Military reform as an integral part of the security concept of the Russian Federation: Systematic dynamic assessment


Report Izborsk club



PREAMBLE

BASIC PROVISIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The important changes that took place at the end of last year in the top leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation once again underlined the need for the Russian state and Russian society to develop a holistic, systemic and adequate - not only in current conditions, but also for the future 30-50 years - the national security concept , including its military component.

Over the past decade, the leadership of our country in this area made a real breakthrough, which found expression in the Decree signed by the President of the Russian Federation 12 in May 2009 of the Year “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020 of the year”. However, the pioneering nature of this document has led to both its strengths and weaknesses.

The first should include the very formulation of the problem: the definition of national security as an independent and holistic concept, not reducible to the concepts of military, political, economic, informational, structural, organizational, etc. security.

The latter, in our opinion, include the insufficient elaboration and interrelation of the key, strategic level, problems of national security, which greatly reduces the degree of practical adequacy and predictive power of this state document.

Without in any way pretending to critically rethink and recycle, we, a group of experts united under the auspices of the patriotic Izborsk club, nevertheless, consider it highly desirable to start work in this direction, since the global geostrategic situation in the modern world is developing rapidly and in many ways unexpectedly, and inadequate assessment of the challenges and threats to the national security of the Russian Federation may entail inadequate actions with catastrophic consequences.

The report below, consisting of three interrelated sections: - “Systematic dynamic assessment of threats to the national security of the Russian Federation” (c.10-32);

- “Evaluation of the past stage of military reform and the formation of new approaches in its improvement” (c.33-70);

- “Promising military technologies and wars of the future” (p. 71-80), is, rather, an invitation to a nationwide discussion than a kind of solid and installation document.

The proposed “agenda” of such a discussion, in our opinion, can be formulated as follows.

1. The current and future security system of Russia, first of all, depends on the adequacy of the actions of the Russian leadership in assessing external and internal threats, a systematic and well-considered approach to military construction, as well as a well-adjusted internal socio-economic policy that does not allow social destabilization of society and population degradation.


2. The 90's geopolitical views, based on the thesis that Russia has no “external enemy” and proclaimed a strategy for unilateral foreign policy concessions, “avoiding” direct challenges, which sooner or later will convince the West of our peacefulness and force it to accept Russia as an equal partner in The club of “civilized countries” showed its complete inconsistency.

We live in a rapidly changing dynamic world, in a period of a descending, crisis wave of the world economy, which provokes geostrategic tensions in various regions of the planet, including along the perimeter of Russia's borders. Over the past twenty years, a number of states bordering on the Russian Federation quite clearly outlined various kinds of complaints against our country: from purely economic to territorial. Many of these claims may in the future provoke conflict situations and attempts to resolve them by force.

3. The main strategic external threats for the Russian Federation today, as before, come from the United States and Western countries, which are not interested in restoring our country as a "center of power" of global importance, and therefore pursue a policy aimed at weakening Russia, pushing it back to the periphery of the world community , fixing its status as the country of source of raw materials and the global landfill. At the same time, the United States and its allies are using - in order to achieve decisive military and strategic superiority over Russia - the concept of “soft power”, which provides for the systemic combined effect of transformational, informational and deformation actions. One of the key political and diplomatic technologies for the destruction of our country is the imposition of unbalanced agreements to reduce strategic nuclear missiles and tactical nuclear weapons. weapons. In light of this, one should be especially careful in approaching such negotiation and diplomatic proposals of the West.

4. The defense capability of our state should be ensured by foreign policy actions. The decisive role should be played by the positioning of the political leadership of the country in the growing strategic confrontation between the United States and China. This confrontation gives Russia an additional range for strategic maneuver, allows you to quickly vary your relations with each of these global “centers of power” depending on specific geostrategic, including military-political circumstances, but it also requires Russia to improve and strengthen the Strategic Nuclear Forces as the main factor ensuring national sovereignty.

5. The wars of the XXI century are characterized by a variety of forms and methods of unleashing an armed conflict, and in advance, long before the outbreak of hostilities, causing maximum damage to the enemy with the help of “organizational weapons”, this know-how of modern warfare. What presupposes, first of all, remote and “contactless” disruption of the functioning of the governance structures of the attacked country, initiation of a split of its political elites, disruption of social stability in this country due to a combination of subversive propaganda-psychological, economic and special operations.

6. The phase of hostilities is characterized by the transient nature of battles, striving as soon as possible to cause unacceptable damage to enemy control systems and military infrastructure, and to conduct combat operations both to the full depth of the front and “vertically”: in air and space. Technologically developed armies seek to conduct combat operations remotely, without direct contact with the enemy. Therefore, priority today is given to the development of means of reconnaissance, automatic control and high-precision weapons, as a means of realizing an advantage in the amount and quality of information received, as well as in terms of its processing and use.

7. In the light of the above, it must be stated that at present, and especially for the near future (5-7 years), Russia finds itself in an extremely difficult and dangerous situation. Today, our country has largely lost that geostrategic potential, including its military-industrial, scientific-technological, mobilization and information-financial components, which the USSR reached in the 80-s. last century for a "direct" response to existing threats. And this circumstance requires the political leadership of the country to develop non-standard, asymmetric approaches, the use of which will allow to counter these threats at a cost of much less economic and financial efforts. It is these principles that should be taken as the basis for Russia’s elaboration of a national security doctrine, including the deployment within its framework of military reform, as well as political, organizational and informational support for these efforts.

8. It is necessary to recognize that the military structure inherited by Russia from the USSR turned out to be almost completely dismantled during the first stage of the military reform of 2008-2012. The measures carried out within the framework of this reform were in many ways chaotic, ill-considered and did not lead to a qualitative improvement in our Armed Forces, and in a number of parameters led to their degradation. A return to the old structure is now hardly possible, since it will require financial costs, far exceeding the real possibilities of our country. Therefore, today it is vital to analyze the previous period, determine the priorities of military construction, clarify the military doctrine, make it more specific and politically sound, and based on the analysis, formulate a plan for further reform, discuss it in the military-scientific and expert community and approve it on the Security Council. The presented report should be considered as one of the first steps in this direction.

9. Today it became obvious the urgent need for specific measures to limit the influence of the element of surprise on political decisions. This could be a center of crisis warning and analysis of the military-political situation closed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which would continuously monitor threats to the national security of Russia and constantly inform political leadership on a range of issues related to this topic.

10. There is a need to create in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation new types of troops and structures:

- Command and Special Operations Forces: a full-fledged offensive arm of the troops, up to the present moment, which was absent in full, completed form in the structure of the Armed Forces of Russia;

- Troops of Electronic Warfare, as in the conditions of qualitative and quantitative growth of automated means of control, saturation of troops of the likely adversary with electronic communication systems and information exchange, the need for developing EW facilities reaches a new level;

- Agencies for information and network confrontation and information operations as a structure that carries out information support for the actions of the army, as well as propaganda, counter-propaganda and other active operations in the global Internet and media space.

11. Reform of the mobilization system and the creation of a National Military Reserve are needed. The army, which has no reserves, is unable to win the modern war.

12. The creation of new types of weapons, the improvement of military equipment and armaments, and R & D in the military sphere is not only strengthening the existing Armed Forces, but also the possibility of a breakthrough to dual-use technologies corresponding to the transition to the Sixth global technological order. Potentially, this is a locomotive capable of pulling Russian industry and economy to a new level. In this connection, the effective activity of the Advanced Research Foundation being created, which is able to combine the work of scientists and the needs of the military, is of paramount importance.

Analysis of available information shows that today research and development deserve special attention:

- remotely controlled automated devices that imitate the physical, speech, and even intellectual human activity - robots;

- remotely controlled and autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles of various functions and purposes;

- intelligence systems, communications, communications and management, their element base, appropriate algorithms, mathematical and software;

- means of warfare based on new physical principles and effects (remote sensing of the Earth’s ionosphere, geophysical and climatic weapons, etc.);

- genetic engineering and biophysical technologies

13. It should be expected that the central mechanism of a complex destructive impact on Russia, up to the dismemberment of the country, will continue to be the “organizational structure” with a direct impact on the process of political stability and on the development and implementation of a financial and economic strategy that will be strongly pushed towards inflating social and political other internal conflicts according to the type of situation of the USSR at the end of 80. Twentieth century. The line on military construction and military reform will also be affected. All this requires that the highest political leadership develop and implement a very verified course of governing the country.

Today we need a scientifically based concept of correction of military reform. As part of this work, it is important to prevent the repetition of the mistakes of the first stage of the reform, when its implementation was left to the discretion of a narrow group of managers and performers, made dependent on their competence, personal preferences, and sometimes prejudice.

Russia today has a unique historical chance to carry out a large-scale reform of its Armed Forces, bring them to a new level and equip them with the most modern equipment and weapons. The creation of such an Armed Forces in combination with energetic political leadership, a balanced and balanced foreign policy will be a weighty response to the challenges of the 21st century.


SECTION ONE

SYSTEM-DYNAMIC ESTIMATION OF THREATS FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

What is the state of the RF national security system now? How does it relate to the deployed reform of the Armed Forces, what potential challenges are facing our country and what strategic priorities should the political leadership of the country choose in the 21st century, when the overall foreign policy situation becomes complicated almost not every year, but every month?

To give the right answers to these crucial questions, it is necessary, first of all, to realize where and how modern humanity is moving. This is evidenced not only by domestic experts, but also by studies conducted under the leadership of the Pentagon and in the NATO system as a whole. Similar developments are also being carried out in the APR countries, primarily in Japan, the PRC and South Korea.

As for domestic military-political thought, here the last two decades have passed under the sign of the undivided dominance of “export versions” of liberal-monetarist concepts, which have proved and are proving the need for the maximum and accelerated military-political rapprochement between Russia and the United States and NATO countries, the main military-strategic a threat to our country called and called a large-scale war with the PRC, as well as local armed conflicts, up to and including individual terrorist acts.

The works carried out within the framework of these versions purposefully falsified the real geostrategic and military-political situation in the modern world, presenting it in a favorable light for the supporters of these concepts. In particular, such documents as the Valdai Club report, the SWAP report, as well as the works of Arbatov and Dvorkin, carried out within the Carnegie Center, actively supported the progress of military reform in the Russian Federation and almost completely solidarized its outcome.

It is obvious that in the failure of the first stage of the military reform there is a share of responsibility and the specified authors, who did not want to go beyond the concepts adopted by them, and personal and group interests put the solution of real security problems of the country above.

Without falling into the extremes of alarmism, we must nevertheless note that today the real "centers of power" are much more transnational corporations (TNCs) than the nation-states. They — even such large ones as the USA — increasingly play the role of military-political instruments of super-large transnational capital (Financial International, Finintern). Therefore, the tendency of transferring the main “nodes” of international and interstate contradictions to the sphere of geostrategic and economic interests is becoming ever clearer. Traditional sovereign states and their military-political blocs lose a decisive role in world development, which they played during the last 200 years, from the end of the 18th to the end of the 20th century.

The influence of qualitatively new forms of information, ideological, technological and economic pressure on “traditional” societies, including the growth of “ideological-religious” terrorism, illicit trafficking in weapons, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, etc., is increasing.

At the same time, in connection with the crisis transition from 5 to the 6 global technological order, “traditional” resource, ideological, religious, national, demographic and territorial conflicts are aggravated and aggravated.

It follows that the strategic security of independent states at the present stage directly depends on how they interact with the main world “centers of power”: the United States, including the NATO bloc they lead, and China. The Russian Federation, despite being the third largest power in the world in terms of aggregate power, is no exception in this regard. Despite the assertions of the above-mentioned “mainstream” politicians and analysts, about overcoming the antagonistic contradictions of the modern world leading to various kinds of military conflicts, as well as about the absence of direct military threats to Russia, the events of this decade, especially the last two years, point to another paradigm in which the Russian Federation is the object of "soft" aggression and is subject to increasing pressure both on the periphery of its present borders and more broadly, breaking strategic parity a. An objective confirmation of this is the expanding range of military conflicts near our territory, as well as on the territory of countries that are our potential allies. Moreover, the territory of the Russian Federation today has become the direct object of external armed aggression of yet another rapidly emerging world "center of power": the "Pan-Muslim" Salafi project, which, with the support of the "oil" monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries, actively forms and supports extremist Wahhabi movements not only in the "Islamic" regions of Russia, but throughout its entire territory. It is no secret that the Salafi project is largely realized with the filing of the United States and partly of the European Union, who see in the billion-dollar Islamic Ummah the demographic potential they need to confront China, India and Russia, as well as other developing countries of the Third World.

In addition, there is a growing US effort to achieve overwhelming superiority in the military-technical sphere, in which the Russian Federation, by dismantling its nuclear missile potential and losing the ability to retaliate with unacceptable damage, would lose strategic parity with the United States. Washington is moving towards this goal both through the deployment of the most promising military-technical programs and through diplomatic efforts to impose profitable agreements on Russia in the sphere of limiting strategic and general weapons.

Specific trends that indicate a spasmodic increase in the threat of various types of wars up to the “global war”, in our opinion, are as follows.

First, the quantitative and qualitative growth of military spending over the past ten to twelve years is obvious. So, in 2000, the total amount of such expenses in the world amounted to 597 billion dollars (the global arms market - 36,9 billion dollars), in 2006, respectively, 1,2 trillion. and 40,3 billion, in 2012 year - 1,8 trillion. and 69,8 billion.

Secondly, there is a sharpening of the tacit, but fierce competition of global military-strategic projects, above all - the US and Chinese.

Third, the role and influence of the military intelligence community in the ruling circles of the leading countries of the world is increasing. Moreover, the concept of "intelligence" in this case should be interpreted broadly - as a type of so-called. "Smart weapons".

The growing global "conflict" is a direct consequence of the systemic crisis of the world economy, in the center of which is the United States of America. It is obvious that the United States is trying to compensate for the reduction of real geostrategic potential by increased political activity, using its military-technological and information-financial superiority in order to preserve its role as a global leader. It was the United States who acted and extolled the initiators of the overwhelming majority of the local wars of the last decade and often their participants. It should be noted that the US participation in such conflicts can be carried out both in the form of direct intervention (Afghanistan, Iraq) and in hidden forms of the “strategy of indirect action” (Libya, Syria, Egypt), which uses qualitatively new force mechanisms: Special Operations Forces (SSO) and private military companies (PMCs), which in their characteristics are "shadow" armies, which are actively used against unwanted US countries and governments.

However, in the known to us stories The global changes in global technological structures have always been accompanied by changes in global geostrategic leaders. Therefore, all attempts by the United States to maintain its leadership by military-political methods without breaking the existing socio-economic model of development look absolutely unpromising.

The system civilization crisis of the world is no longer a forecast for tomorrow, but a fully formed reality. The emergence of alternative global projects, fundamentally new ideologies and leaders is the business of the next ten to fifteen years. And this circumstance also points to the growing likelihood of a “big war” between the main world “centers of power,” that is, first of all, between the USA and the PRC.

Russia, which, as noted above, between these two "centers of power", needs to maintain an independent position in the near future (although it will be extremely difficult to do this in the face of increasing conflict potential between the US and China), since it will remain neutral and "stand aside" this conflict will not be allowed to our country with its giant geostrategic potential).

The probable line of action by the United States in the near future will be the line to draw the RF into the “NEW REBOOT” scheme using the NATO block in order to prevent Moscow from coming closer to Beijing and weaken the Russian military potential to the maximum. The weakening will be carried out through a series of agreements on disarmament and minimizing both the Russian strategic nuclear missile potential and the potential of tactical nuclear weapons, which is especially important in the case of regional and local conflicts, including in the territories of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Moreover, since the 2016 year, after the arrival of the new president, the United States may well go on revising its policy towards Russia. At the same time, Russia, weakened by agreements, will be unable to quickly restore its strategic potential to the level of parity with the United States.

Consequently, the political leadership of Russia should take particular caution in any further proposals to limit strategic nuclear forces - especially without the participation of the PRC and the nuclear powers of the NATO bloc (Great Britain and France) in this process. At the same time, as much attention should be paid to monitoring the global political and economic situation in which the country will be before the 2025 year.

Another significant geostrategic factor is the existence of a “raw needle” in the Russian economy, which will inevitably limit the real sovereignty and “degrees of freedom” of our country's actions in the international arena, forcing it to “make a choice” between the United States and China.

Once again pointing out that the “or-or” option is far from optimal for Russia - unlike the “armed neutrality” option, we should nevertheless take into account that alliances with these powers are far from equivalent and not equivalent as for Russia, and for its counterparties.

If for China, allied relations with Russia in the context of confrontation with the United States are a strategic factor compensating for the US military-technological superiority, then for the United States, an alliance with Russia is nothing more than a “purely technical procedure” that is not crucial for the confrontation with China. Therefore, in order to temporarily remove its fundamental contradictions with China, in certain conditions, Washington will be ready to sacrifice Russia, having weakened it beforehand. This option, first voiced by Zbigniew Brzezinski in the early 90-s, today looks like a very unlikely scenario, since the contradictions between China and the United States focus primarily on the southern direction and have a global financial and economic nature, but it is necessary to take it into account. Thus, closer relations with the PRC are preferable from the point of view of the national security of the Russian Federation and its military construction than a similar level of relations with the United States.

Some analysts are trying to compare the current situation with the eve of the Second World War. We consider the period in which the world entered after 2007 of the year, rather, close to the situation not of 30's, but 80 of the last century. Therefore, our country will have to prepare, rather, for a tough confrontation, similar to the “cold war” against the USSR in the 80s, than with the threat of a “big war” similar to the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War.

Paradoxically, but a fact: we did not have and do not have an adequate analysis of the causes of the geostrategic defeat of the USSR in the 80s, there is no corresponding imitative model and even the necessary conceptual apparatus. It would seem, in any case, such a systematic, multi-factor analysis should have been one of the main tasks of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. But did not. Whether we like it or not, we must state that the relevant lessons were not drawn from the geostrategic defeat of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the repetition by the Russian leadership of many of the fatal mistakes of the “restructuring” of the 80s is almost inevitable.

In the current situation of a global systemic crisis, the fixation of the concept of “victory” in a reflexive systemic war is of paramount importance. The goal of a “victory” in such a war for the US military intelligence elite is to use all the main resources of a potential adversary (Russia) in order to implement their own long-term political and economic strategy.

The meaning of this strategy is to form and implement a global model of controlled reformatting of economic, social and political structures corresponding to the technological complexes of the sixth way.

From this point of view, a thermonuclear rocket war, in principle unacceptable from different points of view, becomes possible only at the final stage of development of a targeted "confrontational spiral" and only in case of loss of controllability of such a "spiral." Since a thermonuclear confrontation will be the ultimate defeat for all participants, one of the main tasks of a reflexive system war is to achieve strategic gain as early as possible in the deployment of a confrontational spiral.

The main milestones of the promotion of "confrontational spiral" in the territory of the Russian Federation in modern conditions are:

- stimulation of local separatist armed actions with bringing them to total chaos and dismemberment of the country;

- the split of the elite and society, as the final stage of the crisis directed by the value system or the system of meanings;

- demoralization of the army and military elite;

- artificial, continuous and controlled degradation of the internal socio-economic situation in the country;

- targeted strengthening and the formation of relevant external crisis factors;

- gradual stimulation of the socio-political crisis;

- simultaneous intensification of various forms and models of psychological warfare;

- activation of mass panic, complete demoralization of key state institutions;

- demonization of leaders unacceptable for the USA, lobbying for “agents of influence”, integration of appropriate internal management schemes;

- the destruction of the external coalition potential of the strategic enemy;

etc.

Therefore, talking about the threats of “small” and “big” wars, it is necessary to understand that these will not be traditional wars of the traditional type, where the main role was played by the deformation impact on the enemy, primarily through the massive use of means of armed struggle (missiles, aircraft, tanks and etc.), and a military victory was achieved by winning a battle or company. This will be a systematic combination of complex procedures and technologies for transformational and informational influence on the enemy’s control centers, which only at the final stage — and not always — implies a high-intensity use of “ordinary” armed forces. That is, the war against Russia in the 21st century will have the 80 Cold War option of its mandatory phase, but with much more dramatic consequences for the losing side.

It is obvious that in the course of the whole chain of wars of the last twenty years, in which the US armed forces took part, including special operations forces (MTR), new approaches were worked out and new ways of waging war were perfected. As a result, it is the United States that today owns the most advanced military-strategic concept. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to attempt to analyze this concept and highlight its main elements.

The most obvious character of the “wars of the future” was manifested in the course of armed conflicts in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Here, with a limited number of forces and means, mainly aviation and special operations forces (MTR), tangible geostrategic goals were achieved in a very short time. This is connected not only with the use of the latest high-tech weapons systems, but also with a fairly deep study of the issues of the theory of modern war in scientific and practical terms.

It was during these wars that the US demonstrated the effectiveness of new ways of waging war and new types of weapons. First of all, such weapons should include organizational weapons: time-coordinated psychological, propaganda and cyberspace operations, combined with economic and political sanctions against leaders of target states of aggression, as well as against “elites” and ordinary citizens of these countries. The combination of such operations has as its goal the psychological suppression of all, “from the bottom to the top,” segments of the population of the countries subject to aggression, disorganization of the management system of these countries, disruption of the economy.

As a result of these conflicts, it is necessary to recognize the high effectiveness of the org. Unacceptable damage to the target countries of aggression was inflicted without direct armed invasion of the territory of these countries. And only after the elimination of the capabilities of the enemy to the effective military resistance, traditional armed forces were engaged in the operations, carrying out a “test shot” against the already defeated enemy.

One of their basic conditions for waging modern-day wars is the US bet on "coalition". The United States does not get tired of using the dominant global military organization of NATO to forcefully suppress its opponents. Creating a coalition of countries to suppress the enemy and isolate the enemy at the international diplomatic level, the American political leadership considers a prerequisite for the outbreak of hostilities. On the one hand, this makes it possible to share political responsibility with the allies, who are forced to follow the United States and support them not only by the military, but also by economic, diplomatic and informational efforts, which creates a comfortable environment for the actions of the US army and gives the appearance of a legitimate international force to the war. impact on the rogue state.

In modern armed conflicts, one of the features of the conduct of hostilities by the US Army is the absolute priority of intelligence and automated control systems. On this basis, in the USA, the network-centric concept of warfare was developed and implemented at all levels of the military organization, which allowed to solve issues of various impacts on the enemy troops, including real-time fire damage, without losing time to make decisions and organize subsequent fire destruction .

In fact, today the US Army uses the concept of a single reconnaissance-strike operation. Within the framework of this concept, all types of intelligence combined into a single information flow are aimed not only at revealing the military potential of the enemy, but also in anticipation of his actions, destruction of control systems, and being combined with the means of destruction in real time, they continuously defeat him -toxic depth.

Another fundamental characteristic of the “wars of the new type” performed by the United States is the priority of conducting contact-free hostilities based on the concept of maximum saving of human resources. In this regard, in the first stage, priority is given to combat attack aircraft and other means of air attack, the prerequisite for the use of which is the conquest of air superiority.

At the same time, more and more tasks of fire destruction are being transferred to unmanned reconnaissance and strike aviation, which is actively developing today.

The third feature is that the United States in advance is seeking to deploy in all key regions of the planet a global network of large combined arms and aviation bases, which in a short time can concentrate on groups of air and ground forces that are significant in number and combat capabilities. For example, in Afghanistan, and in the former Yugoslavia, "superbases" have already been created, which make it possible to deploy thousands of troops here in a matter of days, in contrast to the weeks and even months previously needed to form such a grouping. Under these conditions, the maneuver by carrier-assault groups, which previously revealed US military intentions, is no longer necessary and necessary, which raises the factor of operational surprise of the actions of the American army.

The fourth feature of the "new type of war" is the blurring of the boundaries between the states of peace and war through the large-scale use of specially created and constantly modernized special operations forces in the first stages of military operations. It is the MTRs that create in the countries-objects of aggression zones of instability and armed conflict by involving various ethnic, religious and other types of communities in them. Then, using the already created internal instability as a pretext for intervention, the United States proceeds to directly destroy public administration systems, infrastructure and livelihoods, disorganize the military administration system and disorganize the enemy’s rear.

The fifth feature is the high intensity of the use of conventional weapons in the final stage of the conflict. As a result, the importance of the logistics of the operating troops, which consume a huge amount of ammunition, is increasing. So according to Iraq’s experience, only one battalion tactical group of the US Army needed more than 500 tons of different ammunition per day.

The sixth feature is the use of new forms of control of the captured territory, which is reflected in the widespread involvement of private military companies (PMCs), which not only provide high-quality combat and rear support groups of troops, but also control the captured territory, allowing the current army not to divert .

Thus, the “wars of a new type” performed by the United States are characterized by a variety of forms and methods of unleashing an armed conflict, priority of reconnaissance, control, and high-precision destruction systems that take advantage of the advantages in obtaining, processing and implementing the obtained data in real time, highly manoeuvrable, up to contactless, the conduct of hostilities to the full depth of the front, as well as “verticality” - by moving into air and space.

At the same time, the United States is seeking to eliminate as much as possible the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by their opponents, since the demographic threshold for “unacceptable damage” for their armed forces is extremely low and ranges from tens of thousands (in case of “local war”) to a million ( case of "big war") man.

It should not be forgotten that today the actual military threats are only part of the overall spectrum of threats to the national security of the country and are associated with the direct or indirect use of military force.

The transformation of the global geo-strategic situation has not yet led to the priority of non-military methods of resolving inter-state contradictions. Only the ratio of the likely scale of future wars, forms and methods of warfare, the characteristics of weapons and military equipment has changed. At the same time, military force, as before, remains the main argument of world politics.

The threat of a global nuclear missile war that dominated the era of the recent open confrontation between the two world socio-economic systems and blocs - the USSR and the USA, the ATS and NATO, has generally weakened. Certain threats of this format are hypothetically emanating from other nuclear countries: China, Israel, Muslim states, primarily Pakistan and some others. But the real threat of a massive nuclear missile strike on the territory of Russia in the coming decades will remain only from the US and its allies. At the same time, the likelihood of such a war at this stage can be considered minimal due to Russia's preservation of its strategic nuclear potential and the potential of delivering a nuclear missile strike. All this makes nuclear weapons the potential of the “last argument” and the object of continuous military-technical competition of superpowers in attempts to neutralize this force factor. At the same time, in local and local wars, tactical weapons gain new priority. In the past decade, the United States and NATO countries have been actively developing the concept of a disarming non-nuclear strike on control systems and strategic nuclear forces of Russia of such strength and scale that would completely exclude the possibility of any reciprocal use of Russian nuclear weapons with the United States causing "unacceptable damage."

In recent years, the highest-priority strike weapons systems in the United States military construction programs have been distinguished for their high accuracy, difficulty in detecting them, and increased range. Such systems include, in particular, sea-based and air-based cruise missiles (for strikes from lines not available for enemy defenses), airplanes made using stealth technology (strategic and tactical), unmanned weapons (primarily for on radar and aerospace defense spacecraft), reconnaissance and attack systems (to destroy group armored, as well as point highly protected targets in the depth of the defense of the opposing side). Active work in the field of hypersonic delivery systems has become a new stage in the development of these tools, which adds to the already mentioned qualities of the WTO another important quality for influencing Russia's nuclear potential - the minimum flight time. Putting such systems into service will actually return the national security of Russia to the 80 position of the 20th century, when medium-range missiles were deployed in Europe, and the response time to the military threat shrank to 8-10 minutes.

Western analysts emphasize the orientation of these systems, primarily on non-nuclear conflict. At the same time, they note that, due to their high efficiency, the combination of high power, accuracy and secrecy, existing and prospective conventional weapons, will be able to solve almost all combat tasks, including strategic ones. It is significant that during the Russian-American negotiations on disarmament, such systems are not specifically limited, and the American side’s cruise sea-based long-range missiles consistently and with particular insistence exclude from the subject of any negotiations.

Thus, there is a clear desire of the United States to acquire the possibility of a disarming non-nuclear strike on Russia's strategic nuclear forces.

It is also significant that Russia's repeated attempts to build allied relations with the United States and NATO over the past 20 years ended in nothing. In response, our country has always been given to understand that there is no place for it in the structure of NATO. The maximum that Russian diplomacy has been able to achieve is to create a Russia-NATO commission, which is nothing more than a deliberative and deliberative body. The only path to NATO proposed by Russia is a complete rejection of sovereign foreign policy, large-scale disarmament and integration into the bloc as a neophyte state, along with Croatia, Latvia, etc. At the same time, the armed forces of NATO were repeatedly used to inflict a military defeat on countries with which Russia had partnerships, which clearly indicates the unwillingness of the leadership of the NATO bloc to seriously consider Russia's national interests or its position when making its decisions.

NATO’s military threat at the moment is not a threat of “tomorrow”, but its likelihood rises in the context of a worsening global systemic crisis and the growing struggle between “centers of power” for resources and markets, which already requires effective measures to counter such a threat. .

Unlike the global nuclear threat, military threats of a local, regional scale have increased dramatically. Multilateral conflicts of varying degrees of intensity today occur in the Middle East (Israel, the Arab countries of North Africa, Syria, Mali, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran), in the recent past in the South of Europe (Yugoslavia and the post-Yugoslav countries), the difficult situation is South Asia (India — Pakistan) and a number of other regions of the modern world. Limited regional wars will obviously remain in the foreseeable future the most common form of inter-state armed conflicts. For Russia, Japan’s claims to the South Kuril Islands, as well as the non-recognition by Georgia of the outcome of the 2008 conflict of the year in South Ossetia, are the most framed threats of this kind.

In addition, as noted above, one of the most pressing threats to Russia's security is the increased expansion of the Salafi (Wahhabi) project to the “national” subjects of the Federation in the North Caucasus and the Volga region, as well as the threat of Islamic radicals invading from the republics of Central Asia. This project aims not only to isolate “Muslim” regions from Russia, to create Islamic “amirats” there with a “cleansing” of the non-Muslim population. The perennial problems accumulated in these regions: total corruption, cronyism, degradation of education and the social sphere in general, property inequality, underdevelopment of the manufacturing sectors of the economy and unemployment have become a breeding ground for political forces of an extremist type. After a surge in their activity in the 90-s, the new leadership of the country at the beginning of the 2000-s managed to bring down the "Wahhabi wave", but over the past three years, we have to state a new and abrupt increase in the activity of extremist movements and organizations under the banner of Wahhabism, which is served as "Islamic socialism". Unpleasant news the emergence of extremist gangs on the territory of the previously stable “Islamic” regions of the country: Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia - has become for the structures of the federal government. Not least due to the fact that the Salafi centers of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, during the “Arab spring” in Sudan, Egypt and Libya, having worked out the technologies of overthrowing unwanted regimes, they decided that they could easily repeat such “revolutions” in Russia, therefore, they have repeatedly increased funding for extremist organizations in Russia. In addition, there is a massive transfer of militants who have "released" after Libya and Egypt, the accumulation of weapons, taking control of local authorities and the seizure of spiritual centers. All this makes it possible to draw a conclusion about the inevitability of the escalation of terrorist activity in the region, up to its escalation into armed insurrection and sabotage war.

As a result of a systematic dynamic assessment of threats to the national security of the Russian Federation, it became possible to formulate three main scenarios of military conflicts in which our country may be involved over the coming 15-20 years.


SECTION TWO

CONFLICT SCENARIOS

A. “GREAT CONFLICT”

(NATO COUNTRIES, USA, JAPAN)

By its nature, such a war will be:

- high-intensity and high-tech, since each of the above countries will strive to deliver the first disarming strike with high-precision weapons to our strategic nuclear forces, reconnaissance, control and communications systems in space, air and on earth;

- with a massive use of conventional forces and equipment and precision weapons in the first echelon of the attack (on the principle of "all or nothing"), in the shortest time possible to defeat our troops and perform basic tasks before making a decision on delivering a nuclear strike and making it impossible or before the start of political negotiations.

At the same time, at a strategic level, such a conflict can be preceded by a period of growing conflict potential between countries, which will allow the forces and means of intelligence to promptly reveal military preparations and carry out the necessary mobilization measures.


B. SCENARIO OF THE “REGIONAL BORDER CONFLICT”

By its nature, such a conflict would be:

- transient, due to the limited military tasks, and the desire to solve them without drawing the opposing sides into a “full-fledged” war;

- local: the area of ​​hostilities will be limited to the framework of the immediate conflict zone (disputed territories, enclaves of residence of a particular nation, etc.).

At the same time, the beginning of the conflict can also be preceded by a noticeable period of growth of the conflict potential, which will allow Russia to make the necessary military preparations.


V. SCENARIO OF "INTERNAL MILITARY CONFLICT, COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATION"

By its nature, such a conflict would be:

- sluggish: the enemy will rely on sabotage the war and the tactics of "pinpricks", that is, the exhaustion of federal power structures with terrorist attacks and local strikes;

- long, because victory in such a conflict is possible only with critical fatigue of one of the belligerents, disillusionment with a view to the conflict of the population involved in it and isolation of the battlefield, blocking financial and resource sources that feed one of the parties to the conflict;

- not having full-fledged fighting.

At the same time, both at the beginning of such a conflict, and in the process of its development, Russia will have the necessary and sufficient possibilities for staffing troops conducting combat operations.

Thus, the complexity of the tasks of domestic military planning becomes obvious, since today we cannot, in principle, rank the existing threats to primary and secondary ones. the state of our Armed Forces is such that it only allows us to confidently enough solve the tasks of parrying a terrorist threat and is limited to a regional conflict.

Adequate response to the above threats requires active and proactive measures of military construction, the formation of standards of “wars of the new type” of the Armed Forces, the training of modern military personnel, and the development of new weapons systems. A special role in this belongs to science and the defense-industrial complex.

Under these conditions, the key problem is the timely opening and informing of the highest political leadership about the critical growth of existing conflict potentials at all levels long before the open confrontation stage, when the conflict is already entering an open phase and immediate mobilization of resources is required to resolve it.

The identification of threatening factors and tendencies at an early stage of conflict development will provide strategic time gain for the best preparation for such a conflict, initiatives in choosing the time, place, forces and means to resolve it.

The text of the current Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (paragraph 6-a), in particular, states that "a feature of modern military conflicts is the unpredictability of their occurrence." We consider this thesis to be unlawful and, moreover, untrue, representing all of world politics in the form of chaos of unreasonable and random events. Obviously, literally following this thesis sharply reduces the responsibility of the Russian intelligence community for proactive and systematic work to ensure advance warning of the threat of a sudden attack.

Meanwhile, an analysis of the activities of intelligence structures to reduce the surprise factor, which was so acute during the Second World War and later, up to the South Ossetian conflict 08.08.2008, deserves special attention and relevant practical recommendations.

Today in the United States has developed an organizational system of strategic warning, which operates continuously, regardless of the level of tension in the world. The final result of this system is the presentation to the President of the United States of consolidated analytical reports - “memorandums of warning about the threat of the United States”. These documents are prepared when a threat of armed conflict of various scale and nature arises: from local wars and military actions to nuclear missile war. In recent years, large-scale terrorist acts against the United States have been classified as particularly dangerous situations requiring special warning.

“Warning memorandums” are developed on the basis of a complete set of information that is available to all the competent authorities of this country, primarily the special services. Their training is carried out by a special division of highly qualified experts (the Strategic Warning Group), who have unrestricted access to secret materials of all departments and operating in the office of the US National Security Council. The group is organizationally “tied” to a special center for rapid processing of information for the needs of the US president, the so-called “room” of the White House. The continuous operation of such a unit is a stabilizing factor, because it gives the political leadership a reasonable assurance that no militarily dangerous actions by potential opponents will take them by surprise, and therefore the geostrategic initiative is in their hands.

Not much is known about the organization of purposeful work in the USSR, similar to the American strategic warning system. Such work was undoubtedly carried on, but it was not permanent, but occasional, i.e. Certain consolidated analytical documents relating to imminent military threats were occasionally reported “upward” jointly by all competent departments.

Perhaps the only exception is the situation of the 1970-X-80-s boundary, related to the deployment of Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles in the European part of the country and the NATO response measures to deploy American Pershing-2 missiles in Europe. The short flight time of these missiles to the most important targets on the territory of the USSR, including Moscow, to the 8-10 minutes made the Soviet leadership seriously think about the problem of advance warning of a military attack and a surprise factor.

The question arose about the mismatch of the capabilities of the radio intelligence equipment - in particular, the domestic missile attack warning system (EWS) - the real threat and organization of measures to counter this threat. The whole complex of technical means mentioned was under the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Defense and, following American terminology, provided only tactical warning, i.e. He reported on the expected place and time of the fall of the warheads of already launched enemy missiles. All this gave the country's leadership to analyze the situation and make a decision only a few minutes, which might not be enough to adequately respond to such a threat. Thus, it was recognized that the use of only technical means of intelligence could not provide the highest political and military leadership of the USSR with the necessary warning time.

As a result, a decision was made on the expediency of creating a unified information-analytical structure summarizing critical information coming from both the military and other competent agencies. This structure was to continuously evaluate the information coming to it, forming a strategic warning at the output, in other words, giving advance notice of the appearance of a real threat of a sudden attack, a critical increase in crisis, terrorist and other especially dangerous military-political situations.

Such a strategic warning center was created in 80-ies with the management of intelligence information of the First Main Directorate of the KGB (foreign intelligence). However, at the start of the 90s, this line of work was curtailed. This happened because of the rational explanation of the conviction of the then highest political leadership in the disappearance of any external threats for the country and the belief in the reliability of the newly found allies.

Today it has become quite obvious the urgent need for specific measures to limit the influence of the surprise factor on political decisions. A critical analysis of the American and Soviet experience in this area could be of some benefit. We are talking about the possible creation, under the leadership of Russia, of a certain analogue of the American information mechanism of strategic warning. This could be a center for crisis warning and analysis of the military-political situation closed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which can be deployed on the basis of the situation center of the Kremlin and organizationally included in the Security Council or the Presidential Administration.


SECTION THREE

Assessment of the past stage of military reform and the formation of new approaches in its improvement

The conduct of the previous stage of military reform was handed over to a narrow group of the former military leadership, and therefore depended critically on the degree of competence of only a few individuals. In such conditions, it was fundamentally impossible to avoid mistakes and serious miscalculations. Therefore, in our opinion, a comprehensive professional, public and national examination of the transformations is urgently needed.

To do this, first of all, it is necessary to form an interdepartmental expert commission in which to gather authoritative military commanders, military scientists, political scientists, and military experts who are entrusted with assessing the transformations already carried out and preparing proposals for correcting further actions in the framework of military reform. The non-secret part of their work should be submitted for public discussion, after which the competent state bodies, taking into account the views expressed, will take the final decision.

Of course, our efforts cannot anticipate or replace the results of such an expert commission, but we hope that the considerations expressed below will not be useless for its work.


ON THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF RUSSIA

Within the framework of this commission, making a proposal on the correction of military doctrine should be considered one of the key issues. The existing military doctrine is very vague and general in nature, and therefore does not allow effective preparation of the Armed Forces of Russia to neutralize and repel probable threats, since these threats themselves are conditional and imprecise. We need clear objectives set by the country's top leadership for practical steps in this direction. We need a military doctrine that will establish and rank the possible threats. Finally, it is necessary to determine which wars we should be prepared for within the framework of a single concept of national security. Should also be identified potential costs of the state to repel certain threats. Based on these calculations, it will be possible to determine which specific Armed Forces we need by the number of personnel, by the number and range of weapons and military equipment, by the stocks of various materiel, by the human resources of the mobilization component, etc.

ON THE CENTRAL BODIES OF MILITARY MANAGEMENT

One of the most important elements of the correction of the Military reform should be the restoration of the normal functioning of the main body of the strategic management of the Armed Forces - the General Staff. Today, the General Staff has essentially become a dispatch center for managing the life and activities of troops, which is forced to engage in virtually everything: from the flight timetable of military transport aviation to controlling the use of material resources. in parts. It is necessary to exempt the General Staff from the tasks unusual for it for the day-to-day command of the troops, transferring them to the types of Armed Forces and the branches of troops. It is necessary to return to the General Staff its main functions: forecasting the military-political situation, planning the use of the Armed Forces, conducting reconnaissance, planning and conducting special operations, monitoring the likely adversary, assessing threats, updating plans, monitoring their support.

Speaking about the correction of the reform of the management system, it is impossible not to say about the key element of this system, about personnel. The introduction of a three-year rotation of officers in the leading departments of the General Staff led to the fact that the quality of the performance of official and special duties for the positions held has decreased dramatically. This naturally affected the work of the General Staff as a whole. For example, to fully train a senior officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff to perform independent tasks requires at least five years. This approach was developed over decades of military construction and justified itself. At the same time, continuity remained, professionalism grew, and the quality of accomplishment of assigned tasks increased. We consider it necessary to return to this practice and restore the unique military caste — the officers-general officers, restore the personnel selection system to the General Headquarters, where the best of the best officers went.

It is also worth noting that the mixing of the functions of the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is erroneous, in which the latter assumed a number of troop command and control functions. All this led to the disorganization of the military command system as a whole.

We consider it necessary to clearly distinguish between the functions of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. The Ministry of Defense should focus on the problems of promising military construction, and control over its implementation. The ministry should be the main financier of defense works; act as a customer and controller of the production of weapons and military equipment (state defense order); develop a federal armament program; ensure mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The competence of the Ministry should also include the social protection of military personnel.

And the General Headquarters, we repeat, must once again become a full-fledged military command and control agency, carrying out strategic planning and organizing the use of the country's Armed Forces, ensuring their operational and mobilization training, intelligence activities in the interests of defense, developing a mobilization plan, measures for military registration and training of citizens for military service.

ABOUT OFFICERS

It is obvious that today the key issue for the further implementation of the Military Reform is the formation of an effective officer corps. Today, the officer corps, despite a serious increase in funding and a whole system of incentive measures, is in a state of deep crisis. There are not enough officers, their role in military teams does not correspond to the tasks. Their level of training (especially for junior officers) is often depressing. Unfortunately, all this is a consequence of mistakes made during the reform of the officer corps in 2008 – 12.

The basis of decisions on reform and mass cuts of officers was based on the idea of ​​a “correct proportional combination” in the form of the famous “Makarov pyramid”, which was based on junior officers, the middle was senior officers, and the top were generals. The personnel situation of the army, at which the number of officers in the rank of “major-lieutenant colonel”, exceeded the number of officers in the rank of “lieutenant-captain” was recognized as a distortion requiring correction. In this case, the US Army was cited as a model, where such a combination was “correct.” There was a mistake here. In making decisions on mass reductions, the real structure of the US armed forces was not studied, where the personnel of combat units and subunits really takes the form of the aforementioned “pyramid”, but without taking into account military command, support units and formations, as well as educational institutions. If we also take into account these structures, then practically the same personnel ratio arises as in the Russian Army before the reform. In addition, in the US Army, in addition to the regular army, thousands of senior officers also serve in the National Guard, in the US Army Reserve and in the military-industrial complex.

As a result, on the basis of erroneous or intentionally falsified source data, in 2008 – 2009. mass redundancies of the officers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were held, from where more than 180 thousands of people were fired. In the course of these cuts, additional serious mistakes were also made. An individual approach to the dismissal of officers was excluded. Instead, the formal-structural principle prevailed, under which not specific people were reduced, after assessing their need for the army, but entire structures in full composition. As a result, the army lost tens of thousands of highly trained officers with military experience and military awards of all levels. It is obvious that on this issue a serious correction of the changes made and the correction of the allowed distortions is necessary.

ON MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE FISSION

It is possible to recognize that the four-view structure of the Armed Forces existing today (the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, and the East Kazakhstani armies) is fully justified. However, in our opinion, it must be supplemented within the framework of this structure by the Main Commanders of the Armed Forces, as well as by the commands of the armed forces and to entrust them with full responsibility for the condition, construction, development, training and combat use of their subordinate forces. To reconsider the number of these governing bodies in view of the new tasks, subordinating to them the operational-strategic commands (USC) for the tasks outlined above.

Obviously, the existing military administrative division does not meet the challenges of our time, and it was done without taking them into account. So, the Eastern Military District today, for example, is “embedded” in two state federal districts, and includes virtually all of Eastern Siberia and the Far East. At the same time, in violation of all the "basics" of military construction, the district is forced to cover two strategic directions at once, which makes effective management of such a formation impossible. The same picture with the Central Military District.

Now the new operational command, in fact, are the "over-heavy" old military districts, with weakened military control bodies, but with new functions added. Each of the four operational commands combined two old military districts, two military air armies (now the combined commands of the Air Force and Air Defense), as well as one fleet (flotilla), and in the Southern Military District even two: the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian flotilla. At the same time, the staffs of the command and control staff of the operational command are two times less than they were in the military district before the reform, although the number of bodies under their control was three times larger. As a result, they turn out to be unable to effectively manage troops and accomplish assigned tasks, which each time was revealed during the exercises and maneuvers of recent years.

A critical situation has developed in the control system of disparate forces. Now, for unclear reasons, in each operational command, an add-on has been created from sea and aviation control, which in reality perform not managerial, but advisory functions, although command requires them to make decisions and work out combat documents. At the same time, the command of the fleets was to be abolished, and the leadership of the fleets was transferred to the management as part of the operational commands, whose staff increased by no more than 20%. If these plans were brought to the incarnation stage, fleet management would practically be lost.

In fact, after the abolition of the chief of the clans and types of troops, despite the declared unification under the unified command of heterogeneous forces, such integration did not occur. The fleets and commanders of the Air Force and Air Defense conduct combat planning independently, because their command controls simply do not have the necessary staff to solve these tasks in terms of quantity and quality.

In connection with the above, we consider it necessary to form five military districts: Western (headquarters - Moscow), Privolzhsko-Uralsky (headquarters - Yekaterinburg), North Caucasus (headquarters - Rostov-on-Don), Siberian (headquarters - Irkutsk) and Far Eastern (headquarters - Khabarovsk) - with the return of management functions to fleet headquarters. In the main strategic directions, commands must be created that are capable of solving all possible tasks: both on their own and with regard to reinforcement.

ABOUT GENERAL PURPOSES

The planned universal transition to the brigade structure of the Ground Forces over the past four years did not reveal its superiority over the previously existing divisional-regimental structure. At the same time, during the exercise, it became apparent that the brigade of the “new look” in its combat capabilities was about 2,5 times less than the “traditional” division. Also, the theses that the brigade structure simplifies the management of troops and increases their mobility have not been confirmed. In the presence of a brigade of heavy machinery, its maneuver can still be carried out only by rail or under its own power. The possibility of transporting light brigades with small arms through the air has been proven, but requires tremendous costs and the complete re-equipment of the existing military transport aircraft.

Brigade "new look" - weighted structure with unclear objectives. Obviously, the tasks of a combined arms formation are due to the presence in its composition of combined arms (tank, motorized rifle) units and units. World military experience, including the experience of the Soviet army, shows that the ratio of all-armed servicemen (motorized riflemen and tankmen) from 30% to 60% of the total personnel of the combined-arms unit (unit) is most effective for solving combat missions. Now, in the brigade, the number of combined-arms units is no more than 15%, and, taking into account the "incomplete", in some brigades - only 5%.

As a result, we received a combined arms formation, which can carry out artillery support and even anti-aircraft defense, but is not able to conduct a general combat battle.

It is obvious that within the framework of today's Ground Forces it is necessary to have a flexible structure that combines the advantages of all previously existing organizations and clearly link its tasks with the whole complex of probable military threats. So, against a technically equipped adversary with modern powerful armed forces, it is necessary to use a time-tested divisional-regimental structure. And in those areas where the enemy opposes us qualitatively weaker, or for operations to counter the terrorist threat, it is quite justifiable to form and use brigades.

It should be noted that the modern American division is at least equal in terms of its combat capabilities, and partially even surpasses our current operational formation, that is, the so-called “army” (operational command) of the “new look”! The modern structure of the Ground Forces in the army-brigade model due to the imperfection of the organizational and staff structures (the lack of a sufficient number of barreled artillery in both levels of military formations) does not allow with the necessary degree of efficiency to carry out the tasks of fire preparation of the offensive and defense.

In the Russian army, along with the existing brigades, the divisional structure should be revived - but in a new capacity, as the basis of the ground forces strike group. Divisions should be: permanent readiness, reduced staff and frame (storage base), and brigades: constant readiness and reduced staff.

The division of constant readiness in combat capabilities must exceed the existing and prospective US mechanized division, having an overwhelming superiority in opposing enemy aviation, in reconnaissance, in regrouping capabilities, including its own power, and in firepower. The number of constant readiness divisions should vary within 10-15 thousand people.

A permanent readiness brigade should remain in the structure of the armed forces, but should undergo significant changes to increase their combat power and ability to withstand the enemy air forces. Brigades can be used both to cover the state border in certain operational areas, and to solve problems in those operational areas where it is unlikely that a large-scale war will be launched involving significant forces of the aggressor (North Caucasus, the Polar Region, Karelia, Kamchatka, etc.).

The reduced-strength division is a combination of first-priority readiness, designed to increase the combat capabilities of the associations in repelling aggression during a local or large-scale war with a staff of officers, warrant officers, in the daily activities intended for staffing the regimental schools for military servicemen at the initial stage of training and improving the training of servicemen contract. The base staff consists of personnel officers and ensigns in key management positions who are in the second staff of the constant readiness division in order to organize day-to-day training activities in regimental schools, teaching positions and instructor positions, and carry out periodic rotational movements or in the process of promotion according to the results of training cadets, to other positions in the compound of constant readiness. This is a kind of additional theoretical training in these positions without interruption of part. The engagement of reduced-strength divisions, with their complete manning and deployment, conducting combat coordination during the month, and engaging in operational or strategic exercises, is carried out once in 3 of the year. The number of reduced-strength divisions in the structure of the Armed Forces must correspond to the number of permanent-readiness divisions and fluctuate within 10-15 thousand people.

The reduced-strength brigade is designed to increase the capabilities of the armed forces and special forces, it is deployed at the bases of formations and units of the armed forces and special forces, having a similar divisional structure and purpose divisions. The deployment of brigades, their combat coordination and involvement in various exercises are carried out in accordance with separate plans, but at least once in 3. The number of teams of reduced staff depends on the needs of the armed forces and special forces.

The division of the frame is a compound designed to compensate for losses during the fighting in a large-scale war or in a local conflict that threatens to escalate into such a war. The territory of the division is a platform for locating equipment and property, which is equipped on a site in the vicinity of the existing military base using plates and built canopies. Awnings are designed for sheltering vehicles from the weather, and to hide the true presence of equipment and its composition. On the territory of the base the property is stored on the personnel; Armament, ammunition loaded in technology. The base around the perimeter is equipped with a fence with video surveillance, alarms, installed remote machine gun installations.

The cadre division is guarded by a private military company, which, under an agreement with the Defense Ministry, provides base protection, monitoring the condition of the equipment, its periodic maintenance and testing in combat training conditions, and training the personnel at the training camp, including the officers coming from the reserve.

ABOUT MOBILIZED RESOURCE

The decision to virtually eliminate the mobilization component of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation should be considered strategically erroneous. Reflection of the full-scale aggression of a potential enemy, as well as the conduct of successful combat operations in local conflicts is impossible without the creation of an organized armed reserve. Such a reserve today is in all armies of modern developed countries. Therefore, we consider the inclusion of the mobilization component in the structure of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the resumption of military training for the subscription composition to be of critical importance. Victory in a large-scale war was never achieved solely by regular forces. The outcome of a war is always decided by the availability of prepared reserves.

ON MILITARY EDUCATION

The most serious correction of the military education system is needed. Today, an unacceptable gap has formed in this area. Under the creation of a new education department within the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the introduction of the post of “Deputy Minister of Defense for Military Science and Education”, it was decided in this department to combine applied military science, engaged in research of combat use, tactical maneuver, tactical and technical characteristics of various weapons and military equipment (13 and 30 NII Air Force, 1 and 2 Central Research Institute of the Navy, etc.) and directly military education, that is, military universities and academies. In fact, this led to the disruption works of special scientific research institutes, which now had to coordinate topics and tactical tasks with departmental officials who were far from this subject, being civilian officials and, as a result, evaded decisions on these issues.

The basis of the reform of military education was, for unclear reasons, the idea of ​​its “humanization” was chosen. It was decided to bring the system of education in military higher educational institutions as close as possible to civilian universities. As a result, a radical reorganization of the life and service of cadets took place. The curriculum was revised in the direction of reducing training time and self-training time, dozens of extra hours were introduced on humanitarian subjects instead of tactics, fire training and other special military subjects. As a result, poorly trained officers, whose professional level does not meet the requirements of the modern army, now come from military schools to the troops. An even more depressing picture is observed with post-graduate education. Instead of the “college – military academy – general staff academy” step system, a “course” system was introduced in which the officer had to undergo short-term “refresher courses” before being appointed to a higher position. So, officers for work in operational-strategic levels of management were trained in ten-month courses. The very first experience of using such a form of military education has shown that as a result, the army receives extremely knowledgeable, poorly trained middle and senior officers.

As part of the assessment of the past stage of the Military Reform, it is necessary to carefully study the situation with military education, and decide how necessary were the mergers of military universities to huge educational and scientific centers? What is the effectiveness of these mergers?

It is obvious that military schools should be returned to the types of the Armed Forces, for which they, in fact, train personnel. Four years of their separate existence in the status of the Department of Education of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation showed a serious degradation of military education, its separation from the needs of the troops.

It is also necessary to find out how justified and thoughtful were the decisions on the reform of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, the Academy of the Air Force. N.E. Zhukovsky and Yu.A.Gagarin, Military Academy. MV Frunze, Academy of East Kazakhstan region. G.K.Zhukova?

ABOUT OUTSORTING AND REAR

At the points of permanent deployment of troops, the outsourcing system of the rear was completely justified, since it relieves the soldiers from the work and outfits, but only if there is no corruption component (which is present almost everywhere). However, in the field, exercises, and, especially, in a combat situation, the outsourcing system is not able to work, which has been revealed by the practice of the last four years. Especially acute is the situation with the repair and restoration of equipment. Experimental exercises conducted in the Central Military District showed that Spetsremont (the OboronProm holding company, which is responsible for the repair and maintenance of equipment) cannot repair equipment in the field, and even more so — to evacuate it from under fire.

It seems logical to transfer landfills, shooting ranges, training centers and other training assets through outsourcing to specially created and legally approved private military companies that will be able to maintain the corresponding equipment and equipment at a high professional level. In addition to these duties, in the context of the unresolved question of the protection and defense of military camps, when compounds and units leave them, both during exercises and during combat operations, in order to prevent looting and the loss of stockpiles of weapons and other means, everyday peaceful life and in the conditions of hostilities, the protection of military camps and towns with the families of military personnel to impose established private military companies, which mainly will serve as retired military personnel.

This is a kind of solution to the social problem of dismissed servicemen. These same private companies in a war can also be used to solve other important tasks, from ensuring territorial defense to actions as part of guerrilla special units.

It seems necessary:

- restore the rear service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

- to restore military medicine, the hospitals destroyed and reduced during the last stage of the Military reform;

- to return the functions of management and sale of real estate of the Ministry of Defense to the Federal Property Management Agency of the Russian Federation in order to exclude the possibility of abuse;

- to transfer the enterprises carrying out repairs and maintenance of military equipment that are part of the Oboronservis holding company to the authority of the Main Command of the Armed Forces.

ON “KEY POINTS” OF MILITARY REFORM

Following the four years of the Military Reform, it can be stated that during the transformations a clear understanding of the mobilization component of the military construction of the Russian Armed Forces, the role and place of the mobilization structures in the military organization of the state was not formed.

The modern concept of warfare was never created and, as a result, the necessary reorganization was not carried out. In particular, a fundamentally new type of military force was not formed within the Russian Armed Forces - special operations forces and special operations command, as the most effective tool of the "new type" war.

From the attention of reformers fell the need for urgent modernization of the reserve management system of the country's strategic nuclear forces, as a key element of national security.

As before, the problem of forming a prepared and motivated modern officer corps is extremely acute.

The problem of forming a professional corps of junior commanders has not been solved. The solution of these systemic problems, in our opinion, will allow to neutralize the existing negative trends that today impede the effective reform of the Armed Forces of Russia.

MOBILIZING COMPONENT - MODERN APPROACHES

Modernization and transition to the modern Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, ready to repel full-scale aggression, to conduct successful combat operations in local conflicts, are impossible without the creation of an organized armed reserve. Even in those countries that proclaim non-interference and neutrality as their policy, as, for example, in Sweden, there is an armed reserve along with the country's armed forces.

The problem of creating an organized reserve in Russia has been acute since the first day of the creation of the armed forces of Russia, but it was inherited from the Soviet Army. Already in the 1980-s, the Soviet mobilization system for completing parts and formations, through military registration and enlistment offices, lost its effectiveness. An analysis of the ground forces training conducted in 1987 showed that mobilization manpower training exercises were foiled. Two regiments of the Siberian and Trans-Baikal military districts were deployed for almost three months instead of three days, while the percentage of discrepancies in military occupational specialties was 80%.

In 90-s, the system of work with an organized armed reserve (hereinafter - IAD) has not been revised.

In the 2000-ies with the advent of the units of constant combat readiness (CPG), IAD as such ceased to exist, its basis: the "cropped" parts and formations (which the reservists would have to do with the appearance of a military threat) donor parts for ctr. On the one hand, such an approach made it possible to maintain a high staffing level of the CNG and their constant combat readiness, on the other hand, in the event of a big war, there would be no one to take reservists in the reduced-personnel units, since the entire personnel had gone to re-staffing the CNC in the first hours of the war.

In the course of the military reform on the transition of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to a “new look”, a rational solution of the problem of IAD was proposed. It was proposed to transfer parts and formations of a reduced composition, the “frame”, to the subordination of the governors of the territories and regions (similar to the US National Guard system). It was proposed to conclude contracts with those who wanted them, according to which such “reservists” were supposed to arrive once a month for two-day fees, once every six months for weekly fees, and one month in a year to decrease for regimental / divisional exercises. Under his contract, the “reservist” would receive at least 10 thousand rubles per month of increase to the basic salary. In the event of war, units and formations were automatically reassigned to the command of the military district in whose territory they were located. The mobilization and recruitment offices, where the military commissariats would send servicemen registered for them, should have remained in the CHPG for internship in various positions. The principle of the internship is the same: 2 of the day — a week — a month, and the same contract would be concluded with the same remuneration.

But this proposal was not supported by the former leadership of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Instead, the reserve component was completely abolished in the “new look” of the Russian army by a willful decision. This reduction was justified by the erroneous thesis that the most efficient armies of the modern world (including and above all, the US Army) do not have an organized military reserve and conduct combat operations only with the existing Armed Forces. Parts and formations of a reduced composition — the frame was disbanded: just like most of the bases for storing weapons and military equipment. The military commissariats abolished the divisions and divisions responsible for the recruitment of personnel from the reserve. And for today the system of work with OVR is completely destroyed. It should be noted that none of the wars conducted by the United States in the last twenty years could not do without the broad involvement of the mobilization reserve. During certain periods (“Gulf War” 1991 of the year, the second Iraqi company 2002 of the year), the percentage of reservists in combat groups was up to 25% of the total number of personnel.

The Law of the Russian Federation On Military Reserve, adopted by the State Duma on December 19 of December X, is only an attempt - and not very successful - to solve the problems of IAD that had been going on since Soviet times.

Speaking of mobilization readiness, we argue that the concept of the previous stage of the Military Reform, based on the thesis of the absence of large-scale external threats and the likelihood of a surprise attack on Russia, was fundamentally erroneous. Under any of the possible war scenarios, Russia will have a certain time interval to prepare for war, sufficient for carrying out operational mobilization measures and building up its military groups to the required number. The main condition for the success of such a deployment will be the presence of a sufficiently prepared existing military reserve for such a deployment.

We would like to suggest the following approach to the formation of the Armed Forces and the National Military Reserve (NVR of Russia)

It is based on:

- on the new approach to the creation and maintenance of the National Military Reserve and including the existing army reserve, as well as the mobilization reserve of the first and second stage;

- on the new approach to the deployment of troops, including the joint deployment of formations and units of different readiness in some basic areas and the intensive and high-quality use of the entire material and training base;

- on a new approach to organizing training for young recruitment personnel and contract servicemen, as well as a new organization of the process of daily activities and combat training of formations and units;

- on the new approach to the acquisition, training and testing of combat readiness in the course of various in scale real, rather than ostentatious exercises. We believe that demonstration exercises and bringing tactical methods of using the troops to uniformity entail depriving commanders of their independence and individual initiative to develop new forms and methods of training troops, which means they will contribute to the defeat of our troops in upcoming military conflicts because of the enemy’s ability to anticipate our actions;

- on a new approach to the organization and provision of the territorial defense of the country, to the improvement of approaches to manning the troops;

- on the new approach to solving social issues of servicemen who have served their time in the personnel of the army and in the existing reserve.

In connection with the creation of the National Military Reserve, it is necessary to review the structure and functional responsibilities of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Main Directorate, who were previously responsible for mobilization issues, and in the interests of high-quality formation, arrangement, training of the National Military Reserve, including all types of armed forces Command of the national military reserve. In the formation of the central body of such a Command, as well as of the governing bodies and interaction in the field, it is envisaged to involve in their work officers who are behind the staff and / or laid off in the reduction of staff during the Military Reform. Thus, today we will provide the officers of the NVR Command with highly professional personnel and will reasonably use the current situation, when there are several tens of thousands of officers in the staff. The main tasks of the NVR Command will be the tasks of deployment, arrangement, recruitment, training, combat readiness, combat reconciliation, operational and tactical training of subordinate personnel and formations of the current and mobilization reserve of the army. The operational and operational-strategic preparation of formations of the Command NVR is assigned to the Main Command of the Armed Forces.

We propose the solution of the mobilization issue to be carried out in a complex, through basic districts, located mainly on the outskirts or within the territories of large (republican and regional significance) cities. The base areas should consist of a base area of ​​the compound (division) of permanent readiness, a base area of ​​the compound (division) of a reduced composition, staffed by the existing reserve army from the NVR, the base area of ​​the connection (division) frame, completed from the mobilization reserve NVR. The proposed approach should be applied to other types of the Armed Forces, the armed forces and special forces. Special operations of the probable enemy in the daily activities, during the period of danger and during the combat operations of the territories of the bases on which the families of military personnel will be located, and significant stocks of MTS, equipment repair and restoration, must be guarded and prevented, will be protected by private military companies established in Russia (PMC). Employees of private security committees can be dismissed officers, which will contribute to the social protection of this category of Russian citizens, increase the combat readiness of the formations and units deployed in the bases.

The approximate strength of the Armed Forces, in the event of a global war in modern conditions, can be estimated from 3 to 5 million people and more, taking into account the phased mobilization, the threats themselves and the combat power of the army. At the same time, a clear organization of the Armed Forces should be adopted in the state, including a regular army recruited by conscription and under contract; the regular reserve of the army, previously referred to as reduced units; and mobilization reserve, previously referred to as frame connections.

The size of a regular army should be at least 1% of the total population and fluctuate within 1,3 – 1,5 million. This is the minimum that allows both to maintain combat readiness, and to meet combat requirements for solving emerging problems, including repelling the enemy’s large-scale sudden first strike, which is no longer considered impossible under the conditions of development of high-precision weapons and new weapons systems.

The national reserve of the army must be calculated from the probable threats in this strategic direction, and its strength depends on the number of vehicles stored in the reduced units. A distinctive feature of the National Reserve from the mobilization is that the monthly reserve of reservists is 25 -30% of the allowance of military personnel in accordance with the position held and 100% when participating in exercises and trainings. In the case of conscription for completing regular units in the case of combat operations in the course of the KTO, the calculation is made as with regular troops, increasing the required amount of money three times, and possibly more.

Under the National Army Reserve is meant the part of the personnel that has entered into a contract for a fixed term, serving under a contract and holding positions in reduced numbers, but working in its civilian specialties in the civilian sector. Acquisition of the existing reserve is carried out by conscripts who have served active duty, contract servicemen who have completed contract service in the units of permanent readiness and expressed a desire to continue service in the existing reserve. In order to ensure the social status of military personnel in the reserve in their interests, a special provision is developed on service, monetary compensation and other benefits. Parts of the reduced composition are placed on the territory of the military base together with the division of constant readiness, and are brought to combat readiness on its base at the time specified by the combat use plan. The entire commanding staff of the reduced division at the same time, in its specialty, is also a teacher in the regimental schools of the division of constant readiness. For eight months, he is engaged in the preparation of military servicemen for the initial training programs in the military specialty, and two months a year, every three to five years, he carries out combat coordination of his units in the course of their deployment to wartime states. Additional retraining of personnel of reduced units at special gatherings is carried out according to separate plans, and is carried out after receiving new or upgraded equipment samples to the subunits.

In the past, the main criticism of such compounds was put forward on issues of loss of qualification of the officer corps, the poor state of technology and was rated as "non-readiness". There are, as a rule, several reasons for this, but the main one is in the absence of regulatory funding for all the activities envisaged by the plans. In modern conditions, officers of reduced units are regularly involved in teaching subjects in their specialties, rotated with officers of constant readiness division in order to improve their education and skills in training personnel, have the opportunity to raise their level of education in military academies and in various courses.

The number of mobilization reserve can range from 3 to 5 million people, and depend on the availability of military equipment stored in bases and warehouses, on the industry’s ability to increase the output of military equipment in a special period and in the course of an armed conflict, on the need to complete the reserve component or deploying local self-defense detachments to perform the tasks of the country's territorial defense.

The Army Mobilization Reserve means a part of the personnel that is registered with the military and has served a fixed time in the active army and in the existing reserve of the army and has not reached the age limit for military registration and is divided into the first and second reserve. The reserve of the first stage is attached to the frame connections, and the reserve of the second stage is intended for retrofitting of the connections and units that suffered losses during combat operations. Retraining, improvement of skills, retraining on a new mobilization reserve equipment is carried out once a year for one month on the basis of regimental schools of permanent readiness divisions, and exercises are held once every three years for three months.

Under the mobilization reserve of the first stage is understood as the number of frame connections determined by the states, geographically located in military bases together with the units of reduced composition and units of constant readiness.

For the organization of territorial defense units, it is necessary to restore the military commissariats with the expansion of their functions by placing on their basis the units and subunits of the cadre provided with the necessary equipment and weapons. The service of officers in these structures is carried out after retirement from the active army and being in reserve up to the age limit for military registration (up to 60 years), and the personnel are supplied from local resources. This will ensure the social protection of the dismissed officers, provide them with jobs at the same or newly elected place of residence; will solve the problems unsolvable under the existing system by providing housing and increased land for households. This approach will solve the main issue of ensuring the territorial defense of the country. The structure of such parts and units of the frame - in accordance with a separate justification.

MODERNIZATION OF THE RESERVE SYSTEM OF MANAGEMENT BY STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AS A BASIS FOR NATIONAL SAFETY

The main task of managing at a strategic level is to ensure the execution of the right of the President as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the country to make decisions on the use of nuclear weapons. This is the most important task, which all duty shifts of the central command post of the General Staff are aimed at. The basis of the command and control system in top management is the protected points of government and the Armed Forces. This system was built in Soviet times and is still in operation. Recent trainings have confirmed its high efficiency, but it also needs modernization.

Speaking about the use of nuclear weapons, it is impossible not to raise the topic of the conditions for their use. There are only three options: pre-emptive, retaliation and retaliation. In this case, the main option for the use of nuclear weapons for the Russian army is a retaliatory strike. The main condition for the possibility of such a strike is the presence of a stable reserve command and control system. That it guarantees today the national security of Russia.

Therefore, we would like to draw particular attention to the state of the reserve system of management of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation, a system that allows even when we are preemptively attacked and our main command posts and control centers of the Strategic Nuclear Forces are destroyed, to retaliate against the enemy with unacceptable for him the damage. Today, this system, which is the most important for state security, as noted above, is in a stable working condition, but it requires a planned modernization and extension of service life.

Such modernization is designed to strengthen the possibility of bringing the orders of combat control of the Strategic Nuclear Forces to boats, aircraft and launchers of the Strategic Missile Forces in any conditions. Such a system alone allows us to free up funds for the modernization of other systems that are less important in strategic terms. Covering the country at a strategic level, guaranteeing yourself from a surprise attack, you can then engage in a tactical element.

PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT OF FORCES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF RUSSIA

The closer the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), announced by Washington for 2014, the more dangerous the situation in Central Asia becomes. And the unification of Afghan tribes under the rule of radical Muslim parties, under the control of the Taliban, suggests in the very near future not organized, but organized threat of export of Islamic extremism and drugs of the opium group in the territory of the CSTO countries, Iran, and therefore Russia. And this threat will not come from a weakened and fragmented tribal strife, but from a holistic, intensifying and hostile Afghanistan.

Now much is said about the "network-centric" wars. But unfortunately, only a few countries possess the appropriate technologies of combat operations.

In the concept of a “new type of war”, special forces, as one of the component parts of special operations forces and as a body capable of independently obtaining and implementing information received or acquired, will play a major role in ensuring the national security of Russia.

If we evaluate the experience of countries that are actively engaged in military operations in various regions of the world, then it is quite obvious that all of them attach great importance to their Special Operations Forces (MTR). Such commands today are created in almost all the leading armies of the world and are constantly evolving. So, for example, the USA strengthens the military intelligence service of the RUMO with the agent component - with the task of providing its SSO with reliable and timely information from the “ground” for its use in the right place and at the right time.

The advantage of the SSO, or, in our terminology, “special forces” - lies primarily in the fact that it can successfully act both in large-scale war and in local armed conflicts, following the example of Afghanistan, or provide counter-terrorist operations. In other words, the Special Operations Forces and their component, “special forces”, is a universal offensive weapon. The country and the army that owns these weapons will always have an advantage over an adversary who does not have one.

Today in the Russian Armed Forces there is an urgent need to create a single Special Operations Command (CSR) with the subordination of special operations forces: special forces, "special forces". When creating CSR, one should proceed from the assessment of the likely adversary and the nature of future armed conflicts. CSR should be able to plan and carry out operations in an armed conflict or in a local (regional) war and at the same time actively participate in one or two counter-terrorist operations without attracting additional forces and means, and reserve formations of CSR should be involved only at the final stage. In a “big war”, CSR should perform tasks independently, but reinforcement should be carried out by attracting reserve formations and mobilization deployment. Such an approach determines the basis for the formation of a CSR structure, determining its composition and combat capabilities, the chain of command, and the order and amount of funding to complete the entire set of tasks.

The creation of the Special Operations Command is not just the formation of an additional body of military control and the transfer of some units to it, but the creation of a full-fledged offensive branch of the troops, which has not been fully present in the structure of the Russian Armed Forces.

With the general change in the nature and methods of warfare, methods of non-lethal impact on countries and people, the scale of the use of troops and armaments, approaches to army structures are changing. The United States, Great Britain and other countries, having intelligence as a type of offensive weapon, have long ago decided on the ways and means of its development and improvement, while in this matter, following a defensive strategy, we are far behind only because intelligence cannot be defensive.

Intelligence today is an offensive tool in the hands of a politician and a military leader.

The growth of technical intelligence capabilities and the reduction of the information received into a single stream require new approaches, both to military intelligence structures (part / operational command) and to strategic intelligence structures, which include parts of special forces. The creation of the Special Operations Command will make it possible to solve a whole stratum of unsolvable tasks in modern conditions facing both the Russian Armed Forces as a whole and directly to intelligence. This will make it possible to create a fundamentally new kind of troops for Russia, combining various yet separate structures in it and creating new ones that have no analogues in the world.

The concentration of special reconnaissance forces (reconnaissance / destruction) and other structures necessary to perform special tasks, preparing and equipping them with uniform requirements, using under a single command, will allow you to have the strength and means to perform almost all of the priorities in a limited time, large-scale war in any strategic direction.

In the conditions of the emergence of non-traditional ways of waging war (counter-terrorist operations, “color revolutions” that have grown into armed confrontations like Libya and Syria) it is necessary to use the whole complex of special operations forces and means as the best tool in the fight against militants: in real time and with real results. The experience of Syria shows that any armed confrontation must be localized by decisive actions at the very beginning, preventing its expansion. And the most effective weapon for these purposes are the special forces.

In addition, their use will make it possible to fully organize, ensure and conduct strategic and special reconnaissance: both in a threatened period and at the initial stage and in the course of an immediate armed conflict or large-scale war with sufficient quantities and means.

Developing and introducing tactics and strategies for the use of special forces, as well as other structures of special operations, CSR should lead the conduct of offensive operations, the organization of insurgent, guerrilla and sabotage and terrorist activities in the territories and in the rear of potential enemies. And also, taking into account the received own experience and studying the experience of other countries, to carry out the development, implementation and provision of special forces with the latest weapon systems, the development and use of these weapons and reconnaissance systems directly during participation in hostilities. Not only personal courage and courage, but also the superiority of technical equipment will contribute to the implementation of its combat missions by special forces.

With a single centralized approach to staffing, training, deployment, deployment, ensuring the subsequent use of personnel after serving in the army, the command of special operations on the basis of full cooperation with the structures of Russian private military companies (after the adoption of the relevant law) will have a mobilization force that is constantly ready for combat use. the reserve necessary for the guaranteed performance of the tasks.

CSR, by decision of the country's leadership, will be able to assist our foreign allies in ensuring their national security, in the fight against terrorism and international crime. This will allow organizing and conducting operations to provide humanitarian assistance, as well as search and rescue operations, thereby preventing the spread of terrorist acts to the territory of Russia.

Given the trends in the development of modern warfare, where organizational and information weapons play a significant role, CSR, interacting with the Foreign Ministry and other security forces, will be able to participate in special psychological operations, informational operations and operations that prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

CSR, possessing the advantages listed above, as well as the advantages not mentioned in the text, will significantly increase the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces of Russia, increase the security and defense might of our state.

An important factor in deciding on the creation of a Special Operations Command is the issue of its status and subordination, which largely determines the military effectiveness of the organization. Given the accumulated experience of special operations, it seems most appropriate to subordinate the Special Operations Command not to the GRU, but to the Minister of Defense through the Chief of the General Staff, and use it only by personal order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, that is, the President of the Russian Federation. The advantages of this approach are obvious: this is an increase in the status of the newly created management structure, a reduction in the managerial component, the possibility of allocating targeted funding and, importantly, personal responsibility.

The structure of CSR itself should provide a solution to the whole range of current and future tasks, that is, in peacetime or in a threatened period, independently, or in cooperation with security forces (FSB, MIA, MES, etc.) to carry out the necessary counter-terrorist operations in the country and for its outside, if necessary - in conjunction with Russian PMCs.

Cooperation with the latter will make it possible to exert influence in any part of the globe where Russia's interests are affected and at the same time to maintain a capable and ready-made reserve for CSR.

During military conflicts, CSR and its subordinate forces should be used as an integral part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Such an approach, in our opinion, most fully meets the challenges that will soon face the Russian army and the country as a whole.

ON THE REFORM OF DRY FORCES

The deployment of the Armed Forces should be consistent with the solution of the tasks assigned to them for the near and medium term, and also provide cover for the main operational areas for the subsequent creation and deployment of the necessary groups of troops.

The deployment of formations and units in large garrisons, in the so-called military army bases, makes it possible to concentrate troops and reduce the costs of their deployment and maintenance. However, this approach requires additional costs for the complete equipment of the military base, including the deployment of personnel, the creation of a single fleet for the storage of military equipment and a single military training ground. At the same time, the proximity of military families to major cities will contribute to providing them with jobs and solving a number of social problems (education, health, cultural leisure, etc.).

Picking the first time is permissible according to a mixed principle (conscription plus contract service) and may differ for different categories in terms of service life and benefits received. Gradually, the troops should go completely to the contract.

The recruitment of officers should be carried out on a voluntary contract basis with a service life up to the established age limit with the possibility of extending the term for various popular categories of military personnel. Military ranks are assigned in accordance with the current categories and include junior, middle and senior officers.

The recruitment of a category of ensigns, after this category is returned to the Armed Forces, should be carried out on a voluntary basis on the principle of recruiting officers with the approval of a list of relevant benefits. To replace the main sergeant posts and part of the posts directly assigned to this category, military rank of ensign, ensign, and senior ensign must be introduced. Assignment of military rank occurs after training in the appropriate military school under the program provided for this category. The term of study is from three (in the presence of higher or secondary special education) to six months (in the presence of full secondary education). It should be possible to fill this category of lower officer posts after training in a short-term course at a relevant military school. The conclusion of the contract for ensigns is set for a five-year term with the possibility of extending the contract.

Recruiting sergeants category. For military service positions, conscripts who have undergone military service should be appointed, as well as military personnel who signed the first contract for three years, retrained in their chosen specialty at a military school during the 2-6 months and successfully passed the final examinations. This is due, on the one hand, the opportunity to use the existing bases of military schools, and on the other - the specificity of training in each specialty. The sergeant is assigned the primary rank of “junior sergeant”, and during the service he has an incentive to increase his rank, including including an increase in salary (annual additional payments). The military rank of "sergeant" is awarded at the conclusion of the second contract for three years with an increase in salary and obtaining additional benefits. The military rank of "senior sergeant" and "foreman" is assigned in the same way after signing the third and fourth contracts. For a senior officer, after two years of service, a military rank of ensign can be given the rank with an increase in salary and benefits. It is also necessary to provide for the possibility of transition from the category “sergeant” to the category “ensign” after appropriate retraining.

The current approach to defining salaries, their growth, receiving additional payments and especially privileges in the modern army requires careful processing and clarification. In our opinion, it does not allow for qualitative selection of personnel, does not form incentives for service and for growth in military posts, that is, it does not contribute to the development of military skills, and therefore to increase the combat readiness of the Russian army.

Recruiting categories of soldiers. It should be carried out both by conscription and by contract. In Russia in the near future it is necessary to leave a mixed system of recruiting the army. The invocation system allows you to conduct high-quality training mobilization reserve, sending after military service personnel or on the contract or in the existing reserve. This should happen voluntarily.

The service life of conscription in modern conditions should be one year, but the intensity of training and combat training should be radically strengthened. This is the most pressing issue in discussions about the impossibility of training a soldier in one year and the impossibility of staffing brigades, which means their lack of readiness. Indeed, brigades with such a lifespan will not be ready, and a period of one and a half years will not solve this problem, since there will always be a shortage of more than 30% in the brigade, especially taking into account the vacations of officers and military personnel under the contract. Adding here still temporary and current incomplete sets, we again receive the staffing of the brigade not higher than 60%.

The contract service requires separate justification and extended consideration, especially in terms of providing money allowances, providing various benefits and advantages, determining the minimum and maximum service life in the current army, staying in the existing reserve and stock. An important role will be played by deciding on the future employment of a soldier under a contract, who served as a full-time officer for the entire service life (up to 35 years) and has an even larger temporary reserve for service in an organized reserve (up to 45 years for an ordinary position) and in the reserve (up to 60 years). Private military companies can also play an important role here, the need for the creation of which in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense has already been mentioned.

Ensuring constant combat readiness is achieved by the following measures:

- the presence in the structure of the Armed Forces of divisions and brigades of constant readiness. This will allow, even with partial non-availability of one of the three regiments, to consider the division fully operational;

- the presence of a reserve division in the structure of the Armed Forces;

- the reinstatement of the institute of ensigns in the army with a revision of the list of positions to be replaced, conditions of service, benefits, growth of titles and money allowances;

- revision of the forms of training of military personnel in the training units, disbanding the district training centers, and on their basis forming military units. For training within four months of the incoming military personnel in selected military specialties, return to brigade and battalion brigade (battalion) training schools. The officers-teachers of these schools on the combat schedule and in the intervals between teaching and holiday must fulfill their duties in accordance with the purpose of the reduced divisions, participating in the exercises with the involvement of an organized reserve. Plans, schedules, and everything connected with it, make no trouble. The peculiarity of service in such schools is determined by the special situation and the need for growth, so the officers are moved from school to military units and back. Thus, a company commander and an abbreviated regimental commander can be a teacher, which qualitatively enhances the initial knowledge of the incoming draftees.

- with such an integrated approach to recruiting and training in a division, two brigades (in a brigade there are two battalions, in a battalion two companies) will always be fully operational, and one partly. Partial combat readiness of this brigade (battalion, company) will be due to the absence of two to three days of young recruiting, the young replenishment from the first two weeks of skills in a single training, and during the remaining three months its combat readiness will constantly increase. The bulk of the vacations of officers are distributed so as to invest in four months of the immediate training of soldiers in the school. In the event of a sudden exacerbation of the situation, officers of training schools replace vacant posts, and personnel are called up from the current reserve, the arrival of which may be limited to 10-24 for hours.

- a temporary shortage in officers, warrant officers when they are discharged on leave from any military unit, or for some other reason, if necessary, is replaced by school officers, and contract servicemen are replaced by the call of an organized reserve.

Such an approach would solve a major and unsolvable yet under the current approach to the organization of training and daily activities of the army, the problem with the combat readiness, training, combat capability, combined units and units of the army.

In order to solve this problem it is necessary:

- abandon two periods of combat training, going to the annual cycle of continuous training of a particular compound or unit, removing the preparatory periods and everything connected with it;

- to transfer equipment to various modes of operation in a planned manner by the forces of the outsourcing repair teams and the respective crews without stopping the training process;

- landfills, shooting ranges, training centers and other property transfer outsourcing specially created and approved in accordance with the law by the President of the country to private military companies that are able to carry out maintenance of appropriate equipment and machinery in a professional manner.

Direct training of conscripts may be as follows.

Primary general training the recruit is happening in the school or in the DOSAAF, and where will allow the placement of reserve forces - and on their basis, in their free time or in the evening.

Initial military training for a conscript soldier in a military unit or training unit must be carried out within four months of training, including two weeks of solitary training.

General training in the military specialty includes the training of a conscript and the improvement of the skills of a contract serviceman. After that, the soldier enters the unit, he is given weapons, equipment, and he does not part with the remaining service time. In future classes, which include: stage combat coordination in the crew - 1 month, in a platoon - 1 month, as part of a company - 1 month, a battalion - 1 month.

The final preparation during combat coordination, which includes training conscripts and improvement of skills of a soldier under contract, may consist of training in the regiment - 2 months in the division - 1 month, as part of the army - 1 month.

A preliminary calculation of the new approach to organizing combat training outlined 27 as the main topics for complex preparation of only the squad (crew) that must be learned at the first stage of the general squad preparation. Therefore, during the month of free time a soldier can only stay for the maintenance of equipment on Saturday and rest on Sunday - rest of the time will be occupied by complex classes that include tactics and firepower, and engineering training, and all other items not in isolation, but in complex.

In this way, as one of the main ones, the question of hazing and non-statutory relations among the military team can be finally resolved.

Later, these same themes are fulfilled already in the platoon, company, battalion, brigade (regiment), division and army, in cooperation with other departments, units and formations.

Thus, for the military man of fixed-term service during the year all topics are completely closed, working out not theoretically “on the fingers”, but in practice “in the field”. Such an intensity of combat training, on the one hand, is guaranteed to allow the soldier to master his specialty in full, and on the other hand, he will not allow this soldier to be called up for training for the next five years.

But such intensive training, without which the army is not an army, already requires a different approach to the deployment of troops, the equipment ranges and shooting ranges, to the functioning of the administrative apparatus, to the operation of service structures to DIC operation, performing timely repair, modernization of old equipment and the delivery of troops new equipment, as well as solving many other problems.

As the completion of the operational and combat training, during, hosts a variety of scope, time, place and method (both independently and with the assistance of additional forces and equipment) passing a year at the call service soldier and a soldier under contract for one year:

- tactical and special tactical exercises in the squad, platoon, battalion company, regiment;

- operational and tactical exercises in the division;

- operational exercises in the army.

Participation in operational-strategic exercises is carried out according to a separate plan and can occur both during the fixed-term service (contract) period and during the period of being in an organized reserve.

Feature combat coordination in the framework of the new approach is that the soldier fulfills the elements of tactical training in collaboration with other disciplines in the form of tactical training on all possible variants of warfare.

The second feature is that during combat training, all practical actions are worked out on standard equipment “in the field” after working them out on stands, programs, simulators.


SECTION FOUR

PERSPECTIVE MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES AND WARS OF THE FUTURE

Speaking of promising military technologies, it should be noted that it would be erroneous to try to re-equip our army "with all and at once." This is not only unnecessary, but also unwise. Upgrading weapons is not a one-time act, but a continuous process. And there is no point in seeking to fully re-equip our army in five years or even a decade. Decommissioning of obsolete weapons systems and replacing them with new ones - this option is the least burdensome for the national economy and the most capable of holding a high level of modern arms without sharp jumps update / obsolescence.

Of course, military technologies largely determine what the future military operations, their tactics and strategy, the forms and methods of warfare will be.

Therefore, by studying the possibilities offered by promising military technologies, it is possible to determine the direction of the development of military affairs, and the nature of future armed clashes.

Future military technologies can be divided in terms of lead time, or, in other words, the expected time of their possible practical implementation with the entry of appropriate weapon systems into the troops. There are three such categories.

A) The nearest, almost completed, being, conditionally, at the final stage of the standard innovation cycle, i.e. at the final stage of development work (R & D), are being tested and tested. Their mass admission to the troops has already begun, or may begin in about the next five to seven years.

B) Medium-term, which are still at the stage of basic research, or are moving to the stage of research and development (R & D). Their operational readiness can be reached by about 2030 year.

C) Long-term, still in a state of hypotheses, assumptions, i.e. represent, in fact, science fiction. Materialization of such ideas, if possible, then not earlier than 2050 of the year and beyond, until the end of the century. It is important to pay attention to the word "scientific", in other words, these hypothetical constructions, although they look fantastic, but, nevertheless, do not contradict the fundamental laws of physics.

Military technology of the near future

Regarding the nearest military technology (category A). Their real use in local armed conflicts can be seen today.

The history of the question is approximately as follows. From the beginning of the 2000-ies, the budget of the United States Department of Defense has featured the Future Combat System program, which is rolling over from year to year. The purpose of the program, as well as a host of related routines, - the development of methodologies and appropriate technical means to unite all participants in combat operations in the theater of war into a single informative and command network, thereby ensuring the new capabilities of the armed struggle, increase combat effectiveness and troops and weapons mobility , up to the individual soldiers. As a result of long-term and consistent work, essentially a qualitatively new look has been created for the US Army and Navy, which received, above all, the latest communications and control systems and powerful strike weapons.

The main directions of further development:

- deepening and improving the methodology of information support and command and control of troops, especially by aerospace and aircraft carrier strike groups, i.e. putting into practice the long-established CI-Cub-Ai principle (unity of monitoring, communications, control and intelligence), when all information flows are tied into one node and the combat is managed in real time, remotely and from a single center;

- the creation of a new robotic military equipment (from unmanned aerial vehicles - UAVs, to distance-controlled robots, "infantry" and robots, combat vehicles). All this today is actually used by the American army in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is also being actively developed by other countries of the world. UAVs, for example, are being developed by dozens of states today, several dozen models adopted for service are already known. China, Israel, Iran and others are paying special attention to this topic, which cannot be said about Russia;

- the development of a variety of high-precision strike weapons, operating according to the “shot and forget” principle.

A separate topic is the finishing tests of already completed scientific programs. Today these are:

- Ultra-speed controlled unmanned aerial vehicles. The current generation of UAVs, as noted above, has already ceased to be something unusual in the conduct of modern warfare. At the same time, air defense weapons today quite confidently intercept the entire spectrum of aircraft at altitudes up to the border of the stratosphere. Therefore, the United States is actively developing new impact hypersonic stratospheric and trans-atmospheric aircrafts, against which no effective air defense systems exist yet. Such an American drone, X-37 is already undergoing tests and its entry into service is expected by the 2020 year;

- microwave, kinetic and laser weapons. The United States and Israel have been conducting extensive research in the field of creating combat lasers, kinetic guns, and microwave installations for many years. Today, prototypes of this weapon are undergoing laboratory tests and their appearance in arsenals is possible already in the course of the next decade.

Medium term military technology

Medium-term future military technologies (category B) are now determined mainly at the stage of fundamental scientific research, i.e. before the stage of applied research and OCD. For an assessment of their expected fighting characteristics while there is no necessary actual material. Nevertheless, certain considerations about the essence of future trends can be made now.

It is important to note that almost all new technological developments, as a rule, have a dual, civil-military purpose. Prospective studies are always focused on the search for new effects and patterns. The definition of specific areas of their application, whether military or civil, occurs later.

Briefly about some of the developments in this category.

- Robots. In the United States, Japan and some European states are more and more large-scale research work on the creation of a wide range of remote-controlled automated devices that simulate the physical, verbal and even human intellectual activity, including a soldier. There are well-known advanced programs for the development of “artificial militants”: from infantry robots to battlefield reconnaissance robots adapted for solving various combat missions. The tested models have different dimensions, ranging from a few centimeters to a half to two meters and more. Active work is also being done to give robots the ability to distinguish between voice and visual commands and to operate to a certain degree autonomously, sometimes in accordance with very complex behavior algorithms;

- Minibots and cyborgs, i.e. combination of a living being and a mechanism. In particular, now go study cyborg-insects (bees, wasps, butterflies, etc.) In the United States, created by implanting them in the body of subminiature nanoelectronic transmitters. With the help of such devices, it is supposed to carry out reconnaissance and search for enemy forces at a distance, as well as selectively strike — for example, with potent poisons — certain people whose “electronic portrait” is pre-introduced into the memory of these cyborgs;

- Genetically engineered weapons, resulting from the decoding of the human genome with the identification of supposedly significant differences in the details of the gene structures of people of different nations and races. Search on this basis for methods of selective physical destruction of "unwanted human material" of certain categories. Biological weapons, as is well known, are prohibited by the relevant international convention, but information about research of this kind, however, sometimes appears in the global mass media;

- Medical cloning, copying and changing the life of a person. Relevant studies are conducted in a variety of areas. Invented, for example, the method of reverse reprogramming the temporary vector of growth of body cells (from the adult state - back to youth) and obtaining individual stem cells using the biomaterial of adults. The discovery was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine for the 2012 year. It opens the way to the advance cultivation of “copies” of human internal organs based on his own biomaterial and their safe, without rejection of transplantation, i.e. to regular rejuvenation by surgery of the main human organs. Similar work is being carried out today in our country (biological and physical faculties of Moscow State University, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, etc.) within the framework of such a direction as biophysics;

- Remote impact on the Earth’s ionosphere by radio waves of the microwave range and the creation of long artificial plasma formations. Here, first of all, the American HAARP program (High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program) and the large research radio-engineering stand in Gakon (Alaska) created within its framework deserves attention. According to experts, in the course of the program have been received effects, allowing to speak about the actual creation of systems of geophysical weapons capable not only violate the (blocking) radio, radar, disable the on-board electronics of spacecraft, missiles, aircraft and ground-based systems, but also provoke large-scale accident in electric grids, oil and gas pipelines, have a negative impact on the biosphere, including the mental state and health of the population of whole, including very remote from the United States and regions. The program of creating electromagnetic weapons, samples of which in the United States have been tested and used, in particular, during the war in the Balkans, is closely related to this area;

- Cavitation-vortex technology for processing liquid media (KVO-technology) was developed by a group of domestic specialists. Using it, it is possible to separate mixtures of liquid components that are resistant to decomposition or, conversely, to obtain stable solutions of difficult-to-mix liquids. A series of experimental installations was built.

Military technology of the distant future

Long-term military technologies (category B) now belong, rather, to the science fiction genre, i.e. not contrary to the known laws of natural science. In 2008, a book of American physicist of Japanese origin, Michio Kaký, “Physics of the Impossible”, was published in the USA. The stated goal of the book is "to consider those technologies that today seem to be" impossible ", but in a few tens or hundreds of years they may become common." The main thesis is “any impossibility is relative.” The author divided the subject of his study into three categories.

Impossibility of the 1 class, i.e. that which may become a reality already in this century or, perhaps, in the next, perhaps in a modified form. These are radiation weapons, teleportation, antimatter engines, some forms of telepathy, telekinesis, invisibility and some others.

The impossibilities of the 2 class are technologies that have only recently emerged at the forefront of our understanding of the physical world, and their realization can take thousands of years. These include time machines, the possibility of hyperspace travel, parallel universes.

The impossibilities of the 3 class include such technologies that violate the known physical laws. They turned out to be very few, the author identified only two: the perpetual motion machine and the prediction of the future.

Today, some scientific work related to solving the problems of the “impossibilities of the 1 class” has gained some fame. In relation to the problem of invisibility, this is the work of Professor VG Veselago (MIPT), as early as 1967, predicted the possibility of creating a superlens with a negative refractive index based on the so-called metamaterials. Later, these ideas were picked up in the USA and the first samples of such materials were created there, which opens up the possibility of creating invisible cloaks in the foreseeable future. It should be noted that from the physical point of view, the invisibility in the optical range does not have any fundamental differences from the invisibility in the radar range resulting from the use of the well-known Stealth technology - the difference is only in the wavelengths of the corresponding electromagnetic radiation.

There is also information about some very promising scientific works on the problem of telepathy, performed in the USSR, as well as in the USA. Research on this subject in the West continues, albeit without much publicity.

Of particular interest from a military point of view are also experiments at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) near Geneva (Switzerland). It was repeatedly suggested that, along with the stated program of experiments aimed primarily at finding the “particle of God” Higgs boson, the goal of researchers with such a powerful mechanism as the LHC is to study the possibility of creating and using “microscopic black holes” and high-energy subatomic particles capable of changing the properties of space-time.

New military technology and science

Fruitful work on the creation and introduction of new military technologies requires a radical change in the attitude towards science as such.

It is almost universally recognized that today mankind is on the downward wave of the Fifth (Information) Global Technological Structure (GTU), which is based on computers, telecommunications, the Internet, microelectronics, robotics and similar directions. As it was said above, the technologies corresponding to this structure find active military application today. However, one should not expect qualitatively new, breakthrough military technologies in the Fifth Order, and the technological approaches associated with the formation of a new, Sixth Global Technological Way will be determining for the next quarter of a century. In this regard, the following choice of areas for further domestic military-technological research seems optimal.

First, without going beyond the boundaries of the current structure, try to reduce today's lag in military developments by means of a certain repetition of the main achievements made by others, which, by the way, is in itself not easy. Focus primarily on the issues of detection, communications, automated control and communication, thereby catching up to the world level on the possibilities of remote, contactless combat operations.

Secondly, find the growth points already within the framework of the Sixth GTU, in other words, move away from the “repetition mode” and move on to “work ahead of the curve”. To succeed on this path requires special attention and a serious state approach to science, research work and inventive activity of domestic scientists and specialists, increasing their social status and material status.

It should be noted that almost all new scientific and technological developments have, as a rule, dual applications: both civilian, peaceful, and defense, military. Research is focused primarily on the search for new effects and patterns of interaction of material systems of different levels. The definition of specific areas of their practical application, whether military or civil, occurs later.

Search, selection, development and implementation of promising technologies is possible only in support of the state. In this regard, it is very important and timely the initiative to create the Advanced Research Fund, which was discussed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his Message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation 2012 of the Year. Obviously, it will be necessary to involve in the work of the Foundation people who have, first of all, natural science or engineering education, experience in scientific and analytical work, who know the specifics of the functioning of the state mechanism, are able to assess risks and have a certain freedom to select and finance promising scientific topics and R & D programs . Such work can be performed only by people trusted and verified to observe the interests of national security.

An example of such a state-of-the-art approach to promising applied scientific research is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the United States Defense Advanced Projects Agency, with a staff of about 200 people and an annual budget of just over $ 3 billion. The principles of this structure are quite extensive and detailed. covered in the media. Most likely, it can be productively used in Russian management practice, including in the work of the Russian Advanced Research Fund being established.

Of particular note is the openness of the Agency to new ideas and inventions and, at the same time, careful protection against leakage of information about the selection criteria, the composition and state of the research, the strict protection of the results from outside penetration. "Competition in the scientific and technical sphere and industrial espionage has not been canceled yet," representatives of the Agency have repeatedly noted.

Science and education, knowledge and skills of people should be the main priority of the national security of Russia!


SECTION FIVE

CONCLUSION

In the framework of this report, only some preliminary proposals on the correction of military reform are reflected and presented. But the team of authors, which includes well-known military leaders, military analysts, political scientists, military historians and military scientists, is ready to provide detailed reports on any of the topics mentioned above, and attaches three co-reports of the authors on specific topics of the current military reform as annexes to this report.

Today, two main erroneous approaches to the implementation of military reform are clearly manifested.

The first is the concept of “evading” from direct challenges to Russia, which has been preached for more than twenty years. The main argument of this concept is the conviction that Russia does not have the strength and resources to effectively confront and energetically defend its interests not only in front of the more developed countries of the West and the United States, but also in front of its other neighbors. Adherents of this point of view believe that Russia's restrained behavior and unilateral foreign policy concessions will sooner or later convince the West of our peacefulness and help the club of “civilized countries” to accept Russia as their equal partner. Within the framework of this concept, it is proposed to build compact Armed Forces, focused solely on repelling local threats and on fighting terrorism, albeit while maintaining the strategic segment of Russian nuclear forces as a means of global deterrence.

At the same time, the fact that over the past twenty years, the result of such a policy of “appeasing” our geostrategic opponents has only become a continuous “squeezing” of Russia, increasing pressure on it along the entire perimeter of national borders, growing outside interference in the internal affairs of our state and outright infringement is stubbornly ignored. Russian national interests.

Since the time of the “perestroika”, during NATO’s military-political operations, almost all potential allies of Russia were destroyed, in violation of all agreements, the NATO bloc entered the CIS zone, which was initially defined as a zone of Russia's national interests, and the deployment of American missile defense systems began near the western borders our country.

Based on this reality, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation created within the framework of the “pacifying” concept will condemn us to the role of a passive observer who is unable to defend his national interests in any way not only beyond the borders of the country, but also on its territory (as was demonstrated during two "Chechen" wars 90-ies).

It is obvious that the concept of “evasion”, imposed today by a frankly liberal-pro-Western political “lobby,” completely contradicts the vital interests of Russia.

The second approach to military reform can be called "monetarist." Its essence is that the Military reform must be entered into the military budget, which should not go beyond the "science-based" percentage of GDP. Those. The letter of economic theory is placed above the security of the state. The main argument of the authors sticking to this concept is an appeal to the history of the USSR, which allegedly burst out during the cold war, unable to withstand the arms race. Without dwelling in detail on the criticism of this rationale, we note only that it is in itself false. Modern scientific studies prove that the defense budget was not excessive for the Soviet economy and could not, either alone or in combination with other objective socio-economic factors, lead to the collapse and destruction of the USSR. At the same time, within the framework of the concept of "monetarism", its authors cannot answer such obvious questions: how, for example, would it be possible to fend off the very specific threat of Japan’s invasion of the Kuril Islands, if within the framework of a "science-based budget" there are simply no means to organize the defense of the Kurils? Or, the development of which species of the Armed Forces should be preferred within a limited budget: SNF or general purpose forces, if for the simultaneous development of their full-fledged funds in the budget is clearly not enough? Finally, how in the USA, with real defense spending at the level of 7% of GDP, their reduction by only one tenth will cause, according to experts, a drop in GDP by 0,5% and a loss of more than a million jobs? Or the laws of economics act differently in the United States and Russia?

In fact, over the past twenty years, this concept has justified the chronic underfunding of our Armed Forces and led them to a severe systemic crisis and degradation. However, similar examples in national history have already been, so their lessons have long been learned. Thus, at the end of the 19th century, Minister of Finance S.Yu. was a tough supporter of the “monetarist” approach to military spending. Witte, who demanded to limit the military budget and, in particular, to curtail the construction program of the Navy. As a result, the programs for building the fleet and rearming the army were dragged out in such a way that Russia approached the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war with a clear military gap from the Land of the Rising Sun. The results of that war are too well known ...

Military construction "from the budget" leads to the creation of a perfectly senseless army, unable to repel real threats, but at the same time taking away the country's enormous development resources.

We proceed from the fact that the Armed Forces of Russia should be:

- first, a reliable shield from the threat of military aggression, and for this they need to be built not on the basis of an “economically sound” military budget, but on the basis of a holistic doctrine of national security, which defines the whole range of existing and prospective threats, as well as their ways reflection and neutralization (as a result, the security budget of Russia, including defense expenditures, should be formed on the basis of the real need to prioritize these threats, and not squeeze into some “right”, but not having any relation to, real in proportion);

- secondly, an integral force element of Russian policy, the presence and perfection of which will force any potential adversary to take into account Russia's position and take into account its interests. We must be ready not only to fence off from the world with a palisade of nuclear missiles, but also to have opportunities to ensure our national interests in any regions that are key for us.

Following Emperor Alexander III, we want to repeat: “In the whole world, we have only two faithful allies: our army and navy. All the rest, as soon as possible, will turn against us. ”
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