Military Review

Great Battle of Kursk: defensive operation of the troops of the Voronezh Front

14
On the southern front of the Kursk ledge, in the defense zone of the Voronezh Front, reinforced by the forces of the Steppe Front, the struggle was even more intense and furious than on the section of the Central Front. On July 4, 1943, the connection of the 48th Panzer Corps of the 4th German tank After air and artillery strikes, the army launched an attack on the position of the Soviet combat guard of the 6th Guards Army Ivan Chistyakov. The fighting continued until dark and even at dawn on July 5. At 22 hours on July 30, in order to alleviate the situation of military guard and inflict losses on the German troops at the starting positions, the artillery of the Voronezh Front carried out a 4-minute shelling, firing at the identified positions of the German artillery. At 5 a.m. on July 3, the Voronezh Front carried out counter-training in full. Unlike the counter-training that was carried out on the Central Front, the artillery of the Voronezh Front dealt an attack on the enemy troops in their original positions for the offensive. The choice of areas that were fired was based on an analysis of the area where it is most convenient to deploy troops. Counter-training was carried out on the entire front where they expected an enemy strike - in the defense zone of the 5th, 40th Guards and 6th Guards armies.


Soviet at dawn aviation struck at German airfields. It was planned to destroy German aircraft at airfields with a combined strike of the 2nd and 17th air armies. About 250 vehicles took part in the operation. However, the German Freya and Würzburg air defense radars made it possible to detect single targets at a distance of 80-90 km, and group - at 130-150 km. Some groups of Soviet attack aircraft were defeated by German fighter jets that were raised in the air. The strike of Soviet aircraft reaching German airfields was ineffective - the Luftwaffe was already in the air, fulfilling the tasks of the offensive that had begun.


Memorial "The beginning of the Battle of Kursk on the southern ledge." Belgorod region

These battles, which were noticeably inferior in scope to future battles, nevertheless had an impact on the course of the Kursk battle. German troops were forced to advance to new positions, conducting additional reconnaissance of Soviet positions, creating passages in minefields. It became obvious to the Soviet command that the main blow of the enemy would be delivered in the direction of Cherkassky. The plot of the attack 2-th SS SS Panzer Hausser underestimated. According to the information of German prisoners captured in this battle, as well as defectors who surrendered 3 – 4 in July, the Soviet command became aware that the Wehrmacht’s general offensive on this frontline was scheduled for 2 hours in July 30 5 minutes.


The layout of the lines of defense of the Central and Voronezh fronts on the Kursk salient. Summer 1943

Strike 4-th tank army. Defense of Cherkasy

At the head of the strike of the 4 Tank Army of Goth were the 48 Tank Corps and the SS 2 Tank Corps. In fact, each of the corps of the 4 Tank Army launched its own offensive. The 48 Tank Corps advanced from the Gertsovka-Butovo area in the direction of Cherkassy-Yakovlevo-Oboyan. He had to break through the three lines of defense of the Voronezh Front and, in the Yakovlevo area, he would unite with units of the 2 SS tank corps, surrounding a part of the troops of the 6 Guards Army. Then parts of the SS corps were to move in the direction of Prokhorovka, and the 48 tank corps was to continue the offensive in the main direction Oboyan-Kursk.

The 48 tank corps was the strongest unit of Hermann Goth's army. It consisted of the 3-I, 11-I tank divisions, the elite formation - the Great Germany ’Grenadier Division (German Großdeutschland), the 176-Infantry Division. The corps was reinforced by the 10 Tank Brigade - it consisted of the 39 Tank Regiment "Panther" and the 503 Tank Heavy Battalion. In total, the corps had 86,3 thousand people, 527 tanks and 147 assault guns, 21 artillery division. The second SS tank corps consisted of the elite units of the Third Reich - the 1-I tank-grenadier SS division Leibstartart Adolf Hitler, the 2-I tank-grenadier SS division Reich, the 3-I tank-grenadier SS division the Dead Head. The 2 SS Panzer Corps included 74,8 thousand people, 451 tank and self-propelled guns, 18 artillery battalions. From the air hull supported aircraft 8-th aircraft corps.

The main blow of the German troops came in the center of the construction of the 6 Guards Army. In the first echelon of the army, Chistyakov was located from west to east - 71-I, 67-I and 52-I guards rifle divisions and 375-I rifle division. The main blow was taken by the 67-I and 52-I guard divisions under the command of Alexey Baksov and Ivan Nekrasov. And also the flanks of the 71 Guards Division adjacent to them under the command of Ivan Sivakov and the 375 th Infantry Division under the command of Peter Govorunenko. Divisions were reinforced tank units. The 67-I and 52-I guards rifle divisions received the 230-th and 245-i separate tank regiments. They were armed with the American medium tanks M3 "Lee" and light tanks M3 "Stewart". The division commander Bucks had at his disposal 198 guns, including 20 ACS. Nekrasov had 122 guns.


German tanks, supported by assault guns, are attacking the Soviet defenses. July 1943

Tanks division "Grossdeuchland" (Great Germany) are fighting.

The onset of the 48 tank corps began with a hitch. The corps had to change artillery positions after the capture of the 6 army. The area was not completely cleared of mines, so the troops moved only along the roads, there were congestion. The gunners of the 3 Tank Division were generally late to the beginning of the artillery barrage. The corps artillery was supposed to strike at the “Great Germany” tank grenadier division, and then switch to the support of other units. At 6 in the morning hours, after a two-hour artillery preparation, the offensive began. German troops attacked under the cover of a powerful raid of dive-bombers.

At the very beginning of the onset of the 48 tank corps, another trouble occurred. In the attack zone of the corps there was a ravine, which the Soviet sappers strengthened, turning it into an anti-tank ditch. The approaches to it were blocked by minefields. Moreover, it had rained the day before, sharply worsening the ravine’s passability. This ditch and stopped the masses of tanks division "Great Germany". The infantry overcame the moat, but without the support of the tanks could not continue moving. German sappers a few hours preparing the passages in the minefields, preparing the crossing over the ravine. Works went slowly, the terrain was very difficult. Soviet artillery and aircraft attacked a cluster of German troops. Only at 11.00, the ferry was built and tanks were able to go along it. 17.00 was able to ship only 45 machines. Possessing huge armored forces, the Great Germany Division could not bring them into battle for a long time.

The 11 Tank Division and parts of the 167 Infantry Division, which operated on the right flank of the 48 Tank Corps, operated more successfully. German troops were able to penetrate the Soviet position and go to the eastern outskirts of Cherkasy. In the second half of the day, units of the “Great Germany” division were able to join the offensive. The connections of the 11 Tank Division and the Grossdeuchland Tank Grenadier Division, reflecting a number of counterattacks of the Soviet units (during one of the fights, the Great Germany Tank Regiment destroyed the 9 245 Tank Regiment of the separate tank regiment), were able to gain a foothold in the southeast and south -western outskirts of Cherkasy. Street fights began. In them, the Germans used flame-throwing tanks, which destroyed the Soviet strongholds in stone buildings. In the turrets of the T-3 tanks, two flame throwers were installed that could hit right into the loopholes, windows and doors six dozen meters away. 3-4 the second jet of fire at a temperature of 1 thousand degrees Celsius killed all living things, burning rooms from the inside.

Around 21: 00, the commander of the 67 Guards Rifle Division, ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196 Guards Rifle Regiment to the center of the village and to the position to the north and north-east of the village. With the departure of the guardsmen established minefields. Around 21: 20, the strike group of the tank grenadier division and the 10 tank brigade broke into the Yarki farm (north of Cherkassy), and the 3 tank division units captured the Red Pochinok farm (north of Korovino). Organized resistance in the village of Cherkassy German troops were able to suppress only by midnight. And the Germans destroyed individual centers of resistance only on the morning of July 6. During the day of the battle, possessing an overwhelming superiority in strike power, the 48 tank corps was able to advance only 6 km, without breaking through the first line of defense. It was a failure. According to the preliminary plan of attack in the morning of July 6, the 48 tank corps was to approach Oboyan. However, the heroic resistance of the Soviet soldiers disrupted this plan. The village Cherkassky by the end of the battle was almost destroyed. The battle for Cherkassy 5 July 1943 of the year is one of the undeservedly forgotten feats of Soviet soldiers and commanders during the Great Battle of Kursk.

In general, the soldiers of the 71-th Guards and 67-th Guards Rifle Divisions, without the support of large tank units, held about five powerful enemy divisions at the turn of the villages of Korovino and Cherkassk for about a day. The heroism and skillful actions of the fighters and commanders of the guards divisions allowed the command of the 6 Guards Army to transfer the army reserves to the 71 Guards and 67 Guards rifle divisions and to prevent the collapse of the defense in this sector. Commander Chistyakov brought an anti-tank reserve — the 496 th anti-tank artillery regiment and the 27 th anti-tank artillery brigade — into combat on this sector. They suffered huge losses, but kept the onslaught of the enemy. At the same time, the front command issued an order to the 6 tank corps of the 1 tank army to advance into the area of ​​Berezovka in order to deliver a flank attack and eliminate the planned dangerous breakthrough of the German troops.

Great Battle of Kursk: defensive operation of the troops of the Voronezh Front

The commander of the 67-th Guards Rifle Division Alexei Ivanovich Baksov.

The 2 th SS tank corps on the first day of the battle acted more successfully than the 48 corps. During the day he fought wedged into the defense of the 6 Guards Army on 12-13 km, going into the area Bykovka - Kozmo-Demianovka. However, part of the SS could not meet the schedule of attack. The armored group of the SS division “Leibstantart Adolf Hitler” was supposed to advance approximately 30 km by the end of the first day of the offensive, reaching the crossings over the river Psel. The elite units of the German armed forces did not have to overcome a deep ditch, as the compounds of the 48 corps. But the resistance of the Soviet troops — the soldiers of the 52 Guards Rifle Division held defenses in this sector of the front — were so stubborn that the divisions of Dead Head had to send help to the first echelon divisions Leibstantart and Reich. 3-I tank-grenadier division of the SS "Totenkopf" was to enter the battle only after breaking through the first line of defense. And she was brought into battle in order to help the Reich division storm Berezovo. The day report of the Lebshtandart division, where 5-hour combat for 220,5 height is reported, speaks about the fierce fighting. Only after a powerful artillery bombardment and with the help of heavy Tiger tanks and assault guns, they took the height to the 11.30.

Despite the fierce resistance of the Soviet troops, parts of the SS corps slowly but steadily rushed forward. By the 18 hours after a fierce battle, the SS division "Leibstantart Adolf Hitler" took the Soviet stronghold on the Oboyan highway - Bykovka. The 2-th SS tank corps was able to break through the first line of defense of the 6-th Guards Army and reached the second line, which was defended by the 51-I Guards Rifle Division.

The more successful offensive of the 2 SS Panzer Corps is explained by the superiority of the corps over the 52-th Guards Division of Nekrasov and the underestimation of this front line by the Soviet command. It was assumed that the main blow is applied in the direction of Cherkassky. So it was, but the 4-I German Tank Army beat in two main directions. The air reconnaissance and the first 4 fights of July confirmed the direction of the attack on Cherkassy. Therefore, reserves were quickly transferred to the aid of the 67-th Guards Rifle Division. The 52 th anti-tank artillery brigade located in the rear of the 28 Guards Division was transferred to the aid of the guards only at the end of the day when the Germans had already pierced the defensive orders of the division. Also late with the transfer of anti-tank regiment of the orders of the neighboring 375-I infantry division.

In addition, a large role in breaking through the defenses of the 52 Guards Division was played by German aircraft, which inflicted massive strikes on Soviet troops. The German 4 Air Fleet made 5 July 2387 airplanes. The 58 aircraft of the 8 Air Ventry Vehicle has been lost or damaged. Soviet 2-I and 17-I air armies made 1768 sorties, they lost 159 machines in a day.

The successes of the German aviation during the Battle of Kursk were associated with several factors: 1) the centralized use of aviation and the maximum use of each aircraft (the machines made 2-3 departures per day); 2) more rational placement of take-off sites. During the battle, German landing sites for reconnaissance and communications aircraft were located in 5 – 7 km from the forward, and most of the field airfields were only 18 – 30 km from the forward (Soviet field airfields were located in 40 – 60 km from the forward; 3) in the communications, each German machine had a receiving and transmitting radio station, and the advanced German units had special aircraft manufacturers who were equipped with communication facilities connecting them with the headquarters of the air groups assigned to this sector of the front and squadron commanders, currently located in the air. In the Soviet fighter and assault aircraft, only the commanding personnel had radio transmitters, the ordinary pilots only had receivers.

The right neighbor of the 2 SS Panzer Corps - Kempf army group, on July 5 acted worst of all. She was unable to complete the task, faced with the stubborn resistance of the 7-th Guards Army formations. As a result, the left flank of the 2 tank corps was exposed, and it had to be covered by the forces of the Dead Head division.


Tankers in collaboration with infantry counterattack the enemy. Voronezh Front. 1943

To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties
The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 3
Great Battle of Kursk: defensive operation of the troops of the Voronezh Front
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 3
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 4
The Great Battle of Kursk: Operation Kutuzov
The Great Battle of Kursk: Operation Kutuzov. Part of 2
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  1. IRBIS
    IRBIS 11 July 2013 09: 28 New
    11
    Thanks to the author for the tremendous work done. This is one of the few descriptions of the Battle of Kursk that is closest to the events that took place. Without shouting "hurray" and other snot, clearly and clearly. I look forward to continuing.
    1. afire
      afire 11 July 2013 11: 14 New
      +2
      I join - thanks a lot!
  2. roy72
    roy72 11 July 2013 10: 45 New
    0
    13th army on Oboyansk direction ?!
    1. max73
      max73 11 July 2013 18: 34 New
      0
      is not it so?
  3. Vladimirets
    Vladimirets 11 July 2013 10: 46 New
    +2
    "A 3-4 second jet of fire at a temperature of 1 degrees Celsius killed all living things, burning the premises from the inside."

    What a terrible death.
  4. afire
    afire 11 July 2013 10: 55 New
    +7
    Thanks to these people, I have the opportunity to read the site and generally live.
    1) Panin Prokopiy Lavrentievich - shooter 274 pp. Div. - was killed on March 18.03.1943, XNUMX in Neyolovo, Smolensk region.
    March 2 at 14.30 the troops of the 30th Army went on a decisive attack with the goal of capturing the city of Rzhev. 274 rifle division advanced on Rzhev, covering it from the southeast and south, 215 rifle division - from the west and south. The maneuver was successful. Parts of 274 and 215 rifle divisions merged at the southern part of the city. Scouts of Captain Metelev, the 274th rifle division, were the first to go out onto Kalinin Street, hung out the victory flag, and immediately wrote a letter to M.I. Kalinin. All the units and formations of the 30th army that participated in the liberation of the city of Rzhev were thanked by the Military Council of the Western Front. The Soviet information bureau reported: “A few days ago, our troops launched a decisive assault on the city of Rzhev ... Today, March 3, after a long and fierce battle, our troops captured Rzhev ... The first to break into the city were units of Major General Comrade. Kupriyanova A.F. (215ps.d.), Major General Comrade Olesheva N.N. (371 sd) and Colonel Comrade Shulgi V.P. (274s.d.) ".

    2) Ryabov Grigory Artemievich - intelligence officer 1203 S.Polk, 354 ST.D. - wounded in the shoulder 27.09.1942/1942/30.07.1942 and died a month later. During the Rzhev-Sychev offensive operation, the summer of 2 began on July 10.08.1942, 22.08.1942 from the area southeast of Pogorely Gorodishche, in the direction to the south-west, in the range of the 02.09.1942nd Guards Cavalry Corps in the general direction of Sychevka, on 100/04.09.1942/XNUMX, after crossing the Gzhat River, she was stopped in the area of ​​the Belfry on the Vazuza River, where she went on the defensive and fought off the counterattacks of the enemy troops until XNUMX, was forced to retreat to Grebenkino, Podyablonki, and the Belfry. On September XNUMX, XNUMX, the division again advanced on Burgovo, Romanovo, supported by the XNUMXth Tank Brigade, advanced some distance, but by September XNUMX, XNUMX was forced to withdraw to its original positions.

    3) Fokin Polikarp Efimovich - shooter (driver) - was killed 20.02.1943/33/21.02.43 x.Kruglik. Exit XNUMX guards. divisions to r.Mius in continuous contact with the enemy. Two regiments surrounded by Matveev Kurgan. Breakthrough ring environment. XNUMX was the reorganization of the division.


    I bow to you great-grandfathers, and thank you for my life and freedom.
    1. Captain45
      Captain45 11 July 2013 13: 33 New
      +3
      Quote: afire
      I bow to you great-grandfathers, and thank you for my life and freedom.

      And thank you for remembering and telling us about those whom we owe with our lives.
  5. Hemi cuda
    Hemi cuda 11 July 2013 13: 07 New
    +5
    The grandfather in the battle of Kursk was deaf for a month, there was such a roar, thanks to the author for the series, I look forward to continuing.
  6. Captain45
    Captain45 11 July 2013 13: 26 New
    +6
    Thanks to Alexander for the article, he didn’t appear on the site for a long time, but the appearance exceeded all expectations. I look forward to continuing. Next, my comment was not copied to InOSMI in the discussion of the article by the German expert on the Kursk Bulge. There is no source, but I want to know how I presume the memories of our tankman. I think it will be interesting and I want to hear the opinion of specialists:
    Nemazun: (no title)
    06/07/2013, 10:30
    He was a tank driver and ended up in the regiment after the hospital. The regiment was assigned to reorganize and replenish, where they received a new materiel, namely the Panther tanks. All the tanks went to the spacecraft either completely undamaged (for example, almost all the tanks of its company were captured directly on the railway platforms, the Germans did not have time to unload them), or after minor repairs (usually a broken track or a broken ice rink).
    After a minimum amount of time to master the tank, the regiment was thrown into battle.
    Now specifically his characteristic of the Panther.
    First impression. It is huge in comparison with the T-34-76, on which he fought before. The armor is thick, rational, reliable in appearance. A very convenient place for the driver, the chair is much more comfortable than on the T-34. Management is easier than on the T-34. Great TPU. Quality triplexes - no turbidity (ours happened).
    When the regiment went to the front, the army was actively advancing, so quite a lot had to move on its own. Assessment of driving performance. According to him, “on the circle” is bad, there is no comparison with Soviet vehicles, although the tanks themselves are assembled better than Russian ones (less tighten-tighten). Why is it bad? Firstly, chronic engine overheating. Secondly - a huge fuel consumption and, especially, oil, although the engine itself was reliable (to idle or there, which generator to turn, would work endlessly - his words). Thirdly, a disgusting chassis, the tank is much more “shaking” than the T-34. He does not remember a single case to reach the full force. Box and clutch "flew" constantly. The maximum speed is 30 km / h, usually 20 – 25. At first, when they set the pace of movement like the T-34, the lag was chronic, they could never advance on time, with all the ensuing consequences for the commanders; well - then we sorted it out and the "terms" of the nomination began to give real ones. However, most of the crews were at war and no one was in a hurry to the front, incl. for them, the “slowness” of the Panther was rather a plus.
    Overcoming water barriers was generally a “song”. Since the Panther bridges were not “held”, they crossed the ford rivers. It was done like this. The commander agreed with the "neighbors" and they allocated the T-34, which stood on the other side (he was crossing over the bridge). If, during the ford crossing, the Panther sat on its belly (and this happened almost always), then they started the cable and the T-34 helped the Panther to get out. Then the T-34 moved on, and they continued the epic with the cables further, only the Panther moving over became the tractor.
    Combat characteristics. Together, Panthers and T-34 used 1 – 2 times, then they were used only separately. They quickly realized that the tankers in the T-34 Panthers were getting on their nerves. In addition, it turned out that these tanks are completely different in purpose. Then the Panthers were only engaged in breaking through the fortified bands. We realized that this medium tank was very heavy and began to use it accordingly. "As soon as where the Germans gain a foothold - we go there" - these are his words.
  7. Captain45
    Captain45 11 July 2013 13: 27 New
    +4
    Engine in battle. According to him - rubbish. In addition to overheating, it turned out that the engine for such a tank was weak. The Germans were gaining ground at the heights, the tank was going up very badly, and if it had not rained too soon, then the asshole was complete. Bursting into the trenches with a “jerk” (and sometimes it is very necessary), as it turned out on the T-34, on the Panther is not realistic. There were cases of clutch breakdowns in the battle, when the crews “in the old” memory tried to “jerk”.
    Hit the shell in the engine compartment - truly feared. “On the T-34, a projectile in the motor is happiness. Tanku Ambets - the crew is intact. Rest, wait for the new car. And “Panther” is just as lucky: if it’s in the engine, then there’s a chance, but if it’s in the gas tank, then tryndets, it exploded at any cost. According to him, they went into battle only with a full refueling of tanks - the chance to explode was less.
    Armor. The forehead is reliable. The tower is good in front, from the sides and behind - not bad. The side of the hull and the feed is bad. The German 75 mm PTO was cutting the Panther aboard with 500 – 600 meters, and 88 mm guns per kilometer. Another serious drawback of armor is the departure of fragments due to cracking. According to him, the wounded pieces of armor (sometimes very hard) were after each battle. At the T-34, he said, the armor was much more viscous and such injuries were rare, and each case of such an injury was a reason for serious "disassembly" and a complaint to the factory. In general, according to him, psychologically in the Panther, the fight was hard. Both armor and chassis are unreliable. Especially the armor, the tank is very large, do not run away, do not hide, there is only hope on the armor, and it (armor) throws such fortels.
    A gun. “Class!” Both the gun and the sight. The gunner, unlike him, was terribly pleased. Beat far and super accurate. According to him - "for 100 meters - in a handkerchief." True, his crew only used the opportunity to use it against a tank once. A "shabby" T-IV crawled out from somewhere, "closed up" it with two shells from 900 meters. More precisely, after the 1 hit, the tank caught fire, and finished off the second - the ammunition detonated, the crew died. (At first they thought “Tiger”, and this is at least a medal, but then the intelligence looked and it turned out that it was “four” hung with screens.) According to him, the armor penetration of the gun was excellent, of which, in principle, already with 1000 m it was possible to “close up” any German tank, even the Tiger (and they had such cases). Of course, on the T-34-76 such a “trick” was impossible. Another thing is that the Germans had few tanks, there was "not enough" for everyone. In firing at bunkers and anti-tank guns, he did not notice any special differences in power from the 76 mm gun of the T-34.
    Radio station and stuff. The walkie-talkie is gorgeous. Long-range, no noise, no wheezing. The review from all places is certainly better than on the T-34-76, but similar to the T-34-85. In general, the tower is very convenient, even more convenient than on the T-34-85. Not much, but still.
    His conclusion: an excellent gun with an average reliability of armor and nowhere worthless chassis.
    Maintainability - apparently bad, at our field repair factories, according to him, “Panther” was hated. Why, they really didn’t like Panther, I didn’t guess at that time.
    At the Panthers, they recaptured for about a month. Then the regiment was again taken for reformation and replaced the materiel with the T-34-85, at which he finished until the end of the war. T-34-85 this veteran considered the best tank in the world. He liked him very much ...

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  8. user
    user 11 July 2013 16: 50 New
    -1
    That's what a thing is personal experience.
    And then everywhere the T-34 is so watered and the horseradish cannon and armor are so-so optics rubbish walkie-talkie generally no. And here the T-34-85 is better than the German.
    Mont Scher.
    Nicely
  9. user
    user 11 July 2013 16: 56 New
    0
    That's what a thing is personal experience.
    And then everywhere the T-34 is so watered and the horseradish cannon and armor are so-so optics rubbish walkie-talkie generally no. And here the T-34-85 is better than the German.
    Mont Scher.
    Nicely
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 12 July 2013 18: 04 New
      0
      And then everywhere the T-34 is so watered and the horseradish cannon and the armor are so-so optics rubbish walkie-talkie generally no. And here is the T-34-85

      in general, T-34-76 and T-34-85 were quite different from each other, you should not interfere with a bunch
  10. wolf1945
    wolf1945 11 July 2013 23: 40 New
    +1
    Grandfather told how July 12th day was like night smoke explosions all around burned their guys from the company 260 people left 12 eternal memory of the dead! health to the living!
  11. bublic82009
    bublic82009 12 July 2013 00: 04 New
    -2
    yeah, 5 hours of battle and the gap is broken in defense. But what about our long-range artillery? why didn’t it cover deployment lines in battle formations? Aviation, as always, was not enough for our infantry. and read analytics the way we had it most. but quantity is not always quality. 300 slingshots can not cope with one machine.
  12. Hug
    Hug 12 July 2013 03: 45 New
    0
    My father is there. VET battery was. He told my older brother (I was still young - I did not understand anything) that there was hell. He said that he survived by a miracle. I myself didn’t have time to talk to him - in 1962, a shard was removed from his head — he was received at Balaton in the 44th, and he did not survive this operation.
  13. sokrat-71
    sokrat-71 12 July 2013 22: 02 New
    0
    Thanks to the author for an interesting series of articles.