Geraniums over Kyiv: What the team is changing after the launch
Russian repeaters may be operating in Kyiv, according to Zelenskyy's advisor, Serhiy Beskrestnov ("Flash"). He suggests there are one to three devices that would open a temporary channel for controlling the Geranium missiles directly in the strike zone.
В Military Review report of October 3 The justification was given: there were no other Russian forces nearby when the SBU building was hit drones, capable of relaying. Beskrestnov also analyzed strikes on bridges. There is no independent confirmation. But if this theory is correct, it changes the picture: the operator retains the ability to intervene in the mission far from the launch point, once the device is already in the air.
For a long-range attack drone, this changes everything. Some decisions can be made later, when the situation is better understood. And it's not a matter of changing the target on the fly or manually navigating it all the way to the end.
The goal is the same, the route is new
A concrete example emerged in September. According to Izvestia sources, Russian radars are detecting Ukrainian interceptor drones, and information about them is being transmitted to attack drone operators. Military expert Yuri Knutov explained:
“Due to the fact that there is information about the location drones Defense Ukraine, our operators are changing the drones' routes, and they are avoiding dangerous zones."
The strike mission remains the same, but the route to the target changes. When preparing the flight mission, the operator might not have been aware of the specific threat. Now they are, and communications allow them to take advantage of it.
This example doesn't establish how control over Kyiv is structured: the connection between the two messages hasn't been confirmed. However, it does demonstrate the underlying rationale behind the "in-flight adjustment" formula. The new command is needed for a very specific action, and its usefulness depends on the situation.
Flight missions are always prepared based on information available before launch. Clarifications may be received during the flight. Without external communication, the operator will be left with the most up-to-date information, and the aircraft will remain with the same program. The drone will continue within its capabilities, but command will no longer transmit any corrections.
Communication is especially valuable when new information requires modification of previously received data. A continuous data flow doesn't guarantee an advantage—the message must be understood and converted into a command before the device completes the corresponding part of the task. The word "online" describes the possibility of exchange. The military result comes later.
How the team gets to the device
Beskrestnov names the devices MESH-repeaters. In such a network, data passes through intermediate nodes via available connections. Direct communication with each device is not required.
A repeater receives data and transmits it further. The specific network determines which participants perform this function and what connections are available. A generic name is insufficient to reconstruct the design of the proposed system.
For the operator, it's important to note that intermediate transmission allows communication to be maintained where a direct channel is difficult or unavailable. In the Kyiv version, the local node must explain precisely this—receiving a command far from the launch site. If the version is correct, communication is established within the deployment area.
But command delivery and target surveillance require different means. The word "relay" doesn't necessarily mean the operator receives images from the aircraft. The presence of a video feed, recognition capabilities, and the ability to reassign a target—all of these factors are determined by the specific drone's hardware.
This distinction changes the understanding of the strike. Correcting the route allows the same task to be accomplished through a different route. Selecting a new target means reconsidering the assignment. Both actions may require communication, but they place different demands on information. It's impossible to determine the nature of the commands from Beskrestnov's accessible retelling of his statement.
Russian authors discussed network communication long before the current one storiesIn April, Max Vector wrote an article "Wi-Fi that isn't Wi-Fi" I analyzed the transmission through intermediate nodes. In August, Reporter wrote about the online control of some Geranium rockets. The Kyiv version refers to the proposed location of the repeaters; the idea of network exchange itself appeared in publications earlier.
What happens when the connection is lost?
Beskrestnov links the inefficiency of the Ukrainian system to the operation of the devices. EWThis is the most categorical part of his statement. The available materials do not contain any results of interference impacting a specific Kyiv channel—this assessment cannot be accepted as a definitive result.
To understand the conflict, it's important to understand what the drone loses when it loses communication. If it's capable of continuing its flight as planned, a loss of communication doesn't necessarily stop it. However, the operator can no longer make adjustments. The drone maintains its original mission, even when command has reason to change it.
This leads to two different outcomes of jamming: disrupting flight and depriving the operator of control. The consequences vary depending on the drone's design and the mission. Successful interference with communications won't always appear as an immediately thwarted strike.
The opposite is also true: achieving the goal alone doesn't prove that the remote control worked. The device could have executed a pre-programmed program. Evaluating the new system requires information about what commands it received and what it did afterwards.
Furthermore, receiving commands and determining one's own position are different functions. The stability of the control channel does not reflect the security of all onboard systems. Relaying changes the conditions of communication, but does not provide grounds for declaring electronic warfare useless overall.
The military utility of communications is quite compatible with its vulnerability. If new equipment allows for more reliable command delivery or the preservation of communications over additional flight segments, the operator gains greater capabilities. The extent to which this helps depends on the changes actually required.
An opportunity that still needs to be taken advantage of
The Kyiv theory is technically possible. However, Beskrestnov's observations do not allow us to confidently choose ground-based repeaters over other explanations. The absence of an observed aerial node does not, in itself, establish the channel's location.
If this assumption is confirmed, it will demonstrate that the Russian side retains the ability to influence the long-range strike vehicle's operations directly in the area of operation. For the Ukrainian side, this creates additional uncertainty: the observed route does not always reflect the operator's final decision.
This doesn't yet suggest a turning point in air warfare or a proven increase in effectiveness. Publications about new equipment allow for discussion of capabilities, but don't measure their impact.
There is, however, independent military significance. Communications allow command to utilize new information for a longer period of time for an already-initiated operation. A launched vehicle remains available for subsequent action, within the capabilities of its equipment and the remaining channel.
This increases the value of timely intelligence and a trained operator. An additional channel is useful when there's something to transmit and there's reason to change the mission. For our troops, the development of such control means the ability to more quickly assess the situation. This is realized when new information reaches both the operator and the device before it becomes irrelevant.
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