"Mace" rocket stubbornly reluctant to fly, became famous throughout the world for several consistently unsuccessful attempts to launch.
The main developer of the new weapons for nuclear submarine cruisers, it seems, is ready to admit that he didn’t work out. The main developer of the sea-based intercontinental ballistic missile Bulava, the general designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering Academician Yuri Solomonov made a remarkable statement. According to him, you need to do quite a bit, and the long-suffering "Mace" will fly. True, not from a submarine, here Solomon has somehow failed to work with her for a long time. From the ground it can be much better ... In short, the academician formulated a sensation like this: “Interspecific unification, in general, when the Bulava rocket is taken and used, say, as part of ground-based complexes, this task is realizable in principle.” It is only necessary, they say, a little more to sweat. “I cannot say what to adapt, this is classified information,” the general designer opened the secret slightly. - But an insignificant part of the structural elements, in terms of value - this is no more than 10 percent, will need to be adapted to the conditions of ground operation.
Academician Yuri Solomonov
I would like to give him advice on these lengthy explanations of the chief designer: maybe it’s worth changing the name? What if it helps, after all, as the hero used to say of a famous cartoon, how would you call a ship like that and sail.
Russian corrupt officials have opened a new type of corruption deal, called “Elite Secret Corruption” in the army.
Deputies of the State Duma in the planned budget found a "secret" loophole, not verified by parliament (about 30% - secret for defense). The members of the Russian leadership are in a position to “impose” on the Russian government the opportunity to determine the purchase, pay it from the budget and determine where the “rollback” will be. Conclusion for observation: it is desirable to sell abroad, negotiating directly with the merchants. Projects of this kind today can be supported only by that part of the elite that is interested in legitimizing their capital in the West. Or secures Western guarantees of its political future after the change of top management.
Approximately the situation with the purchase of "Mistral" unmanned aircraft reconnaissance and basement boats. There are many schemes by which budgets are “cut”. For example, in October, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation announced a tender for the construction of a helicopter carrier. What is surprising is not that the tender was announced, but that, without waiting for the results of the bidding, the Russian government has already said who will be the winner in this tender.
The strengthening of the pro-Western lobby in the Russian elite should be associated with the process of "cashing in the image of Russia." Under the guise of a propaganda machine, some elite corrupt officials (and their power patrons) are in a hurry to turn the high ratings of the military-industrial complex - the country through loans into hard currency. But this money does not go to the development of the country, but to an offshore pocket. In addition, last year an agreement was signed with the French company Thales to transfer a license to manufacture Catherine thermal imaging cameras for tanks T-90 A trial batch of these devices was purchased in 2008. This year, the Vologda Optical and Mechanical Plant will begin production of licensed thermal imagers in the amount of 20-30 pieces per month. And finally, the Russian Ministry of Defense began negotiations on the acquisition of the latest French equipment of the "infantryman of the future" Felin. True, according to the statement of the Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov, only eight sets will be purchased in order to "compare with our equipment."
As former President V. Putin said, regardless of who the President of the Russian Federation is, everything will be early “as planned” France is a country that is famous for using corruption schemes when selling arms abroad. I don’t feel like believing in the disinterestedness of the Mistral lobbyists, especially against the backdrop of more and more corruption scandals in Russia. Deputies of the State Duma, mayors of major cities, assistant ministers, admirals are involved in corruption schemes in the field of state defense orders. Today it turns out that Russia is ready to support the French and German shipbuilding in times of crisis, to develop aviation Israeli industry, forgetting about its own shipbuilding and aircraft industry. I am ashamed to hear that Russia is ready to buy Israeli weapons to the detriment of its own "defense".
The current Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Nikolai Makarov, defined the tasks as follows: "We are working on the issue of purchasing a trial batch of Israeli unmanned vehicles." This will be done only in the event that "if our industry is unable to produce in the near future those Dronesthat we need." Officials from the Ministry of Defense want to earn big money against the backdrop of not the best situation in our military-industrial complex.
Speaking about foreign purchases of "UAVs", you need to look further. If we stutter on this, it means that we are actually abandoning GLONASS, since Israeli UAVs operate on the GPS system. Owners of personal cars are “recommended” to buy only GLONASS successors. But how can they be explained why the GPS receivers cost 400 $, and the Russian system more than 1200 $? Thus, officials of the Ministry of Defense are ready to refuse to comply with the decision of the State Duma on the need to purchase Russian weapons. The first major overseas military purchase was the acquisition of various types of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from the Israeli firm Israel Aerospace Industries 12 3. These are lightweight portable complexes, Bird-Eye 400 mini-UAVs, tactical I-View MK150 and medium-sized Searcher Mk II UAVs. Their total cost is $ 53 million, deliveries will begin in 2010, negotiations are underway to purchase the second batch.
At the same time, Israeli drones are completely unsuitable for Russia. The reason - the airfield base. Israeli drone, as a rule, operated in the same way as an ordinary aircraft. He takes off from the airfield for reconnaissance and returns to the airfield. It is suitable for tiny Israel with constantly good weather.
Any domestic drone complex is organized in a completely different way - like a mobile missile system, while the drone itself is operated in the same way as a rocket. Domestic drone, as a rule, is stored and transported in the container of the transport and launcher, starts from this installation in any place where it is delivered, and returns to the place of launch with landing on an unequipped platform. It is clear that Russia does not have such a dense network of airfields to operate unmanned aerial vehicles anywhere in its vast territory, and even with very diverse, not Middle Eastern weather conditions.
With such actions of the Russian leadership, the country actually abandons its defense capability, abandons environmentally not overburdened industries, advanced, export competitive, economically extremely profitable industries. Russia can gradually turn into a backward third world country, inefficient, with dirty industries, with a raw material economy, purchasing finished goods abroad and, thus, supporting Western economies through the export of production and financial resources.
In this regard, I would like to remind you that, being approximately in a similar situation, Japan decided not to equip its armed forces only with Western IWT, and to create at least some of them with our own forces. Although the resulting tanks and airplanes turned out to be more expensive than their Western counterparts at equal performance characteristics, but the money “did not leave” the country, and national scientific institutes and defense enterprises managed to stay afloat and retain highly qualified personnel. Today, India and China have been going the same way for more than a year now - they are trying not to acquire equipment in finished form abroad, but to either go to licensed production, or create joint samples of VVST, or simply copy them and start production at their own enterprises. .
Purchase class Mistral helicopter carriers.
Until now, all attempts to sell these ships on the world market have been unsuccessful. France, having built 2 ships for its Navy, was forced to stop their construction, and put this ship as a tender for a competition in Australia, when Australia decided to choose the type of ship for its landing forces. Canberra firmly insisted that both ships be built at Australian shipyards, while Paris was inferior to foreign colleagues only one ship - the second was to be built in France. The main reason for the failure of the Australian fleet from "Mistral" in favor of his Spanish rival, the unresolved differences over the place of construction of the two ships became. Secondly, Australians rated Mistral as "too complex a ship, having certain problems with seaworthiness and too expensive." The Mistral does not carry any unique equipment or unique weapons that Russia could not independently produce.
Technical characteristics of the helicopter carrier class Mistral.
It has a standard displacement of 156,5 th. Tons, full - 21,3 th. Tons. With dock filled - 32,3 ths. Tons. Its length is 199 meters, width is 32 meters, draft is 6,2 meters. Full speed - knot 18,8. Sailing range - to 19,8 thousand miles.
The helicopter group of the ship includes 16 vehicles (8 airborne and 8 combat assault helicopters). At the same time, 6 helicopters can be placed on the takeoff deck.
In addition, the ship is capable of carrying four landing craft or two hovercraft, up to 13 main battle tanks or up to 70 vehicles, and also up to 470 landing troops (briefly 900). On board the "Mistral" equipped command center area 850 square. m, which can work up to 200 people. It is well equipped and allows the use of the Mistral to control various types and scale operations of interspecific groups of troops (forces), including those carried out in an autonomous mode; the actions of a squadron, flotilla or fleet.
In addition, the ship has a hospital for 69 beds (their number can be increased, but only slightly), two operating rooms and an X-ray room. In Mistral interesting, above all, the power unit. The French have always been strong in creating fuel efficient engines. A distinctive feature of the propulsion installation is the absence of bulky propeller shafts, since the two propellers are located in special swiveling gondolas - the rotation range is 360 degrees. This design of the main propulsion makes the ship more maneuverable, which is especially important when moving near the coast.
True, it is unclear how the abortion HEDs will work again if they fail without the use of a dock? And a ship without movement is no longer a ship, but a simple target. The only advantage of the French ship is its cruising range.
Mistral is designed to transport troops and cargo, landing, can be used as a command ship. Currently, the French Navy has two ships of this type - the Mistral L.9013 and Tonnerre L.9014. These are the largest ships after the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle.
The technical characteristics of the assault landing helicopter carriers of the Juan Carlos I class, or Australians of the Canberra class and Adelaide of the same type, are planned to be built for the Australian Navy by the 2013 and 2015 years. In fact, this is an amphibious assault landing ship, the distinctive feature of which is solid flight deck with a bow ramp to ensure takeoff of aircraft with a shortened takeoff and vertical landing.In addition to twelve helicopters, it also provides for the basing of up to six tactical fighter jets - in our case could be MIG-29K. A ship may be used as a replacement carrier in carrying out its maintenance in dry dock.
It has a length of 230,82 m, maximum width - 32 m, maximum displacement - 27563 t and draft - 6 m. The ship has a maximum speed of up to 21 knot (39 km / h) and provides transportation of equipment and personnel at a distance of 9000 sea miles (16000 km) with a speed of 15 knots (28 km / h). The crew of the vessel consists of a 243 man of permanent staff.
The ship can also transport paratroopers with outfit to 902 and up to 46 of Leopard main battle tanks in the interior.
Therefore, it would be more profitable for Russia to acquire the Spanish landing helicopter Juan Carlos I
In the Russian-French Mistral deal, only the benefit to France is clearly visible. Sarkozy is using the Mistral deal as a bait to establish a wider spectrum of business ties with Russia. With this deal, Sarkozy wants to obtain guarantees for the business contacts of the French business with Russia. For example, GDF Suez will receive a 9% stake in Nord Stream. President Sarkozy confirmed that negotiations are underway to sell Russia four Mistral-class amphibious assault ships. Mistral is a helicopter carrier that we will build for Russia without military equipment, "if they are sold, they will be deprived of electronic and computer systems. It is not clear how you can sell Mistral without modern technology why you need it then."
Official Moscow defined this condition as one of the key parameters of the deal in question. In addition, for France, this is primarily a huge sales market, and the sale of Mistral will save the shipyard in Saint-Nazaire on the Atlantic coast from bankruptcy. In case of signing such a contract, the French industry will be provided for several years. The command of the French Navy emphasized the fact that, thanks to the optimization of expenses for various items, the introduction of innovative engineering solutions and the sectional construction of ships of this type, not only the construction time of the series was reduced, but also the program total costs were reduced by almost 30%.
In Western shipbuilding, there has long been a tendency to use civilian technology in military shipbuilding; this makes it cheaper to build ships and use unified equipment on warships and civilian ships. But all this unification is not the best effect on the survivability of the ship; Although Russian ships may be more expensive, since such a deep unification of equipment with the civilian fleet is not used (and rightly so), they only benefit from this in reliability, survivability and other important characteristics. Unfortunately, these requirements are mutually exclusive: you want cheaper and easier - get one, you want to ensure combat stability - get another. Warships and built for the conduct of hostilities, and not for pleasure trips on a large barrier reef or the Caribbean Sea. Only about this now began to forget. And this is particularly true of Western companies, for whom the issue of low prices comes out on top.
Prospective troubles of Russia. As part of the Russian Navy, the Mistral-class helicopter-carrying docking ship, if purchased from France, will be used only as a command and control ship, the military department considers the landing function of the ship as secondary to the universal ships. The Russians are forced to buy this ship. 450 million euros, which we have to pay for the purchase of the lead ship and about the same amount that we have to pay for the license to produce each next ship, give us a total of almost a billion euros, which we actually have to give to France.
The ship for Russia will be built according to civil standards - without weapons and radar. But if there is a sense of buying a series, then you need to buy the first one that is already ready. The initial official position of Russia is this: we are buying one ship, we are building three others on the territory of our country. The construction of large vessels is also jobs and support for the military-industrial complex. For Russian shipbuilders, this is also an additional opportunity to master new European technologies. But during the negotiations, Russia retreated from the plan. French President Sarkozy proposed that only two ships could be built in Russia. “Two and two - that was a reasonable agreement,” he remarked, implying that two Mistrals would be removed from the stocks in France, and two more in Russia.
Construction Mistral will be engaged in the company STX France and DCNS. Naval experts grinned at the phrase of the head of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov, “According to the Defense Ministry, Mistral consumes 2 - 3 times less fuel than our landing craft! Did the French make a global breakthrough in ship energy? Do they have the power plant efficiency in 2 - 3 times higher than that of ships of all other countries? It becomes clear what "competent" specialists are sitting in our beloved Ministry of Defense!
Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Makarov believes that Russia can purchase one French helicopter carrier plus technologies for its production. "We do not have ships of this class. Our large landing ships somewhere in 3-4 are smaller than Mistral. This is not only a landing ship - its multifunctionality is obvious: it is a helicopter carrier, a staff ship, a landing ship, and a hospital, and just a transport ship, and it is very easy to impart any new function in the shortest possible time. In addition, as part of the Navy, Mistral will be engaged in transporting people and cargo, fighting submarines and saving people in emergency situations " interv TV channel "Russia Today". The Russian Navy intends to use the Mistral, in the case of its purchase from France, as a command ship. The people are laughing! To buy the Mistral, as a control ship (and even more so four ships in the end), as an auxiliary fleet - this is taxpayer money to the wind! In this case, the landing function of the ship is regarded as secondary. The fact is that the Russian ships carry out the landing of troops in any situation under any conditions with a direct approach to the coastline and on their own, the Mistral is exclusively a transfer of equipment. These ships are used in essence as vehicles for the delivery of amphibious vehicles, but they are not such amphibious vehicles.
Why does Russia buy helicopter carriers? Much more important is the motives - why and why Russia buys helicopter carriers, and why France - a member of NATO - does not just agree to such a deal, but practically pushes Russia to buy. It is pointless to buy a heavy helicopter carrier landing craft in France (21 thous. Tons of displacement) for the current RF. Such a large amphibious assault ship is needed to conduct amphibious assault landings in countries far from Russia. And in order to cover such a large ship, an escort is needed - a cruiser, a pair of destroyers, and an aircraft carrier (there is no one in the Russian Federation). In the event of a big war, this “Mistral” in the Russian Navy is simply becoming a big target. It has long been clear to everyone that they will not be able to throw their Marines to the distant shores of the Russian Federation soon, in all fleets only by a brigade of marines.
A serious drawback of these ships is weak armament, which does not provide reliable self-defense against any serious threats (RCC, torpedoes, combat swimmers, saboteurs), but this deficiency can be corrected by re-equipment by domestic ship weapons systems. The Mistral cannot carry out the landing of an amphibious assault force on an unequipped coast alone, only with the help of tank landing ponds. Since 50, the procedure is long and complicated: filling the dock with water and taking out the scows from it takes several hours. Immediately they cannot deliver all the equipment to the water's edge. Need to do some flights. The whole process of landing takes a lot of time. During this procedure, “Mistral” with a filled dock camera is quite vulnerable. However, paratroopers are delivered by helicopters to the shore quickly. But ... without heavy weapons and armored vehicles. The main "Mistral" does not fit today in the concept of combat use of the Russian marines. Having received such a ship, our fleet will not be able to carry out those amphibious assault operations that have been practiced for decades, or at least will not receive substantial assistance from it for carrying out such operations. The Mistral helicopter carrier is not suitable for landing operations and will be difficult to adapt for Russian equipment. This ship assumes NATO equipment ", without modern equipment. The product is purchased in the configuration:" empty box + chassis ", but our shipbuilders can also weld an empty case. It is difficult to imagine a situation when the French will build a case It is difficult to fit to the case of a completely alien project with certain overall characteristics, Russian armament, electrical equipment and other technological components. For this, at least, it is necessary that French ry built a ship with our shipbuilders.
An additional reason for which the ship is not needed, Russian helicopters in the French hangars and elevators will not squeeze. The experience has already been. When the Mistral came to St. Petersburg, the Russian Ka-52 and Ka-27 helicopters successfully landed on its deck, but later it turned out that domestic helicopters did not fit the elevator in height, so they could not be lowered into the helicopter hangar. A small embarrassment quickly "hushed up." So now we don’t need the Mistral, maybe in 15-20 maybe in years it will be necessary - but let's hope that by that time Russia will still be able to do without it.
The Russian Navy needs an UDK with a displacement of 28000 tons, with a springboard and an aerofinisher, suitable for 4-6 MiG-29K bases. More would have approached the Spanish Juan Carlos I having a bow springboard to ensure the take-off of aircraft with a short take-off and vertical landing. The French can afford to build cheap Mistral-type helicopter carriers. Russia needs an amphibious assault ship of the ocean zone with a good air defense of its own, including that provided by deck fighters. Russia is buying an absolutely useless ship that does not fit into the composition of the Navy under any sauce, without a self-defense weapon, without escort ships and without the presence of the marines themselves. The only thing Mistral can do is arrange cruises for the Minister of Defense, the chief of the General Staff of the Defense Ministry and their confidants, the Commander-in-Chief and the leadership of the Navy.
Many defense companies are not yet ready for mass production of high-tech weapons systems. According to Vladislav Putilin (Deputy Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) of the Russian Federation), only 36% of strategic enterprises are financially healthy, and 25% are on the verge of bankruptcy. The Russian defense-industrial complex includes 948 of strategic enterprises and organizations covered by the provisions of paragraph 5 of Chapter IX of the Federal Law “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)”, which provide for special rules of bankruptcy. Currently, bankruptcy proceedings have been instituted against 44.
According to the Federal Tax Service of Russia, 170 strategic enterprises and organizations of the military-industrial complex have signs of bankruptcy. Moreover, in relation to 150 of strategic enterprises and organizations, the tax authorities have already issued orders for the recovery of debts from their property, which are aimed at enforcement by bailiffs. Additional problems of the defense industry created and delayed transfer of funds for state defense orders. As a sample, we will analyze the enterprises of the aircraft industry and armored engineering.
In recent years, the defense industry has managed to make very big debts.
In the aircraft industry: RAC "MiG" - 44 billion rubles., MMP them. V.Chernysheva - 22 billion, NPK Irkut, Sukhoi company - about 30 billion. And in the armored mechanical engineering - for example, FSUE "Omsk Transport Engineering Plant" produces T-80U and T-80UK tanks. The company's payables are 1,5 billion rubles. In 2008, a three-year contract was signed between the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and OAO NPK Uralvagonzavod for the purchase of 189 tanks (for 63 tanks per year). In 2010, the Russian Ministry of Defense planned to acquire the 261 new tank T-90, which is produced by JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod. If the order for the purchase of tanks for 18 billion rubles. nevertheless realized, the plant will have a chance to pay off its debts - 61 billion rubles.
Despite the fact that in recent years Russia has been able to partially regain lost positions in the global arms trade, success cannot be overestimated. After all, the basis of crisis phenomena in the field of military-technical cooperation is not only and not so much the imperfection of public administration (although this is also important), as well as the problems of manufacturers of military hardware. For many military technologies, Russia is still at the level of the 1970 – 1980s. The state of defense enterprises and their substantial technological dependence on foreign suppliers remain critical.
Thus, compared with the 1992 year, the production of military aircraft decreased by 17 times, military helicopters - by 5, aircraft missiles - by 23, and ammunition - by more than 100 times. The decline in the quality of military products (MPPs) is alarming. The cost of eliminating defects in the course of production, testing and operation of security products reaches 50% of the total cost of its manufacture. While in economically developed countries this indicator does not exceed 20%. The main reason is the deterioration of the main equipment, which has reached 75%, and an extremely low level of re-equipment: the rate of equipment renewal is no more than 1% per year with the minimum required need of 8 – 10%.
In recent years, the decline in the quality of drug products and the increasing incidence of non-compliance with contractual obligations by Russian military-technical cooperation subjects, combined with an unjustified increase in the price of military hardware, have become noticeably reflected in relations in the military-technical cooperation field, with traditional Russian buyers of medical equipment (primarily with India and China) and, as a result, on the volumes of deliveries. The enterprises of the defense industry complex do not fully cope with the fulfillment of the concluded contracts. Some foreign customers have to stand in line for Russian weapons. However, it is not yet entirely clear how to keep the price of 2011 of the year for the entire range of military equipment that the military are going to buy from industry, up to 2020 of the year. For some reason, the deflators included in the budget always turn out to be less than the real increase in inflation and the increase in the cost of materials and components for the final product.
As a result, after five years, all weapons programs are unbalanced, and the amount of money lost and, therefore, the equipment that has not been received by the troops reaches 30 – 50%. Comparison of sales of defense products to export with purchases of defense products in the interests of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation showed that for many years, sales of weapons and military equipment (CWT) to foreign countries exceeded domestic purchases and only in recent years there has been a tendency to increase domestic demand.
And while in 2000 – 2003, Russia's military spending was of the order of 30 – 32% of the MPP export volume, then in 2004 – 2005 years they became comparable, and with 2006, they exceeded export volumes, making 2006% in 114,6, in 2007, 132,6%. These data reflect not only the improvement in the economic situation in the country observed in the last five to six years, but also a change in the attitude of the state to the state of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, requiring re-equipment and modernization.
The federal budget for 2009 – 2011 has provided for a substantial increase in the volume of purchases of defense products, despite the financial crisis. The degradation of the science and technology complex has led to the fact that, despite the growth of the defense state order, the production of a new generation of weapons is in no way possible to start. The current situation poses a threat to Russia's national security.
According to Sergey Rogov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences, leading Western countries have R & D expenditures at 2 – 3% of GDP, including at the USA 2,7%, and at countries such as Japan, Sweden, Israel reach 3,5– 4,5% of GDP. Expenditures on research and development in China (1,7% of GDP) are increasing at a very high rate. In the next decade, China is expected to catch up with the United States in terms of expenditure on science. R & D spending in India is also rising rapidly. By 2012, they will reach 2% of GDP. The European Union has set a goal to increase R & D expenditures to 3% of GDP. The share of Russian spending on defense R & D is 0,6% of GDP, and civil science is 0,4%. For comparison: in the last years of the USSR, total R & D expenditures amounted to 3,6 – 4,7% of GDP. Unfortunately, in Russia, the share of total expenditure on basic research is only 0,16% of GDP.
In developed countries, the cost of basic research is 0,5 – 0,6% of GDP. In countries - the leaders of world science science policy has two sides. On the one hand, the state directly funds research, and on the other hand, it stimulates research and development expenditures on the private sector through tax measures. In Russia, according to the OECD, the tax system does not encourage, but infringe upon research and development expenses. The cost of Russian business in R & D is 7 – 10 times less than in developed countries. Only three Russian companies are among the largest 1000 companies in the world in terms of R & D costs.
The surprise is that the satisfaction of the requests of Rosoboronexport takes precedence over the needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In Russia there is an acute question: what is more important for the state - orders of the Ministry of Defense or Rosoboronexport? It seems that Rosoboronexport contracts are more important because domestic prices are inferior to export ones. That is why Uralvagonzavod cannot start production of the new T-95 tank and the tank support combat vehicle (BMPT).
Autonomy remains the main element of the Russian defense doctrine. One of the main goals of the implementation of the new policy for the defense industrial complex is to “prevent the critical dependence of the activities of the defense-industrial complex on the supply of components and materials of foreign manufacture”. The aspirations of the heads of defense enterprises are fully reflected: the state will facilitate the acquisition of unique equipment and its leasing to Russian defense industry specialists. Problems of development of the domestic electronic component base, as well as radio electronics, special metallurgy and low-tonnage chemistry, will be solved within the framework of federal target programs and private-state partnership.
The defense management system in Russia has already been reviewed six times. As a result, the level of this administration fell from the deputy chairman of the government of the Russian Federation to the head of the department of the Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation. The activities of various structures involved in the development of various types of military products are not coordinated with the Federal Law No. 26-ФЗ “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)” of 2002 September 127.
This law softened the requirements for strategic defense enterprises in terms of signs of insolvency and established an enlarged list of measures aimed at preventing their bankruptcy. However, this law also requires a number of changes. This particularly applies to the procedure for granting state guarantees for the obligations of strategic enterprises during their financial recovery, limiting the rights of creditors to dispose of the debtor’s property, the rights of the owner of mobilization (reserve) production facilities.
It is proposed that the amended law spells out the right to initiate bankruptcy of a strategic enterprise only to the Government of the Russian Federation or to initiate a bankruptcy case after the strategic status has been removed from the enterprise.
An unsuccessful policy has also developed in the field of pricing for defense products. Now the prices for military products are approved by the customer in accordance with departmental standards based on cost calculations submitted by the lead executor of the order. Often, the approved prices for OPK products do not correspond to the growth of tariffs of natural monopolies. As a result, prices for military products are constantly growing. Therefore, despite the annual increase in spending on the state defense order, there is not enough money to buy new modern weapons.
There is still no solution to such a major problem for the defense industry as taxation. Land tax, property tax, and other types of taxes that strategic defense enterprises today are obliged to pay, have become one of the main brakes on its reform. For many years, managers of defense enterprises have been striving to abolish value-added tax from advance payments, which are carried out under contracts within the framework of the state defense order, according to the profits of defense enterprises.
Now it is necessary to revise the goals and objectives of the weapons complex. It is necessary to clearly understand with whom we are going to fight, what types of weapons are needed for this and what kind of state defense order should be accordingly. If there is no imputed defense order, then there will be no defense industry. Industry cannot be mothballed and left until better times. The equipment will become obsolete morally and physically, it will be taken away, there will be no specialists. Therefore, restoring a preserved food is much more expensive than building a new one at a new place. While this understanding is not, the situation will only worsen.
Also 2010 year was distinguished by another sensational event. It turned out that business on orders and medals is flourishing, under the auspices of the state. An unprecedented Internet service appeared in the Russian sector of the World Wide Web: now any citizen of Russia and even a foreigner who has enough money can order a vending Russian award according to the “Catalog of departmental and public awards”. During 15-20 days, having paid a certain amount, the amateur “tsatsek” will receive by mail a departmental medal or an order with a blank ID. If desired, and the availability of additional funds, the award will be presented in a festive atmosphere in any prestigious institution in Moscow with the appropriate speeches and a banquet. In the catalog there are more than 23000 departmental and public orders, medals, fracuency marks. The price list is published at zasluga.ru. Price range from 1200 to 376000 rubles. - According to our Constitution, Russians have the right to wear awards both of the USSR and Russia. Order of the USSR - 22 names, medals of the USSR - 58. Awards of Russia - 26 orders, 6 insignia, 21 medal. The remaining 22 827 titles awards - from the evil one.
What is happening with the premium Russian system now, you will not find analogues in ours or in the world stories. Frontal and combat awards of the USSR have been devalued. Created private structures for premium business. The catalog of departmental and public awards has been released. And it seems that it is beneficial to many. Russian government - because less budget spending. Business, because if you want to build relationships, pay for awarding the right person with a public medal or medal, and it's done. If we talk about a purely external side, then the tinsel of brilliant new-fashioned handicrafts eclipsed them somewhat. But most importantly, the reward loses its original meaning. It is now often received not for courage and valor, but, indeed, for money or for connections in the highest echelons of power and business.
I will give a few quotations for other awards. Representatives of show business can order in the Ministry of Defense a departmental medal No.021 / MO “Major General Alexander Alexandrov” for 4000 rubles. Anyone who is interested in interacting with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it is useful to receive the public medal of MDV No.126 / MVD “For merits in management activities” worth 4000 rubles or the public order “For Merit” No.108 / MVD, for 3500 rubles.
A huge series of departmental awards has been created, which even a specialist is hard to understand. In the first place are the awards of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: 32 medals, breastplates - 92, simply signs -22, MO public medals - 22. The Main Intelligence Agency (GRU): public medals - 9, public signs - 24. 22, public signs - 18. Air Force: public medals - 27, public signs - 19. Navy: public orders - 3, public medals - 183, public signs - 583. Amazingly, law enforcement and special services of Russia “do not notice” that all these catalog awards are in free circulation and can be bought all over Russia in the stores of Splav, the Moscow Award Plant, the Moscow Mint, and now on the Internet . In general, in the award system of Russia it is necessary to bring at least an elementary order.