Military Review

About the war in a new way. Views on armed confrontation undergo significant changes.

About the war in a new way. Views on armed confrontation undergo significant changes.

War not only applies to those historical phenomena that, in comparison with peaceful relations, reached developed forms much earlier, but also continue to be a powerful policy tool and a locomotive of scientific and technological progress. However, to date, the war has undergone the most profound changes in socio-political content, military-technical appearance, and the extent of the impact on society.

As early as the 18th century, Carl von Clausewitz introduced three key categories in close relationship: der Zweck is a political goal, das Ziel is a goal of military actions, das Mittel is a means of military influence. All of them were minted into a single fundamental definition: “War is an act of violence, undertaken to subordinate the enemy to our will”. At the turn of the XIX century, they began to believe that since this will is connected with the problem of the redistribution of the world by the leading powers, then all "small" wars and armed conflicts should develop into a large-scale war. Moreover, Marxist theory associated the inevitability of such a large-scale clash with the entry of capitalism into the highest phase of its development — imperialism.

With the emergence of a socialist system opposed to capitalism, this theory continued to remain dominant, although it was supplemented by an ideological component. Moreover, the First and Second World Wars clearly confirmed the conformity of this theory with the realities of the time.

The post-war period as a whole also did not refute it, although the Second World War was the historical milestone followed by major changes in the development of international relations. These changes were due to the formation of a vast area of ​​the so-called "third world".

Karl von Clausewitz.

After the global military confrontation between the East and the West disappeared in the world, the number of armed clashes began to grow, in which, on the one hand, states continued to participate, and on the other, armed structures that were not related to any internationally recognized actors. At the same time, there was often no clearly stated state political goal of the armed struggle. The consequence of this was the uncertainty in the military objectives of the war, as well as in the permitted military means to achieve them. In other words, the logical chain was broken in these armed clashes: der Zweck-das Ziel-das Mittel.

Nevertheless, throughout the 20th century, the definition of war dominated (given to Clausewitz in its time) as a sociopolitical phenomenon, the continuation of politics by violent means.

However, as noted by the well-known Russian military theorist Alexander Svechin, “there are no identical wars, each war is a special case that requires the establishment of a special logic, a special line of strategic behavior, and not an application of a template.” At the end of the twentieth century, when a whole series of armed clashes took place, the character of which was not consistent with established views, this truth was once again confirmed.

A new search began for the causes and mechanisms for the emergence of such "non-standard" wars and armed conflicts, which led to a real renaissance of the old scientific schools. Their reasons began to be found in the biological characteristics of man (the instinct of obstinacy, or, according to Freud, the innate instinct of aggression) or in cultural factors (features of upbringing, ethnocentrism, double moral standards in the “friend or foe” system, etc.), and Armed conflict has become regarded as a phenomenon that is on a par with evolutionary changes and environmental disasters. The causes of armed conflicts were attributed to randomness and uncontrolled development of events, as well as the irrational activities of groups of people, primarily political leaders, who, when making vital decisions for their country, are guided by "their personal choice." Armed conflicts were considered on the basis of the statement that any viable social institution should perform certain important functions, including war as a tool for maintaining homeostasis and ensuring economic, demographic, punitive (restoring social order), psychological and other balances. At the same time, it was believed that the state lives according to objective laws of development, among which the desire to occupy a certain optimal position that would help ensure its long existence was highlighted.

In contemporary armed conflicts, states are often opposed by militants who are not internationally recognized actors.

With such approaches, any war should be considered as an armed conflict, but at the same time not every armed conflict can be related to war. Moreover, the same armed clash of each of the opposing sides can be classified quite differently. So, for a small, militarily and economically weak country, even a local armed incident becomes a full-scale war, while another country with a developed defense industry and powerful armed forces considers the same event as not deserving of special attention.

Thus, the differences between armed conflict and war began to be associated mainly with the assessment of this event by the public involved in it. If armed struggle affects the security of each individual, all strata of society and the state, defines all spheres of their life activities, becomes the main, decisive means (method) to achieve basic social and political goals, then in this case we are talking about war. If the military factor affects only a part of society, and the achievement of the main goals of social groups not involved in the clash takes place in other forms of struggle (ideological, diplomatic, psychological, economic, political, etc.), then they prefer to talk about armed conflict. Accordingly, if during the war a restructuring of the entire social and political life of the society is supposed, then for the conditions of an armed conflict such a deep restructuring in the activities of state and public structures is not supposed.

Obviously, in real life, based on this approach, it is very difficult to draw the line between war and armed conflict. Moreover, such incorrectness leads to the fact that the forms and methods of conducting armed conflicts (including internal ones) begin to copy from the “big” war, only on a reduced scale. However, at the end of the 20th century, the nature of armed conflict became less and less like such a reduced copy of war. Consequently, the practice of military construction requires a clearer identification of modern wars and armed conflicts, for which it is necessary to consider them as a kind of process.

In this regard, it should be noted that in modern conflictology there are several more or less developed approaches to the scientific identification of situations of war and armed conflict. Ultimately, they all try to establish patterns of their phase development. Summarizing these approaches, we can distinguish six such phases: the emergence of a conflict; significant exacerbation of socio-political tensions; the beginning of a separate conflict of force; violation of the situation of strategic stability and large-scale use of force; de-escalation and completion of the armed phase of the conflict; restoring peace.

By the end of the 20th century, the nature of armed conflict became less and less like a smaller copy of the “big” war.

It is quite clear that the zero phase (peaceful cooperation) is chosen as the starting point for the emergence of armed conflict - the most favorable period of the development of society, during which political, socio-economic and other contradictions are resolved only by unforced means and means. However, the term “peace” itself has not yet been subjected to any detailed analysis, for the world can be viewed both as a state and as a definite activity aimed at preventing war. Moreover, it should be emphasized that in the first case the world is not at all equivalent to the complete absence of any kind of violence. Maintaining the world order implies the use of military force as well.

At the heart of the war and armed conflict are some objective contradictions that have acquired a deep antagonistic nature, when armed violence is perceived as an acceptable way of achieving the goals set, and the groups participating in it are convinced that they have enough forces for that. Therefore, it is of great theoretical importance to consider the factors and conditions under which the conflict potential moves into a phase of armed struggle.

Some theorists believe that wars do not start if the fighting nations reach an agreement in assessing their relative power, and they arise when the nations involved in the conflict differ in these assessments.

There are a number of factors that traditionally make a judgment about state power and by which this power is compared with the power of other states. If a certain generalizing indicator of the power of one nation is higher than that of its opponent (at least it is considered so), and on the other hand, the probable opponent also believes that he is a stronger state, the probability of war is very high.

This approach is correlated with the consideration of the actions of the laws of war (the dependence of its course and outcome on the set political goals, the balance of economic forces and capabilities of the opposing sides, the combat power of their armed forces, military art and morale). In recent years, Russian military science rethought these laws, and also conducted a fundamental revision of military theory, the methodological basis of which for a long time was the Marxist-Leninist theory of war and the army.

The laws of war act as mainstream tendencies, and they are objective. However, due to the fact that these trends are realized only through the activities of people, the scale of the manifestation of the laws of war may be different. For example, the law of dependence of the course and outcome of a war on its political goals, being connected with the social and political structure of the state, is specified in such an important law as the dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the moral potential of a country. After all, the very possibility of conducting a large-scale war directly depends on the degree of its support by the popular masses.

The second most general law of war is the law on the inseparable connection of its course and outcome with the ratio of the economic capabilities of the parties. It can be assumed that the chances of winning the war are much greater for the side, which initially has the greatest economic opportunities. However, this is not really the case. The fact is that the economic needs of modern warfare, although very large, are not limitless. Their satisfaction practically does not require the entire volume of production, if we are talking about economically strong enough countries. In other words, the logistical requirements of war can be met at the expense of a part of economic opportunities. It follows that a state that has been subjected to aggression, even if it is inferior to the aggressor in terms of national income, as well as in the volume of production of basic industries, agricultural output and other indicators, will not necessarily be doomed to defeat. But under the condition that this state is able to quickly mobilize a part of its economic potential necessary for the needs of preparing and waging war.

Thus, to absolutize the law of dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the ratio of the economic capabilities of the parties is currently not entirely correct. In order to more accurately reflect the possible course and outcome of the war, only the part of the economic potential of the parties that they are able to mobilize for the needs of preparation and warfare in its various periods should be taken as comparable economic indicators.

Therefore, it is necessary to look for additional levers for a more effective manifestation of this law in such more specific laws as the dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the ratio of the military and combat power of the opposing sides. The mechanism of action of these laws is different. Thus, the law of dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the ratio of military power has a much greater inertia compared to the second law, since it takes time to transform military potential into military power and part of it into combat power.

The economic component of military potential has the greatest inertia. Thus, the transfer of the economy to martial law, providing production in the required quantities weapons, military equipment and other material components of military power, takes more than one month. Moreover, the duration of this process directly depends on how the industry is prepared for such a period. It should also be foreseen and take into account the likelihood of additional difficulties that may arise as a result of the active influence of the enemy on the main military-economic objects already in the first phases of the development of the conflict.

In the era of confrontation between the USSR and the USA, both sides understood “victory” as the military-political destruction of a hostile ideology.

Thus, the ratio of military power in favor of the defending side directly depends on the rate of conversion of its military potential into real military capabilities and the formation of all the components necessary for the timely, constant supply of the combat power of the armed forces directly solving the tasks of repelling aggression.

The law of dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the ratio of the combat power of the armed forces of the parties comes into effect from the moment of the attack of the aggressor. It is important to keep in mind that by this time the aggressor, as a rule, will already take all measures to maximize their combat potential, translating it into effective components of combat power. Under these conditions, a country that has become a victim of aggression can count on success only if, firstly, it managed to accumulate sufficient combat potential in advance, to transform a significant part of it into combat power and oppose sufficiently strong defensive groups against the aggressor, and -second, if it is able to intensively increase its combat power due to the elements of military and combat potentials created earlier.

It should be emphasized that even with comparable quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the opposing groups, the delay in opening up direct preparation for an attack and the operational deployment of groups of troops by the defending side immediately gives the aggressor enormous advantages due to the surprise attack and seizure of the strategic initiative. This has become particularly relevant at the present time, when as a result of carrying out sudden powerful, deep fire strikes with the use of high-precision weapons, the aggressor can inflict huge losses on the defending side, disorganize its command and control system to the full depth of operational-strategic construction, and achieve a significant reduction in their morale. All this will lead to a dramatic change in the overall balance of forces in favor of the aggressor and will create the prerequisites for successfully solving not only immediate operational, but also strategic tasks.

It is also necessary to take into account the sociocultural environment of the parties, in other words, the dominant social values, which also determine the nature of the armed struggle.

In an armed struggle it is intended to achieve the goals set for the battle, battle, operation, war as a whole, which is defined as “victory”. Thus, the concept of “victory” correlates with the concept of “goal of war”, and therefore the goal of war can be considered as a kind of standard of victory.

Clausewitz once wrote: “The purpose of a war can be either crushing the enemy, that is, destroying it politically, or depriving it of the ability to resist, forcing it to sign a peace, or the purpose of the war may be some conquest ... to ... use them as useful pledge at the conclusion of peace. " Thus, he designated two standards of victory opposed in history. Obviously, these standards of victory were determined by the material basis of the wars of absolutism as "business enterprises of the government."

The wars of the bourgeois regimes already differ in an immeasurably wider social base, which makes it possible to transform armed conflicts into "people's wars" and "the cause of the life and death of a nation." Behind these new standards of victory is the transformation of the relationship between the mobilization capabilities of regimes and the potentials of destruction. If in the 18th century the power of weapons prevailed over mobilization capabilities and a large European army could be half exterminated on the day of the battle (with similar consequences for its adversary), then from the era of Napoleon to World War II inclusive, there is a constant predominance of the mobilization potential over the means of destruction, despite their improvement.

With the onset of 1950's. nuclear confrontation of two world socio-political systems has come an hour for a new fundamental revision of the meaning of the concept of “victory”. Initially, successes in the development of nuclear and missile weapons were perceived by the political and military leadership as an opportunity for a radical increase in military power. All efforts were aimed at ensuring that the nuclear arms race is stronger than the enemy. At the same time, “victory” was understood not only as a crushing of the enemy’s armed forces, but also as a military-political destruction of a hostile ideology.

Under the conditions of the existence of a bipolar world, the strategic situation was determined by the ideological “intransigence” of the main geopolitical opponents - the USSR and the USA. Despite the complex fabric of their bilateral relations in the political field, it was declared at the military doctrinal level that both sides are and will continue to fight for the survival of their political systems without any restrictions in their means and resources. Moreover, as is well known, in any of the then existing variants of military strategic planning, although the aim was to avoid a global conflict, the principle acceptability of such a conflict was justified by the need to ensure the survival of the nation and state in the face of the "mortal threat". Let us recall, for example, the ideological American installation known in its time “it is better to be dead than red”, which was viewed in the United States not only as a propaganda stamp.

In this situation, the famous thesis of Clausewitz that war is a continuation of politics by other means was actually exploited and brought to the point of absurdity.

If we look in this connection to the history of the “cold war”, then it should be recognized that the existing “genetic” or systemic conflict between superpowers in principle seemed unlimited by any rational political framework of events. Therefore, each strategic doctrine of that time proceeded as if from the potential inevitability of an unlimited escalation of the conflict.

Every war and armed conflict ends sooner or later. At the same time, ending the war from a political and legal point of view means ending the state of war, that is, restoring peaceful relations between the warring parties with important international legal consequences. States, as a rule, restore the legal restrictions interrupted by the war with respect to citizens (and legal entities) that were considered to be citizens of an enemy state in connection with the war, and other legal consequences caused by the state of war are eliminated. The cessation of a state of war is usually preceded by the cessation of hostilities, which, according to international law, implies a truce or capitulation. A truce can be private (in a separate sector of the front) or general (across the front); urgent and indefinite. Capitulation, in contrast to the truce, which is the result of an agreement between the belligerents, ceases hostilities under the conditions set by the winner. However, in most cases neither a truce nor a capitulation still end the state of war. For the legal termination of such a state, states resort to various international legal means and forms. This may be a unilateral act resulting from the initiative of one party. For example, in 1951, England, France and the United States, each separately, unilaterally declared that the state of war with Germany had ceased. 25 January 1955 g. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the state of war between the USSR and Germany was terminated. All restrictions on German citizens arising from the war were lifted. The cessation of a state of war can be the result of a bilateral declaration when it is based on the agreement of states. For example, 19 of October 1956 of the USSR and Japan signed a joint Declaration, according to which the state of war between them ceased and “peace and good neighborly relations” were restored.

A special international legal form designed to end the state of war is a peace treaty. The peace treaty most fully and comprehensively resolves issues related to the restoration of peaceful relations, including territorial issues, the fate of civilians, armed forces of the defeated state, prisoners of war, reparation (reparations), and the responsibility of war criminals. Thus, on the basis of peace treaties in 1947, their participants terminated the state of war with Germany’s former allies - Finland, Italy, Romania. The final line under World War II in Europe was laid down by the Final Settlement Treaty with respect to Germany, signed by the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France, the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany 12 September 1990. This document contains most of the provisions that are subject to peace treaties.

From the above examples it is clear that the end of the war is formalized by interstate acts. Recently, however, wars and armed conflicts in which states are involved, on the one hand, and, on the other, armed groups that are not internationally recognized state structures, have become particularly relevant. In this case, the situation with the registration of legal acts on the cessation of hostilities is significantly complicated. After all, the armed forces are an organization established on a legal basis and maintained by the state, and all other armed groups are illegal. Therefore, if in a war the criterion of victory can be served by forcing the enemy to sit at the negotiating table, then in armed conflicts related, for example, to the fight against international terrorism, the problem initially is that it is not clear with whom to negotiate and what they are can end?

Thus, although views on the war and its socio-political content are constantly evolving, uncertainty persists with many of their important characteristics.
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  1. My address
    My address 10 June 2013 07: 31 New
    Long for the forum, but surely. The article reminds the dissertation author's abstract.
    It turns out that qualitative changes are taking place both in weapons and in methods of use, and not always in combat.
  2. cartridge
    cartridge 10 June 2013 07: 43 New
    It is necessary to determine the parameters of humanity and humanity in areas of armed conflict. The local resident wears civilian clothes, continues to live with the family, sometimes even works in the fields or in the office. And in his free time from work and family, he digs up a machine gun and shoots the troops in the back, as it was with us, and now the Americans in Afghanistan, as happened in Libya, Iraq, and now in Syria. It must be determined for whom to keep him: for a civilian, but a criminal and then act against him using police methods (detention, arrest, investigation, trial, punishment) or is it an insurgent who can be attributed to a full-fledged enemy and then the rule "If the enemy does not give up, it is destroyed. " What to do with the family of such a fighter, which not only hides him, but in fact is his personal logistical support body. Who are they - innocent locals or accomplices of a bandit?
    The resolution of this issue at the international legal level will immediately make it possible to radically determine, and even completely change the tactics of the troops in the zone of military conflicts.
    1. My address
      My address 10 June 2013 08: 03 New
      You have very interesting questions about the family and the property of the criminal. In Dagestan, two years ago, the relatives of the killed policemen took revenge on the relatives of the bandits, destroyed their houses. So our media shouted: "Oh, how bad, how undemocratic!"
      1. Tarpon
        Tarpon 10 June 2013 11: 37 New
        Quote: My address
        You have very interesting questions about the family and the property of the criminal. In Dagestan, two years ago, the relatives of the killed policemen took revenge on the relatives of the bandits, destroyed their houses. So our media shouted: "Oh, how bad, how undemocratic!"

        In this case, Israel does not stand on ceremony; bulldozers demolish the homes of terrorists and do the right thing.
  3. gregor6549
    gregor6549 10 June 2013 07: 51 New
    Yesterday on Australian television until it was an interview with one of the preachers of radical Islam who lives in London, who was the mastermind behind the darkies ditched the British soldier. The preacher’s opinion is simple, whether you like it or not, you won’t get anywhere from the rule of Sharia. Do not want to force yourself to convert to Islam, but we can’t force it to destroy it. This is the war that is already underway and in which the followers of radical Islam have won victories so far ... while we are discussing how and with what all the others, i.e. non-Muslims will crush each other in a possible war. And these Muslims, as life shows, are completely dispensed with super duper electronics, EMR, and other bells and whistles.
    1. CTEPX
      CTEPX 11 June 2013 06: 03 New
      Quote: gregor6549
      Do not want to force yourself to convert to Islam, but we can’t force it to destroy it.

      In fact, Wahhabism is an edited version of fascism (Nazism). And the use case - the same one - is to be strengthened as much as possible, due to not belonging to the Anglo-Saxons, and moved to Russia)).
  4. shurup
    shurup 10 June 2013 07: 57 New
    War, like work and training, goes into the category of remote and remote.
    "Conflict, incident, cleanup, etc." rather, police terms referring to up to and including Interpol, but not to full-blown OBDs.
    However, the author, relying on Clausewitz, writes his works himself.
    1. AK-47
      AK-47 10 June 2013 09: 08 New
      Quote: shurup
      However, the author, relying on Clausewitz, writes his works himself.

      However, the author is Vladimir Mikhailovich Zakharov, a leading researcher in the regional security sector of the RISI defense research center, doctor of military sciences.
      Useful article +++.
      1. shurup
        shurup 10 June 2013 10: 40 New
        Gorbachev - former president of the USSR, secretary general and speaker.
        But I have not yet received a useful article
  5. Lech from ZATULINKI
    Lech from ZATULINKI 10 June 2013 08: 01 New
    ИFrom the above examples it is clear that the end of the war is formalized by interstate acts. Recently, however, wars and armed conflicts have become particularly relevant, in which, on the one hand, states are involved, and on the other, armed groups that are not internationally recognized state structures.

    this thing is conveniently armed groups that are not part of internationally recognized state structures. I hired wild geese or a private security company in some kind in KOSOVO for war in somewhere in SYRIA and the people’s bloodshed poured a wide river in the name of DERMOCRACY.
  6. Avenger711
    Avenger711 10 June 2013 08: 20 New
    That is, when the colonial troops drove the Papuans in the 16th-19th centuries, it was not a war against the devil, does it know any gangs? Only the birth rate has changed in the 20th century, so it became not very profitable to fight.
  7. runway
    runway 10 June 2013 10: 12 New
    "War not only refers to those historical phenomena that, in comparison with peaceful relations, reached developed forms much earlier, but also continues to remain a powerful political instrument and a locomotive of scientific and technological progress."
    Open propaganda of war. If the author would put this phrase in context, after the war brings countless sacrifices, cripples lives, destroys and destroys everything that humanity has created for centuries as talented scientists, engineers, artists, then everything would look different. Exactly so, people see her, whose family and friends died in the fire of war. But for the author, war it is only a locomotive of scientific and technological progress ....
  8. gene
    gene 10 June 2013 11: 30 New
    The authors of strategy have been writing on this topic for a long time: Martin van Creveld "The Transformation of War", E. Toffler "War and Antiwar", S. Huntington, E. Luttwack, etc. This very uncertainty (the last sentence of the author) determines the nature of many wars of the 20th and 21st centuries. This also reveals the contradiction of international humanitarian law to the current situation. The forms and methods of troop actions in these conditions have not been determined. There are many problems. Article +.
  9. IRBIS
    IRBIS 10 June 2013 12: 07 New
    The main goal of a war, as a rule, is the redistribution of spheres of influence and the establishment of control over the necessary resources. But there is another type of war, which is essentially a consequence of a war over resources. Let's remember the wars for the spread of religion. The story develops in a spiral. And now the world has again entered the era of religious wars. They were the product of that great war. Then, after the redivision of the world and the establishment of new borders, hotbeds of tension arose, which inevitably had to explode. The main task was to localize voltage sources. But the States and the West deliberately began to "warm up" these hotbeds. Only now they do not look back into the past, do not remember how the crusades ended. How many kings ended up paying with their crowns and heads for the efforts to transfer the religion to other countries. Given the level of development of the world in our time, doing such a thing is suicide. But, most likely, the mechanism of a future war has already been launched. All that remains is to prepare for it in order to minimize the damage to our country.
    1. s1н7т
      s1н7т 10 June 2013 19: 51 New
      So all religious wars were aimed at capturing productive forces, no matter what you think about it. laughing Those. religion is just an excuse.
  10. Vtel
    Vtel 10 June 2013 14: 46 New
    "The famous Russian philosopher N.A. Berdyaev in his work" The Destiny of Russia "noted that" the instincts of racial and nationality in the twentieth century turned out to be more powerful than the instincts of social and class "and that" the struggle of races, the struggle of national values, the struggle of great empires for power and dominion over the world began to determine its future ”.
    The involvement of Russia in the globalization projects of the USA, NATO in the so-called civilization world as an ally or partner is nothing more than a “peaceful” way of conquering Russia, tested in the Third World War in the Soviet Union.
    In the West they skillfully use the fact that in Russia there is an internal civil war, and constantly throw flammable material into its fire. The preference of the civil war in Russia was said, in particular, by the former US Secretary of State Kissinger. We define this war as a liberal-criminal-organizational. The liberal component is a market ideology exported from the West, designed to create favorable conditions in order to deprive people of resistance by making them agree to public robbery and indifferent to the ongoing political changes in the country towards its capitalization and Westernization. modern Russia has found itself in two types of warfare: an external or World War Four, and internal or civil war. At the same time, the internal war is organically woven into the external one, since by its goal-setting and management it is directed from a single external center. - Author L.I. Shershnev, president of the NIMB Fund, major general of the reserve.
  11. Egen
    Egen 10 June 2013 15: 18 New
    Respect for the author hi ,

    just why
    "The consequence of this was the uncertainty in the military goals of the war, as well as in the permitted military means of achieving them. In other words, in these armed clashes the logical chain was broken: der Zweck is a political goal, das Ziel is the goal of military action, das Mittel is a means of military influence."
    - IMHO she didn’t break anything. Under Clausewitz, everything was simpler. Now, with a multi-polar and multi-tiered (i.e., layers of society) world, it is clear that everything is more complicated and all three goals may not be applied to one object. For example, they howl in Syria in order to influence the Russian Federation for the sake of not even the United States, but individual rich people. There is logic in general.
    In addition, purely "military actions" are still associated with the beloved Liddell Gart, so it is clear that it is not always possible to determine from the outside what the multi-move will come back to with many unknowns :)
  12. Jurkovs
    Jurkovs 10 June 2013 16: 54 New
    After the surrender of Prussia to Napoleon, Clausewitz was in Russian service. In 1812 he was at the headquarters of Barclay, then at the headquarters of Kutuzov. As always, we won, and the Germans generalized the victory experience. Apparently we will never learn to defend our priorities.
  13. Micex
    Micex 10 June 2013 17: 53 New
    This topic is close to me, since I am writing a dissertation, the topic of which is in conflictology. So, the current fashion trend in conflict resolution is the consideration of conflicts (both current and smoldering) in the form of a certain matrix based on game theory, where the response of player B follows (depending on the course of player A) the response of player B, and from The moves of the participants the matrix expands and gives new moves for action. In fact, all world geopolitics can be considered as a chess game, only very complex - for 2, 3 or more players (for members of a nuclear club without losing a king, since this is a nuclear war) I fully support this approach and have repeatedly convinced of it correctness.
  14. Mikhail3
    Mikhail3 10 June 2013 18: 09 New
    "In other words, these armed clashes broke the logical chain: der Zweck - das Ziel - das Mittel."
    Then I looked at the silly chatter diagonally. Yes, at the turn of the century a general movement began to replace serious scientists with illiterate, uniquely stupid, but at the same time very liquid talkers. That is, people, for reasons of kinship or participation in the same gang of thieves, close to the financial tap. But this does not mean at all that the pitiful chatter about "instinctive war" has crept up to science even by a megameter. On what does the "scientist" author base the completely blatant statement that the Clausewitz triad has been violated?
    On the fact that he is not trying to detect her signs! That's the logic! On the grounds that he does not see or understand something, a person declares something non-existent! Well, a genius ... I will allow myself to quote the words of one very clever Italian. "For a war I need three things. First, money. Second, of course, money. And third, of course ... money!"
    The author, as it should be for a true intellectual, finds money in the bedside table, that is, he considers the matter of material support for the war, for some reason not degenerating into ubiquitous knife fighting and fighting on legs from chairs, insignificant. (he knows - his wife will feed him, so that money is dust, despicable metal ... nonsense) Meanwhile, people, even without scientific degrees, gradually noticed that for some reason no one gives away large material resources for nothing! Moreover, the owners of money are very careful to ensure that their money brings them new money, that is, the cost of resources, especially for such an expensive business as war, paid off many times.
    What is possible only in what case? That's right, with strict observance of the conditions of the triad. If, in spite of the convenience of "scientists" such as a pitiful author, the rulers have ceased en masse to exclaim "I AM GOING FOR YOU", this does not mean that they have stopped walking "for you" ...
    1. Egen
      Egen 11 June 2013 07: 34 New
      Quote: Mikhail3
      Then I looked through silly chatter diagonally

      Michael, with all due respect hi you reason sensibly good but more run over :)
      Please, if it is not difficult, and when there is time :(, to write a constructive article on this subject, it would be interesting to listen to your opinion. Seriously, without jokes :)
  15. uzer 13
    uzer 13 10 June 2013 18: 46 New
    The theory and practice of armed conflict are not always unambiguous processes. A practical conflict is usually planned in advance and at a sufficient distance from its direct participants. Financing plays a major role in organizing and developing further actions. Ideas, no matter how attractive prospects they promise, hardly anyone They will be seduced if they are not backed up with real money. But there are other motives that do not quite fit into the general theory, for example, radical Islamism. It’s hard for a normal person to imagine that on religious grounds you can drive yourself crazy, get involved in explosives and go to destroy other people, having a different worldview.
  16. max702
    max702 10 June 2013 23: 00 New
    In my opinion, all recent wars have not reached their goal for one reason, they have not been completed, take Vietnam that the United States could not conquer it? do not tell, they just didn’t want for political or economic reasons, no matter they didn’t want, that's all! And so did Vietnam have a chance to stand up with the intervention of the USSR using nuclear weapons is the same with Afghanistan that the USSR could not win there? could but didn’t want how wars with a very stubborn opponent were won before? And it was very easy to root out that is total genocide, with the current means of destruction it is not very difficult, but apparently there are no goals that would justify such means.
    1. Egen
      Egen 11 June 2013 07: 46 New
      Quote: max702
      but apparently not yet those goals

      that's it, write about goals yourself. The United States, of course, could conquer Vietnam, but why? In general, what was the purpose of that war? This, as Sergei rightly wrote above, is like a chess game. Vietnam is one of the cells. But the goal of the invasion was Koakova, I didn’t really understand something. Perhaps they didn’t really understand at the top, and therefore they rounded off :)
      But rather, on the contrary, they either achieved their goals on another cell by distracting on this one, or spat and admitted defeat, decided to concentrate their efforts on another cell to achieve the same goal. And what were these goals - this is just the most interesting question for guesswork :)
      1. max702
        max702 12 June 2013 11: 24 New
        And I’m writing about that and that you don’t have to fool yourself, that big uncles are not able to achieve their goal, ABLE !! and more like that !! they just don’t need to ... and since it will be necessary .. then there will be victories and the blood-oceans.
  17. strange and pretty meaningless
    strange and pretty meaningless 11 June 2013 05: 14 New
    Of the entire Clausewitzian Talmud, I remember only a few really coined definitions, one of which is - "Russia is not a country that can be really conquered, that is, occupied ... Such a country can only be defeated by internal weakness and the action of internal strife." Otherwise, the work is clearly crude, it is a pity that it was no longer the author who published it, maybe it would have been better in the edition of Clausewitz himself. Sun Tzu's Treatises on War are more concise and understandable. An amateur's opinion smile The article under discussion is frankly liquid and secondary, the fact that the author at the same time is also a racial specialist speaks only about the crisis of domestic science.
    1. Egen
      Egen 11 June 2013 08: 06 New
      Quote: abyrvalg
      Sun Tzu concise and understandable

      IMHO these are just different works. Su-Tzu wrote about theory, approaches. His laconic phrases make you think, analyze. Clausewitz, I don’t know what he wanted, but it turned out more like ready-made recommendations. And what is raw, since otherwise, before him, in general, there was nothing like this voluminous, and is tied to that era. Now of course we are more armed with both theory and practice :)