So, what did he have at the time when he made the decision on the appointment of Nabiullina as chairman of the Central Bank? Obviously a difficult state of affairs in the Russian economy and the public sector, the increase in problems associated with the main source of replenishment of the Russian budget (reduction in energy export volumes), as a result - a serious increase in intraelite contradictions. In addition, the promise of “liberals” (remember, this is the self-name of the group in Russia's political elite, which currently controls financial and economic policies and represents the interests of the IMF, the World Bank and the largest transnational banks. The interests of the United States and the Rothschild Group) parts of the Russian elite from the middle of the year 2011 no longer coincide) guarantee the interests of Russian money in the Western financial system and maintain economic growth in the country.
Actually, all these problems began in the autumn of 2008, but for several years it seemed that all of them could be overcome. Nevertheless, most likely, these problems forced Putin to return to the highest state post, however, the illusions of overcoming them within the old management system and the elite structure (which is divided into three large groups: "siloviki", "liberals" and regionalists) still remained . Most likely, it was these illusions and confidence in the promises mentioned that caused the decision to preserve the post of chairman of the Central Bank for the "liberals", but it was precisely that point that was followed by a flurry of trouble.
The first of these was the events in Cyprus, which showed that the “friendship” with the IMF no longer resolves any financial issues, decisions were made at a different state level, and there, even in the administration of the US President, the friends of the Russian “liberals” did not left. Accordingly, questions of the safety of Russian assets (both state and private) increasingly began to pass under the responsibility of the “siloviki” (more precisely, the Foreign Intelligence Service), which dramatically weakened the elite positions of the “liberals”.
The second was the understanding that the economic recession in Russia is already a fait accompli, and it is actively influencing all, including political, processes in the country. At the same time, the question remains whether Putin understood that when the “liberals” in February-March gave him promises of growth, they already knew that the recession had begun. However, most likely, taking into account data of various kinds of wiretaps and other operational data on private conversations of representatives of this group, such data is not a secret for him.
The third trouble was the rapid deterioration of the economic situation due to the fact that the seasonal peak in the current, 2013 year, did not reach the level necessary to maintain the status quo. Most likely, this means that the seasonal decline in the autumn of this year will be weaker than a year ago, but given the fact that during the summer season it will not be possible to accumulate sufficient reserves, there may not be a positive rollback in the economy in the autumn. And in some regions the situation can become quite difficult.
But the worst thing for Putin, who loves tactical maneuvers in the current (preferably positive) trend, but does not like at all and does not know how to change strategic plans, is that it becomes clear to everyone, including “liberals”, that liberal policy can no longer provide economic growth. Basically. And this means that it is necessary to change both the policy and the “liberals” themselves. It’s clear about politics, and why the liberals cannot be saved personally? A very simple. Firstly, politically, they are agents of a certain part of the world elite and simply cannot refuse to fulfill their obligations. Secondly, they were selected in due time based on the criterion of limitation and weakness (so that there were no figures among them capable of breaking into “Napoleons”), so they can count on the fact that they can creatively and constructively create some kind of new political system - naive. Third, all of them are tied to various kinds of corruption schemes, including international ones, and in principle they cannot get out of them. There are other reasons, but those already mentioned are enough to understand that keeping the definition of economic and financial policy in the hands of "liberals" is impossible.
Let us proceed from the logic that this last statement for Putin is, if not already obvious, then at least one of the most likely options for development. And how can he solve this problem? Option one: give the development of financial and economic policy to the two elite groups that exist in the country. Regionals here are definitely not suitable - they do not think at the federal and international level and are not ready for such work (although their opinion must be taken into account). But it is also scary to give this function to the “siloviki”, because in this case they simply will not have a counterweight at the federal level, the “liberals”, having lost their main political function, will quickly leave the stage. In other words, Putin may leave such an option only as a last resort, since he practically deprives him of his ability to control the situation.
Option two, which, in a sense, Putin is trying to implement today. This is the option of creating a certain group that will develop a financial and economic strategy, which will then be “imputed” to the liberal government and the Central Bank. So far, the notorious "May" decrees have been developed, but, theoretically, there is no limit to perfection. However, as practice shows (and not only Putin’s past two months, but also the practice of the Economic Department of the President of the Russian Federation, which really controlled the operational activities of the government in 97-98), the government and the Central Bank will never agree with this practice! They will actively fight against such a center as actively as possible (the Economic Department was actually broken up in the spring - at the beginning of the summer 1998 of the year, having worked just over a year) and sabotage the programs created in this way. What Putin saw in recent weeks.
The third option is to look for another large group that could replace the “liberals” in the Russian elite. This is not a new task - so, at the end of the nineties and the beginning of the two thousandth, the "siloviks" were introduced into the elite, who had been severely exterminated before. The only trouble is that at that time there was a resource for the expansion of the elite, and today it is not even for its preservation in the former number. That is, to solve such a problem, the elite needs to be cut down more than the required reduction of resources, and then introduce new players into it. Who could they be?
There are not so many large groups that can claim such a systemic elite place (requiring quite serious support from the population). This is, by convention, “patriots” (supporters of Russia as a Russian state), imperial monarchists and communists (more precisely, supporters of the Red Project, not to be confused with the operetta Communist Party of the Russian Federation). They are in a difficult relationship, but if they are allowed into power, many contradictions will be forgotten. I think that in this case the new “imperial” logic will be rather quickly assembled, from which extremists of all stripes will be sifted out, and the constructivists will develop some common position. It should be noted that from the point of view of financial and economic policy these groups have no serious contradictions, at the first stage - so sure. However, it is possible that this is due to the fact that there are very few economists left in the country who are capable of writing complex system programs, and they try not to fit into the rigid framework of specific ideological schemes in advance.
However, the question arises - how can one solve such a problem in practice? Everything is simple with the “siloviki”: there has always been a clear hierarchy of authorities and positions. And working with amorphous groups, which, moreover, themselves do not really understand what power is and how to work with it ... At the same time, the general development of the situation, it seems to me, leaves no room for options other than the third, cited here. I think that a maximum until the end of the summer will finally become clear that the second option is not feasible in principle - and this means that in the fall it will be necessary to start building (more precisely, consolidating) a new political force. Which, moreover, will have great electoral potential.
It should be noted that in the West they already understood that the Russian “liberals” have no strategic prospects (although they have not yet understood from whom it is necessary to raise “new liberals”). But we, apparently, have no such understanding yet. And it is possible that by the fall, when it will finally become clear that the second option from the above does not pass, an attempt will be simply made to “tighten the screws” and punish certain delinquent officials. However, this will only accelerate the crisis - and will reduce the time to make a more or less reasonable decision.
In conclusion, I would like to note that the text given is only plausible reasoning. And for this reason, I propose to consider whether Putin has any other options besides the three listed. And also to discuss practical options for the implementation of the third option.