Military Review

Long-range anti-aircraft missile system C-200


In the mid 1950s in conditions of rapid development of supersonic aviation and the advent of thermonuclear weapons Of particular relevance has become the task of creating a transported long-range anti-aircraft missile system capable of intercepting high-altitude targets. The C-75 mobile system, which was put into service in 1957, in its first modifications had a range of only about 30 km, so that the formation of defense lines on probable aircraft flight paths of a potential enemy to the most populated and industrially developed regions of the USSR using these complexes was transformed in an extremely expensive venture. Particularly difficult would be the creation of such lines in the most dangerous northern direction, which was on the shortest approach path of American strategic bombers.

The northern regions, even the European part of our country, were distinguished by a rare network of roads, low density of settlements, separated by vast spaces of almost impassable forests and marshes. A new mobile anti-aircraft missile system was required. With a greater range and height interception target.

In accordance with the Government Decisions of 19 March 1956 and 8 of May 1957, No. 501-250, many organizations and enterprises of the country were involved in the development of a long-range anti-aircraft missile system. The head organizations were identified on the system as a whole and on the ground radio-technical means of the firing complex - KB-1 GKRE, and on the anti-aircraft guided missile, which had the designation B-200 - OKB-2 GKAT for the first time. The general designers of the system as a whole and the missiles were assigned, respectively, A.A. Raspletin and P.D. Grushin.

A sketch project for a B-860 rocket (5B21) was released by OKB-2 at the end of December 1959. Special attention was paid to the design to take special measures to protect rocket design elements from aerodynamic heating that occurs during a long (more than a minute) flight with hypersonic speed. To this end, the rocket body parts most heated in flight were covered with heat protection.

In the construction of the B-860 used mainly non-deficient materials. To give the structural elements the required shapes and sizes, the most high-performance manufacturing processes were used - hot and cold stamping, large-size thin-walled casting of products from magnesium alloys, precision casting, various types of welding. A liquid-propellant rocket engine with a turbo-pump system for supplying fuel components to a single-action combustion chamber (without re-activation) worked on components that have already become traditional for Russian-made missiles. Nitric acid with the addition of nitrous tetroxide and nitrile acid were used as the oxidizing agent, and triethylaminoxylydine (TG-02, "thin") was used as the oxidizing agent. The temperature of the gases in the combustion chamber reached 2500-3000 grad.S. The engine was made according to the "open" scheme - the combustion products of the gas generator, which ensures the operation of the turbopump assembly, were emitted through the elongated nozzle into the atmosphere. The initial launch of the turbopump unit was provided by a pyrostarter. For B-860, development of starting engines using composite fuel was given. This work was carried out in relation to the recipe TFA-70, then TFA-53D.

Indicators on the range of destruction of targets looked much more modest than the characteristics of the American Nike-Hercules complex that had already entered service, or the 400 missile defense system for Dali. But after a few months, the decision of the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues from 12 September 1960. No. 136 developers were instructed to bring the range of the B-860 supersonic targets from the ESR Il-28 to 110-120 km, and the subsonic ones to 160-180 km. using the "passive" part of the rocket movement by inertia after the completion of its main engine

5B21 anti-aircraft guided missile

Based on the results of the preliminary design review, a system was adopted for further design, combining the firing complex, rockets and technical position. In turn, the firing complex included:
• command post (CP), which manages the combat operations of the firing complex;
• situation clarification radar;
• digital computer;
• up to five shooting channels.

A radar of clarifying the situation was used at the command post, which was used to determine the exact coordinates of the target with coarse target designation from external means and a single digital machine to the complex.
The firing channel of the firing complex included a target illumination radar (ROC), a starting position with six launchers, power supply facilities, and auxiliary facilities. Acquisition of the channel allowed, without reloading the launchers, to conduct successive shelling of three air targets with the simultaneous homing of two missiles at each target.


The target illumination radar (ROC) of the 4,5-cm range included an antenna post and a hardware cockpit and could operate in coherent continuous radiation mode, thus achieving a narrow spectrum of the probing signal, ensuring high noise immunity and the longest target detection range. At the same time, simplicity of execution and reliability of operation of the GOS were achieved. However, in this mode, the determination of the range to the target, which is necessary for determining the launching moment of the rocket, as well as for constructing the optimal trajectory of missile guidance on the target, was not carried out. Therefore, the ROC could also implement a phase-code modulation mode, which somewhat broadens the spectrum of the signal, but ensures obtaining the range to the target.

Reflected from the target probe signal radar illumination of the target was taken by a homing head and a semi-active radioactive fuse associated with a homing vessel operating on the same echo reflected from the target as the homing system. The control responder was also included in the complex of the onboard rocket equipment. The target illumination radar worked in the continuous radiation mode of the probing signal in two main modes of operation: monochromatic radiation (MCI) and phase-coded modulation (PCM).

In the monochromatic radiation mode, the air target was accompanied by elevation, azimuth and speed. The range could be entered manually by target designation from the command post or attached radar equipment, after which the approximate altitude of the target was determined by the elevation angle. The capture of air targets in the monochromatic radiation mode was possible at a distance of up to 400-410 km, and the transition to the auto-tracking of the target by a homing missile was carried out at a distance of 290-300 km.

To control the rocket on the entire flight trajectory to the target, a "rocket-ROC" communication line was used with an onboard low-power transmitter on the rocket and the simplest receiver with a wide-angle antenna on the ROC. In case of failure or incorrect operation of the missile defense line stopped working. In the C-200 SAM system, a digital computer, the Flame Digital Computer, appeared for the first time. It was entrusted with the task of exchanging command and coordinate information with various controls and before solving the launch task.

The C-200 anti-aircraft guided missile is a two-stage, made in the normal aerodynamic configuration, with four triangular wings of high elongation. The first stage consists of four solid-fuel boosters installed on the sustainer stage between the wings. The marching stage is equipped with a two-component 5D67 rocket engine with a pumping system for supplying fuel components to the engine. Structurally, the main stage consists of a number of compartments in which a semi-active radar homing head, onboard equipment units, a high-explosive fragmentation warhead with a safety-actuating mechanism, tanks with fuel components, a liquid propellant rocket engine, rocket rudder control units are located. The launch of the rocket is oblique, with a constant angle of elevation, with a launcher, induced in azimuth. Warhead weighing about 200kg. high-explosive fragmentation with finished striking elements - 37 thousand pieces weighing 3-5. When undermining the warhead, the angle of scattering of the fragments is 120 °, which in most cases leads to a guaranteed defeat of the air target.

Missile flight control and targeting is carried out using a semi-active radar homing head mounted on it. For narrow-band filtering of echo signals in the receiving device of the GOS, it is necessary to have a reference signal — continuous monochromatic oscillation, which required the creation of an autonomous RF heterodyne on board the rocket.

The starting position technique consisted of a K-3 rocket preparation and control booth, six 5P72 launchers, each of which could be equipped with two 5Ü24 automated power supply systems moving along specially laid short rail tracks. The use of charging machines provided fast, without a long reciprocal exhibition with the means of loading, the delivery to launchers of heavy missiles, too cumbersome to carry out manual reloading in the C-75 type. However, it was envisaged to replenish the spent ammunition with the delivery of the missiles to the launcher from the technical division by road means - on the transport-handling machine 5Т83. After that, with a favorable tactical situation, it was possible to transfer missiles from the launcher to 5Ü24 machines.

Anti-aircraft guided missile 5В21 on a transport-charging machine 5Т83

5B21 anti-aircraft guided missile on an automated charging machine

5B21 anti-aircraft guided missile on the 5П72 launcher

The launch positions 5Ж51В and 5Ж51 for С-200В and С-200 systems, respectively, were developed in the special engineering design bureau (Leningrad), and are intended for the pre-launch preparation and launch of 5В21В and 5ВХNUMXА missiles. The launch positions were a system of launching pads for PU and 3M (charging machine) with a central platform for the launch preparation booth, power stations and a system of roads that ensure automatic delivery of missiles and loading of PU at a safe distance. In addition, documentation was developed for the technical position (TP) 21Ж5, which was an integral part of the C-61A, C-200В anti-aircraft missile systems and was intended for storing 200ВХNUMXВ, 5ВХNUMXА missiles, preparing them for combat use and replenishing missiles of firing positions The complex TP included several dozen machines and devices that provide all the work in the operation of rockets. When changing the combat position, the transportation of the elements dismantled from the ROC was carried out on four biaxial low-bed trailers attached to the complex. The lower container of the antenna post was transported directly to its base after attaching the removable wheel moves and cleaning the side beds. Towing was carried out by the KrAZ-21 off-road vehicle (KrAZ-5), in which the body was loaded to increase traction.

Long-range anti-aircraft missile system C-200

As a rule, a concrete structure with earthen bulk shelter was built on the prepared stationary position of the fire divisions to accommodate part of the combat equipment of a radio engineering battery. Such concrete structures were built in several types. The construction made it possible to protect the equipment (except antennas) from fragments of ammunition, small and medium caliber bombs, aircraft cannon projectiles during enemy air raids directly on the combat position. In separate premises of the facility, equipped with pressurized doors, life support systems and air purification, there were a room for an on-call radio shift on-duty battery, a rest room, a classroom, a shelter, a toilet, a tambour and a shower room for disinfecting the battery personnel.

The composition of the C-200V:
System-wide tools:
control point and target designation К-9М
diesel power station 5EX97
distribution booth К21М
control tower K7
Anti-aircraft missile division
antenna post K-1B with radar target illumination 5Н62В
hardware cabin К-2В
K-3В launch preparation booth
distribution booth К21М
diesel power station 5EX97
Starting position 5Ж51В (5Ж51) of:
six launchers 5P72В with 5ВХNUMX (28В5) missiles
5Ü24 charging machine
5Т82 transport car (5Т82М) on KrAZ-255 or KrAZ-260 chassis
Autotrain - 5Т23 (5Т23М), transport handling machine 5Т83 (5Т83М), mechanized racks 5Я83

However, there are other schemes for deploying elements of the air defense missile system, as well as in Iran, the 2 PU scheme is adopted at launch positions, which, in general, is justified considering the single-channel target targeting scheme, high-security bunkers with spare missiles are located near the PU.

Google Earth Satellite Image: Iranian C-200 Air Defense Systems

The North Korean substitution scheme of the C-200 air defense system is also different from the one adopted in the USSR.

Satellite image of Google Earth: C-200 air defense systems of the DPRK

The mobile fire system 5Ж53 of С-200 system consisted of a command post, firing channels and power supply system. The firing channel included a target illumination radar and a launch position with six launchers and 12 charging machines.

The command post of the firing complex included:
K-9 target distribution booth (K-9М);
three diesel electric power supply system
5EX97 stations and distribution equipment - K-21 cab.

The command post interfaced with a higher command post for receiving target designation and transmitting reports on its work. The K-9 cockpit mated with the ASURK-1MA, "Vector-2", "Senezh" brigade ACS, and with the ACS of the air defense corps (division).

The command post could be assigned to the P-14 radar or its later P-14F ("Van") radar, P-80 "Altai" radar, radio altimeter PRV-11 or PRV-13.

In the future, based on the C-200A, the improved versions of the C-200В and С-200Д were created.

С-200 "Angara" С-200В "Vega" С-200Д "Dubna"

Year of adoption. 1967. 1970. 1975.
Type Zur. 5B21B. 5B28M. B-880.
The number of channels on the target. 1. 1. 1.
The number of channels on the rocket. 2. 2. 2.
Max. target speed (km / h): 1100. 2300. 2300.
Number of targets fired: 6. 6. 6.
Maximum target height (km): 20. 35. 40.
Minimum target height (km): 0,5. 0,3. 0,3.
Maximum target range (km): 180. 240. 300.
Minimum target range (km): 17. 17. 17.
Rocket length, mm. 10600. 10800. 10800.
Rocket launch weight, kg 7100. 7100. 8000.
Mass of warhead, kg 217. 217. 217.
Rocket caliber (sustaining stage), mm 860 860 860
The probability of hitting targets: 0,45-0,98. 0,66-0,99. 0,72-0,99.

In order to increase the combat stability of long-range anti-aircraft missile systems C-200 on the recommendation of the joint testing committee, it was considered expedient to combine them under single command with low-altitude systems C-125. Anti-aircraft missile brigades of mixed composition were formed, including a command post with 2-3 C-200 firing channels of six launchers and two or three C-125 anti-aircraft missile battalions equipped with four launchers.

The combination of the command post and two or three firing channels C-200 became known as the group of divisions.

A new organization with a relatively small number of C-200 launchers in the brigade allowed the deployment of long-range anti-aircraft missile systems in more areas of the country.

Actively promoted in the late 1950-ies. US programs to create ultra-high-altitude bombers and cruise missiles were not completed due to the high cost of deploying weapons systems and their apparent vulnerability to anti-aircraft missile systems. Given the experience of the Vietnam War and a series of conflicts in the Middle East in the United States, even the heavy transonic B-52 were refined for action at low altitudes. Of the real specific targets for the C-200 system, only the really high-speed and high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft SR-71 remained, as well as long-range radar patrol planes and active jammers operating from a larger distance, but within radar visibility. All of these objects were targets not mass and 12-18 launchers in the anti-aircraft missile defense units should have been quite enough to solve combat missions, both in peacetime and in wartime.

The high effectiveness of domestic missiles with semi-active radar guidance was confirmed by the extremely successful use of the Kvadrat air defense system (an export version developed for the air defense of the Ground Forces Kub air defense system) during the Middle East war in October 1973.

The deployment of the C-200 complex proved expedient given the subsequent adoption by the US of an air-to-surface guided SRAM (AGM-69A, Short Range Attack Missile) guided missile with an 160 km launch range. when starting from low altitudes and 320 km - from large. This missile was precisely designed to combat medium-range and short-range air defense systems, as well as to strike at other targets and objects detected in advance. B-52G and B-52H bombers could be used as missile carriers, carrying 20 missiles (of which eight were in drum-type launchers, 12 on underwing pylons), FB-111 equipped with six missiles, and later B 1B, which housed up to 32 missiles. When classifying C-200 positions forward from a defended object, the means of this system made it possible to destroy SRAM carrier aircraft even before their launch, which made it possible to count on increasing the survivability of the entire air defense system.

Despite its spectacular appearance, the C-200 missiles were never shown at parades in the USSR. An insignificant number of publications of rocket photographs and the launcher appeared by the end of the 1980s. However, with the availability of space reconnaissance facilities, the fact and scale of the mass deployment of the new complex could not be hidden. The C-200 system has the SA-5 symbol in the United States. But for many years, photographs of Dal missiles repeatedly captured in the Red and Palace Squares of the two capitals of the state were published in foreign reference books under this designation.

For the first time, for their fellow citizens, Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the USSR N.V.Ogarkov informed 9 of September 1983 in the country about the presence of such a long-range air defense system in the country. This happened at one of the press conferences held shortly after the incident with the Korean Boeing 747, shot down on the night of 1 in September of 1983, when it was announced that this plane could have been shot down a little earlier over Kamchatka, where they were " anti-aircraft missiles, called CAM-5 in the US, with a range of over 200 kilometers. "

Indeed, by that time long-range SAMs were already well known in the West. The space reconnaissance system of the United States continuously recorded all stages of its deployment. According to American data, in 1970 the number of C-200 launchers was 1100, in 1975-m 1600, in 1980-m-1900. The deployment of this system reached its peak in the middle of the 1980s, when the number of launchers was 2030 units.

Already from the beginning of the C-200 deployment, the very fact of its existence became a weighty argument that determined the transition of the potential enemy’s aircraft to operations at low altitudes, where they were exposed to the fire of more massive anti-aircraft missile and artillery weapons. In addition, the undeniable advantage of the complex was the use of homing missiles. At the same time, even without realizing their capabilities in range, C-200 supplemented C-75 and C-125 complexes with radio command guidance, significantly complicating for the enemy the tasks of conducting both electronic warfare and altitude intelligence. Especially clearly the advantages of C-200 over these systems could manifest themselves in the shelling of active jammers, which served as an almost ideal target for self-guided C-200 missiles. As a result, for many years reconnaissance aircraft of the United States and NATO countries were forced to make reconnaissance flights only along the borders of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. The presence of various modifications of the C-200 long-range anti-aircraft missile systems in the USSR air defense system made it possible to reliably close the airspace on the near and far approaches to the country's air border, including the famous SR-71 "Black Bird" reconnaissance aircraft.

For fifteen years, the C-200 system, regularly protecting the sky over the USSR, was considered particularly secret and practically did not leave the limits of the Fatherland: fraternal Mongolia in those years was not seriously considered as “abroad”. After the air war over southern Lebanon ended in 1982 in the summer with a depressing result for the Syrians, the Soviet leadership decided to send two C-200M two-division anti-aircraft missile regiments with 96 5 28 missiles to the Middle East. At the beginning of 1983, the 231 th anti-aircraft missile regiment was deployed in Syria at 40 km east of Damascus near the town of Demeira, and the 220 regiment in the north of the country, at 5 km west of Homs.

The equipment of the complexes was urgently "modified" for the possibility of using 5В28 missiles. The technical documentation for the equipment and the complex as a whole has been revised accordingly in the design offices and at the manufacturing plants.

The small flight time of the Israeli aviation determined the need for tense periods to maintain combat duty on the C-200 system in a "hot" state. The conditions for the deployment and operation of the C-200 system in Syria changed somewhat the norms of functioning in the USSR and the composition of the technical position. For example, the storage of missiles was carried out in assembled condition on special trucks, road trains, transport and handling machines. Refueling vehicles were represented by mobile tanks and tankers.

There is a legend that in the winter of 1983 with a C-200 complex with Soviet military personnel an Israeli E-2C was shot down. made a patrol flight at a distance of 190 km from the starting position of the "two hundred". However, there is no evidence of this. Most likely, the Hokai E-2С disappeared from the screens of Syrian radars after an Israeli plane quickly fell, fixing the characteristic radiation of the C-200BE radar with the help of its equipment. Subsequently, the E-2C did not come closer to the Syrian coast closer than 150 km, which significantly limited their ability to manage the fighting.

After being placed in Syria, the C-200 system lost its "innocence" in terms of super-secrecy. She began to offer and foreign customers, and allies. On the basis of the C-200M system, an export modification was created with a modified composition of equipment. The system received the designation C-200BE, the export version of the 5В28 rocket with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead was called 5В28Е (В-880Э).

In the following years, the Warsaw Pact organization, which remained until the collapse, and then the USSR, the C-200VE complexes were delivered to Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, where the military assets were deployed near the Czech city of Pilsen. In addition to the Warsaw Pact countries, Syria and Libya, the C-200ВЭ system was shipped to Iran (from 1992) and to North Korea.
One of the first buyers of C-200BE was the leader of the Libyan revolution, Muammar Gaddafi. Having received such a “long” hand in 1984, he soon extended it over Sirte Bay, declaring the waters of Libya’s territorial waters, a little less than Greece in area. With the grim poetics characteristic of the leaders of the developing countries, Gaddafi declared the 32 parallel to the Gulf the “death line”. In March, 1986, in the exercise of their claimed rights, Libyans fired C-200BE missiles at three attack aircraft from the American aircraft carrier Saratoga, which were “defiantly” patrolling over traditionally international waters.

According to the estimates of the Libyans, they shot down all three American aircraft, as evidenced by both the data of radio-electronic means and the intense radio communications between the aircraft carrier and, presumably, rescue helicopters sent to evacuate the crews of the downed aircraft. The same result was demonstrated by mathematical modeling conducted shortly after this combat episode independently by NPO Almaz, specialists of the test site and scientific research institutes of the Moscow region. Their calculations showed a high (0,96-0,99) probability of hitting targets. In the first place, the cause of such a successful strike could have been the excessive self-confidence of the Americans, who had made their provocative flight “as on a parade,” without prior reconnaissance and without being covered by radio-electronic interference.

What happened in the Gulf of Sirte was the reason for the operation "Canyon Eldorado", during which at night 15 on April 1986, several dozen American planes attacked Libya, and first of all the residences of the leader of the Libyan revolution, as well as the positions of the C-200VE SAM and C-75M. It should be noted that in organizing the supply of the C-200VE system to Libya, Muammar Gaddafi offered to organize the maintenance of technical positions by the forces of Soviet military personnel.

In the course of recent events in Libya, all the C-200 air defense systems in this country were destroyed.

Satellite image of Google Earth: the position of the C-200 air defense system of Libya after the air strike

4 October 2001 Tu-154, Siberian Airlines flight number 85693, which operated the 1812 flight on the Tel Aviv-Novosibirsk route, crashed over the Black Sea. According to the conclusion of the Interstate Aviation Committee, the plane was unintentionally shot down by a Ukrainian rocket fired into the air as part of military exercises held on the Crimean peninsula. All 66 passengers and 12 crew members died. It is most likely that during a firing exercise involving Ukrainian air defenses, which were carried out on October 4 2001 at Cape Opuk in the Crimea, the Ty-154 was accidentally in the center of the intended sector of the training target and had a radial velocity close to it. detected by the C-200 radar and adopted as a training target. In conditions of lack of time and nervousness caused by the presence of the High Command and foreign guests, the C-200 operator did not determine the distance to the target and "highlighted" the Tu-154 (located at a distance of 250-300 km) instead of the unobtrusive training target (launched from 60 range km).

The defeat of the Tu-154 anti-aircraft missile was most likely the result not of the missile’s miss of the training target (as is sometimes claimed), but of the C-200 operator clearly targeting the missile target.

The calculation of the complex did not suggest the possibility of such an outcome of the shooting and did not take measures to prevent it. The size of the landfill did not ensure the safety of firing SAMs of such a range. Necessary measures to free the airspace were not taken by the shooting organizers.

Satellite image Google Earth: C-200 air defense system of Ukraine

With the transition of the country's Air Defense Forces to the new C-300P systems, the C-200 air defense systems, which began in the eighties, began to be phased out. By the beginning of the 2000's, the C-200 (“Angara”) and C-200 (“Vega”) complexes were completely removed from service of the Russian Air Defense Forces. To date, the C-200 air defense system is available in the armed forces: Kazakhstan, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Ukraine.

On the basis of the 5B28 anti-aircraft missile system of the С-200В complex, the Kholod hypersonic flying laboratory was created for the development of hypersonic direct-flow jet-propelling engines (GPVRD). The choice of this rocket was determined by the fact that its flight path parameters were close to those required for scramjet flight tests. It was also considered important that this missile was removed from service and its cost was low. The warhead of the rocket was replaced by the head compartments of the GLL Kholod, which housed the flight control system, a tank for liquid hydrogen with a displacement system, a system for controlling hydrogen consumption with measuring devices and, finally, an experimental scramjet E-57 of asymmetric configuration.

Hypersonic flying laboratory "Cold"

At the test site in Kazakhstan 27 in November 1991, the world's first flight test of a hypersonic ramjet at the Kholod flying laboratory was carried out. During the test, the speed of sound was exceeded six times with the flight altitude 35 km.

Unfortunately, most of the work on the subject of “Chill” came at a time when science had already received much less attention than it should. Therefore, for the first time, the “Cold” GLL flew only 28 on November 1991 of the year. In this and the next flights, it should be noted, instead of the head unit with fuel equipment and the engine, its weight and size layout was installed. The fact is that during the first two flights, the missile control system and access to the calculated trajectory were worked out. Since the third flight, the Cold has been tested in complete set, but it took two more attempts to tune the fuel system of the experimental unit. Finally, the last three test flights took place with the supply of liquid hydrogen into the combustion chamber. As a result, only seven launches were carried out before the 1999, but we managed to bring the time of the scramjet E-57 operation to 77 seconds - in fact, the maximum flight time of the 5ВХNUMX rocket. The maximum speed reached by the flying laboratory was 28 m / s (~ 1855М). Post-flight work on the equipment showed that the combustion chamber of the engine after the drainage of the fuel tank maintained its performance. Obviously, such indicators were achieved thanks to the constant improvements of the systems based on the results of each previous flight.

Tests of GLL "Kholod" were carried out at the Sary-Shagan test site in Kazakhstan. Because of the problems with the financing of the project in 90-ies, that is, during the period when there were tests and refinements of the "Cold", in exchange for scientific data had to attract foreign scientific organizations, Kazakh and French. As a result of seven test launches, all the necessary information was collected to continue practical work on the hydrogen scramjet, mathematical models of ramjet engines at hypersonic speeds, etc. were corrected. At the moment, the program "Cold" is closed, but its results are not lost and are used in new projects.

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  1. Dima190579
    Dima190579 14 June 2013 08: 59
    Someday, the S-300 will take its place in museums.
  2. avt
    avt 14 June 2013 09: 27
    Yes, near Naro-Fominsk in the 80s they climbed to the position of this complex. Thanks for the article +
  3. Bongo
    14 June 2013 09: 28
    In my opinion, this air defense system was written off too soon. Of course, its operation is much more difficult and mobility is much worse than C-300P. But as long as the C-400 did not go massively with a long-range missile, the C-200D modification would have found a place in the structure of our air defense. For range with her very few people can compare.
    1. Dimych
      Dimych 14 June 2013 11: 51
      The great power was able to deploy and maintain 2030 launchers, and the current "effective managers" can only destroy what was built before them.
    2. reichsmarshal
      reichsmarshal 14 June 2013 19: 45
      I do not agree. In Vietnam, our specialists found that the maximum effective launch range of the S-75 is 40 km. Later, similar indicators were calculated for other air defense systems. This range is determined by the speed of missiles. Taking into account all factors, one can expect good results with a range of 55-60 km, but not 200-250, and especially 400 km. Such complexes of the Far Hand could be useful only against AWACS and the highest altitude UAVs, but not as the basis of our entire air defense. The best system is Buk.
      1. Bongo
        15 June 2013 16: 25
        The operating time of the 5ВХNUMXМ rocket engine is much longer, the rocket itself is heavier. A completely different pointing principle than that of the C-28 is used, the range is more than 75km. It is quite achievable, which has been confirmed more than once at landfills, regardless of whether you agree with this or not.
        1. reichsmarshal
          reichsmarshal 16 June 2013 00: 21
          I'm not talking about RANGE, but about the ability to hit a target GUARANTEED. At such a long range, this is only possible with heavy aircraft such as AWACS. Against F-15 and F-16 no.
          1. Bongo
            16 June 2013 05: 20
            This heavy long-range air defense system was not originally created to combat front-line aircraft, if you read this carefully in the article. But even here she has chances, "guaranteed" to hit the target today, not a single air defense system is capable.
    3. aksakal
      aksakal 15 June 2013 00: 18
      Quote: Bongo
      In my opinion, this air defense system was written off too soon. Of course, its operation is much more difficult and mobility is much worse than C-300P. But as long as the C-400 did not go massively with a long-range missile, the C-200D modification would have found a place in the structure of our air defense. For range with her very few people can compare.

      He served on this complex about 25 years ago. Nostalgia! The oxidizing agent was nitric acid with the addition of nitrogen tetroxide, and the fuel was triethylaminexylidine (TG-02, "tonka"). - it’s rare muck, you can’t refuel it without OZK, but they gave it tasty DP - butter, sausage, condensed milk and other yum-yum laughing
      By the way, in the first photo where the take-off rocket and a row on the launcher stand the second in the initial position, pay attention to the third compartment from the nose (the nose itself is the first compartment, it is also a radio-transparent fairing, such a nose was worth more than two Lada! belay ) that is white, the warhead is located there. Does it seem to me that this white compartment has a yellow stripe? With such a yellow stripe in the third compartment, the rockets didn’t shoot at all, we weren’t allowed to go to such missiles, and all the work on these missiles was carried out specially by the bald guys who came every two months. When they retired with such a missile in the building No. 61 (as we called it), a reinforced guard was put up at the gate.
      Was there really the use of such missiles? What landfill? I won’t believe it!
      Quote: Bongo
      In terms of range, few compare with it.
      - The seeker is very outdated, the noise immunity is not what it is needed, the combat condition is not given at all for 5 minutes, like the S-300, warheads - only 90 kg, for the S-300 - as much as 155 kg. The rocket has limitations on overloads. Etc. On a well-deserved vacation shorter. Although for the Syrians and Iranians you can try to modernize, why not?
      1. anomalocaris
        anomalocaris 15 June 2013 08: 47
        No, this is not a strip. This is a rectangle, almost a square. So missiles with special warheads were marked with a yellow stripe?
      2. Bongo
        15 June 2013 16: 09
        The mass of warheads of the C-200: 217k missiles, refueling missiles is indeed a very troublesome and dangerous business, but some where, according to the stories, they managed to do this even without the means of protection, which, by the way, sometimes led to accidents. Immunity is in any case no worse than that of C-75 and C-125. The altitude in 35-40 km., Even on modern solid-propellant rockets is very difficult to obtain.
        1. reichsmarshal
          reichsmarshal 16 June 2013 00: 22
          I have already dealt with polyneuropathies associated with working with fuel and oxidizing agents
      3. S-200
        S-200 19 June 2013 20: 41
        Warhead weight -220 kg. And the explosive charge - explosive "TG-20/80" -90kg.
  4. Geisenberg
    Geisenberg 14 June 2013 14: 09
    Thank. Good article, interesting.
  5. Proud.
    Proud. 15 June 2013 10: 26
    On the S-75, as an example, products with special warheads could be distinguished visually and by marking. The product is in the middle, with special warheads thickening in the warhead and the absence of destabilizers.
    1. Bongo
      16 June 2013 05: 23
      It is possible that the C-200 was used unified with C-75 special warhead.
  6. S-200
    S-200 19 June 2013 20: 48
    Do not forget that for the operation of an air defense system a spare part is needed. Spare parts were made, including at enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry. The element base of hardware cabins is mainly lamp. It is very irrational to keep outdated production lines (workshops, production) on the state balance sheet for the production of radio tubes, installation and assembly for old air defense systems. Moreover, there aren’t enough qualified personnel for new types ... Etc, etc .... In general, I hope that you don’t need to throw caviar about this ... hi And the S-200 complex is POWER!