Day of memory and sorrow. Why was the Red Army not ready for an attack by fascist Germany?
Some are grieving that the war has begun. That millions died. That we were not ready for war. And they are quite legitimate, among other things, wondering: why did this happen? And in their mouths - this question - the question of the causes of the tragedy.
Others also ask this question. But with a different intonation. Not with tears and torment — with barely concealed, if even concealed, triumph. With subtext - “Well, how are you then? Well, admit it, how did you break it? ”
One question - intonation is different. Feelings are different. The sides in the confrontation are different.
Intonation distinguishes them. And the manner of voicing the issue. Because it hurts alone with him. Another - joyfully.
Alone - ask him in a low voice. Or in general, about myself. And there is no such person who would not ask him about himself.
Others - ask it in the throat. Seeking to make it hurt first. Ask with pathos. Ask - triumphant. And scream. Scream. Scream.
One could say that they are screaming - not realizing that they are screaming on the graves of millions. What is immoral. But the fact is that they all shout it - perfectly aware that they shout at the graves. Because - this is their style. Image behavior. World perception.
And their hatred for those who lay in these graves. Closing, sometimes bare breasts, the road to the enemy. Those screaming hate those who died.
Because those who died, but did not give up - a challenge and denunciation of this, screaming. Which - would never go under the tank. I would never have gone, looking up, to the Gestapo gallows. They didn’t shut down the DOT, which is watering everything around with deadly fire Do not take your plane to ram.
They would simply go over to the side of the enemy, sign up for the POA, go to the police of the invaders. - And they would cover up their meanness with the words about the “intrinsic value of human life”. About unwillingness to die for the "totalitarian regime." On the "right of a free person to a free choice."
And over and over again, having received all the answers, but pretending that they did not hear them - again and again brazenly and mockingly disguising their hatred for those who were not like them, with imaginary concern for human lives - stick to others with this hurting last question.
The question is justified when it is pronounced in a half-voice with flour.
The question is mocking, when he is shouted, triumphing and gloating.
Why did this happen? Why was the Red Army not ready for an attack by fascist Germany? An agonizing question. But why reduce everything only to him?
And why did Poland, which announced, by the way, the mobilization of 1939 in April, a few months before Germany, lay down under Hitler's boots in three weeks?
And why did France, the winner in the First World War, stop resisting at six weeks? And you didn’t even try to fight for your capital? And signed a capitulation on terms more disgraceful than those dictated by Germany’s 1918 year?
And why did the British Expeditionary Force disgracefully escape in Dunkirk only thanks to Hitler's “magnanimity”?
The USSR was not ready for war? And who was ready for it? But was Russia ready in 1914 year (like England, and France, and Germany itself)?
And the US was ready to attack the Japanese on Pearl Harbor?
Not to mention the fact that we, unfortunately, too often find ourselves not ready for anything. Were we ready for the 1812 war of the year? Are we ready for frosts? Are you ready for winter? Are you ready for sowing? Are you ready for fall? Are you ready for harvest? Are you ready for crop failure?
By the way, 18 June 1941, the Soviet troops received the order: “with the receipt of this order, to bring into alert all parts in accordance with the plans for raising the alarm, but do not declare the alarm itself. All work should be carried out quickly, but without noise, without panic and talkativeness, to have the necessary standards for wearable and portable supplies necessary for life and battle. ”
All or not all parts received these orders - there are different interpretations. There is a version - that these orders were brought to the parts of the Directive of Stalin, who already on June 18 admitted the likelihood of war began in the coming days and gave the order to be ready for battle. Someone says that it was not possible to find this directive, that Stalin never gave it away.
But there were only parts that received this order. In particular, it is known for sure that 28 tank division (obviously - and other parts of the 12th mechanized corps of the Baltic Special Military Circle).
And specifically, this division launched an offensive against the German 23 troops on June 1941. And the German troops ran. Already 23 June. And the German tanks were already burning - and not yet from the strikes of the thirty-fours - but from the fire of the outdated BT-7 - and the best German T-IV tanks at that time were burning.
And in this direction - in the direction rarely remembered by Siaulia - the order was executed in the first days of the war - German troops were thrown out from the territory of the USSR. Here we received an order - and here we executed it. So there was such an order? So you could do it?
So, the point is not that he was not given away and not that the troops were unable to carry it out - but that, although he was given away, someone did not bring him to? And / or someone failed to perform it.
Those who ask this painful question “how could this happen” - with rapture and gloating - impose historical memory the idea that the summer of 41 years is the summer of the defeat and shameful defeat of the Red Army.
And in every way they don’t want to ask another question: how could it happen that, with all the known and colossal losses, all of Germany’s plans for the summer of 1941 were thwarted?
Simple question: Was the Barbarossa Plan fulfilled or failed?
The main idea of the Plan was to defeat the Red Army in the first operations and prevent its parts from moving east of the Zapadnaya Dvina and the Dnieper. Did you manage to complete these tasks or not?
And why did it happen that they failed?
And why did it happen that by the middle of July the Wehrmacht lost half of the tanks participating in the attack? And almost fifteen hundred planes?
When was it planned to seize Moscow and Leningrad? By 25 August? And go to the Volga? - By October? And it seems to enter Baku and Batumi. to the beginning of November?
How did it happen that didn't work out?
And how could it happen that 25 July at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Eastern Front of the Wehrmacht, in fact, it was recognized that none of the three army groups - neither the "North" nor the "Center" or the "South" - fully their tasks according to the plan "Barbarossa" is not fulfilled?
What do we have on this subject, writes the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Halder?
June 22: “The German offensive took the enemy by surprise ... After the initial“ tetanus ”caused by the suddenness of the attack, the enemy moved to active operations ...”
23 June: “In the south, the Russians attacked our bridgeheads on the Prut River in Romania and carried out a number of reconnaissance searches from the Chernivtsi region against the Romanian cavalry.”
June 24: “In general, it has now become clear that the Russians are not thinking of a retreat, but, on the contrary, are throwing everything they have at their disposal, towards the German troops that have come in. ... the presence of numerous reserves in the frontier zone indicates that the Russians from the very beginning planned to conduct a stubborn defense of the border zone and for this they created supply bases here. ”
June 25: “The assessment of the situation for the morning generally confirms the conclusion that the Russians decided to conduct decisive battles in the frontier zone and retreat only on certain sectors of the front, where they are forced to do so by the strong onslaught of our advancing troops.”
26 Jun: “Army Group South” is slowly moving forward, unfortunately with significant losses. The enemy, acting against Army Group South, has firm and energetic leadership ... ”
29 Jun: “At the front of Army Group South, the fighting is still going on. On the right flank of the 1 Tank Group, the 8 Russian Tank Corps, deeply wedged into our location ... This penetration of the enemy obviously caused a big mess in our rear area between Brody and Dubno ... There are also separate groups in the rear of the 1 tank group. the enemy with tanks that even advance considerable distances ... The situation in the Dubno area is very tense ...
In the center of the band of Army Group "Center", our completely mixed divisions make every effort not to let the enemy’s environment desperately penetrate in all directions from the inner ring ... "
June 30: “at the front of Army Group Center, a part ... of an enemy group broke through between Minsk and Slonim through the front of Guderian's Tank Group ... At the front of Army Group North, the enemy launched a counterattack in the Riga area and wedged into our location ... Increased activity was noted aviation the enemy in front of the army group "South" and in front of the Romanian front ... ".
And in parallel:
June 23 - Red Army counterattack on Lutsk, Shaulyaem, Grodno.
June 24 is the 2 day of the Red Army counterstrikes on the Šiauliai and Grodno directions, the 2 day of the tank battle in the region Lutsk - Brody - Rovno.
June 25 is the 3 day of the Red Army counterattacks on the Siauliai and Grodno areas. 3-day tank battle in the area Lutsk - Brody - Rivne.
The air forces of the Northern Front and the aviation units of the Northern and Red Banner Baltic Fleets simultaneously attacked Finland's 19 airfields, which they concentrated on for action on our targets of the German-fascist and Finnish aviation. Produced 250 departures.
June 26 - 4 day tank battle in the area Lutsk - Brody - Exactly. The long-range aviation of the Red Army Air Force bombed Bucharest, Ploiesti and Constanta.
June 27 - 5 day tank battle in the area Lutsk - Brody - Exactly.
June 28 - 6 day tank battle in the area Lutsk - Brody - Exactly. 4000 thousands of tanks came together.
June 29 - 7 day tank battle in the area Lutsk - Brody - Exactly. The movement of the Wehrmacht to Kiev and Smolensk was thwarted, plans to occupy them in the first week of the war were thwarted
How could this happen?
It is not true that the army of the USSR after June 22 fled and surrendered thousands.
She responded with a blow to the blow. Counterattack on the offensive. The entire first week of the war is a list of counterstrikes and counterattacks, of which only a few are listed here. And by the end of this week, the recording of the Army Chief of Staff, a description of the state of the German army after a week of fighting: "Our completely mixed divisions are doing their best ...".
This week was not a week of German triumph. This week was a week of mortal battle, whose fate was fun in the balance. And this hair then tactically appeared on the side of the Wehrmacht. There was not enough of something invisible, small - and even then everything could roll on the other side. Nothing was a foregone conclusion even in those unfavorable conditions for the USSR. Something very small wasn’t enough - and the fascist "completely mixed divisions" would roll to the West, and those fresh Soviet divisions that in real history stood up and blocked the way of the "Center" army near Smolensk - rushed through the Poland to the West ...
This is what did not come true. Something was not enough. But everything hesitated during the week. “Why did this happen ...” Maybe because the order from June 18 was not brought to all. Maybe because during the fight of equals - always wins alone. And it's not always you.
It is very likely, because (and this is why it is customary to forget about it) that in the summer of 1941, the Red Army in 80% consisted of untrained or under-trained recruits. In 1938, it counted about 800 thousand people, in 1939 - 2 485 000, in 1941 - 5 774 000. Thus, most of them consisted of newly-recruited people who had no combat experience and were just beginning to undergo military training. And not replaced by new models, technology. And in cases where new samples had time to get - they did not have time to master. Because the mechanic who masterly controls BT-6 or BT-7 - could not fully master T-34 without retraining.
What the German army that passed through the whole of Europe was in this respect is to talk too much. And this army baptized in fire already in the first week was completely mixed by the recruits for the first time who took the fight with their fierce counterattacks, counterstrikes and counterattacks.
The Wehrmacht then held out and prevailed. Tactical and situational. Because strategically - he already then basically lost the war. Because every day he lost momentum. And spent the potential and resources. Which were not intended for border battles - but for the final victory in the second stage of the offensive. Which according to the plans was to begin on the fortieth day of the war. But in fact - by the fortieth day the Wehrmacht, already exhausted in the battle of Smolensk, was forced to go on the defensive in this sector, and in Ukraine - only started the attack on Kiev. Each time, in the summer of 41, the fascist army tactically won, sacrificing to the immediate success the resources of the future strategic battle. Each time, in the summer of 41, the Red Army knocked them out before it intended to put them into action as planned.
Summer 1941 of the year for the USSR and its army is not a summer of defeat and defeat - this is a summer of strategic victory. The destruction of the strategic resources of the enemy.
Although, of course, it is pointless to deny that there were those who ran and gave up - and really huge numbers. And among them, too, were different people.
It only seems that those who today are shouting with malevolence: “How could this have happened!” - they would be among those who surrendered.
Because for them - their little life, their little meanness and their little household comfort - always more than anything else. Countries, independence, ideas, faith. They — they love to proclaim values and freedoms and democracies — but freedom and democracy — for them, only the right to relax and indulgence from duties.
They need freedom not in order to create and create - but in order not to answer for anything. And democracy for them is not the power of the people and the right of the majority to decide their own fate - but the right of the minority to be free from the interests of the majority, the interests of the people and any duty for any effort and tension.
These are - just gave up. Not having time to join the battle without firing a single shot.
Even now they have potentially surrendered - not even finding out who.
And their hateful cry: “How could this happen?” - in fact, not about how it could happen that we had to pay for the victory for the price we paid. And how it could happen that they were as clever as they who betrayed and ran across turned out to be not with the winners but among the vanquished. And how could it happen that others, whom they do not understand and hate, because they have something more valuable than biological existence for themselves - they took, stood up, and won.
The original of this material is published on the tape APN.
Chernyakhovsky Sergey Feliksovich
Head of the Department of Political Science and Head of the Department of General Political Science, Environmental Policy and Global Studies, Professor at the International Independent Environmental-Political University.
In 1981 he graduated with honors from the Moscow State Institute of History and Archives with a degree in Historical Archives.
From 1982 to 1988 - a teacher on an hourly basis, head of the teaching and methodical department of the department.
From 1988 to 1991 - postgraduate study at the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University. In November 1991 defended his thesis for the degree of candidate of philosophical sciences.
In 1990-93. People's Deputy of the Sverdlovsk District Council of People's Deputies of Moscow. Since 1990, a member of the CPSU MGK.
From 1992 to the present - teaching at the International Independent Ecological-Political Science University, Department of General Political Science. Lecturer, associate professor, professor (from 1997 to the present), deputy dean for scientific work (2001-2002), currently head of the department of political science, head. the chair.
In 1997-1999. Member of the Public Council of the NG Scenarios (Nezavisimaya Gazeta).
More 50 scientific and analytical papers. In particular, a series of articles in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, articles in magazines Kommunist (1990), Vestnik MGU, Observer, Russia 21, Polis, Politburo, Kommersant-Vlast etc. Among them - 4 collective monographs, in particular - on the election campaign 1999-2000.
Repeatedly participated in programs “Press Center” (ORT), “Voice of the People” (NTV), Russian Service Bi-Bi-Ci.
Repeatedly participated in research projects of the Carnegie Moscow Center, participated in theoretical seminars of the Carnegie Center and the S. Kurghinyan Experimental Creative Center.
In 2003, he published his author's monograph, The Inconsistency of the Communist Opposition in Modern Russia.
In 2003 - participation in the analytical project of the Carnegie Moscow Center on the analysis of the development of the election campaign in Russia, in 1999-2000. - participation in a similar project.
The problematics of scientific research: the political processes of modern Russia, the left opposition in modern Russia.
At the MNEPU he teaches the course “Political Relations and the Political Process in Modern Russia”, the course “General Political Science”, a number of special courses on the political struggle and political situation in modern Russia, and leads a political science workshop. Provides scientific guidance to graduate students of the Department of Political Science MNEPU.
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