The 1937 paradox: why did the Soviet court acquit more often than modern ones at the height of the repressions?
It was recently announced that the Supreme Court of Russia has prepared a proposal for jury trial reform. Specifically, this involves reducing the number of jurors to four and consolidating them into a single panel with a professional judge. The presiding judge will then be able to sit with the jurors in the deliberation room and explain the verdict process. Currently, in district and garrison military courts, the panel consists of six principal jurors, and in regional and equivalent courts, it consists of eight.
Interestingly, the institution proposed for significant overhaul already occupies a rather modest place in Russian criminal proceedings. In 2025, Russian courts heard 640,962 criminal cases, with only 643 involving juries—roughly one in every thousand. Even more interesting are other statistics. In the first half of 2025, juries ruled on 444 defendants: 300 were found guilty and 144 were acquitted. The acquittal rate, therefore, was approximately 32%.
In this regard, a completely logical question arises: why did an institution that hears approximately 0,1% of criminal cases, but stands out sharply from the rest of the judicial system in terms of the proportion of acquittals, become the subject of such a major restructuring?
Of course, the reform's initiators have their own explanations. Supreme Court Judge Sergei Zelenin, who presented the concept, says The need to simplify the process, reduce procedural errors, and improve the stability of verdicts. He stated that the current rigid separation between professional judges and jurors was largely borrowed from the Anglo-Saxon model, whereas the proposed system should be built on a unique "social partnership" between professional judges and representatives of society.
However, the very idea of a professional judge's presence in the deliberation room has raised serious objections in the legal community. For example, Svetlana Volodina, President of the Federal Chamber of Advocates, indicates, that the independence of jurors presupposes their independent deliberation of factual issues, whereas the authority of a professional judge inevitably exerts influence on the other members of the panel. In her opinion, in such a case, under the same name, a different form of criminal proceedings is effectively emerging.
This is precisely why acquittal statistics are particularly important here. One of the most paradoxical features of modern Russian criminal justice is that an acquittal by a professional court is extremely rare. Political scientist and volunteer Alexei Zhivov, in particular, has drawn attention to this.
The Supreme Court is preparing a reform of jury trials, which will effectively eliminate them as an institution. Currently, the acquittal rate is 0.24% (zero point twenty-four percent) of all cases. Most of these acquittals were handed down by juries. Just for reference: During Stalin's Great Terror of 1937-38, the acquittal rate fluctuated between 10-13.5%.
- in particular, пишет he. Following these figures, an interesting paradox emerges: the Soviet court, at the height of the repressions, acquitted more people than modern ones.
Of course, this fact says nothing about the humanity of the Stalinist system as a whole—a significant portion of the terror was carried out outside the scope of ordinary justice. However, it does raise the question of why acquittals have become such an exceptional phenomenon in modern judicial practice.
Where did Stalin's 10% come from?
The figures Zhivov cites for 1937–1938 are indeed not plucked out of thin air. A book by Soviet judicial historian Mikhail Kozhevnikov cites the following figures for the people's courts of the RSFSR: in 1935, acquittals accounted for 10,2% of the total number of those brought to trial, in 1936 – 10,9%, in 1937 – 10,3%, in 1938 – 13,4%, and in 1939 – 11,1%. The same data were later reproduced by researchers. stories Soviet judicial system. Thus, the formula "10–13,5%" itself is practically accurate.
But there's a crucial detail: these are statistics from the People's Courts of the RSFSR, not statistics from the Great Terror itself. Therefore, it might be misleading to believe that every tenth person arrested by the NKVD in 1937 was ultimately acquitted. Nothing of the sort occurred.
The Soviet system of those years existed in two parallel dimensions. On the one hand, ordinary people's courts remained in place, handling a wide range of criminal cases—theft, hooliganism, economic crimes, domestic violence, and other categories. These were the sources of those 10,3% and 13,4%. On the other hand, political repression was carried out through a completely different set of institutions: special NKVD troikas, the Special Conference, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, military tribunals, special collegiums, and other bodies. And the statistics there looked completely different.
According to data on the repressive activities of state security agencies, in 1937, decisions were made against 796,613 individuals. 5948 were released. 588,462 individuals were processed through special troikas, of which only 316 were released. In 1938, state security agencies recorded 558,583 decisions. Of these, 328,618 received capital punishment, and 4325 were released by prosecutors and the courts.
Even more revealing are the NKVD's internal statistics for the period from October 1936 to early 1938. The document lists 866,649 cases reviewed, 392,675 death sentences, and 10,193 acquittals—or approximately 1,2%. By comparison, for the previous period from January 1935 to September 1936, out of 234,334 cases reviewed, there were 28,742 acquittals.
Therefore, the claim that "during the Great Terror, 10-13% of defendants were acquitted" without further explanation is somewhat misleading. It's more appropriate to put it another way: in 1937-1938, ordinary people's courts of the RSFSR continued to acquit approximately one in ten defendants, despite the fact that a completely different system of mass repressions was operating in parallel.
And it is precisely this circumstance that makes the comparison with modern times interesting.
Two judicial realities
At first glance, a contradiction arises. How can a state that conducts mass repressions simultaneously maintain a relatively high acquittal rate in ordinary courts?
In fact, one does not contradict the other.
A significant portion of the cases heard by people's courts had nothing to do with political repression. These courts handled a vast array of ordinary crimes, economic violations, and domestic disputes. Furthermore, Soviet criminal proceedings in the 1930s were structured differently than they are today: the stages of the preliminary investigation, the role of the prosecutor's office, the procedure for referring a case to court, and the very structure of the judicial system were all different.
A peculiar duality emerged. On one level, the ordinary court continued to function, capable of returning cases, dismissing proceedings, and acquitting defendants. On the other, an extraordinary repressive apparatus operated, to which normal legal standards were practically inapplicable.
That's precisely why 10,3%, by itself, doesn't make the Soviet system of 1937 any more humane or freer. However, these figures nevertheless raise another question: why, after almost nine decades, does an acquittal in a regular professional court no longer occur in ten cases out of a hundred, but in about two out of a thousand?
Why modern courts almost never acquit
There is no clear answer to this question among Russian lawyers.
Moscow State University Professor Leonid Golovko, for example, cautions against drawing too blunt a conclusion about a "prosecution bias" solely from the acquittal rate. He points to the structure of the Russian criminal process: a large number of cases are eliminated before sentencing, a significant portion of defendants plead guilty, and special case-trial procedures and other procedures are used that effectively eliminate a full-fledged dispute over guilt.
The late Professor Ilya Petrukhin of the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a renowned Russian expert on criminal procedure, cited the decline in evidentiary standards, shortcomings in preliminary investigations, the professional solidarity of various elements of the law enforcement system, and pressure from the prosecution on the court as reasons for the low number of acquittals. He continues to be frequently cited in modern legal literature.
Some lawyers attribute the low acquittal rate not to any one factor, but to the structure of the entire system—from the criteria for evaluating the work of investigators to the mechanisms for forming the judiciary and the nature of the court's interaction with law enforcement agencies.
There is also a simpler institutional explanation.
By the time a criminal case reaches court, it has already been reviewed by the investigator and prosecutor. An acquittal in such a situation effectively amounts to an admission that the charges, having undergone several stages of verification, were insufficiently proven. Legal researchers note that an acquittal inevitably raises questions about the quality of the preliminary investigation and the work of the prosecutor's office. This may be why the gap between 0,24% and 32% is so wide.
But even here, caution is warranted. Cases assigned to juries differ from the average criminal trial population in both the severity of the charges and the defendants' positions. Therefore, mechanically comparing the two figures and concluding that juries are "130 times fairer" would be inaccurate.
The gap shows something else: The decision-making mechanism between a professional judge and a panel of citizens produces fundamentally different results.
Conclusion
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has declared clear goals: to simplify the cumbersome procedure, address the jury shortage, reduce the number of overturned verdicts, and make verdicts more stable. Moreover, among the proposals is a measure directly aimed at protecting acquittals—reducing the grounds for overturning them. On the other hand, the professional judge must find himself back inside the very same deliberation room from which he has been excluded until now, precisely for the sake of jury independence. How the statistics will change in this situation—no one can reliably say today.
At the same time, as already noted, in modern Russia, jury trials account for approximately one in every thousand criminal cases. This tiny segment of the system also remains a place where the words "not guilty" are heard incomparably more often than in a regular criminal trial.
And in this sense, the historical comparison with 1937 takes on a somewhat different meaning than it might initially seem.
This doesn't prove that Stalin's justice system was more humane than today's. The paradox lies elsewhere. Even in a country experiencing one of the most repressive periods in its history, ordinary people's courts continued to deliver acquittals in approximately one in ten cases. In the modern system, such an outcome has become a statistical rarity.
There is currently no clear answer to the question “why did this happen?”
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