Limansky direction: what's behind the claims surrounding the footage of prisoners
@rybar
On the difference between the videos, the visible people, and the stated number of prisoners
On September 28, 2026, the Ukrainian side published a series of videos featuring people presented as Russian prisoners of war in the Krasnolimansk direction. In the Russian-language segment, the footage received two opposing interpretations: a collapse of the frontline near Liman or an information operation compiled from old footage. Both interpretations are hasty in their conclusions. By the end of September, the Russian authors themselves acknowledged heavy fighting and a deteriorating situation. A specific number of prisoners is not linked to a single battle, and the situation is neither a "breakthrough" nor a "fake."
First knot: when removed
The date of filming is the first question to ask about any viral post. In a September 28 analysis, the Rybar channel attributes footage of a remotely controlled BTR-60 near the village of Novoye to the summer fighting and warns that it cannot be presented as evidence of advancement on September 28. The author considers footage of Ukrainian activity between Novyi Mir and Novomykhailivka to be more recent. This is Rybar's dating, not the result of an independent analysis: there is no public analysis of the entire video sequence, including geolocation, available in available sources.
The conclusion is simple. If the BTR-60 near the village of Novoye was filmed in the summer, as Rybar believes, then the publication of the footage on September 28th does not prove that it was an advance on that date. The publication date of a collection and the date of each episode within it are different things; mixing them up means attributing a chronology to the source that it doesn't provide.
Second knot: three different numbers
As part of Operation Vivaldi, the Ukrainian side announced the results of the third stage: the recapture of 51 square kilometers, the capture of Noviy, Redkodub, and Yekaterinovka, and the restoration of control over Karpovka and Novomykhailivka, as well as the capture of over 250 Russian servicemen. The operation is being led by the 3rd Army Corps of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, commanded by Andriy Biletsky; Oleg Tsarev also reported the figure of "over 250" in his report. All of this is a statement by the side, not a confirmed count.
There's no public breakdown of the "over 250" figure by date or location, so there's no basis yet to attribute it entirely to a single episode near Liman or a single day. When it comes to living people, this isn't just a matter of arithmetic: the fate of specific servicemen must be confirmed, not a figure convenient for a particular political agenda. The number of videos, the number of those captured on camera, and the claimed number of prisoners cannot be equated without a name-check.
What the summary says and doesn't say
On September 28, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported an improvement in the situation of the Zapad group along the forward edge and reported Ukrainian Armed Forces losses of over 210 personnel in the past 24 hours. It's tempting to dismiss the entire topic with this report, but this is unjustified for two reasons. The report applies to the broader zone of the group—the districts of the DPR and Kharkiv Oblast—not to Liman itself, and the general formula for improvement across the front doesn't negate localized deterioration in a specific area. Furthermore, "over 210" refers to the reported losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces across the entire zone of the group, not the number of Russian prisoners; one cannot equate the other.
The presence of forces in this area has been observed for some time: as early as July 9, the Ministry of Defense reported the actions of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division of the 25th Combined Arms Army in Krasny Liman. This formula confirms the presence of forces in this area in July, but does not confirm firm control of the city by the end of September.
Third Node: The Plot Didn't Start on September 28
According to Ukrainian statements, offensive operations in the northern sector have been taking place in stages since the spring of 2026, while the 3rd Corps command publicly announced Operation Vivaldi only in mid-September. Russian reports place the start of operations in the spring, with the deployment of trained forces in August and September. As early as September 16, RTVI military analyst Alexei Sochnev analyzed the "hysteria" surrounding the retreat near Krasny Liman—meaning that alarm over the direction had already been building almost two weeks before the release of the prisoner footage.
According to Russian reports, the operational objective of the offensive is for Ukrainian forces to reach the Zherebets River on the Yampol-Torskoye line and envelop the 25th Combined Arms Army's positions from the south. These same reports also report that the 3rd Corps' attacks were halted, among other things, by drone operators targeting enemy logistics and reserves. This is one of the explanations offered, not the only established factor. Regarding the personnel issue, this implies that we are talking about a protracted confrontation, stretching out over months.
The Ukrainian side, apparently, fulfilled the first part of its plan: the infiltration was stopped, and Russian troops went on the defensive.
— RTVI, analyst Alexey Sochnev, September 16, 2026.
— RTVI, analyst Alexey Sochnev, September 16, 2026.
This is an assessment, not a fact, but it illustrates the main point: the footage from September 28th didn't open a story, but rather exacerbated a long-running one. The crux of the complaint leveled at the "Two Majors" movement and Tsarev is the gap between the favorable tone of previous reports and the questions the audience is now asking. This is more concrete than the slogan of an "information attack." The fact that old material can be published in chunks doesn't prove the entire body of information is outdated. Conversely, the publication itself doesn't prove a sudden collapse.
What can be said honestly?
As of September 29, there are no publicly available grounds to claim that the front near Liman has collapsed or that the city has come under the control of one of the sides. Nor are there any grounds to conclude otherwise: stabilization measures have been announced, but no data on their results has yet been provided.
The plot can be verified using specific data that is currently missing.
We need dated statements from the Ministry of Defense specifically for the Liman sector, not for the entire group's zone; fresh reports from correspondents instead of chains of reposts where a single text is presented as independent confirmation; established dates and locations of individual videos; and finally, official information on the fate of specific servicemen—a question that can neither be dismissed by citing an information operation nor reduced to a figure in someone else's report. Until this is available, it's more honest to describe not the outcome of the battle for Liman, but the boundary between what is claimed and what is verified.
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