Military Review

The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 4

43
Fight in the area of ​​Prokhorovka


12 July 1943 of the year on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge in the Voronezh Front, in the vicinity of the Prokhorovka Station and the Oktyabrsky State Farm, was one of the largest battles of armored forces in the world stories. In a fierce battle, the elite tank Unions of the German Empire and Soviet Guards. Once again, the Russians and Germans showed their highest fighting qualities.

The 5 Guards and 5 Guards Tank armies that arrived from the reserve of the Stavka could be used in several ways. To divide the army into parts and to plug up the breakthroughs in the front line; in full force to include in the third army defensive line or to use for a strong counterattack. The counter-strike was preferable, since it allowed defeating a part of the enemy's strike force (with success and all), already weakened by previous stubborn battles with parts of the 6 Guards and 1 Tank armies. The idea of ​​a counterblow was supported by the representative of the Headquarters A. M. Vasilevsky.

Planning a counterattack began around July 9 1943. According to the original plan, the army of Rotmistrov was to go on the offensive from the line of Vasilyevka, the Komsomolets state farm, Belenikhino. On this site, it was possible to deploy large armored forces and reach the Oboyan highway located in 15-17 km. An auxiliary strike against the 5-th Guards Tank Army should have been organized by the 1-I tank and 6-I Guards armies. With good luck, there was a chance, if not to surround and defeat the shock forces of the German group, then to inflict a serious defeat on it.

However, during the preparation of the strike - 10-11 July 1943, events occurred that seriously changed the situation on the front. The increasing complexity of the situation in the Korochansky direction forced the 5-th Guards Mechanized Corps to separate from the 5 Guards Tank Army and push it into the Korochi area. This weakened the shock power of the army Rotmistrov. Another unpleasant event was the breakthrough of the 2 SS Panzer Corps into the Prokhorovka area and the Germans seized the positions from which they were supposed to strike. However, they did not abandon the counterattack.



It should be noted that the German command had no information about the preparation by the Soviet troops of a serious counterattack. German aviation discovered the concentration of mobile units in the Prokhorovka area, but there was no information about what forces were gathered by the Soviet command. In the context of the offensive, a dense front and fierce fighting, intelligence gathering information in the deep Soviet rear was impossible. The formations of Rotmistrov’s army complied with the radio silence regime and took all possible measures to camouflage and ensure the surprise of the strike. The German troops had already repelled more than one attack from the Soviet tank corps, so it was assumed that the Soviet command pulled up another mobile unit from the reserve. Even in the evening of July 11, the command of the 2nd Panzer Corps did not realize the power of the Soviet troops in front of them. Hausser’s headquarters did not make any assumptions about the upcoming Soviet counterattack. The German plan provided for access to Prokhorovka and a possible transition to defense in anticipation of the Soviet counterattack. However, on July 12, such an attack was not expected, or was not expected, given the counterattacks of the Soviet tank corps in the previous days.

The 2 SS Panzer Corps did not receive serious offensive missions on 12 July. Local problems were solved. So 1-division "Leibshtandart" 11 July took the defile (a narrow passage between natural obstacles) and did not undertake attacks in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive lines. The division held a front approximately 7 km from the river Psel to the railway. By the evening of July 11, as part of the Leibstandard tank regiment, there were 67 vehicles, including the 4 Tiger, and the 10 SAU were in the assault gun battalion. Leibstandart's flanks 2-I Reich and 3-I Tank Panzer Divisions “Dead Head” were offensive, trying to improve their position. In particular, units of the “Dead Head” division expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel River, transferring a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, thereby providing flanking fire on Soviet tanks in the event of an attack through a defile. The division "Reich in the evening of July 11 consisted of 95 tanks and SAUs, the division" Dead Head "- 122 tanks and SAU (including 10" Tigers "). From the southern direction, the 3 tank corps acted on Prokhorovka direction, which had 12 July around 120 vehicles, including the 23 Tiger in the 503 separate heavy tank battalion.

The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 4


Battle

The seizure by German troops of the initial positions for the planned counterstrike seriously complicated its conduct. Therefore, in the morning of July 12, the units of the 9 Guards Airborne Division and the 95 Guards Rifle Division made an attempt to repel the Oktyabrsky State Farm. The attack began in the early morning, and the battle went on for about three hours. Artillery training was not carried out, they took care of the ammunition for the counterattack itself. But it was not possible to repel the state farm with the help of fire-fighting rifle units. The SS met Guardsmen with concentrated fire and repelled the attack.

The artillery training of the army, which was assigned to 8.00, was carried out at the Vassilyevka line - the Komsomolets state farm - Ivanovo settlement - Belenihino, then the artillery carried fire into the depths of the German order. Similar objectives had the Soviet assault and bomber aircraft. As a result, the Leibstandard’s front line of defense, where the artillery was concentrated, was not affected by the Soviet artillery and air strikes. In addition, in the morning, aviation operations were hampered by bad weather conditions.

In 8.30, after a volley of Guards mortars, tankers attacked. The 29 tank corps of Ivan Kirichenko went on the offensive in two echelons along the railway. The corps included more than 200 tanks and SPGs. In the first echelon, the 32 Tank Brigade of Colonel A. A. Linev (64 tank), the 25 Tank Brigade of Colonel N. K. Volodin (58 tanks) and the 1446 self-propelled artillery regiment (20 Su-76 SU-122). In the second echelon: 31-I tank brigade of Colonel S.F. Moiseyev (70 tanks) and 53-I motorized rifle brigade Lieutenant-Colonel N. P. Lipicheva. On the right flank of the 29 Corps, between Psel and Oktyabrsky State Farm, Boris Bakharov’s 18 Tank Corps attacked. The case was composed of about 150 machines. The 18 tank corps was built in three echelons. The first went: 181-I tank squad Lt. Col. V.A Puzyrev (44 tank), 170-I tank squad Lt. Col. V. D. Tarasov VD (39 tanks) and 36-th Guards separate heavy tank regiment of the breakthrough ( his weapons were 20 tanks Mk IV "Churchill"). In the second echelon - the 32-I motorized rifle brigade of Colonel I. A. Stukov; in the third, the 110 tank tank brigade of lieutenant colonel M. G. Khlyupin (45 tanks). Thus, in the first echelon, they launched 4 tank brigades, one regiment of heavy tanks and an ACS regiment, about 250 machines in total.



The area of ​​the farm "October" was supposed to fall into the "ticks". They were formed by the machines of the 181-th tank brigade and the 36-th separate regiment - on the one hand, on the other - the 32-th brigade, the 1446-th SAU and 170-th tank brigade. The rifle formations of the 33 Guards Rifle Corps of the 5 Guards Army followed them. It was believed that the 181-I tank brigade, advancing along the river, would not meet with serious resistance. Along the railway, the 29-I tank brigade had to pave the way for the main forces of the 32 corps. To support their success were units of the 9-th Guards Airborne Division and the 42-th Guards Rifle Division.

The complete surprise of the attack of the tank corps of the army of Rotmistrov could not be achieved. German aviation spotted in the morning the movement of large masses of tanks, and reported parts of the SS. The command of the 2 corps could no longer radically change its position, but still they had time to come to a certain degree of readiness to repel the impact of the formation.


Padded T-70 and BA-64. Prokhorov for example. 12 – 13 July 1943

The deep beam in front of the Oktyabrsky forced the 170 tank tank brigade of the 18 tank corps to be deployed for the 32 brigade of the 29 tank corps. As a result, the first echelon of the 18 corps was reduced to one brigade. Tanks of only two brigades - 32 and 181 (about 115 machines) entered the Prokhorov field (from the river Psel to the railway). The German anti-tank defense met Soviet tanks with heavy fire, the tanks were out of action one by one. Only one battalion of the 32 Brigade could, under the cover of a forest belt, walk along the railway to the Komsomolets state farm. The further way was blocking the anti-tank ditch. Entering the second echelon into battle was delayed - he entered the battle only in 9.30 - 10.00, when a significant part of the first echelon armored vehicles was knocked out. Another brigade of the 29 tank corps, the 25 brigade of Volodin, which was advancing through Sentry, south of the railroad, faced a battalion of Leibstandard assault guns. 10.30 25 Brigade lost more than half of the machines - only 21 T-34 and T-70 remained. Kompolka Volodin was wounded and sent to hospital. The results of the first two - two and a half hours of the battle were sad - three tank brigades and a regiment of SAU lost more than half of the combat units.


Soviet self-propelled howitzer SU-122 in the Prohorov bridgehead area. 14 July 1943

Similarly, events developed in the offensive line of the Bakharov corps: the 181 brigade entered into battle after the 170 brigade lost more than half of the tanks to the 12.00. But at the cost of great losses, the 181 I tank crew made its way to the Oktyabrsky state farm. Following the tank crews were the arrows of the 42 th Guards Rifle Division, so despite the fierce battle, when the state farm passed from hand to hand several times, this success was consolidated. In 14.00, the 18 Corps resumed its offensive by launching the third echelon, the 110 Tank Brigade. Bakharov's corpus somewhat scored the direction of the main attack, now advancing close to the floodplain of Psёl. The Soviet tankers overcame here the defense of one of the regiments of the division "Dead Head", heavy tanks "Leibstandard." The 181-I and 170-I brigade advanced here 6 km. “Leibshtandart” managed to stabilize the situation only with the help of counterattacks of its tank regiment. The command of the 18 Corps, under the threat of encirclement, due to the successful attack of the “Dead Head” division on the bridgehead on p. Psel pulled brigade back. By the evening of the corps 5-th Guards Tank Army went on the defensive.


T-34 tanks, shot down during the Soviet counteroffensive under Prokhorovka.

The 2 Guards Tank Corps of Burdeyno also participated in the counterstrike. He launched an offensive on 11.15 by two tank brigades (95 vehicles). Corps attacks were repelled by the Reich division. The 2 Panzer Division for some time was constrained by these attacks, but in the second half of the day it launched a counter-offensive in the direction of the Watchdog. The role of Popov's 2 tank corps in the battle was small. After the previous intense battles, only about fifty machines remained in it, and its attack, which began after 19.00 hours, was not successful.

This counter strike 5-th Guards Tank Army led to serious losses in the Soviet corps. The 29 Corps Kirichenko lost up to 77% of the combat units participating in the attack (170 tanks and ACS), the 18 Corps of Bakharov - 56% machines (84 tanks). The mobile units operating in the neighboring areas also suffered heavy losses: the 2 Guards Tank Corps of Burdeynoy - 39% of the counter strike (54 vehicles); The Popova 2 tank corps is a 22 tank (almost half of the vehicles).


German T-34 division "Das Reich", lined with the calculation of the gun sergeant Kurnosova. Prokhorov for example. 14 – 15 July 1943

July 12 battle was not only in the direction of Prokhorov. The Soviet command set the task of Xnumx of Zhadov's Guards Army to destroy the bridgehead seized by German troops on the northern shore of Psel. The forces of the “Dead Head” division were supposed to be shackled by combat, and after the successful offensive of the army of Rotmistrov, to be liquidated. However, the forces of the 5 Guards Army in the morning of July 5 were only in the process of concentration. In the morning, on the perimeter of the bridgehead occupied by the SS, there were only units of the 12 Guards Rifle Division, which was subordinated to Zhadov's army. The division participated in the Battle of Kursk from the first day of the battle and was drained of blood, having by the end of July 52 only 11 thousand people. In the morning of July 3,3, the 12-I Guards Rifle Division was to turn in this direction, and the 95-I Guards Airborne Division was approaching the battlefield.

The German command preempted the Soviet strike. The tanks of the “Dead Head” 3 Tank Division were able to concentrate on the bridgehead. At 6 one o'clock in the morning the Germans launched an offensive. By the offensive and connected the connection 11-th tank division. The positions of the weakened 52 Guards Rifle Division were easily cracked, and the SS men attacked the units of the 95 Guards Rifle Division. In the middle of the day, the paratroopers joined the battle with a “dead head”. To block the offensive of the German division attracted artillery 5-th Guards Army.

The counter-strike of the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area did not yield the expected results. The 2 SS Panzer Corps was not crushed and retained combat capability. However, this battle was one of the last in the course of the Kursk defensive operation. Already on July 12, the advance of the Western and Bryansk fronts began on the northern face of the Kursk salient. German 9-I army and 2-I tank army went on the defensive. The further advance of the 4 Tank Army of the Goth and the Kempf group on the Kursk direction became meaningless. Having advanced beyond 5-12 in July to 35 km, Army Group South was forced, remaining on the achieved lines for three more days, to begin withdrawing its forces to its former positions. In the course of the battle of Kursk came a strategic change.


Top armored 6 th hectares. armies that hit 7 enemy tanks.

Fighting on Belgorod direction

In this direction, the 7-I Guards Army of Mikhail Shumilov held the defense. It consisted of 24-th and 25-th Guards Rifle Corps: combining 15-th, 36-th, 72-th, 73-th, 78-th and 81-th guards rifle division. The river Seversky Donets and the railway embankment strengthened the defense of the army.

On July 5, German troops on the Belgorod-Grafov line, three infantry and three tank divisions of the Kempf group, with the support of aviation, began to force the Seversky Donets. In the afternoon, German tanks launched an attack on the Razumnoe, Krutoy Log section in the east and northeast directions. In the area of ​​Krutoy Log, there was an anti-tank stronghold, which until the end of the day held back the enemy onslaught, having beaten off two major attacks. 26 of German tanks was destroyed, some of them exploded on minefields.


German motorized part in the offensive in the area of ​​Belgorod.

On July 6, the German command continued the offensive in the northeast direction. The command of the front strengthened the army of Shumilov with several infantry divisions. The army also received the 31 th anti-tank brigade and the 114 th Guards anti-tank artillery regiment. The 7 and 6 junction of the Guards armies were reinforced with separate battalions of anti-tank rifles with the 131 and 132. The most persistent battles were in the Yastrebovo area, where the enemy attacked with a group of up to 70 tanks. The blow of the enemy took over the 1849-th IPTAP. By the end of the day, the artillery regiment beat off four major enemy attacks, knocking out 32 tanks and assault guns. In order to strengthen its defense, 1853-th IPTAP was advanced, it was put on the second echelon.

By July 7, the German command pulled up artillery, and in the morning strong artillery preparation began, at the same time German aircraft delivered strikes. After a powerful air raid and artillery preparation, tank units began to attack. The Germans attacked in two directions: an armored group of 100 machines attacked along the Reasonable River; another strike group of numbers up to 100 tanks struck a frontal strike from the height of 207,9 in the direction of Myasoedovo. The infantry could not bear the strike and retreated from Yastrebovo, leaving the artillery regiments uncovered. The leaked German infantry began to bombard the flanks and rear of the artillery positions. The gunners had to hard, repelling at the same time attacks of enemy tanks and infantry. However, a breakthrough on the left flank was stopped by the gunners of the 1853-I IPTAP standing in the second echelon. In addition, the units of the 94 Guards Rifle Division had approached. But in the evening the positions of the infantry were again processed by German artillery and aircraft. Arrows left Yastrebovo and Sevryukovo. The artillery regiments, which had already suffered heavy losses in the daytime battle, could not hold back the onslaught of German tanks and infantry, and withdrew with the battle, taking all the weapons, including the damaged ones.


German tanks in the battle for der. Maksimovka. Belgorod direction.

8-10 July, the German forces did not carry out active operations, the case was limited to local fights. However, on the night of July 11, the enemy struck a strong blow from the area of ​​Melekhovo to the north and north-west, trying to break through to the Prokhorovka area. The units of the 9 th Guards and 305 th rifle divisions that held the defense in this direction did not withstand a powerful strike, and retreated. From the reserve Rates for strengthening the defense in this direction have transferred the 10-th anti-tank artillery brigade. Also pulled 1510 th IPTAP and a separate battalion of anti-tank guns. The 35 units of the Guards Rifle Corps and artillery units kept the enemy offensive.


Repairmen restore the wrecked tank. Field repair team of Lieutenant Schukin. July 1943

14 – 15 July, the German troops conducted the last major offensive on the south face of the Kursk bulge. 4-I tank army and the group "Kempf" delivered converging strikes on Shakhovo from the areas of Ozerovsky and Shchelokovo, in order to surround and destroy the Soviet troops defending in the triangle Teterevino, Druzhny, Shchelokovo. Here the defense was held by units of the 48 Infantry Corps of the 69 Army and the 2 Guards Tank Corps. German troops were able to surround some Soviet units. This was the last success of Army Group South in the Battle of Kursk. Great losses were avoided. Soviet troops retained most of the previously occupied positions, and even counterattacked (parts of the 2 Guards Corps of Burdein). The Germans could not destroy the surrounded Soviet units, they went to the location of their troops. The offensive of the German troops on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was completed, under the cover of strong rear guards, the main forces of Army Group South began to retreat to their initial positions.



Brief summary of the defensive battle

- Operation "Citadel" ended in failure of both German army groups - "Center" and "South." On the north face, the Germans switched to defense on July 12, when the forces of the Western and Bryansk fronts launched the Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov). The failure of the 9 of the German army Model made senseless the continuation of the 4 tank army's attack on Kursk. The last offensive operation was carried out by the 4 Tank Army and the Kempf group 14 – 15 on July 1943. Then the command of Army Group "South" began to withdraw troops. The reserve 24 tank corps and the SS 2 tank corps withdrawn from the Kursk battle were sent to repel the attack of the Southern front on Mius and the South-West front strike (Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive).

- The troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts, with the support of reserves. The stakes withstood the enemy strike. In the Battle of Kursk there was a turning point. The Red Army launched an offensive - on July 12 on the Oryol sector, on August 3 on the Belgorod-Kharkov one. The victory in the Battle of Kursk marked the final transition of the strategic initiative in the war to the USSR. The battle was the last attempt of the German military-political leadership to reverse the situation on the Eastern Front in their favor. As a result, the Battle of Kursk became a decisive turning point in the Great Patriotic War.

- The central front of 5-11 July lost 33,8 thousand people, 9-i Model Army - more than 20 thousand people. Voronezh and Steppe Fronts lost over the period from 5 to 23 July 1943 g. - 143,9 thousand people.

- The hope of the German command toweapon"Did not justify itself. The Soviet troops had enough money - anti-tank artillery, corps, army and artillery Stakes, minefields, tanks to stop and destroy the German "miracle tanks". The hope of exhaustion of the forces of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk was not justified. In the direction of Oryol, Soviet troops launched an offensive on July 12 1943. But the Voronezh Front regained strength by the beginning of August and launched an offensive on the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.

- The experience of “deliberate defense” in the Battle of Kursk shows that any defense is flawed. The Soviet command, thanks to an operational pause of several months, was able to create a powerful defense, to form large reserves. But the German assault groups, skillfully interacting with aviation, artillery, tanks and infantry, broke through the defensive orders of the Soviet armies. Concentration of forces in a narrow area gave good results. This is also evidenced by losses, when Soviet troops, defending in strong positions, lost more people and equipment than the enemy.

Sources:
Vasilevsky A. M. The Matter of a Life // http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/vasilevsky/index.html
Isaev A. Antisuvorov. Ten myths of the Second World War. M., 2006.
Isaev A. Liberation 1943. "From Kursk and Orel, the war brought us ...". M., 2013. // http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av09/index.html
Zamulin V. The Forgotten Battle of the Fiery Arc. M., 2009.
Zamulin V. Kursky kink. M. 2007. // http://militera.lib.ru/h/zamulin_vn/index.html
Zhukov G. K. Memories and reflections. T. 2. // http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/zhukov1/index.html
Kursk Battle // http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/history/[email protected]
Kursk Arc, July 5 - August 23 1943. // http://lib.rus.ec/b/224976/read
Manstein E. Lost victories. // http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/manstein/index.html
Oleynikov G.A. Prokhorov battle (July 1943) // http://militera.lib.ru/h/oleinikov/index.html
Captain Peter A. Steel Guard. // http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/rotmistrov2/index.html
Rokossovsky K. K. On the Central Front in the winter and summer of the year 1943. //
http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/files/morf/1968-06_vizh_rokossovsky_centr.pdf
Timokhovich I.V. Soviet aircraft in the Battle of Kursk. // http://militera.lib.ru/h/timohovich/index.html
Author:
Articles from this series:
The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties
The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 3
Great Battle of Kursk: defensive operation of the troops of the Voronezh Front
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 3
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 4
The Great Battle of Kursk: Operation Kutuzov
The Great Battle of Kursk: Operation Kutuzov. Part of 2
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  1. stalkerwalker
    stalkerwalker 15 July 2013 08: 46 New
    +5
    The experience of “deliberate defense” in the Battle of Kursk shows that any defense is flawed.
    As they say, no comment ...
    1. Kars
      Kars 15 July 2013 08: 56 New
      +7
      Quote: stalkerwalker
      The experience of “deliberate defense” in the Battle of Kursk shows that any defense is flawed.
      As they say, no comment ...


      which incidentally completely puts an end to Rezunoid’s theories about the strategic defense of the USSR as a panacea for German aggression.
      1. Uhe
        Uhe 15 July 2013 11: 27 New
        -3
        The cross on the rezunoids puts the official declaration of the United States Roosevelt Ave., made by him, if I’m not mistaken, in the spring of the 41st, in which he clearly and clearly said that the United States will speak on the injured side, that is, in the event of a Soviet attack on Germany, the United States will fight against the USSR and help Germany in every way, and in the event of a German attack on the USSR, the USSR will fight and help. Prior to this, he stated the same thing in private conversations, which was well known to Stalin.

        Anyone who has even a bit of brains and a couple of convolutions will understand that after such a statement, Stalin could not attack Germany first. On the contrary, he made a statement to Shrakh that the USSR fully adheres to the non-aggression pact, although he knew very well about the start of the war on June 22. This promise was intended specifically for the USA. True, the resunoids think that Stalin was simply blind and stupid, but they are resunoids, too;) Stalin outwitted Hitler, who was told about the eternal enemies of the Russian and German peoples - he was accused of. It was the citizens of Hess who assured Hitler not only that they would not attack Germany in the event of war with the USSR until at least 44 years old (this is the reason for the late opening of the second front - the backstage game of England, which Stalin knew very well, by the way), but assured Hitler of the weakness of the Soviet force on the western border. They supplemented this with information through Canaris, who was an English spy. In general, the naglitsa cleverly pushed Hitler, unprepared for war, to attack the USSR, while Stalin wove intrigue and lured the Germans into his networks. It’s only a pity that because of the betrayal of Zhukov, Khrushchev and other persons, we allowed the Germans right up to Moscow despite the heroic defense of most Soviet soldiers and officers, because of which Stalin had to take the highest command and straighten the situation at the front, but this another story :)

        In general, Stalin was a genius, Hitler was an statistician compared to him, and Rezun was an ordinary scoundrel and traitor.
        1. Drosselmeyer
          Drosselmeyer 15 July 2013 13: 37 New
          +3
          Uhe
          Well, besides the theory, you can bring any facts of your statements. For example, how the British through Hess assured Hitler not only that they would not attack Germany in the event of war with the USSR until at least 44 years old, if Hess was arrested and did not go to Germany. In addition, how do you relate to your version the submarine war with Britain, the bombing of Germany, the war in North Africa? And how did the British know about the Red Army grouping on the border?
          And can you read more about Roosevelt’s statement, how will he help Germany (which at that time was at war with Britain) against the USSR?
          1. Bigriver
            Bigriver 16 July 2013 05: 36 New
            +1
            Quote: Drosselmeyer
            .
            And can you read more about Roosevelt’s statement, how will he help Germany (which at that time was at war with Britain) against the USSR?

            Actually, it was not Roosevelt but Senator Harry Truman (future US President).
            And they were not talking about the war, because by his views he was an isolationist.
            But, the latter (isolationism) was a state ideology at that time.
            The words were spoken on June 23, 1941, to the New York Times:
            “If we see that Germany wins, then we should help Russia, and if Russia will win, we should help Germany, and so let them kill as much as possible!”
        2. Massik
          Massik 15 July 2013 17: 36 New
          +1
          Why are the British afraid of Hitler, if they got at least 1/3 of our share of the Germans, they would not last a year.
        3. Max
          Max 15 July 2013 22: 13 New
          +2
          Quote: Uhe
          Stalin intrigued and lured the Germans into his networks. It is only a pity that because of the betrayal of Zhukov, Khrushchev and other persons, we allowed the Germans right up to Moscow

          Generally nonsense ...
        4. Revolver
          Revolver 16 July 2013 06: 06 New
          +1
          Quote: Uhe
          It is only a pity that because of the betrayal of Zhukov, Khrushchev and other persons, we allowed the Germans right up to Moscow

          No, not treachery, but rather blatant incompetence. Stalin would have shot the traitors.
          In America, the Korean Boeing 777 recently lurched into a landing due to the fact that the captain (!) Had never before landed a plane of this type manually, and the automation at the airport that day was turned off for preventive maintenance. In-service training is too expensive.
          And the management of the army, especially the front, will be less responsible than even the largest airliner.
          Well, at least we learned to retreat only to Moscow and the Volga, and not to, say, the Urals. But most importantly, then the teachers arranged such an exam that they themselves did not pass it.
      2. stalkerwalker
        stalkerwalker 15 July 2013 15: 03 New
        +4
        Quote: Kars
        puts an end to Rezunoid’s theories about the strategic defense of the USSR as a panacea

        I have already erased the Claudia, trying to convey this thought to some of the "high school students" of the history of the Great Patriotic War.
        But they don’t hear, they persist. And their main argument is that this cannot be, because it can never be ... laughing
        1. Stas57
          Stas57 15 July 2013 16: 45 New
          +1
          Quote: stalkerwalker
          I have already erased the Claudia, trying to convey this thought to some of the "high school students" of the history of the Great Patriotic War.
          But they don’t hear, they persist. And their main argument is that this cannot be, because it can never be.


          I will quote
          question. and what was Zhukov’s thought about the need for defense connected with?
          With the features of a specific theater of action? After all, is an offensive more profitable?


          answer.It was connected with the receipt of intelligence data, unprecedented in its information content. Having accurate information, at least to the front of the front about the advance of the enemy to defend, yes, it is reasonable.
          Usually, in the absence of such information, giving initiative is simply dangerous. Therefore, having no answer even to the question "where will the adversary strike?" It’s more profitable to attack. Yes, just in case, I’ll clarify: we are talking about the May decisions to switch to deliberate defense.
          http://dr-guillotin.livejournal.com/116443.html
          1. stalkerwalker
            stalkerwalker 16 July 2013 02: 29 New
            +3
            Quote: Stas57
            Therefore, having no answer even to the question "where will the adversary strike?" tread more profitably

            Hi Stas!
            The stump is clear - if you want to keep the situation under control - take the initiative in your own hands.
            1. Stas57
              Stas57 16 July 2013 13: 31 New
              +1
              Hello,
              so that’s one of the features of the 41go initiative of the Germans, where it’s profitable for them to beat,
    2. Kars
      Kars 15 July 2013 08: 57 New
      +2
      ___________
      1. Kars
        Kars 15 July 2013 08: 58 New
        +3
        _________________
      2. Kars
        Kars 15 July 2013 08: 59 New
        +2
        ___________
        1. Kars
          Kars 15 July 2013 09: 09 New
          +1
          ____________
    3. Motors1991
      Motors1991 16 July 2013 14: 05 New
      0
      For Zhukov’s victory under Prokhorovka, he wanted to bring Rotmistrov to justice, you have to have great talent to ruin an entire army in a day. It can be clearly seen from the article that Zhukov fought with Rokossovsky much better than Vasilevsky, Vatutin and Konev, the loss of fronts speaks for They didn’t carry out any unprepared counter-attacks on the Central Front, so they saved their forces as soon as the Germans ran out of steam so they could go on the offensive. It seems to me that if Rokossovsky had organized a counter-attack, then the fate of Voro awaited the Central Front Nezhsky, only the Headquarters of the Second Steppe Front had no reserve and there was nothing to close the hole. The model apparently expected this step from the Russians, saving part of the tank forces. But thank God Zhukov and Rokossovsky had the intelligence and endurance to clutch their teeth to the ground and We can’t intervene with any counter-offensive adventures, so we won the victory on Kursk. In the 70s, my father worked at the mine in the same brigade as the former tanker who participated in the battle of Prokhorovka, so it was a real shock to me when he under ypivshy told that each lined with a German tank, we lost to his ten, this does not want to believe, because officially so all was well.
  2. valokordin
    valokordin 15 July 2013 09: 31 New
    +6
    Now commenting on the battle, they are making a conclusion directly opposite to the conclusions of the Soviet period, on the correctness of defense tactics. Many, even Zhukov, agreed with this. I.V. Stalin doubted the correctness of such tactics, but Zhukov and his entourage managed to convince him of this. Although the assertion that any defense is flawed is wrong. Remember the defense of the Mannerheim Line. Well, everyone imagines himself a strategist seeing the battle from the side.
    1. stalkerwalker
      stalkerwalker 15 July 2013 15: 08 New
      +3
      Quote: valokordin
      Remember the defense of the Mannerheim Line.

      Remember ...
      The defense broke through.
      Losses on both sides are almost comparable.
      One of the reasons why Mannerheim agreed to a cessation of hostilities is the complete depletion of human reserves.
  3. mnn_13
    mnn_13 15 July 2013 09: 54 New
    +3
    Often met in Western sources that the output of the battle in Prokhorovka was predetermined by the actions of the Allies in Italy. This was the reason that the next day the Germans did not continue their offensive. I haven’t read anything about this in Russian and Soviet iztochnik. In this article, this question is also ignored.
    It seems to me that such speculations should not be ignored, since many people are capable of misleading them. It seems that the Germans would have seen everything there well, but the landing in Sicily decided to leave the Battle of Kursk.
    1. Uhe
      Uhe 15 July 2013 11: 35 New
      +5
      Do you think Stalin did not know the date of the Allied landings? ;) A good military leader takes into account all the values ​​in his game, even random ones, and here the whole operation of the allies. Everything was calculated, so the operation was conducted in this way.

      Everything hindered the Germans - both frost and shit, stupid Hitler, and, most importantly, the actual Russian “subhuman” in a compartment with their allies :) True, already in July of the 41st some wrote that the blitzkrieg was failed, the Russians were fighting that the bear for their children, and at 44, if I am not mistaken, Goebbels wrote that the Russian military commanders turned out to be a higher race in comparison with the German. And so, yes, everything prevented them from defeating us, even the landing of the allies in Italy, who fought on the side of Germany;)
      1. stalkerwalker
        stalkerwalker 15 July 2013 15: 10 New
        +3
        Quote: Uhe
        and in 44, if I am not mistaken, Goebbels wrote that the Russian military commanders turned out to be a higher race in comparison with the German

        II, nurse ...
        In March 45, he wrote (bitterly) that the Soviet generals were no worse than the Wehrmacht, and that Soviet soldiers were armed with excellent weapons.
  4. roy72
    roy72 15 July 2013 10: 28 New
    +4
    Having the bitter experience of 1941 - 42 years, the fears of many Soviet generals are understandable. The enemy has repeatedly severely punished for excessive arrogance.
  5. omsbon
    omsbon 15 July 2013 13: 11 New
    +7
    In the photo "the best armor-piercers" the very boys are captured, but at the same time they are real HEROES !!!
  6. Mikhail3
    Mikhail3 15 July 2013 14: 24 New
    +5
    Defense is flawed. Offensive ... too! Every tool is good or bad just as good or bad hands holding it. No global conclusions can be drawn on the basis of a battle, this is the same as declaring - the right foot is correct and necessary, and the left one is wrong and unnecessary.
    What the Battle of Kursk showed is that the Soviet command was able to soberly assess its capabilities, skillfully and mercilessly. What distinguishes the situation from 41 year ...
    Of course, defense against breasts by tanks is impossible without enormous losses. But our command did not hope to organize an effective defense. That is, to miss tank wedges, after which to cut off most of the infantry and isolate the tanks from the rear, we lacked the skills and capabilities.
    What is a tank? A tank is a gas station. Refueling ended - there was not the most effective gun and not very large ammunition left, that's all. But in order to leave German tanks without refueling, our troops would have to be much more maneuverable, much faster, much more effective than they were at that moment. Well, the command did not file a bicycle to the plane!
    They counted on the unprecedented stamina of the Russian soldier, which is definitely there and which will not fail, we have good APCs in sufficient quantity or not at all! So what was proved was not “defective defenses” at all, but the skillful command of our troops based on a sober assessment of our capabilities. It is a pity that I had to give so many lives. But no one died in vain, because the objectives of the operation were fully achieved.
    1. Alekseev
      Alekseev 15 July 2013 17: 06 New
      +4
      Quote: Mikhail3
      Defense is flawed. Offensive ... too! Every tool is good or bad just as good or bad hands holding it.

      Absolutely accurate definition!
      And the losses in the Battle of Kursk (especially tanks) were not only in tough defense in the trenches, but also as a result of numerous and unsuccessful counterattacks of tank formations of the Red Army.
      The battle of the 5th Guards TA and 2 TK SS near Prokhorovka is the most eloquent confirmation of this.
      Here are the mistakes of the Voronezh Front command and, possibly, the wrong actions of the commanders are lower, and the quality of the BTT.
      But this is not the main reason for losses and unsuccessful counterattacks. It’s just that the best forces of the German army were concentrated in the fields near Kursk, who fought with full force. They simply could not be defeated without loss, with little blood. Although they tried, throwing hundreds of tanks into the attacks ...
      It seems that the command believed that it could crush the Germans, just as Zhukov crushed the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol in 1939. After all, there were forces! It didn’t work out ...
      But strategically everything was done correctly, the Germans also suffered heavy losses, it was problematic to advance further, to cut the defense as before, with little blood they could not, and then the offensive of our troops in the Donbass and in the direction of Orel!
      And here the "Citadel" is the end, the end of the hope of victory in the war.
      1. stalkerwalker
        stalkerwalker 16 July 2013 02: 37 New
        +4
        Quote: Alekseev
        It seems that the command believed that it could crush the Germans, just as Zhukov crushed the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol in 1939. After all, there were forces! It didn’t work out ..

        I agree.
        The miscalculation is psychological.
        But "there is an opinion ..." that on the eve of the counterattack, the reconnaissance of the area by tankmen of the 5 Guards was not carried out. tank.
        Eventually... Only one battalion of the 32th brigade could, under cover of a forest belt along the railway, go to the Komsomolets state farm. The further path was blocked by an anti-tank ditch ....
        And since So the 1th division of “Leibstandart” on 11 on July took a defile (a narrow passage between natural obstacles) and did not launch attacks in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive lines., tankers ran into an organized oncoming fire.
        There is only one question - to whom should I make a complaint?
  7. 094711601
    094711601 15 July 2013 14: 34 New
    0
    No need to ascribe to F. Roosevelt the words of G. Truman, the then Vice President of the United States. This G. Truman, in an interview with the Washington Post, outlined the possible somersaults of American foreign policy in relation to the outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR. As for the article itself. I immediately remember “War and Peace”: - The first column there, the second column here, etc. Why chew on what is already known a long time ago? Why are these unnecessary details, / ordinary people incomprehensible /, about the actions of individual units and divisions? It seems to me that the author did not answer the most pressing question today, -What happened in reality on the Prokhorovsky field? Sorry.
    1. Alekseev
      Alekseev 15 July 2013 17: 24 New
      0
      Well, how can we briefly talk about such a large-scale battle, without indicating part numbers, mentioning the tasks assigned to them, the directions of their actions, etc.
      This will not be the author, but the "storyteller"! smile
      For example, everything is clear to me, although the description of the battle is very brief.
      One must be interested, as in any business, then everything will become clear.
      A person who has studied only arithmetic cannot read a textbook on higher mathematics and quickly understand everything there, "grab it on the fly." wink
      So in matters of history, and even more so, of specific history - military.
    2. valiant
      valiant 16 July 2013 01: 30 New
      0
      And the conclusions are little comforting:
      It is difficult to call the massacre at Prokhorovka a victory of the Red Army, since neither side was able to achieve decisive success. The Germans retreated unhindered, defeating Rotmistrov’s tank corps. In addition, the Germans were able to evacuate and repair all their damaged tanks, and the wrecked Soviet vehicles (which could be repaired) were finally lost by our troops. Also 5 guards. The TA was not able to radically change the operational situation on the entire front of the enemy offensive and, despite the significant numerical superiority of the Soviet side in armored vehicles, especially in the direction of the main attack, the divisions of the 2nd SS TK not only repelled all attacks, but almost completely retained their main defensive strip. Thus, the enemy group in the Prokhorovka area was not only not destroyed or driven back to Oboyanskoye Highway, as the headquarters of the Voronezh Front planned, but it itself created the preconditions for encircling the formations of two guards armies in this area. This was a significant success of the enemy. In addition, acting skillfully and harmoniously, SS divisions inflicted tangible damage on Soviet tank formations. The commissioning of such significant forces from the reserve of the Headquarters was poorly organized, the time was chosen poorly, and the terrain for deploying several hundred tanks was generally not suitable. The Voronezh Front received enormous forces from the reserve: two separate tank corps, a tank and combined arms army, a total of more than 120 thousand people, more than 800 tanks. And all in vain, the Germans continued to move forward and smash our armies until July 16 (at least 2 out of three divisions), then, on the 17th, they freely retreated to the former line, well-equipped in engineering terms. To keep the wedge area — up to 90 km long along the front and 35 km deep — turned out to be risky, given the possibility of Soviet strikes under the base of the ledge. The command of Army Group South decided to immediately withdraw the main forces from the battle and withdraw them to the line they occupied before the offensive. The Soviet command was unable to organize the persecution and actually lost contact with the enemy. Soviet troops simply occupied territories that the Germans had previously left without a fight. Then for another two weeks there were battles to restore the defense ... According to the Germans, “the SS Panzer Corps, in cooperation with the 3rd Panzer Corps, closed the so-called boiler near Belgorod. However, the 69th Soviet Army, operating south of Prokhorovka, withdrew, and most of its forces managed to avoid encirclement. " Preserved figures of the presence in the ranks of armored vehicles in the Das Reich division by the end of July 14. They are summarized in its summary at 18.45. At that moment, she had 90 tanks, 25 assault guns and 12 self-propelled guns, as well as anti-tank guns. Thus, on a plot of about 3 km, the enemy was able to bring 127 tanks and anti-tank self-propelled guns into battle, not to mention the anti-tank guns. In parallel, enemy aircraft continuously bombed the area. Such force to hold the bleeding troops of the 2nd Guards Engine and 48th Sk were no longer able. Thus, despite the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, by 20.00 July 14, two divisions of the SS corps achieved the main thing: the most fortified line Belenikhino - Leski was broken, a platform for a dash into the defense of 69th A (towards the 3rd mall) was prepared. July 14 was the peak: they began to leave Soviet positions with whole companies and divisions, the situation threatened to develop into an avalanche-like ... ("... As a result of the work carried out by detachments from July 12 to 17, p. Mr. inclusively, 6956 people of the rank and file and commanding personnel were detained, who left the battlefield ... ”) We were able to fully control the situation only on July 16, after the withdrawal of the 48th sk to a new line of defense ...
      1. valiant
        valiant 16 July 2013 01: 32 New
        0
        (Continued)
        But Manstein was forbidden to use his only reserve - the 24th Panzer Corps. Without the commissioning of this corps, the further offensive lost perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding on to the captured positions. To speak of a purely military victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk is to wishful thinking. It was not until 3 August 1943 that the Voronezh Front finally came to its senses and, taking advantage of the absence of the Army Group “South” in this area of ​​its main tank forces, at that time fighting far in the south, launched a large-scale offensive west of the city of Belgorod. The actions of the front command (directly of Vatutin, one of the main authors of the failed counterattack) after the army group "South" went on the offensive - the main, most powerful enemy group, of the two acting against the Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge, and not auxiliary, as the General Staff mistakenly believed. cost his troops dearly. The constant psychological pressure from Moscow, the rumors and accusations of inability to quickly deal with the enemy was one of the important reasons for the nervousness of his leadership and as a result of a number of errors during the operation. So, from this battle it was necessary to draw a lesson, and not to hide for decades the enormous losses and blunders of the leadership. (according to Zamulin)
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 16 July 2013 05: 54 New
          +1
          Quote: valiant
          (Continued)
          But to Manstein it was forbidden to use its only reserve - the 24th Panzer Corps. Without the commissioning of this corps, the further offensive lost perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding on to the captured positions. To speak of the purely military victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk is to wishful thinking.

          Answer: why he was not allowed to use the Neringa corps, then he would not need to make long copy-pies :) The introduction of this reserve was already unpromising.
          By September, the Red Army crossed the Dnieper in several places at once, creating bridgeheads on the right bank. Is it desired or real?
          As a result of Kursk, the Wehrmacht lost the ability to conduct large-scale offensive operations on the Eastern Front. Is this statement a fact or a phantom?
          1. valiant
            valiant 16 July 2013 10: 23 New
            0
            Quote: BigRiver
            The introduction of this reserve was already unpromising.

            Maybe. But some military experts argue that with the proper use of this reserve, the Germans could connect with the northern group, Manstein was an experienced soldier and he was eager for battle. Another thing is how long they would have lasted, but they would have inflicted even more damage unambiguously.
            Quote: BigRiver
            Is it desired or real?

            Quote: BigRiver
            Is this statement a fact or a phantom?

            This is the result of ALL of the above facts. It is strange that you did not recall that we ended up in Berlin)) Still, we are talking here about Prokhorovka and we are trying to get to the bottom of the truth. But still from the TV screens they claim about the oncoming battle of thousands of tanks.
            1. Alekseev
              Alekseev 16 July 2013 18: 10 New
              0
              Well,
              Quote: valiant
              TV screens claim the oncoming battle of thousands of tanks.

              For that and TV! laughing
              Advocacy and brainwashing is often its task. lol
              As regards the battle near Prokhorovka, this is, of course, a grandiose battle, but I am inclined to the point of view of the valiant.
              From a military point of view, there was a rather poorly prepared advance of the 5 Guards Corps. TA, almost on the move, to German tank forces, also in offensive battle formations, but met our tankers with fire from a place. Just like in combat shooting exercises, the stage is a reflection of the counterattack.
              Competently acted tankers 2 TC SS.
              German tanks fired from their place, long-barreled 75-mm guns of the t-IV, not to mention the guns of new heavy tanks, confidently hit the t-34-76 from 1500-2000 m. To get out of a stationary tank from such a distance is also not so difficult.
              Ours fired on the move (from a short stop), and there were no tank stabilizers during the WWII. request
              For a reliable defeat of German tanks, given their thick armor, and even to get there, it was necessary to draw closer to a distance of 500 meters ...
              The conclusion, I think, is clear ...
              And our aircraft did not ensure air supremacy in the battles on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, although hundreds of German aircraft were shot down.
              Why didn’t Stalin take off and shoot Gen. Vatutin like a gene? Pavlova in 1941?
              I think he understood well by this time, in contrast to “some civilians,” that it’s very difficult to successfully fight against such a strong enemy, and the other in place of N.F. Vatutina could have made things worse ...
              And the Voronezh Front was not defeated. He suffered heavy losses, yes. But he recovered and after about three weeks began the offensive.
              This is now, after 70 years, everything is clear as God's day, but not then, July 5-16, 1943.
              All are now strategists and tactics, but "p ... t, do not toss bags" ...
              Our fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers honestly fulfilled their duty on the battlefields, including the Prokhorovsky field.
              But it was not possible then to defeat the SS divisions, so still they came to an end.
  8. Regis
    Regis 15 July 2013 14: 42 New
    +2
    "The experience of" deliberate defense "in the Battle of Kursk shows that any defense is flawed."
    Strange conclusion.
  9. Kovrovsky
    Kovrovsky 15 July 2013 17: 34 New
    0
    Thanks to the author! An objective story without embellishment. From this, the greatness of the feat of the Soviet soldier is even brighter!
  10. andru_007
    andru_007 15 July 2013 20: 01 New
    +3
    "The experience of" deliberate defense "in the Battle of Kursk shows that any defense is flawed ..."
    Really strange conclusion. As far as I understand, “deliberate defense” was part of the strategic plan (to exhaust the enemy in defense and deliver a crushing blow), which was subsequently brilliantly executed !!!
    “It’s just that the best forces of the German army were concentrated in the fields near Kursk, which fought with full force. They simply could not be defeated without losses, with little blood. Although they tried, throwing hundreds of tanks into the attack ...”
    I completely agree, but with blood, and sometimes with mistakes (by the way, the Germans also have enough mistakes), but strategically true, without exaggeration, HEROSKI broke the fascists' skeleton, knocked out the elite, and thereby seized the initiative. After Kursk, Germany did not recover, and the Red Army methodically finished off the enemy after this battle. Proud of grandfathers !!!!
  11. Max
    Max 15 July 2013 22: 18 New
    0
    I don’t understand where our aviation was in the Battle of Kursk?
    1. m262
      m262 16 July 2013 00: 15 New
      +1
      There was aviation, but unfortunately after Stalingrad it still did not make up for the losses and was not able to achieve air supremacy. But episodic parity already existed, by the way it was near Kursk that the Soviet Air Force applied a novelty: PTABs and cluster munitions, which also played a role, because the defeat area of ​​the PTABami-oval is 70 by 150 meters with almost 100% defeat of the equipment. The result: compulsory dispersal and camouflage had to be abandoned in the parking lots, and this complicates the command and control, do not worry the Germans on the arc were also tight. By the way, according to US experts, this is the first serious victory of the Red Army in the summer. Quote "The Nazis took the next exam from the Red Army and the Russians passed it by 5" I apologize, the family sleeps the author and the title of the book if anyone is interested I will find tomorrow.
    2. Stas57
      Stas57 16 July 2013 13: 33 New
      +2
      Quote: Max
      I don’t understand where our aviation was in the Battle of Kursk?

      the same thing worked
      German self-propelled guns Ferdinand of the 653 battalion, destroyed by direct hit of a bomb from the Pe-2 bomber
      1. stalkerwalker
        stalkerwalker 16 July 2013 14: 32 New
        +3
        Quote: Stas57
        the same thing worked

        100-kg bomb - exactly as directed ..
        1. Stas57
          Stas57 16 July 2013 19: 04 New
          0
          with a dive apparently
  12. bublic82009
    bublic82009 16 July 2013 00: 10 New
    0
    I read again, about tankers, infantry, artillerymen and a little bit about the role of our aviation. so somewhere in passing write our aircraft knocked out German tanks. and here about it is silent. and somehow the authors poorly describe how they fought and fought. all in general, struck a blow our broke and moved away.
  13. avia12005
    avia12005 16 July 2013 00: 26 New
    0
    Guys, and not dolbanut whether for prevention in the US? This is serious.
    1. m262
      m262 16 July 2013 00: 48 New
      +1
      Think now, or wait until morning ??? am
  14. valokordin
    valokordin 16 July 2013 06: 25 New
    +1
    And the last thing I want to say, the author clearly praises the power and quality of the Wehrmacht, and the stamina of Soviet soldiers, as well as the ineptitude of the command of the Red Army.
    1. stalkerwalker
      stalkerwalker 16 July 2013 14: 35 New
      +3
      Quote: valokordin
      the ineptitude of the command of the Red Army

      Well, do not be so strict ...
      And Konev, and the victory marshal, and Rokossovsky, and Eremenko, as well as Tymoshenko and Meretskov, all felt the bitterness of severe defeats ...
  15. Karimov Glory
    Karimov Glory 16 July 2013 19: 05 New
    +1
    For two days of fighting (July 12 and 13), the number of combat-ready Tigers of the Leibstandart division decreased by one. In the evening of July 13, the division had 16 Pz IV less than in the evening of July 11 (and 10 more self-propelled guns due to the repaired battles that were damaged in the previous days). Unfortunately, there is no data on the loss of armored vehicles "Leibstandart" specifically for July 12. The casualties of Leibstandart for this day are 39 dead, 5 missing and 235 wounded.

    According to documentary (Soviet) data published by V.N. Zamulin and L.N. Lopukhovsky in March 2003, both Soviet tank corps lost on July 12, 1943 - 256 tanks and self-propelled guns (72%), of which 152 are irretrievable, and at least 1.304 killed and missing, about 1.100 wounded. [media = http: //www.volk59.narod.ru/prohorovka.htm]
    I quote this quote and ask to explain to knowledgeable people what this means. Was the Kursk battle a pleasure for the Germans? They in Poland lost more than their soldiers. Or the author has a peculiar method of calculating losses: take our losses from Soviet documents, and German from German sources. Can these German sources be considered objective?
    1. Motors1991
      Motors1991 17 July 2013 12: 29 New
      0
      Manstein estimates his losses on July 17 in 20720 people, of whom 3330 are killed. Compare the losses of the Voronezh Front to 143 people killed, wounded and prisoners (34000 people), the ratio is 1k7 in favor of the Germans, so Manstein was eager for battle, he had no doubt in victory. He asked the model, if he could not advance, then at least fettered the forces of the Central Front. If the Central Front backed away, like Voronezh, the German victory was deafening. Stalin until his death Vatutin could not forgive him for the failure near Kursk.
      1. Karimov Glory
        Karimov Glory 23 July 2013 07: 38 New
        0
        This is again according to Manstein’s calculations. You read their memoirs, so they destroyed the Red Army three times.
      2. Alekseev
        Alekseev 27 July 2013 15: 09 New
        0
        Quote: Motors1991
        Manstein estimates his losses on July 17 at 20720 people, of whom 3330 are killed. Compare the losses of the Voronezh Front to 143 people killed, wounded and prisoners (34000 people), a ratio of 1k7 in favor of the Germans

        Where do these numbers come from ?! (or the loss estimation period is confused)
        If everything were so, then the Voronezh Front could neither carry out the operation "Rumyantsev" nor, in general, successfully advance. This is an axiom for any person with a more or less military education.
        Yes, the losses were great 27542 thousand lost forever Voronezh Front July 5-23, about the same Steppe.
        With a loss ratio of 1 to 7 in favor of the Germans, there could be no talk of any victories and seizures of cities ...
        Units and formations simply simply lose their combat effectiveness and cannot complete their mission.
        If you believe such nonsense, it is completely impossible to understand how we ended up in Berlin? request
        After all, this could only be done by defeating the troops of Manstein, Kluge, etc.
        And to defeat is to inflict heavy, irreparable losses in l / s and equipment.
        Do you sometimes read such “writings” of pseudo-historians, they are a dime a dozen now, and you won’t understand for some time where did tens of thousands of German tanks, planes, artillery systems and millions of soldiers go?
        They probably fled to the West and surrendered to the Americans with the British. laughing
  16. valiant
    valiant 23 July 2013 17: 09 New
    0
    Quote: Karimov Glory
    This is again according to Manstein’s calculations. You read their memoirs, so they destroyed the Red Army three times.

    By the way, in Manstein’s memoirs, the loss figures almost coincide with the latest meticulous studies of Zamulin and Lopukhovskiy, and it’s best to check out: http://militera.lib.ru/h/zamulin_vn2/index.html
  17. Karimov Glory
    Karimov Glory 24 July 2013 09: 24 New
    0
    It can be said in another way: the loss figures in the studies of Zamulin and Lopukhovsky coincide with the figures of Manstein. There is an episode in Rudel’s Pilot Pieces memoirs: there is only one tank left in the tank division, but 60 documents were listed in the General Staff documents. So much for German accuracy, pedantry, honesty. I mean that some researchers have too much confidence in German documents.
  18. Katusha
    Katusha 4 January 2014 08: 23 New
    0
    The Kursk arch is a magnetic anomaly .. It is no coincidence that all the iron was "attracted" there ... Under Prokhorovka .. Why exactly there ?? Fastened with a magnet.
    The last great battle .. Porsche lost to Koshkin .. A little strange, but the names of the designers of Soviet tanks of the Second World War .. Koshkin created the legendary already victorious T-34 tank (he died before the war, after a cold. After showing his brainchild to Stalin he returned to T -34 home and caught a cold), and Kotov created a heavy KV tank (Klim Voroshilov) with absolutely impenetrable armor but not clumsy .. After watching the KV and T-34, an argument broke out - which tank is better?!? Stalin said - let both stay .. Thank you !!