engineering, established in 2003 year. It is the only manufacturer of torpedoes with thermal propulsion in the CIS.
** The concern was established in 2004 on the basis of the Central Research Institute Gidropribor. 100% of shares owned by the state. It is a monopolist in the manufacture of underwater marine weapons.
*** Quote from an interview with the first deputy general director of the plant, Sergei Nedosekin, Kazakhstan's Forbes from 07.02.2013.