To ensure a comprehensive and high-quality solution of defense tasks, science should be more generously than we have done in recent years, to finance and increase its effectiveness. In addition, the development of new knowledge and the introduction of scientific advances into practical activity are important for timely responding to changes in military science, military art and the nature of warfare (started in VPC, No. 20 and 21, 2013).
Investments in science are always profitable, because they pay off a hundredfold. Recently, the Minister of Education and Science Dmitry Livanov announced the futility of the existence of the Russian Academy of Sciences. But, as scientists have calculated, only the discoveries of academician Vladimir Obruchev in the field of mineralogy completely paid off all the costs of the RAS for the 250 years of its existence. Officials from science usually like to count how much money is allocated for its needs, but they are not very willing to talk about how much science has done for production and defense.
Increase efficiency and effectiveness
At the same time, in the current unfavorable trends in the economy, the question of increasing the exactingness and responsibility of scientific organizations for the effectiveness and efficiency of scientific activity arises with particular urgency.
Science is not a formally performed research work, not a number of works, dissertations and scientific conferences, which is mainly mentioned in most reports. In the final analysis, scientific work is the creation of new knowledge, scientifically grounded ideas and proposals on the most effective solution of defense tasks. If there are no new thoughts, discoveries, these are all near-scientific matters that have no direct relation to the essence of science itself. If the work of hunters in the taiga was assessed only by the number of shots fired, they would simply laugh at this. But in our country this most important aspect of the essence of scientific work is most of all ignored, and this flaw must first and foremost be overcome in the most decisive manner. In every way to increase the responsibility and demands for efficiency, effectiveness of scientific work.
Before his death, Nikolai Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the Navy, wrote in a note to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU: “I argued and maintained that every military organization is created for war, and therefore operational and strategic issues are of paramount importance.” It is on the basis of this that research centers can fruitfully work only under the direct supervision of the General Staff, the chief commanders of the Armed Forces, being closely associated with practical work on operational strategic planning, combat use of troops (forces), and operational and combat training, in close cooperation with research and development institutions of the defense industry.
Program-targeted planning method
For many years we have been talking about the need for a program-oriented planning method, the requirements of which are declared in words, but in fact are not only not implemented, but simply ignored, especially in the area of planning the development of weapons and military equipment (IWT). At the same time, the harsh practice of war forced us to come to such a practice of decision-making and planning in the operational-strategic area, where, in essence, the principle of a targeted approach is most fully taken into account. Everyone knows that when forming a decision on an operation, the commander of the army (front) first develops the plan (in general for the army - the front) and only on the basis of this can the tasks of the subordinate be determined, decisions made by army commanders, division commanders. Nobody imagines that it is necessary to collect the decisions of the divisional divisions, put them together and get the decision of the commander. And in the field of military construction, development of armaments, we have been collecting plans for the Armed Forces for years, imposing on them the “common cover” of all the Armed Forces and trying to portray it as program-oriented planning. The general intention of the leadership’s decision on the development of armaments practically does not exist.
Generally in conditions when weapon becoming more complex and expensive, the relationship between the Armed Forces and the military-industrial complex cannot be built on simplified market relations: the consumer (customer) is the manufacturer. It is necessary to develop mechanisms and incentives for mutual interest in creating for the army, fleet and other law enforcement agencies of truly modern weapons and military equipment. It is important not only to make demands on armaments, but also to help industry in every way, closely interacting at the stages of developing operational-tactical requirements and scientific and design work.
At the time of Dmitry Ustinov, not only the staff of the deputy minister of defense for armaments, but also the chief commanders of the Armed Forces, often commanders of districts and fleets, worked for months in design laboratories, factories and test sites.
Engels also noted that the development of weapons determines changes in the methods of warfare. But now military science itself should more substantively determine the main directions of the development of weapons. Unfortunately, this is not always done sufficiently qualified.
In 60 – 70-ies, each scientific research institute of the MO had a special department designed to develop operational-tactical requirements for a new weapon. They were staffed by officers with both operational and tactical and technical training. Then they eliminated such departments and offices and transferred their functions to the teachers of military academies. As a result, the quality of this work has plummeted. The relevant officials of the Ministry of Defense should pay attention to this side of the matter.
Today, it also suggests the need to create a separate Ministry of Defense Industry, but without the former economic functions and with the main task of coordinating the activities of industry enterprises, initiating innovative technologies, and organizing the training of engineering and technical personnel required for the defense industry.
For scientific organizations of the Ministry of Defense in order to accelerate the development of innovative technologies, it is especially important to establish cooperation with the Foundation for Advanced Studies and the relevant structure of the military department directly subordinate to Colonel General Oleg Ostapenko.
Emphasis on asymmetric means
To eliminate our long-standing lag in the elemental base, space communications, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, automated network-centric control systems and precision weapons, in other modern technologies, it is not enough to recognize or declare them as priorities. It is necessary at the state level to provide approximately the same decisive concentration of financial, technological, intellectual forces and means to solve these priorities, as was done after World War II when creating nuclear missiles and space technologies.
With the relative weakness of our economic potential, it is desirable to place the main emphasis on asymmetric means and methods of action. It is known, for example, that modern leading states have communications, navigation, reconnaissance, all control of strategic nuclear forces, missile defense, and high-precision weapons through space. The collapse of this system by radio-electronic and other asymmetric means can greatly reduce this advantage of the opposing side. During the war in Iraq, even the simplest devices - sources of electromagnetic radiation forced rockets to deviate from the target.
It is necessary, of course, to strive for this, but, perhaps, we will never be able to constantly create the best samples in the world for all types of weapons and military equipment. At some stage, in some areas, you may have to concede. But it's not just the weapon itself. It is equally important to develop tactics for its effective use, when the combat properties of various types of weapons and military equipment complement each other and to some extent neutralize their weak points.
I can once again recall the example of the Shrike anti-radar missiles. In Vietnam, in the second half of the 60s, these American missiles hit radar stations from one or two launches. When the Vietnamese gained experience and took some additional countermeasures, only the third, fourth, or even the fifth or sixth missiles began to hit targets. On April 18, 1971, in the Suez Canal zone, while the Egyptians turned on more than 100 radars (not only air defense, but also artillery, aviation, reconnaissance) Shrike missiles began to lose targets. It is one thing when we conduct a single test of weapons at a range, and quite another when they are massively used on the battlefield, where a large number of different weapons operate. It is necessary to revive the practice of conducting operational experimental and research exercises with troops, where various types of weapons and military equipment would be tested in close cooperation and influence on each other.
The development and implementation of science
Finally, the most important task has always been and remains the development of new knowledge and the introduction of scientific advances in practical activity. Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, in his speech at the AVN meeting, gave an example of how Commander Yury Gersyor wrote the book "New Forms of Struggle", which generally predicted the changed nature of the initial period of the war, but none of those who in practice was engaged in operational and strategic affairs, was not interested in these new phenomena. In this case, military science fulfilled its mission on a number of scientific problems, but its discoveries went unnoticed. This often happens in our days.
To prevent this from happening, the management team cannot be only a customer of scientific works, it must be at the height of modern knowledge, head scientific research, as did Mikhail Frunze, Vladimir Triandafillov, Nikolay Ogarkov.
In general, it is necessary to organize information work in the field of science in order to be constantly informed about scientific achievements at home and abroad. Raise to the modern level the whole system of operational, combat training, training officers in higher educational institutions, to revive the curiosity of officers. Only in an environment of universal creativity can there be a rise of science. And in an era when everyone wants to write books, but no one reads them, it is difficult to expect serious changes in scientific matters. There is a separation from the practice of military magazines and newspapers. Their content, orientation, of course, should be determined not by some press services, but by the relevant departments of the Ministry of Defense: “Military Thought” - the State Educational Institution of the General Staff, “Military History Journal” - the Institute of Military stories, "Landmark" - the General Directorate of educational work, etc. You can make more meaningful digests that are sent to senior management. In order to expand the horizons of officers, it is desirable to introduce in universities the teaching of the basics of military science.
In accordance with the nature of modern warfare, it is necessary to determine the content of operational and combat training.
Let, as it is established, planning is carried out for each next year. But in the headquarters, at least in working order, you need to be estimated for several years in order to work through all the operational-tactical, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and other tasks that will have to be faced in a modern war. Otherwise, working out some issues from year to year is repeated, while others, including those related to bringing troops (forces) to the highest levels of combat readiness, are bypassed. For example, if one or another doctrine began with the raising of troops in an alarm, then in the course of it it is impossible to work out methods of covertly increasing the combat readiness of troops in advance. To do this, you need another teaching this or next year. This also applies to other tasks.
On the nature of warfare
Serious changes are occurring in military science and military art, as well as in general in the nature of warfare. An analysis of the prospects for the development of the military-political situation in the world and the nature of warfare suggests that in the conditions of the existence of a nuclear threat, the bosses of the modern world will strive to achieve their military-political goals primarily through political-diplomatic, economic, informational and other non-military means. When the goal is not achieved in this way, they can resort to local wars and conflicts without crossing the nuclear threshold.
But with the drastically changing balance of forces in the geopolitical arena, the acute struggle for the redistribution of energy and other resources on the planet is unlikely to be limited to local wars. Therefore, in the modern conditions, the Armed Forces require priority readiness for local wars, conflicts and mobilization readiness for regional and large-scale wars.
The changing character of modern local wars should also be appreciated. According to the American classification, the war in Korea in the early 50s refers to conflicts of medium intensity. But there on both sides 2,5 million people participated. During the war in the Persian Gulf in 1991, more than 10 thousand participated in the battles tanksThis is 1,5 times more than in the Berlin operation of 1945, where 6300 tanks were deployed on both sides.
From the point of view of the prospects for the development of the nature of warfare, the judgments that future wars will occur mainly in aerospace and will end in a few hours are not entirely legitimate. In reality, now there are 11 thousands of tanks in NATO, 10 thousands in China, they are in Russia and other countries. Where will they go with the start of the war, will they not remain in the parks so as not to spoil the new look of the Armed Forces? Inevitably, artillery and other weapons will be used.
It requires a more sober assessment and the nature of the so-called wars of the sixth generation, where the thesis is being preached from Yugoslav experience - air strikes will be launched only on industrial facilities, infrastructure, and ground forces will not be hit at all. If this is actually such an “advanced theory”, why did we not act in accordance with it in 2008 in Tskhinval. According to this theory, we had to inflict airstrikes on all cities of Georgia and force it to peace. And we entered the "antediluvian" tank battles. Because, first of all, we still have nothing to strike, just as NATO did in Yugoslavia. Secondly, by doing this, we would face opposition from the United States and NATO. This suggests that geopolitical factors will to some extent restrain the expansion of wars and the continuation of politics in general by violent means.
In the air, space and sea
Under the circumstances, for Russia, the main means of deterring large-scale threats are strategic nuclear forces. At one of the summits, some experts argued that there was no particular need to continue to invest in the strategic nuclear forces. They believe that to prevent aggression, 10 – 15 nuclear weapons are enough, the use of which can lead to disastrous consequences. But there is a real objective reality, which, first of all, has to be considered. There are already more than two thousand nuclear explosions in the world, of which more than 500 are airborne, and the consequences of all this are as they are today. And we should not fall for these tricks of non-governmental organizations that have completely different goals.
Therefore, the further development and qualitative improvement of the SNF, taking into account the real balance of nuclear forces in the world, remains one of the priority tasks of maintaining the proper defense capability of Russia, and therefore one of the most important tasks of the defense industry. The only way to prevent a nuclear war is to make it dangerous and impossible for those who are going to unleash such a war if they know that it will end in completely unacceptable damage.
In general, the center of gravity of warfare is actually transferred to the air, space and the sea. The aerospace confrontation is becoming crucial. Therefore, it can no longer be carried out only by the Air Defense Forces or another separate type of Armed Forces. We can successfully fight for the conquest of supremacy in aerospace space not by passive defensive means, but by the combined actions of all types of aircraft, above all by active decisive percussion means. During our World War II, 89 percent of enemy aircraft were destroyed by fighter aircraft and air force strikes on airfields, and only 11 percent were destroyed by the Air Defense Forces. It is sometimes said that in Viet Nam most of the American aircraft shot down our anti-aircraft missile forces, but there was not a comparable number of strike and fighter aircraft there and there was no one else to shoot down the planes besides the ZRV. The most important priority is the creation of its high-precision strategic weapons in conventional equipment.
The development of military art will be significantly affected by the emergence in the armament of the leading countries of the world of new information technologies that transform the control of troops, increasing the effectiveness of the use of weapons, as well as the emergence of unmanned vehicles, robotics, and armaments based on new physical principles.
In recent years, great importance has been attached to the creation and assimilation of the network-centric system of command and control of troops (forces) so that, through the transformation of information technologies, significantly improve the efficiency of command, combat use of weapons and, in general, combat operations. But the current ACS systems are still far from what is required in practice. Unfortunately, we do not have full-fledged combined-arms models of operations and combat actions; at best, there are methods for solving individual operational-tactical tasks for fire destruction, making a march, forcing water obstacles, and solving some tasks for the Air Force and Air Defense. In the course of modeling, our ACSs can take into account only the correlation of forces, in part - the influence of the terrain, they do not perceive the level of military art, nor moral, psychological, informational and other factors. Full simulation will be possible with the advent of elements of artificial intelligence.
It is also advisable to take into account that we can get a modern management system of efficiency only if we simultaneously improve both technical, automated means and the methods of work of the command and staffs. For example, you can say with all certainty: with the level of formalism, with the cumbersome operational and reporting documentation that we have now, we will have to set excessive requirements for the ACS, making them excessively cumbersome, or will not be able to fully use the advantages of automation equipment. Scientifically organized and automated information processing processes are built on a certain logic, algorithms, and they cannot adapt to arbitrariness and bureaucracy. In the language of soldiers, the mess can not be automated. Consequently, it is necessary to streamline and improve the working methods of commanders and staffs.
Thus, it is a question of raising the scientific level of construction management and training of the Armed Forces and strengthening the defense of the country as a whole in all areas and in all sectors.