What we lost

In this article I am going to talk about how Russians could have lived if it had not been for the rejection of socialism. When writing articles, my motto is a slogan - if there is nothing in the article that, when read, would surprise, expand your knowledge, then this is not the necessary article. I think that you will find useful information in this article and will be surprised at how strongly the people are being deceived by the current Russian manipulators.

The article was written in anticipation of the 15 anniversary of the Emergency Committee - the last attempt by the healthy forces of the country to prevent the collapse of the USSR. The reason for this work was the ad campaign launched by the media about the release of E. Gaidar’s new book, The Death of an Empire. also only that the article published on Lente.Ru is extremely manipulative article about the average salary in today's Russia. Thus, in this article, a false premise is already given, intended for manipulating pressure on the reader. The author writes: “Let’s leave out of the brackets the fact that the“ Treasury notes of the State Bank of the USSR ”were not money in their economic sense, but lottery tickets — if you are lucky, you are going to trade.” In fact, money in the USSR was the most stable in the world and were fully supplied with goods. Another thing is that for the sake of the elite, part of the goods had a price lower than the equilibrium price on the market, which led others to want to buy these so-called scarce goods.

So, even reformers recognized that after 19 years of post-reform development, the country did not reach the standard of living of the USSR - a very characteristic fact that had previously been carefully masked by democrats and liberals. And then an obvious thought occurred to me. I asked myself, Sigismund, what would have happened if the reformers hadn’t (or hadn’t allowed the people) to destroy the socialist system. With this question in my mind, I began to analyze statistical data reflecting the growth of the USSR. No, not official (the liberals would immediately shout that they were fake), but those accepted by the international community. The constructed growth curve for the USSR GNP was linear. I extended this very stable straight line and found that if it were not for the reforms of 1987-1991 of the year, the level of GNP in Russia would be more than 1,8 times than now. But then it was an amateur exercise and I did not pretend to anything. Further, I remembered that in this article the average standard of living of the current Russians is given, but this indicator does not reflect the standard of living of the majority of the people. I began to look at available sources on the Internet and found that in today's Russia the richest 20% get almost two thirds of national incomeconsumption, while by 1987, this percentage did not exceed 30%. If so, it turns out that by simply returning to the principles of distribution that existed during the years of Soviet power, one can increase the standard of living of 2% of Russians almost 80 times. But this was not all. Analyzing the family budgets of the current Russians, I found that the share of spending on an apartment in them sharply increased. Previously, during the years of average Soviet power, an average person received 200 rubles and then, after 7 years (on average), he was given a two-room apartment (on average) for free, and the utility payments for such a person did not exceed 10% of salary, now buy an apartment It became almost impossible for 80% of the population, and the share of utility payments in wages increased to 20-30%. If we take into account the impossibility of buying apartments, then we can accept that due to the twist of flat money real wages should be reduced by 25-35%.

Finally, I remembered that almost 30% of the income for consumption was provided by rising oil prices, and if so, why not accept that the USSR would have received the same income from oil. Then I took these numbers and multiplied them and found that if the USSR had not been destroyed, then the distribution of the share of national income consumed would have remained the same (and it was already more or less stable over 30 years) and if the price of oil had grown same pace then 80% of Russians would live in 4-6 times (pessimistic and optimistic scenarios, respectively) better than now (without an increase in oil prices, this figure is equal to four times - I give details below).
Having received such an unexpectedly large difference in the standard of living, I laid out my calculations on the Internet forum of S.G. Kara-Murza and waited for the reaction of the public. I did not have to wait long - the criticism went a powerful stream. When I posted my article, I honestly did not even expect that it would cause such a huge interest. I ran the article literally in an hour - I already had calculations on the quintile coefficient in my computer, there were graphs of growth of the Russian economy. I just thought, what if it all multiplied. Of course, I hadn’t done any simulations there yet. I did not plan to write a scientific economic article. It was only later that I did all this, after shoveling a huge number of scientific articles on the dynamics of the economy of the USSR before the 1985-1986 year.

Here, strictly speaking, all thoughts. Further, you can not read - there will be a theoretical and rational justification for these thoughts, why I took certain figures for my calculations, how and what I thought, research into the question of whether the USSR was doomed, and if not, why.


I will try to apply scientific analysis to verify the fact that the USSR was destroyed for subjective, and not for objective reasons, of internal quality, and this caused the deepest disintegration of the whole society. But before you start exercising in alternative storiesI would like to focus on two questions. 1. Can historical data be used to predict economic growth, and can linear models be used? 2. Can linear models be used for forecasting the USSR economy?


When discussing the initial version of my article, the most heated discussions arose around my intention to use linear extrapolation of the USSR growth to 1985 of the year to predict the development of economics after 1985 of the year. Many have argued that the extrapolation of growth from 80-x to 90-ies is unscientific. Like, relying on linear models with so much data is self-deception. Therefore, I had to consider the question, is there any reason to believe that the change of trend, trend, if you speak modern language, was growing?
According to economists, in any case, using the average growth rate is not something a priori wrong, but represents the simplest approach to the problem of forecasting. For predicting growth rates, linear models are quite adequate. More complex models are used when (1) is available for this, (2) also studies short-term dynamics. To predict the values ​​of a random variable, it is enough to have a history of its implementations. Next, the model specification is selected based on the properties of the data series. For example, a function of the type E (E (Y | X)) = E (Y) - I immediately apologize to those who do not know mathematics.

When the task is to give a forecast of Soviet GDP on 20 years, as if we were in 1985, it is easiest to allow the economy to grow at a constant rate and take the pace that corresponded to the previous decade or two. An econometric base for this is available (although, of course, if you parse the real data, then some particular difficulties may emerge). There is nothing prejudicial about such an extrapolation. The use of projection is justified; in this case, the best conditional estimate of the future (for the point in time 1985) is a linear trend obtained on the basis of information about the previous dynamics of the variable of interest.
When discussing, the most sensitive blow to my skeptics was dealt by A. Putt, the forum member S.G. Kara-Murza. I will give an example of his testing the possibility of using a linear model to predict the growth of the US economy. Were taken figures characterizing the quarterly growth of the US economy over the period from 1947 to 1985 year. Based on computer simulation using the ARIMA program (1,1,0), a linear growth function was calculated. This linear model was then applied to predict growth over the 1985-2005 year and the results obtained were compared. All parameters of the calculated linear function turned out to be statistically significant and show the substantial accuracy of the hypothesis, which initially assumed that the US economy was developing according to a linear model.
Predicting US GDP growth for 1985-2005 based on 1947-1985 data gave a very good result. On 20 years ahead, the model was mistaken for 14% in comparison with reality. So, US GDP growth is not so badly predicted based on such a simple model with a constant growth rate.
So, it was shown that the use of linear trends to predict the development of the country's economy is fully justified. After that, I myself tried to play in the statmodel of economic growth and found that the linear trend can be traced even for Argentina with its jumps in growth rates. Even after 1929, the US economy regained trend linearity. Thus, the main question is whether it is possible to apply linear extrapolation to forecast future development, was resolved positively.


The next question asked by the panelists was slow. Well, let us assume that forecasting on the basis of statistics is possible and even quite acceptable is the use of linear models, but after all, the USSR was special - it was struck by a deep crisis. And if so, then the use of linear models to predict the growth of the USSR is unacceptable. In other words, it is argued that the USSR was in a state of crisis before 1985 for the year. But is it? To answer this question, I will have to use the analysis in (6). It proved that the system in the USSR was stable and for decades provided a very high increase in national income. In 1979-1988 it reached a state of stable dynamic equilibrium — the USSR gave an average of 3-3,5% annual growth in national income. The country cannot develop faster, as the labor reserve has been exhausted, and the working day is limited to 40 hours per week (remember that after the murder of Stalin by Khrushchev, the working week in the USSR was reduced from 48 hours to 40 hours) control over the result of intellectual work is categorically not taken by the workers themselves. Growth was in spite of the fact that oil prices between 1982 and 1986 over the years have fallen 6,8 times, despite Brezhnev’s “insanity”, Andropov’s rush to bring order, Chernenko’s accession, Gorbachev’s publicity. More and more countries are buying Soviet aircraft. Space, unified power grid, unified system of railways. Self-sufficiency in culture and tourism (such heights in culture as the USSR has reached, especially in the field of art for children, we will never reach). Even Canada bought Soviet hydro-turbines, with the proviso that this was not written in the press. Soviet education is the best in the world, the number of registered inventions in the USSR exceeded their total number in the rest of the world, and these were truly new technical solutions. Indeed, not all of them were introduced, but this is a huge creative potential. Science in the USSR ranked second in the world, although it had problems of growth.

The economy of the USSR looked good against the background of the developed countries of the West. So, in 1990, the USSR produced per capita 5964 KWh of electricity, the USA - 12659; Great Britain - 5543; Italy - 3765. The gas per capita was produced by 2624 cubic meters, in the USA - 2021, in Great Britain - 871, in Italy - 278. Meat was produced 69 kg per person, in the US - 123, in the UK - 66, in Italy - 64. (12) It can be seen that the standard of living in the USSR practically did not differ from that in the leading countries of Europe, although it was lower than in the USA, Germany and Japan. I have already written with co-authors that the level of technological development of the USSR was also comparable to that of the leading Western countries.

If we compare the average annual per capita income in international dollars (at purchasing power parity) 1988, it turns out that from 1950, the per capita national income in the US increased from 6430 dollars to 14000 dollars in 1988, while in the USSR it increased 3,9 fold - from 1750 dollars to 6750 dollars, which means that The Soviet economy grew 2 times faster than the US. The American directory of Soviet Economic Structure and Performance gives similar ratios of the USSR and the USA. For example, according to this guide, per capita national income in the USSR was 8363 dollars, and in the US - 18180 dollars. And Czechs and Slovaks (and East Germans) lived under socialism much better than Soviet citizens. Do you know why? They received annually 15 million tons of oil from the USSR - for one third of the price on the world market.
So, as a result of the living creativity of the masses, a new type of living arrangement was formed in the USSR, which lay in line with the basic traditions of Russian organizational technologies, adapted to the modern geopolitical conditions of the country. We call such a political-economic system socialism. Its important features are the combination of economic and administrative, tax and business functions in a single economical management structure, so that a significant part of the social product was directly seized by the state without using the classical tax mechanism and was directed to the needs of the country. The distribution of wealth in a socialist society was carried out taking into account feasibility for the country as a whole. Such a system needed centralized planning, which had certain solvable drawbacks due to the difficulty of accounting for all information and because of the difficulty of reconciling the different interests of the center and periphery.
In the Soviet economic system there were several key decisions given by Russia's geopolitical features: elimination of capital outflow from the country through the monopoly of foreign trade, strict financial control and restrictions on exit; economical and recognized by all the mechanism of coordination of interests in society, performed by the CPSU; the rapid elimination of deficiencies and the adjustment of policy by the Soviets and the CPSU with the help of the press and state security organs; availability of a system for restraining the comprador elimination of the elite with the help of state and party organs. There were valuable money in circulation, but they were separated from the production sector of the means of production, which made it possible not to be afraid of financial crises. The peculiarity of the institute of property under socialism was its multi-level character with a wide division of ownership rights to bundles. Socialism solved the problem of justice on both an individual and national level. Even critics of the Soviet economic system recognize that for all its flaws "it was a solid and stable system. And one of the properties of a stable system is the rejection of alien elements, which happened with cost accounting, Kosygin reforms. The system emasculated them, cut them off and digested them."
The planned economic management system successfully solved the problems of scientific and technological progress, and the planning deficiencies were compensated by the administrative market (or rather, the administrative-market adjustment of the deficiencies of the planned distribution) —the mixed economy made it possible to mitigate, although not without flaws, many of the deficiencies associated with , proclaimed official ideology.
Note that in the 1978-1988 years, the USSR no longer had any serious conflict with the West, a security agreement was signed. And the mobilization development is almost over. A stable self-sustaining society emerged, which had two defects: residual dogmatic Marxism in the field of ideology and a very dangerous mechanism for the functioning of the Supreme Power. They are like two detonators and worked.
So, an analysis of the growth trends of natural production indicators shows that there were no signs of crisis in the Soviet economy. Due to a centralized change in the structure of investments, improvement of production organization, reduction of losses and other methods, the crisis, according to some Russian and Western experts, could have been delayed by another 5-10 years. It turns out that a real crisis (if we accept that it was inevitable, although this is not true) in the Soviet economy would have begun not earlier than 2005-2010. Here it is necessary to take into account a very important fact, which the critics of the USSR deliberately get along with - after the murder of Stalin, the duration of the working week decreased from 48 to 40 hours, that is, the base for economic growth decreased by 20%. Nevertheless, during the 60-70 years, the USSR maintained almost the same growth rates as under Stalin. The basis of this breakthrough was a sharp increase in spending on science.

According to official figures USSR national income increased from 1950 to 1960 year 2,7 times, and from 1960 to 1984 year 3,7 times - the linearity is amazing. If we compare the slope of the linear functions of GNP and wage growth, then it turns out that their ratio was almost absolutely constant, which indicates a very good state of finances in the country. In general, the linearity of wage growth over the years from 1960 to 1985 is also striking. Moreover, if we compare the slope of the linear functions of the growth of GNP and the growth of wages, then the tendency of preferential growth of public consumption funds will appear. By the year 2000, if the same tendency of absolutely linear growth of wages and GNP continued, then the wages would increase 3 times as compared to 1960 year, whereas the GNP would increase 4 times. if we accept that investment in the USSR was about 35%, then we get the ideal work of the economy and financial bodies. All of this suggests that USSR-85 was an absolutely healthy economy.. Moreover, even those negative trends that were easily stopped by increasing the cost of innovation. For example, 12 billion rubles (in 200 prices) were allocated to the program for the modernization of the machine-building complex in the 1985-m five-year plan - two times more than in the previous ten years.
According to the testimony of a well-informed member of the Gorbachev Politburo, E. Ligachev, the measures taken by the government gave effect. In the industry, the growth rate of production in 1986-88. accounted for approximately 4% compared to 3% in the XI five-year period, in agriculture, respectively, 3 and 1%. In the Gorbachev era, it was possible to increase the input of housing from about 300 million square meters. in 1981-1985 to 343 million square meters before 1986-1990 on RSFSR. Over 1986-1988, the average 128 million sq. M. m housing. A significant increase was achieved in the construction of residential buildings, which was not the case during the previous two five-year plans. Western economists unanimously claimed and argued that the Soviet economic system had significant economic reserves in the 1991 year, but the country's leaders did not even try to use them. "Why? - asks Vilkotsky and he himself answers - "There is only one answer to the question: the nomenclature needed to destroy the Soviet Union and create a convenient state system on its ruins."
Many believe that the Soviet economy, that in Stalin, that in Khrushchev, that in the Brezhnev version, could not grow at all - there was no evolutionary mechanism. Only it turned out that moving science and technology, but over time, slower and slower. Meanwhile, a thorough analysis shows that the Soviet economy was just growing due to huge investments in public education.
Reformers of different persuasion, who called to the market (and those who are calling now, are no longer bad, as in today's Russia, but for the good) do not provide for scientific and technical progress. In the present conditions, any market system without the enormous efforts of the state to invest in innovation and science could inevitably be after some short-term improvement lead to a new crisis. There were three 1985 releases. 1. Copying US system. 2. Return to the Stalin system. Only these two systems gave room for the development of innovations and, above all, science. 3. Finally, it was possible to follow the path of socialism and “educate” the population; it was necessary to increase the pressure on managers to make them engage in innovation activities and sharply increase the financing of science.

Copying the US system is exactly what, among other things, reformers do, but without much success for Russia. After so many years of reforms and comparing the paths of various countries that have carried out reforms, it became clear that the implementation of any proposals for transition to the market would have led to approximately the same results as those that have actually been achieved now. The scatter of course is great. From a moderate drop in living standards in the Czech Republic, to a complete collapse in Georgia and Moldova. That is, copying Americans leads to collapse. Stalin’s system was curtailed in 1956. But this did not mean that the Stalin system could not be re-implemented. For this it was necessary to do very little. Reduce the issue of money to the size of GNP growth or below this level (but then centralized price cuts and lower wages must be introduced) and plans to reduce production costs should be restored. Intermediate options such as Swedish socialism, when there seems to be more socialism in capitalism, cannot be an alternative. In fact, it is a pale copy of the American system. They are dual and work badly when there is no incentive for innovation. These systems then successfully develop when they actively stimulate innovative activity. In Sweden and Finland, the most important thing was preserved - state stimulation of science. I was in Sweden. They told me that 15 years ago they were in a deep crisis, but then they began to actively stimulate innovation and it all worked. Now in Sweden and Finland one of the highest percentages of GNP used for science and innovation.

So can Nesuna killed the USSR?

Both liberals and supporters of pure communism are very fond of exposing the USSR as nesun country. They argue that at the end of the Soviet era, it was the massive spread of "misbehavior" that gave rise to a very conciliatory attitude towards plundering state property and eventually led to the death of the USSR. Many of them believe that the flowering of the “shadow businesses” became a symbol of the disintegration of the Soviet system during the “late stagnation” period. Not to see this, they exclaim, means to explain the restructuring only by Gorbachev's "betrayal", which is completely erroneous. But this statement needs additional verification. Criminal stratum and shadow markets emerged under Stalin after the importation of a huge amount of unrecorded material values ​​from Germany. No one has yet proved that crime has grown and began to threaten the security of the country. She was acceptable for normal growth. The notorious offense also served as a way to adjust the distribution system. Thus, in the city of Zelenokumsk of the Stavropol Territory, at the outset of the Soviet era, almost all the butter consumed by the population and sausage were taken from local food enterprises. And this was due to the fact that according to the plan 100% of the products produced, for example, by the meat processing plant, were sent to Moscow. Misbehavior meant that employees of this enterprise, after paying taxes to the state in the form of fulfilling planned deliveries, received their salaries additive in the amount of productswhich can be produced and rendered in addition to the plan from the available resources. Thus, the approval system for drawing up plans ensured a relatively even distribution of the tax burden across economic entities, and after paying these taxes, enterprises could work to meet the needs of their employees.
Yes, the insanity somewhat corrupted society (but does it really compare the present society completely corrupted by the market, where crime, theft, prostitution, pornography ... and morality flourish, as it turned out from the height of the vision from the present time, the USSR society). In order to combat the negative consequences of morale for the morale, it was necessary to first understand what kind of legal mechanism would allow to compensate for the shortcomings of planning and maybe you just had to to restore the principles of planning characteristic of the Stalinist economy, where not money, but natural indicators were planned.
Nesuny did not particularly disturb anyone, except for adherents of ideological purity. The level of "corruption" (in the understanding of supporters of holiness) was acceptable and not higher than in the USA. There was a feedback that did not allow it to grow, - the Soviets, the CPSU, law enforcement agencies. Corruption, shadow markets were mechanisms that compensated for planning deficiencies and made it possible to solve the deficit problem. In Georgia, the shadow businesses worked openly, in Uzbekistan in general, in the understanding of the guardians of the laws, the mafia flourished. But this opinion is far from indisputable: in fact, the adaptation of the system of exchange and distribution to local peculiarities was going on. The complete elimination of violations of laws and crime in a multi-ethnic country is generally impossible.because it is impossible to work out uniform, acceptable for all rules that separate criminal actions from legal ones. Its substantial reduction is possible only in states with moral non-acceptance of economic violations and other crimes by the whole society (for example, Switzerland). At the same time, it is necessary that the interpretation of the action as criminal was the same in the morality of the whole society, and this, as a rule, is achievable only in mono-ethnic states. Therefore, some economists introduce the concept of a crime level acceptable to the people. This is the optimal ratio for the growth and stable development of the price of measures to combat crime and its damage. When the cost of strengthening the fight against crime exceeds the reduction of damage from crime as a result of additional control measures, further strengthening the fight becomes meaningless.
In 1987, the last year before the reform, in the RSFSR 9,2 was committed with thousands of murders or attempted assassinations, 33,8 with thousands of robberies and robberies. Expanded reproduction of crime was not !!! From the data presented in the USSR 1990 statistics collection, it is clear that the role of the shadow economy was minimal. With a total cash income of the population in 493,5 billion rubles in 1988 year. The benefits were worth 502,9 billion rubles. The excess was less than 2%. Again almost perfect indicator. Note for comparison that in 2002, 32,3 was registered in thousands of murders and 214,4 in thousands of thefts and robberies. The number of grave and especially grave crimes has been fluctuating at the level of 1,8 million per year for many years (besides, the proportion of those crimes that are recorded and even more disclosed are revealed). The concealment of income and the evasion of money began to be general.


The second typical accusation of the Soviet system was the assertion that it constantly created deficiencies. The examples are usually given. 1991 year when store shelves were empty altogether. In fact, this is a typical manipulation by substitution of the thesis. Before 1985, deficiencies were rare. “Sausage” electric trains are the result of the creation of a “shop window of socialism” in Moscow. But a lot was done and, in particular, the problem of shortage of meat was successfully solved. For example, in Ivanovo, it was solved due to a sharp increase in the production of duck and duck dumplings. Gradually, by the year of 1985, the situation in Ivanovo began to be resolved in unconventional ways. When they began to introduce coupons for basic products, the severity of trains has died away. Everyone knew that half a kilo of butter per month would give us 2 kg of meat and half a kilogram of sausage .... There were fresh and smoked ducks. Pork appeared - better than nothing. Milk became heaps. Cooptorgi opened and it became possible to buy meat for 5 rubles, but on the market it was almost for the same price and was not translated.
As for the deficits constantly exaggerated by the liberals in the last years of Perestroika, they were artificial. They were specially organized in order to cash in on speculation. A. Kasatkin in the article “Deficit in the USSR” in N5 (454) of the newspaper “Duel” explains how Artificially made a deficit in the USSR. There are other testimonials. So, V.I. Potapov, the first secretary of the Irkutsk CPSU Regional Committee in the years of Perestroika, testifies that for certain types of food the deficit was created artificially: speculation, theft ... U. Sarsenov from Kazakhstan writes about this for some services, goods were created artificial shortage, which allowed any “bugs” to remove from under the floor from the cost of goods, air ticket, hotel room their margin, their percentage, not subject to any tax, of course, tax. Elite torpedoed pricing reforms in 1987, when instead of comprehensively addressing prices and tariffs in the national economy, Goskomtsen and Gosplan began to push the idea of ​​revising only wholesale prices at first, and not to touch retail prices for some time. So, there was a shortage even before Perestroika, although it was also created artificially, and it did not in any way interfere with the normal functioning of the national economy, since it affected no more than 1% of goods and services sold. The magnitude of this phenomenon increased dramatically only after the 1987 year.
So, there was no crisis in 1985 in the USSR. It was artificially created by reformers in 1987-1988, which was reflected in the negative increase in national income in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the economy.


Well, in general, why in today's Russia does not the crisis go away? Do economic crises last? The study of the development of different countries shows that within one economic system, the economic decline usually lasts a maximum 7 years. Crises lasting more than 7 years in the new history was not. As a rule, all economies straighten out very quickly, unless they are completely destroyed. Malaysia and South Korea took 2 of the year, Cuba - 4 of the year. Even the USA after the Great Depression took only 6 years to get out of the crisis. Economic recovery after the war also takes a maximum of 7 years. Even in the transition from one social system to another, as after the bloody Civil War, which claimed millions of lives and led to the complete ruin of the economy, the time for economic recovery did not exceed 7 years. After the Great Patriotic War, the restoration took 5 years with even greater destruction.
We have in today's Russia 19 years of continuous crisis - the crisis is evidenced by the lack of development of the country (not of growth associated with an increase in oil prices, but of development), the complete destruction of the innovation infrastructure and, in particular, of Soviet science ... All the mechanisms of scientific and technological progress have been destroyed. By itself, the duration of the crisis in today's Russia and other socialist countries speaks about its systemic nature, it proves that crisis has a non-economic naturethat he is man-made. Almost 19-year crisis persistence and the complete extinction of the innovation system, the collapse of science and the destruction of infrastructure, the destruction of culture and morality, the loss of technological advantage in all areas where the USSR had it, is characterized by an artificial crisis of the life-support system, which has been destroyed. The situation is similar to that after the fall of Ancient Rome, when during the long ten Dark Ages Europe could not reach the standard of living that existed in the Roman Empire.
So, there is no reason to believe that a crisis was brewing in the USSR in 1985, and if so, then the use of linear models for forecasting is quite reasonable.


Next question. Well, well, the liberals say, let's say that in the USSR by the 1985 year, the economy was functioning normally and brought to a crisis by the 1989 year, but why did everyone, like one, socialist countries of Eastern Europe overthrow the communists in 1989? Why, gentlemen liberals ask, suddenly all the socialist countries at once dropped socialism? So it is natural. In fact, this is the last significant argument of the liberals. Doesn't it seem to these gentlemen that such synchronism for 6 countries in one year is just very suspicious? Does this not prove that the economic decline in the countries of Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet republics was not due to internal factors? The simultaneous fall of socialist regimes in several prosperous socialist countries, such as the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, suggests that they just passed Gorbachev.
Beg to quote. “When at the turn of 80-x and 90-x, westward of the USSR, chain coups began in the countries of the then socialist camp, some unexpected, to put it mildly, highly strange realities surfaced unexpectedly. If you speak very briefly, you will have to say this. Farewell with socialism "passed completely under the auspices of the then Soviet KGB. Dear young Russian friend, so that you could see, read the last paragraph called" As a final word or the KGB and STB as the instigators "velvet roar Lucius "in Czechoslovakia" in my article "The History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia" ... When the velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia struck 1989 in November, then the general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Comrade Milosh Yakesh, unequivocally said: "In recent weeks, we had nothing to solve, since the KGB did everything for us. "The one and only country did not obey the dictates of the KGB - Romania. This is the reason why the December events in 1989 in Romania immediately took a bloody turn. The workers of the KGB of that time, along with the Romanian Securitate without a court, brutally murdered the Romanian President Ceausesque and his spouse. President Ceausescu was literally desperately insisting to go to court to hand over evidence to the court of a conspiracy from the then KGB, and in vain, the line of automata suddenly interrupted the life of not only the Romanian president and his wife, but of all European socialism. " More detailed evidence of the fact that velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe were arranged by the KGB can be found in the book of SGKara-Murza with the co-conspirators. In fact, the only exception was Poland, where a private trader was developed, partly Hungary, where there was also much private, and the USSR, where traitor Gorbachev came. The rest of the countries were forcibly surrendered by reformers to the West. Few people in Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR wanted a market.
Next argument As you know, the reforms caused a sharp drop in production in all countries of socialism, where reforms were initiated. It should be recalled, however, that the system of socialism was extremely unified and had almost the same features in all countries, but the level of economic decline has been enormous. In some countries, it was catastrophic - as in Georgia and even, despite the oil reserves, in Azerbaijan. On the contrary, in those socialist countries where governments did not begin to destroy the system of socialism, for example, in Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, China, and even North Korea (here, however, the factor of adverse weather conditions superimposed, which led to the need for card distribution staple food - AVT.), continued steady growth of the economy. It seems that the recession could have been avoided. And the experience of Cuba, S. Korea, Vietnam, China, and Laos showed that a sharp drop in the former republics of the USSR is not a system, but a subjective factor. This is also indicated by the large scatter of results with a comparative uniformity of systems.
In Cuba, after 4, the years of recession caused by a sharp decrease in the Soviet Union’s sibsidation of the Cuban economy, development again became linear, with the same speed. When subsidies to Cuba from the USSR ended, in 1989-1993, the GDP fell by 35% due to the loss of subsidies and trading partners, but then very quickly the period of rapid recovery began. Cuba grew confidently after a quick recovery from the crisis associated with the termination of subsidies from the USSR. In 1996-2000, the annual average increase would be 4,6%. At the end of 2001, the increase was 5,6%. and in 2005, the increase, according to Cuban comrades, was as much as 11.8%, although international agencies counted only 5,6%. Finally, 2006-percent economic growth is expected in Cuba in 8 year.
Slovenia practically did not change the economic system and had almost no decline - only during the two years of the period of military operations. The Czech Republic had a slight decline, but quickly compensated, although in the Czech Republic there was a transition to another social system. Many economists believed, and not without reason, that Czechoslovakia was going 10 years ahead of the USSR. The decline in the growth rate of Czechoslovakia went very slowly. In 1960-1975, the growth rate of GNP in Czechoslovakia averaged 5% per year; in 1975-1980 - 3,7%, and in 1980-e declined to 2% per year. If we accept that the USSR lagged behind Czechoslovakia by 10 years, and the USSR repeated the path of Czechoslovakia, then again the rates would decrease to 2%, but on average would be about 2,5%. Therefore, we can assume that the USSR could move in the same way.
So, the simultaneous rejection of socialism in Eastern European countries just proves that this is a man-made fact - The so-called Orange Revolutions were crushed in all countries of Eastern Europe with the participation of the Soviet special services. The decline in production and living standards depended not on the crisis factors accumulated in the economy of socialism, but on the actions of reformers in the countries of Eastern Europe. Cuba, Vietnam, Laos and China did not follow the treacherous path of Gorbachev and nothing develops without failures.

Conscious collapse of the USSR economy

In this way, having come to power, Gorgachev got a stable working state.. Yes, there were flaws and they had to be addressed. But how to solve? I myself am a doctor by training and firmly learned that before treating a patient, even with a cold, it is necessary to make a differential diagnosis and make a diagnosis. Andropov tried to do this when he declared that we do not know the society in which we live. Gorbachev behaved quite differently. Instead of starting to study society, he began to sway. let's speed up, let's, but how? Accelerated, but the system is inertial - it extinguished the excitement. Let's debug the economic mechanism, but again the system with its inertia suppressed the initiatives of amateurs. Then they took up the foundations on which the buildings of socialism stood ...

In 1987-1988, decisive mistakes were made (or rather, crimes against the people) —the visiting committees of the regional committees were eliminated. This meant that now foreign contractors would be able to give bribes to responsible Soviet workers in the form of trips to the West and marked the complete elimination of control over the elite.
A valve was opened separating the cash money supply from non-cash. For this, the so-called centers of the “Scientific and Technical Creativity of Youth” were first created, the first gateway for pumping cashless in cash. Under the guise of the development of a youth economy, the plundering of state enterprises was organized. Then came the era of co-operatives, which, like leeches, began to pump non-cash money out of the state. In the first quarter of 1990, banking institutions issued 6 billion rubles from the accounts of cooperatives. in cash, and only 450 thousand rubles were credited to their accounts. The total size of the shadow economy has reached in recent years Perestroika approximately 120-130 billion rubles.., or about a fifth of the national income of the USSR. Pumping from "Cashless" в "Cash" in the USSR was a clear theftbecause non-cash money practically had no real price for enterprises (and private individuals who cashed them for the obligations of state-owned enterprises did not respond).
Finally, in 1987, the branch departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which exercised Party (and in fact, people's) control over the economy, were liquidated. The economic elite could now do everything they wanted, and it began to rock the country. Some reformers, in particular B. Saltykov, the former Minister of Science in the Yeltsin government, admit that the crisis in the economy of the USSR arose in 1989-1991, and not earlier.
Very characteristic statement Gorbachevcited in the book "The Fourth Power and Four Secretary Generals" by Viktor Afanasyev “At first we made a stake on scientific and technical progress, but the mechanisms for its implementation did not work. Undertook the reform of the economic mechanism, but it was also blocked. Then the idea of ​​political reform appeared ... ”. As we see, the leader had no attempt to deal with the essence of the matter. There was confidence that the country urgently needed not the Constitution, or Sevruzhina with horseradish, but each new failure convinced the group of "reformers" not that they did not understand something and that they had to figure it out, but what was stopping them system to break. It did not happen with a swoop (and there many efforts are required) for scientific and technical progress - let's redo the whole economy! In science and technology, our ideas have diverged from reality - we will deal with the economy, this will definitely come to us, and science and technology will regulate the market. It didn’t work with economic reform - we’ll introduce democracy, the market will be immaculate with it! As they say, there will be no bread - we will eat sturgeon.
Here is just one example. According to Ligachev, a member of the Politburo A.N. Yakovlev at the end of the period of perestroika, he sent a note to the General Secretary about the separation of science from the state, the termination of its budget financing, the liquidation of the State Committee for Science and Technology. So can only act american agent


One of the versions of supporters of the objectivity of the collapse of the USSR is the assumption that the people of the USSR are tired of socialism. As if the economy of the USSR was optimized as a wartime economy and during the 70 years (or 50) of the war - the people were tired. Like, one generation is a lot. And in Eastern Europe, the population of 30 is less tired from communism.
In fact, this assumption has no basis. At the very beginning of perestroika, no one even thought that socialism should be destroyed.. All thoughts were focused on the improvement of socialism, which without exception was considered by all as the best social order. Everyone wanted to improve socialism. They did not want to break socialism and most of the leaders of the CPSU. Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee E. Ligachev in a report at a solemn meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on the 69 anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution 6 in November 1986, said. “Of course, we are not talking about changing the essence of our social system. On the contrary, this process is aimed at strengthening and developing the fundamental socialist principles, at eliminating everything that is incompatible with them, at creating conditions for the effective use of the enormous potential of socialism ... All the tools of restructuring, all our experience, all our will, focus on to reliably ensure a new, sustainable recovery of the economy and the welfare of the people. " But the opinion of a resident of the Czech Republic. He writes that the Czech people didn’t have any special desires to destroy socialism in 1989, they were not satisfied with everything.

Many believe that in any case they would have had to abandon the most hateful (in the then mass representation) traits of the Soviet economy. But as it turned out, after 19 years of reform, these so-called "hateful" features are the price of other good features that far outweigh the "hateful ones." This is very well written here. (65) To conclude this section, let me quote a Czech author who has already had enough of capitalism. "Today there is a lot of toilet paper in the shops ... But on the other hand, solve the question, why do I need toilet paper, if there is nothing to eat? You know, I have been out of work for 6 for six years, my friend. Sorry for the sharpness of tone, but I prefer toilet paper queuing before the labor exchange. "

So, socialism was destroyed not by objective economic factors, but by the hands of reformers. Consciously or not, this should be established by the competent authorities. The population, neither in the USSR nor in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, with the possible exception of Poland, did not want to abandon the gains of socialism. The cause of the economic catastrophe is the penetration of the ideology of liberalism and reform.. And to destroy the USSR helped international economic agencies. Here is the opinion of the Nobel Prize winner Stiglitz. "In the future, Russia's economic performance was impressive, but its gross domestic product is still almost 30% lower than it was in 1990. With a growth rate of about 4% per year, the Russian economy will need another ten years to reach that level which was at the time of the collapse of communism. " It is clear that Stiglitz is forced to give explanations of a purely "psychological" sense to what is happening. But if one takes into account his "reservations" and explains the actions of international financial institutions by purely mercantile considerations, a very comprehensive picture is built, close to the "Confessions of an Economic Killer" by John Perkins, who is also not the last person in Western economics. The West deliberately pushed Russia to death and did it with Democrats.
Academician Samvel Grigoryan in his recent speech at the general meeting of the Russian Academy of Sciences was even more outspoken. He said: "The process of destruction of a great power - the USSR - could not be spontaneous and spontaneous. There is no doubt that this was a well thought out, well planned and organized, very well paid share". From myself I add - the trouble is that in the USSR, instead of Comrade Dan (as in China), Comrade was at the top at a crucial moment Misha kraplenny.


They can say to me that it is good, they say, to wave their fists after a fight. Say, in those years, all economists, as one, recognized the goodness of the market for the USSR. But is it? Did all learned economists support the direction of the restructuring of the Soviet economy, elected by Gorbachev and the then young reformers? It turns out that not all. For example, Academician Yaremenko categorically objected to the economic policy leading to the destruction of a significant part of the existing production potential, the "technological core" of the national economy, reasonably showing the futility of the raw materials orientation of the domestic economy, inexorably arising from the nature and content of 90-s production , science, social sphere.

Yu.V. Yaremenko warned that the production and technological structure of the national economy is not able to adequately respond to the controlling "macroeconomic" impacts carried out in accordance with the traditional canons of market regulation. According to his views, the role and functions of the state in the economy should not only not weaken, but even strengthen. Prominent figures of the party waged an active struggle against the grave-diggers of socialism: I.K.Polozkov, V.A. Kuptsov, V.V.Chikin, V.A. Starodubtsev, I.I. Melnikov, A.G. Melnikov, E.E. Sokolov, A.V.Vlasov, E.D. Pohitaylo. Sovetskaya Rossiya newspaper and its editor V.V. Chikin became the mouthpiece of resistance. And if they had won, the story would have gone a different way.


The efforts of the reformers were not in vain. Here is an interesting fact. In the 1922, the USSR was formed, which accounted for only 1% of global industry, and after 50 years - in 1972 - 20% of the total world industrial production. Currently, the share of Russia in the global industry does not exceed 1,5%. We should cite the authoritative opinion of I. Nikolaiev, who convincingly showed that in the GNP, which is calculated by the State Statistics Committee, it has little to do with reality. He analyzed investment and physical production indicators and gave an estimate of GNP in 42% of the Soviet for 2003 a year. Since then, the GNP has grown 1,3 times to a level of about 60% of the Soviet. The reformers, of course, count more, but still, even they recognize that the level of production that existed in the RSFSR has not been reached.
So, after all of this I make the final conclusion: the linearity of the prediction is applicable for the USSR 1985 of the year.


Reformers love to trump salary growth in today's Russia. Here is one of the manipulation techniques used by the author of the article from Lenta.Ru mentioned above: "According to the latest Rosstat data, in May of this year, total cash income per capita amounted to 9459 rubles, average wages - 10030 rubles, average pension - 2727 rubles; in terms of the scale of prices, 148, 157 and 43, respectively Soviet ruble ... (In parentheses, I note that, according to the State Statistics Committee, the average salary in Russia in 2005 was 8,53 thousand rubles or 302 dollars. In my opinion, some very suspiciously large increase in income over 6 months is as much as 18%. In general, the official statistics is similar to the drawbar, as it turned out, and it turned out - according to official data, in December 2005, the average salary was 11,075 thousand rubles or 393 dollars) .- AVT.) ... In the USSR, in 1985, the average salary was about 200 rubles. per month (in brackets, I note that in 1987, it was already 214,4 rubles. However, at that time very few people had left incomes, whereas nowadays up to a quarter of all earnings are hidden in the shadows, which means that their actual size has already surpassed the achievements of developed socialism "Meanwhile, to achieve the same heights in terms of pensions (132 rubles. With the maximum length of service) will obviously still, oh, how, not soon ...", and after all, it's already 19 the year since the beginning of the reforms 1987 year.
I will help the reader - in the last passage, the author tries to distract the reader's attention from the obvious fact that until now, after 19 years of reforms, the average real incomes of the population are significantly lower than those in the years of socialism. To do this, a "subtle" hint is made that then they said there was more left income. I note that left-wing incomes now are mostly the most wealthy Russians who successfully hide them from the tax service. On the contrary, poor people left their incomes, as a rule, not very or very little. Why are there an ordinary person - even the former high-ranking officials, the nomenklatura, were in deep poverty. For example, the pension of the former chairman of the USSR State Bank Gerashchenko 2400 rubles. Let us remember this fact - the extreme niche of pensioners, we will need it in our further presentation.
And here is another and more fact of manipulation in the description of the USSR ... For example, it is argued that "for 1971-1985, the amount of cash increased by 3,1 times, the deposits of the population in savings banks - by 5,2 times, while the production of consumer goods - only doubled". In this passage, the explosive growth of the number of services rendered during these years was deliberately forgotten, which just compensated for the growth of money.
And, finally, the last example of disguised manipulation, but in the next article, which states that in the USSR, per capita income increased from 74 rubles per month to 1970. up to 121 rub. in 1980, or one and a half times, and the balance of deposits in the savings bank per capita increased from 200 rubles in 1971 to 600 rubles in 1981. (in 3 times). 1980 to 1990 revenues increased 1,8 times (from 121 to 215 rubles per month), and deposits in Sberbank from 600 rubles in 1981 to 1500 rubles. at the end of 1990g. (in 2,5 times). However, if we consider the growth of wages relative to the growth of national income, then it turns out that the increase in national income was ahead of wage growth. I have numbers in geographic atlas. The savings of the population were relatively much less than they are now in Japan, where now nobody cries about this as a problem. Just the people of the USSR in those years began to save money on expensive things. Finances in the USSR were in perfect condition (see above).


Do not think that life in the USSR was perfect or consisted of some flaws. This, of course, is not true, but the indicators of the standard of living in today's Russia simply cry out. But these glaring facts are masked by verbal manipulations. Thus, it is stated that the average salary (1985 rubles) reduced to 157 of the year is 1,3 times lower than in the 1985 year (200 rubles), but this obvious fact is covered up with a certain reasoning that now everyone has left incomes. But this is clearly not the case, since the poor have almost no such incomes. As for pensions, it is now more than 3 times (!!!) less than in 1985 year, and this is after 19 years of reform.
In another independent study, experts from the All-Russian Center for the Standard of Living found that today the average wage is still under-burdening to the level of the 1990 of the year. The minus is 35 percent. In other words, Russians are still living in 1,5 times worse than in 1990 year.
And here is the third fact from the same opera. Recently, the newspaper "Arguments and Facts", in general, quite loyal to the current regime, led a table showing the ratio of prices for various goods and services in the 1985 year and in the 2004 year. The newspaper "Duel" complemented it somewhat. From the table in "Duel" it follows that the average salary has increased 34 times, but at the same time the cost of living has increased more than 60 times! In other words, the standard of living of current Russians is 1,7 times lower than in 1985 year. Consequently, the scale of the indicator reflecting a drop in the standard of living compared to 1985-1987 a year on the basis of adjusted wages ranges from 1,43 to 1,7 times.
So, it is obvious to any sensible person that after 21 years of reform, on average Russians live worse than in 1985. But do the figures presented correspond to reality? That is the question. Let's check.


On 1 in January of 1999, the gross national product (GNP) consumed per employed person to the level of 1990 was 72,3 percent, and the real wage was only 34,7 percent. As you can see, there was an active fall in real incomes. If the "production" of GNP per person employed in the country annually decreased by about 3,5 percent, then the salary is by 11 percent. However, over the past five years, the real average monthly wage per employee has grown about three times faster than GDP. Incomes are distributed unequally among industries. Thus, the average salary in the oil industry - 30 thousand rubles, in the gas - 35 thousand rubles. Close to them comes fuel - 21 thousand rubles. In education, the average salary is just 4600 rubles.

The relative level of labor remuneration in science in present-day Russia has decreased in comparison with the USSR by 10. And now let us remember what kind of concern for scientists Stalin showed. In 1946, in a poor, war-torn country, the rector’s salary was increased from 2,5 thousand to 8 thousand, professors, doctors of science from 2 thousand to 5 thousand, associate professor, PhD from 1200 to 3200 rubles (with 10 summer experience). This led to the fact that the ratio of the salary of the associate professor, candidate of sciences and qualified (!!!) worker was approximately 4 to 1, and professors, doctors of 7 to 1.


Moscow acts as a separate state in a state. Thus, the average monthly salary of employees (without data on small enterprises) in Moscow in January-March 2005 amounted to 16 thousand 364,2 rubles, which is 25,4% higher than the similar indicator of 2004 g. In March 2005 g This figure was 17 thousand 768,6 rubles, which is 33,6% higher than in March 2004 and 12,3% higher than February 2005.


The situation of rural residents has deteriorated. I already talked about this. I quote. "For example, in the Gdovsky district of the Pskov region, the average monthly salary of agricultural workers for the last two years was 1017 rubles. And this is despite the fact that they produce constantly demanded products, often working all daylight hours. Material opportunities of villagers are easy to assess when visiting almost any house in villages far from cities and forgotten by people and God: wooden benches along bare walls, no electricity, no gas, no radio, no TV, no refrigerator, or a washing machine. "


But the situation in Russia is still flowers. The situation is much worse in other republics of the USSR, with the exception of the Baltic states and Belarus. Among the countries of the former USSR, the highest average wages are among Estonians. Next come Lithuania and Latvia, in fourth place is Russia. In the last places are Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Georgia, where the level of wages is extremely low. At the same time, the income spread between the republics of the former Soviet Union exceeds a hundred times. In Ukraine, from 1989 to 1999, the year of GNP fell 3 times. In Azerbaijan in 4 times (according to official data), in Georgia even more (judging by the international site in 25 times, if we take Russian sources, the decline in industrial production in 1992 was 43%, in 1993 - a drop of another 21%, and by 1996, industrial production in Georgia decreased by 1990 times compared to 6,7 year, and so on. Yes, yes, in Georgia, which flourished under Soviet rule, Georgia had one of the lowest (50 dollars) average wages among the countries that emerged on the fragments of the former Soviet Union. For comparison, in Russia, According to the same source, the average salary was 302 dollars.


While I was concerned about the standard of living on average. Now you need to go to the details of the distribution of income among the population. Social inequality can be estimated by comparing the incomes of the poorest, lower 10% of the population with the incomes of the richest, the upper 10%. This relationship is called decile coefficient. The income of the bulk of the population is often largely determined not just by the level of GNP, but by the decile coefficient. In Sierra Leone, one of the poorest countries in the world, the bottom 10 percent of the population gets the entire 0,5% of national income consumed. While the top 10 percent get 43,6%. In rich Switzerland, the lower 10% already receive 2,9%, and the upper 10% - only 28,6%.

Now, in official calculations, the decile coefficient in Russia is 14-15 (for example, in 2004, the ratio of incomes to 10% of the richest and 10% of the poorest Russians reached 15,2-fold), and the quintile coefficient (the ratio of the lowest wage among 20% paid workers to the highest wage among 20% of the least paid workers) is equal to 8-9. According to this indicator, which measures the social stratification of the population, Russia by 2002 overtook not only all developed countries - the USA (15,9), Great Britain (13,8), Greece (10,0), France (9,1), Germany (9,0), Spain (9,0) , Japan (4,5), but also a number of developing and post-socialist countries: Dominican Republic (17,7), Philippines (16,5), Thailand (13,4), Tunisia (13,4), Turkey (13,3), Poland (9,3), Hungary (8,9) , Indonesia (7,8), Pakistan (7,6).
But the official data are clearly underestimated. For example, in an article close to the Kremlin of Rimashevskaya, a decile coefficient equal to 14 is given. According to the CIA, US intelligence, which I somehow trust more than through the false data of Russian statistics, in 1998, the decile coefficient in Russia was equal to 22,7-22,8. In 2000, according to an international agency that calculates the human development index, the decile coefficient in Russia was 20,3. But that is not all. A group of experts from the World Bank, the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the University of North Carolina (USA), which conducts long-term monitoring of the budget of 4's thousands of households (large long-term research project Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Monitoring), gives the decile coefficient for 1996. 36,3! Domestic economists have a similar opinion. Thus, the Institute of Public Examination, as well as the most authoritative sociologists today argue that the decile coefficient in Russia reaches 40.
I tend to trust American and independent Russian scientists more than official "democratic" statistics. And it is quite reasonable. For example, such facts indicate an ever increasing increase in the difference in the incomes of Russians. According to a study covering the leading economic powers of 29, Russia ranks third in the world in terms of negative pay for top managers, lagging behind only Turkey and India. Domestic top managers receive an average of 77,355 thousand euros per year. And here is another fact. The interim manager of YUKOS, Eduard Rebgun, is not satisfied with the reward of 1,8 million rubles per month appointed by the Moscow Arbitration Court, however, according to Rebgun, this amount does not even cover the monthly insurance paid by him.


And how do the poor live in today's Russia? Eight years ago, Russia joined the European Social Charter and is obliged to follow all its provisions. For example, to establish such a minimum wage, which would be 2,5 times the cost of living. If you follow this rule, then today the minimum wage in Russia should be at least 4850 rubles.
In 2000, the minimum wage in Russia was about 6% of the average wage. The ratio of average to minimum wages was 3,7 in 1951-1955, in 1966-1970, it was 2, in 1981-1985 - 2,7. In today's Russia, this ratio has grown to 8,6.
In 2004, the minimum wage was 600 rubles per month. Approximately 700-800 thousand people received such a salary. This is 1-2 percent of all employed in the country. In fairness, I should note that there is still a shift. Thus, in December 2004, the State Duma of Russia adopted in the third and final reading a law on the gradual increase in the minimum wage. From January 1 on 2005, the minimum wage will be 720 rubles, from September 1 800 rubles, on May 1 2006, in 1100 rubles per month. But it is much less than the cost of living. According to the Federal State Statistics Service, in The national average living wage for the summer of 2006 is 3102 rubles, and the minimum wage is 1100 rubles.. Interestingly, in Moscow the minimum wage is 2200 rubles, and the subsistence level in Moscow is 4171 ruble per month.
The unreasonably low level of the minimum wage is indicated by its ratio to the average wage. In 2000, it was about 6%. The ratio of average salary to minimum was 3,7 in 1951-1955, 2-1966-1970, 2,7 - in 1981-1985. In present-day Russia, this ratio has grown to 9456: 1100 = 8,6. All this testifies that Millions of Russians are now below the poverty line and the average salary does not reflect their lives.


So, Russians' incomes differ tenfold, but what decile and quintile coefficient to choose for calculations. The scatter obtained by different authors of indicators is too large. As in the case of the USSR, I preferred the figures provided by international agencies, in particular the CIA. In addition, I have taken into account that in most of the works, in particular, in the article by the same Rimashevskaya, the absence of a significant increase in the decile and quintile coefficient is given. Considering the growth of the minimum wage in May 2006, I took for my calculations for the current Russia a decile coefficient equal to 16, and a quintile coefficient - 10.


The next question, how to assess the differentiation of income in the USSR? The level of income differentiation under Stalin was great. Then the apartments were built very little and did not give apartments. Apartments were given mainly to specialists. According to the directives of the Twentieth Congress, one of the party’s goals was to "reduce the difference in the level of wages of low-paid and highly paid workers, and increase the wages of low- and middle-paid workers and employees." At about the same time commercial stores were liquidated. In 1968, the decile coefficient dropped to a record low of 2.7, to 1990, it increased to 3.3. In fact, at the expense of uneven prices for basic necessities and luxury goods, the Soviet state established a progressive tax on the sale of luxury goods, which means a tax on the rich.
According to official data from the State Statistics Committee, decile coefficient in the USSR in 1990 was 4,4. Even three years after the start of reforms, in 1991, the decile coefficient was equal to 4,5, whereas in the USA it was 5,6. But already to 1994 in Russia, he jumped to 15,1. According to the scientists of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who took into account the hidden incomes of the rich, the real decile coefficient in Russia in 1996 was 23.
In today's Russia, 80% of the population accounts for 34,1% of income. The richest 20% get 65,9% consumed by GNP of Russia. In the USSR, the situation was different. 80% of the population received 63,9% of income, while the richest 20% only 36,1%. In other words, if we establish the decile and quintile coefficients that were in the USSR, then the revenues of 80% of the population automatically (without any change in the level of production) will increase 1,8 times. So, by itself A return to the principles of social policy that existed in the USSR makes it possible to improve the lives of the overwhelming majority of Russians in 1,8.


And here is another important parameter - the ratio of prices for essential products and luxury products. Bread has risen in price from the average car (VAZ-2105) about 5 times, and travel by metro to 8 times. The prices of absolutely essential goods soared up even more - relatively cheap domestic cigarettes and the most necessary medicines. In the USSR, on the contrary, low prices for the most necessary products eased the situation of people with low incomes, almost equalizing them in terms of the main indicators of lifestyle with well-to-do people. If we take into account that the average salary does not take into account the consumption baskets, and the poorest segments of the population, due to the relative increase in the cost of essential goods, they lowered their standard of living even more. I would attribute at least 10% to this factor (coefficient 1,1).
Democrats brought the price per square meter to 20 thousand rubles (annual average pension), and in Moscow - to 50 thousand rubles, and after that they lie about Soviet power without a twinge of conscience! Now, almost half of Russians (43%) spend from a quarter to half of the total income of their families on rent and utilities (electricity, gas, water, telephone). 17% spend on it from half to three quarters of earnings. Less than a third of Russians give a communal bill up to 25% of their money. These are the results of the last survey conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center. It is noteworthy that those who have per person in families up to 1,5 thousand rubles, spend most of the money (from half to three quarters) on food, and the rest on communal. So, because of the rise in housing prices, the rent on homeowners, invisible in the USSR, became visible and for its maintenance more than 30% of the money supply is required. Now the cost of utilities is often 30% of revenues. If you take into account the payment for apartments when they are purchased, then the share of money leaving for servicing the payment for accommodation will be 50%, but I will take this share for 30%. In other words, out of the total consumption level in today's Russia, about 30% falls on scrolling through the market price for housing. If this is the case, then it should be recognized that in the level of the average salary in today's Russia should be reduced by 1,3 times.
These two factors that determine the standard of living of the majority of the population (the introduction of property rents, mainly real estate, and an increase in oil prices into money circulation) have not been criticized for some reason during the discussion on the forum. Meanwhile, in the aggregate, these two factors gave an increase for even the absolutely stagnant USSR 1,6 times, and taking into account the 1,1 coefficient even 1,75. And finally, the last. Recall that about 30% of the current consumption growth in Russia is associated with rising oil prices. It is not a secret that the main factor ensuring the growth of the economy is not any kind of efforts by the people for innovation or technical development, but simply the increase in the price of oil and gas in international markets. During Soviet times, oil prices fell. Now is growing rapidly. There is no reason to believe that if the USSR collapsed, the price of oil would not rise. If the USSR had remained intact, then oil prices would have increased anyway. This is the law of a capitalist economy - a rise in prices for a product that is lacking. If the increase in oil prices were the same, they would give an additional increase in GDP by 30%. That is why I am introducing an amendment to this factor in the average salary. USSR salary should be increased in 1,3 times.


But that's not all. In my calculations, I did not take into account public consumption funds. They constituted a significant part of the national income consumed. For example, in 1988, only payments from public consumption funds amounted to almost 36% from monetary incomes of the population. Under socialism, the people got what they really needed, education, health protection, apartments ..., and now he buys what he is being driven into advertising. Just think about the number of cellular phones sold in Russia in recent years - 150 mln. Even if you sell them at 1 thousand rubles, it turns out 150 billion rubles. But do we really need cellular phones that are imported for oil? I bought it recently and use it only when I walk with my daughter. For other purposes, I do not need it. And I am not alone in my opinion. One teacher from the Ivanovo Medical Academy told me that for students mobile phones are a kind of symbol of prestige. They, like children, send each other SMSs and all that ... They don't need knowledge ...
The destruction of the city and district Soviets, the practical elimination of self-government, the dictatorship and the autocracy of the “executive branch” had the most radical effect on the appearance of urban areas, especially on the outskirts, and the way of life in them. On the site of working and sleeping areas, urban ghettos are formed, and parks and recreation areas are diverted to “elite development” zones, which are trying to become zones of prosperous capitalism among the ruined urban environment. Sidewalks are not repaired. The number of main broadcasting points has decreased by almost three times - from 47,6 million in 1990 to 17,8 in 2005, and in the countryside they are almost completely destroyed. Thus, local media were destroyed.

Why are there the media. Mail and the reformers ruined. Let me remind you that the price of a simple letter today is almost 10 rubles instead of 4 kopecks in the Soviet era. Accordingly, in Soviet times, mail sent about 5 billion letters a year, and now - a little more than 1 billion, and that is mainly due to official.

All these benefits that were not accounted for in money constituted a substantial part of the consumption of the Soviet people.


There was a lot of information about how they worked in the USSR and in the West. I remember one story. Our Hero of the socialist labor from Ivanovo, the foremost textile industry, V. Golubev, gave 5 a multiple production rate, and I myself saw how she had to fly between the machines. She went to Belgium. She was taken to a weaving factory and she saw that there, on the same Belgian machines, she works like a 80% shift. At all, in Brezhnev times, people worked far less than many people who were spinning in today's Russia. This is at least evidenced by a sharp reduction in reading literature. As one of my graduate students, now working in America, told me. There is no time to read, it is necessary to plow.

S.G. Kara Murza writes: “I once argued with a friend, the captain of a Spanish fishing trawler. He says: "You violated Lenin's law on labor productivity. When we passed by a Soviet ship, our fishermen looked with hatred: the Russians who were unattended from the watch were sunbathing, playing chess on the deck. And we had twice as few personnel on the same ship and worked on 16 hours a day. From each flight I drove one or two guarded - went crazy ". I ask: "Well, what's so good about it? After all, in the port you had just as many unemployed people who killed themselves with drugs. Why such productivity?". "But Lenin said so", - and there were no more fair arguments. And unfair (like benefits for the owners), he himself did not want to use. He thought about this for a year, and then admitted that the Soviet fishermen had better, and in this case socialism does not need a performance criterion. "Now Russia has surpassed Spain in this regard.
Further. Visiting Ivanovo, I often ask my friends about how they are spinning. It turns out that now most of them work in two or even three jobs. There is almost no time for rest. Children abandoned. And the intensification of labor is increasing. For example, a surcharge has recently been introduced for district doctors, but President Putin has forgotten to extend the effect of the vacation allowance and now the district doctors have stopped taking holidays. But in the years of Soviet power, doctors and teachers had the longest vacation among workers. What do I want to say? That the so-called the average salary in today's Russia includes a sharp intensification of laborThis means that this factor should also be taken into account when assessing the standard of living. It turns out an interesting phenomenon - it seems that labor productivity in the USSR was less than in the West, it worked less, but then you and there was enough money for tanks and lived in 1,4-1,7 times better than now.


After all these calculations, I was faced with a new question, what is the basic growth rate to take to forecast salary growth in the USSR after 1985? Until 1987, the country grew at an average of 3,5%. This is evidenced by the data of independent calculations by economists of reformers, and more precisely, the teams of Yavlinsky, who are hard to blame for being addicted to socialism. This is also indicated by the data from the growth check of natural indicators, which demonstrates that the growth in the USSR in recent years before the beginning of the 1989 crisis was about 3% per year. And most importantly, over the years with a rate of about 3% electricity consumption has grown, and this is an integral indicator. The increase in electricity consumption from 1980 to 1988 year (8 years) was 32%, if there was an increase in 3%, then the increase would be 34%. Considering that gas consumption grew at even higher rates, the forecast that these stable growth rates within 3-3,5% per year would continue seemed very high.

In addition, gas consumption increased, the public transportation system, consumer services improved. These are all the factors that created the increase in energy supply. Therefore, I had the right to assume that the RSFSR would develop steadily and would give 3-3,5% growth per year, as it was on average in previous years. But I deliberately did not take 3% growth, which gave the RSFSR during 1978-1987 years, a decade of stable development - not to tease geese - I took the forecast in 2,5% growth, which, as it turned out, was minimal, by statistical modeling of growth trends .
After reviewing all these issues, taking figures from internationally available sources on the Internet, showing the growth rate of GNP in Russia, I did the calculations and it turned out that in 2005, Russia’s GNP was 237% of the 1965 year, while in 1991, the RSFSR had the corresponding figure in 264,7% If we take the peak of the achievements of the RSFSR in the Soviet time 1989 year, then that year the GNP amounted to 288,5% from the level of 1965 year. So, international statistics show that present-day Russia has not yet reached the highest level that Soviet Russia had (82% of the level of 1989 of the year). This fact is reflected in such an indicator of international statistics as the Human Development Index, which in Russia has not recovered within the framework of the Soviet era level.
1990 g. - 0.817
1995 g. - 0.770
2003 g. - 0.795
What happened? It turned out that if there were no Perestroika and subsequent reforms, the GNP in Russia would be at the level of 428,3% of the level of 1965 of the year. At the end of the year, 2005, this figure was only 237%. In other words, even deliberately underestimated predicted results of GDP growth are taken. Soviet Russia without any straining would have 1,8 times the level of the economy, and therefore the standard of living, than now. Remember this figure. If we take the increase in 3,5%, then by the year 2005 the RSFSR would have a GNP in 500,3% of the level 1965 of the year. In other words, we would live 2,1 twice as good as it is now. Finally, take the most pessimistic forecast - the annual increase in 1,5%. Then you would live in 1,54 times better than now.
By the way, the fact that I did not use 3,5%, but for some reason didn’t take as my main minimum number in 2,5%. I think the reason is obvious - my critics were liberals. For them, scientific approaches do not exist, ideology is important for them. Since Gaidar said that the market is good, it means it is.
I note that the consequences of the degradation of science would gradually manifest themselves without sharp jumps in the decline in GDP growth from 3,5% to 1% by the end of the period. What on average would give the same 2%, or even higher. Tendencies to deterioration would not be detected, because the effect of the degradation of science usually manifests itself in 10 and more years. Given the very high level of higher education in the USSR, the system would have been viable for at least 15 years, even if everything was left as it was.
If we take into account the opinion of the “democrats”, that there were weighty reasons to assume that trends in the economy of the USSR have changed significantly over the 75-85 of the year, then they are reflected in the “pessimistic scenario” with 0% growth. There is no reason to believe that the Soviet economy would show a much lower growth rate, that is, it would fall in 2 times, without starting a restructuring. In the end, the Great Depression was not least due to government action. It could either be avoided or the consequences substantially reduced. And the consequences of this depression were significantly lower than the effects of Perestroika. In any economy after a crisis, there are usually higher growth rates. Even after the Civil War in Russia in 10 years to 1928, the economy was restored. Moreover, industrialization, the GOERLO plan, and an increase in the financing of science have already begun. In the current Russian economy there is no high growth rate of the economy itself. There is a growth associated with an increase in oil prices. That is, the economy continues to remain at the same level. No amount of depreciation required, no investment ...


Now I will try to calculate what would have happened if Gorbachev had not come. In my calculations, I will define an optimistic and pessimistic scenario and then compare how we would live in the first and second cases.
To begin with, the average salary is now 157 rubles, and the pension is 43 rubles. In the USSR, 1985, the average salary was 200 rubles, and the pension was 132 rubles. If we accept that pensioners make up 10% of the adult population, then the average per capita income in Russia will be 145,6 rubles, and in the USSR-1985 - 192,2 rubles. If we take into account the decile and quintile coefficients, then 80% of the population in Russia-2006 have an average income of 49,6 rubles, and in the USSR-1985 - 123,5 rubles. If the Soviet salary was compensated for the increase in oil prices (1,3 coefficient), then it would be 2006 rubles in the USSR-160,6. If we take into account that 30% of the average salary of Russians now goes to the maintenance of housing issues, then the non-apartment part, corresponding to the total in the USSR, will be 38,2 rubles.
So far we have not taken into account the increase in GNP in the USSR. But even in this case, 80% of the population in the USSR-2006 would live better than in Russia-2006 in 4,2 times. If we take the linear trend of growth in the average wage in the USSR-1985 and accept that this trend does not change, then the average income in SSR-2006 would be 240,9 rubles, which is 6,3 times higher than the adjusted income in Russia-2006.
In other words, it turns out that if now the USSR would not have been broken, then 80% of the population of Russia would live in 6,3 times better than now. Well, what would have happened if the most pessimistic forecast had come true (annual increase in 0%). Then you would live better 4,2 times. Agree - not too bad. Imagine, the salary in 4,2 would be higher than the current one, and this at current prices and without taking into account additional factors.
Indeed, as in that joke ... A son asks his father why the sun rises in the morning and sets in the evening, and so every day. Dad was sitting at that moment in deep debugging of some program. What - asks the father - the sun rises and sets every day. Yes - the son answers. Father cried out. Works? Well, then do not touch anything, do not touch, do not touch ...
So, the itch of improvements (or maybe betrayal) led to the collapse of the economy, since no one knew how Soviet society worked. Maybe it was not necessary to improve anything until everything worked, but to take measures for adaptation, and most importantly for painstaking, not swoop, stimulation of scientific and technological progress, but in the next article.
But is it possible to measure everything through the level of consumption? I think no. How much is the opportunity to safely put a child out on the street, watch normal cartoons and humanistic children's films, and not Western cruelty burdened by children for children, without being able to get infected with tuberculosis or pediculosis (lice, scientifically) in public transport? How much does personal security cost at night, the lack of theft at dachas and private plots, at inconvenience in small towns, where in Soviet times local people grew potatoes and now they don’t grow because of theft theft, the opportunity not to see every day is a very nice dark-skinned person an African-American from politically correct American films that have flooded Russian screens, and to see the ugly face of a Russian granny not to let a child absorb the pathological cruelty when he watches every minute as a kitten Tom M is teaching Jerry's mouse? And how nice it is to walk on asphalted sidewalks, and not jump from hummock to hummock. For me, these benefits are more important than sausage or toilet paper.
And the safety of life? In today's Russia, the deterioration of fixed assets has sharply increased. In 1970, the average age of equipment in the USSR was 8,4, and in the USA 6,4. In 1990 in the USSR - 10,8, and in the USA - 7,1. In 2004 in Russia - 21, and the USA - 6 years. The depreciation of fixed assets creates prerequisites for man-made disasters. Every year worn equipment will cause more and more accidents. Look at the importance of the Ministry of Emergency Situations in recent years. For example, according to the Ministry of Emergency Situations, in 2004, 1134 emergencies occurred in Russia, which is 35% more than in 2003. Most of the disasters were in the technogenic sphere - the 863 case. The number of man-made disasters increased in 2004 year by 2003% compared to 67 and, interestingly, 2005 emergencies occurred in Russia in May of 200, and 172 of them were of technogenic nature. And safety of life also refers to indicators of living standards.
I am not alone in my conclusions. Here, for example, the opinion of Vilkotsky. According to official data, the average annual increase in national production income in the USSR was 1976-1980 in years - 4,3%, in 1981-1985 years - 3,2%, in 1986-1990 years - 2,3%. It can be assumed that while maintaining the old economic system, the growth rate would continue to decline by about one percent over the five-year period. Suspending national income growth would only happen in the 2000 year, and not in the 1985 year, as we were convinced. Then the increase still had a good indicator for the Soviet economy - 3,2%.


Am I correct? Check using a completely independent approach and the figures presented on the CIA website. In the US, in 2005, per capita national income was 41800 dollars. If we assume that per capita national income in the USSR was 1987% from the USA in 60, that the USA grew with a gain of 2%, and the USSR grew in 2,5% (with the same population growth), then per capita national income in the USSR would be 66 % of that in the US or 27 500 dollars. Now in Russia, per capita national income, calculated on the basis of purchasing power parity, in 2005 was equal to 11100 dollars per person. So, again, the figure is close to the 4 coefficient I received.
My calculations coincide on the whole with the analysis of independent and dependent researchers. Thus, it is estimated that Rimashevskaya is close to the government, made on the basis of data from the State Statistics Committee of Russia, as a result of one fifth of the population won, the majority basically lost. Now Goskomstat determines the number of poor in the amount of 25%, the World Bank - 27%, and the Institute of Socio-Economic Problems of Population of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which is headed by Rimashevskaya, - 33%.
I will cite the conclusion of the above-mentioned scientific report of Rimashevsky. "Changes in the level and quality of life of the population transformed into the most acute socio-economic problems that had no less acute demographic consequences. Among them:
• catastrophic decline in income and material security of the main part of the population;
• a high proportion of the poor with an extremely poor definition of poverty level;
• unprecedented polarization of living conditions;
• significant unemployment and non-payment of earnings;
• degradation of social security and the actual destruction of the social sphere, including housing and public utilities
“Shock therapy” led to a sharp drop in the population’s cash income, hopes for their recovery in the coming years are low. In 2002, real incomes reached only 1997 values ​​of g ... We can say that now there are two Russiawho live in different dimensions, poorly understand each other, have different orientations and preferences, their own demand and the market for goods and services ... Growth of real incomes of the population, which amounted to three years (2001-2004), according to Goskomstat estimates, 30 %, in reality means an increase in the incomes of only the rich and high-income strata, while the real incomes of the poor are actually frozen ... The presence of one-quarter of families (Goskomstat data) of motor vehicles should not be misleading: the history factor acquisitions (15-20 years ago) and using a car for self-employment. "


So, the majority of Russians should realize that, without hindering the destruction of the USSR by their passivity, they have done a lot of stupidity. Under the USSR, they would live many, many, many better than they do now. And this is not a propaganda slogan. Quite a few unbiased Western scholars hold the same opinion. So, the authors of the Journal of Cold War Studies, which is published in Harvard (articles on economics, but not on politics, there are reasonable), do not hesitate to admit that, according to their calculations, it turns out that in some areas of the USSR has achieved significant success (but they also do not select indicators in such a way as to create the impression that the USSR was a paradise on earth). I have already shown what turned the market for the villagers, who have become the lowest paid category of the population in all the former socialist countries, except Belarus.
If they tell me that there is no alternative history, then I will answer what happens. For the Democrats. After all, it was they who dragged out Mendeleev’s forecast about what the population of Russia should have been in the 20 century. This prediction was also made by simple linear extrapolation. However, the real population of Russia in the 20 century turned out to be much less numerical. The difference was declared by the Democrats as victims of the Bolshevik regime. This is where the numbers in 60 of millions of victims originate.
Why they can, but I can not?
But are there people in Russia who understand the destruction of the current path? The individual voices of sensible people from Russia are heard. Again a small quote. "Three years ago, on the pages of the Internet edition of Pravda, I was able to read the article by Professor Igor Yakovlevich Froyanov“Now it’s about whether Russia should be or not. The rest should be forgotten.” Honestly, after reading the entire article, I was as thunderstruck as I learned the terrible, more precisely, nightmarish facts about the modern stalemate in Russia. By the way, Professor Froyanov was driven out of his post as dean of the faculty of history of the university in St. Petersburg for his convictions, what kind of democracy is there, isn't it? "
Having written all this, I asked myself, Sigismund, how could it be better to finish this article, and decided to complete it with the words of Y. Fucik: "People, beware" - and on my own add: "You are being fooled by manipulators. So let's go back to socialism and immediately."
Is there any hope that this path is possible? I think yes. There are grounds for this - for the first time in post-Soviet history, communists received 17% of votes in the Moscow City Duma. At the same time, the figure itself is not important, the following fact is important - the support of the communists in the Moscow City Duma elections was insignificant among the poor and pensioners, while the scientific and technical intelligentsia and middle layers in the factories elected the communists much more. Maybe started to understand?
The text is given without reference and with abbreviations.
The full version of the article is available at: .contrtv.ru / common / 1872
Allocations in the text are made by me - G.S.

Note The wire "labeled" in the General Secretary - it was the most effective diversion of the West against the Soviet Union. But the ascension of this degenerate to power began not with the CIA, but with Kulakov, who first laid eyes on him, and then Andropov took the “patronage” over him, who needed his own snitch in the Politburo, and now - the coffins of both became steps for the ascension of the "marked" to the throne (V.Legostai, "Bloody General Secretary"). A hand to this (and, more precisely, his own language) was also attached by Gromyko, having coached himself to the position of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who at once offered the “marked” to the general secretary, although knew about the intentions of the United States to lead the leaders of the USSR this particular geek. It is likely that the KGB was also involved in this sabotage (or did not inform the Politburo criminally): how to explain the fact that the NKVD Instruction prohibited people with signs of degeneration from being employed in the NKVD due to instability of their psyche and tendencies to betrayals and suddenly for higher public office was chosen bionegativny type as much as the third (the highest according to G. Klimov) degree of degeneration? After all, even in the Middle Ages, it was well known what these people are capable of with the "mark of the devil" (or "witch mark). They, without much discussion, were simply sent to the fire. Cruel? Yes! But while in Europe, the Inquisition looked after the bionegativ, there were no troubles in it, but as soon as the Inquisition was canceled, the revolutions began and the people began to wash themselves with blood. Isn’t the same thing - even the worst! - happened to the USSR when the first degenerate came to power first?
I do not call for obscurantism, but I urge not to trust degenerates the highest authority in the state is a crime. "THESE PEOPLE ARE HOW WEAPONS MASS DEFEAT "(G.Klimov)


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