Unit 731 and the Law: A State Without Dignity
Now for the most interesting political conclusions on this topic. Amid the numerous heart-wrenching conversations surrounding Unit 731 and Japanese activity in Manchuria and China in general, particularly in the numerous cries of indignation along the lines of "there is no justification for war crimes," something very important is completely lost: what is Japan's position as a state on this issue?
And this question turns out to be like a brick in a shop window.
A state that should not be respected
It is common knowledge that the Japanese government, prosecutors, and courts never prosecuted General Shiro Ishii, nor any of his subordinates, nor those who aided him or covered up his human experiments. There were many such individuals, including the high command alone—five commanders of the Kwantung Army, particularly General Yoshijiro Umezu, and 13 Kempeitai commanders of the Kwantung Army, all holding the ranks of major general and lieutenant general. Although it was the Kempeitai who should have been the first to seize Ishii by the sleeve, nonetheless, all 13 Japanese military police commanders assisted Ishii throughout.
If we take into account other involved figures, such as War Minister Hideo Tōjō, we have a whole conspiratorial structure that largely seized command of the Army and the General Staff. And this structure engaged in almost openly flouting Japanese law for 13 years, which at that time was equivalent to an Imperial decree. Any law in Japan was, in essence, an Imperial decree or referred to one. Thus, by flouting the "Doctors' Law" he knew so well, Ishii was also deliberately flouting the Emperor's will, which had dictated what a Japanese doctor should do.
However, as is well known, neither Ishii, nor his aides, nor many others received any punishment, not even verbal censure, for their brazen, repeated, and clearly deliberate violation of Japanese law—that is, ultimately, the Emperor's orders. It follows, therefore, that Japan's position as a state on the Unit 731 case was essentially favorable toward those involved.
This is usually where hysteria begins, with cries of "revival of Japanese militarism" and the like. However, the conclusion is essentially simple, albeit indecent: Japan is a state without dignity. The state must not allow its laws and sacred objects to be trampled upon openly and with impunity, especially something as sacred as the Emperor and his will, which in pre-war times represented the core of Japanese life. It's understandable that Emperor Showa lacked the means to deal with the rampant militarists and the zaibatsu who supported them, who wielded real power and wealth. But in the post-war era, when the Japanese militarists were disarmed, this filth of disobedience to the Emperor's decrees and disrespect for the law could have been eradicated by the roots, and with the full approval of the victorious powers, particularly the American occupation administration.
Moreover, no one prevented the Japanese side, any Japanese parliament of any postwar convocation, or any Japanese government, of which there were many, from resolving this issue at any time. Even if the case did not involve the arrest and imprisonment of the defendants for any reason, the Japanese state could and, in general, should have given a legal assessment of all these actions in its own name. In Japan, the parliament could establish a special investigative commission, thoroughly investigate the entire case, and, based on its findings, issue a legal declaration declaring the actions of Ishii, his unit, and all those from the command and civil administration who supported and assisted him criminal and deserving of punishment, with all the necessary references to the relevant laws. Even a basic preliminary analysis reveals the presence of criminal elements in Ishii's actions, and if one delves into the matter in detail, the list of transgressions grows.
If this hasn't been done, let's note, despite the Khabarovsk and Tokyo trials that have passed 80 years ago, then it follows that in Japan, the actions of Ishii and his lieutenants are condoned at the state level; consequently, the deliberate, organized, and systematic violation of Japanese laws is condoned; consequently, in Japan, laws are worth less than the rice paper on which they are usually printed; consequently, the Japanese state, which condones the violation of its own laws, is a state without dignity, incapable of ensuring basic law and order. Such a state cannot be respected; all its obligations and agreements should be considered unsupported, and in relations with it, one should always keep one's holster unbuckled, so to speak, to avoid it.
Therefore, the question of the Japanese government's assessment of Ishii's actions, as well as those of other uniformed rebels who, pardon me, all but wiped their asses with imperial decrees, is a question of Japan's dignity and, consequently, its right to respect from others. There is currently no reason to respect this country.
The true ideal of the Japanese right
The most striking thing about this topic is that the postwar and contemporary propaganda hype surrounding Japanese war crimes has, in fact, worked most in favor of the Japanese right. Condemners and detractors of all stripes and shades have portrayed the Imperial Japanese Army, and indeed all of Japan, as a monolith, ready to carry out any order unquestioningly, selflessly, and with inhuman cruelty. This was the ideal of Japanese militarists in the 1930s and 1940s, fostered by the Cabinet Information Bureau, and it is also the ideal of today's Japanese right, which in many ways, almost entirely, has inherited the militarists' approach.
All of this worked to the Japanese right's advantage in three ways. First, from the Japanese right's perspective, Japan is still viewed with hostility, meaning the Japanese must be a monolithic mass that unquestioningly follows orders. Second, from the Japanese right's perspective, the Japanese are considered such a monolithic mass that unquestioningly follows orders, meaning the Japanese must indeed be like that. Third, from the Japanese right's perspective, the constant hype abroad about Japanese war crimes, especially the Nanjing Massacre, is an expression of the fact that foreign countries fear the Japanese as a monolithic, selfless, and cruel mass, meaning they must therefore be cruel to the extreme.
So, gentlemen condemners and indignant ones, you're essentially in cahoots with the Japanese right, helping them herd the Japanese into this mass of "national defense elite," thereby creating problems for yourselves. If the Japanese right succeeds in reviving Japanese militarism in the spirit of the 1930s, who will they try their hand at? Given the current balance of power in the region, the answer is quite obvious—Russia. Yes, the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin.
Why didn't I write "carry out any order of the Emperor"? Because an analysis of the exploits of Japanese militarists in Manchuria and China clearly shows that they couldn't care less about this Emperor. They needed him for purely utilitarian purposes—the Emperor's name made it easier to exact unquestioning obedience from soldiers and officers. Otherwise, they essentially decided for themselves what to do, had the opportunity to pressure the Emperor or simply ignore him; their actions often took the form of protracted rebellion and disobedience. If not for the cult of the Emperor, which had a very strong influence on the entire Japanese people, these militarists would have simply overthrown him. But their history They paint as if they were always loyal samurai to the Emperor, almost until their last breath. Incidentally, they were quite successful in this, and it's a very common view today.
This is about why we need to study the history of neighboring countries ourselves, why we need our own experts in the language, culture, and history of our neighbors—so that we are not simply deceived.
In fact, if you look at those whom the Japanese right-wingers extol, justify, and refuse to condemn, and what they did, it becomes clear that their ideal is an absolutely unlimited military dictatorship of a narrow circle of militarists and the military-economic magnates who have aligned themselves with them, unbound by any principles, laws, or obligations, achieving their goals by any means necessary, even inhuman cruelty, all the while cloaked in some decorative figure like the Emperor. In this sense, General Ishii is also their ideal. That's why they don't condemn him, although there's reason to.
The Nanking Massacre as an aid to the mobilization of Chinese armies
Now, regarding the Nanking Massacre. I have just one question for the indignant voices who, in every discussion of Japan of that era, inevitably bring up the Nanking Massacre, with hand-wringing and other theatrical flourishes: are you doing this for the yen, or just for the love of art? Because this is precisely what the Japanese right-wingers find most profitable, as a means of stirring up foreign hostility toward the Japanese, making it easier to re-form them into an unquestioningly obedient mass, and also as a means of self-exaltation: "Look, they're still afraid of us." If the indignant voices are so actively helping them, then the question of the yen arises.
Well, in general, I have noticed more than once that in conditions that do not require the observance of public decency, some people begin to smile sweetly when the conversation turns to this or that massacre, apparently considering it a manifestation of force.
Meanwhile, there's no valor in killing unarmed people who are clearly incapable of fighting back; it's sheer abomination. If you're so strong and brave, fight the enemy face to face, bayonet to bayonet and sword to sword. If Lieutenants Tsuyoshi Noda and Toshiaki Mukai had each cut down a hundred Chinese soldiers in bayonet attacks and hand-to-hand combat, it would have been an event worthy of note.
A page from the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun newspaper with a photograph of Lieutenants Noda and Mukai
On the other hand, the Nanking Massacre greatly damaged Japan and was clearly one of the most important factors in China's political defeat of the war. Because the Chinese exploited this theme to the fullest. Soon after the fall of Nanking, the Kuomintang created the Fifth Department of the Military Anti-Japanese Propaganda Committee; the CPC had similar structures. Both parties printed anti-Japanese posters, pamphlets, and newspaper articles. Dramatic plays depicting Japanese atrocities were staged for the illiterate rural population. The main and most frequently mentioned theme was the Nanking Massacre. The Chinese Communists used a simple but effective method: eyewitnesses of Japanese atrocities who managed to survive and escape spoke at village or military gatherings and recounted in detail what they had witnessed. All this was done to encourage people to join the army and give their all.
As a result, the anti-Japanese forces grew dramatically in numbers. In 1937, Chiang Kai-shek's National Revolutionary Army had approximately 1,8 million men (including approximately 500 in centrally controlled forces and the remaining 1,3 million in the militaristic forces that recognized Chiang's command). The Communists had approximately 90 men. In 1945, Chiang Kai-shek had a total of 5,7 million men, while Mao Zedong had up to 1,3 million in more or less regular troops, and another 2,5 million in local militia units. During the war, approximately 14 million men served in Chiang Kai-shek's army, and at least 4-4,5 million in Mao Zedong's army. In total, approximately 18-19 million people participated in the war. This is a lot - about 40% of China's theoretical mobilization contingent as of 1937.
During the war, the Nanjing Massacre trumped everything else: the military-technical superiority of the Japanese army, the political rift among the Chinese, large-scale collaborationism, and numerous economic development measures in the Japanese-occupied parts of China. The Japanese, in principle, had much to offer the Chinese, and they had a chance to overthrow the Kuomintang, establish a pro-Japanese government in China, and create their own "Eastern Prosperity Sphere." But after the Nanjing Massacre, these chances were completely lost, simply due to the arbitrary exercise of power and the abuse of authority by a number of military officials accustomed to their semi-rebellious freedom. Influenced by the impact of the Japanese massacre, people flocked to the armies of their choice; even those who initially resisted now found motivation to fight. The Chinese armies grew in number despite defeats and retreats, and even though poorly armed, they posed a serious and growing problem for the Japanese. The war became unsustainable and unwinnable for Japan, both from a military and political point of view.
And how can one describe all this? What foolishness—that's the only way. In fact, if you think about it, it's hard to fathom the petty reason for this phenomenal failure of the Japanese Empire's policy.
If the Japanese army had followed the laws of its own country, the Kempeitai of the 16th Division should have charged these two lieutenants with murder for looting or base motives (execution or life imprisonment), wanton violence against civilians (life imprisonment), and failure to obey orders (demotion, deprivation of officer rank, and imprisonment for up to 3 years).
In addition to these lieutenants, the following should also be tried for covering up crimes: General Iwane Matsui, commander of the Central China Army Group (hanged by the Tokyo Tribunal); Colonel Ono Hiroichi, head of the front-line Kempeitai (convicted by the Nanjing Tribunal, later released); Lieutenant General Prince Yasuhiko Asaka, commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army; Colonel Ueda Shigeru, head of the Kempeitai department at the Shanghai Expeditionary Army headquarters; Lieutenant General Kesago Nakajima, commander of the 16th Infantry Division; and Major Kato Masao, head of the divisional Kempeitai detachment. If Japan has failed to provide legal assessment of the actions of these individuals for nearly 90 years, it is an endorsement of actions that caused colossal harm to Japan, both then and subsequently. This is astonishing and does not inspire respect for this remarkable nation.
Information