The Most Useless Ships of World War II

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The Most Useless Ships of World War II

Looking ahead, I'll let all naval enthusiasts, and especially the critics, know that I don't intend to stop here, and will follow up with a similar ranking article about the most useful ships of that war. There aren't many of those, and it's hard to imagine the amount of fun this will provide for those who like to discuss the author's misunderstandings. I'll be happy to please everyone, but for now, here's a ranking of the worst.

Let me tell you right away why there will be no Soviet battleships on this list, although they would be appropriate.




Firstly, old age must be respected, and these ships were produced before the First World War, and if they did nothing during that war, then what claims can be made against them during the Second World War, when they were very old and good for nothing ships?

Secondly, there was a certain benefit: the bombs that the Germans threw at these battleships could have caused much more damage elsewhere.

On the effectiveness of shooting at "clusters" tanks We won't discuss the "enemy infantry" aspect, as the Americans demonstrated it perfectly, dropping thousands of tons of metal on the Pacific islands where the Japanese were entrenched, and then seeing the Marines suffer at the hands of the supposedly "suppressed" and "annihilated" Japanese. Therefore, defining what constitutes an "infantry concentration" worthy of a 305mm shell is pointless. Moreover, these shells weren't exactly... dense. According to reports, the Gangut/Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya fired 257 main-caliber shells in 25 firings. Draw your own conclusions about how effective these firings were.

But today we have some more recent losers, so to speak. And I've tried very hard to ensure this list includes more than just battleships, although, admittedly, that's no easy task.

And number one on our list will be a submarine. Otherwise, some will say, "Look, now she'll start whining about the Tirpitz..." Although, of course, she's also worthy of our attention.

The most useless submarines


Submarine Surcouf, France



Commissioned in 1934, the submarine was designed for cruising operations along ocean lanes. In addition to a torpedo armament of eight 550mm and four 400mm tubes with a substantial supply of torpedoes, it was also armed with a turret with two 203mm guns and an anti-aircraft battery of two 37mm cannons and four 13,2mm machine guns. It also carried a Besson MB.411 floatplane for reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment.

The ship's displacement is 2880 tons surfaced and 4330 tons submerged. Its length is 110 meters, and its cruising range is 12 miles.

The boat represented the pinnacle of post-World War I efforts to combine the stealth of a submarine with the firepower of a surface ship in a single vessel. Another feature of the Surcouf was its theoretical ability to conduct artillery Fire in a semi-submerged position. In reality, the submarine could fire, but firing from a semi-submerged position caused numerous leaks in the turret.

The boat's service turned out to be as follows: before the start of the war, the Surcouf wandered around ports, demonstrating the flag and the successes of French shipbuilding.

In June 1940, during Operation Catapult, French ships in British ports were taken under control by British sailors and marines. The Surcouf, which was in Portsmouth, was also captured. It's worth noting that the Surcouf was the only French ship whose crew offered armed resistance to capture. The incident resulted in the deaths of two British officers and a sailor, as well as a French midshipman.

Following these events, the crew of the Surcouf, with the exception of two officers and 14 sailors, refused further service in the ranks of the Fighting French and were sent to a prisoner of war camp in Liverpool.

The British assembled a new crew, consisting of French sailors, most of whom were not submariners. Unsurprisingly, the submarine's effectiveness was near zero, and the inexperienced crew operated the boat so extensively that repairs, which were themselves quite the adventure, were never completed.

It's important to remember that France was a metric country, while Britain was an imperial one. Every propeller and every tube had to be handcrafted, which didn't affect the boat's efficiency. Something was constantly breaking down, and the Surcouf saw virtually no combat.

On February 12, 1942, the Surcouf set sail, heading for the Panama Canal to cross into the Pacific Ocean. With only one engine functioning properly, the boat was unable to reach speeds above 13 knots. It is believed that on February 18, 1942, the Surcouf collided with the American cargo ship Thomson Lykes and sank, taking with it 127 French and three British sailors.

I-400-class submarines. Japan



Designed in 1942-1943 as ultra-long-range submarine aircraft carriers for operations anywhere on the globe, specifically off the US coast, the I-400-class submarines were the largest built during World War II and remained so until the advent of nuclear submarines. They were truly enormous:
- standard surface displacement 3,530 t;
- full 5,223 t;
- underwater displacement 6,560 t

Maximum length (according to design waterline) – 122 m.

This thing is really huge.

The I-400 owes its birth to Admiral Yamamoto, who, immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, ordered work to begin on the creation of such a strange ship: an underwater aircraft carrier for attacks on the US coast.

While Japanese shipbuilders already had experience with mounting reconnaissance floatplanes on several submarine classes, the I-400 needed to carry a larger number of aircraft, none of them reconnaissance-oriented, to accomplish its intended missions. Requirements for the aircraft included carrying an aerial torpedo or two medium-caliber bombs.

The construction project was a complete failure: 18 submarines were planned, but in 1943, after the death of Admiral Yamamoto, this number was reduced to nine ships, of which only six were started and only three completed. Due to their late construction, the I-400-class submarines were never used in combat. After Japan's surrender, all three submarines were handed over to the United States and scuttled in 1946.

To appreciate these boats, it is enough to look at their armament:
- 8 533 mm torpedo tubes and 20 Type 95 torpedoes;
- 1 x 140 mm gun in the stern behind the wheelhouse;
- 3 three-barrel and 1 single-barrel 25-mm Type 96 anti-aircraft guns, located on the wheelhouse.

Aviation The I-400 type group consisted of three floatplanes, Aichi M6A Seiran torpedo bombers, with the ability to also transport a fourth one in a partially disassembled form in a hangar.

To launch aircraft, the boats had a launch catapult and launch rails.

The I-400 was no less an interesting project than the Surcouf, but it never saw use.

The most useless cruisers


Battlecruisers Alaska and Guam. USA



The Alaska-class battleship-like monsters were built to catch heavy cruisers in the ocean. fleet Japan and destroy them.

In reality, the resulting ships were inferior to the "light" battleships of the Dunkirk or Scharnhorst class in armor and main battery guns. Furthermore, the Alaska's 305mm guns fired 5-7 km closer than the Dunkirk's 330mm guns or the Scharnhorst's 280mm guns.

The main drawback of the Alaska-class battlecruisers was their inadequate protection against underwater damage. The ships lacked torpedo protection, which, in addition to several layers of watertight compartments, should have had a main armored bulkhead. On the Alaska-class, the underwater protection bulkheads were made of thin sheets of structural steel, and the protective layer itself was insufficient in width.

That is, the main trump card of the Japanese ships, the Long Lance torpedoes with a caliber of 610 mm, were fatal for the Alaska. weapons, and the 533 mm torpedoes were quite serious weapons, capable of sending this cruiser to the bottom with a couple of them.

The Alaska, the Soviet Kronstadt project, and the German and Japanese "large cruisers" were noticeably inferior to the Dunkirk and Scharnhorst. Yes, the French and German ships were considered battleships, but the Alaska had roughly the same displacement, and its main battery was larger than that of the Scharnhorst.

But the struggle for the Alaska's extra two knots, which came at the cost of a significant deterioration in other combat characteristics, proved quite detrimental to the latest generation of battlecruisers, which had finally ceased to be "battleships," that is, ships designed to engage battleships. In this regard, the Strasbourg performed much better than the German and American ships.

The combat successes of the Alaska and Guam were less than stellar. Yes, they entered the war in March 1945, but by the end of World War II, these cruisers had achieved nothing more than the Alaska shooting down two Japanese aircraft and the Guam downing one. And that's all the last two battlecruisers in the war could boast of. stories.

"Too large and expensive to be used as cruisers, too weak and vulnerable for joint operations with battleships, and obviously late in their appearance, they were, in the opinion of American experts themselves, "the most useless of the large ships built during the Second World War."
Kofman V.L.


Deutschland heavy cruisers



We'll discuss these ships in detail in the near future, but today we'll simply relegate them to the ranks of failures, for that's exactly what they were. "Pocket battleships," "perfect pirates"—well, yes, but no.

A great deal of armor was expended on three cruisers, but to little avail. We won't dwell on the details of these ships' design and armament; let's move straight to their combat effectiveness.

Deutschland / Lutzow


She went down in history as the first ship to be bombed by Soviet aircraft. Two 100-kg bombs from Spanish Republican Air Force SB bombers tore through the deck, killing 23 and wounding 73 crew members. It wasn't exactly a great start.

During her voyages, the Lützow sank two merchant ships with a combined displacement of 7,000 tons. And that's all the ship could boast about, because firing her main guns at advancing Soviet troops in the Baltics in 1945 is… well, we've already discussed the value of firing large calibers over large areas.

Admiral Scheer


This one saw a bit more combat: between 1940 and 1942, the Admiral Scheer sank the British auxiliary cruiser Jervis Bay, the Soviet icebreaker Alexander Sibiryakov, and 15 transport ships.

"Admiral Graf Spee"


Before her destruction in Montevideo, the cruiser had sunk a total of six transports. Of course, in the battle against three British cruisers, the Graf Spee fared quite well, the heavy cruiser Exeter was thoroughly decimated by the Germans, and the Ajax also took a beating. Indeed, if not for the personal qualities of the cruiser's commander, Landsdorf, the outcome of the battle could have been entirely different.

But history knows no subjunctive mood, and so the three heavy cruisers, armed with 18 283mm and 24 150mm guns between them and fairly decent armor, never participated in a single major naval battle. For various reasons, including diesel engine failure, navigational errors that sent the Lützow flying who knows where, and so on.

1 auxiliary cruiser, that is, an ocean liner armed with old 152-mm guns, an icebreaker steamer with 2 76-mm guns and 15 unarmed transport ships.

Quite a feat for three super-heavy cruisers, indeed. It's comparable, one might say, to the success of the raider Atlantis, which sank and captured 22 ships with a combined displacement of over 100,000 tons. In other words, the raider, armed with six 150mm guns, proved more effective than three very heavy cruisers. It should be noted that Atlantis was engaged in precisely what the Deutschlands were built for—piracy and plunder. But the former liner accomplished this task far better.

These three designs are, without exaggeration, remarkable. Only the Kriegsmarine's greatest disgrace, the Tirpitz, can surpass them in terms of uselessness.

The most useless battleships


Royal Sovereign, aka Arkhangelsk. UK/USSR



Perhaps this ship deserves the title "The slowest and most dismal trough of two wars." Its top speed of 21 knots meant it couldn't do anything. It couldn't catch the enemy, nor could it escape. Plus, its engines weren't of the best quality: it was their breakdowns that prevented the Royal Sovereign from participating in the Battle of Jutland.

With the outbreak of World War II, Royal Sovereign joined the Home Fleet and was later transferred to the Mediterranean Fleet. On July 18, 1940, she participated in the Battle of Punta Stilo. However, due to the ship's insufficient speed, Admiral Cunningham was unable to engage the Italian battleships Giulio Cesare and Conte di Cavour in a decisive engagement. The Italian battleships simply fled.

Although the main caliber guns were 381 mm, they were inferior in firing range to almost all battleships of the Second World War.

In 1940-1941, the Royal Sovereign escorted Atlantic convoys. In 1942, she was briefly assigned to the Eastern Fleet, based in Trincomalee, Ceylon, and then transferred to Kenya, as she was considered too obsolete to fight the Japanese fleet. And that, essentially, was the end of the Royal Sovereign's service.

From September 1942 to September 1943, due to the poor condition of her machinery, the battleship was sent to the United States, where she underwent a year-long overhaul. Following the overhaul, the Royal Sovereign served for one month in the Indian Ocean and was recalled to reserve.

In 1944, this miracle was given to the Soviet Union for the Northern Fleet.


On August 17, Arkhangelsk and convoy JW-59 departed Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands for Vaenga (now Severomorsk). Initially, the battleship and eight destroyers stayed with the convoy, which was subjected to several submarine attacks. On August 19, the battleship opened fire on the enemy for the first and only time, firing at the location where a submarine's periscope had appeared.

At dawn on August 24, having traveled 1880 miles, the battleship safely arrived in Vaenga, where it became the flagship of the squadron created from the transferred ships.

The battleship never left Kola Bay until the end of the war. The only time the Arkhangelsk's main guns fired a blank salvo was on Victory Day. September and December 1944 were spent mostly at anchor, and in November, the Arkhangelsk had 10-12 days at sea, mostly short excursions from its base within Kola Bay for combat training: anti-aircraft gunnery practice, radio-ranging exercises, and the like.

In 1945, the Arkhangelsk had 40 sailing days, in 1946 – 19 days, in 1947 – 21 days. In other words, the ship was practically at rest.

On January 15, 1949, the Arkhangelsk departed Vaenga and arrived at Rosyth Naval Base on February 4. Upon the ship's return, Royal Navy technicians conducted a thorough inspection of the ship's systems and, according to them, discovered that much of the equipment was unfit for further service. The main battery turrets had not rotated during its entire service in the Soviet Navy and were jammed in the mid-position. Due to its poor condition, the battleship was scrapped.

A battleship that has hardly fired a single shot in its entire life – what could be sadder?

Battleship Tirpitz. Germany



While the previous loser was a rather old ship, the same can't be said for the Tirpitz. After all, the battleship entered service with the Kriegsmarine in 1941 and... did nothing.

Yes, it's fair to say that the battleship fell victim to policies directly linked to the loss of her sister ship, the Bismarck. After the Bismarck, Hitler and Grand Admiral Raeder were extremely cautious about the capabilities of large surface ships without the support of aircraft carriers, which Germany was never able to build.

In January 1942, the Tirpitz was sent to Norwegian waters to hunt Arctic convoys to the USSR. There, in the fjords, she remained for virtually the entirety of World War II. Permission for combat missions was granted personally by Hitler, which often disrupted planned operations. The Führer… was very cautious.

The only operation in which the Tirpitz fired its main guns was Operation Sicily, the German capture of Spitsbergen. It was the only time the Tirpitz fired its main guns at anything other than aerial targets. However, it never fired a single shot at enemy ships.

Of course, this battleship did serve a certain purpose, distracting the British, who were determined to destroy it at all costs. This was accomplished after a dozen operations.

But the fact is: a perfectly good ship spent the war as a target for British bombers. With zero or near-zero value.

Battleships Yamato and Musashi. Japan



Japanese admirals, who considered battleships to be the navy's primary striking force, believed that ships of this type, if built in sufficient numbers, would provide the Imperial Navy with a decisive advantage in a projected general engagement with the US Pacific Fleet. Only Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku believed in the decisive role of aircraft carriers and the insignificant combat potential of battleships.

“These ships resemble calligraphic religious scrolls that old men hang in their homes. They have not proven their worth. This is only a matter of faith, not reality ... the battleships will be useful to Japan in a future war just like a samurai sword. ”
Admiral Yamamoto.

Yamato formally participated in the Battle of Midway Atoll on June 4-6, 1942, but had no fire contact with the enemy, as it was located 300 miles behind the Japanese aircraft carriers.

On May 28, 1942, Yamato transferred to Truk Island, where she spent about a year serving as the Combined Fleet's floating headquarters. On December 25, 1943, while north of Truk, she was hit by a torpedo from the American submarine Skate and took on approximately 3,000 tons of water through a hole. The ship's combat capability was seriously impaired by flooding in the aft main gun turret magazine. From January to April 1944, Yamato underwent repairs and modernization in Kure.

In June 1944, Yamato participated in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The Japanese force was in the vanguard of its carriers. On June 19, Yamato opened fire in combat for the first time in its career, but it was later discovered that the battleship had fired on its own aircraft (fortunately, to no avail).

On March 29, 1943, Musashi left Truk Lagoon, evading American carrier-based aircraft, but was intercepted at sea by the US submarine Tunny and struck in the bow by a torpedo. The ship took on 3,000 tons of water, and 18 crew members were lost. The battleship underwent repairs in Kure until the end of April. From June 19-23, along with the Yamato, it participated in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, where it also achieved no results.

The Japanese command was saving its newest superbattleships for the anticipated decisive battle with the US Navy. In reality, the Pacific War devolved into a series of grueling operations and skirmishes, in which the Japanese navy's strength rapidly dwindled while its most powerful ships were moored at anchor far from active combat zones. As a result, Japanese sailors of the time developed a skepticism toward these ships, giving rise to a bitter joke about the "Hashiro fleet" (named after its home port): "The three biggest and most useless things in the world are the Egyptian pyramids, the Great Wall of China, and the battleship Yamato."

On October 22, 1944, the 1st Sabotage Force put to sea and the very next day was attacked by American submarines, which sank two heavy cruisers. On the morning of October 24, while the force was in the Sibuyan Sea, massive American carrier-based air raids began. The Musashi received the brunt of the American air strikes. In total, the Musashi sustained hits from 11 to 19 aerial torpedoes and 10 to 17 heavy bombs before capsizing and sinking.


Yamato returned to the shores of Japan only on November 22, 1944, and was immediately sent for repairs and another modernization, which was completed in January 1945 and turned out to be its last.

On the morning of April 6, 1945, a squadron consisting of the Yamato, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers set out to sea. The ships were tasked with "attacking and destroying enemy fleets and supply vessels." If unable to return to base, the Yamato was ordered to run aground off the coast of Okinawa and support the island's defenders with artillery fire.

American reconnaissance aircraft spotted the Japanese force early in the morning of April 7. Beginning in the afternoon, Yamato and its escorts came under sustained attack by American carrier-based aircraft (227 aircraft participated in the raids). After two hours of desperate fighting, the battleship, having sustained up to 10 torpedo and 13 bomb hits, completely lost its propulsion and control. At 14:23 PM local time, a monstrous explosion rocked the forward main battery magazines, causing Yamato to rapidly sink.


Only 269 sailors were rescued. 3061 crew members were killed. American losses in this battle amounted to only 10 aircraft and 12 pilots.

Overall, the fate of the Yamato and Musashi is similar to that of the Tirpitz – they were saved until the very end, and thus were ineffective. A pitiful fate…

The most useless aircraft carrier


Aircraft carrier Shinano. Japan



This is a classic example of what not to do in critical times. Shinano was intended to be one of three super-powerful Yamato-class battleships. Its conversion to an aircraft carrier began after the Battle of Midway, in which the Imperial Navy lost four of its most powerful carriers.

Moreover, Shinano, as a battleship, was built to a fairly decent standard. Much could no longer be changed; the armor was structurally integrated into the hull structure, so it could only be reduced by half. The initial design called for 18 aircraft, but the final design accommodated a full 42. By comparison, the Shokaku, half its size, carried 84 aircraft.

And the first, not even combat, patrol, but rather a voyage to Kure Base in the Inland Sea for final fitting-out, turned out to be the Shinano's last. And the efforts of the Shinano's captain, who played a significant role in the carrier's sinking, deserve special mention.

The American submarine Archerfish fired four torpedoes at the Shinano. Her sister ships, the Yamato and Musashi, sustained more damage, but the unfinished and untested ship proved too vulnerable to damage. The Shinano lacked all the necessary survivability equipment, including dewatering pumps.

The watertight bulkheads were not checked for leaks: they had leaks in places where cables and other communications passed through, and the seals of the pipelines and cables were not sealed.

The aircraft carrier's crew for the duration of the voyage was recruited from the crews of other ships and did not work well together, which could not help but affect the effectiveness of the ship's survivability.

Ultimately, 17 hours after setting out on her maiden voyage and seven hours after being torpedoed 65 miles off the nearest coast, the Shinano sank. Escort destroyers took on board 1080 of the Shinano's crew during the rescue operation, and 1435 were declared missing.

The largest aircraft carrier (until the nuclear-powered Enterprise arrived in 1960) also turned out to be the most useless.

This is how the review turned out.

Attentive readers, who I hope haven't yet become extinct like the dinosaurs, may ask: where are the destroyers? Well, they're not there. So it turns out that useless ships of this class couldn't be found. Of course, someone might have a different opinion; that's what comments are for. As the saying goes, go for it.


But in reality, destroyers simply could not have been useless in that war: they laid mines, chased submarines, escorted transports, landed troops, supported landings, shelled enemy coastal targets, carried out torpedo attacks, rescued the crews of sinking ships, fired artillery at enemy ships, and repelled attacks by enemy aircraft.

Some destroyers did this better than others. The worst ones sank to the bottom, while the best ones celebrated victory afloat. They were the all-rounders of that war. So, we'll talk about destroyers in the next article, about the most useful ships.
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  1. 0
    31 October 2026 03: 53
    The text may be good, but the AI ​​images are so jarring that they ruin the overall impression of the article.
    1. +9
      31 October 2026 17: 33
      "AI images are so jarring to the eyes... "
      I would like some specifics, I personally have not found a single one cobbled together by AI.
      There must be problems with your vision... request
      1. +3
        31 October 2026 21: 08
        Illustration for "Gangut"/"October Revolution" - original photo attached (IMHO)
        (what's in the illustration couldn't turn the guns)
        The battlecruisers "Alaska" and "Guam" (the cruiser is underway - but the anchor is dropped and the chain is in the other direction...) - similarly
        You can compare it with what is in the article, I didn’t look at the others much.
        1. +1
          31 October 2026 21: 21
          Correction regarding "Gangut"/"October Revolution" - it may not be in the article, but it is still edited
          1. +6
            1 November 2026 11: 54
            Aleh hi, amendment to "amendment":
            Automatic anti-aircraft guns were mounted directly forward of the first main-caliber turret. In a 1946 photograph (provided by the author and you), the twin gun shields for the 37-mm V-11 automatic anti-aircraft guns (or similar 70-K mounts) are clearly visible on the bow. The characteristic box-shaped, semi-enclosed shields make them resemble miniature gun turrets from a distance.
            The clear deck at the very bow of the ship was one of the few areas where the firing angles allowed anti-aircraft gunners to effectively fire at aircraft approaching the ship from the bow angles without blocking the view of the main caliber rangefinders.
            So the author did not undertake any “editing”.
            1. +1
              1 November 2026 12: 14
              So the author did not undertake any “editing”.

              Well, if you don't count the added smoke from the chimney + improved detailing (clearly not just improved clarity in Photoshop - see the original photo), then yes - the photo can be called "unedited".
              1. +3
                1 November 2026 12: 22
                I found a photo with smoke - so that's also off. request
                1. +2
                  1 November 2026 13: 06
                  No big deal. Even if photos are published with enhanced detail using Photoshop, that's sometimes for the better, and has nothing to do with the AI-powered clichés that often make you sick.
            2. +6
              2 November 2026 11: 23
              Quote: Fachmann
              Automatic anti-aircraft guns were mounted directly forward of the first main-caliber turret. In the 1946 photograph (provided by the author and you), the twin gun shields for the 37-mm V-11 automatic anti-aircraft guns (or similar 70-K mounts) are clearly visible on the bow.

              Do not guess. wink Since 1942, the Oktyabrina's bow has been equipped with a 76,2 mm twin gun and a unique 37 mm quadruple machine gun.
              The experience of the autumn battles revealed the weakness of the battleship's air defense systems, so in February-March 1942 the ship received four additional 37-mm 70-K machine guns, installed two each on the bridges of the foremast and mainmast. By April 20, a third twin 76,2-mm 81-K artillery mount (located on the forecastle deck) was installed, and in September, a prototype quadruple 37-mm 46-K machine gun was installed aft of it. (previously there were two 12,7-mm DShK machine guns that were transferred to the mast bridges).
              © Vasiliev
              Two more 76,2mm 81-K twin mounts were mounted on the stern. The end turrets carried 76mm 34-K anti-aircraft guns, while the middle turrets and bridge turrets carried 37mm 70-K automatic guns.
              1. -1
                2 November 2026 15: 27
                Alexey hi,
                I didn't guess, Google's AI and ChatGpt both gave me this information.
                Maybe these two enemy sources are deliberately bringing cancer to the stone? laughing
                1. +3
                  2 November 2026 15: 52
                  Quote: Fachmann
                  I didn't guess, Google's AI and ChatGpt both gave me this information.
                  Maybe these two enemy sources are deliberately bringing cancer to the stone?

                  They pass off what they wish for (an answer that matches the wording of the request as closely as possible) as reality. smile
                  I almost got caught with the Pobeda's mechanical engineer: AI stubbornly insisted that at the moment I was interested in he served on the Nikolai I.
                  In fact, the AI ​​simply didn't take the word "earlier" into account:
                  Senior mechanical engineer V.A. Obnorsky, earlier Having handled the machinery and fire-tube boilers of the battleship Emperor Nicholas I with great skill, he was so depressed by the constant accidents during the voyage to England in the summer of 1902 that he was discharged to a coastal hospital in Portland with a diagnosis of "nervous disorder."
        2. +5
          1 November 2026 12: 09
          Now about the "Amkrikant", who allegedly "on the move - but the anchor has been dropped and the chain is in the other direction...".
          Correctly noted, but absolutely wrong.
          The author provided an official U.S. Navy archival photograph (Image Number 80-G-289825) showing the cruiser USS Alaska (CB-1) at anchor on November 13, 1944.
          Ship not on the go, and the illusion of movement and diverging waves (breakers) at the stem are caused by a strong tidal current.
          When a large warship is at anchor in a strong current, huge masses of water flow around its hull, creating exactly the same hydrodynamic effect as when the ship is moving under its own power:
          A distinct wave forms at the bow, giving you the illusion that “the ship is making a wave.”
          A foamy wake also forms on the sides and behind the stern.
          In maritime practice, this is a common phenomenon, which is why ships often appear to be moving at full speed in static aerial photographs.
          I would like to add that the author, Roman Skomorokhov, is always extremely meticulous and responsible in selecting photographic material.
          Best regards hi
          1. +2
            1 November 2026 12: 45
            Great, then a request to authors: please caption the images with "from the archive of such-and-such..." or "illustration by the author," so that in the current glut of generated content, there's no need to guess whether it's an AI creation or a real photo. Actually, authors often insert AI hallucinations into their articles on the topic.
            1. +2
              1 November 2026 13: 15
              "...A request to the authors: please add captions to the images: "from the archive of such and such...."", this is often simply impossible. But a general link to the sources below the published article is almost always provided. At least, that's what I always do; you can check out my work. By delving into these sources, those who wish can embark on a journey through the labyrinths of history.
          2. 0
            9 November 2026 06: 44
            The author provided an official US Navy archival photograph (photo number 80-G-289825)

            Dear sir, did you actually look at this official photo yourself? Or did you just ask the AI?

            Doesn’t it bother you?
  2. +9
    31 October 2026 05: 26
    Submarine "Surcouf"
    This submarine simply fell into the wrong hands. It's unclear what France could have used it for, other than demonstrating its naval might and industrial technology. But if Germany had possessed such a device, the war in the Atlantic would have taken on a completely different character. I'm referring to the seaplane carried by this submarine, which could have detected convoys at great distances, corrected the U-boats' courses, and guided them to the ocean convoys. Dönitz must have been licking his chops at the sight of this "Surcouf."
    1. +6
      31 October 2026 06: 35
      Once convoys began to be escorted by escort aircraft carriers and pilots of such a device, the submarine itself became a target.
      1. +4
        31 October 2026 08: 47
        Quote: Grencer81
        Once convoys began to be escorted by escort aircraft carriers and pilots of such a device, the submarine itself became a target.
        The Germans simply hadn't organized any countermeasures against anti-submarine forces. They were in the ocean.
        were on their own
        1. +4
          31 October 2026 10: 15
          The Germans simply didn't have any anti-submarine forces in place. They were on their own in the ocean.


          How could the Germans do this?
          1. +1
            31 October 2026 10: 17
            Quote: old rats
            How could the Germans do this?
            That's exactly it, they couldn't do it at all. They were exhausted!
        2. +4
          31 October 2026 10: 16
          The primary targets for the Kriegsmarine's wolf packs were transports, and enemy anti-submarine forces were considered secondary targets, with the exception of escort carriers.
          1. +5
            31 October 2026 10: 20
            Quote: Grencer81
            The primary targets for the Kriegsmarine's wolf packs were transports, while enemy anti-submarine forces were considered secondary targets.
            So, I'm saying that for German submarines to be successful, they needed to counter the enemy's anti-submarine forces. And they didn't have the manpower or resources to do that during the war.
            1. +1
              31 October 2026 11: 23
              The Germans began using T-V acoustic torpedoes against anti-submarine forces in mid-1943, but after some captured German submariners blabbed about them, the Allies came up with the Foxer.
            2. +2
              31 October 2026 19: 33
              Quote: Schneeberg
              But during the war they didn’t have the strength or the resources to do this.

              How do you envision these "forces and resources" and what should be the approximate makeup of forces to combat one "Hunter-killer" group?
              1. +3
                31 October 2026 23: 06
                Well, it's our own escort carrier, covering the submarines. I don't really know why we need submarines then. laughing
                When I was 12 or 13, I was making sketches for my imaginary army with underwater aircraft carriers that carried dozens of jet-powered unmanned fighters and floating long-range air defense batteries. lol
              2. +1
                1 November 2026 05: 24
                Quote: Macsen_Wledig
                How do you see these "forces and means" and what should be the approximate order of forces?
                The first thing that comes to mind is aviation, which should combat enemy anti-submarine forces. Only aviation that follows all the orders of the naval command, not Göring's. The back-and-forth between Göring and Raeder on the use of aviation at sea, and later with Dönitz, has long since become a thing of the past. And this is just off the top of my head.
                1. +1
                  2 November 2026 11: 32
                  Quote: Schneeberg
                  The first thing that comes to mind is aviation, which must combat the enemy’s anti-submarine forces.

                  "Anti-Submarine Force" is an escort carrier with a dozen Wildcats. The AVE fighters were used to hunt Luft reconnaissance aircraft and to patrol alongside the Avengers as attack aircraft: if a detected submarine hadn't managed to submerge, it would be attacked by a Wildcat's combat missiles; if it had, the Avenger's depth charges would be dropped into the crater.
                  So the anti-submarine forces had something to fight off the aircraft with.
                  Quote: Schneeberg
                  Only aviation, carrying out all the orders of the naval command, and not Goering.

                  This air force would suffer, but not for long. Because the Kriegsmarine admirals had no understanding of air force operations, but they desperately wanted to command them. In reality, Göring confiscated the reconnaissance squadrons transferred to the navy after they complained about naval orders to take off in foggy weather (even in zero-visibility fog), because the navy needed it right now.
                  Quote: Schneeberg
                  The barking between Goering and Raeder on the issue of the use of aviation at sea, and later with Dönitz, has long since become a thing of the past.

                  Operation Cerberus also went down in history, where the naval forces managed to establish normal cooperation with the Lufts, despite belonging to different agencies. Maybe it wasn't just Fat Herman? wink
                  1. +1
                    2 November 2026 13: 52
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    In reality, Goering took away the reconnaissance squadrons transferred to the navy after they started complaining about the navy's orders to take off in low visibility conditions (even in fog with zero visibility), because the navy needed it right now.

                    However, this did not bother the British...
                    There were no complaints to the king. laughing
    2. +1
      31 October 2026 17: 11
      I mean the seaplane on board this boat, which could detect convoys at great distances, correct the courses of submarines and guide them to ocean convoys.

      Was a plane needed there?
      Considering that the Kriegsmarine had, I think, about a hundred submarines in the Atlantic, it seems to me that they blocked all routes, plus there was probably radio intelligence
      1. +2
        31 October 2026 19: 09
        Never before had the Kriegsmarine had nearly a hundred submarines in the Atlantic at one time. At best, two and a half dozen. And even a hundred submarines couldn't physically block all the routes.
        1. +3
          31 October 2026 19: 26
          Well, this is what I find on the Internet.
          Autumn 1942 - 150 Dönitz boats in the Atlantic theater
          May 1943 - 200 boats
          Considering Dönitz's tactics, a third of the boats go into position, a third of the boats return from position, and a third are in repair, I think you're being very disingenuous with "At best, two and a half dozen."
          Again, the case of the ONS-5 convoy, which was attacked by 30 to 40 German U-boats, again indicates a much larger number of boats in the Atlantic.
          1. +2
            1 November 2026 02: 43
            "Hitler's Submarine Warfare", in 4 volumes. Part 1: "Hunters".
            Part two "Victims".
            Several instances where wolf packs of 30-40 boats were deployed against a convoy resulted in collisions between the boats, leading Dönitz's headquarters to conclude that such numbers were excessive.
    3. +5
      31 October 2026 19: 30
      Quote: Schneeberg
      But if Germany had had such a device, the war in the Atlantic would have taken on a completely different character.

      I'll let you in on a little secret: the Germans even considered their "nine" to be too big for operations on convoy routes in the North Atlantic...
  3. +4
    31 October 2026 05: 57
    An interesting article both for its analysis and for the fact that it's not only our admirals who, as customers, can be, to put it mildly, eccentric.
  4. + 16
    31 October 2026 06: 19
    To avoid the Author having to format such a long text, he could simply write that The most useless ships in World War II were the heavy gunnery ships - battleships and heavy cruisers, which bit off a fair amount of money and metal from the economy, which could have been used to build tanks, submarines and airplanes...))
    1. +7
      31 October 2026 10: 10
      I once read a quote that the cost of building one Colorado-class battleship—give or take a bast shoe—was equal to the cost of ALL the tanks in Soviet service at the end of the war. As for the effectiveness of both—it's all clear.
      Well, there's a lot that's not being taken into account here—the very presence of heavy tanks and artillery prevented Germany, for example, from "deploying anti-submarine cover." And the United States, which hadn't fought on land at all, why would they need tanks? Where would they have deployed a division of them? On Iwo Jima? Which, by the standards of the so-called "Eastern Front," was a local battle. And on land in Europe, their problem was building crossings, not tank numbers. Take Monte Cassino—they practically couldn't cross the stream for five months, and without the "Miracle on the Rhine," they would have remained there until the end of the war.
  5. +9
    31 October 2026 06: 38
    The list could also include Japanese mini-submarines, of which several hundred were produced.
  6. + 25
    31 October 2026 07: 02
    Looking ahead, I will inform all fans of the marine theme and especially critics that I do not intend to stop there.

    But threatening is not nice. laughing
    It's impossible to agree with the rating simply because any rating must be based on compliance with certain criteria. What criteria did the author use? Personal preferences, nothing more. The result is a hodgepodge of complaints about performance characteristics and operational effectiveness.
    In terms of performance characteristics, the Soverin is head and shoulders above the French Courbet. In terms of efficiency, the French and Italian LKs have achieved nothing at all, yet they're not included in the rankings.
    1. +6
      31 October 2026 08: 25
      I already asked him a question about Warspite just below. =_=
      And that one is almost the same.
  7. +9
    31 October 2026 07: 35
    Come on, your Spee and Scheer were causing a ruckus, which is useful even if the fires didn't light anything.
    1. +2
      2 November 2026 06: 29
      Quote: Kvakosavrus
      which is useful even if the fires didn't light anything

      No one knows what might have been useful or in demand, and it's hard to disagree with the theme of chaos and stress. The very fact that the Tirpitz exists, even stationed in Altenfjord, was very unsettling for the British. In fact, according to the article's logic, even more useless are the nuclear arsenals that have been sitting idle since the last century, costing enormous amounts of money in design, production, and maintenance. But isn't it worth it?
      It's clear that Roman's article is yet another clever "provocation" designed to spark heated discussion. Kudos to him for that.
  8. + 16
    31 October 2026 07: 39
    It's difficult, of course, to comment on the author's logic, especially when there's none. Let's start with the question: why did the Germans so diligently sink that very same Red Banner Baltic Fleet? Its guns, in the author's opinion, weren't a hindrance. Apparently, Rudel and company simply needed the crosses... Oh well. The unfortunate Surcouf made it into the ranking, but where's the rest of the French fleet? I understand they sank the destroyers there, of course—a very useful fleet, and it justified itself completely. The Italians don't deserve any attention either. From battleship to destroyer, everyone was useful. For some reason, I can't remember who the Italian destroyers sank. Battleships are fine; at least they used torpedoes on them, and most of them survived the war. The Bismarck is clearly more useful than the Tirpitz, and the Japanese battleships, with the exception of the Musashi and Yamato, were the true masters of the seas. A complete mess.
    1. + 14
      31 October 2026 08: 28
      Quote: Black cat
      For some reason I can't remember who the Italian destroyers sank.

      Well, Italian destroyers were quite selflessly supplying Rommel along the "Road of Death" when the Allies had a significant naval advantage at the end of the African opupae. It's a little-known story—but it's there.
    2. +4
      31 October 2026 17: 16
      Let's start with the question: why did the Germans so diligently sink that very same Baltic Fleet?

      But were they really DILIGENTLY sinking it? Or was it just a regular detachment of the Northern Forces, conducting a completely routine combat mission.
      In other words, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was the target of the German troops, but not so much that they would throw all their resources there, that's my opinion.
    3. +1
      1 November 2026 17: 03
      Quote: Black cat
      For some reason I can’t remember who the Italian destroyers sank,

      Search online to find out how the Italian Lupo and Sagittarrio, torpedo boats of course, not destroyers, covered convoys to Crete.
  9. + 11
    31 October 2026 07: 50
    Looking ahead, I'll inform all fans of naval themes and especially critics that I don't intend to stop there, and there will be a similar rating article about the most useful ships of that war.

    And here everything is simple.
    It's a no-brainer—the most useful ships were those the admirals didn't mind losing. That is, destroyers and light cruisers (we'll leave aircraft carriers out of the equation). Emphasis on the latter, as a cruiser, even a light one, is far more survivable than a purely disposable destroyer (sinking something bigger than yourself and dying was already considered a definite advantage). They were driven around the seas and oceans like crazy, and therefore many in these classes managed to accomplish a ton of useful work.
    Of course, some ships had unique fates, but in general, these are exceptions to the rule.

    P.S. Without considering Soviet battleships because they're "old and useless," Roman, I think the British HMS Warspite should also be excluded from the next article about the best. She's also from roughly the same era, after all. If we're going to categorize ships purely by year of construction, then we should include all of them without exception. Otherwise, we're judging here, not judging there, and just throwing away the fish here.
  10. +1
    31 October 2026 08: 00
    The heavy cruiser Blucher is, in my opinion, the only case where a coastal torpedo battery was able to sink anything.
    Well, off the top of my head, about 30% of the Kriegsmarine's submarines—their history is reminiscent of the joke about the Chukchi and the bricks: "Why are bricks rectangular, but the circles they make on the water are round?"
  11. + 13
    31 October 2026 08: 12

    While the previous loser was a rather old ship, the same can't be said for the Tirpitz. After all, the battleship entered service with the Kriegsmarine in 1941 and... did nothing.

    Again, Roman's strange selectivity.
    He praises the Soviet battleships for being a punching bag for Luftwaffe bombers, and the Tirpitz, which the British spent far more attempts, effort, and resources on in order to sink - no, that's something else, you have to understand.

    Well, the author knows better.

    And about the well-known convoy, in whose fate Tirpitz played, albeit indirectly, as a scarecrow - there is also silence.
  12. + 12
    31 October 2026 08: 29
    The Alaska thing made me laugh. Another tired cliché. The author doesn't need to think.
    In fact, the Alaska-class's real problem was that by the time they entered service, they had no opponents left. Otherwise, this is the correct concept for a truly heavy cruiser. Had they been built to replace the Baltimore-class, the fleet could have been equipped with 10-12 heavy cruisers, equally effective as battleships in most operations. Not to mention their significantly greater effectiveness against shore targets, it's worth noting that Alaska-class cruisers, operating in pairs, can reliably sink:
    - German battleship Tirpitz;
    - four Japanese Takao cruisers;
    - a couple of Italian battleships like Cavour or Dulio.
    Alaskan cruisers are capable of engaging a pair of Kongo-class battlecruisers or German Scharnhorst-class battlecruisers on equal terms. Under certain conditions, they are capable of confronting Renown-class battlecruisers.
    The Alaskans had a single, but very significant, drawback, like cruisers: a 1,5-knot speed deficit. The rest... you have to be able to compare cruisers to cruisers.
    1. +3
      31 October 2026 14: 35
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      And so, this is the correct concept of a truly heavy cruiser.
      A ship with 12" artillery is no longer a heavy cruiser.
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      If they had been built instead of the Baltimores, they could have given the fleet 10-12 heavy cruisers.
      Instead of how many Baltimores?
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      not inferior to battleships in terms of effectiveness in most operations
      The only operation where a battleship is truly effective is punching another battleship in the face. A battleship's secondary mission—punching heavy cruisers—could indeed be assigned to the Alaskan. But an Alaskan costs $72 million, a Baltimore costs $30-40 million, and an Iowa costs $100 million. So, three Alaskan ships equals two Iowas, two Baltimores equals one Alaskan. No way.
      Not to mention the significantly greater effectiveness against coastal targets.
      What coastal targets did you need 12" against? Did you find the Maginot Line offshore? That caliber only makes sense against coastal batteries, fortresses, and heavy ships; for everything else, it's too expensive. For everything else on the shore, 8" is a reasonable maximum.
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      It should be noted that Alaskans, working in pairs, confidently drown:
      - German battleship Tirpitz;
      He will shoot them first, at a greater distance.
      1. +7
        31 October 2026 15: 55
        The Americans believed that the old dreadnought with 12x14" guns was twice as effective against Japanese island fortifications and airfields as 9x16". And 8" was a piece of cake. They needed 12".
        The cost of a series built at a rapid pace is always lower than a unique project built on a residual basis. For a series of 10 Alaskas, the cost would drop to 50.
        But the Tirpitz is a problem: it doesn't know how to fight at long range, while the Americans do. With a confident range of 150 cables, they can confidently hit its decks. Plus, 18 twelve-inch guns at that range will fire up to 45 shells per minute. They confidently control the range in a fight with the Tirpitz, so it has a chance of not escaping to Bogen Bay after Spitsbergen. I simulated this fight, and it turns out rather poorly for the Tirpitz.
        1. +3
          31 October 2026 19: 41
          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          Confidently controlling a distance of 150 cables, they confidently hit its decks.

          What is the hit percentage?
      2. +6
        31 October 2026 16: 09
        Add:
        The transverse load (the ratio of mass in kg to the square of the caliber in dm) of the Alaska armor-piercing shell is slightly GREATER than that of the Tirpitz armor-piercing shell. The guns' ranges, depending on the turret elevation, are identical, and the rate of fire at long range is 1.5 times higher.
      3. 0
        31 October 2026 20: 13
        Quote: bk0010
        He will shoot them first, at a greater distance.

        one missed and minus ship
    2. +4
      31 October 2026 19: 39
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      - German battleship Tirpitz;

      How many times did the Tirpitz go out alone?

      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      - four Japanese Takao cruisers;

      That's if they don't get hit with a couple of "long spears" in the side

      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      Alaskans are capable of fighting on equal terms with a pair of Kongo-class battlecruisers, or German Scharnhorst-class ones.

      Can I see the numbers?
      1. +1
        31 October 2026 20: 10
        What is the hit percentage?

        At a distance of 150 cables according to Jurens 2,2%
        Can I see the numbers?

        Be more specific, please.
        Offhand: Jurens uses the percentage of hits as a percentage of the rate of fire at range, then the Monte Carlo method determines the severity of damage to a ship based on the number of hits (Puzirevsky's work can help you). Finally, the projectile's impact is determined by mutual maneuvering.
        I won't publish it myself for now; there are more interesting authors than the old bore. But I sent the material (a proof copy).
        1. +2
          31 October 2026 20: 22
          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          At a distance of 150 cables according to Jurens 2,2%

          The Germans believed that their 380mm would have a 9,9% hit rate at 25 km and 7,2% at 30...

          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          Be more specific, please.

          Well, at least how many of whom will have to be hit...
          But on the other hand, the location of the hit is pure probability theory.
          1. 0
            1 November 2026 05: 17
            Everything is correct, Maxim.
            As for gun accuracy, the German SKC 34 38-cm/L52 is naturally superior to the American 305-mm at 150 cables. Incidentally, the 9,9% figure at 25 km is just a proving ground; the battle with the Prinz doesn't support it. Calculations suggest approximately half that. Therefore, more shells are needed to achieve multiple decisive hits. It's a stretch to attribute the hits in Bismarck's final battle at the outset to shell consumption. Some hits must be discarded, as the frontal armor of the turrets, barbettes, and conning tower are impenetrable by American shells at long range. However, the horizontal armor, including the turret roofs, is completely penetrable. Therefore, the chances at long ranges are better for a pair of Alaskan guns.
            1. +2
              1 November 2026 12: 47
              Quote: Victor Leningradets
              By the way, the figure of 9,9% at a distance of 25 km is a testing ground

              Either the Germans are fools, or one of two things... laughing
              Numbers from combat manuals.
              1. 0
                1 November 2026 15: 38
                What about a fight at a distance of 65 - 100 cables?
                In fact, 25 km and 9,9% correlate well not with the percentage of hit shells, but with the percentage of salvos that hit.
                Jurens wrote the following about Bismarck's final salvo at Hood, which had a 10% hit probability:
                64% - no hits;
                31% - one hit;
                5% - two hits;
                And only 0,2% could hit three times in a salvo.
                But it is not said how he counted (whether a salvo is four shells or eight).
                1. +2
                  1 November 2026 15: 53
                  Quote: Victor Leningradets
                  What about a fight at a distance of 65 - 100 cables?

                  Consider them to have schizophrenia. :)

                  Quote: Victor Leningradets
                  In fact, 25 km and 9,9% correlate well not with the percentage of hit shells, but with the percentage of salvos that hit.

                  However, what is being discussed there is precisely the shells and the number of hits.

                  Quote: Victor Leningradets
                  But it is not said how he counted (whether a salvo is four shells or eight).

                  This is a very interesting question: you can count it both ways...
                  Due to changes in delivery systems compared to WWI, the Germans switched from the classic half-salvo (a shot from one gun in each turret) to salvos fired from the stern or bow guns. This is clearly visible in the footage.
                  However, these half-volleys followed at intervals of no more than 1 second.
                  Furthermore, there's still some confusion about how exactly Schneider fired. According to the Baron, the classic method was rapid fire, with full volleys after covering fire. But according to Leach, Schneider used a method of engaging the Hood by observing the signs of a moving target. Using this method, the fire controller would wait for the volley to fall, make adjustments based on its results, and then fire the next volley.
  13. +9
    31 October 2026 09: 34
    To top it all off, the author should have also remembered the useless Marat/Petropavlovsk-

    In total, during the war, the ship fired 264 shells at the enemy (the last one was on January 17, 1944, during the breakthrough of German defensive lines near Leningrad), firing 1971 305mm shells. Seven enemy batteries were destroyed, the fire of 86 batteries was suppressed, and 25 armored vehicles were destroyed.
    1. +3
      31 October 2026 10: 19
      And the Black Sea "Paris Commune/Sevastopol".
    2. +3
      31 October 2026 20: 16
      Quote: Pavel57
      7 enemy batteries were destroyed and the fire of 86 batteries was suppressed.

      Counter-battery fire was the main job of the old battleships. The terrain around Leningrad is fairly flat, and 12" guns have a long reach. Not the most optimal use of battleships, but at least it was something. It would have been wiser to transfer them to the Northern Fleet early on and use them for convoy escort.
      1. +1
        2 November 2026 19: 12
        Quote: Saxahorse
        It would have been wiser to transfer them in advance to the Northern Fleet and use them to escort convoys.

        The range and seaworthiness wouldn't have been sufficient, but one of the Baltic pair could have easily taken Scheer for a spin and fired at Kirkenes in 44. In fact, they could have used the reserves from the sunken and raised battleships and the burned Poltava to build two battlecruisers with 9x12-inch guns and spare parts for modernization. But such a proposal would have earned them a bullet from the stoker mafia in the early 30s, as a denunciation.
        1. 0
          2 November 2026 19: 56
          Quote: clou
          but let's chase that same Scheer

          With a top speed of 22 knots and a range of 2500 miles at 14 knots?
          1. +1
            2 November 2026 23: 53
            Quote: Macsen_Wledig
            With a top speed of 22 knots and a range of 2500 miles at 14 knots?

            And do you think Scheer moved faster in ice? At least the Ganguts had ice reinforcements and an icebreaker-shaped bow.
            1. 0
              3 November 2026 07: 48
              Quote: clou
              Do you think Scheer walked faster on ice?

              The Scheer entered the ice once when it tried to pass to the Vilkitsky Strait.
              Meendsen-Bolken, realizing that the operation in this part had failed due to the difficult ice conditions, began to "festive" across the Kara Sea.
    3. +4
      31 October 2026 20: 16
      Quote: Pavel57
      In total, during the war, the ship fired 264 shells at the enemy (the last one was on January 17, 1944, during the breakthrough of German defensive lines near Leningrad), firing 1971 305mm shells. Seven enemy batteries were destroyed, the fire of 86 batteries was suppressed, and 25 armored vehicles were destroyed.

      Rail transporters with these guns could also fire and even follow further behind the front lines. All the large surface ships of the Baltic Fleet and Black Sea Fleet also fall into this category. Especially considering how many copies were broken and how many were sunk during their construction. The same "Soviet Union" could have been rebuilt as an aircraft carrier after the war, instead of wasting so much effort on needles.
      1. 0
        31 October 2026 20: 35
        Quote: clou
        The same "Soviet Union" could have been converted into an aircraft carrier after the war, instead of cutting it into needles with so much labor.

        Was there anything to rebuild when the ship was 21% ready?
        1. +2
          31 October 2026 21: 30
          Quote: Macsen_Wledig
          Was there anything to rebuild when the ship was 21% ready?

          This is a complete building with machines.
          1. +1
            31 October 2026 21: 46
            Quote: clou
            This is a complete building with machines.

            But there were no cars... the hull was assembled up to the lower deck, etc.
          2. +2
            2 November 2026 15: 38
            Quote: clou
            This is a complete building with machines.

            The machines were a complete mess. Because the only GTZA kit the USSR had—a Swiss one—was intended for the Molotov LK built at Factory 402. The Leningrad LK was supposed to use domestic GTZAs, which weren't available. And there was no interchangeability between them. And yes, there were no boilers either. And no propeller shafts either.
      2. +1
        2 November 2026 18: 59
        The same "Soviet Union" could have been converted into an aircraft carrier after the war, instead of cutting it into needles with so much labor.

        Verily!
        The Shipbuilding Industry's management simply decided to atone for their sin, and the designers also preferred not to implement projects, but to create them and receive bonuses.
        And so, the example of Shinano was before our eyes and the universal carrier-based aircraft was ready in five minutes.
        As for the steam turbines in Molotovsk, there were no problems if they had been moved to Leningrad. Likewise, the hull components and armored decks could have been transported to SevMash in Molotovsk.
        The latter is preferable due to greater freedom for designers.
        And its main purpose is to train carrier-based aviation pilots and aircraft carrier crews.
        1. 0
          2 November 2026 19: 07
          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          As for the steam turbines in Molotovsk, if there was a desire to transfer them to Leningrad, there were no problems.

          The only thing that needed to be done was to completely redesign the engine rooms and the adjacent compartments, but otherwise, nothing...

          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          And its main purpose is to train carrier-based aviation pilots and aircraft carrier crews.

          If they had wanted, they could (and it was suggested) have used the Zippelin for this purpose...
          1. 0
            2 November 2026 23: 56
            Quote: Macsen_Wledig
            If they had wanted, they could (and it was suggested) have used the Zippelin for this purpose...

            The Zeppelin was completely gutted by internal explosions, but they rushed to sink it. It could have been kept as a model blockship for a couple of years for study and full-scale training.
            1. 0
              3 November 2026 06: 46
              Seydlitz would have been much more useful to us, since we had some equivalent (Lützev/Petropavlovsk/Tallinn). It could have become the basis for an escort carrier primarily for anti-submarine missions.
              1. 0
                3 November 2026 07: 49
                Quote: Victor Leningradets
                Seidlitz would have been much more useful to us, since there was some equivalent (Lützev/Petropavlovsk/Tallinn).

                They wanted to complete it as a cruiser instead of//together with the "Lützow".
                1. 0
                  3 November 2026 08: 02
                  Well, your opinion is decisive here, Maxim.
                  What is more useful, a heavy (here I agree that it is heavy) cruiser or an escort aircraft carrier with 18 aircraft?
                  1. 0
                    3 November 2026 09: 01
                    Quote: Victor Leningradets
                    Well, your opinion is decisive here, Maxim.

                    You are clearly confusing me with comrade Ivanov.

                    Quote: Victor Leningradets
                    Which is more useful?

                    The issue is that the issue of restoring the Zeppelin was moving forward in parallel.
                    That is, the second AV, moreover, was not needed as a surrogate.
                    On the other hand, the People's Commissariat of the Navy planned operations in the area of ​​operation of its own coastal aviation, while the coastal aviation was not particularly needed.
                    1. 0
                      3 November 2026 09: 42
                      Well, while you're saying "clearly confused," you've laid everything out correctly. Only the Graf Zeppelin is clearly unsuitable for the role of a modern (even with reservations!) aircraft carrier.
                      1. +1
                        3 November 2026 10: 14
                        Quote: Victor Leningradets
                        Well, and you say “you’re clearly confusing things”, you’ve laid everything out correctly.

                        lol

                        Quote: Victor Leningradets
                        However, Graf Zeppelin is clearly not suitable for the role of a modern (even with reservations!) aircraft carrier.

                        So the restructuring of Project 23 is also a "crooked" option.

                        If we abstract and simply theorize, then we need (IMHO):
                        - bring the Zeppelin to the form of a test vessel (ideally self-propelled);
                        - "Donate" the transport and create a version of "Odessity" to practice takeoff and landing.
                        - build a version of "Thread" to practice initial pilot training and deck signaling;
                        - engage in the design and construction of aircraft;
                        - get involved in designing and building ships (and that's where the real challenge lies)...
                        But, I repeat, this is a pure abstraction + billions of money and work-days...
                      2. 0
                        3 November 2026 17: 00
                        Quote: Macsen_Wledig
                        But, I repeat, this is a pure abstraction + billions of money and work-days...

                        They went to projects 24, 82, 66, and other sketches. Apparently, Comrade Stalin didn't like the very idea of ​​pilots leaving a Soviet ship at sea without the supervision of a political officer.
                      3. 0
                        4 November 2026 18: 46
                        Quote: clou
                        went to projects 24, 82, 66 and there were also all sorts of sketches.

                        They left because the USSR did not plan to fight in the open ocean.
                        De facto, anti-landing defense was planned under the umbrella of coastal aviation.
                      4. +1
                        4 November 2026 19: 47
                        Quote: Macsen_Wledig
                        De facto, anti-landing defense was planned under the umbrella of coastal aviation.

                        Is this the aircraft that arrives half an hour after the attack?
                      5. 0
                        4 November 2026 20: 16
                        Quote: clou
                        Is this the aircraft that arrives half an hour after the attack?

                        I won't argue: theory often diverges from reality... :)
                      6. +1
                        5 November 2026 00: 54
                        Quote: Macsen_Wledig
                        I won't argue: theory often diverges from reality... :)

                        Over the past four years, the Black Sea Red Navy has had the opportunity to comprehensively assess the reliability of coastal aviation cover.
                      7. 0
                        5 November 2026 07: 52
                        Quote: clou
                        among the Black Sea Red Sea sailors

                        With the loss of most of the base airfields?
                      8. 0
                        5 November 2026 21: 25
                        With the loss of most of the base airfields?

                        How could it be otherwise in a war with the USA and Great Britain?
                      9. 0
                        6 November 2026 09: 29
                        Quote: Victor Leningradets
                        How could it be otherwise in a war with the USA and Great Britain?

                        Bomb us back to the Stone Age?.. (c)
                      10. 0
                        6 November 2026 13: 37
                        There is no doubt that in 1946-1950 they would have completely destroyed all our airfields.
                      11. 0
                        6 November 2026 13: 42
                        Quote: Victor Leningradets
                        There is no doubt that in 1946-1950 they would have completely destroyed all our airfields.

                        Something tells me that in 46-50 even 1 (one) aircraft carrier would not have helped the fleet in any way.
                        In essence, we are talking about the conditions in which the post-war creations of Stalin’s shipbuilding industry could operate: LK pr. 24, KRT pr. 82, KRS pr. 66, etc., etc., and this is, at best, the mid-50s.
                      12. 0
                        6 November 2026 13: 48
                        Oh, Maxim!
                        You were always fighting. We couldn't do anything at sea in those days. And an aircraft carrier was needed as a training ground for pilots, sailors, admirals, and engineers. This ship was supposed to be a kind of foundation for the future. But in the remaining years of the USSR, we never quite got around to building a real aircraft carrier. We were always tinkering with surrogates and gluing together models. And we also tried to master the art of carrier-based aviation on Nitka, just on foot and horseback.
                      13. 0
                        6 November 2026 13: 54
                        Quote: Victor Leningradets
                        Oh, Maxim!
                        You would always fight.

                        What? And the chapel too?.. (c)

                        Quote: Victor Leningradets
                        And the aircraft carrier was needed as a training ground for pilots, sailors, admirals, and engineers. This ship was, in fact, supposed to be a kind of foundation for the future.

                        Did the USSR need it?
                      14. 0
                        6 November 2026 13: 58
                        They (real aircraft carriers) were desperately needed back in the 70s. We wouldn't have had to bribe the entire Arab and African elite. And the socialist choice wouldn't have been a mere formality. However, during Brezhnev's time, the USSR was already terminally ill and in its last stages of life.
                      15. 0
                        6 November 2026 14: 02
                        Quote: Victor Leningradets
                        They (real aircraft carriers) were sorely needed back in the 70s. We wouldn't have had to bribe the entire Arab and African elite.

                        And what tasks would have been set for the AUG?
                        How many of them do you think were needed?
                      16. 0
                        6 November 2026 14: 09
                        The same as before the American ones: support for loyal regimes and the overthrow of those that are undesirable.
                        They divided up the world like in a Bond movie. It's hard to believe, but that's exactly how it happened. A temporary moratorium on mutual destruction was imposed, set for forty years under Nixon. And over there in Africa, it was all hands on deck. And Patrice Lumumba University is churning out our talent just as well as Vulcan-Phalanges. So, two AUGs in the Atlantic, two in the Pacific, and two in the Indian Ocean.
                      17. 0
                        6 November 2026 14: 17
                        Quote: Victor Leningradets
                        So there are 2 AUGs in the Atlantic, 2 in the Pacific Ocean and 2 in the Indian Ocean.

                        Well, that is, you are proposing to deploy it according to the “American” state: at least 10 - 12 AB are needed.
                        Did you count the escort ships and other "small stuff"?
                        And also the presence of military bases?
                      18. 0
                        6 November 2026 16: 50
                        When I started my service, the US had more.
                        But the basing problem is solved by the presence of the strike group. There's no need to worry too much about escorts (4 guided missile destroyers + 2 submarines). It's not like South Africa will attack us, and the US is on the edge.
            2. 0
              3 November 2026 09: 03
              Quote: clou
              The zeppelin was completely gutted by internal explosions, but they rushed to sink it.

              Judging by the inspection report, it’s not that serious.
              The main problem was the damaged TZA, which was planned to be replaced with domestic ones.
          2. 0
            3 November 2026 06: 42
            Since I've been in the business for half a century, the horror-horror of redevelopment is another bugbear of the Ashik/Chilikin Gang.
            The Kharkov plant's GTZA was supposed to differ from the Brown-Boveri GTZA as much as Voroshilov's TV-7 GTZA differed from Kirov's Ansaldo GTZA. So no real modifications were required. Even later, the idea of ​​using the Brown-Boveri GTZA on Project 68-bis cruisers instead of the production ones was raised and deemed feasible, despite the modifications required.
            The Zeppelin could accommodate Yak-9/Il-2 aircraft, whose time had passed by 1945. The only aircraft we had mastered at the time that could truly serve as a dive bomber, a torpedo bomber, and a heavy fighter (with the ability to carry radar!) was the Tu-2 (in its carrier-based version, of course). And only an aircraft carrier the size of Shinano was suitable for it. Once this aircraft was mastered, other types could be developed, up to a takeoff weight of 20 tons. And most importantly, this aircraft carrier was to be specifically designed for combat training; production aircraft, built from scratch based on the experience gained, were to be completely different. But we couldn't build them right away without the experience.
            1. 0
              3 November 2026 17: 11
              Quote: Victor Leningradets
              The only aircraft we had mastered at that time that could truly be a dive bomber, a torpedo bomber, and a heavy fighter (with the ability to accommodate a radar!) was the Tu-2 (naturally in the carrier-based modification).

              The TKU-2's landing on a fixed-deck aircraft is questionable. The LA-9 or LA-11 would have been more suitable. The most valuable advantage would have been the ship's size and the length of the flight deck, which would have provided room for redesigning the ship for first-generation jets and then relatively inexpensively learning the ropes on a running mockup.
              1. 0
                3 November 2026 18: 46
                La-9,11 were already on the brink of the Korean War.
                The Tu-2 had all the above-mentioned capabilities in its variants. Plus, it had a jet variant. If we were serious, we could even consider a turboprop version. And that would mean a speed of around 800 km/h. And besides, the CV-41 Midway aircraft carrier was already a clue.
  14. BAI
    0
    31 October 2026 10: 34
    1.
    And every screw, every tube had to be made by hand, which did not affect the efficiency of the boat.

    The author (human or AI) has problems with the Russian language.
    IT COULDN'T HAVE BEEN ADVISED, otherwise the following sentence would make no sense.
    Something was constantly breaking down and the Surcouf took virtually no part in combat operations.

    2. If the Japanese submarine didn't make it to the war, how did the author conclude it was ineffective? The IS-3 didn't make it to the war. Was it effective or not?

    Overall, a curious picture emerges. The author, not being a naval expert, passes judgment on ships built by top-level shipbuilding professionals.

    Maybe we should talk not about technical characteristics, but about the correctness of application?
    For example, it would seem that the T-70 has no chance against the Tiger. However, at the Battle of Kursk, a T-70 tank was officially recorded as having destroyed a Tiger.
  15. IVZ
    +5
    31 October 2026 11: 28
    Author, what about the soldiers who died without having time to fire a single shot at the enemy, and the equipment destroyed along with transport ships and trains, and other victims of the war with a similar fate... Are these all also "useless losers"?
  16. +7
    31 October 2026 11: 48
    A ship is an element of a system called a fleet. Where this system worked, for example, the American Pacific Fleet or the German submarine force, there were fewer useless losers. But where the fleet was unbalanced, for example, lacking aircraft carriers or air defenses, being locked down, poorly managed, or otherwise problematic, there were more.
  17. 0
    31 October 2026 13: 43
    Battlecruisers Alaska and Guam
    Alaskans are not battlecruisers.
  18. + 13
    31 October 2026 14: 17
    The article is rubbish - about nothing, and with a bunch of factual errors.
    Determining the "usefulness" of warships by the number of enemy ships sunk is childish enough for a junior high school student. Ff-stomp
  19. + 10
    31 October 2026 14: 58
    Any article from Skomorokhov.
  20. +3
    31 October 2026 15: 44
    The I-400s were unique warships for their time, entering service too late to prove themselves.
    The IJN I-400 STō (Sen-Toku) and IJN I-13 AM (Kai-Kō-Taka AM) class submarine aircraft carriers are unique warships, unmatched by any other navy. They were developed in the strictest secrecy at the behest of Admiral Yamamoto to carry out a daring plan to attack the Panama Canal locks with specialized Aichi M6A1 Seiran floatplanes. Each submarine could carry two or three floatplanes when disassembled (folded). The aircraft were stored in a special hangar inside the submarine on launch trolleys. After the aircraft left the hangar, final assembly took place, the floats were installed (stored separately in special sealed containers), and the weapons were mounted. The aircraft took off from the surface using a 26-meter pneumatic catapult mounted in front of the hangar at the submarine's bow. After the flight, the floatplane landed as close to the submarine as possible and was hoisted onto the deck by a crane. When stowed, the crane folded and retracted into a special recess in the deck. Under special conditions (in kamikaze mode), floats were not installed to increase flight range.
    The diesel-powered aircraft-carrying submarines (underwater aircraft carriers) of the I-400 (Sen-Toku) class were the largest submarines built during World War II. They only lost their size dominance in the mid-60s to a new class of submarines – nuclear-powered submarines.
    Unwilling to share with the Soviet Union the innovative technologies used by the Japanese to create a unique attack underwater complex, including submarine-aircraft carriers and special attack seaplanes of the M6A1 Seiran type, the United States destroyed the captured submarines in 1946.
  21. +2
    31 October 2026 16: 02
    The author forgot to mention Kaitens. The number of successes and the volume of releases are depressing.
  22. +1
    31 October 2026 18: 20
    What a funny twist the history of shipbuilding has! Battleships deemed useless risk a comeback. Arm a battleship with ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with a range of 3-4 km, such ships could rain missiles down on any nation. But the much-hyped aircraft carriers will likely prove useless... Drone carriers will take their place. Time will tell.
    1. +2
      31 October 2026 19: 41
      If a battleship is armed with ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with a range of 3-4 thousand km, then such ships will be able to rain missiles on any state.

      I think destroyers and missile cruisers can handle this just fine now.
      Arleigh Burke and Ticonderoga carry enough missiles
      1. +2
        2 November 2026 21: 23
        Now destroyers and missile cruisers can handle this perfectly well.
        Destroyer capacity (up to 56 cruise missiles per destroyer). Let's look at the air defense system: ours use about 1000 missiles and drones at a time in strikes. And even that's not enough. Now consider that 1000 missiles equals 20 destroyers. That's not to mention the potential losses at such a density of ships—it's simply financially difficult. A Trump battleship carries up to 200 MK-41 universal launcher cells, and the number of ships drops to five. This means fewer crew members; there's no need to send tankers (nuclear-powered battleships) to the battlefield. Incidentally, they're not that large (smaller than the Missouri). So, 10 battleships could carry out 5-hour bombardment of an area without approaching within anti-ship missile range. The key is cheap missiles...
        1. 0
          2 November 2026 22: 45
          Let's look at the SVO: ours use about 1000 missiles in strikes

          I think that's too much for rockets
          We at SVO launch drones and rockets every day

          and thanks for the calculation
          1. 0
            3 November 2026 12: 39
            I apologize, I forgot to add that I intentionally assumed that everything flying from us to Ukraine was Tomahawks. I also mentioned drones.
  23. 0
    31 October 2026 19: 16
    Naval artillery, including battleship guns, became a vital factor in the defense of Leningrad. The ships not only provided fire support to ground forces but also became priority targets for the enemy. Despite severe damage and losses, the crews regained their combat capability and continued fighting until the siege was completely lifted.
  24. +7
    31 October 2026 19: 28
    There are some articles that just commenting on them would ruin them... laughing
    1. 0
      9 November 2026 05: 54
      Well, I would say, not that it would spoil, but it would create an excessive rating that in no way corresponds to the content, which, in essence, does not exist.
  25. -3
    31 October 2026 20: 26
    Thank you, good review. And yet, with modern weapons systems, including space, the entire surface navy of all countries is becoming rudimentary, as it is expensive to maintain and useless.
  26. 0
    31 October 2026 22: 25
    Let the great naval expert Skomorokhov tell the guys who held Leningrad, Kronstadt, and the Oranienbaum bridgehead about the uselessness of Soviet/Tsarist battleships.
    1. +2
      1 November 2026 02: 17
      Let the great naval expert Skomorokhov tell the guys who held Leningrad, Kronstadt, and the Oranienbaum bridgehead about the uselessness of Soviet/Tsarist battleships.

      I may be missing something, but what operations did the Baltic Fleet battleships (I think there were only two of them) conduct?
      In no way am I trying to diminish the sailors' contribution to the victory and their heroism, but in my opinion, battleships were used only as artillery platforms.
      1. +1
        1 November 2026 09: 51
        Exactly. Counter-battery warfare. Together with other ships and forts of the Kronstadt Fortress, they held the entire defensive perimeter of the city.
        1. +1
          1 November 2026 17: 27
          Quote: denplot
          Together with other ships and forts of the Kronstadt fortress they held the entire perimeter of the city's defense.

          Right, the entire perimeter of the blockade ring?
          1. +2
            1 November 2026 19: 36
            I wrote about it along with other ships and forts. Marat and Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya held at least half of the Oranienbaum bridgehead and the Finnish positions on the northern shore from Beloostrov and beyond. Krasnaya Gorka reached as far as Voronka. The Rzhevsky training ground held part of the northern and eastern blockade ring. These are just the 305mm and 406mm calibers.
            1. 0
              1 November 2026 19: 40
              Quote: denplot
              I wrote it along with other ships and forts.

              Of the "other ships," only the ersatz gunboats on Lake Ladoga. Otherwise, I agree. hi
              1. +2
                1 November 2026 19: 44
                Heavy cruiser Petropavlovsk, cruisers Kirov and Maksim Gorky, battleship leaders Minsk and Leningrad, destroyers of Project 7 and 7U. Caliber from 130 to 203 mm.
          2. +2
            1 November 2026 19: 47
            Take Rzhevka and draw a circle with a diameter of 45,7 km.
            Take Krasnaya Gorka and draw a circle with a diameter of 32 km.
            Take the Mining Institute and draw a circle with a diameter of 38 km, etc.
            The entire southern sector of the Blockade will be under fire from naval and coastal artillery.
            With the Finns this statement is only partially true.
            1. +2
              2 November 2026 15: 42
              Quote: Victor Leningradets
              With the Finns this statement is only partially true.

              This statement is true for the Finns in the most dangerous area—along the coast and along the railway to Vyborg (Sestroretsky and Beloostrovsky fortified defense areas). If I remember correctly, to facilitate the work of coastal artillery in supporting the Kaur-Ukrainian Fortress, they even built a naval spotter post between Dibuny and Beloostrovsky.
  27. +3
    1 November 2026 22: 30
    I can't agree with the opinion regarding Shinano. The ship was practically never commissioned. It was unfinished, incomplete, and without armament (or aircraft). It couldn't have taken part in combat. There's no way it could have been "useless."
  28. +1
    2 November 2026 11: 11
    Therefore, it's pointless to define what constitutes a "concentration of infantry" worthy of a 305mm shell. Moreover, these shells weren't fired in large numbers. According to reports, the Gangut/Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya fired 257 main-caliber shells in 25 firing sessions.

    According to other reports,
    From the beginning of the war until October 22, the Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya conducted 110 firings, firing 880 305mm shells: 26 armor-piercing, 20 shrapnel, and the rest high-explosive. The ship also fired anti-torpedo shells, expending 133 high-explosive shells in three firings at targets in Novy Peterhof between October 1 and 15.

    In January 1944, the battleship contributed to the final lifting of the siege of Leningrad. In eight firings, it fired 182 305-mm shells from a range of up to 161 kilometer (7 direct hits were recorded on reinforced concrete pillboxes, bunkers, and command posts). In the spring of 1944, some of the Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya's personnel were sent to man the battleship Arkhangelsk, which was being commissioned in England, resulting in a 50-60% shortage of personnel.
    The battleship fired its last 79 main battery shots on June 9, 1944, at Finnish fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus (two direct hits were recorded on pillboxes) at a range of up to 164 kb. In total, during the war, the battleship Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya fired 126 main battery shots, firing 1442 shells.
    © A.M.Vasiliev. Battleships of the "Marat" type.
    We won't talk about the effectiveness of shooting at "concentrations of enemy tanks and infantry," since the Americans demonstrated it perfectly by dropping thousands of tons of metal on the islands in the Pacific Ocean where the Japanese had settled in, and how the Marines then suffered from the supposedly "suppressed" and "destroyed" Japanese.

    Did Japanese infantry and tanks on the TO try to break through the American defenses time and again? wink
    Perhaps this ship deserves the title "The slowest and most dismal trough of two wars." Its top speed of 21 knots meant it couldn't do anything. It couldn't catch the enemy, nor could it escape.

    To compensate for the slowness of the battleships, the RN had aircraft carriers. Their mission was to use air strikes to slow down the enemy battleships so that the Queens and Eras could catch up.
    The Japanese command was saving its newest super-battleships for the expected general battle with the US fleet.

    The Japanese command was conserving the fleet's fuel reserves. Combined Fleet calculated the IJN's fuel consumption in late 1942, during the battle for Guadalcanal. The Yamato's connection to the Tokyo Express put the IJN's fuel balance in the red.
  29. +1
    3 November 2026 12: 32
    According to reports, the Gangut/Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya fired 257 main-caliber shells in 25 firings. Draw your own conclusions about how effective these firings were.

    Soviet battleships were the most useful ships of their class in World War II. They were the only ones to fire at the main enemy—German ground forces—on the main Eastern Front during the decisive period (1941-42). They also transported troops and weapons. Despite this, these ships were only older, having undergone repairs and modernization—in other words, the cheapest ships of their class. This is what efficiency means: the greatest effect for minimal expenditure.
    1. 0
      3 November 2026 13: 19
      Quote: Kostadinov
      Despite all this, these were only older ships that had undergone repairs and modernization—in other words, the cheapest ships of this class. This is what efficiency means: the greatest effect for minimal expense.

      You clearly have no idea how expensive it is to upgrade, maintain, and operate "old hardware."
      For example, just the restoration and modernization of the West Virginia, California, and Tennessee cost the Americans an amount equivalent to the cost of two Alabamas... and this is taking into account that many materials were taken from the remains of Clevelands converted into aircraft carriers, that is, practically for free...
  30. +1
    3 November 2026 18: 47
    Beyond listing the names of a few ships, the article offers little value. The author's speculations, cloaked in half-truths, cannot be taken as objective content.
  31. 0
    4 November 2026 08: 29
    Quote: BAI
    But at the Kursk Bulge, the fact of the destruction of a Tiger by a T-70 tank was officially recorded.

    Sorry for the digression, but it wasn't a Tiger, it was a Panther. And with guns in the mantlet, no less. The crew must have been on edge!
  32. 0
    4 November 2026 08: 33
    Quote: Severok
    Beyond listing the names of a few ships, the article offers little value. The author's speculations, cloaked in half-truths, cannot be taken as objective content.

    Autumn!
  33. +1
    4 November 2026 13: 16
    You clearly have no idea how expensive it is to upgrade, maintain, and operate "old hardware."
    For example, just the restoration and modernization of the West Virginia, California, and Tennessee cost the Americans an amount equivalent to the cost of two Alabamas.

    1. In the USSR, the severely damaged battleship was not repaired.
    2. The repair and modernization of the third battleship cost approximately 110 million rubles: Marat 20 million, Gangut 40 million, and Sevastopol 50 million. This is less than the cost of two Project 26 bis cruisers, which cost 120 million. The estimated cost of a new battleship is 1 billion rubles.
    3. In specific conditions, when heavy ships performed monitor tasks, the effectiveness of 36 305 mm guns was significantly higher than that of 18 180 mm guns.