What an armored cruiser of the Russian Imperial Navy should be like. Opinions of admirals in 1902.
My series dedicated to stories The story of the armored cruiser Bayan's creation, combat history, and comparison with its Japanese counterparts stretches across 16 articles. However, as has been rightly noted in the comments, it contains some understatement: the story of the Bayan would not be complete without examining the circumstances of the construction and combat deployment of its successors, the cruisers Admiral Makarov, Bayan II, and Pallada.
And here the first question arises: how did it happen that the Naval Ministry in 1904 suddenly decided to blow the dust off the project of the armored cruiser "Bayan", which in 1904 was already 7 years old?
I must say that the construction of armored cruisers—the Bayan's successors—has generated a great deal of controversy. This is hardly surprising—why, oh why, did the Navy Department suddenly rush to build an entire series of three ships based on an outdated design? Many theories have been put forward, including some downright conspiracy theories.
A widely accepted interpretation is that cruisers were urgently needed, and no one wanted to delay their construction, and the only completed design available was the "Bayan." Supporters of this theory often criticize the Naval Ministry for failing to create a modern armored cruiser design by 1904.
The respected R. M. Melnikov strongly objected to this theory: he described the multitude of armored cruiser designs that had been pouring into the Navy Ministry during the Russo-Japanese War. At the time, numerous foreign firms understood that Russia would need warships and tried to offer their construction services. However, a number of the designs presented were ahead of their time and resembled not armored cruisers, but battlecruisers of the future. In short, according to R. M. Melnikov, the designs did exist, but for unclear reasons, the outdated Bayan was chosen.
At the same time, the order for one of France's three armored cruisers, and at a price that exceeded that for which the "original" "Bayan" was purchased, combined with other, also highly dubious, facts, could not help but give rise to the theory of corruption.
In short, there are many interpretations. But before discussing them, let's consider how Russian admirals envisioned the armored cruisers of the future in late 1902, when the new shipbuilding program for 1903-1923 was being discussed. The answer to this question will give us an understanding of what the design for the newest armored cruiser for the Russian Imperial Navy would have been. fleet, if it had been developed by the beginning of 1904.
On the program of domestic shipbuilding in 1904
As the esteemed reader is likely aware, at the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian Empire implemented the "Plan to Enhance Shipbuilding for the Needs of the Far East," which included the construction of five Borodino-class battleships. This shipbuilding program was designed for the period 1898-1905, meaning that the slipways and sheds were to be freed up no later than 1903. During the remaining time until 1905, the ships of this program were to be completed afloat and undergo trials.
Understanding this, in 1902 work began on developing a new program, which became the 20-year shipbuilding program for the period 1903-1923. According to it, the Baltic and Pacific fleets were to receive:
Squadron battleships - 36 units;
Armored cruisers - 18 units;
Armored deck cruisers - 36 units;
Fighters and destroyers - 450 units;
Mine layers - 4 units;
Submarines - 104 units.
And so, everything seemed to be fine, but in 1902 no one really understood what types and designs of ships the fleet would need.
On armored cruisers of the shipbuilding program for 1903-1923.
It's well known that, having created a highly distinctive class of armored raider cruisers in the late 19th century, designed to fight ocean lanes, the admirals of the Russian Empire had little idea of what kind of ships of this class would be suitable for service alongside battleships. The role of an armored cruiser in squadron combat was unclear, and this was one of the reasons why the Naval Ministry preferred to build squadrons of battleships rather than "diluting" the main forces with armored cruisers, as the Japanese had done. Therefore, the Bayan, designed as an armored reconnaissance vessel for a squadron, "while still being a combat vessel," remained a single example.
Since all our efforts were focused on squadron battleships and armored cruisers, by the time the 20-year shipbuilding program of 1903–1923 was agreed upon and approved, no consensus had been reached on the armored cruiser. The program called for the construction of 18 armored cruisers for the Baltic and Pacific fleets, but opinions varied widely on what these should be.
So, Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich believed that an armored cruiser should be a reconnaissance vessel with a displacement of 10,000 tons and have a “strong, uniform artillery 8-inch caliber”, a speed of at least 23 knots and large coal reserves, which will allow the cruiser to have a range of 6,000 miles at 10 knots.
Vice-Admiral V. P. Verkhovsky expressed the "seditious" idea that armored cruisers and squadron battleships should be merged into a single class of ship, one with the speed of an armored cruiser. Reading this, I received a profound historical and cultural shock. So, one of the most notorious admirals of the time, a man who had ruined the work of the St. Petersburg port and, "as a reward," was made head of the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding and Shipbuilding, suddenly had an epiphany and managed to foresee the concept of high-speed battleships, which the world only adopted after the First World War?!
However, the following lines disabused me of any illusions: there was no sudden insight or operational-tactical genius in sight. It turned out that V.P. Verkhovsky, in his quest to merge two of the most powerful ship classes into one, was seeking to "dramatically simplify the tactical, material, shipbuilding, economic, port, and all other aspects of the maintenance, supply, and operation of these ships." In short, Vladimir Pavlovich was all about economy, no matter what the circumstances.
Whatever the reasons, the vice-admiral proposed a rather intriguing design for a single ship. He posited that the battleship-cruiser should have a displacement of 11–10 tons, a speed of 25 knots (!), and a main caliber of 10 dm, with a cruising range sufficient to enable a voyage from Kronstadt to Vladivostok without refueling at 10–12 knots (!!!). Such a set of requirements at the end of 1902 seems at the very least odd, not to mention insane, but V.P. Verkhovsky believed that the specified range could be achieved by converting the "battleship-cruiser" from coal to oil. Moreover, he implied not oil-fueled boilers, but the complete elimination of steam engines and the use of "oil engines running on oil gas."
The vice admiral categorically stated that a situation where a ship loses its design speed during operation is unacceptable. He asserted that the main reason for the crushing defeat of the Spanish fleet by American sailors was precisely because the Spanish ships, although commissioned with a speed of 22 knots, barely reached 15 knots in everyday service. Furthermore, V.P. Verkhovsky saw the main reason for the loss of speed as the constant "loss" of water in the steam boilers, requiring replacement with inferior water, which ultimately renders the boilers inoperable. Accordingly, replacing steam engines and boilers with oil-fired engines would eliminate this drawback, simplifying propulsion plant maintenance, and reducing the ships' visibility, since, according to V.P. Verkhovsky, oil produces no smoke.
And besides, it will also reduce the required number of stokers by about half - well, what a saving!
As for armored reconnaissance cruisers, V.P. Verkhovsky believed that they were not needed at all in the Baltic, but were needed in the Far East. He proposed building them like the Bogatyr, but with the addition of an armor belt of “at least 4 dm” (102 mm).
Vice-Admiral S.P. Tyrtov He didn't comment on cruisers for the Baltic and Far East, but his opinion on the Black Sea cruiser class is impossible not to quote. He proposed building ships of 3–4 tons, with light armor (it's unclear whether an armor belt was proposed) and the most powerful artillery possible. However, according to S.P. Tyrtov, cruisers didn't require significant coal reserves, making ocean voyages completely impossible for them. But the most surprising thing wasn't this, but the speed proposed by the venerable Vice Admiral. S.P. Tyrtov believed that 15–17 knots would be sufficient for Black Sea cruisers.
Vice-Admiral S. O. Makarov stood firm behind his 3,000-ton "armorless ships," which he preferred to all other types of battleships and cruisers.
But, realizing that his ideas were not shared by other admirals, he proposed including in the shipbuilding program, in addition to ships of other classes, three types of cruisers: Gromoboy, Bogatyr, and Novik. At the same time, S.O. Makarov also proposed intermediate versions of the program, such as one that would have called for the construction of 30 12,000-ton squadron battleships, 20 Bogatyr-class cruisers, and 148 3000-ton "unarmored" cruisers, plus only a torpedo boat fleet and gunboats.
According to Vice-Admiral A.A. BirilevIn the future, the Russian Imperial Navy would need armored cruisers of 9-11 tons, "and perhaps even slightly more," with a speed of 20 knots and a range twice that of squadron battleships. Their armament and armor were not specified, but they had to be sufficient to fulfill their missions. According to A.A. Birilev, the armored cruisers' missions were as follows:
1. Protecting your squadron from enemy cruisers is a rather unclear thesis; it seems that battleships don't need to be protected from cruisers, but this is probably just an unfortunate formulation of the squadron's patrol duty and the ability to independently deal with enemy cruisers.
2. Formation of a "special line" in a squadron battle, the task of which would be... No, not a "fast wing", but a reserve that would support its own damaged battleships or attack and finish off damaged enemy ships that have left the line.
3. An armored cruiser is not intended for line fighting, but should have such a strength that, if necessary, it can form a line “if it proves useful.”
4. Independent actions - attacks on enemy naval forces and coasts.
Rear Admiral G.P. Chukhnin believed that the fleet required two types of armored cruisers.
The Type No. 1 was to be an armored reconnaissance aircraft for the squadron, but at the same time, “it would be advantageous to have them of such strength that at certain moments they could usefully participate in battle,” for which, according to G.P. Chukhnin, a displacement of at least 7,000 tons and well-protected artillery were required.
The Type II should possess all the capabilities of the Type I armored reconnaissance vessel, but also be capable of operating against England on ocean lanes, for which it would need to have large coal reserves and self-sufficiency. The displacement of such cruisers, according to G.P. Chukhnin, would have to be no less than 11,000 tons.
The essence of the Rear Admiral's idea was that limiting the fleet to armored reconnaissance ships incapable of oceangoing was counterproductive, as they would be useless in the event of a war with England, and G.P. Chukhnin believed it impossible to crush British power in a pitched battle of battleships. At the same time, building only "eleven-thousand-ton" cruisers capable of both serving with the squadron and conducting long-distance ocean voyages would be prohibitively expensive. Furthermore, G.P. Chukhnin believed that the large armored cruiser of the Russian Imperial Navy, Gromoboy, which was closest to his ideas, was a failure, as it lacked both turret artillery and sufficient coal reserves.
Rear Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky He believed it was necessary to build armored cruisers with a displacement of at least 10,000 tons, a cruising range of 6,000 miles at full speed, and a speed of at least 22 knots. The rear admiral also provided tactical justification for both the range and speed.
According to Z.P. Rozhestvensky, the main adversaries of our fleets were the British and German. In a clash with the Kaiserliche Marine, Russian armored cruisers had to perform the following tasks:
1. To act in the vanguard in order to obtain accurate information on the enemy's movements and forces and to engage his cruisers, as well as to destroy his Niobe-class reconnaissance cruisers;
2. Pursuit of the retreating main forces of the Germans, destruction of its rearguard or lagging battleships;
3. In a squadron battle - to act "as additional battleships, or to support weak flanks, or to provide assistance to the injured, or to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy's wavering flank";
4. To act in the rearguard - to cover your retreating squadron, etc.
In a clash with England, operations along ocean lines of communication took center stage. According to Z.P. Rozhestvensky, any chance of success in a battle against the British would only be possible in an "exceptional situation, created by us," in which a significant portion of the British fleet would be diverted to other tasks. Such tasks could have been created for the British by strong Russian cruiser squadrons concentrated in the Far East.
Z.P. Rozhestvensky believed that while "operating on enemy trade routes, destroying colonial warehouses, damaging coastal installations, and so on" was certainly necessary, such actions were essentially auxiliary and would only have an indirect impact on the outcome of the war. However, he also asserted that "these actions acquire exceptional significance if they seem the only feasible ones."
In fact, this is why Z.P. Rozhestvensky advocated the versatility of cruisers, both armored and armored decks. In his opinion, a cruiser should be capable of both serving with the main forces and engaging in piracy on ocean lanes. Accordingly, the Rear Admiral considered the creation of specialized raider cruisers, as well as "squadron scouts," counterproductive.
All of the above explains the requirement for a cruising range of 6000 miles for armored cruisers at economical speed. As for the 22-knot speed, there was an error in Z.P. Rozhestvensky's proposal.
The rear admiral believed that an armored cruiser should be at least two knots faster than an enemy battleship. But Z.P. Rozhestvensky, for some reason, was certain that the newest German battleships would reach a speed of 20 knots, hence his demand for 22 knots for an armored cruiser. Consequently, had he learned that the Braunschweig-class ships' design speed was only 18 knots, he would likely have agreed to armored cruisers reaching 20-21 knots.
Although not relevant to the topic of this article, I cannot help but note that Z. P. Rozhestvensky considered the construction of small cruisers with a displacement of 3000–4000 tons a mistake. He pointed out that:
From this point of view, the Boyarin and Novik class cruisers have insufficient range, poor seaworthiness, and appear to be too unstable platforms for artillery and mine weapons.
Therefore, Z.P. Rozhestvensky believed that the squadron's armored reconnaissance ships should have a displacement of 6000 tons, a speed of 23 knots (ships of this subclass were supposed to outshine enemy battleships by not 2, but 3 knots), and a cruising range of the same 6000 miles at economic speed. In other words, the optimal type of armored reconnaissance ship was very close to the "six-thousanders" ordered and built by the Russian Empire in the lead-up to the Russo-Japanese War.
Rear Admiral A.M. Abaza He fully agreed with Z.P. Rozhestvensky that armored cruisers were to be versatile and equally suitable for squadron service and ocean raiding. According to A.M. Abaza, armored cruisers were to operate on England's sea lanes at sea, but, unlike Z.P. Rozhestvensky, he was confident that these ships would be capable of stopping "all maritime trade."
A.M. Abaza assumed that a successful cruiser war would strangle Great Britain and thereby force it to accept the victor's terms. But the armored cruisers he proposed would also be useful against other countries, as they would be able, after defeating the enemy's main forces in a pitched battle (for which squadron battleships were responsible), to cut off its sea lanes.
The combat capabilities of armored cruisers were also important. A.M. Abaza believed that the British might resort to a convoy system, and cruisers operating in the ocean would have to engage enemy warships. Furthermore, the ability to successfully combat cruisers would also be important for reconnaissance:
During reconnaissance missions, you will often have to fight with enemy scouts and force your way through them in order to obtain information about the main forces or to return with information to your admiral.
But, unlike Z.P. Rozhestvensky and Rear Admiral G.P. Chukhnin, A.M. Abaza believed that the Gromoboy fully satisfied the above-mentioned requirements and that the Russian Imperial Navy did not need any other type of armored cruiser.
Vice Admiral E.I. Alekseev He spoke very briefly and only indicated that the fleet would need armored cruisers of 10,000 tons without any explanation.
Chief Inspector of Shipbuilding N.N. Kuteinikov He did not propose any specific types of armored cruisers, but noted that protecting the Bogatyr with a wide 4-inch armor belt at the waterline would increase its displacement from the current 6850 tons (as in the text) to 8400 tons, and that the improved Bogatyr would be lighter than the British Monmouth, primarily because the latter would be equipped with heavy Belleville boilers rather than the relatively light Norman boilers. N.N. Kuteinikov, however, had no objections to such a ship.
All the considerations of our admirals, which I have outlined above, were presented by them in September-December 1902.
Conclusions
Despite the wide range of opinions, it's clear that the admirals of the Russian Imperial Navy gravitated toward a large armored cruiser of 10–11 tons, equally suitable for squadron service and long ocean voyages. However, such a design would inevitably have resulted in an enlarged Bayan, whose increased displacement would have significantly increased its coal reserves and, consequently, its cruising range! Unfortunately, nothing else could be squeezed into the specified displacement at that time.
The armored cruiser that came closest to the wishes of our admirals in those years was, perhaps, the British Devonshire - a series of 6 cruisers of this type was laid down in 1902.
The main armament of the newest British armored cruiser consisted of four 7,5-inch (190 mm) guns in single-gun turrets arranged in a diamond pattern, and six 6-inch (190 mm) guns in casemates. She could reach a speed of 22 knots with engines producing 21,500 horsepower, and had a fuel capacity of 1,050 tons of coal, with a full fuel capacity of 1,950 tons, giving her an estimated cruising range of 8,500 miles. Her armor belt was 3 meters high and 152 mm thick, while her armored deck (apparently carapace) was 19-51 mm thick.
Accordingly, using the armored cruiser Devonshire as a basis, we can estimate the characteristics of a Russian armored cruiser designed according to the wishes of our admirals. If these were formalized in the technical specifications of the Naval Ministry, of course.
Thus, we see that the Devonshire's displacement and speed fully meet the established requirements. However, it's interesting that the British, when designing her, intended to arm the ship with two 9,2-inch (234 mm) guns, but were unable to do so—such massive artillery systems could not be accommodated in the narrow ends. Ultimately, the British "make do" by installing single-gun turrets with 190 mm guns in the ends, which, of course, were weaker than the 234 mm. To somehow compensate for this deficiency, the British engineers replaced the two-tiered casemates of the 6-inch guns on the bow with two 190 mm turrets—one on each side.
If our shipbuilders had designed an armored cruiser under the 1903-1923 shipbuilding program, they would have encountered exactly the same difficulties, and so twin 8-inch turrets at the ends were completely ruled out. A diamond-shaped layout, while a successful solution, was hardly feasible.
The fact is that domestic warships showed a clear trend toward strengthening vertical protection. The Rurik, Rossiya, Gromoboy, and the Peresvet-class battleships had belt armor that only partially covered the waterline, with their ends protected only by a carapace armored deck. But the Tsarevich and the Borodino, built to a similar design, received main and upper armor belts extending from stem to sternpost. The Bayan had the same, with the exception of a small section at the stern where the waterline was unprotected.
At the same time, the Devonshire's armor coverage was much more modest—its 152mm armor belt extended 74 meters, or just over half the cruiser's length (144,32 meters). Its height was also insufficient—while the Bayan's main armor belt was 1,8 meters thick, plus the height of the upper armor belt (approximately 2,7 meters), the British cruiser's was 3 meters.
The British armor scheme would have been completely unsatisfactory to our sailors; they would have obviously demanded something "like a trumpet," but with full waterline armor. This would have required much more armor than the Devonshire design provided. Consequently, something would have had to be abandoned.
In principle, the British cruiser had some displacement reserves. The Devonshire-class ships retained six cylindrical (fire-tube) boilers, so replacing them with lighter water-tube boilers could have resulted in some savings. Coal reserves could also have been significantly reduced, given the planned cruising range of 6,000 miles, rather than the 8,500 miles of the British cruisers.
But it's also clear that our admirals wouldn't have been satisfied with just six 6-inch guns on such a large cruiser. They would have demanded eight, like on the Bayan, or even more, and that would have meant not only the guns themselves but also the weight of the individual casemates for them. The Devonshire carried two 76mm and eighteen 47mm guns as anti-torpedo armament, while ours would have clearly required no less, and likely even more, than a dozen 75mm guns, which would have further increased the weight.
Based on the above, it can be assumed that if the Naval Ministry had somehow found the resources to design an armored cruiser for the 1903-1923 shipbuilding program, it would have produced a ship with a displacement of 10,000-11,000 tons, a speed of 21-22 knots, and an armament of two 8-inch guns in single-gun turrets located at the ends of the ship, eight to twelve 6-inch guns in casemates, and at least twelve 75-mm guns in the same turrets. Vertical protection (Krupp armor) would have included a main belt of at least 152-178 mm and an upper combat belt running along the entire waterline. However, I estimate the chances of a diamond-shaped arrangement of four 8-inch single-gun turrets as woefully low—there simply wouldn't have been enough weight left for them.
But the main problem lies elsewhere. Undoubtedly, the cruiser I "designed" above would have fully met the wishes of the majority of admirals, expressed by them in late 1902, and the technical capabilities of domestic shipbuilding. But such a design, given the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, would have proven completely obsolete and just as unsuitable for the serial construction of post-war cruisers as the design for the armored cruiser Bayan.
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