Military Review

Day of memory and sorrow. Why was the Red Army not ready for an attack by fascist Germany?

118
Day of memory and sorrow. Why was the Red Army not ready for an attack by fascist Germany?June 22 - Day of Memory and Tribulation. For most citizens of the country. But not for everyone. Because for a certain part, albeit a small one, this is the Day of Malice and Foolishness.


Some are grieving that the war has begun. That millions died. That we were not ready for war. And they are quite legitimate, among other things, wondering: why did this happen? And in their mouths - this question - the question of the causes of the tragedy.

Others also ask this question. But with a different intonation. Not with tears and torment — with barely concealed, if even concealed, triumph. With subtext - “Well, how are you then? Well, admit it, how did you break it? ”

One question - intonation is different. Feelings are different. The sides in the confrontation are different.

Intonation distinguishes them. And the manner of voicing the issue. Because it hurts alone with him. Another - joyfully.

Alone - ask him in a low voice. Or in general, about myself. And there is no such person who would not ask him about himself.

Others - ask it in the throat. Seeking to make it hurt first. Ask with pathos. Ask - triumphant. And scream. Scream. Scream.

One could say that they are screaming - not realizing that they are screaming on the graves of millions. What is immoral. But the fact is that they all shout it - perfectly aware that they shout at the graves. Because - this is their style. Image behavior. World perception.

And their hatred for those who lay in these graves. Closing, sometimes bare breasts, the road to the enemy. Those screaming hate those who died.

Because those who died, but did not give up - a challenge and denunciation of this, screaming. Which - would never go under the tank. I would never have gone, looking up, to the Gestapo gallows. They didn’t shut down the DOT, which is watering everything around with deadly fire Do not take your plane to ram.

They would simply go over to the side of the enemy, sign up for the POA, go to the police of the invaders. - And they would cover up their meanness with the words about the “intrinsic value of human life”. About unwillingness to die for the "totalitarian regime." On the "right of a free person to a free choice."

And over and over again, having received all the answers, but pretending that they did not hear them - again and again brazenly and mockingly disguising their hatred for those who were not like them, with imaginary concern for human lives - stick to others with this hurting last question.

The question is justified when it is pronounced in a half-voice with flour.

The question is mocking, when he is shouted, triumphing and gloating.

Why did this happen? Why was the Red Army not ready for an attack by fascist Germany? An agonizing question. But why reduce everything only to him?

And why did Poland, which announced, by the way, the mobilization of 1939 in April, a few months before Germany, lay down under Hitler's boots in three weeks?

And why did France, the winner in the First World War, stop resisting at six weeks? And you didn’t even try to fight for your capital? And signed a capitulation on terms more disgraceful than those dictated by Germany’s 1918 year?

And why did the British Expeditionary Force disgracefully escape in Dunkirk only thanks to Hitler's “magnanimity”?

The USSR was not ready for war? And who was ready for it? But was Russia ready in 1914 year (like England, and France, and Germany itself)?

And the US was ready to attack the Japanese on Pearl Harbor?

Not to mention the fact that we, unfortunately, too often find ourselves not ready for anything. Were we ready for the 1812 war of the year? Are we ready for frosts? Are you ready for winter? Are you ready for sowing? Are you ready for fall? Are you ready for harvest? Are you ready for crop failure?

By the way, 18 June 1941, the Soviet troops received the order: “with the receipt of this order, to bring into alert all parts in accordance with the plans for raising the alarm, but do not declare the alarm itself. All work should be carried out quickly, but without noise, without panic and talkativeness, to have the necessary standards for wearable and portable supplies necessary for life and battle. ”

All or not all parts received these orders - there are different interpretations. There is a version - that these orders were brought to the parts of the Directive of Stalin, who already on June 18 admitted the likelihood of war began in the coming days and gave the order to be ready for battle. Someone says that it was not possible to find this directive, that Stalin never gave it away.

But there were only parts that received this order. In particular, it is known for sure that 28 tank division (obviously - and other parts of the 12th mechanized corps of the Baltic Special Military Circle).

And specifically, this division launched an offensive against the German 23 troops on June 1941. And the German troops ran. Already 23 June. And the German tanks were already burning - and not yet from the strikes of the thirty-fours - but from the fire of the outdated BT-7 - and the best German T-IV tanks at that time were burning.

And in this direction - in the direction rarely remembered by Siaulia - the order was executed in the first days of the war - German troops were thrown out from the territory of the USSR. Here we received an order - and here we executed it. So there was such an order? So you could do it?

So, the point is not that he was not given away and not that the troops were unable to carry it out - but that, although he was given away, someone did not bring him to? And / or someone failed to perform it.

Those who ask this painful question “how could this happen” - with rapture and gloating - impose historical memory the idea that the summer of 41 years is the summer of the defeat and shameful defeat of the Red Army.

And in every way they don’t want to ask another question: how could it happen that, with all the known and colossal losses, all of Germany’s plans for the summer of 1941 were thwarted?

Simple question: Was the Barbarossa Plan fulfilled or failed?

The main idea of ​​the Plan was to defeat the Red Army in the first operations and prevent its parts from moving east of the Zapadnaya Dvina and the Dnieper. Did you manage to complete these tasks or not?

And why did it happen that they failed?

And why did it happen that by the middle of July the Wehrmacht lost half of the tanks participating in the attack? And almost fifteen hundred planes?

When was it planned to seize Moscow and Leningrad? By 25 August? And go to the Volga? - By October? And it seems to enter Baku and Batumi. to the beginning of November?

How did it happen that didn't work out?

And how could it happen that 25 July at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Eastern Front of the Wehrmacht, in fact, it was recognized that none of the three army groups - neither the "North" nor the "Center" or the "South" - fully their tasks according to the plan "Barbarossa" is not fulfilled?

What do we have on this subject, writes the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Halder?

June 22: “The German offensive took the enemy by surprise ... After the initial“ tetanus ”caused by the suddenness of the attack, the enemy moved to active operations ...”

23 June: “In the south, the Russians attacked our bridgeheads on the Prut River in Romania and carried out a number of reconnaissance searches from the Chernivtsi region against the Romanian cavalry.”

June 24: “In general, it has now become clear that the Russians are not thinking of a retreat, but, on the contrary, are throwing everything they have at their disposal, towards the German troops that have come in. ... the presence of numerous reserves in the frontier zone indicates that the Russians from the very beginning planned to conduct a stubborn defense of the border zone and for this they created supply bases here. ”

June 25: “The assessment of the situation for the morning generally confirms the conclusion that the Russians decided to conduct decisive battles in the frontier zone and retreat only on certain sectors of the front, where they are forced to do so by the strong onslaught of our advancing troops.”

26 Jun: “Army Group South” is slowly moving forward, unfortunately with significant losses. The enemy, acting against Army Group South, has firm and energetic leadership ... ”

29 Jun: “At the front of Army Group South, the fighting is still going on. On the right flank of the 1 Tank Group, the 8 Russian Tank Corps, deeply wedged into our location ... This penetration of the enemy obviously caused a big mess in our rear area between Brody and Dubno ... There are also separate groups in the rear of the 1 tank group. the enemy with tanks that even advance considerable distances ... The situation in the Dubno area is very tense ...

In the center of the band of Army Group "Center", our completely mixed divisions make every effort not to let the enemy’s environment desperately penetrate in all directions from the inner ring ... "

June 30: “at the front of Army Group Center, a part ... of an enemy group broke through between Minsk and Slonim through the front of Guderian's Tank Group ... At the front of Army Group North, the enemy launched a counterattack in the Riga area and wedged into our location ... Increased activity was noted aviation the enemy in front of the army group "South" and in front of the Romanian front ... ".

And in parallel:

June 23 - Red Army counterattack on Lutsk, Shaulyaem, Grodno.

June 24 is the 2 day of the Red Army counterstrikes on the Šiauliai and Grodno directions, the 2 day of the tank battle in the region Lutsk - Brody - Rovno.

June 25 is the 3 day of the Red Army counterattacks on the Siauliai and Grodno areas. 3-day tank battle in the area Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.

The air forces of the Northern Front and the aviation units of the Northern and Red Banner Baltic Fleets simultaneously attacked Finland's 19 airfields, which they concentrated on for action on our targets of the German-fascist and Finnish aviation. Produced 250 departures.

June 26 - 4 day tank battle in the area Lutsk - Brody - Exactly. The long-range aviation of the Red Army Air Force bombed Bucharest, Ploiesti and Constanta.

June 27 - 5 day tank battle in the area Lutsk - Brody - Exactly.

June 28 - 6 day tank battle in the area Lutsk - Brody - Exactly. 4000 thousands of tanks came together.

June 29 - 7 day tank battle in the area Lutsk - Brody - Exactly. The movement of the Wehrmacht to Kiev and Smolensk was thwarted, plans to occupy them in the first week of the war were thwarted

How could this happen?

It is not true that the army of the USSR after June 22 fled and surrendered thousands.

She responded with a blow to the blow. Counterattack on the offensive. The entire first week of the war is a list of counterstrikes and counterattacks, of which only a few are listed here. And by the end of this week, the recording of the Army Chief of Staff, a description of the state of the German army after a week of fighting: "Our completely mixed divisions are doing their best ...".

This week was not a week of German triumph. This week was a week of mortal battle, whose fate was fun in the balance. And this hair then tactically appeared on the side of the Wehrmacht. There was not enough of something invisible, small - and even then everything could roll on the other side. Nothing was a foregone conclusion even in those unfavorable conditions for the USSR. Something very small wasn’t enough - and the fascist "completely mixed divisions" would roll to the West, and those fresh Soviet divisions that in real history stood up and blocked the way of the "Center" army near Smolensk - rushed through the Poland to the West ...

This is what did not come true. Something was not enough. But everything hesitated during the week. “Why did this happen ...” Maybe because the order from June 18 was not brought to all. Maybe because during the fight of equals - always wins alone. And it's not always you.

It is very likely, because (and this is why it is customary to forget about it) that in the summer of 1941, the Red Army in 80% consisted of untrained or under-trained recruits. In 1938, it counted about 800 thousand people, in 1939 - 2 485 000, in 1941 - 5 774 000. Thus, most of them consisted of newly-recruited people who had no combat experience and were just beginning to undergo military training. And not replaced by new models, technology. And in cases where new samples had time to get - they did not have time to master. Because the mechanic who masterly controls BT-6 or BT-7 - could not fully master T-34 without retraining.

What the German army that passed through the whole of Europe was in this respect is to talk too much. And this army baptized in fire already in the first week was completely mixed by the recruits for the first time who took the fight with their fierce counterattacks, counterstrikes and counterattacks.

The Wehrmacht then held out and prevailed. Tactical and situational. Because strategically - he already then basically lost the war. Because every day he lost momentum. And spent the potential and resources. Which were not intended for border battles - but for the final victory in the second stage of the offensive. Which according to the plans was to begin on the fortieth day of the war. But in fact - by the fortieth day the Wehrmacht, already exhausted in the battle of Smolensk, was forced to go on the defensive in this sector, and in Ukraine - only started the attack on Kiev. Each time, in the summer of 41, the fascist army tactically won, sacrificing to the immediate success the resources of the future strategic battle. Each time, in the summer of 41, the Red Army knocked them out before it intended to put them into action as planned.

Summer 1941 of the year for the USSR and its army is not a summer of defeat and defeat - this is a summer of strategic victory. The destruction of the strategic resources of the enemy.

Although, of course, it is pointless to deny that there were those who ran and gave up - and really huge numbers. And among them, too, were different people.

It only seems that those who today are shouting with malevolence: “How could this have happened!” - they would be among those who surrendered.

Because for them - their little life, their little meanness and their little household comfort - always more than anything else. Countries, independence, ideas, faith. They — they love to proclaim values ​​and freedoms and democracies — but freedom and democracy — for them, only the right to relax and indulgence from duties.

They need freedom not in order to create and create - but in order not to answer for anything. And democracy for them is not the power of the people and the right of the majority to decide their own fate - but the right of the minority to be free from the interests of the majority, the interests of the people and any duty for any effort and tension.

These are - just gave up. Not having time to join the battle without firing a single shot.

Even now they have potentially surrendered - not even finding out who.

And their hateful cry: “How could this happen?” - in fact, not about how it could happen that we had to pay for the victory for the price we paid. And how it could happen that they were as clever as they who betrayed and ran across turned out to be not with the winners but among the vanquished. And how could it happen that others, whom they do not understand and hate, because they have something more valuable than biological existence for themselves - they took, stood up, and won.

The original of this material is published on the tape APN.

Author:
Chernyakhovsky Sergey Feliksovich

Head of the Department of Political Science and Head of the Department of General Political Science, Environmental Policy and Global Studies, Professor at the International Independent Environmental-Political University.

In 1981 he graduated with honors from the Moscow State Institute of History and Archives with a degree in Historical Archives.

From 1982 to 1988 - a teacher on an hourly basis, head of the teaching and methodical department of the department.

From 1988 to 1991 - postgraduate study at the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University. In November 1991 defended his thesis for the degree of candidate of philosophical sciences.

In 1990-93. People's Deputy of the Sverdlovsk District Council of People's Deputies of Moscow. Since 1990, a member of the CPSU MGK.

From 1992 to the present - teaching at the International Independent Ecological-Political Science University, Department of General Political Science. Lecturer, associate professor, professor (from 1997 to the present), deputy dean for scientific work (2001-2002), currently head of the department of political science, head. the chair.

In 1997-1999. Member of the Public Council of the NG Scenarios (Nezavisimaya Gazeta).

More 50 scientific and analytical papers. In particular, a series of articles in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, articles in magazines Kommunist (1990), Vestnik MGU, Observer, Russia 21, Polis, Politburo, Kommersant-Vlast etc. Among them - 4 collective monographs, in particular - on the election campaign 1999-2000.

Repeatedly participated in programs “Press Center” (ORT), “Voice of the People” (NTV), Russian Service Bi-Bi-Ci.

Repeatedly participated in research projects of the Carnegie Moscow Center, participated in theoretical seminars of the Carnegie Center and the S. Kurghinyan Experimental Creative Center.

In 2003, he published his author's monograph, The Inconsistency of the Communist Opposition in Modern Russia.

In 2003 - participation in the analytical project of the Carnegie Moscow Center on the analysis of the development of the election campaign in Russia, in 1999-2000. - participation in a similar project.

The problematics of scientific research: the political processes of modern Russia, the left opposition in modern Russia.

At the MNEPU he teaches the course “Political Relations and the Political Process in Modern Russia”, the course “General Political Science”, a number of special courses on the political struggle and political situation in modern Russia, and leads a political science workshop. Provides scientific guidance to graduate students of the Department of Political Science MNEPU.
Author:
Originator:
http://www.apn-nn.ru/539566.html
118 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. Rattenfanger
    Rattenfanger 23 June 2013 07: 25 New
    16
    Why was the Red Army not ready for an attack by Nazi Germany?

    As of June 22.06.41, 5,7, the Red Army totaled XNUMX million people. Throughout the vast country, from Brest to Vladik, from a feldsher girl to uncles with big ranks. The vast majority did not have real combat experience.
    The invasion forces amounted to more than 5,5 million people. Those. it is logical to assume that the superiority was at least twofold. The interaction between the military units and arms was excellent. The troops were driven in for two years of successful military operations in Europe (fighting spirit, again, at a height). Plus the initiative in the hands of the voltaned corporal is the time of the strike and the place of application of forces at his discretion.
    Conclusion: the headline smacks of cheap populism. It would be correct to state how
    "How did the Red Army manage to survive and defeat under such conditions of the initial stage of the war?"
    1. discard
      discard 23 June 2013 09: 29 New
      -19
      To the question posed in the title of the article, a detailed answer, compiled on the basis of the now declassified DOCUMENTS, is contained in the book of Mark Solonin, "JUNE 22, OR WHEN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR STARTED?"
      The book is posted on the Internet, contains figures, facts, last names, including those related to the pre-war period, with links to relevant documents and shows in detail how and what kind of war the USSR was preparing for.
      Read. It is interesting and instructive.
      1. svp67
        svp67 23 June 2013 10: 03 New
        19
        Quote: discard
        in the book of Mark Solonin "22 JUNE, OR WHEN WAS THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR STARTED?".


        He is a good aviation specialist, but he is poorly versed in military aspects, so whoever reads his book, by the way is very easy and fascinatingly written, we must also read the books by Alexei Isaev:
        1.Antisuvorov. The big lies of the little man. - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2004.
        2.Antisuvorov. Ten myths of the Second World War. - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2004.
        3. From Dubno to Rostov. - M .: AST Publishing House LLC: Transitkniga LLC, 2004.
        4.1941: Fights in Ukraine. - M .: Publishing house "Strategy KM", 2004.
        5. A short history of the Second World War. The offensive of Marshal Shaposhnikov. - M .: Yauza, 2005.
        6. "Boilers" of 41. The history of the Second World War, which we did not know. [3] - M .: Eksmo, Yauza, 2005.
        7. George Zhukov. The last argument of the king. [4] - M .: Eksmo, 2006.
        8. Isaev A.V., Drabkin A.V. June 22. Black day calendar. - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008.
        9.Dubno 1941. The greatest tank battle of the Second World War. - M .: Yauza; Eksmo, 2009.
        10. Myths and Truth About Marshal Zhukov. - M .: Yauza; Eksmo, 2010.
        11. Unknown 1941. Blitzkrieg stopped. - M .: Yauza; Eksmo, 2010.
        12. Another 1941. From the border to Leningrad. - M .: Yauza; Eksmo, 2011.
        13. The border battle of 1941. [8] - M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2011.
        Any of them. Of course, it is more difficult to read them, but only after reading these two opinions can you independently make conclusions ...
        1. Avenger711
          Avenger711 25 June 2013 18: 15 New
          0
          Details painted in room 7. 1-2 Read review. The rest of the books, however, will be complex and will give little to the reader except purely background information.
      2. Rider
        Rider 23 June 2013 11: 09 New
        +8
        yeah. corned beef razun falcons Svanidze,

        This is YOUR FSE.
      3. aleks
        aleks 23 June 2013 13: 54 New
        0
        Read corned beef is what to eat corned beef without soaking it,
      4. starshina78
        starshina78 23 June 2013 19: 41 New
        +3
        I did not read and I am not going to read. If only because they are tired of assumptions, conjectures, statements, and so on, the like. Maybe M. Solonin described everything well and colorfully with the help of declassified documents, but any document can be taught in a way that is beneficial to the author, or in a different way, as it really means. All newly published books are based on documents, and not on the stories of real participants in the events, and this allows the author to express his point of view, which is beneficial to him.
        I got lucky. In my family (unfortunately already) there were many people who went through the war, both from the very beginning and from the middle. The other half, mostly women, worked in wartime in factories, on the collective farm. and about the war, its beginning and victory, I know from the stories of relatives. And I believe them! they said that they were waiting for the war, they were preparing, but .... It happens, as always, that it came unexpectedly! Mom’s elder brother served urgent in Belarus (he spent the whole war in the cavalry, had many awards, several wounds). he told how at one o’clock in the morning they were alerted and taken to the old fortified area, and at five o'clock "they were fucked by Fritzev planes." There was no panic, there was even some euphoria: “Here we are, we will show them now!” And I had to show it, right under Minsk.
        At any beginning, there is a factor of surprise, and here the most formidable car was launched - the Wehrmacht! Yes, Stalin hoped that there would be no war, but many movies cite his words that the USSR was not enough for two to three years. And the words that, allegedly, the Soviet Union was preparing to attack Germany itself - this is nothing more than speculation of newly made shit. Yes, a fatal mistake was made in the doctrine of the USSR - the troops were preparing to advance more and not defend, but we learned to do this quickly, which at the very beginning was replaced by courage, heroism, and the sacrifice of soldiers. And I believe that the summer of 41 was - the summer of strategic heroism and courage!
        1. s1н7т
          s1н7т 23 June 2013 21: 37 New
          0
          There was probably only one mistake - ours were waiting for a blow, but they were guided by August. By this time, much in the location of the Red Army would be different.
    2. treskoed
      treskoed 23 June 2013 10: 21 New
      11
      The leadership of the Red Army also has fault. After all, the Fleet under the command of N.G. Kuznetsov was ready for military operations and adequately met the enemy!
      1. leha
        leha 2012 24 June 2013 00: 34 New
        0
        There was an initial negligence, or even some of the generals, especially General Pavlov. For which he was later shot. http://delostalina.ru/?p=742
        1. Andrew-001
          Andrew-001 24 June 2013 19: 29 New
          0
          Quote: leha-2012
          There was an initial negligence, or even some of the generals, especially General Pavlov. For which he was later shot. http://delostalina.ru/?p=742

          A significant proportion of the blame in this case lies with the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army - this is how he planned the war.
          As for the content of the article, the reality is not to be changed. The Germans attacked first - they are aggressors. 1941 is a heroic year for our army, a year when the Red Army broke the course of the German military machine. Whether we were ready for that war - so you can never be fully prepared for a war. Could we deal with less loss - perhaps, but it’s good to talk about it after 70 years.
      2. Avenger711
        Avenger711 25 June 2013 18: 16 New
        0
        Rather, the Germans did not particularly try to meddle with him.
    3. vitek1233
      vitek1233 23 June 2013 12: 05 New
      -13
      and tanks with planes, too, from Brest to Vladivostok? and our Army sat until 41 idle?
      1. Rattenfanger
        Rattenfanger 23 June 2013 12: 22 New
        +8
        Quote: vitek1233
        and tanks with planes, too, from Brest to Vladivostok?

        It was necessary to build one huge barn, and to collect all the equipment there?
        and our Army sat until 41 idle?

        "Your Army" is who, excuse me? Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras? Israel Defense Forces? Antarctic Liberation Corps? Concretize.
        If we are talking about the Red Army, then, of course, it did not sit idly by. But that's far from everything that is taught in peacetime is needed in war. And, again, most are not fired. And this is a huge advantage for the Germans at the initial stage.
    4. 755962
      755962 23 June 2013 12: 08 New
      10
      The American press about Hitler’s attack on the USSR 72 years ago:
    5. Nu daaaa ...
      Nu daaaa ... 23 June 2013 15: 24 New
      -4
      The vast majority did not have real combat experience.


      A kuda devali opyt Ispani, Finlandij i "osvobozhdeni" polskogo naroda? Tolko v Finlandi uchastvoval okolo milliona sovetskih voennyh.
      1. smile
        smile 23 June 2013 16: 22 New
        +5
        Nu daaaa ..
        Greetings to the old opponent, I am glad to see you! :))))
        The nature of the fighting there was somewhat different. By the way, it was literal use in military construction without proper understanding of the experience in Finland that even did some harm ... yes, at that time the Wehrmacht was stronger ... just as we were stronger, as it turned out, stronger than other European armies ... all together.
        And one more amendment, in 39 we liberated Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians from Polish oppression. returned our lands captured by the Poles ... it would be time to recognize this already ... :)))
      2. Rattenfanger
        Rattenfanger 23 June 2013 18: 32 New
        0
        Quote: Nu daaaa ...
        A kuda devali opyt ispani

        What, to Benin’s mother, is Spain’s experience? How is tanker Pavlov?
        There, from 5 to 7 thousand people participated from among the Soviet military experts. For Estonia, this, perhaps, is nothing to itself, but on the scale of a major war, by the cash register.

        T
        olko v Finlandi uchastvoval okolo milliona sovetskih voennyh

        Typical tactical technique of orthodox frolics: take a figure from the ceiling and try to operate on it.
        In the Winter War, the maximum number of l / s of the Red Army was 750 thousand people. Try to calculate how many of them (minus those killed, wounded and commissaries, demobilized) could be in service on 22.06.41.
    6. Kostya pedestrian
      Kostya pedestrian 24 June 2013 06: 25 New
      -1
      The article is correct, and emphasizes that there have always been traitors from the castle on Olympus at all times, for example: the laurels of Great Constantinople were not given rest to the Greeks, its peaceful coexistence with other peoples and races, as well as the successes of the Great Roman Empire, which MAZolil eyes of the Greeks - So the ideological elite of Britain - pseudo the Masons, read the German-Greeks, who played along with the Nazis, being the Nazis, planning for years to come, tried to mislead the Soviet Union, creating fascism in Italy, as if in magic, challenge rat damage in cases esle victim does not live on a "blessed nebogoslovlyaemoe".

      The Russian peoples, read the Soviet - at that moment they had just healed the wounds of the Civil War, imposed on us by frenzied Germans in whom Lenin had brought and brought to Russia a lot of money and Greek Catholic aristocrats who were left without slaves and tributes, beaten by the Bolsheviks, i.e. . Russian workers and peasants.

      Here they are, using the seminary education of Stalin, in every possible way imposed false ideas on him, which led to the repression of talented people and officers on the eve of the war, as well as ignoring the opinions of the Soviet generals, and not taking into account that the BSSR was the shortest way to Moscow.
      So the experience of Holkin-Gol, Spain and France, was cut short, and the Finnish unsuccessful company still undermined the morale of the USSR army. As under Emperor Paul, the initiatives of Young Russia were thrown into the furnace, for the sake of gray hair and dogma.

      So intelligence is not about stealing bagels in the bazaar, but making notes and expanding the network, studying what it drives us and what undermines stability, bringing reactors to critical temperatures. By the way, the kovernern was let down for the sake of these monolithic ideas in order to drive the Russians to the den, and then, as the great hunters should, to poison the Russian copper bear.
    7. Tatar
      Tatar 24 June 2013 07: 47 New
      -1
      Really Stalin did not know that there would be a war, how stupid it was, could he not be the first to speak out against the Germans, for example, on June 20, attacking the enemy. Yes, all this is possible, but it’s understandable if the first to cross the border, the USSR was declared the aggressor. and maybe retreated only to make the Anglo-Saxons really afraid that after the alliance Hitler would move to England and America, therefore, maybe the advance on the offensive was slow ..... these are just assumptions.
      1. Avenger711
        Avenger711 25 June 2013 20: 01 New
        0
        A little above is a list of books, without which no one has the right to talk about war and strategy. The command to begin the advance of troops was given on the 15th. This is 2 weeks late.
    8. saha6052
      saha6052 27 June 2013 06: 04 New
      0
      How did the Red Army manage to survive and defeat under such conditions of the initial stage of the war? "[/ B] [/ quote] Maybe something like that? Not the Red Army survived, I even think that the USSR army was far from the strongest link, after the traitorous assassination of the Stalinist bureaucracy — Soviet officers, specialists, scientists, etc. It’s fair to note: the system was destroyed — the country's passionate layer and the representatives of foreign states who came to the country to build the New World. In essence: the revolution after the removal and extermination of the Russian aristocracy put forward it took absolute positions in the state hierarchy - the Bureaucracy, which, an hour earlier, had destroyed the monarchy, using the weakness of the Monarch and the weak structure of the Russian elites, their genial servility to Europe and the West in general. This bureaucracy was put forward and secured (fraudulently and selectively, so far, with terror ) Stalin’s position at the helm of the state was created by a machine of terror against its own people, something like the Hound of the Baskervilles, the cannibal. The device was filled with marginal material with an absolute performing function (machine) -who was nobody tal to decide the fate of the country and in spite of the permanent catastrophe The reaction potential revealed by the Revolution (demolition of estates, education, propaganda of the workers 'and peasants' republic - although the apparatus almost completed the reincarnation of the monarchy in a surrogate form, with Pakhan the criminal on Olympus) The myth of communism is like an armature propaganda made it possible to have colossal mobilization and which, together with the support of progressive forces in the world, decided everything. The hypocritical model of the bureaucracy turned out to be tenacious in permanent extreme conditions and extremely vulnerable Oh, during the periods of the so-called world: oak, not creative, formalized, paralyzing the social initiative of people, this model took quick steps to its next death. In fact, the USSR went through the evolution of debauchery and the death of Ancient Rome over the course of seventy years - the Laboratory of the Absurd and not the Neuro-world.
  2. fenix57
    fenix57 23 June 2013 07: 36 New
    +4
    Hello! The author (the medical pole "LOST seems to have lost) ..., - Some people grieve that the War has begun. That millions have died." That the history of WAR does not give rest ....."The summer of 1941 for the USSR and its army is not a summer of defeat and defeat - it is a summer of strategic victory. Destruction of the strategic resources of the enemy. "
    - literally yesterday ..... On June 22, 1941 Hitler lost the 2nd World War, and first of all the GREAT DOMESTIC ... Russia is not conquered! ...! RUSSIA- BORN AGAIN AND THE YEARS OF THE 90S ..... YES, IT WILL BE SO! hi
    1. bask
      bask 23 June 2013 08: 14 New
      18
      amyati and sorrow. Why the Red Army was not ready for an attack

      Not ready, but the Nazis .. hit during the period of its rearmament and the creation of fur .. corps !!!
      Quote: fenix57
      .. "The summer of 1941 for the USSR and its army is not a summer of defeat and defeat

      After exhausting and destroying most of the fascist troops. Already in November (the Moscow operation of the Western Front from November 16, 1941 to January 31, 1942), a counter-offensive was launched near Moscow !!!
      The most difficult and bloody year was 1942. All gay Europe fought against the USSR ...
      But our grandfathers, with God's help, broke the ridge BEAST !!!
      And now, no matter how many enemies of Russia do the dirty tricks against us, THE ENEMY WILL BE BROKEN AND THE VICTORY WILL ALWAYS BE AFTER US !!!!!
  3. fisherman
    fisherman 23 June 2013 07: 38 New
    24
    And they would cover their meanness with words about the "intrinsic value of human life." About the unwillingness to die for the "totalitarian regime." On the "right of a free person to free choice."


    "When the personal begins to dictate its demands to the national, state-like nation must order a funeral march."
    (L.N. Gumilev)
    1. Avenger711
      Avenger711 25 June 2013 20: 01 New
      0
      Applicable to homosexual parades.
    2. saha6052
      saha6052 27 June 2013 11: 20 New
      0
      Quote: fisherman
      "When the personal begins to dictate its demands to the national, state-like nation must order a funeral march."
      (L.N. Gumilev)
      Only a true Individuality can be truly national. The National Treasure-Fools showed what national interests were for them in the 91st? Aggressive grayness that Stalin produced and the campaign is not able to understand and realize national sovereignty.
  4. mogus
    mogus 23 June 2013 07: 43 New
    14
    Others also ask this question. But with a different intonation. Not with tears and torment — with barely concealed, if even concealed, triumph. With subtext - “Well, how are you then? Well, admit it, how did you break it? ”

    Still, they love to discuss about footcloths, such as everywhere for a long time in socks, and you still ... Usually they wedge when you remind you that the victorious warrior has passed half of Europe in footcloths ...
    1. cumastra1
      cumastra1 23 June 2013 08: 15 New
      23
      I happened to run in footcloths, run and in socks. Correctly laid footcloths are better.
      No matter how the Nazis attacked in 41, and the war ended in Berlin. The first blow is the hardest one, from which Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, France and England fell apart, our grandfathers and great-grandfathers survived. If it were not for the "meaninglessly lost mechanized corps" there would have been no Russia, there would have been ostzemlis and orabotye. So no need to talk about the meaninglessness of losses.
      The lame Spartan goes to war.
      where are you going? in which case you can’t even run away!
      I am not going to run away, but to fight!

      Blind Spartan goes to war.
      Where are you going? you will be killed first!
      I’m coming for the enemy to blunt the sword about me!

      The old Spartan goes to war.
      Where are you going? Gray your old bones and hearth!
      I'm going to overshadow the young!
      1. mogus
        mogus 23 June 2013 08: 38 New
        +7
        quite "recently", my brother served 06-08. I somehow followed the fashion, I don’t eat it - I don’t want it. The army began to eat everything! And in the part they normally fed, the city nearby, in addition to the kitchen, they got ... So, he liked the footcloths and boots (not berets) very much. Dry, through the shank it is aired, and in berets already tightly.
      2. skeptic
        skeptic 23 June 2013 19: 59 New
        +2
        Quote: cumastra1
        So no need to talk about the meaninglessness of losses.
        The lame Spartan goes to war.
        where are you going? in which case you can’t even run away!
        I am not going to run away, but to fight!

        Blind Spartan goes to war.
        Where are you going? you will be killed first!
        I’m coming for the enemy to blunt the sword about me!

        The old Spartan goes to war.
        Where are you going? Gray your old bones and hearth!
        I'm going to overshadow the young!

        good
      3. Kushadasov
        Kushadasov 24 June 2013 07: 28 New
        +1
        Correctly laid footcloths are better.


        who knows, will understand: the raw part of the footcloth from the foot is remarkably replaced by the dry part from the bootleg. Convenient and comfortable. But with socks this number will not work))))
      4. krpmlws
        krpmlws 24 June 2013 14: 40 New
        0
        I don’t understand who is on this forum and how it puts minuses and pluses, what are they guided by, what are they thinking about? ... Any desire to participate in discussions on the forum disappears. "MK lost their lives meaninglessly" - it is clear that they played a role, but in full the power of your capabilities? NO. That's what you need to talk about and discuss, to reveal the real reasons, but here they prefer ostrich tactics, hide from problems and solve them. They see insurmountable circumstances in everyone and no one is to blame - the stars came together that way, -PC.
    2. fisherman
      fisherman 23 June 2013 08: 26 New
      +2
      so they are natures gentle, creative, graceful :)
    3. Dimy4
      Dimy4 23 June 2013 12: 55 New
      +1
      Yes, they would try to run in tricks in socks and for how long they would be enough.
      Threat. I tried to walk in berets, I didn’t like it better in kerzach.
      1. valokordin
        valokordin 23 June 2013 15: 03 New
        +2
        Quote: Dimy4
        but they would try to run in tricks in socks and for how long they would be enough.
        Threat. I tried to walk in berets, I didn’t like it better in kerzach.

        He studied at SVAUL, wore yuft boots, heavy, uncomfortable, when in the summer they began to fly, they changed boots with soldiers to tarpaulin. They are more convenient and easier. But the soldiers flaunted in our summer and went to the dismissal
      2. mark7
        mark7 23 June 2013 20: 25 New
        0
        or tried to go through the whole war in berets and socks, by the very tomatoes in the mud pushing guns half of Europe
      3. The comment was deleted.
  5. cartridge
    cartridge 23 June 2013 07: 55 New
    16
    It is not true that the army of the USSR after June 22 fled and surrendered thousands.
    She responded with a blow to the blow. Counterattack on the offensive. All the first week of the war is a list of counterattacks and counterattacks, of which only a few are given here.


    If they were unprepared, they would not have fought. And grandfathers fought fiercely. And in this their courage is their main readiness for war. Anyone who is not afraid of the enemy, he fights with him in any conditions and ultimately wins.
    And our grandfathers won. Glory to them!
  6. nickname 1 and 2
    nickname 1 and 2 23 June 2013 08: 06 New
    +5
    The USSR was not ready for war? And who was ready for it? But was Russia ready in 1914 year (like England, and France, and Germany itself)?


    As the genius said, “Experience is the son of difficult mistakes ......”

    Was the USSR not ready for war? - Well, let's ask - Why is Russia not ready for war now?
    Yes! No one is ever ready for it (in general)!
    In order to be ready for it you need to know all the info! And the info is owls. secret! And curtailing the entire social network and throwing money on defense, you give an occasion for accusation of preparing for war (a boomerang?).
    And besides: in those days, word of mouth worked better than any Swamp not honor.
    1. Kostya pedestrian
      Kostya pedestrian 25 June 2013 09: 05 New
      0
      As a rule, the one who prepares it is ready, well, or who is ready to respond to any provocation with an even more crushing blow - as in the USSR State Border in the 5th series, when the Nazis made fun of our border guards from the other side.

      In addition, without a doubt, the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War was organized and started by the world of the colonialists in order to completely subjugate the peoples of Europe and Russia. And, hardly, someone in the West doubted that the USSR would win. Read the memoirs and the press of that time - even erased by neo-historians, and you will see that before 43, few claimed that the USSR would survive.
  7. Zhzhuk
    Zhzhuk 23 June 2013 08: 32 New
    +3
    Dear author, the very raising of this issue is not an insult, but an attempt by generations to figure out what happened.
    Like Hitler attacked, why, what are the reasons, how did the artist manage to restore a country that was completely devastated after the 1st World War, why Germany went into the war 2 times in a row, or rather who so desperately pushed it to it.

    Take Syria. Terrorists declared jihad to Israel and the states, but the miracle is that they are not fighting in Israel, but in Syria, which is an opponent of Israel, how strange. Doesn't it remind you ???????
    Napoleon went to conquer London through Russia, probably the compass "malfunctioned"
    Hitler and he fought with London, but he also probably let the compass down and trampled to Russia, hmm ...
    - No, it's just a coincidence ...
    - Yes, not x, I have the same methods ...
    So maybe the author was so outraged, we had to leave everything as it was, Hitler attacked, we fought back, which is not clear ..., but the thing is, the more you delve into the more questions that pop up, maybe someone wouldn’t want that b these questions were raised, or just to chat the essence,

    dear author, thank you for the biography Carnegie’s center, BBC, tell me the article wholeheartedly, or price figures affect soul aspirations, yeah I'm glad to meet resident mi 6, just kidding,
    only in every joke, there is only a fraction of the joke
    1. 094711601
      094711601 23 June 2013 09: 40 New
      0
      Who is this gentleman? What it is? Who has a familiar psychiatrist?
    2. saha6052
      saha6052 27 June 2013 11: 49 New
      0
      Quote: Zhzhuk
      Zhzhuk June 23, 2013 08:32
      A real person will never limit himself to the separated info and will always scatter the horizon! I think the Beetle was like this: I think the world Zakulis and her intrigues. They always set the brothers against each other and do the right thing, check for lice, and the brothers do not be suckers, and muscles (in your head, download!). If you are Strong, do not prepare for anything, they will only think about diapers, and if you are Honduras, you beat the best people in the country, but what if the new ones? Russian women give birth. There were officers who hysterically told the Führer: what is Russia, Bismarck warned about was he waiting for Moltke and others who were fond of arithmetic? - It’s better to lie in their warm land than on the street in cold Russia. And others shouted: damn yourself: Stalin gave us such a carte — a blanche was crazy! —Do the two states together not break the Soviet ridge to the people? Stalin — in the back with our Kromeshniki from the NKVD, and we from the front! —and into the ladies. We’ll be in Moscow in a week and would be, but — Rudeness, despotism against the peoples of the USSR are no weaker than Stalin’s, arrogance, pride, arrogance- no, the Nazis cannot be Europeans, but only savages, and savages must remain in pro lom.No here they are drawn again: The general crisis of humanity, Russia knocked out of the game as a billiard ball, and without the Wehrmacht-bought for the chocolate, will again have -otrygat blood.
  8. omsbon
    omsbon 23 June 2013 08: 33 New
    11
    In the memoirs of German generals, the expression that summer 41, this is a time of deceived hopes. That the German hopes would not come true, our grandfathers stood to death!
    WE WOULD DIE IF WOULD NOT DIE!
  9. Diviz
    Diviz 23 June 2013 08: 37 New
    +1
    the ideology of fascism itself has not disappeared. after graduation, war broke out in Korea and then in Vietnam. if it were not for the appearance of nuclear weapons, then a world war would not have been unavoidable. in the world as in life: respect means fear. but for this, our power must be shared with the Russian people.
    1. saha6052
      saha6052 27 June 2013 13: 11 New
      0
      Quote: DiViZ
      but for this, our power must be shared with the Russian people.
      -If you share it, I’m afraid you won’t take it away-Yeltsin said-take it, guys-fly on, Russia has fallen in price! -the next delivery manager on the throne and what? -shared
      watered for the earth with the blood of Heroes — pay the thief, for the hut built by your father and grandfather — they didn’t share it better, but they would take it all for themselves and fight for the stolen things themselves, or rather, they would just sit in the cell with Booth, these numbers are full and most of all, Guantanamo.
  10. 094711601
    094711601 23 June 2013 08: 48 New
    +7
    Thanks to the author! I do not agree with all conclusions, but not the point. Our army of the 41st year perished, but the perished won, and defeated no one, but the Western world, which took charge of the country! We proudly say our fathers and grandfathers, and how old were those boys on June 22? We consider the military aspect of the problem, why it happened, and, excuse me, sometimes we forget one thing, because the majority in the army are children aged 18-20! Even if the country's leadership was bewildered, what can we say about the rank and file. Yes, they died, they retreated, and the enemy achieved great tactical and strategic successes .... And in the end, shamefully lost .... It was not Germany that lost, but the West! And they will always lose, because we are better than them, because we have different values, because we are the children of those who died in the 41st, gave us life! EVERLASTING MEMORY!
  11. absaz
    absaz 23 June 2013 09: 00 New
    +8
    All the crying and degrading heroes of our fallen heroes for our Motherland must be considered TRADERS and, accordingly, called to account for the slander on all those who have died and are now living.
  12. MIKHAN
    MIKHAN 23 June 2013 09: 01 New
    +9
    It’s terrible to imagine the feelings of people fell asleep in peacetime .. blood burst explosions of destruction .. The Germans in the early days of the war realized that Russia is not Europe "there will be no parade marches" Eternal memory to the boys who stood to death on the border!
  13. krpmlws
    krpmlws 23 June 2013 09: 09 New
    +1
    Why was the initial period of the Second World War for the Red Army so unfortunate? This question is not an idle one, for it is necessary to learn lessons. The main reason is the disbelief of the USSR leadership that the war could begin in June 41, therefore a complex of measures was not taken to prepare the western districts for a major war. However, the order to bring the first echelons of covering the border of the western districts came. It was probably given to Tymoshenko and Zhukov, but Kirpanos and Pavlov ignored him criminally, but the commander of the Baltic District Kuznetsov complied with. Another major reason is that in 41, Soviet military science lagged behind German military science on a number of important issues: 1. It maintained an outdated position on the nature of the initial period of the war, which began using only personnel divisions staffed in peacetime states. 2. The tactics of the combat use of tank units were poorly worked out, this is the main reason for the failure of all MK counterattacks. 3. In the Red Army, to reduce losses, they refused trenches, in favor of individual cells, as a result this led to a drop in the fighting spirit of the infantry, undermining control in battle, and the impossibility of maneuvering by forces and means. In general, there were plenty of shortcomings in the Red Army, this is also the fault of the leadership of the Red Army. The communication was laid on telegraph poles ??? !!! What prevented digging trenches and laying a wired connection? Why was MK formed in the western districts, and not in the rear? As a result, cripples, rather than combat formations, entered the battle. Why were the three divisions concentrated in the Brest Fortress, and the tank division was located just 2 km from the border, in direct line of sight? There are a lot of questions ... During the Second World War, Soviet generals had to learn through bitter experience what German generals studied at academies while sitting at their desks. And there is no need to speculate on combat experience, its significance is enormous, but the German army also rapidly increased in size Yesterday's lawyers, engineers and so on came, people far from the army, but they went through school, normal training, which was based on advanced science.
    1. svp67
      svp67 23 June 2013 10: 14 New
      +4
      Quote: krpmlws
      Why was the initial period of the Second World War for the Red Army so unfortunate?
      First of all, because our troops significantly lost the German mobility ...
      Quote: krpmlws
      They probably gave it to Tymoshenko and Zhukov, but Kirpanos and Pavlov ignored him criminally, but the commander of the Baltic District Kuznetsov executed.

      It’s easy to talk about the dead, they can’t answer already ... Documents say that this order was brought to the troops. Another moment that the front of Pavlova was in the direction of the main attack and could not stop the German tank groups, in particular, a small role in this direct betrayal of national divisions ...
      1. krpmlws
        krpmlws 23 June 2013 12: 10 New
        +1
        1. Mobility is an important factor, no one disputes, especially in conditions of maneuver war. The problem is why the Red Army was not able to impose its game, draw the Wehrmacht into a positional war, as it was possible near Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge. Thus mobility is minor factor. 2. You didn’t explain why 22 divisions were in Brest at night on June 3, and the camp was about 2 km from the border. During the interrogation of Pavlov, they asked about this. He certainly claimed that he had ordered the withdrawal of diyziy, but for some reason Korobkov ignored him. Korobkov, in turn, claimed that he had not received any order, although he turned to Pavlov with a proposal to redeploy the divisions. 3. You correctly noted that the order to bring the first echelons to full combat readiness was sent to the okrug, but only performed by Pavlov and Kirpanos. 4.You are aware that Pavlov had 6 mk — one of the strongest in the Red Army, in which there were about 400 T34 and KV1 + tanks and other types of total more than a thousand tanks and armored vehicles !!! In total, there were more than 3000 tanks in the western district.
        1. svp67
          svp67 23 June 2013 12: 15 New
          +4
          Quote: krpmlws
          There were over 3000 tanks in the western district.
          Have power !!! But do not tell me how many army flying bombs he had, for the repair of these thousands of tanks, how many spare parts, fuel refueling machines, trucks to supply ammunition, for transporting infantry after advancing tanks, specialized artillery tractors capable of moving at the speed of tank columns? Alas, the army of the middle of the 20 century was not strong alone.
          1. krpmlws
            krpmlws 23 June 2013 13: 02 New
            -2
            No need to juggle and ascribe to me what I did not say. The security situation was difficult, but with rational defense and proper use of microns, the existing shortcomings could be significantly offset.
            1. svp67
              svp67 23 June 2013 13: 16 New
              +2
              Quote: krpmlws
              The security situation was difficult, however, with rational defense and proper use of microns, it was possible to significantly level existing shortcomings.
              I don’t distort anything, you just don’t absolutely understand the technology of warfare, especially at the first stage of the Second World War. There is no such defense that it is not possible to break through with the modern army, even though you dig yourself into the ground three times, only energetic and timely strikes save the army from defeat, which was very well demonstrated both by Stalingrad and Kursk by our troops, and by the Germans near Kiev and Kharkov, not to mention the very beginning of the war ...
              1. krpmlws
                krpmlws 23 June 2013 14: 02 New
                -1
                No, you distort and do not understand at all that the Germans were not able to immediately take Kiev, break our defenses and capture Stalingrad, they also failed to break through the defenses of 1st Guards and Katukov, so they had to go in the direction of Prokhorovka. The defenses can be successful, if there are reserves proper organization and management, timely maneuvering forces and means. Your point of view is deeply mistaken. Counterattacks are made on the most vulnerable areas of the enemy, thereby creating an advantage over the enemy. As a rule, she could not do anything like this at the beginning of the Second World War: neither defend herself nor counterattack.
                1. tixon444
                  tixon444 23 June 2013 14: 34 New
                  +3
                  Quote: krpmlws
                  As a rule, she was not able to do anything like this at the beginning of the Second World War, either to defend herself or to counterattack.


                  Imagine the German national football team, or Bayern Munich.
                  Everyone seems to know the secret of their success: physical strength and strict discipline, but not many can beat them.
                  The Wehrmacht in 41 had the same crushing power and iron discipline, defeated Europe licked their boots, and the Barbarossa plan was ideal from their point of view, and they went to the USSR with full confidence that they were going to free us from the Bolshevik plague. Yes, only we don’t need their freedom for nothing - go, they sipped in the 90s in full.
                  Our Army was able to do everything, both to defend itself and to attack, but only speaking in football, the team plays as its opponent allows it. As A.V.Suvorov taught, you need to fight not by number, but by skill. And before the war in the country there were great hatred moods, each freshly appointed commander thought of himself as Napoleon. With rare exceptions.
                  1. krpmlws
                    krpmlws 23 June 2013 16: 26 New
                    0
                    It feels like you just have something to blur. In my posts there are clear statements with reasoning, you have nothing of the kind. You "gave" an amazing picture of the situation in the Red Army .... It turns out they were all able, but somehow incomprehensible nothing succeeded! Everyone is to blame, the stars agreed so, but the Red Army and the leadership of the country have nothing to do with it !!! ... I don’t know about you, but I’m interested in the real reasons for the failures, in order to learn the lesson so that such humiliation, the nightmare was no longer repeated. Following your logic, we will continue to step on one and the same rake, repeating the same mistakes. We do not learn from the experience of our ancestors, we acted mediocre in Afghanistan, ignoring the vast experience in the development of Asia by the Russian Empire and the USSR, also mediocre fought in the first Chechen, suffered excessive losses in the war with Georgia . The list will continue if we continue to self-cuddle ourselves with invented causes of failures in the Second World War.
                    1. tixon444
                      tixon444 23 June 2013 21: 33 New
                      0
                      Quote: krpmlws
                      It feels like you just have something to blur.

                      Once again I’ll blink, can I? Thank you for not opposing.
                      In my posts, clear statements with reasoning

                      Something I did not notice the argument. Normal demagogic chatter. But that is your right.
                      Everyone is to blame, the stars agreed so, but the Red Army and the country's leadership have nothing to do with it !!!

                      Guilty do not need to look for a big mind. You can indiscriminately.
                      and acted mediocre in Afghanistan, ignoring the vast experience in the development of the Russian Empire and the USSR of Asia, also mediocrely fought in the first Chechen, suffered excessive losses in the war with Georgia

                      You shouldn’t be so. At least out of respect for the dead guys, filter the bazaar.
                      .Do not learn from the experience of our ancestors, and acted mediocre

                      Learn who does not give you. Only such wars, when the army to the army, most likely will not be.

                      Gathered thirty years later classmates at an evening of graduates. And among them, one became a general. Everyone was surprised, asking him:
                      -How so, you were a d-league, didn’t know a damn thing!
                      The general answers:
                      -I don’t know Nichrome, but so that by morning everything would be done! angry
                2. svp67
                  svp67 23 June 2013 15: 56 New
                  +2
                  Quote: krpmlws
                  No, you distort and do not understand at all that the Germans were not able to immediately take Kiev, break our defenses and capture Stalingrad, they also failed to break through the defenses of 1 and Katukova, so they had to go in the direction of Prokhorovka.

                  With this long phrase, you show your ignorance of the issue of discussion ...
                  The mechanized troops are so good that if it did not work out to defeat the enemy in one place, then using their maneuverable potential, they would be transferred to another section of the front where success was outlined. Unable to break through the descent of the Kiev UR, German tank groups simply bypassed it, closing in the encirclement of troops of the whole front, and the UEF did not have the proper number of mechanized troops to parry these attacks.
                  On the Kursk Bulge, the Red Army had the right amount of mechanized formations, which is why it managed to restrain the enemy, although in the direction of the main attacks, in particular on the Prokhorovsky direction, this was possible only by introducing strategic reserves into the battle, well, already in the 1943 year of the Red Army there was such an opportunity. ..
                  1. krpmlws
                    krpmlws 23 June 2013 16: 55 New
                    -1
                    You, dear spv67, not only do not have knowledge, but something else, there may be conscience or wisdom. Write some nonsense, a feeling that I am talking to the troll. 1. "Mech. The troops are good and good ...", - you have revealed America to me here. Well, why is this your remark? ... You shouted there "there is no defense that cannot be broken through." I explained to you the fallacy of your statement. 2. Having failed to break through the front, the Germans rushed to Uman to encircle the armies of the southwestern front. The Soviet command parried the blow by withdrawing the MK from the Southern Front, but it burned down for three days like the other MKs at that time (repeating all the same mistakes in combat tactics ). Only then, together with the Guderian group, troops of the South-Western Front were encircled in Kiev. 3. "On the Kursk Bulge ..." .... In the Kiev okrug. there were over 5000 tanks, is that what you think is not enough? And how much would be enough? In Kursk, 1gv TA managed to withstand the main blow of the enemy’s strongest group, thanks to the increased skill of commanders and privates. Katukov was ordered to counter-attack the wedged enemy as in 41g, but he ignored the order by conducting a counterattack with limited forces. enemy attacks, occupying a defensive defense (and not your notorious counterattacks and maneuvers). Similar could be carried out in 41g near the border, if Soviet military science was not the proper level.
                    1. svp67
                      svp67 23 June 2013 17: 28 New
                      -2
                      [quote = krpmlws]. Having failed to break through the front, the Germans rushed to Uman to encircle the armies of the southwestern front. The Soviet command countered the blow by withdrawing the MK from the southern front, [/ quote]
                      Well, there are a lot of your fantasies, back to the facts:
                      [quote] In the meantime, changing the initial task, the German command began preparations for the transfer of the 2-th tank group of Guderian and the 2-th army of Weichs from the army group "Center" from the west (Moscow) direction south to Kiev to destroy the South-West front. VGK headquarters discovered a turn of the 2-th Guderian tank group to the south and on August 19 allowed Kirponos to withdraw troops beyond the Dnieper, organizing defense on its left bank, and on the right bank it was ordered to keep only Kiev. (With a proposal to withdraw the right flank of the front beyond the Dnieper, thereby freeing up two or three rifle divisions to the reserve, on August 16 Marshal S. M. Budyonny came forward). To counter the breakthrough of the enemy in the rear of the front from the north along the river. Desna deployed a new 40 Army (consisting of three divisions).
                      24 August 2-I Panzer Group launched an offensive against the troops of the front in the direction of Konotop. A few days later, from the region of Kremenchug, the 1-I Kleist tank group began fighting towards it, at the same time delivering an additional strike to Poltava, but soon deployed to the north-east with all its might. By the end of August, parts of Guderian managed to capture two bridgeheads on the river. Desna - at Korop and Novgorod-Seversky, threatening to go into the deep rear of the troops of the South-Western Front. In early September, fierce battles unfolded here.
                      On August 28, the 2-th Army of von Weichs launched an offensive from the Gomel region to Chernigov, squeezing the 5-th Army of M.I. Potapov and, at the same time, squeezing between their units and units of the 2-th Guderian Tank Group, which advanced eastward towards Konotop, 21th Army of the Bryansk Front.
                      7 September 2-I tank group reached Konotop. On the same day, Marshal S. M. Budyonny turned to the Headquarters with a request to withdraw the 5 Army and was again refused. By September 10, in order to cover the right flank of the South-Western Front from the north and surround Soviet troops in the Kiev region, the 2 Panzer Group made a deep breakthrough at the junction with the Bryansk Front in the Konotop-Novgorod-Seversky section, partly penetrating the Romn region. The enemy crossed the Desna in areas east of Chernigov and on the perunin direction, the Dnieper at Kremenchug and southeast. By this time, the reserve of the Southwestern Front was completely exhausted. Two and a half rifle divisions were transferred from the Kiev fortified area to the Chernihiv direction. On the night of September 11, two divisions of the 26 Army were transferred to the Konotop direction.
                      Tupikov, Vasilevsky and Budyonny insisted on the immediate withdrawal of troops from Kiev, Shaposhnikov was against the immediate withdrawal of troops. The headquarters proposed conducting desperate attacks on the Konotop group of the enemy in cooperation with the Bryansk Front, organizing a defensive line on the Psel River, and only then begin the evacuation of Kiev. Only in this way, according to Stalin, was it possible to withdraw troops without the risk of encirclement and destruction. Kirponos assured Stalin that the front had not thought about withdrawing troops until he received an offer to give thoughts on the withdrawal of troops, that the front troops were able to continue the resistance and asked to strengthen the front with reserves. So turn of events
                    2. svp67
                      svp67 23 June 2013 17: 28 New
                      0
                      The rate was put in a difficult position. The proposal for the withdrawal of troops came from Budyonny, who referred to the request of the Military Council of the front. Kiev was ordered not to leave, bridges not to be blown up until the special order of the Headquarters.
                      By September 13, the 3th Panzer Division of the Model from the 2th Panzer Group approached Lokhvitsa from the north. There was still an 3 kilometer corridor between the 16 and 40 tank divisions, which the Soviet troops could no longer use to move east. On September 13, S.K. Timoshenko, who arrived at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front to change Budenny, assured Stalin that Kiev would be restrained. On 14 of September, parts of Model and Hube captured Lokhvitsa and Lubny, but due to strong resistance of the Soviet troops they could not move further towards each other. The battles continued on the next day, but at that time the 9-th Panzer Division from the 1-th Panzer Group and the 15-September 1941-the giant ring around the 5-X, 21-th, 26-th and approached Lokhvits from the southeast. 37-th Soviet armies closed. The South-Western Front was also surrounded. [/ Quote]
                      That is, the Germans struck TWO tank groups in convergent directions,
                    3. svp67
                      svp67 23 June 2013 17: 29 New
                      0
                      Meanwhile, having changed the initial task, the German command began preparations for the transfer of the 2-th tank group of Guderian and the 2-th army of Weichs from the army group "Center" from the western (Moscow) direction to the south to Kiev to destroy the South-Western Front. VGK headquarters discovered a turn of the 2-th Guderian tank group to the south and on August 19 allowed Kirponos to withdraw troops beyond the Dnieper, organizing defense on its left bank, and on the right bank it was ordered to keep only Kiev. (With a proposal to withdraw the right flank of the front beyond the Dnieper, thereby freeing up two or three rifle divisions to the reserve, on August 16 Marshal S. M. Budyonny came forward). To counter the breakthrough of the enemy in the rear of the front from the north along the river. Desna deployed a new 40 Army (consisting of three divisions).
                      24 August 2-I Panzer Group launched an offensive against the troops of the front in the direction of Konotop. A few days later, from the region of Kremenchug, the 1-I Kleist tank group began fighting towards it, at the same time delivering an additional strike to Poltava, but soon deployed to the north-east with all its might. By the end of August, parts of Guderian managed to capture two bridgeheads on the river. Desna - at Korop and Novgorod-Seversky, threatening to go into the deep rear of the troops of the South-Western Front. In early September, fierce battles unfolded here.
                      On August 28, the 2-th Army of von Weichs launched an offensive from the Gomel region to Chernigov, squeezing the 5-th Army of M.I. Potapov and, at the same time, squeezing between their units and units of the 2-th Guderian Tank Group, which advanced eastward towards Konotop, 21th Army of the Bryansk Front.
                      7 September 2-I tank group reached Konotop. On the same day, Marshal S. M. Budyonny turned to the Headquarters with a request to withdraw the 5 Army and was again refused. By September 10, in order to cover the right flank of the South-Western Front from the north and surround Soviet troops in the Kiev region, the 2 Panzer Group made a deep breakthrough at the junction with the Bryansk Front in the Konotop-Novgorod-Seversky section, partly penetrating the Romn region. The enemy crossed the Desna in areas east of Chernigov and on the perunin direction, the Dnieper at Kremenchug and southeast. By this time, the reserve of the Southwestern Front was completely exhausted. Two and a half rifle divisions were transferred from the Kiev fortified area to the Chernihiv direction. On the night of September 11, two divisions of the 26 Army were transferred to the Konotop direction.
                      Tupikov, Vasilevsky and Budyonny insisted on the immediate withdrawal of troops from Kiev, Shaposhnikov was against the immediate withdrawal of troops. The headquarters proposed conducting desperate attacks on the Konotop group of the enemy in cooperation with the Bryansk Front, organizing a defensive line on the Psel River, and only then begin the evacuation of Kiev. Only in this way, according to Stalin, was it possible to withdraw troops without the risk of encirclement and destruction. Kirponos assured Stalin that the front had not thought about withdrawing troops until he received an offer to give thoughts on the withdrawal of troops, that the front troops were able to continue the resistance and asked to strengthen the front with reserves. In this turn of events, the Headquarters was put in a difficult position. The proposal for the withdrawal of troops came from Budyonny, who referred to the request of the Military Council of the front. Kiev was ordered not to leave, bridges not to be blown up until the special order of the Headquarters. On September 12, Marshal S. M. Budyonny was removed from the post of commander in chief of the Southern direction.
                    4. svp67
                      svp67 23 June 2013 17: 30 New
                      +1
                      By September 13, the 3th Panzer Division of the Model from the 2th Panzer Group approached Lokhvitsa from the north. There was still an 3 kilometer corridor between the 16 and 40 tank divisions, which the Soviet troops could no longer use to move east. On September 13, S.K. Timoshenko, who arrived at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front to change Budenny, assured Stalin that Kiev would be restrained. On 14 of September, parts of Model and Hube captured Lokhvitsa and Lubny, but due to strong resistance of the Soviet troops they could not move further towards each other. The battles continued on the next day, but at that time the 9-th Panzer Division from the 1-th Panzer Group and the 15-September 1941-the giant ring around the 5-X, 21-th, 26-th and approached Lokhvits from the southeast. 37-th Soviet armies closed. The South-Western Front was also surrounded.
                      1. krpmlws
                        krpmlws 23 June 2013 17: 52 New
                        -1
                        Svp67, the troll spirit is getting stronger with you. Having no arguments except replicas of my "fantasies", you decided to re-write the history textbook ha))) All your speculations have been refuted by me, you probably can’t say anything new, constructive, so stay in his self-seduction and beyond.
                      2. svp67
                        svp67 24 June 2013 05: 17 New
                        +1
                        Quote: krpmlws
                        Svp67, the troll spirit is getting stronger with you. Having no arguments except replicas of my "fantasies", you decided to re-write the history textbook ha))) All your speculations have been refuted by me, you probably can’t say anything new, constructive, so stay in his self-seduction and beyond.

                        Neither ONE historical fact and how you say my speculation, the Dear You, did not succeed in refuting, because you rushing with beautiful, high-sounding phrases do not see the essence of the tactics and strategies that our grandfathers studied on the battlefield, but it seems that you think like them, in the first months of the war. The enemy’s strike groups and the main ones, mechanized, are not enough to stop with strong defense, burrowing into the ground with an eyebrow, they must be smashed, in the most vulnerable places, from the flanks, otherwise they will not be successful here, they will quickly be transferred to another section where they can achieve their goals. And one mass, LARGE MASS OF tanks cannot do this. The experience of the Khalkin goal prevailed over our command, where it was possible to defeat in this way, but even there the losses were too high, and after all the Japanese defense cannot be compared with what the Germans created. Therefore, for the successful operation of tanks, it is important not only their quantity, but also the quantity and quality of forces and means interacting with them. First of all, of course, infantry, artillery and engineering troops. During the Second World War, our command for two years "experimentally" searched for the "golden ratio" of the ratios of these ingredients, and only by the 43 year they could find it ....
                      3. krpmlws
                        krpmlws 24 June 2013 12: 30 New
                        -2
                        Your statements in relation to my posts are unfounded, unproven. You don’t hear what I’m saying, you are essentially conducting a dialogue with some fictitious interlocutor whom I have nothing to do with. 1. Here you are talking about counterattacks on the flanks, all this is good, but this statement should not be absolutized, because on the Kursk Bulge the Soviet troops won thanks to defense in depth. Of course, counterattacks were carried out, which made their positive contribution. However, only after exhausting the enemy in defense, a situation was created in which the Soviet troops were able to carry out a successful general offensive. 2. Losses near Khalkhin-Gol. And how would the Germans act if they had the same equipment as in the Red Army? Would they climb into the forehead on the unsuppressed anti-tank defense of the enemy, having only tanks with bulletproof armor? NEVER. Zhukov, after one TB, which suffered heavy losses, sent a second TB and acted exactly the same in 41g. Our commanders were taught poorly, military science did not meet the spirit of the times. Here's a fact for you. Therefore, you don’t need to fill in about various means of providing tanks, organization of tank units, quality of tanks, communications, etc., because all these factors are secondary, because without understanding the rational tactics of combat nothing will help you use tanks and vice versa: rational tactics that take into account the whole range of forces and means of your own and the enemy will make it possible to level existing shortcomings in many ways and achieve effective results and examples of this mass and in the same 41g.
                3. svp67
                  svp67 23 June 2013 17: 47 New
                  0
                  Quote: krpmlws
                  .In Kiev district. there were over 5000 tanks, is that what you think is not enough? And how many would be enough ?.

                  5000 tanks in the SWF - According to "The quantitative composition of the armored fleet
                  Kiev Special Military District "
                  (as of June 1 of 1941 of the year) there were 5894 of them ... Is this interesting or not? Apparently a lot, even very ... but these thousands of tanks themselves do not fight, for the success of operations they need the support of infantry and artillery and good combat and rear support, otherwise they will not be able to complete their tasks, but simply become targets for enemy artillerymen .. .Yes, and by the time of the tragedy of the Southwestern Front, this happened. With a normal, balanced scheme for building mechanized troops, so many tanks were not needed, 2000 could be completely dispensed with, but infantry and engineering units and units were required to be motorized, and artillery should have marching capabilities no worse than tanks. which, in principle, happened at the end of the war, when tank armies, more balanced in terms of numbers and military composition, defeated the enemy ...
                4. svp67
                  svp67 23 June 2013 18: 07 New
                  0
                  Quote: krpmlws
                  On Kursk, 1vg TA managed to withstand the main blow of the strongest enemy group, thanks to the increased skill of commanders and privates. Katukov was ordered to counter-attack the wedged enemy as in 41g, but he ignored the order, having carried out a counterattack with limited forces. Thanks to this, Katukov retained TA forces to reflect enemy attacks, occupying a dead defense (and not your notorious counterattacks and maneuvers).

                  Well, let's see what really happened ...
                  In the preparatory period
                  In accordance with the plan of the commander of the Voronezh Front, the following use of the tank army was foreseen during the operation.

                  When delivering the main blow to the opponents from the Tomarovka, Belgorod region in the direction of Oboyan, the 1-I Panzer Army, interacting with the 5-m Guards Stalingrad and 2-m Guards Tatsin Tank Corps, as well as with units of the 69-th Army, counterattacks the enemy in the general direction on Ascension, Belgorod.

                  When the enemy strikes from the Belgorod region on Koroch, the 1-I tank army, in cooperation with the same formations, counterattacks the enemy in the direction of Koroch. In the event of an enemy offensive at the junction of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts, the 1-I Panzer Army is not brought into action and remains in place.

                  In addition to preparing counterattacks in the indicated directions, the 1th Panzer Army had the task of preparing the defense: the 3th Mechanized Corps at the turn of Studenok, TSW. Stalin, Vladimirovka, Orlovka and the 6-m tank corps along the northern bank of the river. Psel.

                  Preparing the operation. Based on the tasks set by the 1-th tank army, for three months the units carried out engineering work on the equipment of the lines of defense indicated by them and were engaged in combat training. At the defensive lines, tank trenches were prepared for firing from a place; for infantry, full-profile trenches with communication courses and anti-shatter visors were opened, and 2 - 3 bunkers were built and in the main directions along 5 - 7 bunkers on the 1 km of the front.

                  In order to mask the area of ​​the army, all the material was carefully hidden from air surveillance and for the most part was dug. Dugouts were built for the personnel and gaps were dug. The use of vehicles in the area was extremely limited. Any work on the radio was prohibited. The measures taken made it possible to hide the location of tank formations and army units. So, despite a long stay in the area, enemy aircraft never bombed the location of the corps, and during the battle the appearance of tank formations on the second defensive line of the 6 Guards Army was unexpected for the Germans.

                  Simultaneously with the work on the defensive lines, the headquarters of the formations and units studied and appropriately prepared the lanes of the corps during the transition to a counterattack. Each building was allocated from 4 to 6 directions, and on each direction two routes were indicated for reaching the initial position and applying a counterattack.

                  The main work of the command and headquarters of the corps was to equip routes for the exit of tank formations to their designated areas.
                5. svp67
                  svp67 23 June 2013 18: 23 New
                  0
                  Quote: krpmlws
                  but he ignored the order, conducting a counterattack with limited forces

                  Actions during the battle:
                  The course of hostilities on July 6 showed that the joint attack of the 1 Tank Army and two separate tank corps planned by the front commander did not take place, since the enemy, having introduced large tank forces, seized the initiative and pressed the units of the 6 Guards Army to the second army defensive line.

                  As a result of heavy fighting on July 7, the left flank of the 1 Tank Army turned out to be bypassed and driven back to the north-west, and the army's defense front stretched over 45 km. The 3th mechanized corps, the parts of which, with the exception of the 10th motorized rifle brigade, suffered significant losses, turned out to be the most affected during the first two days of the fighting. The most combat-ready was the 6-th tank corps, in the area of ​​which the enemy continued to act passively. In the reserve of the tank army was the 180-I tank brigade, pulled into the area of ​​Ur. Standing. Thus, the 1-I tank army had enough forces to conduct further defensive battles.

                  The advancing enemy tanks managed to crush the battle formations of the 86 Tank Brigade and seize Novoselovka. By the end of the day, some parts of the 3th mechanized corps had retreated to the battle formations of the 309th rifle division.
                6. svp67
                  svp67 23 June 2013 18: 23 New
                  0
                  After a three-hour battle, the enemy occupied this height, but his further advance was stopped by the counterattacks of the 112 and 200 tank brigades.
                  After regrouping, the Germans renewed their attacks at 13 hours, as a result of which the 200 tank brigade was abandoned by the end of the day and part of the forces reached the outskirts of Novyenko, thus leaving the flank and the closest rear of the 6 tank corps and the 184 infantry division .

                  By noon, the German group advancing from the Zavidovka area managed to take possession of Rakovo. A group advancing from the east approached Berezovka, and tanks operating from the area of ​​ur. Tolstoy, sought to capture the Red Uzliv. The 6th Panzer Corps thus found itself in a semicircle, its battle formations were thoroughly shot through by enemy artillery and mortar fire, and also were continuously attacked by enemy aircraft.
                  In connection with the situation, the commander of the 6-th tank corps received an order from the commander of the 1-th tank army to take the corps to the line of Krasny Uzliv, Chapaev, where to gain a foothold.

                  At 9 hours on 12 July, army troops launched a counterattack.

                  The 5-th Guards Stalingrad Panzer Corps broke the enemy’s resistance, captured Chapaev and by 17 clock went to the northern outskirts of Rakovo. The 10-th Panzer Corps, having met the Germans Panzer Division "Great Germany", knocked it down from its positions and took possession of ur. Tolstoy. The 3th mechanized and 31th tank corps and the 309th rifle division also went on the offensive, but were unsuccessful. In the following days (13 - 14 July), the formations of the 1 Tank Army continued their offensive but were unsuccessful. On July 15, the army was ordered to go on the defensive and prepare its site for surrender to the troops of the 6 and 5 guards armies.

                  That is, the Katukovites fought hard, using maneuver and fire, and moving from position to position ... The army was so battered that during the transition to the offensive it was able to act only on strength for two days on July 12 and 13, after which it retreated second echelon of the front ...
                  The heavy losses of mechanized forces at the front of Vatutin caused his troops to launch a general offensive later than the Rokossovsky troops. But this is not the most important thing, the victory on the Kursk, we were unconditionally provided
                  Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov) Actions of 12July of the West (Commander-Colonel-General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansky (Commander-Colonel-General Markian Popov) of the fronts
                  Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (operation "Rumyantsev")
                  The counterattack of August 3 by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began.
                  1. krpmlws
                    krpmlws 24 June 2013 13: 05 New
                    -2
                    Read Katukov’s memoirs “At the cutting edge of the main strike.” There, Katukov writes about how he was forced to counterattack the enemy and how he got out of the situation. The losses at Katukov during the defensive battle were great, but the Germans did NOT PASS. TA suffered serious losses during the general offensive getting involved in oncoming fights with enemy tank units. In addition, you don’t understand that maneuvering or counterattack by a tank brigade is one thing, but the whole TA is different, you have some kind of mess in the head. Maneuvering by forces and means, counterattacks, changing positions in move defensive fighting is obvious norm.
                  2. svp67
                    svp67 25 June 2013 04: 13 New
                    +2
                    Quote: krpmlws
                    Read Katukov’s memoirs “At the cutting edge of the main blow”.
                    everything must be treated critically. Count how many "tigers" 1TA destroyed, you will be very surprised by the figure. And also answer the question why, in order to restrain the German offensive, Vatutin asked for strategic reserves, which were not intended for defense, but for the offensive, if Katukov and his 1TA so famously beat Germans ...
                  3. krpmlws
                    krpmlws 25 June 2013 14: 50 New
                    -2
                    You go away from the discussed issue by proposing a new one, well. Firstly, the goal that Katukov pursued not to miss the Germans, he achieved it. Secondly, the Wehrmacht’s losses were such (according to German generals, primarily in manpower) that they they didn’t have the opportunity to hold their positions. This predetermined a turning point in the situation on the Kursk Bulge. And the merit in exhausting the enemy of the 1st GVA was considerable. Thirdly, the Germans broke through the front, but not the front of TA Katukov, on which the initial main blow was dealt. and were attracted rezervy.Pri us this 1TA continued to occupy their defensive front.
                  4. svp67
                    svp67 25 June 2013 19: 39 New
                    +1
                    Quote: krpmlws
                    Thirdly, the Germans broke through the front, but not the front of TA Katukov, on which the initial main blow was delivered
                    You repeat my thought in your own words
                    The enemy’s strike groups and the main ones, mechanized, are not enough to stop with strong defense, burrowing into the ground with an eyebrow, they must be smashed, in the most vulnerable places, from the flanks, otherwise they will not be successful here, they will quickly be transferred to another section where they can achieve their goals.

                    It is not possible to create such a defense that cannot be hacked, but it is possible to get ahead of the enemy in the deployment and buildup of forces and means, and then success in both defense and offensive is guaranteed ...
                  5. krpmlws
                    krpmlws 26 June 2013 12: 36 New
                    -2
                    1. "It is not possible to create such a defense," I do not repeat anything, because whether the front is broken or not depends on many factors, to say that the front of the defenders is obviously doomed to a breakthrough is your mistake. 2. Success, as the experience of the Kursk battle proved, can also be achieved by defensive actions. A breakthrough of the defense did not give the Germans anything, they only depleted their strength in the process of gnawing defense in depth. The offensive itself, counterattacks do not guarantee success - this is the experience of unsuccessful strikes MK of the Red Army, including on the flanks of the enemy. The problem is that quantitative indicators are one thing, and qualitative indicators are another, so against the powerful flank attacks of the MK Germans opposed strong anti-tank areas, the poet On the other hand, strikes conceived as flanking essentially turned into frontal, hence huge losses. Soviet tankers thought sensibly at the operational level, but at the tactical level at the beginning of the Second World War they were completely helpless.
          2. vladim.gorbunow
            vladim.gorbunow 24 June 2013 15: 00 New
            0
            The South-Western and Southern fronts are traditionally forgotten. At a meeting with Hitler on 13 07 Manstein stated that the Russian offensive against the Model’s army makes the South group’s attack even more urgent. He proposed shifting efforts to the Kempf band, thereby turning the attack vector to the east why attract a backup 24 shopping mall. But beginning 17 07 offensive 8 Guards A. Chuikov on and the Tolbukhin front simply overturned this plan. 2 TK SS and 24 TK were thrown to the south. According to Marshal Konev, German armored forces turned into a fire brigade of the Eastern Front.
  • saha6052
    saha6052 27 June 2013 13: 45 New
    -2
    Quote: svp67
    Alas, the army of the mid-20th century was not the only one strong tank ...
    Guys, it feels like I’m not reading komenty, but I’m watching Ozerov’s films — well, there will be no more war, archaic, dust and decay on Earth. Why did officers such as Tukhachevsky, Svechin, etc. be killed? -The Russian aristocracy who prepared the country were killed and the army to the war of engines, to the war of the future! What in the Future war did the semi-educated siminarist understand, if he knew how to shoot his civilians well too (although he never had any of his own: an enemy wife! -Killed children did freaks , died under other people's fences, comrades who erected on tr n-shot, thanks Beria-slammed off the paranoid, it's too late. Although we have Gagarin in the asset, and they could have been an atomic war.) So now, why sort out the tactics of an outdated war? -Learn -new: Chubais came with a box from the Xerox and how it goes wrong across the Empire! - two of the casket ...
  • mark7
    mark7 23 June 2013 20: 43 New
    0
    I agree with you, the huge cauldrons and thousands of our prisoners say a lot about the unpreparedness of whom the composition will respond quickly to the theater of the theater of war, and I will always be proud and admire the homeland for soldiers and junior personnel at all times of courage.
  • Rattenfanger
    Rattenfanger 23 June 2013 10: 21 New
    10
    Quote: krpmlws
    The main reason: the disbelief of the top leadership of the USSR that the war could begin in June 41, therefore a complex of measures was not taken to prepare the western districts for a major war.

    For starters, I’ll advise you not to listen to Svanidze and Roy Medvedev, but to read the documents yourself, even if they are in the public domain, although I would like to report to the same Zorge. Ramzai. November 18, 1940,28, December 1941 of the same year, May XNUMX - several dates at once. And in August, according to Dr. Sorge, the japans were supposed to attack.
    And there are dozens of such reports from various sources.
    You should not judge Abwehr by Hollywood films. Uncle Wilhelm and his menagerie knew their business tightly. And, I’ll tell you a terrible military secret, there are no spies stealing plans for an enemy offensive from the enemy’s headquarters (Gorbachev doesn’t count).
    So do not sing songs about the idiot-Stalin who slept through the war.
    1. krpmlws
      krpmlws 23 June 2013 12: 27 New
      -2
      I don’t listen to either Svanidze or R. Medvedev where did you get that? You didn’t write anything concrete, you just threw unreasonable statements. I respect Stalin. Everyone makes mistakes, including great people. So the situation was that Stalin made a mistake then, why keep silent and tell a lie? This miscalculation, from my point of view, as a statesman, does not beg Stalin. Moreover, there are objective reasons. Before WWII, Stalin received exaggerated data on the power of the Wehrmacht. Thus, the Commander of the Air Force of the Kiev District wrote to Stalin about the need to increase the production of combat aircraft citing the fantastic numbers of the German Air Force. Judge for yourself how many military aircraft and tanks were on the border of German and Soviet. Could Stalin believe that the Germans were not strong enough to decide to start aggression? In addition, where are the main forces in this case, and if they are somewhere else, then the Germans have no intention of aggression? Intelligence data on the date of the attack were contradictory, moreover, they were not "confirmed" by vigorous data on Germany’s readiness for aggression.
      1. Rattenfanger
        Rattenfanger 23 June 2013 12: 59 New
        +2
        Quote: krpmlws
        So the situation was that Stalin then made a mistake

        As I understand it, you still insist that Stalin slept through the war? But did intelligence report?
        Good ... Proof to the studio.
        Before the Second World War, Stalin received exaggerated data on the power of the Wehrmacht.

        Proof
        Air Force commander of the Kiev district in a report to Stalin wrote about the need to increase the production of military aircraft, citing fantastic figures of the German Air Force.

        What figures, when he cited what he demanded, suggested.
        I will not be the original link to the studio.
        1. krpmlws
          krpmlws 23 June 2013 17: 07 New
          -6
          Ratten, the most interesting thing is that you did not understand anything))). Reread my posts, everything is clearly stated there.
          1. krpmlws
            krpmlws 24 June 2013 14: 51 New
            -1
            I don’t understand who it puts me cons? Rattenfanger does not give a single argument, he has only one unfounded grudge (((
            1. Setrac
              Setrac 24 June 2013 16: 24 New
              0
              Quote: krpmlws
              I don’t understand who it puts me cons? Rattenfanger does not give a single argument, he has only one unfounded grudge (((

              I will give you an introduction, and you will answer the question, and you will understand that you are wrong at the outbreak of the war. So.
              You know the area of ​​the USSR, you know the area of ​​the Third Reich, the distances in Europe are several times less than in the USSR, what follows from this? And the consequence is that the mobilization and deployment of troops in the USSR is several times slower, the reason is commonplace, the speed of trains, and no way to change this parameter. And now the question is how to forestall the Wehrmacht in deployment, or at least not to be left behind under such unfavorable conditions? The answer is no way!
              1. krpmlws
                krpmlws 24 June 2013 17: 53 New
                -2
                I didn’t set the minus for you, but it’s as if by the way. Only Rattenfanger and svp67 put the minuses. You will not find my unreasonable assessments of anyone's posts, in relation to my statements one continuous trolling, without any arguments. I do not see any connection, logic in your words. It was possible and necessary to carry out partial mobilization by May 41g, to understaff divisions of the western districts by state of wartime. Intelligence data on the concentration of German troops manned by wartime states was abundant. For all the rules of international relations, we had every right to mobilize and enough for this time.
                1. Setrac
                  Setrac 24 June 2013 18: 10 New
                  +1
                  Quote: krpmlws
                  It was possible and necessary to carry out a partial mobilization by May 41, to replenish the divisions of the western districts in wartime.

                  You opened the bin with Newton.
                  Quote: krpmlws
                  According to all the rules of international relations, we had every right to mobilize and enough time for this.

                  The enemy knew about the beginning of mobilization and could start mobilization on his part, and again smaller distances and lead in deployment.
                  The logic is simple, if the USSR begins to mobilize earlier, then the Wehrmacht, too, what can I say, the Wehrmacht was already mobilized.
                  The Germans played with marked cards.
                  1. krpmlws
                    krpmlws 24 June 2013 18: 20 New
                    -2
                    Could you please explain, I honestly do not understand anything in your words and your logic ... Either you offer to solve the problem, then you yourself come to the conclusion that it’s meaningless "the Wehrmacht was already mobilized." So what is the problem, is it possible and whether it was necessary partial mobilization in the USSR by June 41g or not?
                    1. Setrac
                      Setrac 24 June 2013 18: 42 New
                      +1
                      Quote: krpmlws
                      .To you offer to solve the problem, you yourself come to the conclusion that it is meaningless "the Wehrmacht has already been mobilized

                      It’s not enough to mobilize, it is necessary to move to the area of ​​concentration, and here the distances are crucial.
                      Quote: krpmlws
                      So what is the problem, was it possible and necessary to conduct a partial mobilization in the USSR by June 41 or not?

                      And it was carried out, in addition, they tried to carry out a hidden mobilization.
                      The USSR was unable to forestall the Third Reich in the deployment of troops for objective reasons, maybe you know how to do this?
                    2. krpmlws
                      krpmlws 25 June 2013 15: 08 New
                      -2
                      What is still crucial in relation to that situation? Partial mobilization was carried out in the USSR, but limited to half measures, this is the mistake. If they managed to mobilize in the USSR, they could and would have managed to carry out a larger one. "I could not preempt ...", in reality I could preempt, I could, but partially: Tymoshenko and Zhukov gave an order on June 16-19 (I recall) to bring the first echelons of covering the borders of the western districts to full combat readiness (Vasilevsky writes “The Work of All Life”). This order was executed in the Baltic (except for bringing the first echelons on full alert, they transferred 12MK from near Riga to the border, also transferred 5TD 3MK) and Odessa districts, but was ignored in the Byelorussian and Kiev (for a separate reason).
                    3. saha6052
                      saha6052 27 June 2013 14: 47 New
                      -1
                      The USSR was unable to forestall the Third Reich in the deployment of troops for objective reasons, can you know how to do this? [/ Quote] Damned, subjunctive, but you just scored the forum for them. If the devil had eaten me, Lenin lived before the cold summer -53rd, fantasize? And we would not know-Stalin and his NKVD. In what bad dream can it happen that the victorious proletariat begins systemic terror with itself? The ruling estates are destroyed, and we have "an aggravation of the class struggle with the people?" - "dizziness from success" and again terror, army, empire science prostitute Alisma? Lysenki - the lights of the agricultural community. Do you remember the people around Lenin and who remained after Stalin? One blinked out Stalin, the old steel-gape old executioner and Laurentius slammed the leader of the peoples and faithful as dogs-protection did not help, but-killed the leader- ? Moor has done his job, Moor can go to another world, by the way, the Institute of Gerontology organized — he wanted to drink blood forever, but didn’t grow together — the scientist who promised him immortality died earlier — he ran away and cheated, you bastard, said Stalin. And if if Lenin had remained in his place, there would have been no war, where would the pug on the huh, today America wouldn’t wipe its feet on Russia, but stood in line for humanitarian aid from the USSR. I don’t grow together — the consolidated West didn’t want to shod the USSR, don’t build churches without brains, but only prisons, and Spitak shook and the country fell.
                    4. saha6052
                      saha6052 27 June 2013 16: 19 New
                      -1
                      And yet, lads: if there was a sane leader and not a leader (we are not Indians, albeit red-handed) and the head (there was a chance — Kirov! —And now — Kirov-forest) who would dare to kill the Comintern, okrom Stalin, betraying the Communists Hitler, with whom he hoped to end up, is not seen only by the blind, but what did he end up in prostration when Hitler attacked? -Not expected, he thought that only he could be treacherous, only he is a genius in the politics of linguistic knowledge, the Russian language has not been in thirty years learned-talent. The Communist parties began to melt, the people left them, who needs the Emirate under the guise of K of communism? If it weren’t for Pakhan Pakhanych, the labor movement and the Social Democrats wouldn’t let fascism go wild, we just have what we have — war and inconceivable losses, but the main thing — the Revolution, betrayed by criminals with party cards, stone and overturning History in the Middle Ages and Super Market, pigsties and slaughterhouse.
          2. Setrac
            Setrac 24 June 2013 16: 33 New
            +1
            Quote: krpmlws
            I don’t understand who it puts me cons?

            Cons to you put those to whom you put cons.
    2. svp67
      svp67 23 June 2013 13: 56 New
      +1
      Quote: krpmlws
      Could Stalin believe that the Germans were not strong enough to decide to start aggression?
      No, they believed that the Germans were not fully prepared for such an operation ...
  • svp67
    svp67 23 June 2013 10: 37 New
    0
    Quote: krpmlws
    Tymoshenko and Zhukov probably gave him away, but Kirpanos and Pavlov ignored him criminally,


    Minutes of the first interrogation of 7.07.1941
    “No. 630. Protocol of interrogation of the arrested PAVLOV D.G.
    July 7 1941 city
    Interrogation started at 1 hour 30 min.

    Question: Was the reason for your arrest announced to you?
    Answer: I was arrested on the day of 4 July. in Dovsk, where it was announced to me that I was arrested by order of the Central Committee. Later, the deputy talked to me. before Sovnarkom Mehlis and announced that I was arrested as a traitor.
  • svp67
    svp67 23 June 2013 10: 39 New
    0
    Quote: krpmlws
    Tymoshenko and Zhukov probably gave him away, but Kirpanos and Pavlov ignored him criminally

    Question: In this case, proceed to testify about your betrayal.
    Answer: I am not a traitor. The defeat of the troops that I commanded happened for reasons beyond my control.
    Question: The investigation has evidence that your actions over the years have been treasonous, which were especially evident during your command of the Western Front.
    Answer: I am not a traitor, there was no malicious intent in my actions as commander of the fronts. I am also not guilty of the fact that the enemy managed to penetrate deeply into our territory.
    Question: How, then, did this happen?
  • svp67
    svp67 23 June 2013 10: 40 New
    0
    Answer: I will first describe the situation in which the military operations of German troops against the Red Army began.
    At one o'clock in the morning of June 22 by order of the People’s Commissar of Defense, I was called to the front headquarters. A member of the Military Council of the corps commissar Fominykh and chief of staff of the front, Major General Klimovsky, came there with me.
    The People’s Commissar asked the first questions over the phone: “Well, how is it, calmly?” I replied that a very large movement of German troops was observed on the right flank, according to the report of the commander of the 3 Army, Kuznetsov, they went continuously to the Suvalsky ledge for one and a half days German motomekkolonna. According to him, in many places from the side of the Germans from the side of the Augustow - Sopotskin, the fence wire was removed. In other sectors of the front, I reported that I am particularly concerned about the Bialodoplaska group.
    In my report, the People’s Commissar replied: “Be calm and don’t panic, gather the headquarters just in case this morning, maybe something unpleasant will happen, but look, don’t go for any provocation. If there are separate provocations, call '. This ended the conversation.
    According to the instructions of the People's Commissar, I immediately called all army commanders to the HF apparatus, ordering them to appear at the army headquarters together with the chiefs of staffs and operational departments. I also suggested that the commanders bring the troops into a state of combat and occupy all battle-type structures, and even unfinished reinforced concrete ones. To this my order Kuznetsov replied that, according to my previously given instructions, he had distributed ammunition to the troops and was currently embarking on the occupation of structures.
    The commander of the 10 Army Pshubev reported that he had the corps headquarters after the war game left for the leadership of the troops in the place where they should be according to the plan. I warned Golubev that he keep the troops in full combat readiness and wait for my further orders.
    Korobkov, commander of the 4 Army, reported that his troops were ready for battle. He promised to check the combat readiness of the Brest garrison. To this I pointed out to Korobkov that the garrison should be at the place where it was supposed to be according to the plan, and offered to proceed with the execution of my order immediately. ”
    ..The commander of the district air force Kopec and his deputy Tayursky, who arrived at my district headquarters, reported to me that the aircraft had been put on combat alert fully and was dispersed at airfields in accordance with the order of the NCO.
    This conversation with the army commanders took place at about two in the morning. ”
    “At 3 hours 30 minutes, the People’s Commissar of Defense called me again and asked what was new.
    I answered him that there is nothing new now, I have established contact with the armies and given instructions to the commanders. ”
    “At the same time, I reported to the addict that, despite the prohibition by the Air Force chief Zhigarev to refuel the aircraft with NZ gasoline and replace the engines with NZ engines, I gave this order to Kopn and Tayursky. The People's Commissar approved my order. "I promised the People’s Commissar the further situation on my site after secondary negotiations with the army commanders."
    "Question: Why, after all, did the Germans manage to break through the front and delve into our territory?
  • svp67
    svp67 23 June 2013 10: 40 New
    0
    Answer: In the Brest direction, against the 6 and 42 divisions, the 3 mechanized corps immediately collapsed, which created superiority of the enemy, both in number and quality of equipment. The commander of the 4th Army Korobkov, having lost control and, apparently confused, could not sufficiently close the main line on his own, at least by pulling the 49 Division in this direction. A huge mass of bomber aircraft was thrown at the 6 and 42 divisions in the same Brest direction by the enemy. According to the report of Korobkov, this aircraft carefully processed the location of our infantry, and diving enemy bombers disabled the gun after the gun. The dominance of enemy aircraft in the air was complete, all the more so since our fighter aircraft already on the first day at the same time hit the enemy exactly at 4 in the morning at all airfields and was knocked out in significant numbers without getting up into the air. In total, up to 300 aircraft of all systems, including training ones, were knocked out that day. All this happened because it was dark and our aircraft could not fly into the air. I personally could not physically verify how aviation was dispersed at the airport, while Air Force commander Kopets and his deputy Tayursky, deputy. for political affairs, Lister and the chief of staff of the Air Force Taranenko reported to me that the order of the People’s Commissar of Defense on the concentrated location of aviation was fulfilled by them. ”
    "Question: Tell us how events on the front developed further.
    Answer: The headquarters of the front on June 23 received a telegram from Boldin, addressed simultaneously to the 10 army, that the 6 mechanized corps had only one quarter of the fueling. Given the need for fuel, the OSG (Fuel Supply Department) on the first day of the battle sent to Baranavichy for the 3 mechanized corps all fuel in the district, i.e., 300 tons. The rest of the fuel for the district according to the plan of the General Staff was in Maykop. Fuel Baranavichy could not advance further due to the continuous damage to the enemy railways and stations ...
    The main reason for all the troubles I consider the huge superiority of the enemy tanks and its new material part and the huge superiority of enemy aircraft ... "
    "Question: And what is your personal fault in breaking through the front?
    Answer: I took all measures to prevent the breakthrough of German troops. I do not consider myself guilty in the situation created at the front. ”
    1. krpmlws
      krpmlws 23 June 2013 13: 06 New
      -1
      Pavlov received the order to bring the first-echelon troops somewhere on June 16-19. For some reason he was silent about this during interrogation. It takes several days to bring the rifle division into combat readiness. If Pavlov acted like Kuznetsov, he would have managed bring your district on alert.
  • svp67
    svp67 23 June 2013 10: 40 New
    0
    "Question: How long did you command the Western Special Military District?
    Answer: One year….
    Question: If the main parts of the okrug were prepared for military operations, you received an order to speak on time, which means that a deep breakthrough of German troops into Soviet territory can only be attributed to your criminal actions as a front commander.
    Response: I categorically deny this accusation. I did not commit treason and betrayal.
    Question: Throughout the state border, only on the site that you commanded, German troops penetrated deep into Soviet territory. I repeat that this is the result of treasonous actions on your part.
    Answer: A breakthrough on my front occurred because I did not have a new material part, as much as, for example, the Kiev Military District ... ”
    1. Grishka100watt
      Grishka100watt 23 June 2013 12: 08 New
      0
      read, great thank you.
    2. Setrac
      Setrac 23 June 2013 21: 04 New
      0
      Brevity is the soul of wit.
  • Valery-SPB
    Valery-SPB 23 June 2013 12: 36 New
    +1
    Quote: krpmlws
    . The troops of the western districts were dispersed and the Germans beat them in pieces. However, the order to bring the first echelons of covering the border of the western districts came. They probably gave him Tymoshenko and Zhukov, but Kirpanos and Pavlov criminally ignored him, but the commander of the Baltic district Kuznetsov complied with.


    "... the rifle corps of the district, deployed in the eastern regions of Belarus, on the instructions of the General Staff on June 18-21 began to advance by marching order and by rail closer to the border. Both military personnel and the civilian population of Western Belarus were aware of this. There was also information about transportation of troops of the Ural military district that began in mid-June ... "(L.M.Sandalov)

    According to the April directive of the command of the Western District for the Brest district of cover and the 4th army: the 6th page division remains in Brest, the 2nd regiment of the 42nd from the fortress and the 22th tank from Brest are withdrawn. The troops occupied extremely disadvantageous(rather than dispersed) position.

    At 24 hours, the commander and chief of staff (L.M. Sandalov) were called up to the army headquarters (4th) by order of the chief of staff of the district. Commander Korobkov on his own responsibility ordered the "red packets" with instructions to be sent to all formations.
    Up to 3 hours and 45 minutes, the commander himself personally issued two orders by telephone to raise the 42 pages of the division by alarm and the commander of 14 mechanized corps.

    At 4 hours 15-20 minutes. the shelling of Brest was launched, and at the same time an order came from the district headquarters.

    Quote: krpmlws
    Why were the three divisions concentrated in the Brest Fortress, and the tank division was located just 2 km from the border, in direct line of sight?


    Directly at the border was three divisions. Out of which TWO, consisting of the 6th and two regiments of the 42nd, and not threewere directly in the fortress. 22nd Panzer Division in the South Town of Brest.

    (Source "The First Days of the War" by L.M. Sandalov)
    1. krpmlws
      krpmlws 23 June 2013 13: 14 New
      -1
      What do you bring all this data to, what do they prove ??? That the troops were not dispersed or what? The dispersal of Soviet troops to great depths of up to 400 km is a well-known fact. Look at the field charter of the Red Army what are the norms for the size of the front of the rifle division and what it really was.
  • Mikhail3
    Mikhail3 23 June 2013 12: 54 New
    +2
    it prevented digging trenches and laying a wired connection?

    Telephone wire insulation quality. The rag was isolation ... And the wire was hard, in the ground it vomited at times.
  • Bosk
    Bosk 23 June 2013 09: 27 New
    +6
    Of course, the summer of 1941 was terribly difficult for the Soviet troops. Endless battles without visible positive results. Endless environments in which the choice was often between death and captivity. Nevertheless, the Germans were beaten. There were people who chose a more reliable position for themselves, stocked up weapons and accepted their last battle, knowing in advance how it would end. Or they organized disorderly crowds of encirclement into combat units, attacked the German cordons and broke through to their own. Sometimes it succeeded ... sometimes not. There were commanders who retained control of their troops in the most difficult situations. There were divisions, corps, and entire armies that attacked the enemy, inflicted defeat on the enemy, stubbornly defended themselves, evaded German attacks and beat themselves. Yes, they beat us so that it turned out 1,5-2 times more painfully. Each strike was answered with a double blow.This was a difficult time, but it was then that the victory was forged in the 45th.
  • Smersh
    Smersh 23 June 2013 09: 28 New
    +9
    Only the one who attacks first is ready for war
  • 094711601
    094711601 23 June 2013 09: 34 New
    +2
    Friends! Who has not seen, be sure to look at the latest achievement of Ukrainian documentary- "1941. Prohibited Truth." Not for the faint of heart!
    1. svp67
      svp67 23 June 2013 10: 05 New
      +3
      Quote: 094711601
      Friends! Who has not seen, be sure to look at the latest achievement of Ukrainian documentary- "1941. Prohibited Truth." Not for the faint of heart!
      But before watching, be sure to "vaccinate against anti-Soviet rabies ..."
  • Nevsky
    Nevsky 23 June 2013 09: 55 New
    +2
    I recommend:

    http://www.mediacentr.info/socio/v-simferopole-nardep-kommunist-podralsja-s-mili
    ciej-iz-za-portreta-stalina__94172

    Things are already bad in the Crimea ... crying
  • Selevc
    Selevc 23 June 2013 09: 56 New
    -3
    With all due respect to veterans - an article in the spirit of cheers of patriotism and hatred !!!

    And in every way they don’t want to ask another question: how could it happen that, with all the known and colossal losses, all of Germany’s plans for the summer of 1941 were thwarted?


    What a cute nonsense !!! The war began on June 22nd, and on July 10th the Germans were already standing near Smolensk ... Who cares, look where is the western border of the USSR and where is Smolensk !!!
    Zhukov himself writes that by the beginning of October 1941 there was no one to defend Moscow ... Let me, where is the Red Army? I am sure that the forces opposing the army group were the center, if not the largest army group of the Red Army, then the second largest, for sure ...

    If this is not a rout of the central group of the Red Army then what is it? What are these riddles of the 1941 half year and not the year as it is written everywhere? ...
    1. Igarr
      Igarr 23 June 2013 10: 14 New
      +7
      Well, you write nonsense ...
      The results of the war are considered based on the results.
      Our result is May 9, 1945. And surrender - a little earlier. Yes, Japan.
      Everything else is a process.
      ..
      When they play chess, pawns and pieces are given easily. For Victory.
      Though a nasty analogy - but true.
      ..
      ". Zhukov himself writes that by the beginning of October 1941 there was no one to defend Moscow .." - there was nobody. There was nothing.
      And Berlin has fallen!
      ..
      And all your intelligence.
      1. Selevc
        Selevc 23 June 2013 10: 28 New
        -7
        Berlin fell - but Germany lost 7 million people in the war and the USSR 20 (and now they say that 25 or 26) - how do you feel? And this despite the fact that the USSR at the beginning of the war had one of the best armies in the world !!!

        When they play chess, pawns and pieces are given easily. For Victory.
        Though a nasty analogy - but true.

        Never mind pawns - millions of people, vast territories and in fact most of the Red Army manpower and equipment ...
        1. Rattenfanger
          Rattenfanger 23 June 2013 11: 53 New
          +7
          Quote: Selevc
          Germany lost 7 million people in the war and the USSR 20 (and now they say that 25 or 26

          In Ukraine, common sense has been officially recognized as a criminal legacy of the bloody communist regime? And it got, along with logic, banned?
          Of the 27 million dead, more than 20 million are peaceful people.
          1. Selevc
            Selevc 24 June 2013 13: 24 New
            0
            Quote: Rattenfanger
            Of the 27 million dead, more than 20 million are peaceful people.

            It’s hard to kill such a number of people physically - as if the Germans would not bomb and mock ...

            When I read articles and comments about the topic on June 22 of the 41st year, I read a lot of emotions that are sometimes angry and joyful from everywhere and almost no one wants to understand the details of the events ...
        2. Rider
          Rider 23 June 2013 12: 17 New
          +9
          Quote: Selevc
          but Germany lost 7 million people in the war


          when I hear such allegations, I am always tormented by the question of why Germany, having 80 million people (mobility is 15-17 million people) and losing (according to you) 7 million, at the end of the war called on boys 14-16 years old and old people over 60.

          A good review of the total losses of Germany.

          http://www.poteryww2.narod.ru/index.html
          1. smile
            smile 23 June 2013 16: 39 New
            +3
            Rider
            I’ll add a little on the Reich’s mobility capabilities — they also called for a mass of people from Europe — 13 people were called up to the Wehrmacht in microscopic Luxembourg — I repeat, these are not volunteers — they are called up. If you count only those called up outside the territory of Germany, you will get millions. Yes + lots of volunteers.

            to comrade Seleucus

            In total, according to various sources, from 22 to 24 million people are called to the Wehrmacht. And this is only in the Wehrmacht! And where did they all go if we didn't kill them? Fled to Antarctica? :))))
        3. revnagan
          revnagan 23 June 2013 14: 42 New
          -1
          Quote: Selevc
          Berlin fell - but Germany lost 7 million people in the war and the USSR 20 (and now they say that 25 or 26) - how do you feel?

          You know, I still believe that there was nothing for us to spare the German population and prisoners of war, as well as satellites of Nazi Germany - in all enemy territories where our troops entered it was necessary to conduct a total cleansing of human potential. Then the losses of Germany and its allies would easily exceed ours 2-3 times. I regretted it, I didn’t want to be like them, and now people like you have the opportunity to trump such a question ... I hope our people will draw the right conclusions from this, and with defeated in the future, we will act like a Pecheneg and the Khazars. "Nedorublenny forest grows again" -can leave enough defeated enemies hope for a rematch?
          1. Was mammoth
            Was mammoth 23 June 2013 14: 49 New
            +2
            Quote: revnagan
            it was necessary to conduct a total stripping of human potential.

            Are you a fan of Hitler’s ideas? The Soviet warrior was different from the Nazis in that, considering the war dirty and hard work, he remained a man with a capital letter.
          2. smile
            smile 23 June 2013 16: 41 New
            +2
            revnagan (
            We have never been able to do this - we are simply not like them. It was not possible in principle.
        4. kush62
          kush62 23 June 2013 15: 04 New
          +1
          Quote: Germany lost 7 million people in the war and the USSR 20 (and now they say that 25 or 26)
          Mr. Seleus suggests destroying civilians? It was necessary to burn cities and villages with people? And the rest to burn in crematoria?
          To equal the losses. So we are not fascists !!!
          1. Selevc
            Selevc 24 June 2013 13: 41 New
            -1
            Again, continuous emotions - the USSR in the first half of the Great Patriotic War waged a defensive war, and as you know, in any war the attacking party suffers more severe losses than the defending ... Further - the USSR left almost the entire European part of its territory in the 41st 42nd years - and this is a densely populated territory with a large number of cities - big and small ... Then in 1943-45 I had to repel all this with fierce resistance of the Wehrmacht and as everyone knows, the city battles are the hardest ... Plus, half of Europe also had to be freed - they took Warsaw, Prague Budapest ie, Bucharest, Vienna, Berlin, Poznan and Keniksberg. These are all huge cities - and it is simply impossible to take them without major losses ... This is still without taking into account especially hot battles such as Stalingrad, Kursk, Sevastopol, Rzhev, Kharkov, etc. etc.

            Summing up all of the above, I want to especially note - the course of the Second World War speaks of major losses in the Red Army !!! In the first half of the war - many were taken prisoner, or defeated in boilers, and in the second half of the war many of our soldiers were killed liberating the USSR and Europe ... And no matter how patriots screamed, the statistics are stubborn !!! Based on their point of view, it turns out that the Germans were either completely stupid, or slanting, or armless, or simply didn’t know how to fight - and they knew how much more they could, the best gunners, pilots, tankers from all over Europe fought on the Wehrmacht !! ! And I very much suspect that defeating them without big sacrifices was simply impossible ...
            1. saha6052
              saha6052 27 June 2013 15: 02 New
              0
              Quote: Selevc
              And I really suspect that defeating them without big sacrifices was simply impossible
              There is nothing impossible if there is Mind and Will. If it were not for the struggle for power which is Power! and the extermination of potential competitors (just in case). Some officer has a replica: we wash with Semyon in the bath, and the winds are cold on the 37th. I say: Semyon! -and tomorrow you and me! Semyon answers : wash calmly, do not take fools.
        5. sanych your division
          sanych your division 23 June 2013 15: 47 New
          0
          and for the difference in losses, those who neglected intelligence and believed in the disinformation of the Germans are responsible. simple Russian people who fell and fought for their homeland, only ETERNAL GLORY
        6. Setrac
          Setrac 23 June 2013 21: 47 New
          0
          Quote: Selevc
          Berlin fell - but Germany lost 7 million people in the war and the USSR 20

          Another crime of the Deutsch, the murder of civilians and prisoners. Every fifth German died in Russian captivity, every fifth Russian survived in German captivity.
      2. krpmlws
        krpmlws 25 June 2013 18: 25 New
        -2
        Igarr, read the title of the article under discussion and the question: can you say something in essence? In fact, your position is ostrich, because you do not say anything about the causes of failures, thereby not revealing systemic causes that may not be overcome at the present time. In addition, your expression “process” is cynical and inappropriate.
    2. Rattenfanger
      Rattenfanger 23 June 2013 10: 26 New
      10
      Quote: Selevc
      Excuse me, where is the Red Army?

      In boilers. Without supplies, wounded, hungry, with a minimum of BC. Dying, they won. Clinging to the Germans, like a bulldog in a bull.
      Read Manstein, or Halder, how much resentment! It’s impossible! They should have surrendered, barbarians! They are crazy! And in that spirit. The OKV and OKH analysts did not take into account such a variable in their equation as the armed masses of people with a suppressed self-preservation instinct.
      1. Igarr
        Igarr 23 June 2013 10: 35 New
        10
        You don’t even know the numbers ..
        According to Krivosheev, it is quite comparable with Germany. And in relative numbers - you know what it is - we are so in general, with a big plus.
        And under Gorbachev they shouted - 47 million were lost.
        Under Stalin, it was said - 20 million. So this figure - as it was true then, remains true now.
        Eh, people .... so the desire to crap themselves so?
        And I - I don’t want to - walk with you, laced with shit. Go yourself.
        ..
        Guns, millions.
        Let's get tyagomotin .. about the tear of a child, about the value of human life ...
        It is valuable, life - when brought to the altar of the Fatherland.
        Otherwise, it is ... content. It seems like cats are kept in the house.
  • chauvinist
    chauvinist 23 June 2013 10: 21 New
    -16
    Nefig was to destroy combat generals and officers in 30x. And only the vast territories and heroism of the soldiers saved the Great Patriotic War of the USSR. The war was won not by Stalin, neither by the marshals, nor by the CPSU, and the war was won by the simple Russian Vanya, who laid his soul on the altar of victory.
    1. Igarr
      Igarr 23 June 2013 10: 24 New
      10
      Another theorist ...
      List by name .. of the destroyed generals and marshals who were given to tear to pieces by vandals?
      Maybe it's Zhukov? Vasilevsky? Chernyakhovsky? Petrov? Rrokossovsky? Badanov?
      ..
      Where do you come from? So smart theorists?
      1. Rider
        Rider 23 June 2013 12: 22 New
        +3
        Quote: Igarr
        Where do you come from? So smart theorists?


        Well, how are you?

        Not for nothing are the Rezuni Svanidze Sokolovs working, etc.

        however, if a person wants news with a (-) sign, he will certainly find them.
    2. crest 57
      crest 57 23 June 2013 15: 18 New
      +1
      chauvinist
      Nefig was to destroy combat generals and officers in 30x. And only the vast territories and heroism of the soldiers saved the Great Patriotic War of the USSR. The war was won not by Stalin, neither by the marshals, nor by the CPSU, and the war was won by the simple Russian Vanya, who laid his soul on the altar of victory.

      Diagnosis:
      "No mental illness. Just doo."
      1. Corsair5912
        Corsair5912 23 June 2013 17: 15 New
        +1
        Quote: crest 57
        chauvinist
        Nefig was to destroy combat generals and officers in 30x. And only the vast territories and heroism of the soldiers saved the Great Patriotic War of the USSR. The war was won not by Stalin, neither by the marshals, nor by the CPSU, and the war was won by the simple Russian Vanya, who laid his soul on the altar of victory.

        Diagnosis:
        "No mental illness. Just doo."

        Not territories are at war, people, technology and economics are at war.
        Germany had its own well-developed military industry, as well as industry in Austria, Czechoslovakia, France, Holland, Denmark, etc. thousands of captured tanks, aircraft, guns, cars, etc.
        The Germans had excellent machine tools and highly skilled, experienced workers and engineers in the factories.
        The USSR had factories built in the 30 years, workers and engineers who came to industry from villages after schools and labor schools in the 30 years. New military equipment was mainly under development.
        The Germans of 3 of the year were preparing for an attack, creating roads, military depots on the border, etc.
        1. saha6052
          saha6052 27 June 2013 16: 36 New
          0
          The Germans prepared for an attack for 3 years, created roads, military depots on the border, etc. [/ quote]
          Once again, for the slow-witted: the Germans are one of the most advanced peoples in world history, and not the Chumga-chang aborigines and not suicides. The country is made weak by provoking war - it provokes an attack, it doesn’t attack the strong! -More expensive-Iraq attacked the United States ? Libya, Vietnam, Yugoslavia? In general, a scene from a movie: a savage runs across the Earth with a torch in his hand and sets fire to the dry grass of traditional states, from Morocco to China (or Japan?) - while to China and shouts in Purely Amerian language: gentlemen! I invite you to another persecution of the Russian beast! -nothing changes under the moon th.
      2. saha6052
        saha6052 27 June 2013 16: 27 New
        0
        Quote: crest 57
        The war was won not by Stalin, neither by the marshals, nor by the CPSU, and the war was won by the simple Russian Vanya, who laid his soul on the altar of victory.
        The crest understands the subject, not only Vanya and the brothers in the Union, it is impossible to forget, and of course, the Myth is the Worker-Peasant Republic! Betrayed by the Goats.
  • Selevc
    Selevc 23 June 2013 10: 26 New
    -6
    Why was the Red Army not ready for an attack by Nazi Germany?

    The article does not answer this question - and the answer is simple but sad The Red Army was ready for a big war ... But for me, for example, it’s a huge mystery why such powerful Red Army groups were concentrated at the Western border of the USSR ... And these are millions of people, tens of thousands of pieces of equipment, ammunition, fuel and lubricant depots, etc. ... This doesn’t interfere with the defensive strategy RKKA ... If our country was preparing for defense - why expose such enormous forces to a potential enemy? This is possibly somehow explained by the general pre-war strategy of the Red Army in the event of an enemy attack - to repulse the enemy’s blow and then go on the offensive ... But to repulse the blow did not work !!!

    And Stalin’s behavior in the early days of the war is completely mysterious ...

    In 1940, Germany perfectly demonstrated Blitzkrieg’s tactics in the Arden operation ... And this is comparatively in a theater of operations narrow by Russian standards ... Didn’t the Kremlin understand that the Germans would also fight against the USSR? - the more so since it would unfold where ...
    1. Igarr
      Igarr 23 June 2013 10: 42 New
      +2
      Andrew...
      Germany perfectly demonstrated the Blitzkrieg tactics in the Soviet Union.
      One problem ... a little one.
      This turned out to be a tactic - not a BLITZCRIG.
      And the tactics are deep embraces and rounds. Here they are well done.
      ..
      BlitzKrieg - lightning war. Translated from German, who does not know.
      A war of 4 years long, with a defeat at the end - somehow in a scrap, consider Blitzkrieg?
      How do you think?
      1. Selevc
        Selevc 24 June 2013 14: 48 New
        -1
        On June 22, the Germans started the war and on July 11 they were already standing under the walls of Smolensk - behind Belarus, and these are huge territories by European standards - if it’s not Blitzkrieg then what?
        The Germans did not achieve all their assigned tasks - but their offensive in the year 41 was very swift ... As by the way in the year 42 too ...
    2. Rattenfanger
      Rattenfanger 23 June 2013 12: 01 New
      +2
      Quote: Selevc
      The article does not give an answer to this question - and the answer is simple but sad, the Red Army was ready for a big war ... But for me, for example, a huge mystery why such powerful Red Army groups were concentrated at the Western border of the USSR ...

      What a talent disappears! I saw what the best German generals did not see! crying
      Yes, open the sources at last, and read what the Germans write!
      "...the group of Soviet troops on June 22 did not speak in favor of the intention to launch an offensive in the near future"(E. von Manstein, “Lost Victories,” AST, 2003, p. 190)
    3. Rider
      Rider 23 June 2013 12: 33 New
      +3
      Quote: Selevc
      And Stalin’s behavior in the early days of the war is completely mysterious ...



      and why is it expressed?

      I hope you will not voice the 10-day "drinking bout" IVS?
      otherwise the work documents in the Kremlin have long been published.
    4. Mikhail3
      Mikhail3 23 June 2013 13: 14 New
      +1
      What is a "defensive strategy"? Are you so "thin" trying to push through the thought that we were preparing to take over the world, and Hitler was ahead of us? Somewhere I already read all this ... When someone tries to hit you in the eye, you can hide behind a block. And you can leave and break the oncoming one. Does the use of a competent counter strike mean that you are a vicious aggressor and you yourself wanted to score an opponent, he just got ahead of you?
      The Red Army did not know how to defend itself, so it was still set by the dearest Lev Davidich, who, I recall, created it. The tactics that were adopted by the Red Army, suggested a powerful counter strike in the technique, which was adopted by her command. So what? Does this mean that we wanted to attack everyone? Stalin’s “mysterious behavior” is the behavior of a person who, like any person, can directly control no more than four people. And he is forced to urgently, in an indescribable time pressure, transfer the burden of management, removing some and loading completely different people, while simultaneously trying to completely rethink the mountains of information that had already been evaluated, but the assessment suddenly turned out to be simply worthless.
      I dare to assume that your head would simply burst. But Stalin simply "behaved strangely" for several days. Then he began our Victory ...
      1. saha6052
        saha6052 27 June 2013 16: 48 New
        0
        Quote: Mikhail3
        But Stalin simply "behaved strangely" for several days. Then he began our victory.

        Misha, did you live in '91? This is the real victory of Stalin, the funeral of the USSR. Who destroyed Lviv and produced jackals? Who turned the party into the "Order of the Sword-bearers?" - The Mafia, Who eliminated the Communists and criminals considered socially close? Who turned the Revolution into a coup d'état and a struggle for power, he not only did not reduce the despotism and dictatorship of the Bureaucracy, but strengthened it through provocative theses about the aggravation of the class struggle as it approached communism? But can you count all this out?
    5. crest 57
      crest 57 23 June 2013 15: 28 New
      0
      Selevc (1)
      The article does not give an answer to this question - and the answer is simple but sad, the Red Army was ready for a big war ...

      To begin with, the aggressor always has an advantage over the victim, no matter how well prepared.
      Further, Germany was at war, and therefore, according to the Geneva Conventions and the rules of war, had the full right to the army of war, while the USSR, not being at war, according to the same conventions, had no right to the army of war. Announce the mobilization of the USSR until June 22nd, and he immediately becomes in line with the aggressors. Here is a policy.
      And, excuse me, what do you see "the mysterious behavior of Stalin in the first days of the war ..."?
      1. Selevc
        Selevc 24 June 2013 14: 55 New
        0
        The war began on June 22 and Stalin addressed the people already on July 3 !!! How do you like the difference - more than 10 days? And this is all the time when the enemy was already bombing the cities of the USSR and was actively advancing - from the first person’s face to the ears ... Maybe he actually went to the cottage and waited until Tymoshenko, Zhukov and others report that the enemy was defeated and the Red Army went on the offensive? It was such a course of war, by the way, that his marshals promised him ...

        The very course of the first days (weeks) of the war speaks of the passivity of the Soviet leadership - but at the front, meanwhile, the bill went not for days but for hours !!!
        1. Setrac
          Setrac 24 June 2013 16: 27 New
          -2
          Quote: Selevc
          The very course of the first days (weeks) of the war speaks of the passivity of the Soviet leadership - but at the front, meanwhile, the bill went not for days but for hours !!!

          But what about the evacuation of industry east? This fact contradicts your words.
  • mirror
    mirror 23 June 2013 10: 28 New
    +2
    Something I did not meet those who joyfully ask this question. Apparently, the author really wants these people to be. The other day I downloaded from the network a document informing that my uncle went missing in February 1942 near Leningrad. And I have a question for people who have taken the trouble of governing the country: not why we were not ready for war, AND WHY WE WOULD SO READY FOR A WAR? I understand that even excellent preparedness might not have saved my uncle, and that the fate of one person in a war is just a grain of sand. But there are millions of such grains of sand, and those who ask this question, too. As far as I remember, in the movies, books and history books they repeated the mantra that we did not have time to rearm, that the Germans treacherously deceived us, etc. But after all, forces and means were pulled to the very border. The fortified areas were disarmed. And it was sad: are we really so stupid? Was the country's leadership so stupid? And it was a little disappointing. I know that they are now clicking on the minuses - but somehow I read Suvorov's “Icebreaker”, and even some kind of pride appeared for ours. If you were preparing to strike, then everything was done right, and our military leaders were not idiots. And I think that it would be worthwhile to listen to Karl von Clausewitz: A STATE ACTOR WHO SEES THAT WAR IS INEVITABLE AND CANNOT RESOLVE TO PUNCH THE FIRST PUNCH, GUILTY OF A CRIME AGAINST YOUR COUNTRY. And the point! And our people know how to close the country with bare breasts, for which they honor and glory.
  • creak
    creak 23 June 2013 10: 36 New
    +2
    Failure with
    Quote: krpmlws
    Why were the three divisions concentrated in the Brest Fortress, and the tank division was located just 2 km from the border, in direct line of sight? There are a lot of questions ..


    I will touch on only a few aspects of the commentary. On the eve of the war, only the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions were deployed in the Brest Fortress without a number of units and subunits at the training camps, and not at all three. But this is by the way .. The main reason for the unsuccessful use of mechanized corps consisted of a number of factors: their imbalance and cumbersome structure: so the 8th MK of the Kiev Military District had 858 tanks of eight different types of which 171 were equipped with diesel engines, and the rest - gasoline and required gasoline of three different brands. The tanks had guns of various modifications and calibres - 37, 45 and 76 mm. In artillery regiments were 122 mm. howitzers and 152 mm guns. Under the conditions of a maneuverable war, the supply of a colossus, when exposed to the enemy, went beyond the limits of human capabilities ... But the most serious problem was command and control and, accordingly, organization of interaction. There were 4 armies and 8 mechanized corps at the disposal of the state of the Southwestern Front. It was impossible to control these troops at the same time and each corps was assigned tasks separately. This was the reason for the loss of our troops in the oncoming major tank battle of Lutsk-Dubno-Brody. Although some of the corps and in the setting of the competing task were working successfully enough and inflicted tangible losses on the Germans. What prevented the burial of selling in trenches? Common sense. HOW can you control troops on the march and in battle by wire. Unfortunately, the few radio stations available in the troops were used extremely rarely and the front command preferred to send communications delegates to the troops in cars and motorcycles, which led to delay and confusion. There are a number of factors that seriously influenced the course of hostilities, but in this case I will not dwell on them.
    1. svp67
      svp67 23 June 2013 10: 48 New
      +2
      Quote: ranger
      I will touch on only a few aspects of the commentary.

      “No. 5. The protocol of the closed court session of the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR in the case of Pavlov D.G., Klimovskikh V.E., Grigoriev A.T. and Korobkova A. A. [3]
      Moscow 22

      July 1941

      Top secret

      Otp. 1 copies

      Presiding - armwrestler V.V. Ulrich [4] Members - Divnenoyurist A.M. Orlov and the divinorist D.Ya. Kandybin Secretary - Military Lawyer A. S. Mazur.

      At About 20 hours, the presiding judge opened a hearing and announced that the case was to be tried on charges of former commander of the Western Fronts, Army General Pavlov Dmitry Grigoryevich, former chief of staff of the Western Front, Major General Klimovskikh Vladimir Efimovich, both of the crimes under Art. Art. 63 – 2 and 76 of the Criminal Code of the BSSR; the former chief of communications of the headquarters of the Western Front, Major General Andrei Terentyevich Grigoriev and the former commander of the 4 Army, Major General Alexander Korobkov, both of them in the crime under Art. 180 p. "B" of the Criminal Code of the BSSR.

      Having ascertained the self-determination of the defendants, the presiding judge asks them whether a copy of the indictment has been handed over to them and whether they have familiarized themselves with it.

      The defendants answered in the affirmative.

      The composition of the court is announced and the defendants are explained the right to withdraw someone from the composition of the court if there are grounds for that.

      There was no challenge to the composition of the court by the defendants.

      There were no petitions before the start of the judicial investigation.

      Judicial investigation:

      The presiding judge announces the indictment and asks the defendants whether the charges against them are clear and whether they plead guilty.

      1. Defendant Pavlov. The charge against me is clear. I plead not guilty of participating in an anti-Soviet military conspiracy. I have never been a member of an anti-Soviet conspiratorial organization.

      I plead guilty that I did not manage to check the fulfillment by the commander of the 4 Army Korobkov of my order on the evacuation of troops from Brest. At the beginning of June, I ordered the withdrawal of units from Brest to the camps. But he did not fulfill the boxes of my order, as a result of which the three divisions, when leaving the city, were defeated by the enemy.

      I plead guilty that I understood the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army in my own way and did not bring it into effect in advance, that is, before the advance of the enemy. I knew that the enemy was about to come out, but they assured me from Moscow that everything was in order, and I was ordered to be calm and not to panic. I cannot name the surname who told me this. ”
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. The comment was deleted.
    2. krpmlws
      krpmlws 23 June 2013 12: 54 New
      0
      Thanks svp67, about the number of divisions in Brest. 1. Indeed, microns were cumbersome, but it was not necessary to pass off this as the main factor. Our commanders, as a rule, did not know how to command tank divisions. It doesn’t matter in principle if they were subordinate to microns of staff of 41g or 45g. 2. No need to fantasize: “the inability to control the MK was the reason for the loss ...” The bottom line is that you can analyze the combat use of tanks in the Red Army and the Wehrmacht and make sure that the cause of the Red Army's failure to understand the specifics of using tanks in battle. 3. As for communication. Zhukov in the spring of 41 raised this question before Tymoshenko, to which the latter said that this issue could be resolved by August 41. This is a crucial question, because due to this disorder there was no normal connection between whom. county com. armies and the center. Therefore, there is little common sense in your words ...
  • Valery-SPB
    Valery-SPB 23 June 2013 10: 44 New
    0
    It is very likely because (and this is why it is customary to forget about it) that in the summer of 1941 the Red Army consisted of 80% of untrained or untrained recruits. In 1938, it numbered about 800 thousand people, in 1939 - 2 485 000, in 1941 - 5 774 000. Thus, most of it consisted of recently called up people who had no combat experience and had just begun to undergo military training.


    Under the General Military Duty Act of 1939, they were drafted from 19 years old, with secondary education from 18. Drafting began on September 15. The service life in the infantry is 2 years, ml.com.composition 3 years.
    The first appeal of September 1939 gave 4 ages. Three, reached 19, 20 and 21 years, 18-year-olds partially. The 1940 autumn draft gave two ages, 19 years old and 18 year olds with secondary education.

    Thus, the appeal of 39 years to June 41 had 1 year 9 months. service, appeal 40 years - 9 months.
    Also before the war, about 800 thousand were called up from the reserve. Out of stock, not recruits.

    To those recruits who later survived and threw back the enemy, how much were given for individual rifle training and rallying of units? Two month? And sometimes even less, and sometimes without it.

    What in this respect was the German army that passed through all of Europe - it is unnecessary to speak.


    “When gathering different peoples into one fist, it must be borne in mind that their community will arise only gradually by reaching a solid partnership.
    The most important prerequisite for prudent human leadership is the tireless and prolonged communication of the commander with his subordinates. He must ensure that all subordinates are imbued with the most complete trust in him and know for sure that he is the most faithful comrade for them.
    The more prudent and kind the unit will be managed, the stronger will be the internal communication of the commander and soldier, as well as the level of their combat training will increase ...
    .....Signed Steiner". (The commander of the SS division" Viking ". From the manual on education in the war).

    "Discipline and companionship are crucial. Why does a soldier leave the shelter of the trench and go towards bullets and shells? Because the commander is ahead, and the comrades are around. ... the fighter will bear everything if his heart is full of courage, if he knows what he is fighting for, I’m sure in his officers and comrades, and he knows that they will never demand from him the impossible. " (Field Marshal B. L. Montgomery "The Nature of War")
    1. rexby63
      rexby63 23 June 2013 12: 25 New
      0
      Out of stock, not recruits.


      A little crafty, do not find. What year are the storerooms?
      1. Valery-SPB
        Valery-SPB 23 June 2013 12: 41 New
        0
        Quote: rexby63
        Out of stock, not recruits.


        A little crafty, do not find. What year are the storerooms?


        What do you mean? Recruitment, in accordance with the Law, was carried out from September 15 to October 15. Who could then be called upon?
        1. rexby63
          rexby63 23 June 2013 12: 46 New
          0
          Reserves of the 35-37 year conscription had values, like soldiers, not much more than recruits. During this time, even the PU changed radically, not to mention weapons. And there is no need to speak about the psychological component of these "partisans" - "We know everything, we can do everything, we all are good." So these 800 thousand people from stock are more like a pig in a bag than artillerymen, tankers, sappers
          1. Valery-SPB
            Valery-SPB 23 June 2013 14: 38 New
            0
            Quote: rexby63
            Reserves of the 35-37 year conscription had values, like soldiers, not much more than recruits. During this time, even the PU changed radically, not to mention weapons. And there is no need to speak about the psychological component of these "partisans" - "We know everything, we can do everything, we all are good." So these 800 thousand people from stock are more like a pig in a bag than artillerymen, tankers, sappers


            I served in the Soviet Army. Then, back in the 60s, the experience of the Second World War was passed on to youth.
            The course of a young fighter is a month. "Training" ml.ach. composition - 6 months.

            Is 9 months of service and study for a draftee of 1940 (without studying the basics of protection against WMD, etc.) is it a lot or a little?
            And a year and 9 months of service for the main draft of 1939 is it a lot or a little (3 months before the "demobilization" for the l / composition of the 70s)?

            Based on your words that the values ​​called up in 1941 were not much greater, then, therefore, were they still more experienced than those who had already served 1 year and 9 months?
            1. rexby63
              rexby63 23 June 2013 17: 39 New
              +1
              The Field Charter has changed, fundamentally, the armament has changed, almost fundamentally. What did the conscript of the 35th year know from the changes that took place in 39-40 years, if he was demobilized in the 38th? This is the first. Have you met our Soviet "partisans" during your military service? Certainly not, they began to call for retraining already since the 70s. I met the craving for the development of new technology and new weapons for these men zero point and hell of a tenth. I do not think that in 41, a similarly simple peasant, taken allegedly for retraining, had different feelings. And it turns out that to teach from scratch is much faster and more problem-free. And yet - learn to read the comments of others, you do not know how to do this, I initially spoke not about calling recruits, but a call from STOCK. There is a difference?
              1. Valery-SPB
                Valery-SPB 23 June 2013 19: 04 New
                0
                Quote: rexby63
                The Field Charter has changed, fundamentally, the armament has changed, almost fundamentally. What did the conscript of the 35th year know from the changes that took place in 39-40 years, if he was demobilized in the 38th? This is the first. Have you met our Soviet "partisans" during your military service? Certainly not, they began to call for retraining already since the 70s. I met the craving for the development of new technology and new weapons for these men zero point and hell of a tenth. I do not think that in 41, a similarly simple peasant, taken allegedly for retraining, had different feelings. And it turns out that to teach from scratch is much faster and more problem-free. And yet - learn to read the comments of others, you do not know how to do this, I initially spoke not about calling recruits, but a call from STOCK. There is a difference?


                Have you read everything carefully? AT 1967I served in the training and missile brigade of operational-tactical missiles (8K14). You were young, you’re talking about the 70s. So, we already, ALREADY, called the so-called partisans. Alas! Missiles were not taught to launch them. But the service? Fueling complexes, for example. Radio communication and weather reconnaissance units, transport and loading complexes.
                How many, for example, active bayonets (shooters) in a rifle division are 41 years old with a staff of 14 thousand? Less than 4 thousand.
                Always, most served less. A minority launched rockets, and the majority served them.
                In Siberia, to serve our separate regiment of the first cruise missiles, there was still a whole regiment. Although no one was going to teach him a rookie in this regiment, even though he was a “partisan,” he was not going to launch rockets.
                Is the idea clear?
                1. rexby63
                  rexby63 23 June 2013 20: 31 New
                  0
                  Have you never commanded these "partisans"? And yet - in the 41st they really called from the reserve not “active” bayonets, but specialists (tankmen, artillerymen, sappers, signalmen), but it was necessary to retrain and retrain them even more seriously. than shooters. There were active bayonets from 3200 to 4500, but the rest were artillerymen about 2500 people, tankers - 350 people, sappers - 500 people who needed to master NEW TECHNIQUE, fundamentally NEW, and some of them did not even consider it.
          2. zavesa01
            zavesa01 23 June 2013 16: 56 New
            -1
            That is, according to your draft soldiers in 2009 sucks, and in 2013 real soldiers.
            1. rexby63
              rexby63 23 June 2013 17: 45 New
              -1
              Sucks both those and others. For those who do not know how to read Russian - in 1939 the Field Charter of the Red Army changed, at the same time there was an intensive rearmament
              1. Rattenfanger
                Rattenfanger 23 June 2013 18: 24 New
                -1
                Quote: rexby63
                Sucks both those and others

                Aha-aha. One of you is D'Artagnan. All who are not lying around after all.
                1. rexby63
                  rexby63 23 June 2013 18: 59 New
                  0
                  Are you offended?
                  1. Rattenfanger
                    Rattenfanger 23 June 2013 19: 48 New
                    -1
                    No, it’s funny to be honest laughing
  • vini-buh
    vini-buh 23 June 2013 11: 00 New
    -2
    bez bazara. why on the fourth day of the war the Germans ALREADY stood near Minsk.
  • Strashila
    Strashila 23 June 2013 11: 33 New
    +2
    The Red Army grind the European team led by Nazi Germany. We like to consider only 1941, but also the hardest year of 1942.
  • creak
    creak 23 June 2013 11: 41 New
    +2
    Quote: svp67
    I plead guilty that I did not manage to check the fulfillment by the commander of the 4 Army Korobkov of my order on the evacuation of troops from Brest. At the beginning of June, I ordered the withdrawal of units from Brest to the camps. But he did not fulfill the boxes of my order, as a result of which the three divisions, when leaving the city, were defeated by the enemy.


    We are talking about three divisions i.e. the 6th, 42nd infantry and 22nd tank. The latter was never stationed in the fortress, but was located near the Bug River and suffered heavy losses in the first hours of the war.
    Moreover, the headquarters of the 6th and 42nd divisions and 6 SK were located in vg. Brest, and not in the Fortress. Thus, by June 22, there were about 9 thousand military personnel in the fortress, including units of the army, district and central subordination (for example, a battalion of NKVD escort troops) .In addition, an unidentified number of enlisted personnel was raised in the fortress before the war. The interrogation protocol says that the divisions were raided upon leaving the city, and not their fortresses (evacuation of troops from Brest).
    1. svp67
      svp67 23 June 2013 11: 44 New
      +2
      Quote: ranger
      22-th tank.

      My grandfather started the war in this division, and miraculously survived ... In the first minutes of the war he was heavily shell-shocked and evacuated to the rear, many were not so "lucky"
    2. krpmlws
      krpmlws 23 June 2013 13: 21 New
      -1
      TD was not in Brest, so she could not leave the fortress.
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Andy
    Andy 23 June 2013 12: 11 New
    +1
    because in a clash of equal - always one wins. And it's not always you.


    our gay Ropeians (including some visitors to this site with turtles on their shoulders) cannot understand this. I honestly don’t know if all the heroes and strategists could use the computer itself, but in reality ... from the first minutes of the war went to death. and I'm proud of my grandfathers that went through it. and it never occurred to me to ask my grandfather the question “how did they say they’ve mischief?” I’ll say that they didn’t wait for the attack. I didn’t get to the part (Lithuania) where the grandfather served although there were fighting for several hours. The alarm was announced only when the bombs fell. We must pay tribute they knew how to fight Fritzam, they knew how to carry out sabotage and blocked the communication. but the war ended in Berlin, so they stood up in an open battle, outplayed the enemy. Should we be ashamed of what our grandfathers went through? Each one decides for himself, this is a test question for REASON AND CONSCIENCE [/ quote]
  • True
    True 23 June 2013 12: 31 New
    -6
    Because there was complete incompetence of the command, therefore it was and was not ready. Now it’s not customary to recall that the USSR on June 22 exceeded the Wehrmacht’s forces in Western regions.
    Like 1904, the Russian fleet was three times stronger than the Japanese.
    1. Rattenfanger
      Rattenfanger 23 June 2013 13: 03 New
      +2
      Quote: True
      Now it’s not customary to recall that the USSR on June 22 exceeded the Wehrmacht’s forces in Western regions.

      I wildly apologize, but P. Karel (from the Nazis, by the way), speaks of a 2-fold overall superiority in the theater of operations, and ten-fifteen-fold superiority in the directions of attacks. And all in favor of the Wehrmacht.
      Above, the numbers have already been announced: 5,7 million. ALL THE RKKA and 5,5 million invading troops.
      Excuse me, are you indulging in drugs?
  • valmer
    valmer 23 June 2013 12: 46 New
    0
    Not to mention the fact that we, unfortunately, too often find ourselves not ready for anything. Were we ready for the 1812 war of the year? Are we ready for frosts? Are you ready for winter? Are you ready for sowing? Are you ready for fall? Are you ready for harvest? Are you ready for crop failure?


    In my opinion, you can’t say how much you’re not preparing, but all one. Sadness.
  • tixon444
    tixon444 23 June 2013 13: 09 New
    +2
    Why was the Red Army not ready for an attack by Nazi Germany?

    And who then tore Germany and their satellites like a tusik heating pad? To defeat the most powerful military machine in less than 4 years - which army is capable of this?
    In 1941, the USSR did not have a military doctrine in the form in which we understand it now. The war was to be fought on the territory of the aggressor. A powerful rebuff and the transition to a counterattack - such a task was assigned to the troops. And the army completed the task, like, this is another matter.

  • Russ69
    Russ69 23 June 2013 13: 18 New
    +4
    It seems to me that it is unlikely that any article will explain the reasons for the defeat in the first weeks of the war. Too much of everything is mixed up there and not the decisiveness of some commanders and the preparation of the army and logistical support.
    And to argue on this topic, it seems to me will forever lead a bunch of facts.
  • Misantrop
    Misantrop 23 June 2013 13: 28 New
    +4
    Quote: Russ69
    And to argue on this topic, it seems to me will forever lead a bunch of facts.

    Better to find at least one single positive result of the military clash with Germany of those years, ANY other country in the world. Which KNEW, UNDERSTAND and PREPARED, having for this decade of quiet development. Or at least an ally of Germany. US entry into the war with Japan began with brilliant victories? Or require less time and resources? Maybe England can boast of brilliant victories for the start of the war? At least against Rommel’s corps. Or France? Let them show by their own example HOW it was necessary to RIGHT to act in those conditions. And after that, let them criticize ...
    1. krpmlws
      krpmlws 25 June 2013 17: 50 New
      -2
      “How it was necessary to fight” was shown, sadly, by the Germans. In addition, there is such an institute as military science, which was not up to the mark here, unlike German science. The conclusion is obvious: to actively develop domestic military science, military education and strengthen the channel of communication between science and the army.
  • starlyii
    starlyii 23 June 2013 13: 56 New
    +4
    I really liked:
    “They need freedom not to create and create - but not to answer for anything. And democracy for them is not the power of the people and the right of the majority to decide their fate - but the right of the minority to be free from the interests of the majority, interests people and any duties for any effort and tension. "
    This is very relevant today !!!
  • tixon444
    tixon444 23 June 2013 14: 10 New
    +2
    "On July 7 of 2011 in the Komsomolskaya Pravda under the general heading" Secrets of the State Archive "an interview was published with the director of this archive, doctor of historical sciences Sergey Mironenko, who, answering questions from a correspondent, shamelessly ridiculed the memory of the defenders of the capital, calling the feat of twenty-eight heroes- Panfilov’s myth, claiming that “there were no heroically fallen Panfilov’s heroes”, referring to the fact that after the war “one by one people began to appear who were supposed to lie in the grave”.

    Feat of heroes

    The historian Mironenko felt a kick in the ass and collapsed to the frozen bottom of the trench. Still not believing what was happening, he got up and looked up. On the edge of the trench in a semicircle were soldiers of the Red Army.

    - This is the last? - clarified one of the military, apparently the commander.

    “That's right, comrade political instructor!” - the soldier reported, whose kick sent the director of the State Archive to the trench.

    - Excuse me, what's going on? The historian muttered.

    “How is it going?” - grinned the political instructor. - The establishment of historical justice. Now you, Mironenko, will save Moscow from the Nazi invaders.

    Politruk pointed to a field on which several dozen German tanks froze in anticipation. Tankers climbed onto the towers and, shivering from the cold, watched with interest what was happening at Russian positions.

    - I? Why me? - Mironenko asked in shock. “What do I have to do with this?”

    “The most direct,” answered the political instructor. - All of you here have the most direct relation to this!

    The commander pointed Mironenko to the trench and the historian saw that it was full of respected people: there were already academician Pivovarov and his nephew-journalist, Svanidze was sitting by the machine gun with bulging eyes, next to him was the main de-regulator Fedotov, who was trembling from the cold, or from horror , further there were still familiar faces, but the frightened archivist completely forgot their names.

    “What are we all doing here?” - asked Mironenko. - This is not our era.

    The soldiers laughed together. Not only Russians but also Germans laughed, and even the recently killed German tanker, trying to maintain decency and pretending not to hear anything, nevertheless, shuddered with laughter.

    - Yes? - the political instructor was surprised. “But you all tell in such detail in detail how it really was!” You explain with foam at the mouth that we threw Hitler with corpses. It’s you shouting that the people won the war, not the commanders, and especially not Stalin. You explain this to everyone that Soviet heroes are a myth! You yourself, Mironenko, told us that we were a myth!

    - Excuse me, are you political instructor Klochkov? - asked Mironenko.

    “Exactly,” the commander answered. - And these are my fighters who are destined to lay their heads in this battle at the Dubosekovo junction! But you, Mironenko, assured that everything was wrong, that all these heroes were a propaganda myth! And you know what we decided? We decided to really be a myth. And to defend Moscow to trust trusted and reliable people. In particular, to you!

    - And you? The historian asked quietly.

    “And we are in the rear,” one of the fighters answered. - The guys and I were thinking to die for our homeland, for Stalin, but since we are a myth, why should we substitute bullets for nothing! Fight for yourself! (to be continued)
    1. tixon444
      tixon444 23 June 2013 14: 11 New
      +2
      “Hey Russians, how long have you been?” - shouted the shy German tankman.
      “Now, Hans, now,” the political instructor waved to him. - You see, Mironenko, time does not endure. It is time for you to defend your homeland.

      Then academician Pivovarov jumped out of the trench and rushed briskly towards the Germans with raised hands. In his hands he held white pants, which he was actively waving.

      “What a shame,” one of the fighters said.

      “Don’t worry,” Klochkov chuckled. - This is not our shame!

      Two German tankers caught Pivovarov and dragged him by the arms to the trench, dropping him down.

      “Schweine,” the German swore, looking at his overalls. “This hero of yours has pissed me off my leg with fear!”

      The second tankman shot Panfilov’s people to smoke and, drawing out, said:

      - Yes, comrades, you're out of luck! And for these here you were dying! Really in our Vaterland same have grown?

      “No, comrade,” one of the Panfilov responded to him. “You now have none.” Only gays and Turks.

      - And who are gays? - the German specified.

      A Red Army soldier whispered an answer to the aggressor in his ear. The face of the German was flooded with shame. Waving his hand, he went to the tank.

      “Let's quickly end with us,” he said. “I want to die from such things again.”

      Svanidze rushed from the trench to the political instructor.

      - Comrade commander, you misunderstood me, I didn’t say anything like that! And then, I can’t, I have a “white ticket”, I have poor eyesight and an ulcer!

      Politruk confidentially leaned towards Svanidze:
      - Do you think the tyrant Stalin was worried? He bombarded the enemy with cannon fodder! And even more so, I'm not your commander. You have your own - experienced and proven! Here he comes!

      From the depths of the trench Nikita Mikhalkov came to the place of conversation, holding a shovel from his hand.

      - Comrade political instructor, how can this be fought against tanks? - the director begged.

      “You know better,” the commander answered. “You already did this.” Yes, by the way, your beds are there. You can quickly establish anti-tank defense from them! Well, or pray, or something. Maybe help!

      Then the political instructor ordered the construction of his fighters.

      - Where are you going? - Mikhalkov asked with a longing in his voice.

      - Where to? - the political instructor grinned. - Take a position in your rear! The NKVD detachment is not at hand, so we ourselves will replace it! And if some scum from your penal battalion rushes out of position, we will shoot on the spot for cowardice and treason!

      - So there are no penal battles yet!

      - One created. Especially for you!

      German tanks roared engines. Desperate screams and swearing were heard in the trench - the new defenders of Moscow found out who was the first to expose the myths and dragged them into this story. Fedotov was beaten all together, after which he was thrown out of the trench under a German tank with a bottle. Someone shouted goodbye to him:

      - Well, for the Motherland, for Stalin!

      Mikhalkov clung to the outgoing political officer:

      - Comrade, my father fought, I was always a patriot and defender of heroes, help me!

      “Only out of respect for you,” the political instructor answered. - I give a great tool to fight the enemy! As good as it gets!

      And the commander handed the director a badminton racket and three shuttlecocks.

      “Farewell, your homeland will not forget you,” Mikhalkov, the political instructor, patted goodbye and rushed after his departing fighters ...

      http://petrovchik.livejournal.com/106038.html
      http://telemax-spb.livejournal.com/279809.html
  • Valery-SPB
    Valery-SPB 23 June 2013 14: 56 New
    0
    Because the mechanic masterly controlling the BT-6 or BT-7 could not fully master the T-34 without retraining.
    .

    Why was the Red Army not ready for war?

    For a very one and important reason. The fault of the author of the article, who armed our valiant army with BT-6 tanks! With such a tank it’s really hard to relearn on the T-34! Especially when he is not in the army!
  • Taoist
    23 June 2013 15: 22 New
    +8
    I reposted this article here. For a very simple reason. With all the shortcomings and certain “mistakes” (there really was no BT-6, there was BT-5), one very important component was noticed here. The one that is often forgotten (and sometimes deliberately ignored) by all current lovers measure kg, thousands, mm ....
    It’s not tanks or planes that fight, or even people taken separately ... Systems that fight. And 22 June 1941. this is the day when by far the best war machine in the world at that time 3go Reich stumbled upon a system not only not inferior to it in scale but also having (as it turned out) an incredible margin of stability. And this stock could not be calculated with true German thoroughness.
  • zbidnev
    zbidnev 23 June 2013 16: 08 New
    0
    You can talk a lot about the incompetence of the command, the lack of initiative in the troops as a result of purges, inexperience and much more. At that time, blitzkrieg was the latest in military art. The masters of this technique and more than once using it in practice until 1941 were Germans. Recall the results - Poland, France, Greece, Norway. In history, I have not seen an effective counteraction to this technique before the Great Patriotic War. Therefore, our grandfathers and grandmothers had to write with blood the theory and practice of maneuverable defense, the evacuation of industry beyond the Urals, the fighting in the environment in order to gain time at the cost of life. As a result, the post-war USSR was feared, I’ll say harsher before which they pissed boiling water, against which they created NATO, etc. So that the Yankees and the like do not say, we won, no matter what, it is the blood of our peoples, the glory of our ancestors. I would like that we would be worthy of our grandfathers !!!
  • Corsair5912
    Corsair5912 23 June 2013 16: 46 New
    +2
    All the reasons for the retreat of the Red Army in the first months of the war were not named by any historian, writer or commander.
    No one used the full information, not because of secrecy, but because of the incompetence of the authors.
    Recently, there was an article in Military Review about German armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns, armored tankers, projectile drivers, etc. Given these data, the imaginary superiority of the Red Army in armored vehicles (and this is not only tanks) is scattered like smoke.
    Perhaps the number of the Red Army was 5.7 million people, but in the Far East, parts of the Red Army opposed the millionth Kwantung Army, in the Caucasus there was a threat from the millionth Turkish army, and the Basmachi became more active in Central Asia.
    No one wondered how much time was needed for the transfer of troops from the Far East to Moscow, how much time was needed for the mobilization, armament and delivery of reservists to the front, how much time was needed for the transfer of factories to military products, and railway for the transportation of military goods. And all this is a FACTOR OF TIME one of the most important factors of war.
    So far, the country moved to the martial law of the Red Army without reserves and a regular supply of food and ammunition restrained the superior forces of the Nazis.
    Eternal memory to the heroes who restrained and stopped the Hitler’s hordes of non-humans at the cost of their lives.
  • Renat
    Renat 23 June 2013 18: 47 New
    0
    And yet we won. Our ancestors at such a high price, but nevertheless survived and saved the world from the brown plague. it was the Red Army that saved the world and not someone else.
  • waisson
    waisson 23 June 2013 19: 26 New
    +3
    it was not we who won, but our grandfathers and grandmothers who stood up in the most difficult conditions and then raised the country in the same conditions while giving life to our current greenhouse generation. I BEFORE THEM I WANT TO KNIFE AND WORSHIP hi hi hi
  • Gardamir
    Gardamir 23 June 2013 19: 49 New
    0
    I am not strong in military history, but were there any cases when an attacker immediately got a fight back and lost?
    1. Uzoliv
      Uzoliv 23 June 2013 20: 08 New
      0
      The Italians in 1940 invaded Greece and got in the face. Moreover, the Greeks transferred the hostilities to the territory of the enemy - occupied by Italians Albania. This is in my opinion the first victory of the countries of the anti-fascist bloc. The Germans had to save the allies.
  • Yuriwhite
    Yuriwhite 23 June 2013 20: 02 New
    0
    Ours had no combat experience. Everything else is secondary. And only in the middle of the year 43 they got in. Alas with such victims. All Eternal Memory and Glory!
  • deman73
    deman73 23 June 2013 20: 42 New
    0
    It may be enough to discuss any nonsense already, were we ready or not ready, the main thing is that OUR ANCESTORS WON WIN AND WE SHOULD BE THAT THANKS !!!
  • builder74
    builder74 23 June 2013 20: 48 New
    0
    What do we have on this subject, writes the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Halder?

    June 22: “The German offensive took the enemy by surprise ... After the initial“ tetanus ”caused by the suddenness of the attack, the enemy moved to active operations ...”

    24 June: “In general, it has now become clear that the Russians are not thinking about retreating, but, on the contrary, are throwing everything they have at their disposal towards the wedged-up German troops. ... the presence of numerous reserves in the border strip indicates that Russians from the very beginning planned a stubborn defense the border zone and for this we have created supply bases here. ”
    "Hello" to Rezun and his fans, from a German general.
  • 128mgb
    128mgb 23 June 2013 21: 36 New
    0
    Yes, where do we really .. Here the Americans were preparing for Pearl Harbor, even filmed a movie wink but something didn’t help!
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Bosk
    Bosk 23 June 2013 22: 44 New
    0
    Keitel was asked at the Nuremberg Trials ... "When did you realize that the company on the Eastern Front was lost?" and he answered in one word ... "Moscow." It turns out that even in the opinion of many senior officers of the German army ... the first six months or a year had a turning point. And yet ... I can certainly make a mistake, but it seems that in the 41st year the Germans mobilized six draft ages ... and this already says a lot.
  • Savva30
    Savva30 23 June 2013 22: 55 New
    0
    I read somewhere that a documentary source was found confirming that the retreat of our troops at the beginning of the war was a planned maneuver (it may be undesirable, but planned, the purpose of which was to "stretch" the Nazi troops for hundreds of kilometers, thereby complicating their rear support , as well as create conditions for sustainable defense by strategic reserves and retreating forces. In my opinion, this may well be true ...
    And the fact that the fighters were “green” approached military equipment on “holidays” is not worth wondering, nothing has changed to this day ... God forbid that we at least once draw the proper conclusions from our military history !!!
    1. Jurkovs
      Jurkovs 24 June 2013 08: 36 New
      0
      Do not throw on the fan. This does not work here.
  • lexe
    lexe 23 June 2013 23: 15 New
    0
    that’s a mystery ... Hitler mobilized the entire male population, calmly pulled troops to the border, pressed on the allies. As it became known that France would fall it was necessary to introduce universal and burrow into the ground at the border. Demobilization only jointly. Neglected the leader as usual practice. so did the self-arrows at the command staff after June 22 from realizing the catastrophe. The Stalinist falcons were immediately laid on the ground. What is the use of the past five-year plans with the vigorous results of arms production if everyone crossed out the first days. Assessment of the country's leadership and military commander Alnikov 2. I have the right - a relative went missing in 1941. in one of the boilers.
    The enemy was already superior in 1812. Let me remind you of the encirclement at that time, as well as major disasters. Napoleon had a very large cavalry.
    Not ... the Soviet government is the most progressive in the history of mankind. It especially cuts the contrast with our history. But the mistake could be fatal ... And it was not the leader who corrected it, but our people and the Russian soldier.
    1. Jurkovs
      Jurkovs 24 June 2013 08: 34 New
      0
      burrow into the ground
      It is still unknown who gave the order to blow up the Dota in the URA along the old border, the URA on the new border did not have time to build. The weak pace of the Wehrmacht offensive on the South-Western Front is due precisely to the fact that the URA on the old border did not have time to blow up there and the troops took up positions in these fortified areas. And they left them only because there was a threat of encirclement from the north.