25 has been fulfilled since the entry into force of the indefinite Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles (the INF Treaty). Apparently, in commemoration of this event, the American newspaper The Washington Times, citing information from the special services, noted: “Russia is grossly violating the INF Treaty, creating the Rubezh missile system with a new intercontinental ballistic missile of increased accuracy.” According to the estimates of the Americans, the tactical and technical characteristics of the missile make it possible to classify it as a medium-range missile, the production and testing of which by the INF Treaty are prohibited.
Unfortunately, Russian officials, various "wise men" and analysts, instead of a professional response to the attacks of the Americans, limited themselves to formal comments on the provisions of the Treaty. But let's take a look at the problem from the other side and consider a far from complete list of violations by the Americans of key provisions of the INF Treaty and the START Treaty.
Failure to comply with the INF Treaty
The US side openly and grossly violates key articles of the INF Treaty, developing medium- and short-range target missiles to test elements of a global US missile defense system and an European missile defense system.
Thus, Article I states: “Each of the parties liquidates its medium-range and shorter-range missiles, does not have such funds in the future (highlighted by the author).” Paragraph 5 of Article II states that “the term“ medium-range missile ”means a BRNB or RNSD, the range of which exceeds 1000 kilometers, but does not exceed 5500 kilometers.”
The 6 clause of the same chapter states that "the term" shorter range missile "means a BRNB or RNB, whose range is equal to or exceeds 500 kilometers, but does not exceed 1000 kilometers."
It is important to emphasize that the Americans, without the consent of the Russian side, introduced and use the term “intermediate-range missile”.
In addition, Article VI regulates that neither side: a) does not produce any medium-range missiles, does not conduct flight tests of such missiles, and does not produce any stages of such missiles and no launchers of such missiles. ”
And finally, we’ll give Clause 12 of Article VII, which is considered by Americans to be the strongest argument and is used in justifying their actions: “Each party has the right to produce and use for accelerator facilities only existing types of accelerator stages.
The launches of such accelerator facilities are not considered as flight tests of medium-range and shorter-range missiles, provided that: b) such accelerator facilities are used only for research and development purposes for testing objects (emphasis added), but not the accelerator facilities themselves. ”
It is obvious that such objects can be payloads that are output to the upper atmosphere or to space.
However, the Americans do not conduct any research with the launch of objects into space within the framework of the INF Treaty.
But on the basis of accelerator stages (“Minutemen-2”, “Trident-1” and others) they make HERA target missiles (firing range - up to 1200 km), LRALT (to 2000 km), MRT (to 1100 km), which are used during test launches of antimissiles, which means a violation of the requirements of the above articles of the Treaty.
In this connection, the first statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry appeared in 4 on January 2001: “The United States has the experience of creating a medium-range ground-based ballistic missile of a new type of HERA, in violation of the INF Treaty, on the basis of the second and third stages of the Minuteman-2 ICR . It is worth recalling that the issue of violations by the United States of this Treaty was repeatedly raised by the Russian side at various levels. However, the Americans rejected all our claims.
The next statement by the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation was made on 7 on August 2010: “The American side systematically violates the basic provisions of the INF Treaty, using target missiles that imitate HERA, LRALT and MRT for the missile defense system elements. According to the INF Treaty, launching of these missiles is qualified as tests of a medium-range BRNB of a “new type”, which is a violation of Article VI. ”
According to the general designer of the unique PGRK Topol, Topol-M, Yars and the Bulava missiles of academician Yuri Solomonov, in violation of the INF Treaty, the Americans actually created a medium-range missile. Undoubtedly, Yuri Semyonovich offered Russian politicians and experts an authoritative and powerful argument for protecting the interests of Russia's national security in the field of strategic offensive arms and anti-missile defense, but these recommendations were not heeded. And as a result, a significant number of successful anti-missile interceptions using medium and shorter target missiles.
IGNORING START AGREEMENT
The American side has committed a number of gross violations of Article XIII of the START Treaty.
It is appropriate to recall that this Article limits the cooperation of the Russian Federation and the United States in the field of strategic offensive arms with other states: “The parties do not transfer to the third parties strategic offensive arms falling under the scope of this Treaty ... This provision does not apply to any existing at the time of signing this Agreement cooperation practice, including commitments in the field of strategic offensive arms between one of the parties and a third state ”(see also“ IEE ”No. 30, 2012). It should be emphasized that the START Treaty does not disclose the terms "cooperation", the types of "cooperation", as well as "third states" and how many there may be.
The essence of the first violation of Article XIII is that the Americans are not announced at the time of signing the START Treaty (8 on April 2010) selling the Trident-2 SLBM by the British strategic nuclear forces, participating in the modernization of the Vangard type and in various technical measures docking systems of British SSBNs and warheads with American missiles, in conducting autonomous and complex tests.
In addition to sales of missiles, the American side performs the following activities: training British specialists; assisting in the study and development of operational and combat documentation; docking of the Trident-2 SLBM systems with British warheads and SSBNs.
American experts are involved in bringing missiles on British SSBNs into combat readiness, in their maintenance, in autonomous and complex tests, in troubleshooting and service maintenance, in preparing and conducting control and combat launches of British SLBMs from the Eastern Missile Range and other activities.
The essence of the second violation of the Article is related to the fact that at the time of signing the START Treaty, the Americans concealed their participation in the Saccessor program (Successor) to create a new British SSBN with a universal missile compartment (Сommon Missile Сompartment - CMC) for the Trident- 2.
It turned out that the American corporation General Dynamics has been participating in this program since May 2012 of the year, that is, after the signing of the START Treaty.
The content of the program is disclosed in an article by the consultant of the Royal Navy, Richard Scott, published in HIS Jane's Defense Weekly 30 in May 2012. The article notes that the program "Saxsessor" provides for the development of three or four new SSBNs, which, with 2028, must be received to replace British nuclear submarines of the Vanguard type.
The cost of the four-boat construction project, taking into account inflation, is estimated at 44 billion dollars. It is emphasized that the UK Department of Defense completed the concept development and approved a new-generation SSBN design program in May 2011. The laying of the head boat is planned in 2021 year with the date of its adoption in service in 2027 year.
The article contains a fragment of a statement by the British Ministry of Defense on the implementation of a US program to develop a universal missile compartment (8 – 12 mines) in British SSBNs, which will house Trident-2 missiles with a nuclear warhead.
It is stated that the rocket compartment is being designed by the American corporation General Dynamics with preset overall parameters for promising SLBMs.
At the same time, the British new-generation SSBNs, along with the missile compartments, will be unified with American SSBNs of the Ohio type, which will save the resources of the two countries.
The essence of the third violation of Article XIII lies in the fact that the Americans and Great Britain carry out other types of undeclared cooperation, which are not regulated by the Treaty:
coordination of nuclear planning guidance documents;
selection and coordination of targets;
data development for aiming;
the distribution of targets between carriers and warheads, taking into account their performance and reduction of the combat strength of the US SNA in connection with the implementation of the START Treaty;
coordination of the ballistic route of the passage of carriers through the territory of other states,
coordination of options for the joint use of nuclear forces;
assessment of the options chosen for feasibility, jointly addressing issues of interaction, support and management;
coordination and approval of operational documents;
development of measures to reduce the time of planning and automating the process of re-targeting carriers to unplanned or newly identified targets; development and implementation of uniform forms and methods of combat use, combat duty, operation of weapons and equipment.
It is quite realistic that another nuclear ally, France, which has completed the entry into the military organization of NATO, will be designated in these cooperations.
As a result, the US side, according to the START Treaty, can reduce nuclear warheads to the level of 1550 warheads and lower, since the list of objects of potential adversaries and the composition of nuclear weapons for their destruction are annually updated during joint nuclear planning in the joint strategic command of the US military. Therefore, part of the targets of potential enemies will be assigned to defeat the strategic nuclear forces of the allies.
In this regard, the initiatives of the President of the United States on deeper cuts in strategic offensive arms in conjunction with the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons are quite understandable. weapons, besides, without taking into account the deployment of a global US missile defense system and its European segment - Euro missile defense.
The essence of the fourth violation of the START Treaty is that the Americans are in flagrant violation of the clause in the Treaty’s preamble: “... recognizing the relationship between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive weapons, the increasing importance of this relationship in the process of reducing strategic nuclear weapons and that the current strategic defensive weapons do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties ... ”
The reports of the Defense Minister and the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces at the international missile defense conference in Moscow in May 2012 indicated that the strategic defense weapons developed by the United States and NATO undermine the viability and reduce the effectiveness of the use of the Russian strategic nuclear forces. In confirmation of this, a computer model was presented, demonstrating the possibility of anti-missile interceptions of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs using EuroMD missiles. In response, we were told: “Your models are imperfect, and the selected source data that was entered into the models is questionable. You did not convince us. We have our own models. ”
Deputy Commander 3rd flotilla nuclear submarines Rear Admiral Vladimir Kuznetsov accompanies US military inspectors during a test of the nuclear facilities of the flotilla in the Gadzhievo garrison. Photo from the NVO archive
According to Russian experts, the EuroPRO system will still be deployed by the 2020 year, greatly reducing the combat capabilities of the Russian strategic nuclear forces. However, a serious threat is predicted in that part of the US warships and ground-based missile launchers of anti-missile systems can be converted to launch ballistic missiles.
Thus, according to the project "Arklayt", based on the SM-3 antimissiles mod. 2B plans to develop a ballistic missile to deliver a hypersonic aircraft at a distance of up to 4000 km. The missiles will be loaded into the launch devices of surface ships and submarines, the ground version of these missile complexes is also being considered, with their deployment in the countries participating in the NATO bloc. R & D is underway to refine the GBI (Ground Based Interceptor) type antimissiles under ballistic missiles for the delivery of various types of combat equipment.
The essence of the fifth violation of the START Treaty is that the Americans are in flagrant violation of the clause stated in the preamble of the Treaty: "... taking into account the influence of ICBMs and SLBMs in conventional equipment on strategic stability ..."
We are talking about the Pentagon’s plans for deploying non-nuclear ICBM and SLBM factions in the short term.
This class of strategic offensive arms is being developed within the framework of the operational-strategic concept of “Instant Global Impact” with adoption by the 2020 year.
At the same time, the Minotaur-2 and Minotaur-3 ICBMs developed using the Minuteman-2 and MX missile launch stages, the basis of the non-nuclear ground-based missile complex, will be undestructed, in violation of the START-1 stage. ).
The formation of an ICBM grouping is planned at Vandenberg airbase (US West Coast) and at Cape Canaveral (East Coast). The possibility of re-equipping part of the “Minuteman-3” ICBM from the existing missile bases was also considered.
In the USALNS, two SLBMs "Trident-2" from 24 on each boat are planned to be equipped with non-nuclear warheads. High accuracy of targeting of warheads will be achieved due to the inertial control system with correction according to the NAVSTAR spaceborne radionavigation system (CRNS).
POSSIBLE HAZARDOUS IMPLICATIONS
The destabilizing nature of these missiles lies in the real possibility of nuclear incidents between the United States, Russia and China.
Thus, mutual notifications regarding combat training, test, unauthorized, and random launches of ICBMs and SLBMs operate in peacetime conditions only between Russia and the United States.
It causes an ironic smile that the military leadership of Russia and other states will be pre-informed by the Americans about preparations for the application of preventive strikes by non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs for operational destruction of time-critical targets anywhere in the world, for example, North Korea, Iran or Syria. There are no ways to identify launches of ICBMs and SLBMs with non-nuclear warheads and there is no research in this direction.
Channels of direct communication are organized only between the leaders of Russia and the United States, and their involvement will be ineffective. Due to the lack of an international contractual base, there is a problem of promptly notifying the heads of state of the undeclared launches of ICBMs and US SLBMs, coordinating the flight routes of the missiles through their territory, specifying areas of the first and second missiles falling into the ocean, and the third step to the territory of other countries that will inevitably cause complications in relations between states.
The hidden reverse retooling of ICBMs and SLBMs into nuclear weapons is quite real. Moreover, the START Treaty does not define control and inspection procedures and does not provide for the submission of notifications and telemetry information. Under the pretext of conducting test launches of missiles in non-nuclear equipment, it is quite realistic to have uncontrolled improvements in the characteristics of ICBMs, SLBMs and testing of new nuclear warheads.
In addition, the “Minotaur” type ICBMs are not declared as new type of missiles, Russian experts have not regulated their inspections, they have not been preliminarily shown, and there are no distinctive signs.
Violations and deviations from the requirements of the START Treaty and the Annex on Inspection Activities are revealed during inspections at US strategic offensive weapons sites.
Thus, at one of the objects of the START inspection it was recorded that the own identification marks of the Trident-2 SLBM, which were kept in assembled form, were inaccessible for observation, since the number was inscribed inside the first stage. The numbers of the first stages of the missiles that were stored undocked did not match the numbers provided by the Americans in the notifications.
At another object of the START inspection, the IDB numbers were written on a piece of paper, which the Americans pasted on the cover of the rocket nozzle.
Often, the IDB's own identification marks were put on a tag suspended on the fence; whether the number of the missile deployed in the mine corresponded to the duplicate on the tag is unknown.
In addition, the US military continues to use hard covers. As a result, they cannot convincingly prove that the head part of the specified SLBM “Trident-2” launching shaft contains the number of warheads equal to the number that is declared.
However, there is also a major violation of the START Treaty, the essence of which lies in the fact that the Americans do not carry out reductions in strategic offensive arms with the subsequent liquidation of carriers and infrastructure facilities. This is confirmed by the estimates of the director of the project on nuclear information in the Federation of American Scientists Hans Christensen. (See the “US XNA March 2013 Martial Information” table).
As is known, more than two years have passed since the entry into force of the START Treaty.
The table shows that the Americans conducted a reduction in the number of warheads on ICBMs of the Minuteman-3 type and the Trident-2 SLBMs. Strategic bombers В-1В are once again declared for solving non-nuclear problems. At the same time, the technical capabilities for their return to the nuclear status are preserved.
In this regard, the following questions are reasonable. How many ICBMs of the “Minuteman-3” type and SLBM “Trident-2” were destroyed in accordance with Section II of the Protocol to the START Treaty (Procedures for the Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs) “by first-stage blast”? How many launchers of ICBMs are liquidated according to Section III (Procedures for re-equipment or liquidation of launchers of ICBMs) “by destroying the head of a mine to a depth of at least eight meters”? How many SLBM launchers are destroyed, according to Section IV (Procedures for retrofitting or eliminating SLBM launchers) “by removing the hatches of the launch shafts, fairings, gas generators”?
How many and types of heavy bombers are destroyed, according to Section V (Procedures for the conversion or elimination of heavy bombers) "by cutting the fuselage into two parts"? What are the results of the work of the Russian national technical means of monitoring the progress of the elimination of carriers and infrastructure facilities in the United States of America?
Thus, the American scientist Hans Christensen has documented that the Americans achieve access to the stated levels of nuclear warhead reduction by “unloading” the platforms for breeding warheads and various manipulations with the number of warheads. At the same time, they observe with satisfaction how the Russian side is compelled to destroy unique types of strategic offensive arms, whose exploitation terms have expired. In vain, some of the disarmament officials of Russia and various experts in the field of strategic nuclear forces expect the Pentagon to rush to destroy new ICBMs like Minuteman-3 and SLBM Trident-2, which are being procured.
Most likely, in 2017, the required number of ICBMs and SLBMs will be temporarily decommissioned, as was done with the intercontinental ballistic missile LGM-118A Peacekeeper - MX. We can put as an example the INF Treaty, according to which the unconditional and controlled elimination of a whole class of strategic offensive arms was carried out without any return potentials, except for the non-destroyed instruments of the Pershing-2 missile control system. Meanwhile, Chapter I (Terms and their definitions) of the Protocol to the START Treaty does not even contain the terms "reduction of strategic offensive weapons", "limitations of strategic offensive weapons", "elimination of strategic offensive weapons" and even the most important term - "strategic offensive weapons".
In this regard, it is proposed that the US Department of State soon publish a specific table of eliminated US strategic offensive weapons for two years of the START Treaty, indicating their types, production dates, locations and other data.
As for the article in The Washington Times newspaper about alleged breach of the INF Treaty by the Russian Federation, it should be noted that the range of an intercontinental ballistic missile depends on the parameters of combat use data that are entered into the missile control system, including for the destruction of strategic and critical facilities. likely enemy even at medium range. It's about time for American officials to know.
RESULTS AND SUGGESTIONS
In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that June 2013 became a landmark month in the international treaty activity of the Russian Federation in the field of control over the reduction of strategic offensive arms. For the first time, Russian President Vladimir Putin has openly declared that the INF Treaty does not fully meet the interests of ensuring the state’s military security: “Other states are actively improving medium-range missiles, and almost all of our neighbors are developing these weapons systems around us. At one time, the Soviet Union and, naturally, the Russian Federation abandoned medium-range missiles, signing an agreement with the United States. This is not very clear, since these systems are generally not relevant for Americans: they have nowhere to use, and for the Soviet Union and for today's Russia, especially given the fact that our other neighboring countries are developing these shock systems, this solution was at least controversial.
By the way, those officials who pushed the country's leadership to make controversial and flawed decisions on the elimination of the INF and START-1, now hello, work in various companies, write articles and give lectures. At the same time, all the blame for making decisions is placed on the leadership of the USSR (RF) of those years, glorifying their own merits.
It should be recognized that in the current START Treaty there is a sufficient number of “irrelevant for the United States and controversial for the Russian Federation” provisions.
It appears that the statement by the President of the Russian Federation allows an independent substantive analysis of the viability of the so-called equal opportunities, balance of interests and parity of the parties enshrined in the START Treaty to begin. To this end, it is proposed to create an independent commission to analyze and evaluate the results of the implementation of the START Treaty for two years; to study the methodology for the development of treaties in the field of reducing strategic offensive arms; deal with the system of selection, preparation and work of the inspection teams of the Russian Federation at the US strategic offensive weapons facilities; analyze the functioning and subordination of the Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to monitor the implementation of treaties (the National Center for the Reduction of Nuclear Danger) and the effectiveness of its interaction with other Russian entities involved in the implementation of the Treaties; Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation to verify the correctness of the expenditure of budgetary funds allocated for the implementation of liquidation measures and their communication to the troops performing liquidation measures; tax authorities of the Russian Federation to verify the correctness of the distribution and expenditure of financial and material resources previously allocated under the Nunn – Lugar Program.
The Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office should conduct a prosecutor’s check on the implementation of Federal Law 28 of January 2011 of the Year No. 1-ФЗ “On Ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms”, especially regarding New types of strategic offensive arms and the state of rocket production cooperation. Conduct a legal examination of speeches in the media of managers of various levels, allowing the disclosure of the performance characteristics of new types of strategic offensive arms, data from construction plans and other information constituting a state secret. Other areas of work may be proposed.
Data on the combat strength of US strategic offensive forces for March 2013 of the year