Military Review

The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front

26
At the end of June 1943, there were obvious signs of a near German offensive. Soviet intelligence observed the concentration of large groups of armored vehicles, enemy motorized infantry. At the forefront of the German artillery conducted sudden, short artillery attacks. Enemy scouts constantly observed in the air. German ground intelligence also became more active. At night, German sapper units removed their minefields, prepared the aisles in the obstacles, tried to make aisles in the Soviet minefields and engineering obstacles.


On the night of July 5, the reconnaissance forces of the 15 th rifle division in the area Verkh. Tyagino discovered German sappers who made passages in minefields. The German sapper captured by the 6 Infantry Division B. Formel told that the German troops were on full alert and in 2 hours European time (3 hours Moscow time) would go on the offensive in the general direction of Kursk. At the same time, an offensive will start from the Belgorod area, also in the Kursk sector. Approximately the same testimony was given by a German prisoner who was caught in the 48 th army band.

This message was very valuable, because at that time the Soviet command was working on plans for a warning artillery strike. There was little time to make a decision. Until the time indicated by the captured Germans remained a little over an hour. It was necessary to begin artillery training, which allocated up to half of the ammunition. There was no time left for a request from the Bet. The question had to be resolved on the spot. According to Konstantin Rokossovsky, this decision was made by the representative of the Headquarters, Georgy Zhukov, who arrived at the location of the Central Front the night before, entrusted the commander. Rokossovsky immediately ordered the commander of the artillery of the front to open fire. 2 hours 20 minutes the thunder of guns broke the silence. Soviet artillery opened fire in the defense zone of the 13 Army and partly the 48 Army and 70 Army, where they were waiting for the main attack of the German troops. As it turned out later, Soviet artillery outstripped German artillery by 10 minutes. The German command planned to begin artillery preparation in 2 hours 30 minutes.

Artillery strikes during the counter-training were mainly directed against the artillery positions of the enemy. On the Central Front, 507 X-guns of caliber 76 and higher, 460 82 and 120-mm mortars, 100 BM-13 rocket launchers were used for counterpreparation. According to the plan, the artillery preparation was supposed to last about 30 minutes with a waste of up to a quarter of ammunition. On the Central Front, artillery preparation was conducted twice, the second was held in 4 hours 35 minutes. Counterpreparation conducted on the Voronezh front. In addition, air force forces conducted an airstrike on enemy airfields.

Many researchers believe that the idea of ​​counterpreparation is questionable. In the course of the regrouping of forces, the positions of infantry, artillery and armored vehicles may change. And positions identified in advance may be left. In addition, due to insufficient artillery density, which is attracted to artillery preparation, weak reconnaissance of enemy positions, the effect of such a strike will be minimal. As a result, high waste of ammunition, which would be useful in such a battle, is ineffective. Other military historians, on the contrary, consider such an artillery preparation useful, it had a significant psychological impact on the enemy, forced him to postpone a strike for some time, to put in order a bond that suffered greatly, the units that had been prepared for the offensive.

July 5 1943 year. At 6 a.m. Moscow time, German troops inflicted on Soviet defensive lines aviation and artillery strikes. The artillery barrage was very strong. In addition to its own artillery of formations and divisions of the reserve, guns from the second echelon participated in it. tank divisions. Due to the lack of aviation, which did not allow strikes to be launched simultaneously in all directions, the 6th Air Fleet supported the 9th Army's formations in succession. First, the entire aviation of the 1st Aviation Division struck in the offensive zone of the 41st Tank and 23rd Army Corps, then in the zone of the 47th Tank Corps. Therefore, German units did not advance at the same time. The shock units of the Wehrmacht went on the offensive. On the Oryol-Kursk direction on the first day of the battle, more than 500 tanks and self-propelled guns were thrown into battle, on the Belgorod direction, about 700 tanks and assault guns.

In the defense zone of the Central Front, German troops attacked the 13 army and adjacent flanks of the 48 and 70 armies. The main grouping of the Model was inflicted by three infantry and four tank divisions on Olkhovatka, on the left flank of the 13 Army Pukhov. Four enemy infantry divisions were moved against the right flank of the 13 and the left flank of the Romanenko 48 army, they were advancing on Maloarkhangelsk. Three infantry divisions of the 9 Army attacked the right flank of General Galanin's 70 Army, making their way towards Gniec. The offensive of the ground forces was supported by the strikes of the German Air Force. The battle from the very beginning took on a fierce character. The command of the 9 of the German army, faced with a powerful Soviet defense, was forced to re-hour artillery preparation.

The 47 Tank Corps (TK) of Joachim Lemelsen went on the offensive when the air strikes shifted to the west. On the edge of his offensive was the 6-I Infantry Division of General Horst Grossman. She was supported by the only Tiger heavy tank unit in the Orel-Kursk sector - the 505 heavy tank battalion of Major Sovan. The 505 heavy tank battalion began to form in February 1943, in Falinbostel, consisting of two tank companies. At the beginning of July, the battalion was 25 Pz. Kpfw. Ill (T-3) and 31 Pz. Kpfw. VI (T-6 "Tiger"). In service with the second company were small wedges "Goliath". These self-propelled disposable mines without crew were used to undermine enemy tanks, to destroy dense infantry formations and destroy engineering structures.

The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front

Tiger No. 214 from the 2 Company of the 505 Heavy Tank Battalion.

The Tigers of the 505 Battalion (numbers 114, 214, 321) in the battles of Kursk.

In the offensive zone of the 47, the 15 th Infantry Division, under the command of Colonel Vladimir Janjgawa from the 29 Infantry Corps, held the defense. She was in charge of the 9 km front section. For her, the strike of the 6 Infantry Division, reinforced by the Tigers battalion, by the two battalions of the Sturmgeschütz III ACS and the 20 Panzer Division equipment, became a serious challenge. Wedge from the battalion "Tigers", almost hundreds of other tanks and self-propelled guns did their job. In the afternoon, the 15 Infantry Division was knocked down. The 676 th infantry regiment was surrounded north of Aleksandrovka, but in the evening was able to get through to its own. In the second echelon, the Germans met the 6-I Guards Rifle Division Dmitry Onuprienko. She was part of the 17 Guards Rifle Corps.

The collapse of the defense of the 15 Division led to a deterioration of the situation at the junction of the 13 Army with the 70 Army. Here the 132-rifle division of Timofey Shkrylev from the 70-th army kept the defense. The 46 Tank Corps of Hants Zorn (in the period of the Kursk battle there were only 4 infantry divisions in it) repeatedly launched attacks on this sector of the front, but the Germans could not break through the Soviet defense in the first half of the day. Also successfully repulsed all the attacks of the enemy units of the 280 th infantry division Dmitry Golosov (70-I army).

In the afternoon, the retreat of the 15 divisions exposed the right flank of the 70 army. The division commander Shkrylev, trying to protect the flank of the army from a detour from the east, dispatched the Xnumx Rifle Regiment east of Gnilets. But he was already exsanguinated by previous battles, and he could not alone change the situation. The regiment was attacked and slowly began to retreat in the direction of Gnilets. The 712 Division was again attacked from the front and then the flank, and was forced to withdraw.

The German offensive on the left flank of the Model 9 was developing less successfully. Here, the 41 Tank Corps of Joseph Harpe and the 23 Army Corps of Johannes Frierner advanced. The offensive of the 86 and 292 infantry divisions from the 41 and the 78 th attack division from the 23 ak supported the 653 and 654 battalions from the 656 9th tank destroyer regiment. The two battalions included the Ferninad 90 SAU with 88-mm guns. Each battalion of assault guns "Ferdinand" was attached to a company of radio-controlled transporters of explosives "Borgvard". In the second echelon, the third battalion of the 656 regiment (216 battalion of assault tanks) moved - it was armed with Sturmpanzer IV "Brummbär" assault guns (German bear grumbler) with 150-mm guns.


"Ferdinand" 653-th battalion of tank destroyers before the battles.

The Soviet positions defended by the 81 Rifle Division commanded by Alexander Barinov (29 Rifle Corps of the 13 Army) and 148 Rifle Division 15 Rifle Corps were well covered by a dense minefield. “Borgvardy” did not have time to make passages in minefields, so the German troops suffered heavy losses. Already at the very beginning of the battle, more than 10 SAUs were blown up by mines, receiving serious damage to rollers and tracks. Heavy losses suffered and the crews of cars. Soon, artillery fire was added to the losses from Soviet mines, which turned out to be quite effective. By July 17 5 in the 653 battalion left only 12 "Ferdinands" from 45.

The launch of the 654 th battalion of German assault guns proved even more unsuccessful. Assigned to the battalion sappers prepared for two passes through their minefields. However, when the SAU began moving the 6-I company of the Ferdinands and the Borgvard platoon assigned to it fell into their own minefield, which was not marked on the maps. As a result, all 4 wedges undermined. Several assault guns were damaged. Soviet artillery opened fire on the enemy who identified himself, withdrawing a few more cars from standing. Only 6 machines were able to reach the Soviet positions from the 4 Company. Another platoon of "Borgvardov" and 5-I and 7-I companies of German SAU also acted unsuccessfully. The engineers were able to make only one pass in the minefield, and came under shelling. Artillery shell hit the wedge, which was at the starting position. She flew into the air and damaged two wedgies, which also detonated. 5 and 7-I companies having lost most of the machines came to the Soviet positions. In this case, the battalion commander, Major Noack was mortally wounded by a shell fragment. True, the remaining machines operated quite effectively.


Destroyed at the Kursk Bulge German tank robot B-IV and German motorcycle.

The 81-Infantry Division as a whole completed the task, although the Germans in several places broke through its positions. The division by the evening fought in a semi-circle, some of its units were surrounded. On July 6, Soviet troops launched a counterstrike and unblocked parts of the division, which was fixed on the previous lines. On July 7, the Germans attacked her again and pushed back to the second line of defense, the bloodless division was taken to the second echelon. The 8 and 148 rifle divisions of the 13 army, which defended in the same direction, managed to hold their positions on the first day of the battle.

By the end of the day on July 5, German troops were able to break into the 13 Army’s defense zone on the 6-8 km, breaking through the main line of defense. In the area north of Olkhovatka, the Germans reached the second defense zone of the army in the 15 km area. The attacks on Gnilets and Maloarkhangelsk were less successful. Here the nazis advanced approximately 5 km. The model decided to remove the artillery attached to 23 to the army corps. In general, despite the inaccuracy of determining the attacked area, the safety margin of the defense of the FC allowed to correct the situation and avoid a critical situation.



After the approximate direction of the enemy strike was revealed, the commander decided in the morning of July 6 to launch a counterstrike on the wedge of the enemy grouping. Significant forces were allocated for the counteroffensive - the 17 th Guards Rifle Corps and the 16 Tank Corps of the 2 Tank Army were to strike from Olkhovatka in the north direction, and the 19 Tank Corps from the Self-stretch in the northeast direction. The counter-strike was to restore the position of the left flank of the 13 Army. There was no time for a more sophisticated solution, the collapse of the defense of the 15 th infantry division occurred too quickly, it was necessary to react.

The model, faced with strong resistance from the 13 Army, decided to bring fresh forces into the battle ahead of schedule. In the evening of July 5, the Model informed the commander of the 47 tank corps, Lemelsen, that he would enter the 2 and 9 tank divisions in his corps in the battle the next day. Initially, these divisions wanted to use for the development of success, and now they had to be thrown into battle to break through the Soviet defense. The model also finally allowed the commander of the 41 tank corps, Harpe, to use his second echelon, the 18 tank division, which had already been partially introduced into the battle. There was also a narrowing of the front of the offensive - the actions of the 46 tank corps and the 23 army corps were now purely demonstrative, auxiliary. The forces of the 2 and 9 armored divisions began to be moved in the afternoon of July, and they began to operate in the evening.

The model wanted to strengthen the blow, and was not limited to the introduction of the second echelon. Early in the morning of July 6, he called the commander of the Army Group “Center” von Kluge and promised to take the heights from Olkhovatka, Ponyrey, Kashara by the evening, hacking the defense of the Central Front to the full depth, and asked him to send him 10 tanknogrenadarsky and 12 th tank divisions. Of these two divisions and the 4 Armored Division, which remained in reserve in the Model, it was intended to organize a succession of success development - the “Ezebeck group” (its commander was von Ezebeck). After some hesitation, only the 5-Tank Division remained in the reserve of the Army Group Center, von Kluge agreed to transfer two divisions to the Model.



To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties
The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 3
Great Battle of Kursk: defensive operation of the troops of the Voronezh Front
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 3
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 4
The Great Battle of Kursk: Operation Kutuzov
The Great Battle of Kursk: Operation Kutuzov. Part of 2
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  1. 12061973
    12061973 8 July 2013 07: 13 New
    +1
    why there are so few heroes of the Soviet Union for this battle and almost everything is posthumous.
    1. Tuareg
      Tuareg 9 July 2013 13: 42 New
      0
      The question is rhetorical. In the battle for Voronezh, no less people were killed, but few people know about it at all.
  2. Kovrovsky
    Kovrovsky 8 July 2013 09: 53 New
    +8
    One of the greatest battles in war history! Who else but the Russian soldier could survive there and win?
  3. Roll
    Roll 8 July 2013 10: 50 New
    +4
    wassat Is preemptive shelling effective or not? Official historians say no. Zhukov threw responsibility to Rokosovsky and that fellow, made the right decision. I think the opinion of official historians is stupid. Preemptive shelling is effective. Of. Historians miss the next points. Yes, the artillery consumes ammunition, but when the enemy goes on the offensive, he captures and destroys our guns along with the ammunition, then before the offensive the army is crowded, the soldiers arrive in the trenches, climb out of the dugouts and are therefore vulnerable. As for tanks, they advance to the attacking positions and line up for combat orders are therefore vulnerable, but competent intelligence is needed here, the tanks are buzzing, raising dust, and it is important to convey their coordinates on time, it is important that we unfortunately rarely succeeded, they worked mostly blindly.
    1. Bronis
      Bronis 8 July 2013 14: 24 New
      +6
      It is difficult to judge the effectiveness of that counter-training. A lot of copies were broken. But there are certain facts.
      1. the Germans began vigorous action several hours later. possible reasons: regrouping, restoration of controllability of the advanced units, an attempt to understand what is happening (the onset of the Red Army is possible).
      2, and most importantly - the Germans were finally convinced that their plans were well known. And this is an important psychological moment, which concerns both the Field Marshal and the ordinary (even more than the ordinary, for he is to die).
      So there was a certain effect, and the decision did not cause a catastrophic shortage of ammunition.
  4. pensioner
    pensioner 8 July 2013 12: 05 New
    +5
    Quote: Kovrovsky
    One of the greatest battles in war history! Who else but the Russian soldier could survive there and win?

    There are no questions at all. But the Germans too !! What a fortitude the infantrymen and tankers must have in order to move toward their target under heavy fire, through minefields! After all, they stopped then not from fear, but having exhausted all resources. All that they could - they did. The more honorable the victory. The Wehrmacht before the Battle of Kursk is the strongest army in the history of wars. The same applies to the red army sample 45g. As the youth says IMHO.
    1. Drosselmeyer
      Drosselmeyer 8 July 2013 13: 17 New
      -5
      Exactly. The battle of Kursk is a confirmation of the flawed theory of "one must dig in and wait." They knew in what areas the offensive would be, they knew the timing of the offensive and approximate forces, but they barely repelled the offensive. And if the Germans had a couple more aces in their sleeves in the form of a pair of tank divisions - the devil knows how the battle would end, they could also cut off the ledge.
      1. Bronis
        Bronis 8 July 2013 14: 38 New
        +6
        In this scenario, a couple of tank divisions could not rectify the situation. With a Reserve Front and the possibility of the Red Army to pull reinforcements from other sections, the Kotel would require about another 500-650 thousand people (and this is very modest) and at least 1000 tanks and self-propelled guns from the Wehrmacht. They didn’t have them ... Thus, the Germans could not have made the second Vyazma — the boiler would be huge, and the Reserve Front would “look” at the troops in the back. Although, if the "Citadel" was more successful, the counter-offensive of the Red Army would not have been discussed.
        The Red Army already surpassed the Wehrmacht quantitatively, and the quality was no longer in the fall of 1941. The remaining (albeit melting) tactical superiority of the Germans was compensated by the quantitative Red Army. Therefore, albeit with greater losses than the Germans (especially in technology), but the Battle of Kursk was won. We were able to restore our reserves, the Germans did not. The Battle of Kursk is a turning point in the war of attrition. And there is nothing to be ashamed of. Then there was Bagration. And there was a uniform beating of the Wehrmacht, and even how the Red Army passed half of Europe cannot be explained only by quantitative superiority. But that was later.
      2. Bigriver
        Bigriver 8 July 2013 14: 58 New
        +5
        Quote: Drosselmeyer
        ... And if the Germans had a couple of aces in their sleeves in the form of a pair of tank divisions - the devil knows how the battle would end, they could also cut off the ledge.

        On the southern front, Manstein had the 24th Walter Nering TC in reserve.
        The problem is not the number of APs. In the south, tactical defense was “stitched” to the full depth. The Germans did not have enough infantry to hold the place of the breakthrough, expand it and develop success in depth. And the Red Army was already different. The defense did not crumble after the breakthrough, it was viscous, they fought for each square. kilometer. The wedges thus stuck to a Russian character.
        And, in general, Kempf AG could not provide the right flank of Goth, which really nullified all prospects.
        In this situation, two TCs would not have helped the Germans. Because there was a man in the bushes with a hefty club called "Steppe Front". But he was not pulled strongly to parry the blow of Goth.
        1. Bronis
          Bronis 8 July 2013 15: 41 New
          +1
          Namely, all the more so since the reserve Steppe Front was not just standing in the field, but had its own echeloned line of defense, and it had enough mechanized units to counter breakthroughs (even after losses from Rotmistrov) - it was supposed to be a counter-offensive. So, with the most favorable outcome for the Germans - maintaining the situation before the operation.
      3. pensioner
        pensioner 8 July 2013 18: 13 New
        0
        Well ... Couples of divisions, even a superfood tank they would not have been enough. Our reserves were very powerful. But 10 divisions - yes ... But the Germans were not to take them! With all the previous course of the war, ours have achieved this! And no matter how heavy the casualties of the battles near Kursk were accompanied, we (in humans and in technology) compensated for the losses with 100% filling, and the Germans, God grant 50 ... And then their planes ended up to the Dnieper, and tanks too. ..
      4. svp67
        svp67 8 July 2013 21: 34 New
        +1
        Quote: Drosselmeyer
        And if the Germans had a couple more aces in their sleeves in the form of a pair of tank divisions - the devil knows how the battle would end, they could also cut off the ledge.

        Could not. The main "surprise" for the German side was not that the Red Army was "buried in the ears", but that on the flanks of the advancing German groups the blows of our mechanized formations were ready, and this after our defeat near Kharkov. The Germans understood very well that the further they “penetrate” the Russian defenses, the more they MYSELF drive themselves into a prepared trap ...
      5. Xnumx kopeek
        Xnumx kopeek 8 July 2013 21: 39 New
        0
        Quote: Drosselmeyer
        Exactly. The battle of Kursk is a confirmation of the flawed theory of "one must dig in and wait." They knew in what areas the offensive would be, they knew the timing of the offensive and approximate forces, but they barely repelled the offensive. And if the Germans had a couple more aces in their sleeves in the form of a pair of tank divisions - the devil knows how the battle would end, they could also cut off the ledge.
        -
        ------ be with the Germans ...-
        -If bi was beaten by granny's dick, she was beaten by bi grandfather wassat
  5. Iraclius
    Iraclius 8 July 2013 12: 28 New
    +1
    The series of articles is detailed and interesting. Thanks to the author! hi
    Near Kursk, the legendary tank ace Michael Wittmann was also noted. 5 July 1943 year, on the first day of the battle of Kursk, he personally destroyed 8 Soviet tanks and 7 artillery pieces. During the entire Battle of Kursk, he alone destroyed 30 Soviet tanks and 28 guns.
    These are the people who opposed our fathers and grandfathers. hi And they survived! But Wittman realized that there could be no career on the Eastern Front. Here, damn it, not Ville-Bocage ...
    1. Drosselmeyer
      Drosselmeyer 8 July 2013 13: 25 New
      +5
      Well, honestly, heroes like Wittmann were appointed by Goebels on a routine basis. Here is a tank hero, here is a bomber hero, a fighter hero, etc. And all have dozens, hundreds of downed-lined. Well, who and how will check whether Wittmann knocked out 30 tanks or 20? None. Undoubtedly, capable and productive soldiers were appointed to the heroes, but the victory figures were clearly taken in the style of "write more, what a busman to regret."
      1. Iraclius
        Iraclius 8 July 2013 14: 14 New
        +1
        Well, be that as it may, but a noble schucher under Ville-Bocage he brought Tommy, and not they him. request
      2. Bronis
        Bronis 8 July 2013 15: 51 New
        +1
        If we ignore aviation, in tank troops, in principle, such a result is possible. The same Livrienko in 3 months on T-34-76 and 57 (seemingly) destroyed more than 50 tanks. He would be alive, and could bring to a hundred before spring. Why such an account? Ambush action, the best armor-piercing weapon, the quantitative dominance of the enemy’s worst performance tanks, experience gained ... Such an account would not be available on BT.
        The Germans have the same picture. the vast majority of their tank aces fought on the Tigers and scored accounts with them. And under similar circumstances. Well, postscripts in war are a must. Propaganda is also a weapon.
    2. spanchbob
      spanchbob 8 July 2013 17: 55 New
      +1
      Vitiman himself did not run away from the Eastern Front, but was transferred to the Western Front. So after the allies landed in Sicily on July 9 (in the west this is called the opening of a second front), many units were removed from the Eastern Front and sent to Italy, the same thing happened after the landing in Normandy
    3. Tuareg
      Tuareg 9 July 2013 13: 45 New
      0
      I agree. Articles are wonderful
  6. mamba
    mamba 8 July 2013 13: 22 New
    +1
    The model hit with "fan columns", as if with spread fingers, and not with a fist. Advancing on a broad front, he hoped to disorient the Soviet command regarding the direction of the main attack. However, the blow was very strong.
    Already at half-past seven the Germans captured the advanced trench of the Soviet troops. Thus, one of the fan columns of the Germans breaking through the defense at the Vesely Berezhok farm, moved west, surrounding the regiments of the 15th division, at the same time the second "fan column" attacked Podolyan. The third "fan column" rushed to Soborovka, the fourth to the Druzhovetsky farm. These four groups of enemy troops determined the direction of the Model’s main attack. Later, the 5th and 6th "fan columns" rushed east, one through the northern part of the village, the 1st Ponyry attacked the Ponyry station, the other surrounded the 467th regiment of the 81st division. The first four “fan columns” formed the right wing, and the 5th and 6th “fan columns” formed the left wing of the advancing enemy troops from the Vesyoliy Berezhok farm. A kind of axis of the Model’s advance was the direction of movement of the German group from the place of this breakthrough to the Druzhovetsky farm (in a straight line to the south). Simultaneously with the onset of "fan" columns, the Nazis launched a frontal offensive, on a 45-kilometer stretch of the Northern face of the arc.
  7. mamba
    mamba 8 July 2013 13: 56 New
    +2
    In the afternoon, the 15th Infantry Division was shot down.
    The collapse of the defense of the 15th division led to a deterioration of the situation at the junction of the 13th army with the 70th army.
    In the afternoon, the retreat of the formations of the 15th division exposed the right flank of the 70th army.
    By 23-00 part of the 15th SD retreated to the line of defense Podsoborovka - farm Steppe, occupied by the 6th Guards. SD, and entrenched. With the onset of darkness, the 15th division was withdrawn into the second echelon. She, being in the direction of the main blow of the Germans, fought heroically and lost up to 80% of the personnel in one day of fighting. Veterans remember the commander Janjagawa, who was in a terrible state on the evening of July 5th.
  8. Raptor75
    Raptor75 8 July 2013 16: 34 New
    +3
    Quote: retired
    Quote: Kovrovsky
    One of the greatest battles in war history! Who else but the Russian soldier could survive there and win?

    There are no questions at all. But the Germans too !! What a fortitude the infantrymen and tankers must have in order to move toward their target under heavy fire, through minefields! After all, they stopped then not from fear, but having exhausted all resources. All that they could - they did. The more honorable the victory. The Wehrmacht before the Battle of Kursk is the strongest army in the history of wars. The same applies to the red army sample 45g. As the youth says IMHO.

    For the first time I’m ready to subscribe to every word.
    In the history of wars, I think there were only two perfect military vehicles - the Wehrmacht of the 1941 model and the Red Army of the 1945 model.
  9. bistrov.
    bistrov. 8 July 2013 16: 44 New
    +1
    But I come from these places: v. Nikolskoye, Oryol Oblast. Diving is not far from Nikolsky. The Germans created a very strong defensive line along the high bank of the Malaya Rybnitsa River. There was a very intense battle in that place. As a kid, about three years old, I remember the gun carriages of German guns, standing in place of these battles, cut balls for bast shoes from the gustmatika of gun wheels. Trenches not visible in battlefields are still visible; you can see the entire defense system, dugouts, gun positions, machine gun nests. And how many shells, cartridges, broken weapons and other things are there. Not far, in a Dubka fishing line, a Soviet tank drowned in a swamp, it plunged so quickly that the crew barely managed to leave it. They say he is still sitting there still. If you want, you can go check. By the way, this battle is described in the book of Marshal Yakubovsky "Earth on Fire", at that time he was the commander of 91 tank brigade, which took part in this battle.
  10. ed65b
    ed65b 8 July 2013 21: 19 New
    +1
    "Panthers" in the district of Verkhnopenye - ur. Tolstoy. July 21, 1943
    Then Dekker complains to Guderian that Strachwitz used the Panthers as a go ... from.




    The 39th military unit united the 51st and 52nd Panther battalions (96 vehicles each) and there were another 8 Panthers in the regiment's management. Total 200 cars. Other units armed with the Panthers did not participate in the Citadel.
    Accordingly, the 39th military unit was commanded by Major Meinrad von Lauckert, the 10th Panzer Brigade - Colonel Karl Decker. For their massive use in conjunction with the tank regiment of the Great Germany division.
    The Panther battalion (2nd battalion of the 22nd SS SS), intended for Das Reich, was in the feltland during the Citadel and arrived at the front only on August 1943, 1943. The Panthers made by July 1943 did not fall immediately to the front, the units formed on them underwent training. The Panthers, made by the summer of XNUMX, went into battle in the Donbass and near Kharkov in August.
    According to the report of Lieutenant Colonel Reinhold from the headquarters of the German 4th Panzer Army of July 26, 1943: “As a result of the order for immediate departure, failed Panthers that were not towed cannot be restored. It is assumed that the following Panthers should be destroyed using subversive charges: 3 tanks from the regiment’s headquarters, 29 Panthers from the 51st tank regiment, of which 9 tanks can be restored and 24 tanks from the 52nd tank regiment, and a total of 56 tanks (of which 40 have already gone into irretrievable losses) "
    The full text of Guderian’s phrase about the situation in the regiment is with Yents, and everything agrees there. “By the evening of July 10, there were only 10 combat-ready Panthers in service. 25 Panthers were irretrievably lost (23 cars got hit and burned, two more burned during the march). 100 Panthers needed to be repaired (56 were damaged by shells and mines, 44 had technical problems).
  11. ed65b
    ed65b 8 July 2013 21: 23 New
    0
    503 - TTB Wehrmacht.
    part of Bieberstein broke into Yastrebovo, continuing to conduct street battles. And Unrain’s group along the Razumnaya river valley along the right bank to Sevryukovo. On the left bank, 31-RB, reinforced by 6 companies 2-TP 11- made its way through the fire on the left bank. TD, including the Tigers.
    -Yastrebovo defended: battalion 228-Guards .SP, 1 and 3 divisions 161-Guards. APAP (12 122-mm howitzers), 4-battery 114-Guards. AIPTAP and 1 KV 262-OTP.
    -At 10:00, the infantry 228-Guards.SP started to move away from the center of the village, 8 and 2-batteries fell into a difficult position. The German tanks went to the OP in a direct shot. The fragments broke the sight and the turntable at one howitzer, and the other at the rear . From a direct hit from the tank, the Bedford and GAZ-AA burned out, and the tractor suffered damage to the radiator. Both divisions left the line.
    -After noon, Sevryukovo did not come under control, the grenadiers of Unrain and the Tigers company still fought on its outskirts.
    --- The battle of 2 114-Gv.AIPTAP batteries with the Tigers attached to the 6-TD company 503-TTB: “On July 7, in the Sevryukovo district, the battery, commanded by senior lieutenant Zykov, was attacked by tanks on the flank. marching “Tigers”, then medium tanks. Letting them down at a distance of 600 meters, the calculations opened fire on the tracks and skating rinks. The fire was fired by armor-piercing-ignited grenades. After 13 hits, 2 “Tigers” were shot down. After the tanks turned in the forehead.
    2 “Tigers” were shot down 70 meters from the OP, and the 1st was hit after 5 hits, and the 2nd after 4. The fire was fired exclusively on the chassis and drive wheels. It is noted that if the crew found a gun, then unfolding the frontal part. "
  12. ed65b
    ed65b 8 July 2013 21: 26 New
    +1
    Erich Manstein with a Turkish representative inspect positions in the Belgorod region. Summer 1943.
    On the eve of the Battle of Kursk, on June 26, 1943, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein received a Turkish military delegation of five people, headed by Colonel General Shahid Kodimir, Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Army. Especially for distinguished guests, training maneuvers were arranged. The Turk was very interested in the tiger tank, which was demonstrated by soldiers from the 3rd company of the 503rd heavy tank battalion. Turkish officers were struck by the ability of the "tiger" to maneuver and shoot at remote targets, moving at high speed. Subsequently, the delegation was acquainted with other recent achievements of the German military industry. This visit was part of a special program for drawing Turkey into the war on the Reich side, developed by Hitler. However, the Führer did not achieve his goal. The cautious Turks did not dare to enter the war on the side of Germany and adhered to a policy of neutrality until the very end.
  13. ed65b
    ed65b 8 July 2013 21: 30 New
    +1
    Quote: Iraclius
    The series of articles is detailed and interesting. Thanks to the author! hi
    Near Kursk, the legendary tank ace Michael Wittmann was also noted. 5 July 1943 year, on the first day of the battle of Kursk, he personally destroyed 8 Soviet tanks and 7 artillery pieces. During the entire Battle of Kursk, he alone destroyed 30 Soviet tanks and 28 guns.
    These are the people who opposed our fathers and grandfathers. hi And they survived! But Wittman realized that there could be no career on the Eastern Front. Here, damn it, not Ville-Bocage ...

    Untersturmfuhrer SS Karl Kloskowski, commander of the 7th tank company of the 2nd SS SS. During Operation Citadel, he destroyed 15 T-34 tanks. For this, on November 5, 1943, he was included in the Honorary List of Ground Forces.
    German.
  14. ed65b
    ed65b 8 July 2013 21: 33 New
    0
    Joachim Scholl commanded the Panzer VI Tiger tank under number "232" in the 2nd company of the 102nd SS Tank Das Reich. until his capture at Kahn, he managed to destroy at least 76 enemy tanks.
  15. bublic82009
    bublic82009 9 July 2013 00: 03 New
    0
    now there are a lot of literate men, but did the commander do this or that then? everything was done according to the situation. was counter-training successful or not? Germans do not remember, then significant. ours do not remember about the experience of using the same significant artillery preparations, which means a miss. one thing is clear, this military technique is now operating as an information weapon, and if they try to belittle it, then it was a significant event. guessing can be long and tedious, but we don’t know anything reliably. time has passed a lot.
  16. sokrat-71
    sokrat-71 9 July 2013 23: 23 New
    0
    Thanks to the author for an interesting series.
  17. Letnab
    Letnab 10 July 2013 06: 13 New
    0
    The series of articles is very interesting! Thanks to the author! You read about the Second World War, and you catch yourself thinking, if our countries hadn’t fought among themselves, the whole world would probably have lived in fear .. Two such forces, God forbid, accidentally move ...