Military Review

The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties

The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties

70 years ago the Great Battle of Kursk began. The battle on the Kursk Bulge in its scope, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-strategic consequences is one of the most important battles of the Second World War. The Great Battle of Kursk lasted 50 incredibly difficult days and nights (July 5 - August 23, 1943). In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide this battle into two stages and three operations: the defensive stage - the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); offensive - Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23) offensive operations. The Germans called the offensive part of their operation "Citadel". About 2,2 million people, about 7,7 thousand, participated in this great battle on the part of the USSR and Germany. tanks, Self-propelled guns and assault guns, over 29 thousand guns and mortars (with a reserve of more than 35 thousand), more than 4 thousand combat aircraft.

During the winter 1942-1943. the offensive of the Red Army and the forced withdrawal of the Soviet troops during the Kharkov defensive operation 1943 was formed. Kursk ledge. The Kursk Arc, a projection facing west, was as wide as 200 km and as deep as 150 km. During April - June 1943, an operational pause came on the Eastern Front, during the course of which the Soviet and German armed forces were tensely preparing for the summer campaign, which was to be decisive in this war.

On the Kursk salient were the forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts, threatening the flanks and rear of the German army groups Center and South. In turn, the German command, creating powerful attack groups on the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkiv bridgeheads, could inflict strong flank attacks on the Soviet troops defending in the Kursk area, surround them and destroy them.

Plans and forces of the parties

Germany. In the spring of 1943, when the enemy’s forces were exhausted and there was a debauchery, nullifying the possibility of a quick attack, it was time to prepare plans for the summer campaign. Despite the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad and the battle for the Caucasus, the Wehrmacht retained its offensive power and was a very dangerous opponent who longed for revenge. Moreover, the German command held a series of mobilization events and by the beginning of the summer campaign of 1943, compared with the number of troops at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942, the number of Wehrmacht increased. There were 3,1 million people on the Eastern Front, without taking into account the SS troops and the Air Force, almost as many as 22 million people were in the Wehrmacht before the start of the campaign to the East on June 1941, 3,2. In terms of the number of formations, the Wehrmacht of the 1943 model was superior to the German armed forces of the 1941 period.

For the German command, unlike the Soviet, a waiting strategy, pure defense was unacceptable. Moscow could afford to wait with serious offensive operations, time played on it - the power of the armed forces grew, enterprises evacuated to the east began to work (they even increased production, compared to the pre-war level), the guerrilla struggle in the German rear spread. The probability of the Allied armies landing in Western Europe, the opening of a second front grew. In addition, it was not possible to create a solid defense on the Eastern Front, stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. In particular, Army Group South was forced to defend 32 by divisions up to 760 km long, from Taganrog on the Black Sea to the Sumy area. The balance of forces allowed the Soviet troops, if the enemy was limited only to defense, to conduct offensive operations on various sectors of the Eastern Front, concentrating the maximum amount of forces and means, pulling up reserves. The German army could not adhere only to defense, it was the way to defeat. Only a maneuver war, with breakthroughs of the front line, with access to the flanks and rear of the Soviet armies, allowed us to hope for a strategic turn in the war. Major success on the Eastern Front allowed us to hope, if not for victory in the war, then for a satisfactory political decision.

Adolf Hitler 13 March 1943 of the year signed the operational order number 5, where he set the task to preempt the Soviet army and "impose its will on at least one of the front sectors." In other sectors of the front, the task of the troops is to bleed the attacking forces of the enemy on the defensive lines created in advance. Thus, the strategy of the Wehrmacht was chosen in March 1943. It remained to determine where to hit. Kursk ledge emerged at the same time, in March 1943, during the German counteroffensive. Therefore, Hitler in the order number 5 and demanded the application of converging attacks on the Kursk ledge, wishing to destroy the Soviet troops stationed on it. However, in March 1943, the German troops in this area were significantly weakened by previous battles, and the plan of attack on the Kursk ledge had to be postponed indefinitely.

15 April, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 6. Operation "Citadel" was planned to begin as soon as weather conditions allow. Army Group South should strike from the Tomarovka-Belgorod line, break through the Soviet front at the Prilepa-Oboyan line, connect at Kursk and east of it with the connections of the amy group Center. Army Group "Center" struck from the line of Trosna - the area south of Maloarkhangelsk. Her troops were to break through the front in the Fatezh-Veretenovo sector, concentrating their main efforts on the eastern flank. And to connect with the Army Group "South" in the area of ​​Kursk and east of it. The troops between the strike groups, on the western flank of the Kursk salient, the forces of the 2 Army, were to organize local attacks and when the Soviet troops retreated, immediately go on the offensive with all their might. The plan was pretty simple and obvious. They wanted to cut off the Kursk ledge by converging blows from the north and south - on 4, the day was supposed to be surrounded and then destroyed by Soviet troops (Voronezh and Central Front). This made it possible to create a vast gap in the Soviet front and intercept the strategic initiative. In the Eagle region, the main strike force was represented by the 9 Army, in the Belgorod region, the 4 Army and the Kempf task force. Operation “Panther” was to follow the operation “Citadel” - a blow to the rear of the South-Western Front, an attack in the northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of the Red Army and create a threat to Moscow.

The start of the operation was scheduled for mid-May 1943. Army Group-General Marshal Erich von Manstein, the commander of Army Group South, believed that it was necessary to strike as early as possible, preventing the Soviet offensive in the Donbas. He was supported by the commander of the Army Group Center, Field Marshal Gunter Hans von Kluge. But not all German commanders shared his point of view. Walter Model, the commander of the 9 Army, had enormous prestige in the eyes of the Führer and 3 prepared a report in May, expressing doubts about the possibility of successfully carrying out Operation Citadel if it began in mid-May. The basis of his skepticism was intelligence data on the defensive potential of the opposing 9 Army of the Central Front. The Soviet command prepared a deeply echeloned and well-organized line of defense, reinforcing artillery and anti-tank potential. And the mechanized units diverted from the forward positions, removing the enemy from a possible strike.

3-4 in May, Munich discussed this report. According to the Model, the Central Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky had almost double the superiority in the number of combat units and equipment over the 9 of the German army. The 15 infantry divisions of the Model had a number of infantry half the size of the regular ones; in some divisions, 3 from the 9 regular infantry battalions were disbanded. Artillery batteries instead of four had three guns, and in some batteries 1-2 guns. By May 16, the 9 Army's divisions had an average "combat strength" (the number of soldiers directly involved in the battle) in 3,3 thousand people. For comparison, the 8 infantry divisions of the 4 tank army and the Kempf group had a “combat strength” at the level of 6,3 thousand people. And the infantry was needed to crack the defensive lines of the Soviet troops. In addition, the 9 Army experienced serious transport problems. Army Group South, after the Stalingrad catastrophe, received units that were re-formed in the rear in 1942. The Model was mainly infantry divisions, which were on the front with 1941 year and needed urgent replenishment.

The report of the Model made a strong impression on A. Hitler. Other military leaders could not put forward serious arguments against the calculations of the commander of the 9 th army. In the end, we decided to move the beginning of the operation by a month. This decision of Hitler will then become one of the most criticized by the German generals, who shoved their mistakes at the commander-in-chief.

Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891 - 1945).

It must be said that although this delay led to the strengthening of the strike power of the German troops, but the Soviet armies were seriously strengthened. The balance of forces between the Model army and the Rokossovsky front from May to early July did not improve, and even worsened for the Germans. In April, the 1943 Central Front numbered 538,4 thousand people, 920 tanks, 7,8 thousand guns and 660 aircraft; in early July - 711,5 thousand people, 1785 tanks and self-propelled guns, 12,4 thousand guns and 1050 aircraft. The 9 Army Model in the middle of May had 324, 9 thousand people, about 800 tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns. In early July, the 9 Army reached 335 thousand, 1014 tanks, 3368 guns. In addition, it was in May that the Voronezh Front began to receive anti-tank mines, which would become a real scourge of German armored vehicles in the Battle of Kursk. The Soviet economy worked more efficiently, replenishing troops with technology faster than German industry.

The plan for the offensive of the 9th Army from the Oryol direction was somewhat different from that typical of the German school of admission - the Model was going to break the enemy’s defenses with infantry, and then bring tank units into battle. The infantry was supposed to attack with the support of heavy tanks, assault guns, aviation and artillery. Of the 8 mobile units that the 9th Army had, only one was immediately introduced into the battle - the 20th Panzer Division. In the zone of the main attack of the 9th Army, the 47th Panzer Corps was to advance under the command of Joachim Lemelsen. The strip of his advance lay between the villages of Gnilets and Butyrki. Here, according to German intelligence, there was a junction of two Soviet armies - the 13th and 70th. In the first echelon of the 47th Corps, the 6th Infantry and 20th Panzer Divisions advanced, they struck on the first day. In the second echelon were located more powerful - 2nd and 9th tank divisions. They should have been introduced already in the breakthrough, after breaking the Soviet line of defense. In the direction of the Ponyrei, on the left flank of the 47th Corps, the 41st Panzer Corps advanced under General Joseph Harpe. The 86th and 292nd infantry divisions were in the first echelon, and the 18th Panzer Division was in reserve. To the left of the 41st Panzer Corps was the 23rd Army Corps led by General Frisner. He was supposed to deliver a distracting blow with the forces of the 78th assault and 216th infantry divisions in Maloarkhangelsk. On the right flank of the 47th Corps, the 46th Panzer Corps of General Hans Zorn was advancing. In its first strike echelon there were only infantry formations - the 7th, 31st, 102nd and 258th infantry divisions. Three more mobile formations - the 10th motorized (tank-grenadier), 4th and 12th tank divisions were in reserve of the army group. After von Kluge, they had to transfer them to the Model after breaking the strike forces into the operational space behind the defensive lines of the Central Front. It is believed that the Model did not initially want to attack, but was waiting for the Red Army to advance, and even prepared additional defensive lines in the rear. And he tried to keep the most valuable mobile units in the second echelon, so that, if necessary, he would transfer him to a site that would collapse under the blows of Soviet troops.

The command of Army Group South was not limited to striking Kursk by the forces of Colonel-General German Goth's 4 Tank Army (52 Army Corps, 48 Armored Corps and 2 CC SS Corps). In the north-east direction, the Kempf task force under the command of Werner Kempf was to attack. The group was facing east along the Seversky Donets River. Manstein believed that as soon as the battle began, the Soviet command would throw into battle strong reserves, located east and northeast of Kharkov. Therefore, the attack of the 4 tank army on Kursk should have been secured from the eastern direction from suitable Soviet tank and mechanized formations. The Kempf Army Group was to have General X-NUMX-X (42-X, 39-I and 161-I infantry divisions) of General Franz Mattenklot keep the line of defense on the Donets. Her 282 Tank Corps, led by General of the Tank Forces Herman Bright (3, 6, 7 Tank and 19 Infantry Divisions) and 168 Army Corps, General of Tank Forces Erhard Raus, before starting operations and until July 11 was called the Routh Special Reserve Command Reserve (20, 106 and 198 infantry divisions), were to provide active operations to ensure the offensive of the 320 tank army. The Kempf group was planned to subjugate another tank corps, which was in the reserve of the army group, after it captured a sufficient area and secured freedom of action in the northeast direction.

Erich von Manstein (1887 - 1973).

Command of Army Group South was not limited to this innovation. According to the memoirs of the Chief of Staff of the 4 Tank Army, General Friedrich Fangor, at a meeting with Manstein 10 - 11 in May, the offensive plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Goth. According to intelligence data, a change in the location of Soviet tank and mechanized forces was observed. The Soviet tank reserve could quickly join the battle, passing into the corridor between the Donets and Psel rivers in the Prokhorovka area. There was a danger of a strong blow to the right flank of the 4 tank army. This situation could lead to disaster. Got believed that it was necessary to introduce into the oncoming battle with the Russian tank forces the most powerful force that he had. Therefore, the Paul Hausser 2 Tank Corps is part of the 1 Tank Grenadier Division of the SS Leibstartart Adolf Hitler, the 2 Tank Grenadier Division of the Reich SS and 3 Tank Grenadier Division of the SS Totem Grenadier Division of the Reich Tank Tank Grenadier Division and the XNUMX Tank Tank Grenadier Division of the SS Reich and the XNUMX Tank Grenadier Division of the SS Reich Dead Head ”) should not now have moved directly north along the Psel River, he should have turned north-east to the Prokhorovka area to destroy the Soviet tank reserves.

The experience of the war with the Red Army convinced the German command that there would certainly be strong counterattacks. Therefore, the command of Army Group "South" tried to minimize their consequences. Both decisions - the strike of the Kempf group and the turn of the 2 SS tank corps towards Prokhorovka had a significant impact on the development of the Battle of Kursk and the actions of the Soviet 5 Guards Tank Army. At the same time, the division of the forces of Army Group South to the main and auxiliary strike in the northeast direction deprived Manstein of serious reserves. In theory, Manstein had a reserve — Walter Nering’s 24 tank corps. But he was a reserve of the army group in case of the Soviet offensive in the Donbas and was located quite far from the point of impact on the southern face of the Kursk salient. As a result, it was used to defend the Donbass. He did not have any serious reserves, which Manstein could immediately enter into battle.

For offensive operations, the best generals and the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht were recruited, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and a significant number of individual formations. In particular, shortly before the operation, the 39 tank regiment (200 Panther) and the 503 battalion of heavy tanks (45 Tigers) arrived in Army Group South. From the air, the shock groups supported the 4 th air fleet of the General-Marshal of the Air Force Wolfram von Richthofen and the 6 th air fleet under the command of Colonel-General Robert Ritter von Graeme. In total, more than 900 thousand soldiers and officers participated in Operation Citadel, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, more than 2700 tanks and assault guns (including 148 new T-VI Tiger heavy tanks, Panther X-VUM tanks and 200 assault guns "Ferdinand"), near 90 aircraft.

The German command placed great hopes on the use of new types of military equipment. Waiting for new technology was one reason why the attack was postponed to a later time. It was assumed that the heavily armored tanks (the Soviet researchers "Panther", which the Germans considered the medium tank, considered to be heavy) and self-propelled guns will become a ram for the Soviet defense. The medium and heavy T-IV, TV, T-VI tanks that came into service with the Wehrmacht, the Ferdinand assault guns combined good armor protection and strong artillery weapons. Their 75-mm and 88-mm guns with the 1,5-2,5 km direct shot range were about 2,5 times the range of the 76,2-mm gun of the main Soviet T-34 medium tank. At the same time, due to the high initial velocity of the projectiles, the German designers achieved high armor penetration. To combat the Soviet tanks, armored self-propelled howitzers that were part of the artillery regiments of the tank divisions were used - 105-mm Vespa (German. Wespe - "wasp") and 150-mm Hummel (German. "Bumblebee"). German combat vehicles had excellent Zeiss optics. The German Air Force received new Focke-Wulf-190 fighter jets, Henkel-129 fighter jets. They were to win air supremacy and carry out assault support for the advancing troops.

Self-propelled howitzers "Vespe" ("Wespe") 2-th battalion of the artillery regiment "Great Germany" on the march.

Stormtrooper Henschel Hs 129.

The German command tried to keep the operation in secret, to achieve a surprise strike. To do this, they tried to misinform the Soviet leadership. Conducted enhanced training operations "Panther" in the band of the army group "South". They carried out demonstrative reconnaissance, threw tanks, concentrated transport means, conducted active radio communications, stepped up their agents, spread rumors, etc. On the contrary, they tried to conceal all actions as much as possible, to hide them from the enemy. The events were carried out with German thoroughness and methodicalness, but they did not give the desired results. The Soviet command was well informed about the impending offensive of the enemy.

German shielded tanks Pz.Kpfw. III in a Soviet village before the start of Operation Citadel.

In order to protect their rear forces from the strike of partisan units, in May-June 1943 of the year the German command organized and conducted several large punitive operations against the Soviet partisans. In particular, 20 divisions were deployed against approximately 10 thousand Bryansk partisans, and in the Zhytomyr region 40-thousand were sent against the partisans. grouping. However, the plan was not fully realized; the partisans retained the possibility of delivering strong blows to the occupiers.

To be continued ...
Articles from this series:
The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties
The Great Battle of Kursk: Plans and Forces of the Parties. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation of the troops of the Central Front. Part of 3
Great Battle of Kursk: defensive operation of the troops of the Voronezh Front
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 2
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 3
The Great Battle of Kursk: a defensive operation by the troops of the Voronezh Front. Part of 4
The Great Battle of Kursk: Operation Kutuzov
The Great Battle of Kursk: Operation Kutuzov. Part of 2
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  1. rexby63
    rexby63 5 July 2013 08: 49
    50 days! What people! And we still do not believe in Russian epics. We are only 70 years old separated from these events, and consciousness already refuses to believe in their ACTION. How else to make memory remember them
    1. spanchbob
      spanchbob 5 July 2013 09: 11
      What are 50 days? One week! After July 12, only the Germans retreat, and very small losses on both sides compared to other major battles.
  2. Greyfox
    Greyfox 5 July 2013 08: 58
    Who knows what kind of black ribbon in the photo Manstein has on his chest?
    1. Kovrovsky
      Kovrovsky 5 July 2013 10: 04
      Maybe during World War I the Iron Cross of the II degree.
    2. anip
      anip 5 July 2013 11: 00
      Quote: Greyfox
      Who knows what kind of black ribbon in the photo Manstein has on his chest?

      The ribbon of the Iron Cross, but the buckle on it is the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords. In general, the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross had a slightly different ribbon, but apparently it was allowed to wear its buckle on the Iron Cross ribbon, especially since Manstein was awarded the Iron Crosses I and II degrees in 1914, the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross in 1940 and Dubovy leaves to it and swords in 1943 and March 30, 1944, respectively (if everything is correct, it turns out this photo was taken after March 30, 1944).
      1. ed65b
        ed65b 5 July 2013 13: 02
        Here he is in person on the Kursk Bulge.
      2. Greyfox
        Greyfox 5 July 2013 15: 30
        Thank. In variations of the German LCD you can get confused even by the expert (with a bow, without a bow) smile )
  3. rennim
    rennim 5 July 2013 09: 19
    Grandfather there miraculously survived ... wounded, one of the entire battery of forty. The arm was then shortened three times due to gangrene.
  4. Kovrovsky
    Kovrovsky 5 July 2013 10: 05
    Thanks to the author, we are waiting for the continuation!
  5. Sergey Medvedev
    Sergey Medvedev 5 July 2013 10: 17
    On the Kursk Bulge, my uncle fought and died. Eternal glory to the Heroes!
    1. mamba
      mamba 5 July 2013 13: 42
      My cousin grandfather Leonid Ivanovich Gusev, born in 1922, fought on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge. He served in the 432th tank battalion of the 101st tank brigade of the 19th tank corps. The military rank is lieutenant. Position - tank commander T34-76. He happened to experience in full measure the horrors of defensive battles in the direction of the main blow of the Germans:
      As I managed to find out, Leonid Ivanovich died during the offensive of our troops on July 17, 1943 in the area of ​​the village of Soborovka in the Verkhne-Lyubazhsky District of the Kursk Region. He was buried there in a mass grave.
      1. Was mammoth
        Was mammoth 5 July 2013 23: 49
        My father-in-law, the gunner, became disabled there.
      2. Dimonn
        Dimonn 9 July 2013 00: 03
        My grandfather served as a machine gunner in the second company of 432 battalion 101 of the tank brigade 19tk, tank T-34 No. 17. For participation in the battles from 6.07.43/10.07.43/XNUMX to XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX awarded the Order of the Red Star. Even the exact place I know the nameless height east of the village. Hammers.
        The award sheet indicates that the crew destroyed 10.07.43 three tanks of the enemy (of which one T6 tiger was burned and 2 killed)
  6. ed65b
    ed65b 5 July 2013 10: 20
    -On the night of July 5, Major General G. Schmidt (commander of the 19th TD) had one bridge that he planned to use to transfer the combat group (74-hydraulic fracturing lieutenant colonel Richter) to the southern part of Mikhailovsky bridgehead to strengthen the grenadiers. Mixed group from the West Bank supported fire company 503-TTB captain Count C. von Kagenek.
    --- After breaching the Russian defenses and erecting a bridge for heavy tanks, Captain Haitman's Tigers Company was planned to approach the eastern bank.
    As a result, an armored wedge should be formed from the 228-division of assault guns and the Tigers company to break through to the Old City.
    But during the transfer of self-propelled guns of the 228th division, the bridge span collapsed and the ferry stood up.
    --- From the report 19-TD:
    "On the night of July 5, the sappers were assembling a 60-ton bridge for the Tigers. When the bridge was ready, targeted artillery fire began. Despite the night, the fire was accurate, so one of the boats loaded with soldiers was sunk by a direct hit. The sappers also suffered serious losses. , because 40-60 people were standing under each bridge brace. "
  7. Nayhas
    Nayhas 5 July 2013 10: 35
    By 1943 Hitler generally lost its relevance (if it was at all of course). Stalingrad taught him nothing, in general the operation of the Citadel is not in the style of the German command, to gnaw at a long-term defense by such weak forces, relying only on a technical advantage is more than stupid.
    1. Drosselmeyer
      Drosselmeyer 5 July 2013 11: 47
      What else could they do? Waiting on such a huge front of blow of the Red Army is even more stupid. The calculation was that on the Kursk (in a place specifically designated by the Germans) destroy all strategic reserves of the spacecraft and close in 1943 the issue of the Soviet counteroffensive. And in 1944 it will be so ... But it did not grow together, although the Red Army was forced to throw reserves into battle to repel the German offensive, although they were supposed to develop a counterattack.
  8. ed65b
    ed65b 5 July 2013 10: 47
    On July 6, out of 14 "Tigers", 6 "Tigers" could have entered the battle, and the rest were incapacitated due to elementary negligence and recklessness, as happened with the mountain mech-water.
    --- Either Bright or Kempf (unknown) dispatched Hünesdorf's 6-TD, reinforced by the Tigers company, into the 7-TD lane. Trying to break through the clogged roads east of the Donets, the von Oppeln-Bronikovski battle group was able to reach the crossing in the 7-TD lane only at 13:00, and entered the battle only at 14:30.
    --- The first day of the battle of the Schmidt division at the junction of the 81st and 78th Guards SD was costly for its units, especially the TP. At least 32 tanks were blown up by mines, burned and destroyed, including almost the entire company of Tigers "Haitman ..." It was understood that the heavy tanks would come into contact with the advancing units directly behind the minefields, but, faced with extremely strong Russian fire, they retreated. And by the evening of July 5, 4 Tigers burned down 50-80 meters in front infantry units, where they became the target of massed Russian f / t fire. "
    By nightfall, of the 14 "Tigers" deployed to support the 19-TD, only 1 remained intact!
    "The loss of the" Tigers "company, which was the nucleus of the attacking division, determined the further course of the offensive," Bright noted 2 weeks later.
    --- Destroy the 228-SP and expand the crossing section by 2 km - that’s all that Schmidt’s division managed by the end of the day.
    The 228th assault gun division operating in the division's strip lost 2 "Stugs" (according to the data plotted on the map of GA "South" for July 6).
    --- At about 16 p.m. there was infa that the Germans took Krutoy Log and went to the eastern outskirts of the village. The decision was made: 00-Guards .SP with 209-TP and 167-SAP to block the way to Belovsky and be ready to repel the attack to the east and northeast.
    From the magazine 167-TP: "Having received the order of the commander of the 78th Guards SD, the regiment commander gave a signal on the radio" Attack. "The tanks left without preliminary artillery preparation and the battle of tanks was not supported by the infantry."
    In total, the attack went: 34 T-27s, 70 T-5s. Upon reaching the eastern outskirts of Razumnoe, our tanks wedged into the German defenses and took battle with enemy artillery in Razumnoe, and with the Tigers near the southwestern outskirts of Krutoy Log ...
    The battle lasted 2 hours 30 minutes. The regiment lost: T-34 20 pieces, T-70 4 pieces, burned and knocked out in the depths of the German defense. The evacuation of cars was not possible, most of them burned.
    The Germans knew about the approach of the tank group and put up their weapons of fire in a "bell" formation.
    From the regiment's report: "During operations in the Krutoy Log-Reasonable area, the enemy used tactics: some of the tanks (including the Tigers), using terrain folds, were placed on the flanks, and a small number of tanks with infantry were put into battle by jolts and rolls , then forward, then backward, diverting the tanks. As a result, our tanks were drawn into the depths of the defense, fought with the German infantry and OT, and at this time "Tigers" were beating from ambushes on the sides and stern of the vehicles. All this intensified the artillery fire ...
    After the battle, a reconnaissance group was sent under the command of Lieutenant Murmantsev, which counted 15 burnt and 3 wrecked owls. tank.

    Here's another.
  9. ed65b
    ed65b 5 July 2013 10: 49
    6 of July.
    --- The 25-TD, which still included 19/1-GRP, the 429th regiment of six-barreled mortars (without the 54rd division) and the "Tigers" company, was the first to attack the 3th Guards SK.
    Report 19-TD: "The offensive of Becker's group on the Harvest Day collective farm stalled east of height 139.9 in a large minefield. 14 tanks lost to mines. 4 from shelling."
    --- Schultz's armored group attacked Krutoy Log through the western and northeastern outskirts, while battle groups 106-PD, supported by the Stugs, attacked the southern and southeastern outskirts.
    According to the headquarters of the 73rd Guards SD, they broke through as part of a tank wedge and "Tigers".
    --- Journal of the database 11-TP 6-TD (including the acting 2/11-TP F. Becke):
    "The armored group went to elevation 216.1 and height 207.9.6. 8th and 20th companies, with the support of the Tigers, attacked the Solovyov collective farm, but met heavy fire. Both companies suffered losses. At 00:7, contact was established with the advancing TP 207.9-TD on the right. At night, the Oppeln battle group took up a perimeter defense at height XNUMX.
    Success: 2 T-34s destroyed, 5 T-34s and 1 T-70,10 half-guns, 1 infantry equipment, 3 152-mm guns, 1 anti-aircraft battery (4 76-mm guns), about 120 people .
    Losses: 8 tanks from fire, 3 from mines. "
    --- The hardest duel at the Kreid junction (the ruins of the former collective farm) was at the 173-Guards AP division of Captain Kokhokidze. 12 crews destroyed and knocked out 12 tanks. 114-Guards AIPTAP, which destroyed 6 tanks (2 Tigers were knocked out from the bottom from 300 meters with a 76-mm APCR shell hitting the side).
    Kokhokidze’s division was almost completely destroyed. 5 KV 3-TRs were buried on the left, but they were also burned in the afternoon.
    --- In the area of ​​the intersection of Maslova Pier-Svkh.Polyana (near the grove) the crew of the 4-gun of the 3-battery burned 2 Tigers.
    At the beginning of the financial allowance of the regiment, on the basis of an order of NPO No. 038, to issue the calculation of monetary rewards in the amount of:
    - To the gun commander to the Guards. Senior sergeant M.A. Putivsky - 1000 rubles.
    - to the navigator, sergeant N.S. Uchaykin, 1000 rubles.
    rooms, Red Army men: N.N.Dubin, F.K. Markov, S.F. Kobyakov,
    G.K. Iskhakov, P.F. Semershinov-400 rubles each.
    It is doubtful that these are "Tigers", because. not a single 503-TTB vehicle was in the area.
  10. Roll
    Roll 5 July 2013 10: 56
    angry On March 13, 1943, Adolf Hitler signed operational order No. 5, where he set the task to forestall the advance of the Soviet army and "impose its will on at least one of the sectors of the front." On June 22, Hitler brilliantly managed to do this, moreover, on all fronts, and in 43 there was a bummer. And why? The Red Army was preparing for the defense, and it learned how to defend itself competently, and at 41 it only knew how to correctly attack. Suvorov is right, what can I add, and our fellows, thanks to them for the victory, they broke the ridge of the fascist beast.
    1. Svyatoslavovich
      Svyatoslavovich 5 July 2013 11: 50
      Suvorov is not right, as a traitor cannot be right, a traitor who slandered his people, his father, a front-line soldier for the sweet scraps from the lordly London table, violated the military oath, and violated the honor of the officer.
      1. Roll
        Roll 5 July 2013 17: 19
        angry What Rezun’s sweets are so sweet, that there is a bill of billions, or a football club, everything is modest, the person wrote normal books, by the way, many serious historians support his version. It is necessary to understand it, but the arguments in the official history are weak. Yes, Rezun doesn’t write anything bad, he doesn’t scare the USSR, but for a long time we are so accustomed to the role of the victim of a sudden attack.
        1. Nagaibak
          Nagaibak 5 July 2013 21: 46
          Rolm "What such sweet snacks Rezun has, that there is a billion-dollar bill, or a football club, everything is modest, a man wrote normal books, by the way his version is supported by many serious historians."
          Come on you. Suvorov-Rezun read- do not respect yourself. He is a complete woodpecker ...
        2. Svyatoslavovich
          Svyatoslavovich 5 July 2013 22: 58
          Dear Rolm, you apparently didn’t read anything other than Rezunishka, unfortunately, you need to acquire knowledge not on the shelves of cheap fiction, but at least in libraries. Look for the history of the traitor and slanderer Rezun on the net, there is enough material, just don’t read his memoirs about yourself, he’s lying to look for liars already from his own rank.
          Serious historians who support the so-called. Who is the "version" of Rezun? Surnames in the studio.
          What are the arguments of the official history weak, the list is here too?
        3. Day 11
          Day 11 5 July 2013 23: 32
          I agree with you. None of the normal historians have yet been able to refute Rezun! NOBODY! All their arguments are Rezun a traitor, so he cannot a priori write the truth about the Second World War and sprinkle any crap like Antisuvorov (a normal historian will never write such a guan). This is the first the man who made us think with our own head
          1. Kars
            Kars 5 July 2013 23: 36
            Quote: Den 11
            None of the normal historians have yet been able to refute Rezun! NOBODY! All their arguments, Rezun the traitor

            They have refuted it more than once. Although you probably have special criteria for obtaining the title of Normal historian.

            I, as a non-normal historian and lover of armored vehicles, declare that in relation to Armored vehicles, the outbreak of the war, 1941 Rezun writes complete nonsense.
            1. Day 11
              Day 11 5 July 2013 23: 44
              For me, a normal historian is someone who is trying to objectively approach understanding, who has stepped aside from all this nonsense that they drove into our heads from the school bench. By the way, this person, if you are aware, doesn’t know armored vehicles from textbooks. PS Of course he is a traitor
              1. Kars
                Kars 6 July 2013 09: 48
                Quote: Den 11
                By the way, this person, if you are aware, doesn’t know armored vehicles from textbooks

                Is he already a tanker? And about armored vehicles, even if the tanker writes such nonsense that he vryatli he saw the tank at all. And about BT, T-34 KV especially in 1941
                Quote: Den 11
                PS of course he is a traitor

                his personal problems.
                1. Day 11
                  Day 11 6 July 2013 10: 25
                  You shouldn't be like that, honestly. Have you read at least one of his books? Start with "The Liberator". Take an interest (out of curiosity) in his biography. Where and how did you study
                  1. Kars
                    Kars 6 July 2013 21: 53
                    Quote: Den 11
                    In vain are you so, Chesslovo. Have you read at least one of his books?

                    And if you read?
                    Quote: Den 11
                    Take an interest (out of curiosity) about his biography. Where and how he studied

                    Why do I need his biography? I have his books where all his conclusions on armored vehicles and including armored vehicles are complete nonsense. And not even how he will justify himself that there in millimeters and bolts he can make a mistake, but it will not change anything. But in fact nonsense.
                    1. Lopatov
                      Lopatov 6 July 2013 22: 04
                      "Highway Tank"?
                  2. svp67
                    svp67 6 July 2013 21: 58
                    Quote: Den 11
                    You shouldn't be like that, honestly. Have you read at least one of his books? Start with "The Liberator". Take an interest (out of curiosity) in his biography. Where and how did you study

                    On the fences we used to write in the old days ... Rezun was not a tanker and did not study and, accordingly, did not graduate from the Kharkov tank, he is a graduate of the Kiev combined arms. Why he so "lied" in "The Liberator" there may be many versions. From - he has it in his blood, to - he tried to substantiate his "delirium" on T64 more strongly.
    2. maxvet
      maxvet 5 July 2013 13: 44
      What kind of Suvorov are we talking about? If he is a traitor, he’s a traitor and a fool ..l, if there’s no comment about Alexander Vasilievich. And as for correctly attacking in 41g, remember the liberation campaign against Poland and Finland (I’m about organizing attacks)
      1. Roll
        Roll 5 July 2013 17: 23
        wassat I agree, but they defended it even worse, they defeated the Japanese on a hal keen goal correctly, with the Finns, but didn’t succeed, they turned on the Stalin sledgehammers and smashed the Finns, although the Finns really competently defended, some of the pillboxes are worth millionaires, and Poland is such an episode, we they didn’t attack much there, everything the Reich did for us.
  11. omsbon
    omsbon 5 July 2013 10: 57
    The Wehrmacht smashed its armored fists about the courage and stamina of Soviet soldiers. A pompous phrase, but essentially very true!
  12. Komandir 1999
    Komandir 1999 5 July 2013 12: 09
    Good article!!!
  13. Evgenx
    Evgenx 5 July 2013 12: 51
    I talked about 7 years ago with the WWII Veteran! He commanded a machine-gun compartment near Prokhorovka on the Kursk Bulge !!!! Himself born in 1923 (reminded me of my father, also born in 1923, after this war)! He is one of the whole unit who survived !!!
    Glory to the courage of the soldiers who fought on the Kursk Bulge, and who won that WAR !!
  14. morpogr
    morpogr 5 July 2013 13: 01
    An interesting article is waiting to be continued.
  15. ed65b
    ed65b 5 July 2013 13: 29
    9 of July.
    --- General Bright is trying to form at least some corps reserve and recalls a company of "Tigers" from 19-TD.
    Order of the corps on July 9, 1943:
    "p.5) The Tigrov company, which was still in the 19-TD, is again subordinate to the 503-TTB and moves across Tavrovo and the 50-ton bridge Dorogobuzhino for the executive corps in Generalovka. The company commander establishes contact with the commander of the 7-TD" ...
    --- Of the 45 "Tigers" that day, 33 are in service.
    --- 2/503-TTB, withdrawn from 19-TD subordination, is in the reserve of the corps commander and another combat group was hastily formed at its base on the morning of July 9 under the command of Major Count Kagenek, first to repel the 276-Guards.SP , after which it is involved for an auxiliary attack on the Hut. Postnikov.
    --- The "Tigers" company, subordinate to 6-TD, was used that day during the breakthrough of the line at Dalnaya Igumenka.
    --- In the morning, the counterattack of the 276-Guards SP against B. Igumenka. The blow was so strong that the Chalet de Beaulieu grenadiers, instead of taking positions from B. Igumenka, left their positions in a panic.
    From Daily Summary 19-TD:
    "At 7:00 442, the GRP again set out to the southeastern outskirts of B. Igumenka to attack the us. Point. But the enemy counterattack threw our infantry back to the southern and southeastern outskirts. Only after using all forces and catching the retreating infantrymen was it possible to prevent the breakthrough enemy to the southeast. "
    -Approximately 1,5 hours after the start of the attack, the 276th Guards Command broke into the center of B. Igumenka to the square near the church on the southern outskirts. At 11:00, they hit with 2 battalions from the Hut. Postnikov at joint 19-TD and 6 -TD, threw off a company of grenadiers on an armored personnel carrier, covering the left flank of 600-RB at a height of 6 m northeast of the village, and took the road.
    -To restore the former position of the units, Hünesdorf quickly deployed a company of "Tigers" on the flanks of the attacking, which was led by Kagenek and subordinated to him a company on BTR-ah 6-RB.
    -After the appearance of tanks on the flanks of 282-Guards.SP, the attack was crumpled and the battalions were in the ring.
    --- On the Melekhovo-Sevryukovo sector, there was Unrain's group, part of Bieberstein's forces, up to 20 11-TP and Mardera tanks (7 pieces). And Hünesdorf planned to solve the task at hand with units of von Oppeln, Bieberstein, Westhofen, Quentin's reconnaissance battalions, 2 companies of "Tigers" and 228-division "Stugs" with the support of artillery.
  16. ed65b
    ed65b 5 July 2013 13: 30
    -The first general attack drowned out under the fire of artillery and tanks, and during the second Bieberstein's grenadiers, accompanied by a company of "Tigers" (6-TD) and "Shtugami", crushed 1/282-Guards SP at 16:00 broke into the center of D. Igumenka ...
    - Reconnaissance battalion Quentin with a company of "Tigers" and armored personnel carriers-mi Kagenek forged in battle 3/282-Guards SP in the area of ​​hut.Postnikov.
    -After the construction of crossings through the PT-ditch and the mine belt south of D. Igumenka, the groups of Biberstein, Quentin and Kagenek (with the "Tigers") resumed their attack.
    -By 18:00 2 Churchill's out of 5 in D. Igumenka were hit. And the 228-TB, which fought in the forest to the north, having lost half of the T-34, began to retreat to Kiselyovo. Biberstein's grenadiers, with the support of the Stugs, began to press guardsmen from the village from the south and southeast, while Oppeln's tanks tried to bypass the village from the north in order to strike in the rear.
    -In an effort to prevent a breakthrough into the ovo, Major Karklin at 20:00 launched a counterattack with 2/1245-SP forces supported by 4 T-34 (96-TBR) and 3 MK-4 (47-Guards OTTP). outskirts they did not advance. After that "Churchill" retreated to the height. 2 km south of ovo, and 34-ki in Kiselyovo.
    -During this battle on the western outskirts of D. Igumenka, Soviet soldiers pulled the commander of the 3rd company 1/27-TP Chief Lieutenant P. Sonntag and 2 crew members from the wrecked tank. This was the first German officer captured in the first 5 days of battles in the Kempf AG strip.
    From the daily report of 19-TD: "Knight's Cross Knight's Cross Ober-Lieutenant Sonntag and 2 people from 27-TP were missing on 9.7, probably killed or wounded fell into the hands of the enemy."
    -Group Kagenek lost 1 "Tiger". Calculations of 2 batteries of 114-Guards AIPTAP on the south-western outskirts of the khut. Postnikov stood in the rye, it was difficult to notice them. 3 Pz.IIIs were set on fire and 1 was knocked out from a distance of half a kilometer. After The OP moved "Tiger". The first 2 shells ricocheted against the turret, the next shot broke the track and the car turned around and framed the side. The crew fired 2 76-mm shells and set the tank on fire.
    ---An important role in the fight against German equipment was played by the so-called. "tank hunters." These were groups of sappers, a feature of their actions was not so much waiting for the approach of tanks in ambushes, but also an active search for a meeting with them. The group (2-7 people) was cut into a section of 3-7 km, where they had to be personally monitored, by interrogating commanders, to find a concentration point for equipment, refueling points, knocked-out combat vehicles and block these areas, roads, aisles and parking places with mine-explosives. In docks 69 and 7-Gv. A cases of such groups staying on German territory are recorded The sappers also mined the corpses of soldiers and animals, usually after the first battle.
  17. Djozz
    Djozz 5 July 2013 13: 32
    Well, a cannon cannot shoot 2-2,5 km in a direct trajectory.
  18. ed65b
    ed65b 5 July 2013 13: 32
    -From oper.svod 1529-TSAP:
    "At 17:00 on 8.07, fire was fired at tanks (up to 10 units) that entered the road 2 km south-west of Batratskaya Dacha. SU-152 3 batteries burned 2 tanks and 2 knocked out (1 of them" Tiger "). 15 HE grenades ".
    On the photo SU-152 1529-regiment in the area of ​​x. Watchdog. July 14, 1943
    1. lelikas
      lelikas 5 July 2013 18: 29
      Quote: ed65b
      In the photo SU-152

      In the photo of ISU-152, they could not light up near Kursk.
  19. ed65b
    ed65b 5 July 2013 13: 36
    Senior Lieutenant Ivan Shevtsov, the future Hero of the Soviet Union, next to the German Tiger tank that he had been wrecked.
    The commander of the tank company of the 142nd tank battalion (95th tank brigade of the 9th tank corps of the Central Front) Ivan Andreevich Shevtsov July 15, 1943 at the head of his unit and in cooperation with the infantry, the first broke into the railway station "Maloarkhangelsk" (Oryol region) and held it 4 hours before reinforcements arrived, inflicting significant damage to the enemy in manpower and equipment. Personally destroyed 4 tanks, one of them is the PzKpfw VI Tiger tank and 3 anti-tank guns.
    For this battle on August 27, 1943 he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.
    1. maxvet
      maxvet 5 July 2013 13: 47
      fill out such comments in an article, it will be interesting
  20. Djozz
    Djozz 5 July 2013 13: 45
    The elevation angle to a distance of 2 km from a 152mm howitzer, do not tell me, or the laws of ballistics are different.
  21. Djozz
    Djozz 5 July 2013 13: 46
    The range of a direct shot is when the projectile flies parallel to the ground.
    1. Igarr
      Igarr 5 July 2013 15: 17
      Here are harmful people, yes, Nikolai?
      She doesn’t want to answer in any way.
      ".. Direct shot range
      Direct Shot Range - The greatest firing range at which the trajectory of the projectile (bullet) does not exceed a given target height. Shooting within the range of a direct shot is carried out on a permanent installation of the sight, which simplifies and speeds up the aiming of the weapon (especially when shooting at moving targets) ... "
      The text of the article means that for 2 - 2,5 km the projectile of the 88-mm cannon-aht gun completely broke through the armor of our tanks.
      You have to get it again. True optics at the Fritz was (and is) excellent. The rate of fire is good.
      But our 152-mm howitzer-guns - not only broke through the armor, but in general carried all of the tanks - dviguns together with the rear armor plates. One problem was getting there.
      Yes. One more thing. The earth is ... round. Do you know? So .. parallel to the ball fly - is that how?
      No matter how much you read about the war, you are so astounded.
      There is in Orel Diorama. There is a T-70. I walk around him, I think that for the boys there were such that, climbing into this tin, they went to Ferdinand, to the Tigers. To the guns.
      I try on myself.
      And slowly so .. "goose bumps" cover myself.
      The eternal glory of the valor of our grandfathers - fathers And for me it's an uncle.
      1. Djozz
        Djozz 5 July 2013 17: 07
        For me, these are 2 uncles, a grandfather and a father wounded from the war, by the way, he fought in regimental intelligence and ended the war in Denmark.
      2. Thunderbolt
        Thunderbolt 5 July 2013 17: 14
        Quote: Igarr
        There is a T-70. I go, I go around him, I think
        I also went around him, but not in Oryol, but the same thoughts.
      3. dustycat
        dustycat 6 July 2013 17: 13
        My uncle Misha was such a MV. They were sent to counterattack in the area of ​​Prokhorovka. Along the way, came under the raid of their aircraft. Flew into the swamp. They were shot by Panthers and wedges from a distance of less than a kilometer. At some stream, the surviving crews met in hand-to-hand combat. When they fought back until night, they sat in the bush. Night and day went to their feet and belly. The Germans blew up our wrecked tanks all night and pulled out their tractors.
        Two weeks later, a sanbat near Stalingrad was again sent to the formation and two weeks later into battle. Now on the T34. Blown up on their mines. They repaired the day and waited until the road was cleared. When approaching Kharkov, their convoy was shot by Ferdinand. This time it passed - without injuries and burns.

        Growth he was really quite unprepossessing.
        As a drinker he always told how the T70 tower is buzzing from a through lumbago and how the scale inside the tank clouds and burns the skin. And all that their column of 10 cars could do was break the two Panthers of the caterpillar and knock out two wedges.
  22. sokrat-71
    sokrat-71 5 July 2013 14: 45
    Thanks for the interesting article. We look forward to continuing ...
  23. pensioner
    pensioner 5 July 2013 14: 53
    A book by Mansur Abdulin with a foreword by A. Isaev was published in the "Soldier's Memoirs" series. Abdulin was a mortar and fought in the Kursk Bulge. The battles in which he had a chance to participate, he describes as pitch hell. And Isaev, in the preface, writes approximately the following: the division in which Abdulin served was on a RELATIVELY QUIET SECTION OF THE FRONT !! And you, he says, now imagine WHAT happened in other areas, in those where the most active actions were carried out? One could stay alive only by accident.
  24. Odysseus
    Odysseus 5 July 2013 15: 05
    If we evaluate the actions of Germany, then the operation "Citadel" first of all shows the degradation of the German General Staff. "The main weapon of Germany," the students of the "Schlieffen School" could not offer anything better than a banal strike at the base of the Kursk salient, and without achieving any operational surprise. was made only for the "miracle weapon".
    Apparently the reason for this was the general hopelessness of the strategic situation and the expulsion from the army of all generals critical of Hitler’s decision.
    1. Ivan_Ivanov
      Ivan_Ivanov 5 July 2013 16: 11
      Let me ask,

      and do our generals, our headquarters, our commanders and soldiers have anything to do with the defeat of the German army in the Kursk?
      1. Odysseus
        Odysseus 5 July 2013 16: 16
        Quote: Ivan_Ivanov
        and do our generals, our headquarters, our commanders and soldiers have anything to do with the defeat of the German army in the Kursk?

        Weird question. Of course they do. I wrote, "If you evaluate the actions of Germany"
        1. Ivan_Ivanov
          Ivan_Ivanov 5 July 2013 16: 26
          Thank. Sorry for the harsh tone. It’s just that this does not follow from your post at all.

          Do not consider it an interference, but if they wrote, say: "Well, and of course, the result of the defeat of the Germans in Operation Citadel was the excellent, skillful planning of our General Staff and the heroic actions of our soldiers and officers," no complaints would have arisen.
          1. dustycat
            dustycat 6 July 2013 17: 30
            According to my uncle Misha, all the skillful planning of the general staff was reduced to the fact that the trenches at the prepared positions were dug in full profile in several lines, and not like in 41 and 42 - only rifle cells.
            And on the second third line there were troops. What was especially lacking in 1942.
            More heroic literate actions and tenacity of the linear parts worked. Well, they armed the infantry better.
            From the first lines, few survived and left.
            Four wounded foot soldiers came out from under Prokhorovka. What struck him was that they were in new and also burnt tunics. As if from tanks got out.
    2. Thunderbolt
      Thunderbolt 5 July 2013 18: 03
      Quote: Odyssey
      , the students of the "Schlieffen School" could not offer anything better than a banal blow to the foundation of the Kursk ledge
      And in my opinion they had no other choice: the Kursk salient loomed over the groups "North" and "South", and fettered the actions of the "Center" group. And since the Germans could conduct an offensive in only one strategic direction, they did not liquidate the ledge could not start a summer campaign. It's not 41 years. By that time, the German economy had already lost, and after the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht could only respond with counterattacks.
      1. Odysseus
        Odysseus 6 July 2013 16: 56
        Quote: Thunderbolt
        And in my opinion they had no other choice: the Kursk salient loomed over the groups "North" and "South", and fettered the actions of the "Center" group. And since the Germans could conduct an offensive in only one strategic direction, they did not liquidate ledge couldn't start summer company

        So that is the essence of the issue that the advance from the north and south of Kursk was obvious. Such operations (especially in the absence of any kind of surprise) can be carried out only with great superiority in forces. And where was the Germans? Alternatives
        1) Generally evacuate the Eastern Front, focusing on the defense of the Reich and the Allies. Propaganda rationale-landing of the Allies in Italy.
        2) Concentrate on the defense by allocating tanks to the Army Group Center and the "Miuss-Front". This is not a panacea but would delay the defeat.
        3) If you are so drawn to attack, adopt an asymmetric scheme. On the one hand, deliver only a demonstrative strike, and give all the tanks to the other flank of the offensive. It is better to the south. And an auxiliary strike on Voronezh, and the main one at its junction with the South-West.
        But on the other hand, the Germans, after 2 summer campaigns, were sure that they would break through our defenses with new tanks. But it wasn’t there!
      2. dustycat
        dustycat 6 July 2013 17: 36
        Most likely the strength of the reach habit has worked.
        If all the forces gathered on the southern ledge and rushed south of Prokhorovka, they could have reached the rear to the groupings north of Orel ..
        If the power reserve of heavy equipment was enough.
        But a single deep raids on the rear in the next cauldron was a favorite tactic of the Red Army of 1942.
  25. Odysseus
    Odysseus 5 July 2013 16: 40
    Quote: Ivan_Ivanov
    Thank. Sorry for the harsh tone. Just from your post it does not follow at all

    Well, of course, the result of the defeat of the Germans in Operation Citadel was the excellent, skillful planning of our General Staff and the heroic actions of our soldiers and officers. smile
    I can add that the general hopelessness of the strategic situation also arose not by itself, but as a result of the actions of the Red Army.
    1. Ivan_Ivanov
      Ivan_Ivanov 5 July 2013 17: 09

      Bold +
      and many thanks.
  26. Kostya pedestrian
    Kostya pedestrian 5 July 2013 17: 44

    Germans were never outstanding strategists, Normans - maybe, and even that is not a fact. Vladimir was still a Baltic - our Baltic.

    And given the fact that the "battle-hardened" generals could not convince the Fuhrer to make the right decisions, which of them are the tactics? They can't even stand up for themselves.

    May our brave and living Heroes who die be eternal memory and respect for all time, and these unfortunate soldiers one more reminder, so that they don’t yelp, they whine like wolves, mad when the tank runs into the tail,

    By the way: the nuclear submarine "Kursk", awkwardly "drowned" at the beginning of Auguts, was it not paid for by the example of Deutsche corporations, as if for the "moral damage" inflicted on would-be soldiers by our grandfathers, such as Voltsvagens or Audi? Look, the audi have signs like rollers from a tank, and in Belorussk a skating rink is also an executioner or an ice battle, who knows what kind of smart deep blue computers they have to implement such an algorithm? With nimizh bogyuyu.
    1. max73
      max73 5 July 2013 18: 54
      and here you are wrong ... Moltke and Bismarck are examples of this, coupled with the "frogs", which the Germans more than once .... and the "blitzkrieg" after a successful 2 years only on our people and stalled ... don't talk nonsense
      1. Kostya pedestrian
        Kostya pedestrian 6 July 2013 03: 42
        Bismarck, besides calling the Russians "fools", has not distinguished himself in anything in life, except for politics, and he is closer to us - a Prus. The Latvians are Germanic crusaders who, like the aborigines in Australia, destroyed almost the entire indigenous population of the Semigallian-present-day Latvia, and the Prussians are part of the Russian people. It's like comparing a resident of Minsk and a Kaliningrader, without the Zakhidno-Jab perfume "freedom for the Kuril".

        Moltke is just a successful mercenary and strategist, but, again, with the Russian alphabet of warfare. Without Russian science, they would not have heard of him. It's like an outstanding Russian military officer, shortlander by origin Barclay, not to be confused with the launch from "White Sun of the Desert"

        I'm not sure who the frogs are, but if the French, then they took half of Africa from the "brilliant" Fritzes, they attached the other half to themselves, with only one exception for the French and French settlements - it was a war of liberation, and the Britons began to divide strangers again grave, as the Scots say to their dogs: "forward Newfoundland, it's time to make dough, and thresh the ix bones"
    2. Xnumx kopeek
      Xnumx kopeek 6 July 2013 04: 09
      Quote: Kostya pedestrian

      Germans were never outstanding strategists, Normans - maybe, and even that is not a fact. Vladimir was still a Baltic - our Baltic.

      And given the fact that the "battle-hardened" generals could not convince the Fuhrer to make the right decisions, which of them are the tactics? They can't even stand up for themselves.

      May our brave and living Heroes who die be eternal memory and respect for all time, and these unfortunate soldiers one more reminder, so that they don’t yelp, they whine like wolves, mad when the tank runs into the tail,

      By the way: the nuclear submarine "Kursk", awkwardly "drowned" at the beginning of Auguts, was it not paid for by the example of Deutsche corporations, as if for the "moral damage" inflicted on would-be soldiers by our grandfathers, such as Voltsvagens or Audi? Look, the audi have signs like rollers from a tank, and in Belorussk a skating rink is also an executioner or an ice battle, who knows what kind of smart deep blue computers they have to implement such an algorithm? With nimizh bogyuyu.

      Baltic Fleet sailor? / Vladimir / -He beat Rurikovich, like Nevsky, like Europ. leaders / William the Conqueror, Richard the Lionheart / grandson of William / etc.-the Normans were beaten by great warriors, -from the 8th century - they kept the world in fear - until the 12th century /! / in the person of the Richards, until they left for civilian life .- / then the world beat Europe and Asia / -Normani formed their states in the east. England / where children were frightened by the name of the Normans / Sicily, Sardinia, West. France / Normandy / in Russia, etc.-N. possessed the most powerful army and navy - / in quantity and quality / -. They paid off from them / did not fight /, and who intervened, like the Arabs with war elephants - then they regretted. .-Live the Normans to the Mongols --- badly beat the Mongols, -Normani taught to fight both the Slavs and the "Germans" / Saxons, etc. - the Celts, in a word / - the agrarians and traders.
  27. Ulysses
    Ulysses 5 July 2013 18: 49
    The bastard bowed to our tankman.
  28. max73
    max73 5 July 2013 18: 50
    with the introductory part - I agree one hundred pounds. I look forward to continuing with impatience, I feel there will be a reason to argue normally
  29. Rjn
    Rjn 5 July 2013 19: 09
    As for getting into the cans: Janusz Pshimanovsky in Studzianki has a beautiful description of our tank attack, so there are, in my opinion, terrible words when a shell hits a tank and it explodes.
    Janusz writes: "... and three Russian guys ceased to be ...". Just think, and frost on the skin that they went through.
  30. Alf
    Alf 5 July 2013 21: 12
    "To combat Soviet tanks, armored self-propelled howitzers that were part of the artillery regiments of tank divisions were also used - 105-mm Vespe (German Wespe -" wasp ") and 150-mm Hummel (German" bumblebee ")."
    Howitzers to deal with high-speed and maneuverable targets, which are tanks? Original, original ...
  31. The comment was deleted.
  32. sergey158-29
    sergey158-29 5 July 2013 22: 37
    A terrible battle, but a great VICTORY!
    1. Day 11
      Day 11 5 July 2013 22: 45
      It gets even worse when you find out the REAL alignment of the losses in the battle of Prokhorovka --- 5/1 in favor of the Hans
      1. Ulysses
        Ulysses 5 July 2013 23: 47
        Yes you are right.
        The topic is painful, but it does not detract from the heroism of the rank and file tankers who complied with the order.
        1. Kostya pedestrian
          Kostya pedestrian 6 July 2013 03: 54
          You missed the officers! But in vain - an ordinary without an officer, that the hero is without cartridges.
          1. Ulysses
            Ulysses 7 July 2013 14: 48
            The lieutenant, the tank commander in those conditions did not differ much from fuel oil.
        2. Ulysses
          Ulysses 6 July 2013 13: 39
          People, in vain minus.
          I am a patriot of my country.
          And the conclusions of the outcome of the Second World War I do not agree with jerks like Rezun-Suvorov.
          But do not be like ostriches.
          Under Prokhorovka, military operations for us were unsuccessful.
          This is a war, the main thing is that we hoisted the banner of victory over the Reichstag. repeat
      2. Kostya pedestrian
        Kostya pedestrian 6 July 2013 03: 51
        Is that five Hans for one Nicholas?
  33. xomaNN
    xomaNN 6 July 2013 19: 15
    The beginning of the article sets up a serious study of a relevant topic. Interesting sequel