Military Review

The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties. Part of 2

Soviet Union

After the end of the winter campaign at the end of March 1943, the Soviet command began to develop a plan for the upcoming actions for the summer campaign. The Supreme Command Headquarters, the General Staff and all the front commanders who defended the Kursk salient participated in the development of the operation. The Supreme High Command was going to launch a large-scale offensive in the summer-autumn period, launching the main attack in the southwestern direction in order to defeat Army Group South, to liberate Left-bank Ukraine, the Donbass from the invaders, and force the Dnieper River.

Before the Headquarters, there was a difficult choice - to strike a warning strike or to defend. Each strategy had its own advantages and disadvantages. Despite the conviction of the German command that the Red Army would immediately go on the offensive after the end of the spring thaw period, the Soviet high command was in no hurry this time. On April 8, 1943, Headquarters representative Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, who was sent to the southwestern direction to stabilize the situation after the Kharkov defeat, sent the Supreme Commander-in-Chief his views on possible enemy actions in the spring and summer of 1943. Zhukov, given the high losses of the Wehrmacht in the winter campaign, believed that the German command did not have large reserves for a serious operation, such as an attack on Stalingrad and the Caucasus in 1942. The Marshal assumed that the Germans, having collected the maximum forces, including 13-15 tank divisions, with the support of significant air force forces, will strike with the Oryol grouping bypassing Kursk from the northeast and the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping bypassing Kursk from the southeast. The German command could deliver an auxiliary blow from the west from the Vorozhba area, between the Seim and Psel rivers, to Kursk from the southwest. Thus, Zhukov quite accurately defined the general plan of the German command.

Marshal Zhukov considered the transition of the Soviet troops to the offensive in order to pre-empt the enemy inappropriate. In his opinion, it would be better to wear down the enemy in a defensive battle, knock out his strike potential, tanks, and then, bringing fresh reserves into battle, go on a general offensive and defeat the main German grouping. That waiting will be delayed for the rest of the spring and part of the summer, George Zhukov did not anticipate.

Stalin, having received the report of Zhukov, instructed the General Staff to solicit the views of the front commanders and to prepare a special meeting on the summer campaign of 1943. April 12 held a special meeting at the Supreme Command Headquarters. It was attended by Stalin, Deputy Supreme Commander Zhukov, the head of the General Staff Vasilevsky and his deputy Antonov. The meeting made a preliminary decision on intentional defense, focusing mainly on the Kursk Bulge. After repelling the enemy strike, they planned to launch a counterattack and a general offensive, striking the main blow in the direction of Kharkov, Poltava and Kiev. In the absence of an enemy offensive for a long time, the transition of the Soviet troops to the offensive without prior defense was envisaged.

G.K. Zhukov and I.S.Konev on the Kursk Bulge.

It should be noted that the Soviet intelligence was able in advance to reveal the training of the German armed forces for a major attack on the Kursk salient and even set a date for the start of the operation. This information was obtained in the spring of 1943. April 12 on the table of the Supreme Commander, the exact text of directive No. 6 “On the plan of Operation Citadel of the German High Command” was translated from German. The document was not yet signed by Adolf Hitler. This valuable information was obtained and transferred to Moscow by an intelligence officer who worked under the name "Werther". His real name is still unknown. It is believed that he was an employee of the High Command of the German Armed Forces and the data he received were transferred to the Soviet Union through Lucius agent Rudolf Roessler, who was active on the Swiss territory.

Soon the data transmitted by Werther was confirmed from another source. The 7 of May of the T-bills received a message from the London station, it contained the text of a telegram intercepted by British intelligence from 25 in April by Field Marshal Maximillian von Weichs to the operational department of the High Command headquarters. This document was handed over to the Soviet intelligence officer Kim Philby by one of the members of the Cambridge Five, John Cairncross. The Briton worked in the service of decryption. Cairncross has been a Soviet intelligence agent since 1935. The telegram intercepted and deciphered by British intelligence set out in detail the plan of Operation Citadel. At the end of May 1943, the General Staff received a special report from the 1 Directorate of the NKGB USSR, which indicated strikes by German groups along the Kurs-Belgorod-Maloarkhangelsk line.

On the evening of May 8, the Headquarters warned the fronts of a possible enemy strike. The fronts command was informed of the possibility of a German offensive on May 10-12 on the Oryol-Kursk or Belgorod-Oboyan directions, or both. By the morning of May 10, the Supreme High Command ordered the troops of both the first line of defense and the reserves to be fully operational. Aviation should not only protect the troops from the attacks of the enemy air force, but also gain air supremacy. In May, the German offensive did not follow, the commander of the 9th Army Model persuaded Hitler not to start the operation.

In principle, in May the Red Army itself could go on the offensive. The compounds were replenished with people and equipment, could begin active operations, relying on the already created powerful defense system. However, the idea of ​​“deliberate defense” was already predominant. In addition to the defensive positions of armies and fronts, which were to meet the blow of the German groups, a developed system of rear lines and strategic reserves were created, which allowed the enemy to withstand the blow, even if the Germans broke through the defenses of the armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts. At the same time, offensive operations (the future Rumyantsev and Kutuzov) were being prepared.

Waiting for the enemy to strike was psychologically heavy, but it gave more time to prepare defensive lines. In addition, intelligence data did not give an answer to the question of where the main attack would be delivered and the exact location of the offensive of the enemy troops. There was no complete information about the number of troops involved by the German command. The headquarters and the General Staff believed that the enemy would strike the main blow from the Orel area on the Central Front. In reality, the Belgorod group of the Wehrmacht will be the strongest, which will strike the Voronezh front. Therefore, despite the fact that Zhukov and Vasilevsky (the head of the General Staff) adhered to the idea of ​​moving to defense in the area of ​​the Kursk salient, there were also opponents of such a strategy. The Red Army had everything necessary for an offensive, and the commanders of the Voronezh and Southern fronts, Generals Nikolai Vatutin and Rodion Malinovsky, insisted on delivering a preemptive strike in the Donbass region. They were supported by the members of the Supreme Headquarters Semyon Timoshenko, Clement Voroshilov and some other military leaders. The final decision of the Soviet command was adopted in late May - early June 1943 of the year. Most researchers believe that the decision on intentional defense, in this case was the most rational type of strategy.

The defensive operation in the area of ​​Kyrsky ledge involved mainly forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts. To support them, the Reserve Front was formed by 30 on April, then it was renamed the Steppe Military District, and from July 9 1943 of the year - under the Steppe Front commanded by Ivan Stepanovich Konev. The 27 th, 47 th, 53 th army and 5 th air army were initially included in the Steppe Front. The troops of the Steppe Military District were located in reserve behind the Central and Voronezh fronts. The steppe front was supposed to stop the advance of the enemy troops in case of its breakthrough. On July 18, the 69 Army and the 7 Guards Army were included in the Steppe Front, and in September the 4 and 5 Guards armies, 37 and 46 armies.

The Reserve Headquarters of the Supreme Command and in the second echelon of the fronts were deployed 5 tank armies, several separate tank and mechanized corps, a significant number of rifle corps and divisions. From April to July, the Central and Voronezh Front was reinforced by 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-recourse software, anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate anti-tank artillery regiments, 14 artillery regiments, 8 shelves and their own stope-and-go-off-on-put-off-and-go-to-off-order artillery. Two fronts that were supposed to repel the blow of the enemy were given over 7 thousand guns and mortars, 9 aircraft.

Representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky coordinated the actions of the fronts in this direction, the artillery was supervised by Colonel-General Artillery Nikolai Voronov, and the aviation marshal Alexander Novikov.

By the beginning of the Great Kursk battle, the Central, Voronezh fronts and the Steppe fronts had more than 1,9 million people (of which 0,6 million was in reserve), more than 26,5 thousand guns and mortars (with 7,4 thousand in reserve), over 4,9 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns (1,5 thousand in reserve), about 2,6 thousand aircraft (of which 0,5 thousand were located in reserve).

After solving the tasks of a strategic defensive operation, the Soviet command planned to launch a counteroffensive. The implementation of the Kutuzov plan - the defeat of the Oryol German grouping was entrusted to the troops of the left flank of the Western Front under the command of Colonel General Vasily Sokolovsky, the Bryansk Front under the command of Colonel General Markian Popov and the right flank of the Central Front Konstantin Rokossovsky. The implementation of the Rumyantsev plan was an offensive operation on the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, planned to be carried out by the formations of the Voronezh Front under the command of Nikolai Vatutin, the Steppe Front Ivan Konev and the forces of the South-Western Front Rodion Malinovsky.

The forces of the Central, Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Fronts created a powerful defensive system, which included 8 defensive lines and lines with a total depth of 250 – 300 km. Great attention was paid to anti-tank, anti-artillery and anti-aircraft defense with deep echeloning of battle formations. A developed system of strong points, dugouts, firing points, trenches, communication lines and anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers was created. On the left bank of the Don they created a state line of defense. The depth of the defense lines on the Central Front, where the German troops were waiting for the main attack, was 190 km, on the Voronezh Front - 130 km. Each front was equipped with three army and three front lines of defense. Rokossovsky's central front was composed of: 48, 13, 70, 65, 60 and 2 tank armies. The Voronezh Vatutin Front also had six armies: the 6, the 7, the Guards, the 38, the 40, the 69, and the 1. The command of the Central Front located in the first line all five combined-arms armies, the 2-I tank army was in the second echelon and two tank corps (9 and 19) were in reserve. On the Voronezh front in the first echelon there was an 4 army. The width of the defense lines of the Central Front was 306 km, and the Voronezh one - 244 km.

The Soviet command paid great attention to the formation of artillery groups. 10 on April 1943, the People’s Commissariat of Defense issued a special order on the use of artillery of the High Command Reserve (RVGK), reinforcement of artillery regiments of reinforcement for the armies and the formation of anti-tank and mortar brigades for the fronts. In the defense lines of the 48, 13 and 70 armies of the Central Fleet, on the intended direction of the main attack of the German Oryol grouping was concentrated, together with the second echelon and front reserves, to 70% of all guns and mortars of the front and 85% of the entire artillery of the High Command. . In the defense zone of the 13 Army, where the point of impact of the 9 Army was aimed, they concentrated 44% of the RVGK artillery regiments. The 13 Army was attached to the 4 th Artillery Breakthrough Corps, which had 700 guns and mortars and 432 rocket artillery. On the Voronezh front in the front line, where the 6-th and 7-th Guards armies were located, concentrated up to 66% artillery of the Supreme Command-87 from 130 artillery regiments. The command paid great attention to the mines of defensive lines. The average mining density in the direction of the expected strikes of the German groups was 1,5 thousand anti-tank and 1,7 thousand anti-personnel mines for each kilometer of the front. The troops of the Central Front during April-June 1943 of the year installed up to 400 thousands of mines. and land mines.

The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties. Part of 2

Soviet sappers set up TM-42 anti-track mines in front of the front edge of the defense. Kursk Arc, Central Front.

By the time the Battle of Kursk began, the Soviet command had established closer cooperation with partisan units than it had been before. In preparation for the battle on the Kursk bulge, the central headquarters of the partisan movement organized mass sabotage in the rear of the German Army Groups Center and South. Particularly important were the strikes of the partisans on enemy communications. By the summer of 1943, the Belarusian partisans forged their actions with more than 80 thousand German soldiers and officers, Smolensk partisans - up to 60 thousand, Bryansk - about 50 thousand Nazis.

It should be noted and dedicated work of the civilian population. The population of the Kursk, Oryol, Voronezh and Kharkiv regions, with the mobilizing role of the party and Soviet organs, provided tremendous assistance to the troops of the fronts. The inhabitants of the front-line areas helped the Soviet soldiers to build defensive lines, repair roads, repair communications destroyed by German aviation.

The Central Front. Rokossovsky, on the basis of an assessment of the situation, believed that the enemy would launch an offensive against the forces of the right wing of the front, delivering the main attack on Ponyri, Olkhovatka, Zolotukhino, Kursk in the 13 Army’s defense zone, and auxiliary attacks from Zmiivka to Droskovo and from Trosny to Kursk . Therefore, the front command decided to reduce the 13 Army’s defense line from 56 to 32 kilometers and increase its strength to 4 corps - 12 rifle divisions. The construction of the army has become a two-echelon. The commander of the 13 Army was Lieutenant-General Nikolai Pukhov.

In addition to the 13 Army Pukhov, on the way of the German strike, there were units of the 48 Army as part of the 7 rifle divisions. The 48 Army I, Lieutenant General Prokofy Romanenko, occupied an area of ​​38 km to the right of the 13 Army. On the left of the 13 Army, the forces of the right wing of the 70 Army Lieutenant General Ivan Galanin were deployed as part of the 5 rifle divisions. Thus, 95 rifle divisions from the 24 division and 41 brigades, which the TF had, were deployed in the 4-kilometer sector of the front, where the enemy was expected to advance. Ten rifle divisions were deployed in the main defense zone, nine divisions in the second defensive zone, and five divisions of the 13 Army were located in the area of ​​the army defensive zone. The rest of the front with a length of over 200 km defended 17 rifle divisions and 4 brigades. It was the left-flank corps of the 70 Army - 3 rifle divisions; 65 Army Lt. Gen. Pavel Batov - 9 rifle divisions and one brigade; 60 Army Lt. Gen. Ivan Chernyakhovsky - 5 rifle divisions and brigade 3. The total number of ZF to 1 July 1943, the year was 711,5 thousand people, 5359 guns, 5792 mortar, 1897 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations. Most of the tanks and self-propelled guns were subordinated to the front as part of the 2 tank army under the command of Alexey Rodin, 9 and 19 tank corps. Part of the tank units was subordinated to the armies.

The commander of the Central Front, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky and a member of the Military Council of the Front, Major General KF Telegin at the forefront of the battle of Kursk.

Voronezh Front. It was more difficult for General Nikolai Vatutin, commander of the Voronezh Front, to determine the direction of the main strike of the German Belgorod group. Komfronta considered it possible to attack the enemy troops in three directions: 1) from the area west of Belgorod on Oboyan; 2) from Belgorod to Korocha; 3) from the area west of Volchansk to Novy Oskol. The first two areas were considered the most likely. Therefore, the command of the VF concentrated its main forces in the center and on the left flank of the front, on a stretch of 164 kilometers, which amounted to two thirds of the total length of the front. In all three directions, counter-attacks were prepared by second echelons with reserves involving the forces of the first echelon.

Four armies were in the first echelon of the defense: 40-I, 38-I combined and 6-I and 7-I guards. In the center and on the left wing of the front there were three armies as part of 7 rifle divisions each. 40-I Army Kirill Moskalenko defended a sector of the front in 50 km, 6-I Guards Army Ivan Chistyakov was responsible for the sector in 64 km, 7-I Guards Army Mikhail Shumilov - 50 km. In the first echelon of the front 21 division was deployed: 12 rifle divisions (4 in each army) occupied the main line of defense, 8 divisions - the second line, one division was located in the army defense zone behind the left wing of the 40 army. On the right flank of the Voronezh Front, against the right flank of the 2 of the German army, in the 80 km zone, the 38 Army was under the command of Nikandr Chibisov as part of the 6 rifle divisions (five divisions were in the first echelon of defense, one in the second).

In the second echelon of the defense of the Voronezh front, the defense was occupied by the 1-I tank army of Mikhail Katukov (31-th, 6-th tank corps and 3-th mechanized corps), it closed the direction of Oboyan - Kursk; and Vasily Kryuchyonkin's 69 Army (5 rifle divisions, they were deployed in the 6-th and 7-th Army Guards Armies) defended Belgorod, Korocha and Volchanks, New Oskol. The reserve VF 35-th Guards Rifle Corps (consisting of three rifle divisions), who stood on the left flank of the first defensive line, as well as 5-th and 2-th Guards tank corps.

The uncertain situation with the direction of the main attack of the German troops and the error with the place of the main attack (he was waited in the Central Front) was aggravated by the features of the defense line of the Central and Voronezh Fronts. On the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, the terrain was less favorable for the movement of large masses of armored vehicles (the terrain was more wooded). At the FC, this area band was about a third of the entire plot, while for the VF it was two thirds. Vatutin was forced to smudge the troops on a wider front, reducing the density of military formations in the place where the German command would deliver the main attack. In particular, the 40 Army of Moskalenko, which was away from the direction of the strike of the 4 Panzer Army of Goth, was more powerful than the 6 and 7 Guards armies, which took the enemy's attack. The 40 Army had more anti-tank 45-mm guns, 76,2-mm regimental guns, 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, than the 6-I Guards Army. At the same time, the 40-i army defended the 50-Kyometrovy sector of the front, and the 6-I Guards-64-kilometer. The 40 Army was also the leader in the number of tanks among the armies of the Voronezh Front — 237 vehicles (in the 6 Guards — 135 tanks). Already in the course of the battle, the units of the 40 Army began to be transferred to the aid of the Guards, but the 6 of the Guards Army was no longer relieved. Yes, and the German troops were easier to beat the Soviet troops in parts. The total number of troops on the Voronezh Front at the beginning of July was 1943, 625,5 thousand people, 4155 guns, 4596 mortars and 1701 tanks and self-propelled artillery.

It is clear that in such a situation, “deliberate defense” was unacceptable for Vatutin’s com-front. With an unfavorable development of the situation, the Voronezh Front could come to a catastrophe. Therefore, Nikolai Fedorovich would prefer to attack. Vatutin repeatedly asked the General Staff the question of the need to launch an offensive in the south-western direction. In addition, he expressed fears that the enemy would never advance and the Soviet troops would miss the time to conduct offensive operations in the 1943 year. Vatutin convinced Vasilevsky: “Let's stop digging and start first. We have enough strength for this. ” According to Vasilyevsky, the Supreme Commander was also unstable. Vatutin insisted that he should strike no later than the beginning of July. Stalin considered that this proposal deserved attention and ordered the commander to prepare his ideas on this matter and report them to the Headquarters. The long delay in the German offensive made Stalin worry and think about a preemptive strike.

On 2 on the night of July 2 on July 1943, the directive of Supreme Command Rate No. 30144 was sent to the commanders of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Southwestern and Southern fronts, where it was noted that German troops could launch an offensive during July 3-6 . The troops were ordered to be fully prepared to repel the blow and to strengthen the observation of the Germans.

Construction of fortifications on the Kursk Bulge.
Articles from this series:
The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties
The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 3
Great Battle of Kursk: defensive operation of the troops of the Voronezh Front
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 3
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 4
The Great Battle of Kursk: Operation Kutuzov
The Great Battle of Kursk: Operation Kutuzov. Part of 2
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  1. nickname 1 and 2
    nickname 1 and 2 6 July 2013 09: 06

    By the beginning of the Great Kursk battle, the Central, Voronezh fronts and the Steppe fronts had more than 1,9 million people (of which 0,6 million was in reserve), more than 26,5 thousand guns and mortars (with 7,4 thousand in reserve), over 4,9 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns (1,5 thousand in reserve), about 2,6 thousand aircraft (of which 0,5 thousand were located in reserve).

    What a force!
    How many LIVING people!
    It is necessary to write more extensively, deeper, in more detail and more often, for someone to get it!

    Fighted! So many people have put that there is no one to LIVE in Russia!
    And what villages were in Russia. What life was seething.
  2. Ross
    Ross 6 July 2013 09: 26
    There is no one to live in Russia because my parents had 7-10 children, their parents only had two, now they have two, and what about the children? With today's fashion for civil marriage, not a single one!
  3. wolf1945
    wolf1945 6 July 2013 09: 44
    The homeland was defended completely by times in a different way and could not be! Eternal memory to the soldiers of the Second World War! soldier
  4. Stas57
    Stas57 6 July 2013 09: 59
    The central front of Rokossovsky was composed of the 48, 13, 70, 65, 60 combined arms and 2 tank armies.

    my grandfather who started the war with the Kursk Bulge, Rokossovsky always remembered as the father of his native, only with a kind word
  5. creak
    creak 6 July 2013 10: 07
    Rokossovsky is undoubtedly our most talented commander who has always achieved maximum results with minimum losses. And what is very important - he was always distinguished by a respectful and sensitive attitude towards his subordinates - which was noted by all who had the honor to serve under his command (this was confirmed by my late father who went through the whole war).
    1. Reyngard
      Reyngard 6 July 2013 10: 14
      14 th
      I agree! Unlike Zhukov!
      1. bistrov.
        bistrov. 6 July 2013 11: 19
        Why did Zhukov not please you? Almost all the main battles of the Second World War were won either under his direct command, or under his control, as a representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. And about all the nonsense that they talk about him, that he allegedly did not value the lives of soldiers and was too cool with his subordinates, these are the machinations of Khrushchev. Krut Zhukov was only with negligent commanders and loafers, so they really got it from him. Didn’t they composed a tale that all Zhukov’s victories were paid for by a large
        soldier's blood. Many envied his nationwide fame, in particular Marshal Konev. I advise you to read the book "Ups, Downs and Unknown Pages of the Life of the Great Marshal" about this.
        1. svp67
          svp67 6 July 2013 16: 35
          Quote: bistrov.
          Almost all the main battles of the Second World War were won either under his direct command, or under his control, as a representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.
          STRONGLY EXPRESSED opinion ...
          1. bistrov.
            bistrov. 6 July 2013 19: 46
            Quote: svp67
            Highly EXCLUSIVE opinion.

            Okay, let's get down to the "texture": He stopped the Germans near Leningrad, he crushed the Germans near Moscow, so much so that they didn't go there anymore, in fact, the decision to encircle the Germans near Stalingrad was formulated and prepared by him, though together with Vasilevsky, Kurskaya the battle took place under his direct leadership, he supervised the crossing of the Dnieper and the capture of Kiev, he also led the troops of Vatutin, after his injury and death, it was under his leadership that the Proskurov-Chernivtsi operation took place in terms of the scale of the defeat of the Germans, not inferior to the Battle of Stalingrad, when on a huge territory from Vinnitsa to Prut, German troops were surrounded, they lost all heavy equipment and tanks, only a small part of the infantry managed to escape from this encirclement in the direction of Lvov. For example, the Proskurov-Kamenets-Podolsky highway, for 100 km, everything was filled with German equipment standing completely in the back of each other's heads, this was the only way that the Germans tried to use for evacuation, and it was cut by our troops in several places, including the city of Kamenets - Podolsky and Chernivtsi were in our hands, and since there was a spring thaw, the Germans were forced to abandon their equipment and weapons, run away on foot through the fields. Few managed to escape. Read the book "Earth on Fire" by Marshal Yakubovsky, this operation is very well described there. And finally, the operation to take Berlin. It was developed personally by Marshal Zhukov, and he practically implemented it. This operation is recognized by the whole world as a classic. I will not go into its description, you can read it in any source. In addition, Supreme Commander Stalin did not make a single significant strategic decision without consulting Marshal Zhukov; Marshal Zhukov had a hand in the development of all operations and management of many. His authority was extremely high not only in the USSR but abroad. Therefore, it is no coincidence that after the end of the war, Marshal Zhukov fell into disgrace. We always had enough parquet shufflers, and there was no need to fight anymore. I do not idealize this person, I do not approve of his behavior in the family, but we must give him his due: in the firmament of Russia and Russia, this is a star of the first magnitude, at the level of Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Alexander Suvorov. I approve of the introduction of the Order of Marshal Zhukov. All the greatness of the personality of Marshal Zhukov has yet to be comprehended. I think our descendants will later appreciate his service to the Russian people and the state.
            1. svp67
              svp67 6 July 2013 20: 02
              Quote: bistrov.
              Ok, let's get to the "texture":

              Quote: bistrov.
              He stopped the Germans near Leningrad, he defeated the Germans near Moscow

              Quote: bistrov.
              in fact, the decision on the encirclement of the Germans near Stalingrad was formulated and prepared for its implementation, though together with Vasilevsky

              Here you are wrong. At this point in history, he has very little to do, so "head over heels" was busy with other things, in particular the battles near Demyansk.
              Quote: bistrov.
              The battle of Kursk took place under his direct supervision

              Here you are again not quite right, since he was the representative of the General Headquarters on the Central Front, while on Voronezh the same representative was Vasilevsky.
              Quote: bistrov.
              And finally, the operation to capture Berlin. It was developed personally by Marshal Zhukov, but he practically implemented it

              This operation was developed by the General Staff and was also carried out by the General Staff. If it were your way, NEVER the tanks of the 3 Tank Army from the Konev front would go to Berlin ...
              1. Igarr
                Igarr 7 July 2013 13: 17
                Sorry to interrupt ...
                however, I would like to note that only one Zhukov hung out on all fronts. And he climbed, with each appointment, higher and higher.
                The battle of Yelnya is a dubious merit.
                Leningrad defended .. well, actually, there were many who were there. Zhdanov, for example. Tributs. Yes, and Leningrad stood until 1944 without Zhukov.
                Stalingrad - in general, he’s not at work there. Chuikov's head.
                And Zhukov at that time took possession of Sychevka ... which was repeated every year, which year.
                About the Kursk Bulge already answered. And he continued to clobber at the line of Rzhev-Sychevka.
                Everyone knows the methodology of nominating .... effective managers. What now, what then - there is no better way to expel an incapable figure, to prevent his ebullient, mediocre activity - how to send for promotion.
                Something really reminds me .. of Zhukov’s career.
                And Khrushchov ... well, two tarantulas in the bank. "There should be only one left!"
                Here is one left.
                And the other now - at the Manege. Shameful monument. Why is he alone there?
                Rokossovsky would be more suitable. To sit, go through "special methods" of interrogation - and then defend "Bagration" - was Zhukov capable of that? I doubt it.
                ".. It was developed personally by Marshal Zhukov,". From the characterization of Zhukov from Rokossovsky - ".. disgusted with staff work ..".
                This is the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army in 1941.
                Developed ... together with Serov ... how to seize reparations.
                Much is known of other Victory Marshals?
                And there were - give me a way how much.
                1. Igarr
                  Igarr 7 July 2013 17: 41
                  Yes cons put how much will fit ..
                  Notice .. posting an article only with a signature stamp - My opinion .. or there ... Soldier's tales.
                  All our activity here ... - to the elephant poultice.
                  Then there is none of the old composition. at least a year ago.
                  We .. DO ... want. And - we know how, KNOW-HOW - we own.
                  A - chatting ...
                  Old ... chatter is much better for owning ... young animals.
                  Recently I have been observing a strange story - an audit of the results of the Great Patriotic War ..
                  Serve this revision - under the brand - of the historical TRUTH ....
                  Under the brand - it was like that !!!
                  There was after all - WAR !!!
                  There was a war.
                  Allies were.
                  Noticed - were the Allies?
                  The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in abbreviation - the USSR - carried on its shoulders the entire war against Hitlerism.
                  Allies, oddly enough - only participated in the war against the Nazis !!
                  They did a lot in denazification !!!
                  They are our allies in the Second World War !!!
                  On this - THEIR Achievements and END. !!
                  So ... preoccupied ... please separate .. the fly from cutlets.
                  And all business.
        2. combat192
          combat192 7 July 2013 14: 14
          In 1981, at the age of 15, in the museum of the USSR Armed Forces, my father, by the way - a front-line soldier, drew my attention to the map "executed" (what this is for a military man should be clear) personally by Zhukov. Unfortunately, as a young man, I did not ask what kind of operation it was. But it stuck in my memory: BLUE an arrow has been drawn in pencil, so the map is broken through. The arrow rests against an uneven, hastily painted oval of the same color. Caption: "To master to ... (I do not remember the date)! Signature of Zhukov."
          In adulthood I was looking for this exhibit in the same museum and in the museum on Poklonnaya Gora. Not found, removed from the exposition.
        3. igor.borov775
          igor.borov775 8 July 2013 02: 51
          Hi, I absolutely agree with these comments, Yes Zhukov was a very tough commander, and the requirements concerned mainly command and control of the troops, Remember the first victory near Orsha, Even there he demanded that the commander should take into account and know from the division and above how he reported the command for the fact that they didn’t even really know what forces were opposed to them, it now seems an axiom that artillery should hit precisely for targets, but they would hit just at squares, Zhukov forced him to learn to use artillery and not only it on the go, And it was 41 years the most difficult, When in 60 years began the mass writing of memories where Zhukov is mentioned, he clearly stated, see where and for what he spoke to the commanders, Just for the cause, And it’s not cool that he just demanded what the fathers of the commanders should do clearly and reliably, It’s after the Kursk Bulge that the stars of the generals shone Malinovsky, Chernyakhovsky, Rybalko and many many others. On the Kursk Bulge for the first time, our aviation was able to destroy almost 800 aircraft before the Germans attacked, a little German tanks that were going to the places of concentration were also reduced for the first time, on the Kursk Bulge there was essentially a completely different army, It was here that intelligence and counterintelligence began to work more clearly, All this experience was instantly generalized and went to all fronts, And the requirements were very tightened to the fronts in issues of preparation and conduct of operations, And the Germans began to experience what they were doing with us, The battles had not yet begun, and they suffered losses, They are trying not to mention such things now, Eternal glory to our ancestors who did everything possible in those very difficult conditions that we call the pure name VICTORY, Shame and oblivion to those who, under cover of justice, pour slop on our ancestors, I mean ROSMAN and K
        4. wladimir
          wladimir 27 May 2017 22: 24
          And if it’s calm ...... and in order, the battle for Moscow-Rokossovsky, Govorov, Vlasov-received the Order of Lenin, and Zhukov-nothing (Obviously the Supreme knew nothing about his special merits) 2-Stalingrad --- the idea of ​​the colonel The General Staff .. Responsible for conducting Vasilevsky ... surrounded and finished off. Rokossovsky 3- And Zhukov at that time carried out the operation ** Mars ** huge in costs and zero in results. 4-Battle of Kursk was on the Central Front of Rokossovsky day but there and without it it went like clockwork and drove off to the other front, though Vatutin felt bad and they barely fought off with Vasilevsky and Konev. 5-Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya == was a representative ... overslept a breakthrough and leaving the encirclement of a tank group - received a reprimand from Stalin In Belorusskaya was against Rokossovsky’s plan and went to Gorbatov to prove that there would be a breakthrough in his section (as planned by Zhukov and the General Staff) success = but Rokossovsky at his station went into rapid separation .. (Stalin instantly reacted to the rank of Marshal and Hero of the USSR) Well, the capture of Berlin ... terrible victims ... hundreds of tanks burned in street battles (and the generals repeated this terrible experience with grief at the battles for Grozny (history is not for us, people and technology were always consumables !! That's all ... nothing personal
  6. Roll
    Roll 6 July 2013 10: 58
    wassat That's what a well-built defense means, if in June 41 at least 20 percent of what had been done on the Kursk Bulge were completed, the Reich would not have gone further than Minsk, and the war would have ended by taking Berlin by December 41 and really little blood . Unfortunately, competent defense is the most difficult type of battle, and it is very unloved by the military and politicians, but everyone loves to attack, and even with a lot of blood.
    1. bistrov.
      bistrov. 6 July 2013 12: 31
      Quote: Rolm
      The Reich wouldn’t go further than Minsk,

      Well, I would not say so categorically. All the same, we would have to retreat in 1941, the strike was too powerful, the enemy was too experienced and trained, I mean, first of all, the Wehrmacht command staff, and our commanders were too inexperienced, notorious, frightened, and even traitors. For example, General Pavlov. His behavior can truly be regarded as outright betrayal. There were many reasons.
      1. Roll
        Roll 6 July 2013 16: 18
        wassat Well, I disagree about the commanders, Rokosovsky, Vatutin, Zhukov and others do not make such an impression, but Pavlov can be understood, we had no plans and instructions in case of a sudden war, we were completely unprepared for defense, for which we paid. We were ready only to the offensive, but he was not. Then the combat experience of the Reich was lower than ours, not counting the pilots and sailors. With the right defense, they wouldn’t let Minsk further.
        1. Cat
          Cat 6 July 2013 16: 53
          Quote: Rolm
          But you can understand Pavlov, we had no plans and instructions in case of a sudden war, we were absolutely not ready for defense, for which we paid

          cases when everyone was ready for everything - you can count on the fingers. And the task of a good commander is not so much to have ready-made plans for all occasions - how to quickly assess the situation and make appropriate decisions based on available forces and means.
          A simple example: a karate champion returns from training, in the gateway he is attacked by hooligans. One champion - immediately dawns on the gopota of the jaw and moves on, another champion - begins to change into a kimono. Which one, one asks, is a real fighter, and who is ostentatious? That's it.
        2. dustycat
          dustycat 6 July 2013 18: 36
          Pavlov playing at the staff exercises for the Reds already received a hat from Zhukov who played for the Blue on the same map.
          In 1941, the pre-war headquarters game was repeated in kind.
          Pavlov acted just like in the pre-war headquarters games.
          The result was predicted by Zhukov.
          The Germans in Pavlov’s army strip acted just like Zhukov.
          Pavlov had several days to realize that the Germans were repeating Zhukov’s maneuver and changing location as Zhukov advised.
          But it turned out as it happened.
          1. igor.borov775
            igor.borov775 8 July 2013 04: 58
            how strict what do you know about those battles, It is written very sparingly about them and it is clear And Zhukov could not change anything in the MP since he is the only document that he must fulfill, Another question is how, And we don’t have to blame everything on one person, the Germans exceeded us in everything on many counts of warfare, A simple example in 1942, the Bryansk Front very unsuccessfully almost failed the operation to alleviate the situation in the STALINGRAD direction, After the commission investigated this case, an order was issued on the use of tanks, And after the Kursk addition, take into account the opinion of tank army commanders,
        3. bistrov.
          bistrov. 6 July 2013 20: 29
          Quote: Rolm
          Then the combat experience of the Reich was lower than ours,

          What are you saying, in your opinion, two years of victorious combat operations and the capture of practically all of Europe, while inflicting a heavy defeat on Great Britain in Dunkirk is not considered a combat experience? For comparison: the Red Army had only two local conflicts: on Khalkin-Gol, where it hardly defeated the Japanese, again thanks to the corps commander Zhukov, and in Finland, where it completely disgraced itself. Or do you consider the Drang nakh West march to join Galicia and Zapad as a military experience. Belarus, when the lagging broken cars and BT tanks stood on all field roads? Yes, a tremendous experience! How was it that there were no instructions? What are you babbling, young man? Why, in the South and North, the Red Army not only repulsed the blow, but also captured bridgeheads on the enemy's territory, Why was the German advance in the Lviv and Ternopil regions stopped and only the threat of encirclement, precisely because of the breakthrough of the Germans in Belarus, where Pavlov practically withdrew from leadership of the troops and they advanced without hindrance, forced them to retreat! What instructions does a military man need? There is a combat manual, everything is written there.
          1. Roll
            Roll 6 July 2013 22: 26
            wassat The capture of Europe and what kind of fights were there, with Poland yes, but we also fought there and scored prisoners, the Reich and Poland quickly got rid of and the fighting experience was small, in France the Germans didn’t get off motorcycles to Paris, at first I agreed to fight under Dunkirk, then Hitler forbade the British to attack, and they hit off on their own. The experience of the Reich land connections was minimal, Finland alone cost more. As for the march to the west, I agree, but I had to make conclusions, there was time. As for the charter, it was not enough, there should be a clear plan , the commander opens the package and everything is written where and what kind of defense to take, but this was not.
            1. bistrov.
              bistrov. 7 July 2013 09: 47
              Quote: Rolm
              but it was necessary to draw conclusions, there was time. As for the charter, it was not enough, there should be a clear plan, the commander opens the package and everything is written where and what kind of defense to take, but this was not.

              Conclusions were made, reorganization and rearmament of the troops began, more than a million people were drafted into the army, this is a huge work of many thousands of people and huge funds that were not enough, or you think everything is done with a wave of a magic wand, a mechanized corps waved and appeared, the formation of which then started, but unfortunately did not finish. And there was just no time, it turned out to be less than 2 years old. Right now, there has been talk about the rearmament of the Russian army for more than five years, but has much been done? They only completed a couple of submarines, yes a couple of corvettes, well, they strengthened the southern direction, but there are others, no less dangerous, they can’t solve the form in any way, it turns out that this is the main question. It was not so simple, a lot depended on people and on the ground, for example, in the Odessa military district, the troops under the responsibility of the local command were sent to field areas and dispersed, therefore they had the least losses, and therefore they were exposed to the Romanians in the very first days. And in the Brest Fortress, which was literally hundreds of meters from the border, they continued to sleep peacefully in the barracks. After all, the local commanders knew the situation very well, but did not take any measures. And on the territory of the Brest Fortress two divisions were deployed, this is a decent force, if they were in the field, even in pre-battle orders they would not be so easy to take. And so they bombed the sleeping in the barracks and all things. And you say packages. Yes there were these packages, only it turned out to be zero sense.
              1. igor.borov775
                igor.borov775 8 July 2013 08: 07
                It’s like there were two divisions in the Brest Fortress, Something is getting dark mister, You are buzzing on the keys without glancing at the saints, Why should the Cossacks put a shadow on the wattle fence so I repeat, These are which divisions of the room are urgent, For information there was only a regiment of really Germans and ours They lie, there were still quite a lot of engineers and engineer units well, they don’t pull the division at all. They were unloading materials that arrived at the station. For information from Lithuania to Izmail almost 200 thousand engineers and engineer troops worked at the border, they built bridge reinforcements , If the field fortified areas are not clear, Cement was in short supply, the Commander was together take off if you don’t know, Lieutenant General Karbyshev was a specialist in fortification, 45 divisions of the whole squad occupied the south of the fortress, the Defense Zone was 35 km From the north of the fortress, 75 divisions occupied the position, Defense zone 50km, By the way, who will have the opportunity to look carefully at the coast in those places, Minesmen are very the combat units were nervous, they were not armed, it greatly bothered the commanders, It was reassuring that by September they would do everything, the Germans were never fools, It was through the orders of these divisions that almost all this armada moved, These divisions were in their trenches did not sleep in the barracks, It these divisions were heavily stretched and the main artillery strike came, the strike was the strongest. Just imagine what was happening there, and who survived the resistance, the last remnants of resistance were crushed and the movement of the shock formations of the Germans armored immediately began. made pontoon crossings, Tanks broke loose and went ahead, We read the diary of the first battles in Belarus, almost all divisions are fighting there are no reports from the 45th and 75th divisions communications delegates sent there are not returning, 13th tank division is suffering huge losses retreating, This division is on the defense plan should help detain the enemy moving forward to the aid of the 75th division, Chitam informed By the beginning of the battles, the 13th tank division had nearly 10 thousand people, it consisted of only 50 training tanks and 1000 rifles and a separate regiment fully armed with infantry weapons. The tanks of this division did not reach them, they were bombed even in flanks. And you don’t have to catch a wave And our only found out about the Brest Fortress in winter, surrounded the division and its number 45, Having captured the headquarters, we learned that it had stormed it until the last soldier of the surrounded fortress, And there are no divisions there, The brighter the star of great deed burns, What is interesting the Germans captured a fair amount of soldiers who they didn’t have a weapon, then they were surprised as a soldier and without a weapon,
          2. igor.borov775
            igor.borov775 8 July 2013 06: 41
            Nobody took it in vain, you say so, the most severe blow was delivered there, and attempts to repel were suppressed as much as possible, having air superiority, the Germans knew where and where the troops were concentrated under incessant bombing, the troops had not yet encountered the Germans suffered tangible losses. This is the worst trouble, It’s not Pavlov's fault that all aviation was concentrated at 30 airfields and 100 airfields were built and should be ready only in the fall, Is it his fault that the most powerful aviation regiments were concentrated in Lidice Baranavichy and the Germans knew them like the back of their hand there was a ban on shooting them down not from Pavlov, but higher, and there the most experienced pilots who had military experience were based, It was those pilots who were able to take off worthyly beat the enemy, They needed to take off their hats before their feat they had only one flight, there was nowhere to return the airfields exist, And the KOROBKOV’s army on the Belostotsky ledge was immediately surrounded by Pavlov’s fault, These are the errors of MP-41g. Incidentally, Vasilevsky and Zhukov also took part in its development and adoption. After he admits that the deployment of troops in Belarus wasn’t well planned, even the concentration of troops was unsuccessful, Pavlov’s headquarters had to rebuild everything that could be done , He was not the only one who commanded the troops, after his subordinate staffs will become very known to everyone, But in Ukraine there were much more airfields and tank corps were far from the border and they were preserved, The very arrangement of the troops was much more successful, For a long time no one doubts that At Pavlov’s And the second echelon of covering the border was not very well located and, most importantly, it was too close to the border, There was a less developed railway and automobile network, So the Germans were in a hurry to break up the second echelon of troops in Belarus and unleash any directions, And there’s nothing to bring down all sins, Read more documents, Tymoshenko and Zhukov strongly pressed on the dissatisfied, Namely on mandating districts, You think they were silent nothing like that, You think about the supply bases of troops in Belarus they were silent nothing like that but there was no possibility to transfer Contacts with the transfer of equipment and troops and location all receded the next year, And here is one small fact, The troops in Ukraine were better equipped with equipment and personnel, And in Belarus the equipment was transported by rail there were also all sorts of troubles, And before the war airfields were transferred to aerodromes, there was a huge amount of aircraft which was difficult to fly from overloaded bases, According to MP-41 in case of anxiety, it should fly away to the airfields that were still under construction,
        4. igor.borov775
          igor.borov775 8 July 2013 04: 36
          What are you talking about sweetheart, And what kind of offensive are you talking about, Do you write yourself you don’t know what, According to MP-41 There was only one defense, But what do you know about the Army of the Red Army 40-41g nothing, If you do not know then know recently became a draft the call to the service of recruits instantly had the problem of a junior command staff from a platoon and a company inclusively, there were not enough specialists of all specialists in each particular military branch, junior commanders who had experience of a civil war were urgently called up, an early release from military schools was carried out, in the Far East it was also quiet I also had to strengthen the troops, All 40 years west troops were transferred from the internal districts, It was also not just impossible to break the train schedule, the country lived peacefully, Now it is simply impossible to imagine how the western districts lived, In these districts we organized according to our training, Thousands of soldiers were sent to them, Of the cavalry and soldiers urgently trained artillery tankers and aviation specialists, All called drivers with once we went to learn tanking, Everything went according to the accelerated rate, time was running out, now we can only say that tankers, having had almost 20 hours of running in tanks, courageously met the enemy, young aviation graduates had a 30-hour raid courageously fought with the enemy, By all accounts The General Staff will not be ready for war until 42 years earlier. It was 41 years that exercises of all types of troops were planned for training all types of wax and gaining experience. Unfortunately, the Germans were well aware of all or many events.
      2. igor.borov775
        igor.borov775 8 July 2013 03: 01
        As they say at school, unfortunate in history
    2. smile
      smile 6 July 2013 13: 43
      None of the countries that decided to join the 1 MV did not intend to defend themselves. Not a single one. Everyone perfectly understood that defense, the loss of initiative, or rather its surrender to the enemy, where and when he imposed it on you (of course, where the enemy is profitable and where he created superiority) .. hereinafter-kirdyk. Passivity can only lead to defeat and to nothing more ...

      The same applies to 2 MV - any defensive positions are only designed to slow down and wear down the enemy in order to further switch to a decisive offensive ... that is why the offensive is "like the military" - because they have brains. because there is no other way to victory. because they don't want to waste the lives of soldiers ...

      If you look at the insignificant length of the contact line of the troops participating in the Battle of Kursk, and then compare with the length of the border with the Germans at 41, you will understand that for the construction of such a defensive system at least 20 percent along the entire border with our resources at that time would be required dozens of years ... And about the capture of Berlin by December 41 ... something rezunovschiny smelled ... The Wehrmacht at that time was stronger, and I'm afraid we were not in December in Berlin, even if we attacked it ... ourselves ... of what. however, we were not going to do in principle.
      You will forgive me, but do not read bad books - they very much damage the ability to think rationally - as you have in this case ...
      1. Roll
        Roll 6 July 2013 16: 24
        belay Why not a single one, for example, Finland, an example of exemplary defense, she specifically showed us, poke around, wash my face with blood. And their defense was excellent, millionaire pillboxes, cuckoo snipers, mobile mortar brigades that knocked out the first and last tank in our convoy and then shot it. Here Vasily Margelov based on the actions of the Finnish special forces created our landing troops. Then France was also ready for defense, the Maginot line was almost impenetrable, if not for Manstein. England defended on the island. And only after 3 years began to advance, Africa does not count.
        1. Roll
          Roll 6 July 2013 16: 30
          wassat And you, as the length of the border line, consider Belarus, there are swamps, there is forest, there are roads and highways. If you stretch the troops in line, I agree there will not be enough troops. And if you build echeloned, circularly fortified areas along highways, there will be less than on the Kursk arch, also in western Belogrussia, there are enough mountain peaks to control, I don’t write about rivers.
          1. igor.borov775
            igor.borov775 8 July 2013 08: 13
            Hey strategist, you need to get in at that time to understand everything that can be done at that time was done. I would like to see you on those roads where there were very few of them.
        2. svp67
          svp67 6 July 2013 16: 57
          Quote: Rolm
          Then France was also ready for defense, the Maginot line was almost impenetrable, if not for Manstein.
          You are unfamiliar with the material you are trying to operate on. The offensive of the German troops in 1940, which led to the defeat of the Franco-British forces, was carried out through a section of the so-called "Maginot Line", which was broken through to its entire depth ...
          However, in reality, the Germans broke through the "continuation" of the "Maginot Line" in the Ardennes. On May 17, 1940, two 210-mm guns opened fire on the small fortification of La Fer. On May 18, two casemates with 75-mm cannons were abandoned by their garrisons. German assault groups began to fight their way deep into the fortifications. The neighboring fortification of Le Chesne tried to support the defenders of La Fer with 75mm cannons, but the casemates were too far away for the fire to be effective. By the end of the day on May 19, the entire fortification of La Fer was captured, and the road to the interior of France was opened for the Germans. Between 20 and 23 May, four fortifications of Maubeuge were destroyed one by one. The last blow on the "Maginot Line" was delivered in June 1940 during the operations "Tiger" and "Bear". 420-mm artillery, attacks by dive bombers, and assault groups were used against the fortifications. In general, we can say that the "Maginot Line" was, although with difficulty, but broken by the Germans in several places.

        3. dustycat
          dustycat 6 July 2013 18: 45
          The Maginot Line had the same glitches as our defense in 1941.
          It was focal in nature and the neighboring stronghold could not fully support the attacked by either fire or maneuver forces. There was no continuous line of trenches - the French seemed to have forgotten the experience of the First World War with the effectiveness of trenches.
          It was enough to destroy one echelon strong point and get access to the operational space.
          Ours, however, also did not go far from them.
          So the Germans broke through to Moscow and Stalingrad. Between strong points of fortified areas.
          1. smile
            smile 6 July 2013 20: 11
            The main drawback of all defense lines in the 40s was that the development of weapons and military equipment, tactics and strategies led to a situation where there can be no impenetrable defense lines in principle ... The Maginot Line, which the French have been building for 20 years, having an order of magnitude more resources, just money, even engineers, had been broken through in a matter of days to the full depth ... no trenches, ditches, and what else on the plain could stop the tanks with the appropriate support - this showed the whole nature of 2 MV. The Germans didn’t leave us in this either, remember. how, from the age of 44, they set up defense units in exactly the same way - that’s how our tank units were tearing down their defense and communications, bypassing the centers of resistance and destroying everything and everything in their rear, and we got as far as Berlin ....
            And the trouble of the French is precisely in that they did not forget, but on the contrary, they too literally used the experience of 1MB ... this ruined them ...
            1. Roll
              Roll 6 July 2013 20: 37
              wassat The parodox of France is that it built defense, but was not ready for defense. Yes, she had a wonderful line of defense, almost impossible to penetrate, had trained personnel, but only in the first echelon. After six months of a strange war, the French became insolent on impassability. The Maginot line was lazily cursing, the English expeditionary corps was resting, Paris was having fun. There were no reserves and plans to protect France either. And when the Germans broke through Maginot, instead of attacking the erupted units, everyone was draped.
              1. igor.borov775
                igor.borov775 8 July 2013 09: 45
                You don’t need to turn yourself into an idiot, It’s hard to take Maginot’s forehead right away, you can turn the war into VERDEN, well done Germans in terms of planning Take your face off more expensive and get around where they don’t wait for it, and MAZHIN went around and went around the entire army breaking perfectly and talented , And then the whole of France without an army, only policemen and some rear units, And we couldn’t get around the Finnish fortress, we only had to take it in our forehead, Only ROMEL allowed the Anglo-Saxons to flee to our island, And in 44 g the Meretskov Front again had to take the Finnish fortress When plans to break through the MANERGAME LINE were being considered, Meretskov began to tell in the BETTER OF THE SUPREME THAT THIS FOR THE LINE Stalin had flared up WHAT YOU FRAW AND RESERVES SO ASK, GO AND RATE AGAIN; but not so much as he wanted, the Karelian front was never important but with limited resources he took this fortress and so took that FINLAND came out of they asked for peace, In 1945, when preparations were underway for a war with Japan, the question immediately became how to take the areas along the border with Primorye to strengthen, Even questions did not arise in the Supreme Headquarters, In Primorye we will send the cunning Yaroslavl is his bread, This is about Marshal of the Soviet Union MERETSKOVA , And about the master of rapid walks in forests and mountains, the ability to reject stereotypes was immediately called by Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky, Those who showed themselves as a bright commander began the war with Japan and finished, Well, I ran ahead of them,
            2. igor.borov775
              igor.borov775 8 July 2013 09: 58
              The main feature of strengthening the regions is stability in defense and the ability to create a powerful fist in some place to launch a large-scale offensive. In principle, the Yankees also do the same, they just call it differently, they create a well-fortified base and crush the enemy under its cover, only once they got it in VIETNAM, well, who knew that the Vietnamese would break the tunnels to the bases themselves, where all the power of fire support would be meaningless, they would have to shoot their own and the Vietnamese would only force them to fight with small arms, and this is a completely different war of losses,
          2. igor.borov775
            igor.borov775 8 July 2013 08: 29
            And here you are wrong, the GERMANS turned out to be smarter than the French Well, who thought that the Germans would rush to Belgium and quickly rush to France, there is no MAZHIN but there is an English ally, Drapanuli are allies and the road to Paris is free, so that the French do not rush to defend the capital bypass this line through the forest and went to the rear of the line and from Belgium to the rear of the entire army of FRANCE, You don’t have to think that the MAZHINO just can be taken in the forehead of a soldier would have lost the Germans no one knows how we are in Finnish, They arrived gracefully the line went around from the rear and the army with rear Adyu The road is free, And the Germans experienced the fortification in full, I had to attack Kiev, It was very difficult for them to give It would be more ready for them I don’t know how everything turned out,
        4. smile
          smile 6 July 2013 19: 54
          Great example! You have carved yourself - Finland has been preparing for an aggressive coalition war for 20 years.
          The interaction with Latvia and Estonia on blocking with the help of coastal batteries, up to 305 mm, of the Gulf of Finland was worked out (exercises were held regularly).
          There were corresponding agreements and plans for engaging Britain and France in the conflict, and you will laugh- and Germany.
          You will laugh even more, but the Finns actively collaborated with Japan. they tried to establish interaction and draw it into a war with us at the same time as the Finns (in 36-37, if memory serves, the largest Japanese foreign intelligence center and intelligence school opened in Finland, evacuated to Sweden in September-October, contrary to our requirements).
          The armed forces after mobilization and deployment, made in advance, even before the conflict, amounted to 450 thousand well-trained soldiers and Shyutskor, their analogue of the SS (translation-guard units).
          According to their plans, no matter how the war begins, they planned in the first week to launch a massive offensive with decisive goals - to double the territory of Finland .... and not their fault, that did not fail, that their allies were delayed, that the Anglo-French were too long they were going to send an army of invasion to 180 to us, capture Murmansk and bomb Baku, Grozny, etc.

          In general, you refuted yourself by your example ... I recommend making a second attempt, this does not count ... :)))))
          1. Roll
            Roll 6 July 2013 20: 28
            wassat And how many millionaire pillboxes did they plan to use in the offensive, 180 army in Grozny? Bomb Baku? kidding. But they did not plan to capture Moscow with one regiment? Or the Kremlin in one company, in 000 the Latvians succeeded. You look at the armed forces of the Leningrad District, what an increase in Finland, Manenheim did not suffer from the Napoleon complex, but was a talented commander.
            1. smile
              smile 6 July 2013 23: 44
              Read at least De Gaulle’s memoirs, if you don’t know such well-known things - Europeans didn’t hide them, their ordinary historians know it, they simply don’t publish monographs on these topics in thousands of copies — they don’t rush to mix themselves with mud ... even worse with Finns, these, on the contrary, have published a lot of research on these topics. They cooperate in this with ours - there are even fewer liars there, such as Rezun, than in, for example, Britain or the USA ... and the Finns have long published documents, the various plans of their side are not everything, but a significant part is much larger than we are and even more so than the British (keeping their secrets much cooler than us) - but less so than the French, whose archives were in the hands of everyone, including us, Germans, Britons and Americans ...

              ours, by the way, worked off retaliatory attacks on the British bases in Middle-earth ... so that it would be disgraceful ... the British intelligence made dozens of reconnaissance sorties and aerial photographs of targets for airstrikes in the region of Baku, Grozny, nobody hides anything ...
              The 180 thousandth Anglo-French group was to be deployed in Finland ...
              Tell me, it’s not familiar to you that any defensive structures, among other things, increase the combat stability of the troops, as well as tanks assigned to the infantry ... although this is understandable to you? ... although it is unlikely ....
              Manstein didn’t suffer from Napoleon’s complex, it was just he who proclaimed the Great Suomi the Aunt to the Urals and consistently, competently sought for it and had good chances for the implementation of these plans ...
              I repeat, read at least De Gaulle's memoirs — he wrote about all this in his famous memoirs when hell in plain text ...

              you can read Shirokorad- "Great Intermission", no matter how you and I relate to his conclusions, he refers to a huge array of documents and gives verifiable links to them - read only documents - without his text - and your primitive musty little world will scatter like crystal vase against the wall .... although you may like him, he does not like the Bolsheviks ... :)))
              damn it, talking with you about this, how to explain algebra to a child when he still does not know the numbers ... and does not want to know ... excuse me, I'm tired of you, bye ...
            2. maxvet
              maxvet 7 July 2013 09: 20
              By the way, the combat experience of the war in Finland is rather ambiguous - the LDP is very specific
            3. igor.borov775
              igor.borov775 8 July 2013 08: 49
              You know a bad story before the war, the French and the British all worked out plans for an attack on the Transcaucasia. They all figured out the options. Air strikes against the BAKU were already worked out. Now it’s not decided to discuss, since it didn’t take place, it wasn’t. MOSCOW and BAKU and exercises were periodically carried out in this oil-bearing area. Only after the defeat of FRANCE it was decided to transfer the army from the North Caucasus to the west, and the remaining troops were given the identical order as the Far East, to not open fire and not a step back, this is also a story real
        5. combat192
          combat192 8 July 2013 03: 12
          Plusanul. No war was won by the defense.
    3. ftgad
      ftgad 7 July 2013 12: 06
      I was always interested in why, considering the Battle of Kursk, they forget about the "Kharkov catastrophe" of spring 42, because it was then that the Germans laid out some of their trump cards - the first use of heavy tanks
      Quote: Starover_Z
      The forces of the Central, Voronezh fronts and the Steppe fronts created a powerful defensive system, which included 8 defensive lines and lines with a total depth of 250-300 km. Much attention was paid to anti-tank, anti-artillery and air defense with a deep separation of battle formations. A well-developed system of strongholds, dugouts, firing points, trenches, communications and anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers was created. On the left bank of the Don created a state line of defense. The depth of the defense lanes on the Central Front, where the main blow of the German troops were waiting, was 190 km, on the Voronezh Front - 130 km. At each front, three army and three frontline defensive lines were equipped.

      To dig into such a depth of defensive structures !!!
      How many people plow naturally, and sapper units and soldiers, soldiers !!!

      ... and as a result, German troops actually pushed through all the lines of defense ...
      1. igor.borov775
        igor.borov775 8 July 2013 10: 59
        The Kharkov catastrophe has a different connotation. Everyone wanted to show off as a winner. There was nothing to support the shock groups. Moreover, the sweeping attack described him as Stalin. They were all chasing the number of settlements liberated. The troops were distracted. The breakdown power was lost. Tank formations also disintegrated. there is a question of where the enemy’s tanks go, the standard answer is running, But in reality there was a regrouping, it was watched by the main enemy escaping The attack ran into the well-equipped fortified areas with great difficulty The Voronezh Front struck them and then there was no more strength, Vatutin was strictly instructed to stop such the offensive regroup the shock groups not to be pulled in different directions, but time was lost, the Germans hit and, besides, all the escaping tanks suddenly turned out to be the base of the wedge, the defense wasn’t equipped, we attacked, it started to turn off on August 17-20, it was the hardest fighting, with with great difficulty the enemy was stopped, protracted battles began, and the other wing of the front advancing where Konev’s army was moving at the tip of the wedge was able to assess the situation quickly regrouped and delivered a strong blow to the attacking Germans on the flank. Moreover, they crushed the defenses and rushed to the enemy’s rear, it was impossible to repel this blow , building up the blow, chasing the Germans in front of them, not letting them gain a foothold, burst into Kharkov on August 22, Kharkov was taken and, what is important, Konev’s losses were not the same as they were estimated much less.
      2. igor.borov775
        igor.borov775 8 July 2013 11: 37
        Gentlemen Throw a nonsense. Where exactly did you push the entire defense, It seems that all the literate ones have already been written a lot by our and German generals about the defense on the Kursk line, the Germans failed to break through the tactical defense of the front. The defense was echeloned but not solid, strong reinforced anti-tank defense units were created that covered each other, I must admit the Germans were able to find a weak spot among other things Vatutin Zhukov pointed him out and the rate demanded to fix the deficiencies in the defense, 48 armies even added a few batteries the neighbors had the strongest defense there, Vatutin thought the main blows would be exactly where the tip of the tank wedges would be buried, But it turned out differently, the IPTAP regiments were thrown from the neighboring armies and the attack stopped, Although the tanks advanced to a maximum depth of 35 km and a very narrow wedge, attempts to expand to nothing except for loss of tanks, What kind of breakthrough of the whole defense do you speak of God if you don’t know such things, Army depth of defense is almost 45-50 km, what else to talk about
    4. Drosselmeyer
      Drosselmeyer 7 July 2013 12: 11
      Here you have compared ... a narrow section of the Kursk ledge, the offensive on which and the timing of the offensive were directly indicated by the reconnaissance and the thousand-kilometer border of the USSR and Germany. And then, what efforts had to be made to hold the defense near Kursk.
    5. igor.borov775
      igor.borov775 8 July 2013 03: 00
      Yes, indeed, people who do not know a lot of things knock on the keyboard would have to check in. We know our history 60 years ago, and then worse
  7. ed65b
    ed65b 6 July 2013 11: 02
    Quote: Reyngard
    I agree! Unlike Zhukov!

    you do not touch Zhukov, this is our everything.
    1. smile
      smile 6 July 2013 13: 45
      That is why they are touching because "our everything" -learn from the rezun .... zarrazy.
    2. combat192
      combat192 8 July 2013 03: 15
      Well, if G.K. Zhukov is with you EVERYTHING...
  8. ed65b
    ed65b 6 July 2013 11: 10
    --- Armored vehicles of Westhofen (replaced Becker, who was wounded during the battle for Near Igumenka), with a battalion 74-GRP and a company of "Tigers", went to the outskirts of the Far Igumenka. The commander of the battery 1/93-PAP, senior lieutenant Golovash brought 152- mm howitzers for direct fire. Only 1 "Tiger" was damaged.
    --- In the area of ​​the Near Igumenka, the 19-TD crew operated, which was distinguished by the fact that it did not destroy OT with shots, but methodically twisted dimes on the bunkers until it was leveled to the ground. Moreover, the crew openly ignored the danger, exposing the sides to flanking fire. The guardsmen noticed a peculiarity and hunted for the "black ganz", as they called him among themselves. They assembled a group of 6 people, gave out 3 bottles of KS. The crew did not participate in all the attacks and the group did not give out anything for some time. the tank appeared, the group roughly determined where it was going and crawled towards it from several sides. The tank was thrown with several bottles, while several soldiers were injured, one later died. The tank burst into flames and, having passed about 50 meters, froze.The crew did not even try to open the hatches .....

    Looks understood that they would not be taken prisoner
  9. omsbon
    omsbon 6 July 2013 12: 32
    "War is not just who will shoot whom. War is who will change his mind."
    These words of foreman Vaskov from the film "The Dawns Here Are Quiet" can safely characterize the activities of the commanders of the fronts and the General Staff.
  10. pensioner
    pensioner 6 July 2013 16: 18
    Today I heard from the Star. On the eve of the Battle of Kursk, there was a real struggle in our generals. What to do: attack or wait for the German offensive? Zhukov was in Moscow, going to Stalin. Nearby was an assistant - a colonel. On the way Zhukov met someone from the supporters of the preemptive strike. I quarreled with him, f ... sent. Then he realized that he blurted out too much in the presence of extra ears, even though these ears and his assistant. He stopped and said to him: "The Bolsheviks in civilian service. In addition to the military regulations, they also had their own Bolsheviks. The punishments in it were as follows: remark, warning, shooting. Consider that you have already received a warning ...". This is from the words of the colonel himself. I didn’t hear his name.
  11. Ross
    Ross 6 July 2013 16: 54
    Quote: ranger
    Rokossovsky is undoubtedly our most talented commander who has always achieved maximum results with minimum losses. And what is very important - he was always distinguished by a respectful and sensitive attitude towards his subordinates - which was noted by all who had the honor to serve under his command (this was confirmed by my late father who went through the whole war).

    And also Chernyakhovsky! A very young and talented general.
  12. Spstas1
    Spstas1 6 July 2013 17: 55
    Very slowly, but we learned to fight: in 41 only a few, sometimes dozens, survived; in 42, there are already tens and hundreds; in 43, thousands began to survive. But now they have learned not only to survive, but also to win. And the strike near Kharkov cooled many souls that burned after Stalingrad ... Remember the scene in Osvobozhdeniye: Vasilevsky: "They cannot recover after Stalingrad, Comrade Stalin. Stalin:" And we are after Kharkov, Comrade Vasilevsky! "
    Therefore, the point of view of waiting and careful preparation for the German offensive won out. In addition, even in the summer, the Red Army did not win this war (and the Germans certainly took this into account). This was proved by the outcome of the battle - even if there was an error in the strength and exact place of Manstein's strike, and again the lagging behind in the quality of tanks ("Tiger" "baptized" ours from two kilometers, the T-34 required 500 meters), our troops did not flinch, regrouped and turned the tide of the battle in their favor. it was the battle of Kursk that showed that the Red Army had learned to fight and the end of the Millennium Reich was not far off!
    1. Snoop
      Snoop 6 July 2013 18: 54
      Not slower than allies .. and maybe faster. Read how the British and Yankees fought in Normandy in the year 44. The infantry attacked the old-fashioned ... chain))) Tanks rush through hedges without waiting for the infantry. As a result, the infantry are laid by ss-ts, which the tanks did not notice, and the tanks themselves are destroyed by the German Fri))) I read the British and the Yankees, they lament that the American tankers for a long time came to the idea that we should move with attached infantry, and not try ourselves smoke entrenched German infantrymen.
    2. igor.borov775
      igor.borov775 8 July 2013 11: 53
      You are right, near Kursk there was a completely different army, In all respects, the infantrymen were not afraid of tanks and calmly turned into scrap metal. The gunners became completely different, rested, calm, they were probably already the same pilots, this is heaven and earth, even compared to the army of 42 years, this is a completely different weapon whatever they say, and there’s a completely different, more powerful weapon, and most importantly we learned how to use it. This is the main difference between Army 43 and Army 42goda
  13. Snoop
    Snoop 6 July 2013 18: 50
    Come on, if in the year 41 they did the defense, how many times did I hear that. But the length is different, 4000 km. And where to build defense? To do this, you need to know the direction of the main attacks. In Belarus? Well, let's say, but there is not 30 km? Where exactly? Where from?
    Here, intelligence, like in a song, reported exactly ... here is the result, apart from intelligence, is just military thinking, not ingenious but simple, how did the Germans like to attack? Blows under the flanks, the environment. Kursk ledge is the most convenient place. Everything came together and intelligence data and common sense. Therefore, they built such a defense, not being afraid that the Germans might outwit.
  14. Starover_Z
    Starover_Z 6 July 2013 21: 10
    The forces of the Central, Voronezh fronts and the Steppe fronts created a powerful defensive system, which included 8 defensive lines and lines with a total depth of 250-300 km. Much attention was paid to anti-tank, anti-artillery and air defense with a deep separation of battle formations. A well-developed system of strongholds, dugouts, firing points, trenches, communications and anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers was created. On the left bank of the Don created a state line of defense. The depth of the defense lanes on the Central Front, where the main blow of the German troops were waiting, was 190 km, on the Voronezh Front - 130 km. At each front, three army and three frontline defensive lines were equipped.

    To dig into such a depth of defensive structures !!!
    How many people plow naturally, and sapper units and soldiers, soldiers !!!
    But if this had not been done ...
    Eternal gratitude to fathers and grandfathers !!!
  15. sokrat-71
    sokrat-71 6 July 2013 21: 48
    We look forward to continuing an interesting article.
  16. family tree
    family tree 6 July 2013 22: 15
    Quote: Rolm
    Manenheim did not suffer from Napoleon’s complex, but was a talented commander.

    Yes, stop it. He’s a good politician, but he didn’t suffer from military talents. He ran into KaUR, and stood there, until the feint of the change of the enemy.
  17. lexe
    lexe 7 July 2013 23: 00
    I think that in 1943. it was necessary to advance. And advance in May. The Germans delayed their offensive until July and in the end, our offensive but the bright summer days were lost. With their new small super-tanks (with problems in cross-country ability), the Germans could not plug holes, defending themselves on on a wide front. Here they could attack on a narrow one. As a result, they lost 1 year. I think our allies didn’t really want our attack. Perhaps the whole Kursk battle was a tricky game of the Germans ---- to attack late depriving us of this more bright days. They were preparing a nuclear bomb, which meant they were just pulling time in defensive battles.
    1. igor.borov775
      igor.borov775 8 July 2013 12: 32
      It’s good now to consider what should be attacked, At 45 at a conference where both the initial period and mistakes were considered in peacetime, I had to say there were few of them, just at that time the industry couldn’t give new and many, In 41, new weapons were put on stream new engines for Aviation didn’t succeed at once in the same way in metallurgy, Our engineers and scientists spent the night in the workshops sorting out the problems, A lot of things were missing and it wasn’t possible to achieve more, Especially the aviation suffered from a lack of aluminum It was not possible to put radio stations on stream And the most important thing was only industrialization of the country only in 36 eradicated illiteracy of the population lacked competent specialists many factories had no analogues in the country had to learn on the go, Our Academy was loaded with numerous requests to find substitutes for what we could not produce, It was all in 40-41 when the launch of new products began , Peaceful sky and the crazy rhythm of the country's entire large economy, It’s always to remember this, THIS IS OUR PEOPLE THIS IS OUR COUNTRY AND TOGETHER DID THOSE NO ONE WILL NEVER REPEAT FORCES WILL BE ENOUGH, Our people, through the bitterness of defeat, laid down and created weapons that will forever remain an integral part of the history of the GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR, So this should be treated bowing my head before the feat of my people and all nationalities, without exception, AND A PART OF THIS feat SHOULD BE IN THE HEART OF EVERY RESIDENT OF OUR HOMELAND \\\
    2. igor.borov775
      igor.borov775 8 July 2013 12: 46
      And about the offensive, it’s good to knock on the clave, When you know the plans and documents of the enemy you have to admit that our commanders did the right thing in this matter, look carefully at what the troops were not just the elite in front of our soldiers, And they weren’t just standing and ready to repel any offensive, AND THE SUPREME RATE did the right thing, defensively knock out the entire elite and then advance without letting the enemy retreat to the defenses, Very wise
      1. lexe
        lexe 8 July 2013 14: 14
        My grandfather was badly injured in the Kursk. And I really easily knock on the keyboard. Thank you grandfather laughing
        Where would the Germans advance in 1943? If they had success ...
        And this despite the fact that our plants are far behind and the allies are already in full swing preparing a blow to Germany.
        The elite ... several battalions and divisions ... Yes, in 1941-42 this elite died in the majority. At the same time, the Germans were preparing fortified areas much to the west, for which we still have to pay in full with blood.
        Yes, an interesting battle took place on the Kursk Bulge. The maximum of defense against power in the offensive. But it was already an anachronism with highly mobile battle means. We could choose a strike-release Leningrad or the southern direction.
        In fact, in 1943. there was a short-term Stalingrad in the field ...
        I think the Headquarters in 1943 was still impressed by past losses. I do not think that German intelligence in 1943. lost, you need to see who they were awarded after 1943. and who went on to a career in growth.
        I have never made a complaint to our people and soldiers in that war. On the contrary, I am proud of my Russian people. There are questions to the leadership ...
        And the last ... an article to think and not write enthusiasm. Our grandfathers left our lives, including in order not to repeat the mistakes of the past.
      2. lexe
        lexe 8 July 2013 14: 32
        but where did you get the idea that it was necessary to step on Hitler’s life standard head-on? The front is wide ... So far, as a reserve, the SS on tigers will get a couple of Wehrmacht divisions to write off ...
        The reserve arrived with a new miracle technology against us - stop the car reversing. Next, a new blow, well, already for 200-300km.
  18. bublic82009
    bublic82009 8 July 2013 00: 16
    Yes, I would know the ransom would live in Sochi. if he knew the plan of the enemy, he would defeat him in advance. that’s the significance of this battle, that everything was carried out partly and in the end we won.
    1. igor.borov775
      igor.borov775 8 July 2013 12: 33
      One hundred points, I join tired of reading mistakes
    2. lexe
      lexe 14 July 2013 10: 15
      Let's undo the story laughing Seriously
      And instead of the lessons of history, we will make the children learn 1 phrase
      Yes, I would know the ransom would live in Sochi.

      And the free time will force the children to take classes in labor and physical education. I think this redistribution at the exit can help to get out of the demographic hole laughing
  19. Appiann
    Appiann 8 July 2013 04: 49
    An article without a map is not complete!