Military Review

The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 3

29
Fights for Olkhovatka and in the band of the 70 Army


While 41st tank Harpe’s corps stormed Ponyri, the 47th tank corps of Lemelsen tried to break into the Olkhovat direction. The commander of the 47th Corps removed a tank regiment from the 4th Panzer Division and transferred all available tanks to the 2nd Panzer Division under the command of Folrat Lubbe. The 2nd division was transferred and the 505th battalion of heavy tanks "Tiger". All tank forces were combined into the Burmeister brigade under the command of Major General Arnold Burmeister from the 2nd Panzer Division (actually commanded by Lubbe). She was directly subordinate to the headquarters of the corps. The 4th Panzer Division was transferred to the Sturmgeschütz III assault gun battalion. In fact, the 4th division ceased to be a tank.

The Burmeister Group, which included up to 180 tanks, was to break through from the Samodurivka-Kashara line southwards, towards the height 274, about 4-5 km south-west of Olhovatka. Lemelzen hoped to deliver a crushing blow and break through the Soviet defenses. However, these calculations were not justified. The defense in this sector of the front was occupied by three divisions of the 17 Guards Rifle Corps, reinforced with tanks of the two corps of the 2 Tank Army.


Soviet intelligence officers, captured serviceable PzKpfw III Ausf N and led him to the location of their troops. July 1943.

Fierce battles began on July 7 for a height of 257,0, which the Germans called "tank height." German troops could not take it. They somewhat suppressed the formations of the 6th Guards Rifle Division Dmitry Onuprienko. But they failed to bring her down, as she was supported by the 109th tank brigade, the 48th and 58th tank regiments, and the 614th anti-tank fighter regiment. All the dominant and tactically important heights were fortified by camouflaged tanks dug in the ground, which were used as armored machine-gun and cannon firing points. It was impossible to get around them from the rear. T-34, KV-1 and KV-2 had good armament, powerful armor, so from the front they could be destroyed only with the help of heavy artillery and aviation.

The German commanders regrouped their forces and in the evening the Germans attacked again, advancing in the direction of the 2 Ponyri, the height of 257,0 to the flank and the rear of the 75 Guards Rifle Division under the command of Vasily Horishny. But this attack was repelled. The divisions' joints were prudently strengthened and provided with the support of artillery units.


German armored personnel carrier SdKfz 251 / 10, hit a mine. North of Kursk, July 1943

70-I army. In the defense zone of the 70 Army, commanded by Ivan Galanin, the most stubborn battles were in the village of Kutyrki-Teploe. Here the main blow of the German armored vehicles took the 3-I fighter brigade, 140-I and 175-I infantry divisions. In the area of ​​the settlement, two anti-tank areas were created, each containing three artillery batteries armed with 45-mm and 76-mm cannons, one mortar battery with 120-mm mortars and a battalion of anti-tank guns. Each artillery battery created an anti-tank stronghold. The entire battle formation of the 3 Brigade, under the command of Colonel V.I. Rukosuev, ranged along the front of 4 km and deep into 5 km.

6-7 July 3-I brigade restrained enemy attacks, destroying and damaging the enemy's 47 machines. By July 18, the German command, concentrating a significant number of tanks and assault guns at the junction of the 6 and 70 armies, attacked the 13 fighter brigade three times in two hours. Armored groups were thrown into battle in 3-50 units with infantry. The offensive tanks and infantry were supported by artillery and aircraft. The first blow fell on the 150 th artillery battery of Captain Igishev. The commander of the gun, senior sergeant Sklyarov, with two shots hit a heavy Tiger tank. When the German tanks came closer, the 4-I battery opened flank fire at them. Having lost their 6 machines, the Germans retreated. The second blow was struck on the 5-th battery. Now the direction of movement of the enemy’s tanks has placed them under the flank fire of the guns of the 5 battery. After a fierce battle, the enemy lost 4 tanks and retreated. Also successfully repelled the third attack. During this battle, 14 of enemy vehicles was destroyed and damaged.


The calculation of sergeant Kruglov's 45-mm guns in the 3 battles of a German tank. July 1943

An interesting tactic was used by the commander of one of the 45-mm cannon batteries - Captain Gorlicin. He positioned his guns in such a way, behind the reverse slope of the ridge of height, that they hit the bottoms of German tanks, until the enemy tanks would return fire. Thus, within a day, his battery destroyed and damaged 17 German tanks, while not losing a single weapon and a single person. On the night of July 8, the 70 Army was reinforced by the 19 Tank Corps, which was handed over to the 2 Tank Army for the organization of the July 6 counterattack.

On the morning of July 8, before 70, German tanks and assault guns with infantry on armored personnel carriers reached the outskirts of Samodurovka. Then, with the support of aviation, the Germans launched an offensive in the direction of Warmth-Molochi. Before lunch, the Soviet troops held back the enemy offensive, but by 12: 30, when the German troops launched a third attack from the Kashar area in the direction of Teploi, they were able to break through. Two batteries of the brigade (1-I and 7-I) were almost completely destroyed, the Germans captured Kasharu, Kutyrki, Pozhoreltsy and Samodurovka. The 6-i battery continued to resist - on the northern outskirts of Teploe, the 4-i battery and mortar-takers - in the 238,1 altitude, the remnants of the armored personnel unit and two tanks - on the outskirts of Kutyrka. The commander of the anti-tank area, Colonel V. I. Rukosuev, threw into battle the last reserve — the 5 battery, three light batteries of 45-mm cannons, and a battalion of anti-tank guns. The breakthrough was able to localize, the Germans could not develop success. The 3 fighter brigade personnel fought heroically. Only the 4-I battery destroyed the 19 of the German tanks for the day of the battle, but also lost all the guns. The battery commanders, Captain Igishev and First Lieutenant Kartuzov, died a brave death. The last to keep the defense was a senior sergeant Sklyarov, his regiment appointed him the commander of the battery (one damaged weapon left). Senior sergeant Sklyarov and two Red Army men repulsed the enemy attack, destroying two German tanks. A bomb hit the cannon with a direct hit, the heroes died.


Panzergrenadery and anti-tank self-propelled guns "Marder III" in the battle near the village. Kashar.

On July 10, German troops attempted to break through the defenses of the 19 tank corps. The hull that day lost the 44 tank. The 101-I tank brigade suffered particularly - losing 32 vehicles during the day of the fighting.

July 11 German troops again tried to attack in this direction. However, the defense of the 3 th fighter brigade had already strengthened the 1 th anti-tank brigade and two anti-aircraft divisions. In addition, by this time, Soviet aircraft had gained air superiority and the attacks of diving bomber mixed military order of German armored vehicles. German offensive repelled.

The powerful German offensive in the area of ​​Ponyrey and Olkhovatka - Teply forced the command of the Central Front to enter into battle its last mobile reserve. Rokossovsky took the risk and threw it on the main line - the 9 tank corps under the command of Semyon Bogdanov. The corps was located at Kursk, covering the city from the south. July 5 The 9 Tank Corps was concentrated in the Arsenyevsky, Trubitsyn, Sergeevskoye area. By the end of 7 July, he was sent to the front line, and from 8, he participated in the battles. It was a fully equipped unit that had 23, 95, 108-tank brigades, 8-th motorized rifle brigade, 730-th separate anti-tank division. The 9 Corps was handed over to the 13 Army and transferred to Olkhovatka.

In the last days of the defensive battle on the northern face of the Kursk salient, the Western and Bryansk fronts were actively preparing for a counterattack. It should be noted that researchers note the fact that the 9-i Army Model after 9 July actually stopped the offensive with all its might and apparently was preparing to repel the Soviet strike. The model did this without consulting the commander of the Army Group Center von Kluge. Formally, July 9 was considered an operational pause before the resumption of the offensive. The model was waiting for the 10-th tankogrenadier and 12-th tank divisions, as well as the 36-th motorized division that had just arrived from the reserve. Prior to this, "attacks with limited integers" were undertaken. But, in fact, these attacks were a fierce positional battle.

New German divisions were being relocated slowly. The 10-Tankogrenadier Division arrived only on July 10 and entered the battle in the Ponyri area. The 12-I tank and 36-I motorized divisions arrived only 11 July. A new offensive was scheduled for July 13 morning. However, at that time, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive. The German grouping in the area of ​​the northern flank of the Kursk ledge began to hastily reorganize, turning to defense. The reaction of the command of the Army Group Center and the 9 Army to the Soviet offensive on the Oryol sector was very quick. The 12-I tank and 36-I motorized divisions were redirected to a new direction. 18-I and 20-I tank divisions, the regiment of "Ferdinand" received an order to withdraw. The strike force was dismantled, and the liberated divisions were thrown to meet the advancing Soviet troops.


German six-barreled mortar "Neblverfer" in the reflection of the Soviet counterattack.

Results of the defensive battle in the north

- 9-I German army lost during the period from 5 to 11 in July 1943, 22,2 thousand people. During the same time, the Central Front lost 33,8 thousand people. In the 9 Army, the 86 and 292 Infantry Divisions of the 41 Tank Corps, the 6 Infantry Division and the 2 Tank Division of the 47 Tank Corps suffered the highest losses. During the seven days of fighting, the German group was able to advance only 10-12 km, without breaking through the defense zone of the Central Front. In general, the soldiers of the Central Front solved their task - the blow of the Oryol grouping was reflected. The German strike forces suffered heavy losses.

- The situation on the north face of the Kursk bulge was less critical than in the defense sector of the Voronezh Front. This was due to several factors: 1) lower impact capabilities of the Oryol grouping of the enemy than the Belgorod grouping; 2) a narrower section of the front, which was convenient for the onset of German armored vehicles. Soviet command was easier to organize a dense anti-tank defense on dangerous areas. 3) is a model personality, who is suspected of not wanting to make every effort to develop an offensive, he is a bank of force for a defensive operation.

- The conduct of a defensive operation by the command of the Central Front raises many critical questions. There are many complaints about the decision on counterpreparation. Already in Soviet historiography it was rated very restrained. It is believed that the main targets for counter-training should be the accumulations of enemy infantry and equipment, command and observation posts, which leads to disorganization of the command and control system. Suppressing enemy artillery is considered an auxiliary task. Therefore, the plan for counter preparatory training and its implementation on the Central Front are more criticized than positive reviews.

The front command was mistaken with the definition of the main thrust of the German Oryol grouping. It was assumed that German troops would advance along the Orel-Kursk railway. However, the 9 Army Model delivered the main blow west of the railway line. The headquarters of the Central Front had no plan for this case and was forced to improvise.

- The actions of the Central Front once again showed the vulnerability of the defense. Even in the presence of a relatively narrow sector of the front, where the German troops delivered their strike and where they created a serious defense, in order for the 13-I army to withstand, we had to throw into battle almost all the reserves that the front had. All rifle corps were involved, including guards airborne divisions, and all tank corps. On the third day of the battle, the order to join the battle received the last reserve of the front - the 9 tank corps. With more serious enemy forces, the Central Front would have to resort to the help of other fronts and the Stakes reserve.
Author:
Articles from this series:
The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties
The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 3
Great Battle of Kursk: defensive operation of the troops of the Voronezh Front
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 3
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 4
The Great Battle of Kursk: Operation Kutuzov
The Great Battle of Kursk: Operation Kutuzov. Part of 2
29 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. Vladimirets
    Vladimirets 10 July 2013 08: 33 New
    +2
    "The Central Front headquarters had no plan for this case and was forced to improvise."

    Rubber stamp - winners are not judged.
    1. anip
      anip 10 July 2013 09: 12 New
      +4
      Quote: Vladimirets
      Rubber stamp - winners are not judged.

      That is a fact.
      You can still do it
      The front command was mistaken in determining the main direction of the strike of the German Oryol group.

      say that
      1. Now it is, of course, more visible when all the actions of opponents are already known,
      2. The Germans still made more mistakes (and not only directly in the hostilities), since they lost.
      1. IRBIS
        IRBIS 10 July 2013 10: 27 New
        +5
        Quote: anip
        Now it is, of course, more visible when all the actions of the opponents are already known

        After the Battle of Kursk, a committee was appointed by the order of the State Defense Committee, headed by Malenkov, to identify the causes of unreasonably high losses in associations (fronts). The materials of the commission's work are still classified, there is only an order to create it.
        1. Ulan
          Ulan 10 July 2013 11: 34 New
          +4
          Well, they say that we didn’t count the losses and didn’t ask for unjustified ones. As they asked and there are orders in this regard.
        2. Ross
          Ross 10 July 2013 11: 58 New
          +2
          Quote: IRBIS
          Quote: anip
          Now it is, of course, more visible when all the actions of the opponents are already known

          After the Battle of Kursk, a committee was appointed by the order of the State Defense Committee, headed by Malenkov, to identify the causes of unreasonably high losses in associations (fronts). The materials of the commission's work are still classified, there is only an order to create it.


          So I have long been interested in this question. For some reason, the author did not write that almost the first few days of the Germans' offensive, air supremacy with fewer aircraft was for the Germans. A German fighter pilot made 6 sorties per day, against one of our pilots. German dive bombers, according to the recollections of our fighters, plowed passages in minefields, and anti-tank battalions lived under bombs for several minutes.
          Excellent coherence and organization, apparently led to our heavy losses.
          1. IRBIS
            IRBIS 10 July 2013 12: 23 New
            +2
            Quote: Ross
            So I have long been interested in this question.


            And I suggest you still do this:
            Take the memoirs of our and German generals who took part in the battle (any), open them and synchronously track the events taking place from beginning to end. I guarantee - you will learn a lot of interesting things.
            1. Ross
              Ross 10 July 2013 16: 18 New
              +1
              Quote: IRBIS
              Quote: Ross
              So I have long been interested in this question.


              And I suggest you still do this:
              Take the memoirs of our and German generals who took part in the battle (any), open them and synchronously track the events taking place from beginning to end. I guarantee - you will learn a lot of interesting things.


              Thanks for the advice!
              In some truncated form, I tried to do so. Not systemically of course.
          2. Alekseev
            Alekseev 10 July 2013 13: 17 New
            +3
            That's right! yes
            But this is not news!
            So our command in the summer of 1943 also knew the capabilities of its troops and the potential of the German.
            Understood that
            Quote: Ross
            Great coherence and organization
            at that moment in time, the Germans were still higher than ours.
            It was also understood that in the operation "Citadel" the Germans set out to achieve a decisive defeat of the Red Army, change the course of the war to victorious for themselves and use their best forces for this.
            The risk that "our defense, as happened more than once in 41, 42, will not withstand the blow of the German (namely perfectly coordinated, organized and armed) troops" was great.
            The result of this understanding was the creation of a layered strong defense and the use of powerful strategic reserves in the Kursk region.
            Which justified itself. yes
          3. Garysit
            Garysit 10 July 2013 14: 56 New
            +3
            After the end of the Battle of Kursk, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov tried to initiate the process of analyzing the events of July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka, clearly targeting the perpetrators of the awkwardly huge losses - the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin with his peculiar methods of leadership and the commander of the 5th guards tank army P.A. Rotmistrova. They were going to give the last to the tribunal. To analyze the causes of large losses in people and tanks, on the instructions of I.V. Stalin, a commission was created under the chairmanship of G.M. Malenkov, secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), member of the State Defense Committee.

            The materials of this commission are still confidential and are stored in the Presidential Archive (the former archive of the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee). P.A. Rotmistrov saved the successful completion of hostilities. In the context of propaganda euphoria after the Battle of Kursk, it was somehow strange to remove from office, and even more so to judge, the commander of one of the most powerful tank armies on the Soviet-German front, who just seemed to ensure the Kursk “victory”. Such an act would certainly raise doubts about the unconditionalness of the “victory” among its own army and people and among the Western allies. For the latter, the myth of the "invincible and legendary" was concocted in full in the light of the already started secret game in the usual communist spirit.

            In addition, G.K.Zhukov, apparently, did not want to substitute A.M. Vasilevsky, the chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Union, who would also have to answer. Be that as it may, but instead of the Order of Suvorov of the 1st degree, P.A. Rotmistrov received a lower status Order of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, and the commander of the 5th Guards Army A.S. Zhadov, who fought no better, received the Order of the Red Banner, even G.K.Zhukov acquired the order for the Kursk operation - the Order of Suvorov of the 1st degree, but A.M. Vasilevsky did not receive anything ... Article "The battle of Prokhorov. Myths and reality." Published by the journal "Military Historical Archive" in issues 9, 10, 11, 12 for 2002, 1, 2, 3 for 2003. Read, learn a lot of interesting things.
            1. svp67
              svp67 10 July 2013 15: 44 New
              +1
              Quote: GarySit
              clearly targeting the culprits of absurdly huge losses - the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin with his peculiar methods of leadership

              I think if that trial had taken place, Vatutin would have had to answer for the great losses of the 5 tank corps, which he also dullly killed ...
              1. Garysit
                Garysit 10 July 2013 23: 23 New
                0
                Vatutin died because he ran into a German convoy en route, believing that they should not be there, due to poor knowledge of the situation and lack of intelligence.
            2. Alekseev
              Alekseev 10 July 2013 19: 31 New
              +2
              Losses, losses, "mediocre" Vatutin, Malenkov’s secret commission ...
              Weaknesses in command and control, of course, were.
              There can be no without them. request
              But, in general, the command of the Red Army, in contrast to the 41 and 42 years, was on top.
              We can judge “strictly, but fairly,” all of us, but you and I were probably there ourselves ... wink
              Or, at least, they devoted years to studying secret and non-secret primary sources and interviewed thousands of participants in the Battle of Kursk.
              We often forget that the large losses to our troops were not caused by partisan gangs at all ...
              And we forget the indispensable military truth: the military unit, the connection with the losses of 30% is suppressed, 50% is actually destroyed and can not perform the tasks for its intended purpose.
              But there is a very important criterion of truth - the result!
              There is no arguing against the truth!
              В battle result German forces on Kursk were defeated, they did not achieve their goals and began, though fiercely and skillfully resisting, but irreversibly retreating, before the "bloodless" and "defeated" divisions of our army, clearing the left-bank Ukraine, Kharkov, Oryol, Kiev.
        3. Goldmitro
          Goldmitro 10 July 2013 13: 52 New
          +1
          The created commission investigated the reasons for the unexpected huge losses in the 5th Guards. TA Rotmistrova, delivering a counterattack near Prokhorovka (later known as the tank battle near Prokhorovka). So the Headquarters at that time did not care what kind of losses success was achieved at the front.
          1. Alekseev
            Alekseev 10 July 2013 19: 44 New
            0
            Absolutely so!
            At Stavka and the General Staff there were not magazines, shit-racers and “effective managers”, but military men who grew up from the “foundation” of military affairs, from tsarist officers and non-commissioners, generals, though not all geniuses of military affairs, who perfectly understood (and Stalin also understood) that huge losses did not achieve victory, even having some numerical advantage over the enemy. So you can only achieve the depletion of their troops, and, ultimately, defeat ..
            Of course, many of our soldiers were killed, a lot of military equipment was lost in the battles of Kursk.
            But the enemy lost a huge amount of manpower and equipment.
            Lost hope of victory in the war.
    2. Dmitriy69
      Dmitriy69 10 July 2013 09: 16 New
      +4
      But I didn’t have to fight with fools. The probability of such mistakes in the war is very high. I believe that our command has done a good job.
      Well, of course, our grandfathers had to patch up holes in plans.
      1. svp67
        svp67 10 July 2013 15: 49 New
        +1
        Quote: Dmitriy69
        The likelihood of such mistakes in the war is very high. I believe that our command has done a good job.
        Well, of course, our grandfathers had to patch up holes in plans.
        Yeah, only Vatutin originally EXACTLY SAME killed the 5 Tank Corps, depriving the front of mechanized reserves.
    3. svp67
      svp67 10 July 2013 12: 10 New
      +1
      Quote: Vladimirets
      Rubber stamp - winners are not judged.

      As A.V.Suvorov used to say: "Once happiness, twice happiness - have mercy on God! One must have some skill sometime." I think that this applies in full measure to Rokossovsky
  2. Kovrovsky
    Kovrovsky 10 July 2013 08: 56 New
    +4
    When reading clearly felt the drama of the events of the battle! On the southern front, the events were even more dramatic. We look forward to continuing!
  3. Stiletto
    Stiletto 10 July 2013 09: 12 New
    +5
    "The Central Front headquarters had no plan for this case and was forced to improvise."

    Hitler was also forced to improvise - it was unlikely that he had originally planned to shoot himself.
  4. Sergey Medvedev
    Sergey Medvedev 10 July 2013 09: 53 New
    +1
    The author of the article is alarming. About our mistakes a lot, about German - nothing. Although the Germans made more mistakes, they lost the battle.
    Another moment. The Germans are advancing. That is, they are moving at full height through minefields, overcoming wire and other barriers under the fire of our troops, equipment is also open for destruction, and ours are all in the trenches. And people, and tanks, and guns. In such conditions, the attacker is obliged to suffer greater losses than the defender. The author gives a ratio of 22 against 200. Now this is generally a trend - to pass off the work of the department of Dr. Goebbels as "German accuracy." soldier
    1. Mareman Vasilich
      Mareman Vasilich 10 July 2013 10: 08 New
      +1
      Doubt creeps in, maybe the author is from the Svanidze-Mechino-Radzin-Rezunov cohort?
    2. dustycat
      dustycat 10 July 2013 20: 15 New
      0
      Unfortunately, the stupidity of some counterattacks was egregious.
      Including under Prokhorovka.
  5. Mareman Vasilich
    Mareman Vasilich 10 July 2013 10: 00 New
    +3
    I was waiting for parity from the author, but I did not wait. In the very first article on this topic, the author showed the German commanders in close-ups, but did not bring the Russians in any article in close-ups. It seems to be a trifle, but because of such trifles, worldviews very often change. Things like historical research need to be approached very meticulously and seriously, and be no less Russian than Germans were Germans. Nothing personal.
  6. Volkhov
    Volkhov 10 July 2013 11: 23 New
    -7
    There was also a landing in Sicily, because of which a third of the aircraft and other units were withdrawn - in fact, the war was fought in coordination with the allies and all the major battles on our side (Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Bagration) had a mirror operation in the West, usually by 10 days earlier.
    Perhaps, as now, the main documents were prepared in Washington (territorially in London) by a working group, and the general staffs of the countries tied them to the area.
    Indirect confirmation - the working regime of Stalin with night work and a late rise - is not a whim, but the Washington time zone.
    1. Ulan
      Ulan 10 July 2013 11: 38 New
      +2
      Isaev wrote in detail on this subject. The Germans began to remove units after the operation "Citadel" failed and they began to transfer units primarily to the Miuss Front, and not to Italy. Sicily is still not continental Europe, I do not think that the Germans were very worried about the loss of this island.
    2. user
      user 10 July 2013 11: 38 New
      +2
      Well, firstly, in this mode, Stalin always worked like that, and secondly, ours asked to open a second front and not the landing in Sicily. But the interests of the allies are clearly closer.
      And finally, it doesn’t fit into your head that We could defeat all of Europe. You probably cannot sleep from this. And you compose such nonsense, except you, we also know how to read, and not only Soviet but foreign memoirs
      1. Volkhov
        Volkhov 10 July 2013 11: 49 New
        -4
        Quote: user
        Well, firstly, in this mode, Stalin always worked like that,

        So industrialization was also carried out by America with the delivery of complete plants (for example, VTZ), like the war with Lend-Lease, basically nothing has changed either before or after. Only Khrushchev, as a German agent, began to live according to Berlin time and almost grappled with America.
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 10 July 2013 17: 22 New
          0
          Quote: Volkhov
          Quote: user
          Well, firstly, in this mode, Stalin always worked like that,

          So industrialization was also carried out by America with the delivery of complete plants (for example, VTZ), as well as the war with Lend-Lease ...

          Industrialization was a gift for the states, which they could not refuse. The Old and New Worlds were bent from the crisis. And industrialization was carried out by the leadership of the USSR, and not America. In addition .., the machines, equipment and technologies of Italy, England and Germany were used to establish our industry and defense industry. There was no preference for a particular country.
          And there was a certain specialization. For example: USA - cars and heavy vehicles, England and Italy - engines, Germany - artillery systems and heavy vehicles. Well, it's fluent-rude. You will find more details.
          Second.
          The night work of the GKO and the General Staff is due to the regime of military operations on the fronts, which had a strange peculiarity ending with the onset of darkness. Then there was a multi-stage flow of information, summaries from bottom to top: from compounds and parts to associations and GS. Even further - by the General Staff, this info was generalized, analyzed and only then entered the highest level, where decisions were made.
          In exactly the same night mode, the top military leadership of Germany worked.

          Tackle the issue for real and do not tailor reality to your ideologies and theories.
          1. Volkhov
            Volkhov 10 July 2013 17: 55 New
            -1
            Quote: BigRiver
            The night work of the GKO and the General Staff is due to the regime of military operations on the fronts, which had a strange peculiarity ending with the onset of darkness. Then there was a multistage flow of information,

            And before and after the war, why was the mode of operation the same?
            Quote: BigRiver
            In exactly the same night mode, the top military leadership of Germany worked.

            But didn’t Hitler Germany be made in the same banking groups as the USSR and they did not have to report to the same Washington?
            The war as a whole was controlled from 1 center; only the SSs that had evacuated were independent.
    3. m262
      m262 11 July 2013 00: 39 New
      +1
      Hello! And on the “HF” connection, Shaposhnikov, Zhukov and Rokossovsky asked Montgomery for permission to bring a tank brigade into battle wassat Dear comrade! Red Army operations were NEVER planned in London and Washington! The general agreement on the timing and intentions of actions was, and even then quite approximate and not mandatory, it is enough to recall the situation with the polar convoys in the summer of 1942, when a catastrophe occurred on the southern front, the Soviet command asked for help, and Britain even “to the peak” of the USA stopped all supplies ! The only time when in London they tried to plan military operations on the eastern front — the uprising in Warsaw in the autumn of 1944, by the way then they strongly framed the AK, and the Poles in general !!!
      1. Volkhov
        Volkhov 11 July 2013 01: 25 New
        -2
        Quote: m262
        And on the “HF” connection, Shaposhnikov, Zhukov and Rokossovsky asked Montgomery for permission to bring a tank brigade into battle

        The headquarters of the fronts and armies of the embassies did not have, with the exception of the Northern Front, where in the region of Murmansk there was an English air regiment and military mission - there had to be coordinated.
        General decisions were worked out in the center (conditionally in Washington), transferred to the USSR, Africa, Britain, where they were implemented as part of their understanding.
        In the USSR, together with the war, there was also genocide of the population on all occasions - non-distribution of rations, communication with the Germans (who worked in the occupation), surrender, failure to comply with orders, frontal attacks, breakthroughs without providing flanks ... therefore the villages are empty.
  7. Ross
    Ross 10 July 2013 16: 22 New
    0
    Quote: svp67
    Quote: GarySit
    clearly targeting the culprits of absurdly huge losses - the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin with his peculiar methods of leadership

    I think if that trial had taken place, Vatutin would have had to answer for the great losses of the 5 tank corps, which he also dullly killed ...


    Reading about those days from Vasilevsky and other authors - it seemed that Vatutin "didn’t have any pair, another, tank corps" to win near Prokhorovka.

    As a contrast - the battles of the 1 tank Katukov.
  8. Fin
    Fin 10 July 2013 19: 03 New
    0
    3) the personality of the Model, who is suspected of unwillingness to make every effort to develop the offensive, he is a force of strength for a defensive operation.
    With discipline and fighting spirit, apparently then they were not all right. At a crucial moment, do not believe in success? If so, thanks.
  9. Alex96
    Alex96 12 July 2013 09: 28 New
    0
    In war, always someone is mistaken. I think our military leaders did what they could.