Military Review

Divisions against brigades, brigades against divisions

169
Recently, quite a lot of talk has been going on about the restoration in the Ground Forces of the Russian Armed Forces of the divisional link eliminated in the recent past. How appropriate, thoughtful and reasonable is this step? Will its result really be an increase in the level of combat readiness and combat capability of the Ground Forces? How justified is it to take this step precisely in our days when, in the conditions of the global financial and economic crisis, the armed forces of almost all the leading states of the world undergo serious reductions and military budgets are sequestered? Let us try to calmly and impartially speculate on this topic, leaving behind the inevitable emotional aspects of the problem.


At first glance, everything is simple: correcting past mistakes, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense decided to return to the division. However, in reality, this problem is not as simple as it seems.

We will immediately determine: the analysis of this step by the current leadership of the Ministry of Defense cannot be carried out abstractly. It must interface with different areas of modern Russian reality: military-strategic, economic, budget-financial, socio-demographic, emotional-psychological.

WHY CHANGED TO THE BRIGADES

In the military-strategic sphere, the decision to liquidate the divisional level had certain justifications. As is known, within the framework of the reform of the Armed Forces and the optimization of the command and control structure, it was decided in principle to reduce the number of links in the command and control system. Divisional or army units of command were considered as “candidates for withdrawal”. In the end, they decided to save the army unit, and the divisions were reformed and disbanded.

The then leadership of the Ministry of Defense made attempts to explain to the general public the need for a transition to a brigade basis, but not all experts accepted this decision positively. There were reasons for this. Divisions have traditionally been the main tactical formations of the Ground Forces. Military science and military art, the training of troops, the preparation of mobilization reserves, combat regulations and instructions were “sharpened” for the division.

The transition to a brigade basis in those conditions was a very difficult step associated with the breaking of the traditional military mentality, the need to abandon stereotypes, standards, principles and ideas that had been established over many years.

At the same time, according to many military experts, with the end of the Cold War era and the end of the global military bloc confrontation along the East-West line, the likelihood of classic large-scale operations using numerous ground forces factions has become extremely small. New dangers, threats and challenges to security demanded serious changes in the organization and tactics of troop actions. In this context, the team was seen as a more efficient, flexible, mobile and better managed organizational structure of the Ground Forces.

Taking into account the experience of conducting combat operations in the North Caucasus against enemy irregular formations (militants, terrorists, gangsters), the justification for the transition of the Ground Forces to the brigade basis at the conceptual level was clear.

ABOUT THREAT OF THE BIG WAR

What has changed in the military-strategic landscape over the past six months, that there was a sharp need to restore the divisional level?
In this regard, military experts point out that the thesis of the danger of large-scale war over the past few months has been repeatedly voiced by the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. If this danger is real - who in our country can challenge the official statements of the General Staff - then a “big” war is not far off. In this context, the re-establishment of divisions in the Ground Forces looks like a logical and justifiable step. So, the General Staff knows something that the expert community is not aware of. And if this is so, then it is not necessary to make hints, but to objectively prepare the whole country, the entire population for a “big” war.

So in what direction is this "big" war ripening?

A military threat from the NATO bloc - the traditional nightmare of our General Staff - exists, but not in the form of a large-scale ground invasion of millions of armies. Even in turbulent fantasies today it is impossible to imagine the existence of a new Barbarossa plan, which provides for the early concentration in the border zone with Russia of powerful strategic groups of ground troops of the aggressor, ready to bring down thousands of our lands tanks and planes, millions of soldiers with automatic rifles at the ready. The threat from the West is high-tech, based on the desire to achieve absolute superiority in space, the information sphere and cyberspace. Military operations with such an adversary, as military experts note, are more and more clearly transferred to virtual space and become like computer games.

In conditions of a new type of military conflict, our formations of ground forces — be it brigades or divisions — may appear to be outside spectators. That was the case in Yugoslavia in 1999, when aviation and NATO’s long-range weapons of destruction, pointwise disabled the most important elements of the state-political structure, economy, energy supply system, key transport infrastructure, leaving aside the troops and military facilities of the Yugoslav army. Thus, the reconstruction of divisions in this strategic direction can hardly be regarded as an effective and efficient measure to counter the high-tech threat of our enemies and ill-wishers.
Another direction from which a military threat can hypothetically come is the Far East.

Let's be realistic: The Far Eastern Federal District is a third (36,1%) of the area of ​​Russia, where only 4,4% of the population of Russia lives. In absolute terms, the population of the Far East is slightly less than 6,3 million people (on 01.01.12). The forecasts for the development of the demographic situation in the Far Eastern Federal District are extremely pessimistic. According to expert estimates, over 2010 – 2050 years, the total population of the Russian Far East may decrease by 21,1%, and the working age population - by 42,5%.

And what is the demographic situation of our neighbors in the Far East?

The estimated population of Northeastern China (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang provinces) for 2010 was 120 million, Mongolia - 3,5 million, DPRK - 28,5 million, Republic of Korea - 49,7 million, Japan - 130,4 million. What can we talk about at all if the entire population of our Far East is only half the size of Mongolia.

Another perspective: the strength of the personnel of the Shenyang military district of the PRC bordering on Russia reaches a quarter of a million people. At the same time, the mobilization capabilities of the Chinese armed forces compared to ours seem simply unlimited.

Fortunately, today our relations with almost all neighboring countries in the Far East are developing in a positive direction. Within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and on a bilateral basis, military-political relations between the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the PLA are strengthened. In this context, the re-creation of divisions in the Far East may not be fully understood by our partners and colleagues.

Well, if we still want to insure against some future hypothetical military threats in the Far East, then will the restoration of the divisions help in this? How many divisions do we need to recreate? One, two, ten, a hundred? If one or two, then they are clearly meaningless. If a few dozen divisions - where to take people and finances? In the context of current economic and demographic opportunities, objective financial and budgetary constraints, the experience of the Soviet Union is unlikely to help here.

And finally, the third direction of possible military threats to Russia is the “soft underbelly” in the South. The main type of opponents here is traditionally irregular formations of militants and terrorists operating both inside Russia and outside its national territory. Divisions here, as shown by domestic and foreign experience, is the least effective form of the organizational and staff structure of the troops. Groupings of forces are forced to act by small tactical groups (subunits), guided to a greater extent by tactics of special forces. And who will be against fifty bandits to send a whole division to the mountains?

As a result, from a military-strategic point of view, the validity of the decision to recreate the divisions, as we see it, is not at all obvious.

WHY CHAPTERS OF TAMAN AND CANTEMIROV

If, nevertheless, to take on trust the military-strategic need to recreate divisions in the Russian Ground Forces, the question arises: why did this process begin not from the Far East, but from the Moscow region? What is this threat that compels us to re-deploy the Taman and Kantemirov divisions near our capital?

Attempting a logical answer to this question inevitably leads to sad conclusions or leads to a dead end.

Recall history. The Tamansk division stationed now in the Moscow region of Naro-Fominsk district was formed in 1940 in Kharkov under the name of the 127-Infantry Division. From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the division took part in bloody battles in the Western direction. September 18 The 1941 of the year for distinction in battle was renamed the 2 Guards Rifle Division. Completed the war in East Prussia.

An interesting fact from the historical form: in March 1953, the division was introduced to Moscow to maintain public order during the funeral of Stalin.

In the same year, the unit was renamed the 23 Guards Mechanized Division, and in the 1957 year it became the 23 Guards Motorized Rifle Division. In the 1964, the compound returned the name of the 2 th guards motorized rifle division.

Fact from the modern history of the division: separate units and military units of the compound were involved in the political events of August 1991 and October 1993 in Moscow.

In May 2009 of the Year, the 2-I Guards Motorized Rifle Division was disbanded and on its basis the 5-I Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Moscow Military District was created, leaving all the insignia of this Guards unit. Exactly four years later, in May 2013, on the basis of this brigade and other military units stationed in the Moscow region, the 2-I Guards Tamansky Order of the October Revolution, the Red Banner Order of Suvorov, motorized rifle division was reconstructed.

In parallel with this, in May 2013 of the year the 4-th Guards Kantemirovskaya Order of Lenin Red Banner Tank Division was reconstructed on the basis of the 4-th separate tank tank brigade.

Of course, the return of heroic names and honorary titles is an important moral and political action of state importance. But let's be frank. During the transition to the brigade base, the glorious traditions of the Tamanians and Kantemirovs were not forgotten: their successors were the 5 motorized rifle and 4 I tank brigades, respectively. Therefore, it is not entirely correct to justify the process of rebuilding divisions in the Ground Forces with the desire to return the glorious names and traditions of the Armed Forces.

By the way, if we are to be consistent in returning to heroic traditions and names, then we must recreate hundreds of divisions that received honorary and guards names for the heroic feats of their soldiers and officers during the Great Patriotic War. But everyone understands that this is impossible and, most importantly, not necessary.

So it turns out that the recreation of the Moscow region Kantemirov and Taman divisions has some other reasons, about which experts can only guess.

MILITARY BUDGET IS NOT A BADLESS BARREL

Let us now try to look at the decision to recreate the divisions from a financial and economic point of view.

What does it mean to create or recreate a division? It is required to carry out a number of the most complicated measures: to determine the place of permanent deployment (region of the country) of the headquarters of the division and subordinate units; to correlate the place of permanent deployment with the presence of populated areas (within the city limits, in the "open field"); to provide land for the permanent deployment of all headquarters, military units and other structural elements of the division, military camps for families of military personnel; to build capital structures to ensure the life and activities of the personnel of the division and the storage of relevant military equipment and weapons; to build housing stock with necessary elements of social and cultural infrastructure for families of officers and contractors of the division; to carry out hundreds of other organizational and practical measures and approvals, to provide for thousands and thousands of small things.

All this requires financial resources, and considerable ones. Of course, a soldier can be placed in tents, and officer families - in dilapidated hostels. Naturally, temporarily, about five or ten years. After all, the money for the arrangement of all at once is clearly not enough.

More fortunate for those divisions that will be formed by “reformatting” brigades on their ready-made infrastructure. However, in connection with the expansion, they will inevitably face all the same difficult financial problems.

Most importantly: the military budget is not a bottomless barrel. The allocation of funds for the re-establishment of divisions entails the redistribution of priorities of the military budget, the reduction of other items: the monetary allowance of military personnel, their housing.

The re-establishment of the divisional level in the structure of the Ground Forces will entail the need to increase the number of officers, with all the resulting financial implications for the military budget.

So it turns out that from the socio-economic and budgetary and financial points of view, the re-establishment of divisions in the Ground Forces is quite a costly task.

CHEKHARD IN MILITARY THEORY AND PRACTICE

What is, in practical terms, the mechanism itself returning to the divisional basis? Judging by the decisions taken, some brigades are once again “reformatted” and become divisions, while other brigades are transformed into regiments. In the new divisions, parts of divisional subordination are again recreated, divisional rear. It will again have to recycle all the combat regulations and instructions, "adapted" under the brigade. It will be necessary to rethink the tactics of the actions of the divisions, it will be necessary to correct all standards and calculations, to work out new models and algorithms of actions. All these tasks will require large amounts of funds, human and time resources for their solution.

In addition, the system of higher military education is once again facing the problem of what and how to teach. “Textbooks revised for brigades”, lectures, reference materials now again need to be reworked “under divisions”, bringing further confusion and confusion into the consciousness of not only the officer-officers, but also the teachers themselves.

In conditions when domestic military science, as even Makhmut Gareev, president of the Academy of Military Sciences, admits, is actually in a state of crisis, when we don’t have an “established scientific theory of future wars,” theoretical theoretical practicalities in the organizational structure of ground forces look like frankly, completely frivolous. It would be more logical, first of all, to aim the military-scientific thought to develop adequate theories and concepts of modern and future war, and then, on the basis of the formulated ideas, begin practical work on the correction of organizational structures.

By the way, it is not at all obvious that the result of such military-scientific developments, if they are carried out impartially and objectively, will be the conclusion that it is necessary to return to the divisional basis. The global trends in the development of the Ground Forces are in the vector of creating compact, mobile, highly mobile tactical units of a flexible composition (ideally, “combat packs”, about which the Independent Military Review has already written on its pages) operated and based on the so-called network-centric principles .

Under these conditions, the consolidation of organizational structures, that is, the return from the brigade base to the divisions, as it falls out of world trends. It's time to turn to world experience.

FOREIGN EXPERIENCE

Serious reforming processes at the turn of the century affected the armed forces of almost all countries of the world. Not bypassed they and the US military.

With the end of the Cold War era, the military and political leadership of the United States faced the necessity of closing military bases and facilities, reducing the number of personnel and reorganizing the regular and reserve components of the armed forces. The US military experts concluded that in new geostrategic conditions, the brigade is for many reasons the most effective form of the organizational and staff structure of the ground forces. The American divisions of the Cold War era had a set of line infantry and armored battalions and three brigade headquarters. In a battle (operation), this made it possible for the division commander in each particular case to form brigades of different composition from a set of existing battalions. The Soviet divisions, as is known, had a clear regimental structure. And the one and the other options had their pros and cons.

Having made the brigade the main tactical unit of their ground forces, the United States, however, did not abandon the divisions. Now the brigades formally received a clear organizational structure, absorbed from the division a necessary set of support and service units and were transformed into brigade combat groups. In addition, in each particular case, when solving the tasks assigned, the brigade can receive reinforcements from various branches of service, from combat and transport aviation to battalions of the military police or engineers.

In the Ground Forces of the USA ten divisions still remain today. They also have corps (1 and 3 army, 18 airborne, 5 army corps deactivated in June 2013 of the year) and army units of control. Moreover, in the American army, which many domestic military experts are not aware of, they did not even abandon the traditional regimental numbering. The infantry, tank, artillery (fire) battalions and divisions entering today in brigades still retain the traditional regimental numbering in their names, the origins of which date back to the events of the American War of Independence and the Civil War. Each regiment has its glorious military history, and today all military personnel honor and observe the historical traditions, norms of behavior and customs of their regiments.

The last ten years, the US Army has been widely used in hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq. The real situation, as American experts believe, confirmed that the brigade fighting group is the most effective form of organization of the Ground Forces. The team, possessing a complete set of all the necessary forces and means, is able to operate completely autonomously and perform independent tasks. The headquarters of the division in this situation acts as a body of management, coordination and ensuring a higher level - provided that several brigades take part in the battle (operations). It seems to us that the role of the division, in our view of the military conflicts of the modern era, fully justifies itself.

AND PENTAGON WHY REDUCES

In late June of this year, the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces, General Raymond Odierno, spoke at the Pentagon outlining a detailed plan for the reduction of the American army.

Along with a serious reduction in the number of personnel of the regular troops, the number of combat brigade groups will significantly decrease. Of the currently existing 45 combined arms brigades, only 2017 will remain in 33 by the US Army. The grouping of the US Land Forces in Europe already in 2013 will be reduced from the current four brigades to two (one in Germany, the other in Italy). Ten brigades will be reduced in the United States. This is followed by the deactivation of another brigade, with the result that only 32 brigade battle groups will remain in the army.

As General Odierno acknowledged, armored forces are more likely to suffer. According to him, the 10 armored, 14 infantry brigades and 8 brigades on the Stryker BM will ultimately remain in the Land Forces.

What do these numbers say? First of all, that after long years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the American army loses almost a third of its main tactical armies. Objectively, this means that even conflicts of the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan, not to mention stronger opponents, can become problematic for the US Ground Forces.

In the context of cuts in the American army, the decision taken in Russia to recreate the divisions looks, frankly, somewhat extravagant. Particularly interesting was the coincidence in time of these two completely unrelated shares.

QUESTIONS REMAIN

So, it seems to us, the re-establishment of divisions in the Russian Ground Forces is a step that is not fully thought out and calculated. This means that inevitable corrections and clarifications are expected. Perhaps the decision to recreate the divisions is indeed a sensible step. But will there be a problem with the army command line? How appropriate would it be to maintain a multi-stage control system for a grouping of troops as part of one or two brigades and several attached units? It seems that experts will give correct and reasonable answers to these questions. At the same time, it is necessary to approach these issues calmly, carefully, taking into account the accumulated domestic and international experience, with the involvement of the expert community.

In the meantime, when assessing this decision of the Defense Ministry’s leadership, the thought involuntarily suggests itself: was it really worth it to haste the garden so hastily? There are no intelligible comments on this issue from the Ministry of Defense. As a result, the situation looks just strange: today we are restoring divisions only because they were liquidated a few years ago.
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  1. 77bob1973
    77bob1973 14 July 2013 08: 12 New
    15
    The United States overseas their ground troops "as far as" so they are reducing what can be reduced. Before the Second World War, the United States had no tank units at all.
    1. Mitek
      Mitek 14 July 2013 09: 18 New
      53
      Figs with them with mattress covers. Talk about Russia. So, in Russia, in my opinion, we need divisions and brigades. Divisions are needed in the Far East, to defend the Kuril Islands and against a possible attack by China. China can hold back only nuclear weapons, because it’s important that they get bogged down at the border, otherwise they will have to be beaten on their territory, plus the SDs on the border with China are looted (100km dimilitarized zone), and new ones are not built. Storage bases for military equipment and warehouses with weapons, equipment, products close to the Chinese border, do not deploy divisions in the event of a conflict, as the Chinese will be there earlier and five armies will be deployed on our property. And from the Chinese side they approach our border with roads with heavy equipment that can withstand passage, rockades are arranged. It’s not just for us to recreate divisions there, but it won’t hurt URs as well. And missile brigades with nuclear weapons will not be out of place. The Chinese army is not what it was 10 years ago. The technological advantage is less and less.
      Among other things, tank divisions will not interfere with gamerope. After all, in which case it will be necessary to "turn off" individual countries from the game. Fist-tank division, and individual tasks are solved by motorized rifle brigades, after breaking the defense. Indeed, one of the differences between brigades and divisions is that a division can solve strategic tasks, but a brigade cannot.
      1. alicante11
        alicante11 14 July 2013 12: 04 New
        +3
        Mitek
        Plusanul. Only in the Kuril Islands divisions have nowhere to deploy. These are the islands. There are enough mobile coastal missiles with cover from small formations of marines. And then to drop out the landings with counter-landings with the support of land aviation.
        1. Mitek
          Mitek 14 July 2013 12: 08 New
          10
          Quote: alicante11
          Mitek
          Plusanul. Only in the Kuril Islands divisions have nowhere to deploy. These are the islands. There are enough mobile coastal missiles with cover from small formations of marines. And then to drop out the landings with counter-landings with the support of land aviation.

          18-I machine-gun artillery division


          It was formed in April 1978 in the village of Knyaz-Volkonskoye in the Khabarovsk Territory on the basis of the 129th training motorized rifle division. In the same month, the division began to relocate to the village of Goryachie Klyuchi on the Kuril Islands.

          All summer 1978 was spent on the delivery of personnel and military equipment to the islands of Iturup and Kunashir.

          The 18th machine gun and artillery division (headquarters - item Goryachie Klyuchi) includes:
          The 46th machine-gun artillery regiment (lagunnoye, Sakhalin Region, the regiment includes the 264th separate mobile battalion);
          49-th machine-gun artillery regiment.

          ---

          According to the Ministry of Defense, the headquarters of the 18th machine gun and artillery division, a regiment and several separate battalions from its composition, as well as border guard units, are deployed on Iturup Island. On the island of Kunashir, also part of the South Kuril Islands, the regiment of the 18th division and the border guard units are located.

          ---

          interesting in that it is the only pulad that has survived since the war (at one time it was folded into a brigade, and all its units received a status one rank lower - regiments became battalions, battalions became companies, etc.). Created on 08.07.46/109/38 on the basis of 40 Imansky UR, consisting of 46, 49, 484, 40 pulp. On Shikotan there are 49 MRP (6 pulp), in Yuzhno-Kurilsk (Kunashir) - 2 pulp and zrp, in the village. Golovino - tp, everything else is on Iturup. Its structure: 1 regiments - 94 MRP on MT-LB (55 MRP became then a Pulup), Pulup, TP (3 T-76 tanks and 30 PT-308s), AP (D-70 guns with Ural tractors), ZRP (SAM “Arrow on MT-LB); obs and optdn; oisr, ovr, XNUMX omsb (then the company), oavtr, ovkhz and okv. chemical protection and commandant. At one time, she was awarded the Pennant of the Ministry of Defense for the fact that with her "power" she frightened a US frigate that came too close (somewhere in the XNUMXs).
          Now she is rearming. T-55s were changed in the 80s, air defenses were updated and something else. And "Mistral" will not be superfluous there.
          (http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/18-ya_ machine gun-artillery

          I_division)
          Among other things, the islands must be held in order not to be knocked out by counter-landings then .. The landing operation from the sea is not the easiest thing and, in the face of counteraction, is fraught with heavy losses. Therefore, the islands can not be returned.
          1. Aleks tv
            Aleks tv 14 July 2013 15: 58 New
            +1
            Quote: Mitek
            machine gun and artillery division


            Nice to ponastalgat.
            Thanks for the info.
            My koment below, also remembered about these divisions.
          2. Airman
            Airman 14 July 2013 20: 44 New
            -2
            Quote: Mitek
            Quote: alicante11
            Mitek
            Plusanul. Only in the Kuril Islands divisions have nowhere to deploy. These are the islands. There are enough mobile coastal missiles with cover from small formations of marines. And then to drop out the landings with counter-landings with the support of land aviation.

            18-I machine-gun artillery division


            It was formed in April 1978 in the village of Knyaz-Volkonskoye in the Khabarovsk Territory on the basis of the 129th training motorized rifle division. In the same month, the division began to relocate to the village of Goryachie Klyuchi on the Kuril Islands.

            All summer 1978 was spent on the delivery of personnel and military equipment to the islands of Iturup and Kunashir.

            The 18th machine gun and artillery division (headquarters - item Goryachie Klyuchi) includes:
            The 46th machine-gun artillery regiment (lagunnoye, Sakhalin Region, the regiment includes the 264th separate mobile battalion);
            49-th machine-gun artillery regiment.

            ---

            According to the Ministry of Defense, the headquarters of the 18th machine gun and artillery division, a regiment and several separate battalions from its composition, as well as border guard units, are deployed on Iturup Island. On the island of Kunashir, also part of the South Kuril Islands, the regiment of the 18th division and the border guard units are located.

            ---

            interesting in that it is the only pulad that has survived since the war (at one time it was folded into a brigade, and all its units received a status one rank lower - regiments became battalions, battalions became companies, etc.). Created on 08.07.46/109/38 on the basis of 40 Imansky UR, consisting of 46, 49, 484, 40 pulp. On Shikotan there are 49 MRP (6 pulp), in Yuzhno-Kurilsk (Kunashir) - 2 pulp and zrp, in the village. Golovino - tp, everything else is on Iturup. Its structure: 1 regiments - 94 MRP on MT-LB (55 MRP became then a Pulup), Pulup, TP (3 T-76 tanks and 30 PT-308s), AP (D-70 guns with Ural tractors), ZRP (SAM “Arrow on MT-LB); obs and optdn; oisr, ovr, XNUMX omsb (then the company), oavtr, ovkhz and okv. chemical protection and commandant. At one time, she was awarded the Pennant of the Ministry of Defense for the fact that with her "power" she frightened a US frigate that came too close (somewhere in the XNUMXs).
            Now she is rearming. T-55s were changed in the 80s, air defenses were updated and something else. And "Mistral" will not be superfluous there.
            (http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/18-ya_ machine gun-artillery

            I_division)
            Among other things, the islands must be held in order not to be knocked out by counter-landings then .. The landing operation from the sea is not the easiest thing and, in the face of counteraction, is fraught with heavy losses. Therefore, the islands can not be returned.


            You know too much, but talk even more.
            1. Day 11
              Day 11 14 July 2013 20: 48 New
              0
              They’ll deal with it. It’s my fault. I already wrote here, filter the market!
            2. Mitek
              Mitek 15 July 2013 08: 09 New
              +1
              Quote: Povshnik
              You know too much, but talk even more.
              Dear air defense specialist, ALL data on the 18th PULAD given above is exclusively from open sources)))))))). To get one, it’s enough to drive 18 pool into Yandex.
          3. cdrt
            cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 15 New
            -1
            It seems like back in WWII it was clearly shown that the defense of the island with the right amphibious operation has no chance (see Okinawa, Iwo Jima).
            Troops in the Kuril Islands are needed. What is now there is not a division at all, but a weak brigade. But ... For a day two of them should be enough. And then...
            In general, the defense of these islands should be based on MRA, nuclear submarines and a strong KUG from a pair of cruisers, 3-4 destroyers / BOD
      2. piter-tank
        piter-tank 14 July 2013 12: 29 New
        +3
        Indeed, one of the differences between brigades and divisions is that the division can solve strategic tasks, but the brigade does not.[I]
        The division has never solved and will not solve not only strategic tasks, but even operational ones. This is a tactical mix.
        1. Blackgrifon
          Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 12: 44 New
          +4
          Quote: piter-tank
          Indeed, one of the differences between brigades and divisions is that a division can solve strategic tasks, but no brigade. [I] The division has never solved and will not solve not only strategic tasks, but even operational ones. This is a tactical mix.


          The brigade and even more so will not be able to. The a priori division has a well-equipped and protected rear. The brigade is not.
          1. sergaivenski
            sergaivenski 14 July 2013 16: 13 New
            +2
            The division I served in was formed from militias in Moscow. This division went a long and glorious path. The soldiers of this division freed Orsha, the capital of Belarus from Minsk, participated in the liquidation of the Nazi group of Nazis surrounded in the Baltic states. A formation called the brigade could , to solve such problems? It is unlikely !!! Now that Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia have become NATO member countries, when American missile defense systems are deployed near the borders of Russia, the question naturally arises: what’s next? What adequately does our country, Russia, be able to answer? Only divisions that have a full rear, equipped with new equipment !!!
        2. s1н7т
          s1н7т 14 July 2013 18: 36 New
          0
          Quote: piter-tank
          but even operational. This is a tactical mix.

          Was the ADD division, for example, also a "tactical formation"? laughing
        3. aviamed90
          aviamed90 14 July 2013 19: 38 New
          +1
          piter tank

          We will specify - operational-tactical in aviation and Strategic Missile Forces and tactical in SV.
      3. Blackgrifon
        Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 12: 42 New
        +3
        Quote: Mitek
        Figs with them with mattress covers. Talk about Russia.


        As far as I know officers, NO one supported the transition to an exclusively brigade uniform. By all accounts, the division is more autonomous and more viable.
        It is very difficult to restore the divisional-regimental structure now - the bulk of professional contract soldiers, in addition to the officer corps, were ensigns - this institution was destroyed, and without a professional "backbone" (officers and contract soldiers) not only restore, but also ensure the normal functioning of the current structure impossible.
      4. vladimirZ
        vladimirZ 14 July 2013 14: 24 New
        +5
        For some reason, we rush from one extreme to the other.
        Russia, in view of its large territory, long borders, which no one else has in the world, it is vitally necessary to have both brigade and division formations. On the Far Eastern potential enemy and not one, mainly divisional formations of various structures are needed, in the Central Asian and North Caucasian theater of operations - mainly mobile brigade formations, in the European part - due to the proximity of NATO to our borders - mainly divisional formations. And this despite nuclear deterrence, conventional warfare can also be very likely.
        The question of financing - "the tenth thing", the formula of the classics "the people who do not want to feed their army - will feed the enemy" has not yet been canceled.
        And these principles of Russia must be maintained regardless of who is in the post of Minister of Defense - Taburetkin-Serdyukov, Shoigu or some other Vasya Pupkin.
        1. s1н7т
          s1н7т 14 July 2013 18: 49 New
          +1
          Quote: vladimirZ
          Russia, in view of its large territory, long borders, which no one else has in the world, it is vitally necessary to have both brigade and division formations.

          In the USSR, no matter how much he was abused by the advocates of full-time capitalism, there were enough brains to ensure that there were divisions, corps, and brigades — depending on the region and the tasks set. Who believes that the USSR Armed Forces were built incorrectly - a supporter of the Russian Orthodox Church, Putin, bestial capitalism and the collapse of the Great Country, i.e. brainless. Recall, at least, our ODSBR — the forerunners of the rapid reaction forces. But how many good things are anathematized for cuts, kickbacks and personal enrichment? A country without a common idea is simply a state doomed to collapse.
      5. Reptile
        Reptile 14 July 2013 18: 57 New
        0
        Divisions in the Kuril Islands? But why!?
        Among other things, tank divisions will not interfere with geyrop

        Russia will not be allowed there. The maximum you can dream of is the air base in Belarus, it was already discussed.
        1. aviamed90
          aviamed90 14 July 2013 19: 44 New
          0
          Reptile

          Yes?

          A month ago, the forum seriously proposed creating a military base of the Russian Federation (naval, land and aviation) in Cyprus!

          How do you like the breadth of "thought"?

          And I think that there is nothing for the divisions on the Kuril Islands. Something like brigades and with appropriate SDs will fit in there.
          1. Reptile
            Reptile 14 July 2013 19: 47 New
            +1
            How do you like the breadth of "thought"?

            Deep thought.
            Something like brigades and with appropriate SDs will fit in there.

            I agree.
            1. cdrt
              cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 20 New
              -1
              "... depth of thought ..."

              "... Gandhi went to Dundee.
              - Gandhi's head, yeah
              "Dundee is also a head ..."
              Pique Vests, Golden Calf Ilf and Petrov laughing
          2. cdrt
            cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 18 New
            -1
            Actually, only on the forum such ideas were discussed wink
            In the harsh unromantic reality, everything was completely different wink
      6. Rakti-kali
        Rakti-kali 14 July 2013 23: 05 New
        0
        Quote: Mitek
        The Chinese army is not what it was 10 years ago. The technological advantage is less and less.

        Why make a scarecrow from China?
        In the Altai Republic (RF CVO), the border passes in difficult mountainous terrain, and the ratio of forces of 2 armies to 2 armies (in equivalent brigades (1 division for 2 brigades) - China - 13-15 brigades (5 divisions, 5 brigades), Russia - 15-16 brigades without formations and units of district subordination.
        BBO - the Russian Federation has 4 armies (more than 20 brigades); China (Shenyang and Beijing military districts) - 6 armies (equivalent to about 40 brigades), but most of these forces cover either Beijing or the coast of the yellow sea.
        1. Poppy
          Poppy 15 July 2013 10: 47 New
          +1
          only China has unlimited opportunities to throw more troops
          for a second: if you kill a million Chinese every year, it will be 365 million / year approximately equal to their annual birth rate

          all hope that they are going to depopulation, the population begins to age, time plays on us
          1. Rakti-kali
            Rakti-kali 15 July 2013 12: 42 New
            0
            Quote: Poppy
            only China has unlimited opportunities to throw more troops

            And as soon as he seizes this opportunity in a conflict with the Russian Federation, he will receive a nuclear apocalypse in his most densely populated and industrialized areas. Now the question is - does he need it?
        2. s1н7т
          s1н7т 15 July 2013 13: 07 New
          -1
          Quote: Rakti-Kali
          In the Altai Republic (the Central Military District of the Russian Federation), the border passes in difficult mountainous areas, and the ratio of forces of 2 armies to 2 armies (equivalent to brigades (1 division for 2

          Where have you (in Tashant) seen at least one soldier ?! laughing
          1. Nagaibak
            Nagaibak 15 July 2013 20: 07 New
            +1
            s1n7t "Where have you there (in Tashanta) seen at least one soldier ?!"
            Indeed, besides the border guards there is no one there. And in Chemal, the monument is a cannon.
          2. Rakti-kali
            Rakti-kali 15 July 2013 20: 24 New
            -1
            Quote: c1n7
            Where have you (in Tashant) seen at least one soldier ?!

            Are you really sure that CVO and Tashant are phenomena of the same order? Are you absolutely sure that both armies of the Central Military District should stand along the border? Do you really think that both Chinese armies in Lanzhouski VO are standing at the border of the Russian Federation, despite the fact that they still need to cover the borders with Pakistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and so on. And do not forget the Uyghurs, this is also the headache of Lanzhou VO.
            What will continue to look for soldiers in Tashant? Or will we still think rationally?
            1. s1н7т
              s1н7т 15 July 2013 22: 58 New
              0
              Quote: Rakti-Kali
              Or will we still think rationally?
              Let's rationally - more than 500 km to Tashanta from the Altai Territory. hell knows what road. In other places, I would not even drive. And when will your teams be there? Never.
              1. Rakti-kali
                Rakti-kali 16 July 2013 00: 02 New
                0
                Quote: c1n7
                Let's rationally - more than 500 km to Tashanta from the Altai Territory. hell knows what road. In other places, I would not even drive. And when will your teams be there? Never.

                And what? How will a potential aggressor attack there, without roads, along difficult mountainous terrain? Or Chinese tanks, like epic heroes, will fly without touching the ground, at a speed inaccessible to the eye? You would be frank at least would not write. From the place on the Chinese side where all roads (in general all) that are less suitable for the movement of columns of vehicles to the Russian border end there are another 70 km of forests, mountains and rivers, through which subspace tunnels the probable enemy will advance to our borders?
      7. Nagaibak
        Nagaibak 15 July 2013 19: 58 New
        0
        Mitek "And from the side of China, roads are approaching our border with a pavement that can withstand the passage of heavy equipment, there are rockets"
        I saw almost autobahns there. Two stripes in each direction. And where there is no second, they build and build quickly. Then you enter us and ...
    2. Revolver
      Revolver 14 July 2013 09: 31 New
      0
      Well, yes, that's why marines are fighting in Afghanistan. And again, when Bin Laden was wet, the maritime special forces worked. I wonder what kind of sea Afghanistan borders?
      1. Blackgrifon
        Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 12: 47 New
        +1
        Quote: Nagan
        Well, yes, that's why marines are fighting in Afghanistan. And again, when Bin Laden was wet, the maritime special forces worked. I wonder what kind of sea Afghanistan borders?


        Mb they are cutting something, but the divisional level remains. In addition, reductions are not made due to the backbone of the army - officers and sergeants. And we famously drove out under 200 thousand professionals and are still surprised - why everything is so bad and because of what the arsenals explode (for those who do not know - before, officers and contractors were responsible for the reception, storage and destruction of b / p), and now - draftees).
    3. Airman
      Airman 14 July 2013 12: 56 New
      +8
      Quote: 77bob1973
      The United States overseas their ground troops "as far as" so they are reducing what can be reduced. Before the Second World War, the United States had no tank units at all.

      Having switched to brigades, we immediately lost a set of divisional units: an artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft missile regiment, a missile division, a jet division, reconnaissance battalion, an automatic battalion, a battalion, a chemical battalion, a communications battalion and other units. A team without reinforcements cannot solve many problems. The transition to the brigade in the armed forces is considered a mistake.
      It was possible to transfer to brigades in the internal troops, special forces. So the divisions MUST be restored. And about the infrastructure, because it was, if it had not been sold out yet.
      1. cdrt
        cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 22 New
        0
        But a lie ...
        Have you seen the OSB OSBR? What did they lose there?
        It turned out, of course, the regiment with the ass of the division, but they didn’t lose anything
    4. Apologet.Ru
      Apologet.Ru 14 July 2013 18: 11 New
      0
      hi
      I fully support colleagues who claim that in the current conditions the Russian army needs both divisions and brigades. As well as the mixed principle of manning, both on draft and on contract. Everything will depend on in what places they are deployed, and what combat missions are put before them in the initial period of hostilities. Despite the antiterrorist wars, ethnic conflicts and shtetl conflicts, the intensity of the threat of global conflicts is not too high, and no one canceled using tactical nuclear weapons. Then it will definitely be too late to organize the process of returning to the divisional system. The whole problem lies in the extremes of those present in the reform of the troops. In addition, very often the final word is given to the lamp telepuziki who carried the main part of their service in the Arbat military district and make strategic decisions for the sake of their superior ministers with maximum lieutenant titles of “jackets” ...
    5. cdrt
      cdrt 14 July 2013 20: 50 New
      0
      The theme of the scripture is grateful, but.
      Well, US Army reductions - hmm ... if you count on the BCT, and in the combat battalions, then instead of 98 they will remain 96 ... such reductions wink
      Well, the division from - a modular formation, "assembled (tailored in the original) for specific conditions." Fully corresponds to our OK - OA of a new look.
      Their corps is a purely managerial structure, without full-time units, it is far from always formed.
      Their theater command is entirely our USC.
  2. Lavrik
    Lavrik 14 July 2013 08: 18 New
    +1
    Having transformed the brigades into divisions into the BBO (and where to get the money), we will still lose the Chinese ten times. In the west, 2 divisions created at the expense of other brigades (transferred to the regiments of these divisions), of course, will create 2 powerful fists. But this is such a trifle in comparison with NATO forces. The transfer of all ZVO brigades to a divisional basis will make it possible to create only 3-4 divisions in the western direction (a trifle that should not even be considered compared to NATO). Conclusion: the number of troops of the NE should be significantly increased (slightly more than 300 thousand people). And where to get the money? Can leave about 40 toy brigades for all NEs and calm down?
    1. Rakti-kali
      Rakti-kali 14 July 2013 10: 08 New
      +6
      Quote: Lavrik
      But this is such a trifle in comparison with NATO forces. The transfer of all ZVO brigades to a divisional basis will make it possible to create only 3-4 divisions in the western direction (a trifle that should not even be considered compared to NATO

      What does NATO have in Europe? Equivalent of the same 3-4 divisions at the borders of the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine.
      1. Misantrop
        Misantrop 14 July 2013 10: 59 New
        +3
        Quote: Rakti-Kali
        What does NATO have in Europe?

        In addition to Europe itself, there is an East nearby, which is not in vain called the Middle East. And there NATO is constantly forming, supplying, training and training just a gigantic number of semi-anarchic gangs, which are specifically targeted against the regular forces of the states. The example of the same Libya and Syria does not allow a frivolous dismissal of such a threat ...
        1. Rakti-kali
          Rakti-kali 14 July 2013 23: 44 New
          0
          Quote: Misantrop
          In addition to Europe itself, there is an East nearby, which is not in vain called the Middle East.

          The Russian Federation is going to fight in the BV?
          Quote: Misantrop
          And there NATO is constantly forming, supplying, training and training just a gigantic number of semi-anarchic gangs, which are specifically targeted against the regular forces of the states.

          How will the divisional structure improve the ability to combat illegal armed groups?
          1. Misantrop
            Misantrop 15 July 2013 00: 01 New
            +1
            Quote: Rakti-Kali
            How will the divisional structure improve the ability to combat illegal armed groups?

            Compare the composition of the reinforcements of the brigade and the division. Those that the division can use if necessary, IMMEDIATELY, and not after long and tedious coordination and shaking. Again, for the same size, the headquarters structure of the division has a significantly more impressive number of main divisions than the brigade. And IAF, unlike regular units, does not deliver one concentrated blow, but many small ones. And then the strength of the opposing structure, under a single command, plays an important role. The changed strategy is changing the way troops are used. The brigade structure is sharpened for destruction troop command and control structures enemy, to inflict quick and powerful point strikes. And the opposing illegal armed groups of such objects simply no, this mass is amorphous. But at the same time, every fighter is dangerous (since he is absolutely not connected by the moral and principles of warfare, for such an equally important goal is both a warehouse or headquarters, and a kindergarten or school). This, figuratively, is not a land mine that can be neutralized by unscrewing the fuse . Rather, it is a tank with acid; it does not have a point at which it needs to be hit to render it harmless ... request
            Quote: Rakti-Kali
            The Russian Federation is going to fight in the BV?

            No, sclerosis is a completely natural phenomenon, but not as much ... Has the multinational gang of the same Hottab in the mountains of Chechnya managed to be completely forgotten? Will you give a guarantee that tomorrow these same crowds of armed thugs will not show up in the same Ingushetia? Or do not rush through South Ossetia to the Russian Federation from the territory of the same Georgia?
            1. Rakti-kali
              Rakti-kali 15 July 2013 12: 40 New
              0
              Quote: Misantrop
              Compare the composition of the reinforcements of the brigade and the division.

              Tanks, motorized rifles, artillery, reconnaissance, sappers, doctors, signalmen are in the MRF, in the MRF. What means of reinforcement cannot the brigade use, but can the division take advantage?
              Quote: Misantrop
              Again, for the same size, the headquarters structure of the division has a significantly more impressive number of main units than the brigade.

              The division has a much more developed headquarters and this is its advantage over the brigade, unless of course the headquarters can work, and not replace the intelligence and commanders of units and subunits, if the headquarters organizesinteraction and supports the functioning of the control mechanism.
              In terms of the number of the "main divisions" of the ISBR, in fact, it is the ISBR ISD SA. Now the question is - did the mechanized infantry division often operate in full force in opposition to illegal armed groups, or did BTG and PTG stand out from their composition?
              In fact, modern MSBR is a ready-made PTH MTF. There are advantages here, in the form of simplified management, and cons - the inability of the MSBR to increase efforts or compensate for losses with its own funds.
              The result - for small-scale short-term warfare without decisive goals, the brigade is both cheap and cheerful. For a real war, it is preferable to have a divisional structure - it is more stable and better managed.
              Quote: Misantrop
              And IAF, unlike regular units, does not deliver one concentrated blow, but many small ones.

              And the most effective means of armed struggle against them are reinforced companies operating by the same partisan methods, with the support of the DRB and aviation.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. T-100
      T-100 14 July 2013 10: 35 New
      +6
      Having transformed the brigades into divisions into the BBO (and where to get the money), we will still lose the Chinese ten times. In the west, 2 divisions created at the expense of other brigades (transferred to the regiments of these divisions), of course, will create 2 powerful fists. But this is such a trifle compared to NATO forces.

      They do not want and will not be able to fight, and it is not even a matter of technology and financing, we are talking about spirit and faith, the belief that we must fight for our country, the belief in victory over the occupying forces, and this is a very serious factor. All the more alive there is still no one to take an example from - these are our veterans.
      They do not have such a factor, and as experience in conducting large-scale wars, they did not know what war is on their territory, our country and for half a century have not known rest from wars, how are they going to win at all. Destroying our strategic nuclear forces, factories, factories, thinking that we will bow before them in order to capture us they will have to kill us all !!!!
    4. Blackgrifon
      Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 12: 50 New
      0
      Quote: Lavrik
      Conclusion: the number of troops of the NE should be significantly increased (a little more than 300 thousand people). And where to get the money? Can leave about 40 toy brigades for all NEs and calm down?


      Mb then it’s easier to immediately surrender and disband the whole army? And then money will come.
      It is necessary to restore the army. And against China, first of all, concentrate the Air Force and Navy. Large contingents of internal troops are not stationed in the East either - there are too many civilians there who are potentially hostile to the Russian Federation.
      1. Reptile
        Reptile 14 July 2013 18: 59 New
        -7
        The main deterrent in the 21st century is the strategic nuclear forces. There is no sense in large contingents. They are being actively reduced even in the USA today.
        1. Lopatov
          Lopatov 14 July 2013 19: 11 New
          +1
          So tell the audience about "active reduction"
          1. Reptile
            Reptile 14 July 2013 19: 17 New
            -3
            Everything is simple: even a superpower does not see the point and does not have the capacity to maintain such and such an army.

            http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/krizis/235427-zakat-ameriki-geopoliticheskie
            -posledstviya-sekvestra-byudzheta-ssha

            There is no point in talking about Europe. It is necessary to develop a small army, sharpened by local conflicts. Riveting tank wedges and fantasizing about the war with China is not worth it.
            1. Reptile
              Reptile 14 July 2013 19: 22 New
              0
              Here is the correct link:

              http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/krizis/235427-zakat-ameriki-geopoliticheskie
              -posledstviya-sekvestra-byudzheta-ssha

              http://www.vmdaily.ru/news/2013/05/14/sekvestr-byudzheta-otpravit-v-besplatnie-o

              tpuska-grazhdanskij-personal-armii-ssha-196269.html
            2. Lopatov
              Lopatov 14 July 2013 19: 24 New
              +1
              Cool. Have reduced. Now, the American army is capable of waging, without mobilizing a reserve and transferring the economy to war, not two regional wars (not to be confused with a local conflict), but only one.
              Everyone became much calmer.
              1. Reptile
                Reptile 14 July 2013 19: 28 New
                0
                not two regional wars (not to be confused with local conflict)

                Tell me about the difference?
                but just one.

                In what sense?
          2. cdrt
            cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 27 New
            0
            12 brigades reduction. Only 2 battalions are fighting, but recon squadron is already cutting 12, talas too, artillery too. In general, they cut by 80 thousand snouts.
            1. Lopatov
              Lopatov 14 July 2013 22: 24 New
              0
              Quote: cdrt
              12 brigades reduction.

              Out of the 73s, not counting the ILC?
  3. Revolver
    Revolver 14 July 2013 08: 29 New
    0
    Or maybe everything is easier than it seems to the author? How many general posts are there in the brigade structure? And with the division? And the general is not only big stars on uniform and pants with stripes, and even not only general general allowance. It is also a car with a driver, and an apartment in a good house, and a summer house with a staff of servants.
    And again, the more generals with a small number of stars, the more generals with a large number of stars are required to command the above.
    1. Canep
      Canep 14 July 2013 08: 38 New
      +5
      According to the state, the division commander is major general, and the brigade commander is most likely the colonel’s fork is major general. So there is no particular difference in the number of generals. As for the car - UAZs were put to all the deputies of the divisor, and the Volga (now I don’t know what to give) to the divisional commander, the brigade commander most likely also had conscripts as drivers in our division, and the commander had an adjutant - ensign. Our division commander did not have a summer house. but there was an apartment in Almaty.
      1. soldat1945
        soldat1945 14 July 2013 09: 06 New
        18
        It’s the same thing in the brigades, now they have again entered the adjutant’s ensign posts, only the UAZs were put in place, the Volga was removed, the problem that the author raised didn’t stand the eggs, where a lot of divisions in the Caucasus, for example, always used either a regiment or BTGr (i.e. a reinforced battalion), question during the reform, he had to stand on increasing the firepower of existing units, instead they reduced the combat units and the new brigades turned into inflated carts with incomprehensible tactical use, and Makarov deliberately destroyed the Army for a long time;
        1. Blackgrifon
          Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 12: 53 New
          +1
          Quote: soldat1945
          It’s the same thing in the brigades, now they have again entered the adjutant’s ensign posts, only the UAZs were put in place, the Volga was removed, the problem that the author raised didn’t stand the eggs, where a lot of divisions in the Caucasus, for example, always used either a regiment or BTGr (i.e. a reinforced battalion), question during the reform, he had to stand on increasing the firepower of existing units, instead they reduced the combat units and the new brigades turned into inflated carts with incomprehensible tactical use, and Makarov deliberately destroyed the Army for a long time;


          The question is how long will they give us to disentangle? And why are Makarov and Serdyukov not yet held accountable for their actions ?!
      2. Lopatov
        Lopatov 14 July 2013 09: 22 New
        +2
        Not a fork, Major General.
        1. Rus2012
          Rus2012 14 July 2013 10: 47 New
          +3
          Quote: Spade
          Not a fork, Major General.

          on this basis, by the way, there were serious disputes:
          Major General
          and major general, brigade commander, what is the difference?
          And who is flawed ... :)
          In my humble opinion, there should be brigades and divisions.
          A division is a self-sufficient basis, and a brigade is a lightweight mobile and flexible structure.
          I recall a conversation with a division commander who was part of Afghanistan. He says they drove in completely equipped - even with the bridge-pontoon service, which there was no need for them and much more. But the pipelines with the materiel were very out of place, at first considered the fifth wheel ...
          Another air defense colonel - Grit and we were dragged to Chechnya with a division, just once during the whole war we used MANPADS - on the burning floor of a high-rise building. There was a sniper below the floor, but they couldn’t get it in another way.
          But "Shilki" - roamed to their heart's content ...
          1. Lopatov
            Lopatov 14 July 2013 13: 51 New
            +2
            Quote: Rus2012
            A division is a self-sufficient basis, and a brigade is a lightweight mobile and flexible structure.

            Here you are wrong. The Russian brigade is almost no different from its predecessor division. Only fewer combat units. Look at the OSH, for example, state No. 5/060
            1. Aleks tv
              Aleks tv 14 July 2013 15: 50 New
              +1
              Quote: Spade
              The Russian brigade is almost no different from its predecessor division. Only fewer combat units. Look at the OSH,


              Yes, there is.
              If you look at the organizational structure of the division and the modern brigade, then the feeling of two SMEs, TP, and ZRP thrown out of it. The rest of the units and units remained, though in a truncated form.
              This is exaggerated of course, but something like that.
              Those. The Brigade of the RF Armed Forces now has a very long and clumsy "tail".
              1. Lopatov
                Lopatov 14 July 2013 18: 54 New
                0
                Vague doubts torment me. Maybe it was sabotage, and the modern Russian brigade did not accidentally retain the divisional basis?
                1. Aleks tv
                  Aleks tv 14 July 2013 19: 54 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Spade
                  Maybe it was sabotage,

                  Babai knows them.
                  Yes, most likely it was faster to redo it to please the furniture maker, cutting linear parts. It is necessary to tinker with special equipment, take it to BHVT ... it’s a dreary long time, and they had terms.
                  Or maybe someone from the planners and hedged, sensing a possible return ...
                  But returning to divisions will still be difficult and expensive.
                  1. Lopatov
                    Lopatov 14 July 2013 20: 12 New
                    +1
                    Wow, "cut" B 58 A from one division, two brigades did. And from the 19th and from the 42nd. Motorized rifle. There, rather, on the contrary, not to cut, but to give birth.

                    It’s just that I can’t find any other explanation for such an original state.
                    1. Aleks tv
                      Aleks tv 14 July 2013 20: 22 New
                      0
                      Quote: Spade
                      In 58 A, two brigades were made from one division.


                      And for all Transbaikalia one motorized rifle brigade was left. It cut the division, the rest of the parts under the knife completely.
                      Another gunners left one unit.

                      Quote: Spade
                      It’s just that I can’t find any other explanation for such an original state.


                      I agree. It’s hard to explain.
                      1. Day 11
                        Day 11 14 July 2013 20: 27 New
                        +1
                        Do not dramatize anything. If you need to, put up five pieces of the bottom!
                      2. Lopatov
                        Lopatov 14 July 2013 20: 30 New
                        +1
                        In ZABVO, the show began under Gorbachev. For example, they re-equip the division with relatively new equipment, withdrawn from the European part on the CFE Treaty, and half a year after the end of rearmament, the division is disbanded.
                      3. cdrt
                        cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 42 New
                        0
                        Really in Transbaikalia cut military units, state of emergency, but not cropped?
                      4. Lopatov
                        Lopatov 14 July 2013 22: 19 New
                        0
                        There was no CHP. They cut deployed around the world. Plus, the remaining ones were turned into cropped ones, then into BHVT, when Serdyukov was completely disbanded.
                    2. Aleks tv
                      Aleks tv 15 July 2013 02: 16 New
                      0
                      Quote: Aleks tv
                      And for all Transbaikalia one motorized rifle brigade was left.


                      I got excited, forgot that there were still brigades in Buryatia: tank crews in Kyakhta and Ulan-Uda itself.

                      But this is not THREE Army of the Army, as it was ...
                  2. soldat1945
                    soldat1945 14 July 2013 22: 03 New
                    +1
                    42 division for your information was 18500 and out of three brigades it turned out 12500 so no one gave birth to anyone, and out of 19 divisions they made one brigade and one base with a total number of about 9000 and there were 15000 so there were so many people fired that are now in operation from stock set!
                    1. Lopatov
                      Lopatov 14 July 2013 22: 16 New
                      -1
                      In 19 divisions, only the Mozdok regiment was disbanded. The artillery regiment became an artillery brigade, 693 became the base of brigade personnel, 503 moved to its place on Sputnik. The 19th regiment did not have a tank regiment. What gave birth? Reactivists, anti-tankers, OBMO-RemBat, sappers, reconnaissance. Changed completely killed equipment. I would not say that they cost only reductions.
              2. cdrt
                cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 41 New
                0
                I think more truly - they wanted the best, but it turned out as always.
                Ehhh ... earlier, apparently now it’s forever "on maintenance" the forum could ask real staff officers, now everything repeat
          2. cdrt
            cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 39 New
            -1
            I probably agree about this state.
            To fans of divisions - the car would have time to chip in and buy, and in the Second World War.
            In my opinion, the optimum is the Ogarkov brigades and the KLA, but since Ogarkov at one time dared to offend the interests of the corporation, gobbled up without worrying. True, they doomed their own army to 20 years of decay, but no one laid it in the head as the consequences of their actions.
            By the way, everything seems to converge again to the Ogarkov brigades, and the KLA, which they seem to have sought with OK. Well, only at the tactical level are fertilized by the ideas of the same Striker brigades.
            Another question is that the Americans with real modularity are not mature enough, therefore, it turns out they have a manageable option, but we have monsters that lose their control for 2-3 days
            1. Lopatov
              Lopatov 14 July 2013 22: 36 New
              0
              Quote: cdrt
              By the way, everything seems to converge again to the Ogarkov brigades

              Yes, it is not known what it is necessary to strive for. Because it should be done differently than it is now. God knows, divisions are needed, no; brigades are needed or not. Or maybe somewhere in the Baikal region the battalion tactical groups will show themselves best, and military units are needed that can quickly and painlessly get rid of such BTGs during the war.

              So it is not necessary to deal with "eliminating the consequences of Serdyukovism", but real scientific and scientific-practical work.
              1. Day 11
                Day 11 14 July 2013 22: 52 New
                +1
                HERE! This is what I was waiting for, when you all come to this!
    2. aviamed90
      aviamed90 14 July 2013 19: 48 New
      -1
      Minesweeper

      This is before. To Serdyukov.

      And now? I heard that the division commander is in the category of "colonel", and the brigade commander is in the category of lieutenant colonel.
      1. aviamed90
        aviamed90 14 July 2013 21: 03 New
        0
        In aviation, this situation:

        Air bases are divided into three categories:
        1st equivalent to the previous aviation division - major general
        2nd - former aviation regiment - Colonel
        3rd — separate squadron — lieutenant colonel.
      2. cdrt
        cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 44 New
        0
        And rightly so - the colonels commanded divisions in the Second World War. And in the IDF brigades, it seems like in the hottest years 67-73, the colonels commanded
  4. Rakti-kali
    Rakti-kali 14 July 2013 09: 43 New
    +1
    Quote: Nagan
    Or maybe everything is easier than it seems to the author? How many general posts are there in the brigade structure? And with the division?

    Brigade commander = 1. Division commander = 1. Financial conspiracy theories fly by.
  5. quolta
    quolta 14 July 2013 09: 46 New
    -2
    I agree these 2 divisions have always been courtiers probably and beg for themselves
    1. Blackgrifon
      Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 12: 55 New
      0
      Quote: Quantu
      I agree these 2 divisions have always been courtiers probably and beg for themselves


      No, they were rather transformed for political purposes. No one in the know - did the Kantemirovsky staff revert to the division level?
      1. cdrt
        cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 45 New
        0
        They say there is a division, but the staff is actually like that of a brigade
  6. avt
    avt 14 July 2013 09: 52 New
    +2
    Quote: Nagan
    How many general posts are there in the brigade structure? And with the division? And the general is not only big stars on uniform and pants with stripes, and even not only general general allowance. It is also a car with a driver, and an apartment in a good house, and a summer house with a staff of servants.

    "The archer walked around me ..." laughing That's right, well, just a pun for which the stripes break. What prevents the same regiment of three battalion reinforcements from pumping up in the brigade? But even if they were ordered to be appointed by the Major General, it doesn’t sound, regiment for the colonel, it’s insulting to understand ... laughing
  7. piter-tank
    piter-tank 14 July 2013 12: 35 New
    +1
    That in the brigade, that in the division - there is only one general position - the commander.
    1. avt
      avt 14 July 2013 12: 55 New
      +4
      Quote: piter-tank
      That in the brigade, that in the division - there is only one general position - the commander.

      So that post! And here - the title, stripes, shoulder straps are different. Well, of course, the general doesn’t command a platoon, even if the scale name fellow will laughing In vain did the marshals again follow the army general’s epaulettes, they were reluctant to wear four stars, they feel more dignified with one big wreath.
    2. Airman
      Airman 14 July 2013 13: 20 New
      +4
      Quote: piter-tank
      That in the brigade, that in the division - there is only one general position - the commander.

      Now the brigade commander is at the level of the commander of a reinforced regiment, and he cannot pull the division. I know for what grandmothers they become brigade commanders and for what grandmothers they receive general ranks. Normal divisional commanders, when transferred to brigades, were dismissed, and in their place came "wild-growing" regiment commanders without the General Staff Academy.
      1. Day 11
        Day 11 14 July 2013 13: 25 New
        +3
        Plus to you! Only do not give out military secrets. The enemy sees everything
        1. Airman
          Airman 14 July 2013 20: 55 New
          +1
          Quote: Den 11
          Plus to you! Only do not give out military secrets. The enemy sees everything

          Rather, our mattresses on VO read and draw appropriate conclusions.
          1. Day 11
            Day 11 14 July 2013 20: 58 New
            +1
            Do you think not? The analytical department works seven days a week!
  8. cdrt
    cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 31 New
    0
    100500
    From the same opera - to restore the commander in chief, cropped divisions, separate the air force from the USC and close them to the air force headquarters. The goal of the corporation is understandable - more colonel / general positions are good and different ...
    It was absolutely correct that there were as many lieutenants in 2008 in the colonels of colonels (in the mass of people who had never fought before)
  • Akim
    Akim 14 July 2013 08: 38 New
    +5
    Russia needs divisions. Across the Urals, brigade formations are perfectly acceptable in the European part.
    1. svp67
      svp67 14 July 2013 09: 53 New
      +8
      Quote: Akim
      Russia needs divisions. Across the Urals, brigade formations are perfectly acceptable in the European part.
      Russia needs balanced, having good fire, managerial and maneuverable connectivity, and as I call them, I think the third thing ...
      1. Rus2012
        Rus2012 14 July 2013 10: 57 New
        0
        Quote: svp67
        and what to call them, I think the third thing ...

        ... that’s how it is, dear colleague!
        Only now ... the whole military history of Russia, which we remember, passed under the words - division (wild, mountain, iron ...) and regiment ...
        And that also means a lot ....
        1. cdrt
          cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 48 New
          -1
          Learning the history of the Second World War. Tank / motorized infantry just fell in 1941, so all the tank and mechanized units of the brigade corps and the whole war passed (and this was the sword of victory).
          And the red army / army division with an average number of 4-5 thousand people is a brigade, not a division
      2. Blackgrifon
        Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 12: 58 New
        +1
        Quote: svp67
        Russia needs balanced, having good fire, managerial and maneuverable connectivity, and as I call them, I think the third thing ...


        Team - a priori inferior in terms of firepower to the division. Compare the staff and structure of the US team and our team. And then the US division and our brigade.

        Quote: Rus2012
        Only now ... the whole military history of Russia, which we remember, passed under the words - division (wild, mountain, iron ...) and regiment ...


        Fortunately, almost the entire history of the military department was led by responsible people, not furniture makers.
        1. svp67
          svp67 14 July 2013 16: 24 New
          +1
          Quote: Blackgrifon
          Team - a priori inferior in terms of firepower to the division. Compare the staff and structure of the US team and our team. And then the US division and our brigade.
          This is all conditional. Take the period of World War II and compare the German tank division and our tank corps ...
        2. mole
          mole 14 July 2013 18: 33 New
          +1
          I agree! Furniture makers have nothing to do.
          What to call - the last thing. Maybe - mislead the enemy? The main thing is the ability to complete the tasks!
        3. cdrt
          cdrt 14 July 2013 21: 50 New
          -2
          And why not compare our brigade with their army?
          Our team surpasses them in power (if our states have 2 TB), their division = our OK. OK is superior to the US division.
  • Canep
    Canep 14 July 2013 08: 44 New
    +5
    In the 90s, in Kazakhstan, regiments were deployed into brigades, and Serdyukovsky clever men decided to reduce the divisions to brigades. This is the appearance of reforms, the number of personnel is being reduced - this is a saving, but the logistical support is being transferred to commercial rails - this is a cost. And at the same time, on the whole, its defense capability is decreasing. units and compounds do not have field rear structures. You can’t make merchants fight, it’s not profitable.
    1. Blackgrifon
      Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 13: 02 New
      +2
      Quote: Canep
      You can’t make merchants fight, it’s not profitable.


      During WWII, at one of the English airfields, civilian workers were supposed to repaint the GDP - its color greatly unmasked. The workers worked leisurely and earned more than the pilots. Officers dismissed them with indignation. That was until a journalist arrived at the airport (called by one of the commanders). After the scandal, the strip was painted over very quickly.
      Here's a real story from the commercial rear. Hair from "enlightened Europe".
      1. mole
        mole 14 July 2013 18: 39 New
        +1
        We are used to scandals. Serdyuk disgraced. We look forward to continuing ... Although in everyday life, maybe civil services are the most active answer. In case of mobilization, civilians should be dressed in uniforms and let them carry out the same tasks taking into account the specifics of military service during the war. request Life will show. The main thing is not life!
  • MIKHAN
    MIKHAN 14 July 2013 08: 45 New
    0
    I am not an expert in this matter, but the only thing I want to say is that any transformation and reform must be done very carefully and thoughtfully, especially if it concerns our Army !!
  • 77bor1973
    77bor1973 14 July 2013 08: 56 New
    +1
    It is just necessary to form such divisions which in their combat qualities would be superior to any division of the expected enemy, a division of 9000 people is one thing. another division 19000 In general, heavy divisions and brigades should be approached in the complex beyond the Urals, and in Europe brigades are possible.
    1. Russ69
      Russ69 14 July 2013 09: 01 New
      +4
      I guess I agree, you need to have a mixed composition and brigades and divisions. It all depends on the tasks and the theater of operations. Copying the American system is stupid; they have a completely different military doctrine.
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 14 July 2013 09: 23 New
        +1
        And so absolutely do not copy
      2. Blackgrifon
        Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 13: 04 New
        -1
        Quote: Russ69
        I guess I agree, you need to have a mixed composition and brigades and divisions. It all depends on the tasks and the theater of operations. Copying the American system is stupid; they have a completely different military doctrine.


        Rus69! So, as Comrade correctly remarked. Shovels, they do not copy it. If they had copied - it would have been nice - the Yankees had more engineering troops before the reforms than our ground forces. But we destroyed the structure of the army and the air force, and did not bring anything useful to its place.
  • rekrut
    rekrut 14 July 2013 09: 09 New
    +1
    There are too many advisers, and the military will fight. These guys have already reformed.
    1. aviamed90
      aviamed90 14 July 2013 19: 51 New
      -1
      rekrut

      The people and the army are ONE!
    2. Blackgrifon
      Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 21: 26 New
      -1
      Quote: rekrut
      These guys have already reformed.


      Who reformed - the furniture maker? At least they collected proposals from military universities, military officers and military analysts, and only then began the reform. And that happened in the whole army, as with the painting of airplanes, when the furniture maker said "I want everyone to be gray" (ugly, but monotonous) and by f.i.g. him for camouflage and other little things. Well, at least I didn't repaint the whole army in pink, I changed it.
  • Igarr
    Igarr 14 July 2013 09: 47 New
    +5
    Only in one thing I agree with the author - ".. As a result, the situation looks just strange: today we are restoring divisions only because several years ago they were eliminated ..."
    And it seems that these Russians are only concerned about military superiority.
    And honestly - is our business general only business? What to reform endlessly?
    They will pass exercises at the Far Eastern Military District and summarize. Develop recommendations.
    And in the spring we’ll hear what will be created ... what next thread - Airborne assault regiments .... or airborne divisions.
    Do not go to the grandmother.
    Just because - effective managers are focused on the process. And not the result.
    So I see.
  • Orik
    Orik 14 July 2013 10: 16 New
    -1
    At a time when domestic military science, even the recognition of the president of the Academy of Military Sciences, General Makhmut Gareev, is actually in a state of crisis, when we do not have an “established scientific theory of future wars”


    If so, then neither the division nor the brigade will help us. Remember the 41st when the mechanized corps could only heroically die in border battles, and the enemy was hardly stopped at the walls of Moscow. Moreover, we often outnumbered the Germans.
    1. Airman
      Airman 14 July 2013 17: 51 New
      +1
      [quote = Orik] [quote] In conditions when domestic military science, even the president of the Academy of Military Sciences, General Makhmut Gareev, admits, is actually in a state of crisis, when we do not have an “established scientific theory of future wars” [/ quote]

      Do we have military science? If we do not have an EXPRESSIVE MILITARY DOCTRINE, then military science must analyze the experience of local wars and draw conclusions. You just need to understand that any, big or small war will begin with an AIR-SPACE operation.
    2. aviamed90
      aviamed90 14 July 2013 19: 53 New
      0
      Orik-u

      I dare to assure you - it is.
      Pure truth!

      Nobody has been dealing with this issue for a long time.
    3. Rakti-kali
      Rakti-kali 14 July 2013 23: 59 New
      -1
      Quote: Orik
      Moreover, we often outnumbered the Germans.

      Rarely. Rarely. In 41-42, almost always the Germans outnumbered the Red Army.
      1. Day 11
        Day 11 15 July 2013 00: 02 New
        0
        It is foolish to deny the known! Let us count the number of divisions?
        1. Rakti-kali
          Rakti-kali 15 July 2013 12: 46 New
          0
          Quote: Den 11
          It is foolish to deny the known! Let us count the number of divisions?

          Do you want to tackle the score? wink If you want to, always contact, always ready to help count. hi
  • creak
    creak 14 July 2013 10: 18 New
    +3
    In this case, you can’t cut from the shoulder and it’s time to finally stop shy from side to side. One gets the impression that the most important issues of military development are adopted without serious discussion with the competent specialists who we still have and without considering the possible consequences. We are transferring army aviation to the Air Force, although the experience of Afghanistan convincingly proved that this can never be done. Now army aviation is returning to the Ground Forces. The role of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is being minimized, now they are trying to correct and liberate the General Staff from unusual functions, etc. Such experiments are too expensive - after all, it is not only about reducing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, but about the fate of tens and tens of thousands of people. And probably you shouldn’t hang all the dogs only on Serdyukov (everything is clear with him), a former beginning at one time. The General Staff Kvashnin broke a lot of firewood ... And instead of a serious and painstaking analysis of the situation until hoarseness, the issue of returning shoulder straps on a field uniform, reviving the so-called Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments. In the meantime, in leading posts we will have secret Heroes of Russia like Makarov, we will continue to make reciprocating movements with the results that we have displeasure to observe. Less euphoria and more sober analysis and relevant conclusions ...
    1. aviamed90
      aviamed90 14 July 2013 20: 00 New
      0
      ranger

      And who will deal with these issues?
      Those people who are appointed to these positions (often not even in their specialty) come there to "cut down the dough", and not to engage in science. And who makes the decisions on the appointment of the generals?
      Correctly!...

      That’s all military science with reforms!
  • erased
    erased 14 July 2013 10: 35 New
    +7
    I completely disagree with autororms about the Far East. To rely on peace treaties with China is stupid and dangerous. And the argument - the return of divisions will become expensive - does not roll at all. In the Far East, we need a powerful group of ground forces + tactical nuclear weapons. This will guarantee the containment of such a fickle ally. And of course, strategic nuclear weapons.
    As for the South - there brigades may be preferable, but this must be accurately calculated.
    And the song about the lack of finance asks for an answer - whoever does not want to feed his army will feed someone else's!
    1. Misantrop
      Misantrop 14 July 2013 11: 10 New
      +2
      Quote: erased
      To rely on peace treaties with China is stupid and dangerous.

      China, China, and three more China ... About not at all small in military and mobilization plan, and even having Japan territorial claims have already been safely forgotten? But she remembers ...
      1. Blackgrifon
        Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 13: 05 New
        +1
        Quote: Misantrop
        China, China, and three more China ... About not at all small in military and mobilization plan, and even having Japan territorial claims have already been safely forgotten? But she remembers ...


        Against China, only nuclear weapons or the mass of the air force with the Navy - the ground forces of the PLA will simply sweep away.
        1. svp67
          svp67 14 July 2013 16: 27 New
          +3
          Quote: Blackgrifon
          Against China, only nuclear weapons or the mass of the air force with the Navy - the ground forces of the PLA will simply sweep away.
          But even without them, we have nothing to do there - the territory or object is considered captured only when it was captured and held by infantry ...
          1. Aleks tv
            Aleks tv 14 July 2013 16: 31 New
            +2
            Quote: svp67
            But even without them, we have nothing to do there - the territory or object is considered captured only when it was captured and held by infantry ...


            To the very point.
          2. Day 11
            Day 11 14 July 2013 16: 34 New
            0
            You are absolutely right!
          3. Blackgrifon
            Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 21: 28 New
            0
            Quote: svp67
            But even without them, we have nothing to do there - the territory or object is considered captured only when it was captured and held by infantry ...


            I do not deny, svp67, but I think that priority should be done on the Far East on aviation, missile and fleet.
    2. mole
      mole 14 July 2013 18: 44 New
      0
      And technically equipped border protection with China. So that the DRGs did not break through. Plus counterintelligence operational component in the rear.
    3. aviamed90
      aviamed90 14 July 2013 20: 09 New
      0
      erased

      The Far East is big!

      What area did you mean when you talked about the NE and TNW grouping?
      Kuril Islands, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, Primorsky Territory, Amur Region?
      Everywhere its conditions, including purely geographical and natural ones. And if in the Primorsky Territory a division is the very thing, then in the Kuril Islands it is of little use. Here the rank of smaller troops are in demand.

      By the way, undeservedly forgot about UR! And in those conditions it is quite in demand (Primorye, Kamchatka, Kuril Islands).

      But the divisions would be very popular in Transbaikalia and South Siberia.

      But, in one you are right - these decisions should be analyzed and calculated. Yes, and about China - I agree.
  • MIKHAN
    MIKHAN 14 July 2013 10: 46 New
    0
    The Chinese live very compactly (everything is concentrated in the south ..) you can quickly destroy the main bases and communications .. (Chinese saboteurs are far away ..) The strike will be from the south after the fall of Syria and Iran .. Crowds of refugees without arms will run to us and take off Islamists .. That's where the problem will be (God forbid)
    1. smile
      smile 14 July 2013 12: 28 New
      +5
      MIKHAN
      A couple of dozen Chinese DRGs sent during the threatened period or de-preserved on the spot will disable the Trans-Siberian Railway. (And if more?) That's it. Far East will be forced to cope on their own. Enough of them? Recovery will take time. Will they give it to us?
      Who in general will look out for these prominent Chinese saboteurs?
      1. vladimirZ
        vladimirZ 14 July 2013 13: 59 New
        +1
        On action "Chinese DRGs dispatched during the threatened period or reactivated on the spot," which "will disable the Trans-Siberian Railway. (And if more?)" it is necessary in peacetime to plan and implement preparatory measures for the experience of the United States during the WWII. Then, millions of Japanese living in the United States, with all the households, were sent to isolation, concentration camps for the entire period of hostilities. Cruel, but there is no other way if we do not want to lose.
        1. smile
          smile 14 July 2013 14: 25 New
          +2
          vladimirZ
          All self-respecting countries have such plans. We are no exception. But protecting the Transsiberian from incapacitation by sabotage methods will not help. And it is difficult to carry out operational-search measures in the taiga and there is no one who has a very long piece of iron. Of course, strategic objects are protected ... but practice shows that you can destroy anything .... you must not underestimate the capabilities of the Chinese.
      2. mole
        mole 14 July 2013 18: 45 New
        0
        It is logical! The Chinese seem to be guarding the border. And in the rear there are a lot of them.
      3. Airman
        Airman 14 July 2013 20: 41 New
        0
        Quote: smile
        MIKHAN
        A couple of dozen Chinese DRGs sent during the threatened period or de-preserved on the spot will disable the Trans-Siberian Railway. (And if more?) That's it. Far East will be forced to cope on their own. Enough of them? Recovery will take time. Will they give it to us?
        Who in general will look out for these prominent Chinese saboteurs?

        There are about 8-10 million Chinese in the Far East and southern Siberia, officially less by an order of magnitude, but even if 1% of them are trained saboteurs, this is enough to disrupt communications, communication lines, and transport links. And all the movements of our troops will be opened immediately, and brought to the Chinese command.
  • S-200
    S-200 14 July 2013 10: 55 New
    -3
    There is nothing wrong with the constant construction (reconstruction) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in peacetime. This process is natural and responds to the challenges and threats posed by a potential adversary (by adopting new types of weapons, etc.). Worse if there is no clear scientific concept for future wars ...
    1. Reptile
      Reptile 14 July 2013 19: 00 New
      0
      The circus itself is bored, not the reformation. Step forward and two back.
  • kagorta
    kagorta 14 July 2013 11: 11 New
    +8
    Do not forget that the amers brigades are united in a division. And in this divisional component of which there is nothing. Some reconnaissance helicopters
    Here's an example of their famous 1st Infantry, which is mechanized and based in Fort Riley, Kansas. It includes:
    1st Brigade (Devil Brigade)
    2nd Brigade (Dagger Brigade)
    3rd brigade battle group (Duke Brigade)
    4th Infantry Brigade Battle Group (Dragon Brigade)
    1st Combat Aviation Brigade (Demon Brigade)
    1st Support Team
    75th Fire Brigade

    This is due to the aviation division, and ours, as always, are not consistent. I thought they cut the brigades, like those of Amers, they will restore order in them and begin to combine them with the helicopter component in the division too. And we will again create a general with headquarters, with an adjutant and a UAZ with the Volga.
    1. Blackgrifon
      Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 13: 07 New
      0
      Quote: kagorta
      This is due to the aviation division, and ours, as always, are not consistent. I thought they cut the brigades, like those of Amers, they will restore order in them and begin to combine them with the helicopter component in the division too. And we will again create a general with headquarters, with an adjutant and a UAZ with the Volga.


      Before the reform, our divisions were combined, autonomous formations. Helicopters and engineers were needed + mat. Technical support.
    2. mole
      mole 14 July 2013 18: 47 New
      0
      If only to "the general with the staff, with the adjutant and the UAZ with the Volga" did not slide!
    3. aviamed90
      aviamed90 14 July 2013 20: 23 New
      0
      kagorta

      You don’t look at the names and signs! Not everything that is called a brigade is such. Again, in whose terminology? Our or amersky?
      Specify, otherwise you can get confused.


      I now remember a precedent when 1 air defense fighter regiment, 1 bomber aviation regiment, 2 separate air squadrons and a separate transport aviation squadron, 1 air defense division (3-zrp, 1-rtp), 1 mercury brigade, 1 about Rab were loudly called the "Air Force and Air defense "!

      By the way, about the shelves. Now in the air regiment 2 squadrons, as you know, and not 3. And the name ("sign") is the same. And the difference, as you understand, is significant.

      You see at the root - how many people and equipment there are!
  • Alekseev
    Alekseev 14 July 2013 11: 16 New
    +4
    Quote: S-200
    There is nothing wrong with the constant construction (reconstruction) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in peacetime.

    The constant stupid, unfounded, restructuring of the Armed Forces is "worse than a universal conflagration."
    Moreover, the issue of divisions and brigades was conceived by reformist traitors.
    The organizational structure of the troops is determined by what they are supposed to be used for. That is the tasks. Simply put, when a divisional structure is needed, and sometimes it is superfluous, a brigade can be dispensed with.
  • vladsolo56
    vladsolo56 14 July 2013 11: 38 New
    +3
    Divisions are brigades, brigades are divisions, but in essence, as in that Krylov’s fable about musicians. The point is not how to name and how to form, but who will manage all this. If competent smart commanders then everything will be fine, and if mediocrity, then everything is useless.
  • Yuri Y.
    Yuri Y. 14 July 2013 12: 17 New
    +1
    In my opinion, the author contradicts himself. This is about the lack of the need to restore the division, then about their existence in the US Army.
  • knn54
    knn54 14 July 2013 12: 20 New
    +3
    A division for the construction of a summer residence is not needed. "Brigade" - just right. A. Serdyukov.
  • Andrew
    Andrew 14 July 2013 12: 28 New
    +2
    To strengthen the Far East, it is necessary not to reform the local brigades, but to create new divisions, and for this to increase the number of armed forces at least by 130 thousand (for 10 divisions). And as already mentioned, create an SD and move the storage base away from the border. And relations with China resemble relations with Hitler; they strengthened cooperation, made friends, ruined the defense, and everyone remembered what came of it.
    1. Blackgrifon
      Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 13: 10 New
      +1
      It is not enough for 130 thousand - not less than 200 thousand. And to maximize them with aviation, missile forces and the fleet, then there is a small chance to keep the Far East - the PLA is not "whipping boys" and they took into account the experience of fighting with the USSR.
    2. Day 11
      Day 11 14 July 2013 13: 10 New
      -6
      Andrei, now the Chinese are allies to us! And there’s nothing to pour water here! What will happen then, only the Almighty knows! Now the most important thing is to save Syria! Everything else will come later! There will be a problem --- we will also ruin it!
      1. Blackgrifon
        Blackgrifon 14 July 2013 21: 32 New
        0
        Quote: Den 11
        Andrei, now the Chinese are allies to us! And there’s nothing to pour water here! What will happen then, only the Almighty knows! Now the most important thing is to save Syria! Everything else will come later! There will be a problem --- we will also ruin it!


        Alexander III correctly said: "Russia has only 2 allies - the army and the navy." China has its own interests and when it squeezes it will not reckon with the interests of Russia - remember history.
        1. Day 11
          Day 11 14 July 2013 21: 39 New
          0
          I remember the story! We all just know that we now VERY need China as a friend! They have their own problems with Muslims
  • Alexanderlaskov
    Alexanderlaskov 14 July 2013 12: 39 New
    +2
    We need divisions. The decision is right. Brigades are also needed. Money for the army is not necessary to spare.
    1. yanus
      yanus 14 July 2013 14: 02 New
      -2
      Quote: Alexanderlaskov
      We need divisions. The decision is right. Brigades are also needed. Money for the army is not necessary to spare.

      And the compote? .. They forgot the compote ...
  • knn54
    knn54 14 July 2013 13: 52 New
    +1
    -Alexander: We need divisions.
    A bit of history. The only thing that distinguished the Soviet cavalry division in August 1939 from the Polish cavalry brigade was the presence of a mechanized regiment of forty-eight BT-7 tanks. Otherwise, these mobile connections are almost IDENTICAL. BUT the Poles were armed with PTR, which we practically did not have at the beginning of the Second World War.
    There is NO money for the army in EVERYTHING in the country. Therefore, a battle-worthy brigade is better than a half-dead division.
    As part of the NEW motorized rifle brigade, two 152 mm. self-propelled howitzer battalions, Gradov’s division, anti-tank division. And all this is directly subordinate to the brigade commander and he can use all this without any coordination with the divisional commander .. And the powerful technical base and rear support (for example, repair units) that the division had were easy to distribute among the regiments - but without EXCESSIONS.
    As for the Yankees, they spend money on technical re-equipment. But they don’t need SV: there are private armies, cannon fodder of the allies and a “pseudo-Muslim” rabble .. For everything, the Gay country simply does not have enough human resources.
    During the Soviet era, there were ONLY more generals in Moscow than in the WHOLE US Army. The brigade commander is a colonel, the commander is ALREADY major general ... Well, money for another reorganization can be cut down.
    War, it’s not who shoots anyone, but who changes their minds!
    Sergeant Major Vaskov (film "The Dawns Here Are Quiet").
    PS "We call ourselves the 6th Tank Army because we have only six tanks left." (Josef "Sepp" Dietrich April 1945).
    1. Day 11
      Day 11 14 July 2013 14: 02 New
      0
      The Hans also had cavalry divisions. During the war, they only increased them (number). Florian Geer, does he mean anything to you?
      1. Aleks tv
        Aleks tv 14 July 2013 16: 22 New
        +1
        Quote: Den 11
        The Hans also had cavalry divisions.


        Almost out of place, but it was recalled that we also had Horse-Mechanized Groups (KMG) in the Second World War.
        They were successfully used with tanks about breakthroughs and raids on the shallow rear of the enemy.
        KMG was a bit.
  • Jurkovs
    Jurkovs 14 July 2013 13: 56 New
    0
    Some officers were unable to reorganize to a brigade base, while others refused to undergo rotation and did not exchange the Arbat military district for a province, even with a promotion. The authorities succumbed to the blackmail of the Moscow Region officers, and a "palace coup" took place with the participation of the Life Guards.
  • yanus
    yanus 14 July 2013 14: 00 New
    +5
    The author is naive to tears. Some kind of analysis ... It all comes down to laziness, window dressing and populism.
    Laziness brings to mind the brigade, which is tactfully said at the beginning of the article. it really says that it is "difficult"))
    Populism, because nobody loved Serdyukov, you eat a stool)) All actions of Serdyukov are now a priori wrong and must be redone. Hamsters people will like it))
    Window dressing for the layman. Here the author wonders why they started not from the Far East but from Kantemirovskaya and Tamanskaya. Do you know how many names of divisions in the Far East? And everyone knows Kantemirovskaya and Tamanskaya, and you can also drive them to the parade and report to the audience about the reform
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 14 July 2013 14: 03 New
      +1
      Here you are right. Neither subtract nor add
  • FC SKIF
    FC SKIF 14 July 2013 14: 07 New
    +1
    I am not an expert in this matter, but I am sure that almost any innovations from Serdyukov - the pest are fatal. So return as it was, but the Americans have nothing to level off, they really never even knew how to fight.
  • dizelniy
    dizelniy 14 July 2013 15: 06 New
    0
    Quote: S-200
    There is nothing wrong with the constant construction (reconstruction) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in peacetime. This process is natural and responds to the challenges and threats posed by a potential adversary (by adopting new types of weapons, etc.). Worse if there is no clear scientific concept for future wars ...

    Relocating in our time of the RF to a new duty station, as a rule, means leaving officers homeless, a lack of discipline, deterioration in the conditions of service of military service, open-air equipment, promises that are not fulfilled, the general mood is on fire. These are our ongoing reforms due to drugs. All front-line aviation ended up in a 300 km border strip, without shelters, crowded basing, our leaders learned from 1941. teach?
  • kartalovkolya
    kartalovkolya 14 July 2013 15: 12 New
    +2
    Lord, when will the reforms be carried out for the benefit, and not for the sake of reckoning? Well, learn from historical examples: after the Spanish events, according to Pavlov’s report on the use of tanks, what did you do? Yes, they actually disbanded the tank corps, and the Germans did not think about such a fool. And how did it end? But when the tank corps and armies were revived and where the same Guderian ended up! You can’t carry out reforms like an elephant in a china shop.
  • Aleks tv
    Aleks tv 14 July 2013 15: 15 New
    +4
    ... as part of the reform of the Armed Forces and the optimization of the command structure, a fundamental decision was made to reduce the number of units in the command and control system ...
    Yes, a good goal, but somehow the most important thing has been forgotten - WHAT will these effective links manage? What parts and units? Only battalions in the brigades ...

    ... Divisions have traditionally been the main tactical formations of the Ground Forces ...
    Yes, and yes again - YES.
    A division is a self-sufficient military unit capable of performing almost any tactical and even operational task.

    ... the likelihood of classic large-scale operations using numerous ground forces has become extremely small ...
    Pass it on to a likely enemy, for example in the East. Like everything, "ales", so the war is no longer waged. To fight in divisions is no longer comme il faut. Like "follow the fashion", otherwise experts will laugh at you.

    ... the personnel of the Shenyang Military District of the PRC bordering with Russia reaches a quarter of a million people. At the same time, the mobilization capabilities of the Chinese armed forces in comparison with ours seem simply unlimited ...
    In fact of the matter…
    Friendship and chewing gum are of course very good, but why cut the armored train on the emergency route? Let yourself stand, make friends only with a potentially strong partner, and capture the weak, sooner or later.

    ... In this context, the reconstruction of divisions in the Far East may not be completely correctly understood by our partners and colleagues ...
    Ah, it’s inconvenient for us in front of the neighbors that we can hint at something, hint that we are also strong ... Ah-ah-ah, how convenient it is for me to tie a blue handkerchief to me so that the neighbors can see my good intentions.

    ... How many divisions do we need to recreate? ...
    As much as needs. This is the task of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

    ... "soft underbelly" in the South. The main type of opponents here is traditionally irregular formations of militants and terrorists operating both within Russia and outside its national territory ...
    BTGry - the most effective battle group, is no longer required. So PRACTICE showed. As well as smaller units that operate under the wing of BTGr. These groups can be created both from brigades and from divisions.

    ... So it turns out that the reconstruction of the Kantemirovskaya and Taman divisions near Moscow has some other reasons that experts can only guess about ...
    Yes, the military aspect is not enough. Military-patriotic and maintaining the most important element - Military Traditions, this is clearly correct.

    ... What does it mean to create or recreate a division? ...
    THIS IS A HUGE HEAD PAIN.
    The author has very well painted the necessary infrastructure, which is currently destroyed. And besides this - where to get the rank and file, where to get junior officers in the absence of graduations from military institutions, to restore the equipment that is on the BHVT and ... still a hell of a wagon of questions.
  • Aleks tv
    Aleks tv 14 July 2013 15: 16 New
    +2
    Continued:

    ... Having made the brigades the main tactical formation of their Ground Forces, the United States nevertheless did not abandon the divisions ...
    A thousand times - YES.
    Amer on the basis of the division made a kind of symbiosis that can solve a lot of problems. As an independent most powerful combat unit, it will sweep away almost any enemy. With other tasks, it quickly transforms into separate brigades, sharpened by the personnel and equipment of the division for specific combat missions. The replenishment of all resources when performing hostilities comes from the division itself, which does not cause leapfrog among the rear units. "chm.shniki" they are very quick.

    ... The infantry, tank, artillery (fire) battalions and divisions that make up the brigades today still retain the traditional regimental numbering in their names, the origins of which go back to the events of the American War of Independence and the Civil War. Each regiment has its own glorious fighting history, and today all military personnel honor and observe the historical traditions, norms of behavior and customs of their regiments ...
    Traditions are the most important part of the morale of a fighter, everyone who was in the army understands this.
  • Aleks tv
    Aleks tv 14 July 2013 15: 16 New
    +5
    Continued:

    And the conclusion is quite simple in terms of Strategy, Operational Art and Tactics:
    - Each theater should have those organizational and staff structures of troops and units that will most of all meet the requirements of ALL tasks on this theater, and also, by virtue of necessity, should be able to replace other units located on other theater.

    For example, everyone knows that the ZGV consisted mainly of tank divisions for a vigorous passage to the English Channel, but few know that at the same time in the ZABVO there were mainly artillery-machine-gun divisions on the border with China (by cap and cap) ... I’ll add that units of the 12 GUMO with tactical nuclear weapons closely clung to these divisions and they acted together, they drove had "cunning sappers."
    And so it was in the USSR. Lisaped has long been invented.

    Both divisions and separate brigades are needed, each with its own tasks. I am absolutely sure of that.
    A division is a medvel that destroys everything and can transform into small predators, but it’s not always handy to climb into a “hole”.
    The brigade is a fast trot, but in isolation from the "den" it will not last long. Do not forget that our brigades now have the “tail” of the support units almost the same as the divisions, i.e. this is a very clumsy tail.
    The coordinated work of individual brigades is MUCH MORE DIFFICULT than the work of regiments of one division, the teachings have proved this.

    One question that has been bothering me since the announcement of the re-establishment of Cantemir and Taman:
    Now we have a three-star management system “District - Operational Management - Team. So Makar push the division here now ??? As a brigade or as operational management ???
    Believe me, this is a very important issue and a considerable headache. This is a matter of control, communications, supply, and in general is one of the most important issues of the Armed Forces Directorate.
    For example, how will an alarm from Moscow go to the units?
    I don’t see anywhere discussing the decision to “push” the division into the current three-star management system.


    The author is very grateful for the article. Definitely - Plus.
    A hot topic and well written, it is difficult to reveal the topic more strongly - too much needs to be described.
    I apologize for the too long opus; my colleagues and I almost always talk about this when we meet in the “kitchen”. Eheh.
    1. Day 11
      Day 11 14 July 2013 15: 32 New
      +1
      I wish you good health! Excellent painted. Plus to you.
      1. Aleks tv
        Aleks tv 14 July 2013 16: 19 New
        0
        Quote: Den 11
        Good health, I wish!


        Hello, I wish Denis.
        hi
    2. aviamed90
      aviamed90 14 July 2013 20: 33 New
      +1
      Aleks tv

      Totally agree with you.
  • My doctor
    My doctor 14 July 2013 15: 58 New
    0
    Quote: Misantrop
    In addition to Europe itself, there is an East nearby, which is not in vain called the Middle East.

    bugaga, poor student. The name "Middle East" was given by the Greeks. For them it is the Middle East, but for us geographically it is not even the East at all. lol
    1. Day 11
      Day 11 14 July 2013 16: 13 New
      0
      Don't do it right away! Slowly, little by little, learn. There will be minuses, hammer
  • Old warrior
    Old warrior 14 July 2013 16: 10 New
    +3
    I do not understand why Mr. Popov was prevented by the division. Russia is not Iraq or Yugoslavia ... "They are afraid of our enormity ..." (C) Emperor Alexander III. The states will get sick of disrupting our infrastructure throughout our vast territory. Any very limited conflict can always turn into a large-scale (which our enemies do not want so much) war, but here, just here, one cannot do without divisions, as well as cover the vast expanses of the Far East and Siberia. It is annoying that "experts" like Popov are trying to fool our ears about the "peacefulness" of the West - a lie! What's going on in Europe today? You yourself know. They just haven't figured it out yet, to shave their marginalized into the army and send them to the next crusade to Russia.
    I wonder whose money the author works out. sad
  • Per se.
    Per se. 14 July 2013 17: 30 New
    0
    In principle, a division could consist of two brigades instead of 4-5 regiments. The number of headquarters would be reduced, and collective armaments, like the same artillery from regimental batteries, could be more rationally divided into two brigades. In any case, where which structure is more advantageous, what kind of troops, you need to look specifically, not losing sight of and against whom, in which direction it is supposed to be used. It would not have been possible for our scanty brigade to be against a full-fledged Chinese or NATO division. As for the number of troops, if you lean on the contract army, the costs will naturally increase, and the mobilization reserve will begin to melt. Until they begin to use the constitutional duty, increasing the service life, and dividing the mandatory urgent for all military and civilian, the problem can not be resolved.
  • tank64rus
    tank64rus 14 July 2013 17: 47 New
    +2
    Well, what does the author want to clearly justify at least somehow the actions of Serdyukov and Makarov, they say, not everything that they did with the army is Oboronservis. Here they have already written about the difference between the division and the brigade, this one is a self-sufficient connection both tactically and partially operational. Second, if, as my students from the troops told me, the modern brigade is a regiment oversaturated with rear units, which because of this has lost its mobility and efficiency. In the SA there were brigades of the Airborne Forces, Marine Corps, mountain rifle brigades, etc. But they performed special tasks or operated a specific theater of operations. The Americans have a brigade component of the division, which is formed for the desired option of warfare and nothing more. It is bad when military science is sacrificed to a political moment.
  • waisson
    waisson 14 July 2013 18: 15 New
    0
    why it was necessary to break everything that was thought out in difficult combat conditions and not as now sitting at the headquarters
  • angarchanin
    angarchanin 14 July 2013 18: 50 New
    0
    It is difficult for me to judge the organizational and staffing structure of the NE, Navy, but I served in the DA for more than a dozen years and I can definitely say that the DA, being a reserve of the Supreme High Command, fulfilling strategic tasks, unnecessarily had a division and corps (and a little later, an army). Let me explain: in the seventies and nineties 70-80% of regiment commanders had behind their back the knowledge gained at the General Staff Academy. All more or less serious tasks (their implementation) were planned at the headquarters of the DA and sent for implementation to the regiments. The corps (army) to a greater extent carried out logistical support, the division - the role of the mailbox.
  • s1н7т
    s1н7т 14 July 2013 19: 07 New
    +1
    The article is a minus. The author has never seen either a division or a brigade "from the inside", does not reflect that they have different tasks. And not at all in the subject. Let me remind you that the USSR Armed Forces had divisions, corps, and divisions. brigades. The elimination of the "extra link" is nonsense for suckers. My separate battalion, if something happens, did not wait for the command of the division. The command was received immediately from the army, while the package was being opened, confirmation came from the "opera" of the division (the scoreboard was still working) - and that's it! Those. the shelves were apparently in the same situation. Transferring the RF Armed Forces to brigades was also stupid because there is no corresponding and detailed part in the military doctrine for them - i.e. hell knows why, why and for what - what, the BUSV has already been rewritten, or what? In short, unprofessional nonsense. soldier
  • pamero
    pamero 14 July 2013 19: 43 New
    0
    Proto chatter. We need analytic adjustments; without them, everything is empty!
  • UFO
    UFO 14 July 2013 21: 30 New
    +2
    Article +, since the topic will still come to the fore. Comments - as in the dispute "about the path of Russia." It is clear that the theater of operations in the European part of the country and the Far East theater of operations are different things, but it was not for this that "THEY" carried out the reform, so that now everything would be returned back. In my opinion, everything is more or less clear with the "brigades in the European and Southern directions", but in the Far East without divisions, "if something happens" is indispensable. "But you can't turn the river back." In an amicable way, each million-plus city needs cadre divisions of a 2-battalion - regimental composition (for training conscripts) with warehouses of equipment and logistics, the last million-plus city to the east is Krasnoyarsk, which means that personnel divisions are needed for: Irkutsk, Ulan-Ude, Chita , Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok. And preferably: Murmansk and Kaliningrad. In total, we get about 23 divisions of accelerated formation, and while the brigades in the Far East will "get tangled in the laces" of the potential aggressor, these divisions will have time to redeploy to the theater of operations.
    Quote: Aleks tv
    Both divisions and separate brigades are needed, each with its own tasks. I’m absolutely sure of this. A division is a medvel that destroys everything and can transform into small predators, but it’s impossible to climb into the “hole” constantly. The team is a fast lynx, but in isolation from the “den” it will not last long

    I completely agree. And at this stage, an explosive regiment is needed in Tynda (from the DRG), a mountain brigade south of Neryungri on the Stanovoye Upland, to close the passage to South Yakutia, a Marine brigade on Sakhalin with an area of ​​responsibility from Kamchatka to Khabomai. It would also be good to place in the area of ​​the Timpton Aldan-Tommot-Swan airbase "strategists" - a la Engels-2, with a patrol zone Alaska-Chile-Australia-SEA.
    The above will not lead to a significant increase in drugs, but the effect will be significant. hi
  • JackTheRipper
    JackTheRipper 14 July 2013 21: 47 New
    +1
    Chatter is not chatter, but there is something in it ... The balance of forces between Russia and NATO (even for 2007, but how many tanks, planes and ships have been adopted since then?):
  • chenia
    chenia 14 July 2013 21: 50 New
    +1
    A two-level approach to the formation of the armed forces is needed. DRAWBAR (reserve training centers-TsPR) and CONTRACT (constant readiness troops).

    CPR - educational units or units, a program according to the methodology of the Military School (if we discard general civilian disciplines, command training), it is quite possible to have a reserve for a year where EVERYONE will be trained across the entire spectrum of military-technical training in the battalion, division.

    And the troops of constant readiness can have a brigade structure. But at the same time, the brigade structurally repeats the division, and it has the equipment for the division. But the cadre division, i.e. the brigade must be prior to separation (in a platoon division). For example, a brigade includes battalions and divisions, companies and platoons, respectively, regiments, battalions (divisions), and company divisions. In battalions (this is already a part) companies - structurally repeat battalions, etc., until separation. Then the brigade will be completely combat-ready formation immediately (in contrast to the cropped regiment.

    There was a situation in which there is no need for deployment, the brigade is fully combat-ready unit with full-time (to the brigade) equipment performs the task, and the cops or escort units guard the abandoned equipment.

    A general mobilization then in units, even in units will be a third of the composition of contract soldiers. Well, of course, further from the corps to the army.
  • quolta
    quolta 14 July 2013 23: 24 New
    0
    Well, the Emergencies Ministry wanted a nickname and renamed it, a man did not serve a day in the army what to take from him, does anyone know what they gave him the Hero for?
    1. Day 11
      Day 11 14 July 2013 23: 29 New
      0
      I know! He, at the EBN, when they pressed him, opened the Ministry of Emergency Situations with AK. The Army men did not want to, and he opened
  • ammunition
    ammunition 15 July 2013 03: 57 New
    +4
    Dear Readers ,

    Mobile forces for operations abroad = good and right. But I want to pay attention to another nuance.
    Here is a quote from the article -
    "" "
    demonstrate the advantages of a relatively small but maneuverable force capable of attacking the enemy from a considerable distance - without warning and with deadly efficiency. .. "" "

    This fact is repeated from article to article .. in a variety of variations.
    Yes! This is a fair fact! But !! BUT!!
    It is valid solely for the aggressor.
    It is fair for those who wreak havoc and rebellion in other countries.
    ---------
    This fact is repeated like incantations .. mantras .. And now our officers (some) have a "conviction" that a brigade .. like .. is better than a division.
    Well, Dushenov ... who said that the division is a cumbersome organization, which is suitable only for war at the front. He is a former sailor .. he is allowed to make mistakes.
    ====
    But you then ... you must understand the infantry and land things!
    --------
    Russia has a task directly opposite to the aggressors. Russia will never wreak havoc and rebellion - wars in the underbelly of America. Moreover, go for an intervention.
    The task of our armed forces is to defend our territory. Including from rebellion-war ... that is, "partisanship".
    Do you know what the "blue" dream of bandits from groups that are waging a rebellion-war against this or that country?
    This dream is to crush the armed forces of the attacked country into small semi-partisan units in order to chase each other across the country. Repeatedly increasing chaos.
    --------
    But the division covers a controlled territory, like a concrete slab. And any chaos in the entrusted territory ceases.
    Once again I will try to explain it on my fingers. The power of even a company, as part of a division, is many times greater. The company co-leader ... (if the regimental is not enough) in a minute calls up divisional artillery ... And every meter of the entrusted territory has been shot. The company commander calls the divisional aviation (attack and transport helicopters) in a minute ... The company commander requests information from the divisional intelligence chief in a minute. And the division's intelligence chief is not anybody else. And the division's reconnaissance battalion is a serious unit, capable of gathering intelligence across the entire spectrum. Though "languages", even radio interception, even reconnaissance in force) action on the ground). All support services of the division work for the company commander. Where there is a division, there are almost no losses from "friendly fire". Because the units and the officer corps of the division are driven in and coordinated in numerous command and control exercises and exercises. The division has the forces and means of the entire spectrum. The division closes the entrusted territory without gaps.
    -----
    You can go on a lot .. I just want to ..,
    1. Aleks tv
      Aleks tv 15 July 2013 13: 49 New
      +1
      Quote: ammunition
      All support services of the division work for the company commander. Where there is a division, there are almost no losses from "friendly fire".


      Precisely said Nicholas.
      This was shown by the experience of military operations in the Czech Republic and the current exercises.
      Wonderful comment.
  • Jurkovs
    Jurkovs 15 July 2013 06: 29 New
    -1
    It seems that yesterday is arguing with the day before yesterday. And the next "41 years" will show that today something fundamentally new is needed, for example, well-coordinated and outrageously armed special forces groups, using network communication and interaction technologies.
  • Sochi
    Sochi 15 July 2013 13: 06 New
    +1
    It’s hard to say, since it’s not a strategist ... but I think that the division should be the basis, but to help it, in the operational-tactical plan, and in the case of large-scale military operations, as a reinforcement in threatened areas, and to perform tasks for which the division redundant brigades are needed - mountain rifle, air defense brigades, tank, motorized rifle and mixed squad, depending on the theater of operations.
    1. s1н7т
      s1н7т 15 July 2013 13: 24 New
      +1
      Quote: Sochi
      in the case of large-scale military operations as reinforcements in threatened areas, and to fulfill tasks for which the division is redundant, brigades are needed

      And why, for example, can not do with a regular regiment from the neighboring division? fellow
      However, in the USSR Armed Forces all this already happened: divisions consisting of brigades, and regiments as part of the corps, and mechanized battalions and many others, but everything, as you rightly noted, depends on the nature of the theater of operations. It’s simply that the most significant and therefore well-known group of forces was oriented towards a full-scale war with NATO with all its features - from here, probably, everyone thinks that the armed forces were exclusive. from divisions, but it’s not. And all these throwing division-brigade-division - from political myopia, probably, since we don’t know what war and with whom we must be prepared first. soldier
  • Sochi
    Sochi 15 July 2013 15: 03 New
    +1
    Quote: c1n7
    And all these throwing division-brigade-division - from political myopia, probably, since we don’t know what war and with whom we must be prepared first.
    Here I completely agree with you, and I want to note that, as Napoleon said, the generals are preparing for the past war ... here ours were preparing for a war like the Chechen one. And what it will be next - no one really knows. Because such a structure, such as it was under the USSR, is most optimal and ready for any type of action (under the condition of training troops in various scenarios)
  • chenia
    chenia 15 July 2013 20: 37 New
    0
    The whole point is in the number of military formations. There is a certain number of hp, and you need to have the greatest number of combat-ready formations. If these are divisions, then they will be three times less than brigades.

    And the brigade built according to the divisional structure (with armament per division) is ready to be used immediately as a brigade, and when deployed to the division, even in the BRANCHES there will be a third of contract soldiers (naturally, KOs and the most valuable specialists). Hence, combat coordination is multiple times faster.

    For example, a manned infantry fighting unit SA - 1 regiment and a battalion of communications are deployed, a commandant and sports company (70% peacetime staff), the remaining MSP -1 company (3 platoons 20-25 people), TB-3 company commanders, and mechvody (the most combat-ready) and a service company, in the remaining divisions 3-5 people each. Officers to the company company (platoon only in 1 company and TB) But it was considered a part. And the same thing in other regiments and individual battalions, but fully standard equipment. But part of the two weeks after the deployment is not combat-ready (3 and 7 days on the conscience of visionaries from the General Staff).

    Hence, with the same number of drugs and equipment, we have a different degree of formation combat readiness.
    1. Rakti-kali
      Rakti-kali 16 July 2013 00: 04 New
      0
      Quote: chenia
      And the brigade built according to the divisional structure (with armament per division) is ready to be used immediately as a brigade, and when deployed to the division, even in the BRANCHES there will be a third of contract soldiers (naturally, KOs and the most valuable specialists). Hence, combat coordination is multiple times faster.

      Already tried to deploy from the regiments of the division - complete h.ren and hopelessness turned out.
  • chenia
    chenia 16 July 2013 10: 28 New
    0
    Quote: chenia
    Already tried to deploy from the regiments of the division - complete h.ren and hopelessness turned out.


    YOU are talking about? And the tank is turning on manure.
    1. Rakti-kali
      Rakti-kali 16 July 2013 11: 44 New
      0
      About that.
      Quote: chenia
      A brigade built according to the divisional structure (with weapons per division) is ready to be used immediately as a brigade, and when deployed to a division

      Quote: chenia
      And the tank is turning on manure

      Well, you know better, I have no business with manure.
  • chenia
    chenia 16 July 2013 15: 20 New
    +1
    Yes, you didn’t have anything to do with the Army either, otherwise you reacted to the term DEPLOYMENT (they would say it happens to make a reservation). And so this is an army saying from the series "IT IS POSSIBLE a goat in the cart."
    1. Rakti-kali
      Rakti-kali 16 July 2013 16: 13 New
      0
      Quote: chenia
      Yes, you didn’t have anything to do with the Army either, otherwise you reacted to the term DEPLOYMENT (they would say it happens to make a reservation). And so this is an army saying from the series "IT IS POSSIBLE a goat in the cart."

      What did you study well at the military department? Understand. Army jackets are also needed ... it’s boring without them. wink
  • chenia
    chenia 16 July 2013 21: 42 New
    +1
    Quote: Rakti-Kali
    What did you study well at the military department? Understand.


    Yes, such a large, and a continuous military department, called HACCP. Mentioned, admit, and do not scuff. And by the way, jackets, especially techies, will be thrust into the belt of any personnel specialist.

    And now on the topic. As a formation, do not name it, no matter what attributes it has (military unit number, seal, banner), the main thing is its combat efficiency at the moment. In the war, we had divisions at the time of formation and before the first battle. And then 5,5-6 thousand and so on until the end of the war, in fact, reinforced brigades. They introduced another corps unit and then the army.

    A regiment is a poorly divisible formation in terms of deployment. And deployment on its basis to a division is an exorbitant burden on the environment (just kidding). The regiment must contain the materiel of the entire division, which parks should be there (storage should not resemble a storage base), and the ammunition depot, and mobile districts, and the divisional management structure.

    After all, a brigade (formation) is created on the basis of a division. The deployment-management and company of communication with one of the battalions, the battalion (part) of 750 people, taking into account the on-duty departments of the barracks for 250 people. and a park of 400 / 400m 8-9 boxes, PTO, MTO warehouses, refueling, etc.

    On-duty squads, this is a platoon squad spending the night in the barracks after classes, work, etc. (1 time in three days) - hence the availability of places in the barracks (outfit, guard is another). On alarm, you can pick up weapons and remove equipment of all units (battalion) immediately, without waiting for arrivals.

    In the technology park on the regiment.

    The remaining battalions (divisions) of the detached company are formed on the basis of regiments, detachment. division battalions, in material terms, everything has already been built, engage in combat until you drop.

    In this case, initially the brigade in combat efficiency surpasses the cropped division, having the same number of HP and equipment, and surpasses in speed the transformation of the formation into a full-blooded division ready for battle.