The Russian Navy in the Russo-Japanese War: Its Shortcomings and How to Correct Them

“…I saw the main reason (for the defeat) in the way we organized military affairs in Navy, in the absence of special bodies that would be engaged in preparing the Fleet for war…” (Admiral Kolchak. Meeting of the Extraordinary Investigative Commission, January 23, 1920)

When contemporary observers examine the causes of the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, there are two extreme viewpoints. The first holds that the Russian command did everything correctly, and the defeat was an accident, and that if the war were replayed, the outcome would have been different. If anything needed to be changed, it would have been minor: reinforcing the armor on a particular cruiser, or moving it from Port Arthur to Vladivostok, or vice versa.

The opposite view is that the Russian admirals were incompetent, the sailors were good for nothing (both statements are false), and the Japanese would have won anyway.

Both of these opposing points of view agree on one thing: they don't need to look for the reasons for failure, since they already know the answer. This article is for those who fall between these extremes.

The need for a fleet construction concept

The construction of a strong navy began with its concept (in Japan - Yamamoto Gombei, in Germany - Tirpitz, in England - Fisher), which defined its opponents and tasks in relation to them, from which its structure and requirements for classes of ships followed, and only from these - the requirements for specific ships.

A ship successful for one navy might be unsuccessful for another. For example, the British navy needed "trade protectors" with long range, seaworthiness, endurance, and habitability, so Japanese armored cruisers, which had weakened all these qualities in favor of increased armament and armor, were unsuitable.

A fleet without a concept might contain good ships, but assembled haphazardly, they would not be effective as a whole, or in specific combat situations.

The Russian fleet defended three theaters, very different in their characteristics, and it lacked a concept for the Far East, therefore "We ended up with some kind of fantastic ships that appeared for some unknown reason." (Transcript of Kolchak's interrogation, January 21, 1920). Here Kolchak is viewed as a naval theorist who generalized the experience of this war, and his subsequent political activities are not touched upon.

The main classes of warships and their qualities

It's impossible to see the shortcomings of the Russian fleet of 1904 without turning to military theory. An article entitled "On the Types of Warships" was published in 1900, but it's not available online. Therefore, excerpts from Kolchak's 1908 report "What Kind of Fleet Does Russia Need" are provided below (emphasis mine).

The main and fundamental operation of naval warfare is a battle with the enemy's armed forces, and squadron battleship is being built...for this sole purpose...

Along with combat, naval art has advanced two more operations directly connected with it, preceding and accompanying it: these are reconnaissance, i.e., the search for the object of the battle and the determination of the strength of this object, and the exploitation of victory, i.e., the use of its results in the sense of pursuit with the goal of the final and complete destruction of the enemy...

The significance of these operations is determined by… the words of Nelson: a squadron that has no scouts and wants to engage in battle is always in error, but if it has reason to avoid battle, then it is in a dangerous position…

The Moltke school defined the importance of exploiting victory by stating that “a thorough pursuit is more fruitful than a new victory…

Reconnaissance...is divided into two operations: terrain coverage in the sense of searching for the enemy, which requires a number of scouts, and reconnaissance in force to determine...the strength of the intended battlefield...

The main requirement of reconnaissance is a long speed and a radius of action, and the separation of battleships for reconnaissance purposes, firstly, would tie up the main forces in terms of speed, which is obtained at such a high price and has not only tactical but also strategic significance; secondly, it would lead to the separation of the main forces and would contradict the principle of concentrating these forces at the beginning of the battle; and thirdly, it would affect the elements of attack and defense of the ships, since every ship is a compromise, and it is impossible to increase one of its elements without damaging the others... and would always contradict the requirement for the number of scouts - illuminators of the area...

Therefore, the strictly logical types of warships…are: the armored cruiser and the light reconnaissance cruiser…

An armored cruiser, having as its task reconnaissance in force, is part of the main forces of the squadron and takes part in a battle of the line, but not in the general formation of battleships, but in an independent line in order to use in battle the precious advantage of speed, an element that is dual from a tactical point of view, generally increasing the elements of attack and defense and to a certain extent compensating for the smaller number of guns and the weakness of armor...

A light reconnaissance cruiser is a special type of vessel, one in which offensive and defensive elements are entirely sacrificed for speed and range. The need for numbers naturally leads to a desire to limit the displacement of this vessel while preserving its superior seaworthiness. A light cruiser is a destroyer of enemy mine-laying vessels, for which purpose it is armed with a comparatively light artilleryLight cruisers are responsible for providing fire support to minelaying vessels, and for patrol and security duties at sea and when anchored in unfortified areas...

Thus, based on the principles of naval strategy, armed naval power is differentiated into four main types: squadron battleship, an armored cruiser, a light cruiser and a destroyer, the first two types being battle line vessels, while the second two are given an independent and extremely important role in reconnaissance and exploitation of victory.

I would like to draw attention to the words: “every vessel is a compromise, and it is impossible to increase one of its elements without damaging others.”

The vessel operated with characteristics such as artillery power, protection, speed, and range. Increasing one of these, while maintaining a fixed displacement, meant sacrificing others.

By strengthening one of them to the limit, all the others were critically weakened, and the ship became unbalanced. So, on a cruiser Novik everything was weakened for the sake of speed. On the cruiser Accordion For maximum protection, they sacrificed range. But a universal combat vessel was also impossible: it was impossible to find the perfect balance.

The objective of the fleet concept was to select the characteristics of its types of vessels so as to minimize their weaknesses and enhance their strengths in the process of joint action.

Moreover, she took into account the specifics of her theater and the characteristics of the enemy fleet. Just as fencers would look for each other's weaknesses and be prepared to exploit external factors, such as the position of the sun, here the external factors were the specifics of the theater, and by finding the enemy's weak point, they could defeat him.

Shortcomings of the Russian fleet in 1904

If a fleet is to consist of ships of different types, the question arises in what proportions they should be combined.

The larger the naval theater, the more cruisers were required, and the better their seaworthiness. Confined inland seas required fewer. For example, Sweden, a weak regional power, had no cruisers in the Baltic, then only one, and ironclads were used only for coastal defense. But the more powerful Austria-Hungary had a fleet in the Adriatic of all types and was well-balanced.

The composition of the navies in 1904

Source: Russia in the World War 1914–1918 (in figures). Page 95. Table 74

1) The table shows that the Russian fleet had the lowest ratio of cruisers to battleships, while 5 of the 7 other countries, including Japan, had a ratio more than twice as high as Russia's.

“Compared to other fleets, we have a higher percentage of battleships and destroyers and a small percentage of so-called cruisers” (Admiral Makarov).

This was contrary to the plans to wage a raiding war against England, for which they were needed in great numbers.

“It is better to send 4 cruisers of 3000 tons into the ocean than 1 of 12000 tons” (Admiral Makarov).

"We desperately need cruisers. Building only battleships is absurd. In the event of war, it's like an army without cavalry, meaning without eyes, not to mention the importance of special cruiser operations" (Captain 1st Rank, Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich).

The cruisers performed the following tasks:

• intelligence
  
• counter-torpedo warfare,
  
• support of their destroyers,
  
• protection of minesweeping forces,
  
• protection of bases and convoys,
  
• conducting raids, incursions and blockades,
  
• finishing off damaged ships,
  
• were used for pursuit,
  
• for patrol, messenger and rehearsal service,
  
• inpatient service,
  
• support of ground troops,
  
• retransmission of radio communications to increase its range (among the Japanese).
  

Moreover, cruisers-raiders (3 Rurik and 3 Diana) were poorly suited for all other tasks. To achieve high seaworthiness, they were built with high sides and increased displacement, but underarmed; to accommodate larger coal mines, their width was increased, reducing speed. "The construction of such expensive ships for the specific purpose of cruising is questionable." - Vice Admiral V.L. Alekseev believed in 1897.

Cruisers Svetlana и Diamond were built as yachts.

The lack of ships that could take on dangerous routine work exposed first-rank ships to increased danger from enemy mine-laying forces and made the fleet inflexible and blind.

After death Varangian и Boyarina In the 1st Pacific Squadron there were only 3 cruisers left capable of conducting reconnaissance: Bayan, Novik, Askold. FROM Diana и Pallas There were five of them against more than fifteen, and to protect them, destroyers were sent on reconnaissance missions. Due to a shortage of cruisers, patrol duty off Port Arthur was not conducted, and the protection of the outer roads was overstretched.

2) Except for one thing Bayana, there were no armored cruisers capable of conducting reconnaissance in force: with squadron, not raider, qualities. The cruiser Accordion The price for increasing the armor was the loss of range, which greatly limited its use.

3) Armored cruisers of 6000 tons were overkill for reconnaissance and impractical for building large numbers of scouts; they were poorly suited for defending the fleet from torpedo boats, lacking 100–120 mm caliber guns (the 75 mm caliber was weak and effective at close range, while the 152 mm was unwieldy and carried a smaller ammunition supply; as a general-purpose caliber, it could expend its ammunition before an enemy torpedo attack). Their thin armor and lack of heavy artillery prevented them from conducting reconnaissance in force.

4) Cruisers of 3000 tons Novik and its derivatives Pearl и Emerald At high speed, they had poor seaworthiness, an unstable gun platform, and weak "cigarette" armor, which made it dangerous to send them in pursuit of Japanese reconnaissance aircraft during the Battle of Tsushima: one stray hit could disable them or put them out of action in the face of a more numerous enemy. Together with Boyar, their armament was weaker than that of any of the Japanese cruisers, which were distinguished by their excessive artillery.

The emphasis on the high speed of cruisers was a sound strategy, allowing them to avoid or force combat, and to choose more advantageous positions during battle. All leading naval powers came to understand the importance of speed.

5) The battleships were of different types, which reduced the effectiveness of their use.

Battleships of the type Relight They were built for both line combat and raiding. For line combat, they were lightly armed and lightly armored, and their high sides made them easy targets. Their low speed prevented them from being used as squadron cruisers.

Here is what the magazine wrote about this in its article “On the Issue of Types of Military Courts” Marine collection1900:

Ironclads are the strong core of a squadron, and therefore everything in them should be directed primarily towards invulnerability and strong artillery for active operations; any diminution of these qualities for other purposes, i.e., either for very great speed or for an excessively large increase in the range of action, can result in death in battle.

6) The raiders, weak in combat, were intended to disrupt enemy trade, but this could not defeat a significantly superior fleet, which would eventually find and destroy them.

"Cruiser warfare cannot be carried on alone...Unless supported, a cruiser may...steer a short distance from home, and her blows, though painful, cannot be fatal" (Mahan, 1890).

“Cruiser operations, although based on bases – sea stations, but remaining without the assistance of a combat fleet, cannot be fruitful” (Rear Admiral F.V. Dubasov, 1896).

“…A single cruiser war or… actions against enemy trade,” wrote Captain 2nd Rank I. Zborovsky in the “Naval Collection” in 1898, “cannot count on the necessary success unless a squadron war is waged alongside them by entire fleets of battleships…”

“…In a war with a nation that has a large trade network,” Admiral Makarov believed, “it would be possible to send several…cruisers out to sea, consider them lost, and be content with the fact that before they fall into enemy hands, they will have time to divert part of his forces from the main objective of the operation.”

To stop Russian raiders, England only needed to blockade the Danish Straits and Vladivostok. Furthermore, Russia signed the Paris Declaration of 1856, which made it difficult to wage a cruiser war. Such actions undermined relations with countries trading with the enemy, even to the point of potentially leading to their entry into the war.

Pacific Fleet composition options

By 1895 the fleet had several battleships, a semi-battleship Admiral NakhimovAll the other cruisers were raiders, and there were no high-speed reconnaissance cruisers. At the same time, with the growth of the Japanese fleet, the question of the composition of the Pacific Squadron arose.

There was no unified vision for the navy's structure, lacking a naval general staff to develop one. Three admirals did not envisage the use of armored cruisers, but Admiral Alekseyev changed his mind by 1897 (bottom line).

Admiral Makarov was a proponent of unarmored cruisers—an idea conceived by the naval architect Armstrong. Of the five captains of the first rank, four favored armored cruisers, and two of them proposed replacing all battleships with them.

The 1897 versions of Chukhnin, Felkersam, and Alekseyev included all types of ships, with the last being the most balanced in terms of the ratio of light cruisers to other classes. (This version was influenced by French theory: 8 battleships, 8 armored cruisers, 8 large armored cruisers, 8 small cruisers. The 1500-ton cruisers were analogous to Japanese avisos.)

In 1895, VK Alexander Mikhailovich submitted a memo, "On the Desired Composition of the Fleet." In it, all first-rank cruisers were armored. Each fleet was assigned a structure appropriate to its theater of operations. For the Pacific Ocean, this structure was strong, but very expensive, and was designed for the long term: it was impossible to quickly build 20 armored cruisers, and for a fleet to be effective, its armored cruisers had to include not only raiders but also armored scouts.

However, at the "special meetings" of December 1897, only E. I. Alekseyev and P. P. Tyrtov spoke in favor of building armored cruisers of 8,000–10,000 tons. Admirals V. P. Verkhovsky, N. M. Kaznakov, I. M. Dikov, S. P. Tyrtov, S. O. Makarov, and F. K. Avelan (it's a shame that captains of the first rank weren't invited) were in favor of building long-range armored reconnaissance ships of 6000 tons.

For the Pacific Ocean, the following structure was chosen: 10 battleships, 4 armored cruisers, 10 armored deck cruisers of 6000 tons each, 10 small cruisers of 3000 tons each.

Shipbuilding programs

1. The state of the Japanese fleet

Japan is building 6 battleships (it also had an old battleship Chin-yen), as well as six powerful armored cruisers, whose strength, calculated at 0,65 times that of an armored cruiser, amounted to the equivalent of 10 armored cruisers. (Apparently, this is the source of the 10 armored cruisers planned for the theater by the Russian fleet.)

Chin-yen by 1904 it was completely outdated. His and an even older one Fuso can be considered as coastal defense battleships.

Japan is building eight light cruisers. It will have a total of 17 of them. They are heavily armed, having fought against battleships at the Yalu, but are unseaworthy, which reduces their speed and accuracy in rough seas. Their guns are closely mounted, making them more vulnerable in combat. The 203mm guns have a poor gun platform on these small ships, and on 3 Matsushima In addition, they are outdated and have too low a rate of fire, and are useless against fast ships.

2. Russian shipbuilding program

The final shipbuilding program of 1899 for 3 fleets included: 12 battleships, 1 coastal defense battleship, 14 1st rank cruisers, and 6 2nd rank cruisers.

Of these, the following were not built: 1 battleship, a coastal defense battleship (both for the Baltic), 2 1st rank cruisers and one 2nd rank cruiser.

Of the 1st rank cruisers, 2 were built as armored cruisers (Thunderbolt и Accordion).

Without taking into account the isolated Black Sea Fleet, there were 22 cruisers for every 17 battleships, 5 of which had a speed lower than that of the new battleships (Memory of Azov, Dm. Donskoy, Vl. Monomakh, Adm. Nakhimov, Adm. Kornilov), and therefore of limited use. Without them, the ratio of cruisers to battleships was 1:1.

But according to military theory, there should have been 2-3 cruisers per battleship (until the advent of large sea-going destroyers of 1200-1500 tons, which took over some of the tasks of light cruisers).

Therefore, a proposal from China to purchase five cruisers with a total displacement of 17,800 tons was considered. It was rejected due to the need for lengthy repairs in the Baltic and the replacement of British artillery, which would not have made it in time for the expected start of hostilities.

Composition of the Russian Pacific Squadron

According to Admiral Makarov, Japan's superiority in oceanic repair facilities required compensation in a more powerful Russian fleet. But with a reduced shipbuilding program, this could only be achieved by leaving the Baltic unprotected.

According to N. L. Klado's report on the strategic game "War with Japan in 1905", by the beginning of the war in the Pacific Ocean there should have been:

• 10 new battleships, including 3 types Relight, 2 of which, due to weakened main caliber guns, were no stronger in combat value than the Japanese armored cruisers,
  
• 5 armored cruisers (raiders) Thunderbolt, Russia, Rurik, scout Accordionold Dm. Donskoy as a training ship),
  
• 7 armored deck cruisers of 6000 tons (3 types Diana, Varyag, Bogatyr, Askold, Oleg),
  
• 5 cruisers of 3000 tons (Novik, Boyarin, Pearl, Emerald, Diamond).
  

V. P. Kostenko in his report “Borodino-type battleships in the Battle of Tsushima” says that the distribution of forces was expected to be as follows: 7 Russian battleships against 6 Japanese battleships; 3 Overexposure and 3 armored raiders (Rurik, Russia, Thunderbolt) against 6 Japanese armored cruisers.

But Peresvets and the raiders lost in their diversity, in the rationality of their armor, in speed (the weakest and slowest among them was Rurik with 18 knots). Two Peresvetov The main caliber guns were weakened. Therefore, 6 Russian ships would be weaker than 6 Japanese ones. To them could be added Accordion, improving the balance of power.

3 raiders and Bayana The broadside only had two large 203mm guns. Sufficient for raiding, but Bayana - for reconnaissance, they were difficult to aim in a linear battle, so even with Bayan 7 Russian ships of 3 types would not have been stronger than 6 similar Japanese ones.

The Japanese fleet had its advantages:

• his battleships and armored cruisers were uniform in purpose, armament, speed and armor;
  
• his armored cruisers could participate in both line battles and cruiser operations, so they had to be taken into account in both;
  
• its repair capacity allowed for damage to be repaired many times faster;
  
• it had a larger number of bases (M.A. Petrov gives a list of 15), and their location was more convenient;
  
• He had a superiority in the number of 17 cruisers and in coastal defense vessels: 2 old battleships, 10 obsolete ships and 11 gunboats, against 7 Russian gunboats and 3 clippers.
  

The Russian fleet composition described above would have had one more battleship and four individually stronger and faster cruisers, which would have partially compensated for the smaller number of cruisers (12, including the yacht Diamond — against 17), and it was presented to the Tsar as superior to the Japanese, but taking into account the qualitative advantages of the Japanese fleet, which cannot be formalized in numbers, the superiority, if there was any, was small, and later purchased by Japan Nissin и Cassuga (the Garibaldians) would tip the balance of power in favor of the Japanese.

The Russian command correctly estimated the Japanese fleet's readiness, but Finance Minister Witte prevailed, claiming that his personal sources indicated the Japanese would not be ready before 1905. (So, it turns out the Finance Minister can have a personal intelligence service? — Whatever the case, it was either mistaken or misinformed.)

This delayed the Russian program. The Japanese intended to call off the attack if the Russians had 10 battleships in the theater by the time it began. But by 1904, there were 18 Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean, including seven battleships (of which only two were of the newest types, compared to four Japanese ones).

As can be seen, when the Vladivostok cruiser detachment was separated, there were only 7 cruisers for every 7 battleships, including Accordion, which was completely insufficient for full-scale combat operations (moreover, 2 of them died in the first days of the war).

Japan's purchase of two Garibaldians—replacements for battleships for poor countries—made its fleet stronger than the actual Russian Pacific squadron of early 1904 by a ratio of about 4:3, and this ratio was considered a condition for victory.

Another four Russian ships, including a battleship, were heading to the Pacific Ocean, but were returned after the Japanese attack.

Regarding the possibility of Russia purchasing the Garibaldians, Rozhdestvensky wrote that the condition for selling the Garibaldians was the consent of the previous owner, who was financially dependent on England, which did not want to sell them to Russia.

This was true: according to the terms of the treaty between Argentina and Chile, they were each to renounce two ships at a time, and four ships had to be purchased simultaneously to ensure that neither of the former adversaries gained superiority. The King of England became the guarantor of the sale, so a Russian purchase of the ships was ruled out. Russia's official refusal of the manufacturer's offer was a way to save time and effort, given the impossibility of a purchase.

But Russia still tried to purchase two battleships of the type Swiftsure, which, in her opinion, should have occurred late in their construction, so that England would not have time to counteract it. England itself purchased these ships to prevent them from falling into Russian hands and to help Japan acquire two Garibaldians, as Japan lacked the funds to purchase all four vessels.

The Chilean ironclads were conceptually unsuitable for the British navy and were clearly of no use to it. But they were purchased for political reasons.

Moreover, Russia could not buy up all the questionable ships to prevent their purchase by Japan, and a fleet composed in this way would only be formidable on paper.

In addition, 3 battleships left the Pacific Ocean for the Baltic at different times for repairs and modernization:Sisoes the Great, Navarin, Nicholas I), 4 armored cruisers (Memory of Azov, Admiral Nakhimov, Dmitry Donskoy, Vladyka Monomakh), and 1 armored deck (Adm. Kornilov).

The tasks of the fleet in the Pacific Ocean and the conditions of its basing

The fleet's objective was not formulated, but most admirals considered it to be countering the landing operation, thereby giving the initiative to the enemy.

It was believed that preventing a Japanese landing in the east and south of Korea was impossible, but on its western coast, even weaker Russian forces based in Port Arthur made such a landing impossible. Therefore, the navy could only partially accomplish this task.

Theater of operations of the Russo-Japanese War

This explains "a calm attitude toward the question of maintaining superiority in forces over the enemy. This was expressed in particular in the decision to send Chukhnin's detachment to the Baltic at the end of 1901—after which the question of Japanese superiority was… finally resolved. If the goal had been naval supremacy, then no sacrifice of the advantage we had initially, in 1895, would have seemed acceptable… in the spring of 1895, the question of superiority in forces was raised—our admirals wanted to field 150,000 tons against the Japanese 126,000 tons. However, the lack of a focus on fighting for naval supremacy made superiority in forces…"not necessary".

The location of the two bases was divided by the naval forces, and naval theorist M.A. Petrov wrote: “Port Arthur had…an outlet to the sea, accessible to ships only at high tide…This alone made it unsuitable as a base during the war.".

Plan of Port Arthur

The raiders based in Vladivostok could not cause serious harm to Japan, since all the sea routes important to it passed to the south and east.

Naval historian Corbett wrote that if the Russian fleet had chosen Vladivostok as its base, its unfavorable location meant it would have had to immediately seek battle, which would have required it to be stronger than the Japanese fleet. Otherwise, a Japanese army landing on the mainland, receiving reinforcements by sea, would have vastly outnumbered the Russian army, which was being transported along a single railway line. The Japanese army would then have cut the Chinese Eastern Railway and besieged the Russian naval base.

In reality, given the lack of forces, Admiral Vitgeft's naval war plan declared the main principle to be conserving the fleet's strength for as long as possible, leading to passivity and indecisiveness. (It was precisely the lack of forces that prompted his words, "We don't need to venture into the South Korean skerries.") But there's a saying: "When a fortress defends itself, it will surely fall."

Admiral Alekseev "Effectively tasked the fleet with delaying the deployment of the Japanese army...until the concentration of our troops was complete...this task was accomplished. The answer to the question of why our fleet didn't defeat the Japanese...should begin with 'no one wanted it or asked for it.'".

As can be seen, the defeat of the Russian fleet was caused by an underestimation of the enemy and a number of mistakes made.

What the Russian fleet lacked in the Pacific Ocean in 1904

There were two conditions for building a fleet: 1) its suitability for a specific theater and 2) its ability to resist (or defeat) a specific enemy – the Japanese fleet.

• The theater's conditions dictated an increase in the fleet's cruiser component to a ratio of no less than 2,5 cruisers per battleship, and preferably 3. This included armored cruisers whose combined strength was comparable to that of the Japanese. Otherwise, the initiative at sea would shift to the enemy.
  
• The Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean had to be on par with the Japanese fleet. Given Japan's more advanced repair capabilities, it had to be stronger, especially since Japan could purchase additional ships beyond its program.
  
• It was necessary to develop the naval infrastructure on the ocean, because the situation in which English ships were delivering coal to the Russian fleet during the war was intolerable.
  
• Due to the theater's weak infrastructure, the navy was limited in the number of vessels. Its maximum possible size was likely no more than the original design: 10 battleships, 4 armored cruisers, and 20 armored deck ships.
  
• If repair capacity was insufficient, designs with increased reliability were to be selected. All other things being equal, designs requiring extended construction times were not to be selected. Designs requiring complex and labor-intensive repairs were not to be accepted—a reference to the popular battleships.
  
• The fleet's mission in the Pacific Ocean should have been defined by the words of the naval agent in Tokyo, Lieutenant I. I. Chagin, in September 1897: “Only by defeating or… destroying Japan’s main naval forces… will our fleet be able to engage exclusively in secondary operations, consisting of capturing transports with troops and supplies that risked going to Korea without a sufficient convoy.”.
  
• The changes were to begin no later than 1895.
  

Based on these conditions, several options for the composition of the Pacific Fleet were possible, depending on what Russia wanted to achieve on the ocean, in other words, on the desired path to victory: whether in a decisive general battle or by prolonging the war and attrition, and the associated risks, as well as the resources it was prepared to spend.

Used materials

• Kolchak, "What Kind of Fleet Does Russia Need?"
  
• Japanese Navy weapons programs
  
• Note by S. O. Makarov on the shipbuilding program for 1903–1923.
  
• Gribovsky, "The Formation of the Russian Pacific Fleet"
  
• V. Ya. Krestyaninov "Cruisers of the Russian Imperial Fleet"
  
• Battleships of the Wittelsbach, Braunschweig, and Deutschland classes. 1899–1945 (Collection of articles and documents). Collective authors. Shipbuilding program under the law of 1898.
  
• Fedechkin A.D. "Cruisers without the support of a significant squadron will not have a decisive influence on the course of the war"
  
• Articles naval_manual-livejournal:
  
  • "Questions of Methodology. Petrov on the Necessity of Advantage"
    
  • "Russo-Japanese War: Intuitive Defeat and Theoretical Victory"
    
  • "We need more cruisers"
    
  • "The Third Element: Aviso, Fuso, and Other Ships of the Japanese Victory"
    
  • "Russo-Japanese War: Local Difficulties"
    
  • "Ram them all!" Pekingham agreed with Melnikov on this.
    
  • "Smart Bastards. The Young Ecole as Philosophy. Parts 1, 2"
    
  • The Tactical Importance of Speed
    
  
  

Comments

[snow mountain]

A good and thoughtful article. Especially this:

A ship that was successful for one fleet might be unsuccessful for another.

Thanks to the author and a big plus!

[bk0010]

Quote: Schneeberg

A good and thoughtful article. Especially this:

A ship that was successful for one fleet might be unsuccessful for another.

Thanks to the author and a big plus!

Or it might not have been: Des Moines, for example. Or Baltimore. Yes, I know they're from a completely different era, but both ships clearly demonstrate that with sufficiently high performance characteristics, a ship can be useful to any fleet. But when it comes to "either-or," you have to choose a ship where the disadvantages won't be so critical.

“It is better to send 4 cruisers of 3000 tons into the ocean than 1 of 12000 tons” (Admiral Makarov).

I also disagree: for an ocean-going cruiser, 3000 tons is very small, both in terms of seaworthiness and as an artillery platform (see how Narvik got clobbered by a cruiser of the same caliber), even all other things being equal. Yes, a single 12000-ton ship can't be in four places, but if a 3000-ton ship gets clobbered and doesn't accomplish its mission, it won't be much use either.

[Adrey]

Quote: bk0010

I also disagree: for an ocean cruiser, 3000 tons is very little both in terms of seaworthiness and as an artillery platform.

It's all a matter of calculation. Drowning unarmed trumpets at point-blank range doesn't require a stable platform.
But this does not cancel the postulate that cruiser warfare is a temporary phenomenon until the dominant fleet catches and drowns the raiders (anti-raiders catch - the function is fulfilled, raiders flee - their function is not fulfilled), which still leads to a general battle for dominance in the theater of military operations.

[bk0010]

Quote: Adrey

Drowning unarmed tramps at point-blank range doesn't require a stable platform.

For this purpose, there were Dobroflot cruisers.

[Ragnar]

Quote: bk0010

unarmed Trumps at point-blank range

Don't tell Donald...

[Adrey]

Quote: bk0010

I also disagree: for an ocean cruiser, 3000 tons is very little both in terms of seaworthiness and as an artillery platform (see how Narviks got clobbered by a cruiser with the same caliber), even all other things being equal.

Well, as practice has shown, the most successful raiders were not specially built ships, but ordinary tramps (if we do not take into account the “exotics”, in the form of a very successful sailing barque, by the way) after refitting. Possessing excellent seaworthiness, enviable range, autonomy, and camouflage capabilities.

[bk0010]

Quote: Adrey

Well, as practice has shown, the most successful raiders were not specially built ships

It seemed to me that they were talking about a spy...

Quote: Adrey

Possessing excellent seaworthiness, enviable range, autonomy and the ability to camouflage.

Sarcasm is inappropriate here: that's exactly how it was. One Dobroflot ship had the displacement of a battleship and incredible seaworthiness and range. I just can't remember the name...

[Adrey]

Quote: bk0010

Sarcasm is inappropriate here:

There's no sarcasm there. I just strayed a bit from the timeline and described the situation during WWI and WWII. And I know about the dual-purpose Dobroflot steamships.

One Dobroflot ship had the displacement of an armored cruiser and exceptional seaworthiness and cruising range.

There was more than one like that. VI 10,000t, speed 19 knots.

[Zodiac]

Quote: bk0010

One Dobroflot ship had the displacement of an armored cruiser and exceptional seaworthiness and cruising range.

"Rion" and "Angara" are 12-ton submarines. With additional bunkers, the range is up to 17000 miles.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: bk0010

For an ocean cruiser, 3000 tons is very little in terms of seaworthiness

"Emden" had enough

Quote: bk0010

Yes, one ship of 12000 tons cannot be in 4 places, but if a 3000-ton ship gets hit and does not complete its task, then there will be little sense either.

So the hypothetical "Rurikovich" will also be caught sooner or later

[Jura 27]

The conditions of the theater dictated an increase in the cruiser component of the fleet in a ratio of no less than 2,5 cruisers per battleship, and preferably 3.

The main mistake (or rather the lack of an elementary analysis of the time-money factor) was precisely the ordering of useless cruisers like the Bayan and six-thousanders, instead of the EBR (another Retvizan and Tsarevich).
And without an advantage in battleships, all the Russian cruisers of those years (even 15 pieces) do not have a decisive significance.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Jura 27

The main mistake... ordering useless cruisers like the Bayan and six-thousanders, instead of an EBR (another Retvizan and Tsarevich)

Bayan and six-thousanders instead of universal (squadron) armored cruisers capable of forming a high-speed wing of the main forces of the 1st Pacific Fleet.

And without an advantage in battleships, all the Russian cruisers of those years (even 15 pieces) do not have a decisive significance.

You only call squadron battleships "battleships," right?

At Tsushima, Togo had no advantage in squadron battleships with 12" main guns.

However, despite the numerical parity in the armored ships participating in the battle, there was an overall advantage in the course of his two armored combat units.

As a result, the formation of 11 battleships and one armored cruiser under Rozhdestvensky was completely overwhelmed in a multi-hour battle by the enemy, who had an advantage in squadron movement and in choosing the combat distance.

This was the overall result of "utilizing the precious advantage of a turn in battle." Although, of course, this advantage wasn't Togo's only one in the Battle of Tsushima, and it wasn't the only one that led to the well-known outcome. But the RIF only realized this after Tsushima.

[Jura 27]

Bayan and six-thousanders instead of universal (squadron) armored cruisers capable of forming a high-speed wing of the main forces of the 1st Pacific Fleet.

Ordering Garibaldians in 1898 was almost impossible, but ordering two more EBRs abroad was more likely.

You only call squadron battleships "battleships," right?

In this case, in relation to the Japanese, this concept included ersatz-Ebrs - "battleships for the poor" with an openly cruising eight-inch main gun.

As a result, a formation of 11 battleships and one armored cruiser Rozhdestvensky

Even if you give ZPR twelve mikas, he will still lose the battle.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Jura 27

Ordering Garibaldians in 1898 was almost impossible, but ordering two more EBRs abroad was more likely.

Just as the French designed a "French-style Asama"—the cruiser "Azuma"—the French could have designed a "French-style Garibaldian" instead of the real "Bayan." As is well known, the French proposed building two armored cruisers, but our proposal was rejected. Now someone was ready to design and build two "Garibaldians"—the "Forche et Chantier." Furthermore, in 1898, Kramp proposed building two battleships and four cruisers (6000 and 2500 tons) for the Russian Navy. As a result, our side ordered the single-class "Retvizan" and "Varyag." Or they could have ordered two first-class squadron battleships and two more "Garibaldi" cruisers. Someone in the Russian Empire, instead of even small series of two, really wanted their own "model fleet" "for the needs of the Far East." Germaniawerft – another "Garibaldiets" instead of "Askold." AG Vulcan – another "Garibaldiets" instead of "Bogatyr."

Well, it turns out that even without any Italians, just in foreign shipyards in France, the USA and Germany, it would have been possible to build six 20-knot "Garibaldians" with a full armor belt and a broadside of two 10" and 6-7 6" guns before the Russian Navy, acquiring that very high-speed wing of the main forces of the 1st Pacific Fleet, which in fact did not exist.

You do NOT think that 20-knot cruiser cruisers with a full belt along the waterline, a normal displacement of 7300-7700 tons, two 10" guns in turrets and 10 6" guns in an armored battery could only be designed and built by the Italian shipbuilding school and Italian shipyards?

In this case, in relation to the Japanese, this concept included ersatz-ebras - "battleships for the poor"

They desired such a balanced fleet based on the experience of the Sino-Japanese War, and they did not abandon the idea of ​​the "Eight-Eight" even after the Russian Nuclear War, when the "fast wing" became far from budget-friendly.

Squadron armored cruisers with a full waterline armor belt and turreted main guns were the result of two innovations of the late 1880s and early 1890s: rapid-fire antitank guns with high-explosive shells containing picric acid and cemented steel-nickel armor. This was accompanied by the absence of a third innovation: "good armor-piercing shells" capable of penetrating this cemented armor from medium ranges, using explosive charges of phlegmatized high explosives with delayed-action fuses, detonator caps, and intermediate detonators of high explosives.

Such "good armor-piercing shells" (c) appeared in the arsenal of the world's navies after the Russian Nuclear War, closing the era of squadron armored cruisers with their appearance.

Instead of squadron armored cruisers, the first battlecruisers appeared, with a level of armor protection equal to the best BRCMs of the previous era, but with steam turbines and all-big guns.

Even if you give ZPR twelve mikas, he will still lose the battle.

"He was framed" (C)

He probably wouldn't have behaved so inappropriately during the 2nd TOE campaign if he hadn't constantly tried on the fate of Admiral Vitgeft.

In any case, the Mikado's fleet had already trained in modern warfare during the 1st TOE, and since the advantage in squadron maneuvering and the choice of combat distance was inevitable, the Japanese guns were aimed by seasoned, experienced gunners, and Rozhdestvensky's squadron never received either modern shells or a sufficient quantity for a large number of practice firings, defeat was inevitable, whether Nelson, Nimitz, or the gray-haired Yamamoto of 1941 had commanded the squadron instead of Rozhdestvensky.

The only question is whether it was simply a defeat, or a catastrophic defeat - what happened in historical reality.

[Jura 27]

It was simply possible to build six 20-knot "Garibaldi" ships at foreign shipyards in France, the USA and Germany before the Russian Nuclear Forces

They didn't fit the concept, but the EBRs did.

He probably wouldn't have behaved so inappropriately during the 2nd TOE campaign if he hadn't constantly tried on the fate of Admiral Vitgeft.

He's just not a naval commander, but a good deputy for logistics.

and the idea of ​​the "Eight-Eight" was not abandoned even after the Russian Nuclear Forces, when the "high-speed wing" became far from budget-friendly.

It wasn't a budget option in the RYAV either; an Asamoid cost the same per ton as a Mikasa.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Jura 27

They didn't fit the concept.

Due to the lack of an original or borrowed concept for a fast wing of an armored squadron in contemporary Russian theoretical thought, by 1897 Russian theoretical thought was already lagging not only behind Italian and Japanese theoretical thought, but also behind, as they like to say of the British, "conservative" British thought.

He's just not a naval commander, but a good deputy for logistics.

How does a good deputy for logistics differ from a naval commander? Does a deputy for logistics NOT experience the thrill of battle and the bleak abyss at the edge? Does the fear of anticipation of battle paralyze the higher faculties of a good deputy for logistics?

It wasn't a budget option in the RYAV either; an Asamoid cost the same per ton as a Mikasa.

Well, that's per ton. And since there were fewer tons, the cost per unit was lower.

This wasn't the case with the subsequent "Eight-Eight" program. The design full displacement of the Amagi-class battlecruisers and Nagato-class battleships was virtually identical, while the design full displacement of the Tosa-class battleships was even several thousand tons smaller.

[Jura 27]

In what way, by 1897, Russian theoretical thought was already lagging behind not only Italian and Japanese theoretical thought, but also, as they like to note about the British, “conservative” British thought.

This is not a problem if there are enough EBR keels.

How does a good deputy for logistics differ from a naval commander? Does a deputy for logistics NOT experience the thrill of battle and the bleak abyss at the edge? Does the fear of anticipation of battle paralyze the higher faculties of a good deputy for logistics?

This "commander of logistics" lacked proper thinking about how to structure a battle with the available forces. Logistics is a different area of ​​activity.

Well, that's per ton. And since there were fewer tons, the cost per unit was lower.

And the fighting force is less.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Jura 27

This is not a problem if there are enough EBR keels.

Believing that a lag in squadron speed was “not scary,” Russian theoretical thought prepared for defeats in both the Yellow Sea and Tsushima.

The only defeat in a squadron battle that was honorable was the battle in the Korean Strait. And it was there that, for most of the battle, the fleet was effectively evenly matched (if you don't count the unfortunate cruiser Rurik, which was lost in that battle).

This "deputy logistics officer" lacked the correct ideas about how to structure a battle with the available forces.

What "fresh" thoughts might Rozhestvensky have had regarding the details of the squadron battles in the Yellow Sea and the Korea Strait that he knew? Please state your position on this matter.

And the fighting force is less.

Everything is relative. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Spanish-American War of 1898 actually demonstrated that the main combat force lies in rapid-fire medium-caliber artillery. Large-caliber main guns fire too slowly, and as a result, hit too few targets.

As a result of this demonstration, in terms of the broadside salvo of 6" guns, the Asamoids were 40% superior to the Fuji-class battleships ordered before the Sino-Japanese War - 7 versus 5.

During the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese expended ~172 tons of 12" shells, ~11,3 tons of 10" shells, ~158,2 tons of 8" shells, ~286,3 tons of 6" shells, and ~57,6 tons of 120 mm shells.

The 6" accounted for ~42% of the total mass of metal produced.

[Jura 27]

What "fresh" thoughts might Rozhestvensky have had regarding the details of the squadron battles in the Yellow Sea and the Korea Strait that he knew? Please state your position on this matter.

There are many points - I'll take the same speed: why drag slow-moving transports into battle if you yourself admit that your forces are much weaker than the enemy?
Battle location - why fight a battle near enemy bases and far from friendly and neutral ports, where heavily damaged ships can quickly take refuge?

[Alexandra]

Quote: Jura 27

There are many points - I'll take the same speed: why drag slow-moving vehicles into battle?

When did Russian theoretical thought realize that lagging behind an enemy squadron in squadron speed is a sure prerequisite for defeat?

"If we form a separate detachment from non-armored ships, then we will be able to benefit from their great speed, but along with this there will be a complication in managing the overall forces.Let's assume that the squadron commander himself leads the battleship squadron, and the admiral next in command leads the cruisers. We must either grant the junior admiral complete freedom of action, or, while allowing him discretion in detail, specify the main objective, or else completely direct the actions of the cruiser detachment by signals. We believe that smoke and other factors will greatly complicate signaling in battle, and it may happen that the squadron commander will be unable to transmit his orders to the detachment commander in a timely manner. Therefore, in the event that the cruisers form a separate detachment, its commander must be given complete freedom. He must, by monitoring the actions of the squadron commander, guess his intentions and arrange the actions of his detachment so that it strives for the same objective without interfering with the actions of the armored ships.
However skilled the squadron commander may be, there is still a fear that he will hinder the squadron's actions {302} and that the squadron commander will in some cases refuse to make moves that, in his opinion, could lead to a collision with the squadron. There is nothing more difficult than maneuvering even one ship in a place where another ship is also free to maneuver. Anyone who doubts this should place two floating shields close to each other and allow the two ships to maneuver freely around these two shields. The commanders of both maneuvering vessels will be in great difficulty; both will lose sight of the main objective and will be concerned only with one thing: avoiding a collision. To avoid such inconveniences, wouldn't it be better to place all non-armored ships at the end of a general wake column, so that they wouldn't interfere with movement at all? And when it becomes necessary to detach them to pursue fleeing enemy ships or for other purposes, this order could be made by signal. We personally tend to think it would be more convenient to have non-armored ships in a general wake column before the start of battle."S.O. Makarov, "Reasonings on Naval Tactics." St. Petersburg, 1904.

You yourself admit that your forces are much weaker than the enemy's

"It is now generally accepted that armored vessels are necessary for artillery combat, and the question I posed has already found its answer everywhere. True, warships are divided into armored ships and cruisers, but it is generally accepted that only armored ships are suitable for artillery combat. Cruisers are assigned to reconnaissance missions, and as a result, they are given greater speed than armored ships, but it is recognized that they are essentially unsuitable for artillery combat with an armored ship." S.O. Makarov "Discourses on Naval Tactics. - St. Petersburg. 1904.

Rozhestvensky had 11 battleships in the line of battle. Togo had only 4 battleships in the line of battle. If Russian theoretical thought held that armored cruisers were "essentially unsuitable for artillery combat with battleships," why should Rozhestvensky be confident that his forces in an artillery battle were so much weaker than the enemy's?

Battle location - why fight a battle near enemy bases and far from friendly and neutral ports, where heavily damaged ships can quickly take refuge?

Was there any other place for the battle?

"The task entrusted to you is not to break through to Vladivostok with some ships, but to take possession of the Sea of ​​Japan..." Nicholas II

Which strait should be used to break into the Sea of ​​Japan for easier capture? The Tsushima Strait? It's about 800 km to Vladivostok, and the distance from the Tsushima Strait to Vladivostok is about 1000 km. If the battle had taken place 200 km closer to Vladivostok, would that have saved Rozhdestvensky's squadron?

[Jura 27]

When did Russian theoretical thought realize that lagging behind an enemy squadron in squadron speed is a sure prerequisite for defeat?

In order to understand that the enemy is overtaking and blocking the path to Vladivostok from the nose - does it require a lot of time or intelligence?

Rozhestvensky had 11 battleships in the line of battle. Togo had only 4 battleships in the line of battle.

I'm too lazy to look for the statements of ZPR himself, that he considered his squadron much weaker than the enemy, and his resources unsuitable for conquering the sea.

Through which strait should one break into the Sea of ​​Japan to make it easier to take possession of it, through the Tsugaru Strait?

As one of the options, since there will not be numerous "small" destroyers there.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Jura 27

In order to understand that the enemy is overtaking and blocking the path to Vladivostok from the nose - does it require a lot of time or intelligence?

Hindsight is what it is. When a truth becomes widely accepted, the question always arises: how could venerable domestic professionals have failed to grasp it in time?

I illustrated "Reasonings on Naval Tactics" St. Petersburg, 1904 by S.O. Makarova

Our brightest mind of naval theory and practice, who, however, until the very end advocated that armored deck "unarmored ships" with a displacement of 3000 tons ("wonderful" artillery platforms!) with 8", 6" deck guns, even without shields, could give first-class squadron battleships a run for their money, instead of "taking advantage of their great speed" in a squadron battle, for example, attacking the enemy's flagship battleship with a detachment of such cruisers... proposed keeping these ships "at the end of the general wake column", "before the start of the battle, have unarmored ships in the general wake column."

Why? So that a detachment of fast cruisers operating independently would "get out of the way" of a column of battleships.

The level of learning from the experiences of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Spanish-American War of 1898 is approximately zero.

I'm too lazy to look for the statements of ZPR himself, that he considered his squadron much weaker than the enemy, and his resources unsuitable for conquering the sea.

"I was beginning to suspect something" (C) But I'm most likely afraid of something personal, something personal, that the conning tower of the flagship "Prince Suvorov" will not save him.

Therefore, fixated on self-pity, he never gave orders that would have allowed him to somehow increase his chances, for example, to ensure a 13-knot squadron speed (as in the Yellow Sea), to unload the battleships from all the junk that had accumulated on them during the "unprecedented" multi-month campaign, etc.

As one of the options, since there will not be numerous "small" destroyers there.

There were certainly options. But they were all options for defeat. Rozhestvensky chose the most direct and swift option. Typical behavior: "Eher Ende mit Schrecken als Schrecken ohne Ende" / "Better a terrible end than endless horror."

[Arhat109]

If we form a separate detachment from non-armored ships,

Now that's just AWESOME. Yeah, Makarov's just as much of a wedding admiral as Tyrtov and the whole gang. What do you mean, "grant independence"? No, no, don't, serfdom hasn't been abolished in our navy yet!
))) Horrible..

[Ragnar]

Quote: AlexanderA

What "fresh" thoughts might Rozhestvensky have had regarding the details of the squadron battles in the Yellow Sea and the Korea Strait that he knew? Please state your position on this matter.

Easy... From his experience in the Yellow Sea, Rozhdestvensky knew that almost all the boats on the battleships were damaged or even destroyed... So what? On the ships of the 2nd Pacific Fleet, before the battle, not only were they not transferred to the transports (which, by the way, would have reduced the overload), but they were also lashed "tightly"... and even filled with water... Is this an example of "creative thought"???

[Alexandra]

The main complaint of historians and the investigative commission against Rozhestvensky and his staff was their inaction. As far as I know, Rozhestvensky did not give the order to secure the lifeboats and flood them.

And pre-war domestic creative thought looked like this:

https://studopediaru.com/11_131364_prigotovlenie-k-boyu.html

"156. How to proceed with steam and rowboats before battle. The question deserves attention: should the boats be left raised during the battle or lowered, as is sometimes done? The Chinese fleet at the battle of Yalu was without boats, which were left in Port Arthur before leaving for sea. Due to the fact that the Chinese fleet was defeated, one cannot conclude that the boats should be left on the davits before the battle. During the American Civil War, ships often fought without boats, or rather with a very small number of them. The presence of boats on davits increases the {266} impact surface; consequently, some shells that could fly by unhindered will hit the boat, explode and hit people on the upper deck with their fragments. To drop the boats into the water before the battle would mean depriving oneself of the opportunity to use them in the event of sinking of his ship, but it must be borne in mind that in a prolonged artillery battle, most of the boats will probably be so damaged that it will be impossible to use them.

There are compelling reasons to take lifeboats and engage in battle as the ship normally sails, but there are also compelling reasons against them, especially since in the event of a sinking in battle, it's more reliable to rely on the sailors' cork mattresses than on lifeboats. Since these considerations balance each other, the commander will do the right thing whether he takes lifeboats or not. In many cases, launching lifeboats before battle will prove impossible due to the conditions of the sea.

There is more incentive to launch steam launches and torpedo boats than rowboats, and if circumstances permit, they should be launched fully armed, with guns and mines. These boats should constantly maneuver at a distance from the combatants and use their weapons to inflict damage on the enemy; it is best to keep them in the wake of your ship, shortening the path on turns. The boat and torpedo boat crews should be aware that fire directed at them distracts the enemy from the main target, and therefore, in this alone, they are useful. But, in addition to their passive benefit, the boats can be of active use. Mines enable them to inflict a fatal blow even on large enemy ships, and when some ships begin to circle and maneuver relative to others, the steam launches will not be given much attention, and they will have the opportunity to make their contribution and, perhaps, even decide the matter.

[Ragnar]

Quote: AlexanderA

The 6" accounted for ~42% of the total mass of metal produced.

I'm happy for them... But they didn't pose any threat to a more or less armored ship...

[Alexandra]

"More or less armored ship"—what percentage of the surface area of ​​the ship should be armored? And what percentage of the ship's overall silhouette?

https://www.rulit.me/books/linejnyj-korabl-andrej-pervozvannyj-1906-1925-read-339059-13.html

"After the Port Arthur naval battles" it was necessary to make major changes to the design, replacing the 75 and 47 mm guns with twenty 120 mm ones, raising some of them one deck higher and providing them with armor protection.

This decision was motivated by the same combat experience (although there were also opinions regarding the futility of such protection, which was ineffective against heavy artillery fire). D.V. Skvortsov believed that the experience of the Battle of Tsushima demonstrated the inadequacy of the Russian ships' stability measures. A calculation check based on the materials of the Andrei Pervozvanny project showed that "with the destruction of the entire freeboard, unprotected by armor, the maximum stability of the ship is achieved only at a list of 15°, while with an intact side, this maximum occurs at 30°. The historian of shipbuilding and the navy M.M. Dementyev once said about the battleships - dreadnoughts of the Sevastopol class - that "this is a project of the frightened." What was at issue was the "smeared" armor of these ships, which did not provide, as was belatedly realized, protection from heavy gunfire. This "fear," inexpressibly acute in the year of the Tsushima catastrophe, apparently completely dominated all circles of shipbuilding and the navy. Everyone seemed to have forgotten the recent pioneering role of domestic shipbuilding in solving the unsinkability of ships and those the benefits it brings to ensure its survivability."

Tell me, what was it about the "Tsushima disaster" that so frightened Russian shipbuilders that, after Tsushima, they began to "smear" armor in a relatively thin layer over as large an area as possible, if such armor, "smeared" in a relatively thin layer, protected only from medium-caliber shells, not only from 305 mm "good armor-piercing shells," but also from 305 mm good high-explosive shells?

https://www.rulit.me/books/linejnyj-korabl-andrej-pervozvannyj-1906-1925-read-339059-14.html

"Later in November, it was deemed necessary to increase the side armor between the upper and battery (middle) decks from 75 mm to 127 mm. A qualitative assessment of the increase in the ship's survivability, of course, was not made, and the justification for this decision, as in most other cases, was not proven. Subsequently, based on well-known firing tests in the Black Sea against the former battleship Chesma, it was established that a new type of high-explosive 305 mm shell easily penetrates armor of both thicknesses. But for now, neither the factories nor the MTC had given any thought to the impact of the new shells. After armoring the ends between the upper and battery decks and installing armored beams forward of the 120 mm bow on the upper (middle) armor deck, the ship's displacement was already 17151 tons."

[Arhat109]

At Tsushima, Togo had no advantage in squadron battleships with 12" main guns.

There's no point in appealing to Tsushima or the Russian Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area (RYaV) in general. The ZPR clearly had a different goal there, not to "win" or even "break through."
If the ZPR had been properly focused on the task of "winning," it wouldn't have treated ship commanders like idiots and sailors like cattle. There would have been briefings, planning, and training—thankfully, the ZPR had even more time for these than Togo had after the Battle of the Yellow Sea.
Alternatively, with equal training and the active participation of commanders, the following would have happened in Tsushima:
a) combat security and reconnaissance from cruisers. And Togo's main forces could have been detected significantly earlier, which would have allowed them to gain a head start and reorganize into battle formation, rather than marching single file to the slaughter;
b) the allocation of transports, destroyers, and a pair of cruisers to a separate detachment, and perhaps even its dispatch separately, bypassing Japan. What might have happened in the La Perouse Strait with its mining is a separate issue;
c) The foresight of wise leadership and an understanding of the role of long-range combat, taking into account the start of the Battle of the Yellow Sea (surely they had to know about ZPR!) and training specifically in long-range shooting during the campaign (methods were known at the time) would have allowed them to open aimed fire first and at a greater distance. Mikasa would sink in the first 10 minutes, assuming half of the 2TOE main battery was fired, with a hit probability of 4-5% from 60-80kb, because it was aimed "at the deck."
Togo's reluctance to expose Mikasa's battered side (his famous turn and crowding) would have been fatal for the rest of the squadron - not a single one would have escaped.
That's if we "win." But... it looks very much like (you'll know them by their actions) that the goal was different - to "drown."

[Ragnar]

Quote: Jura 27

useless cruisers like Bayan and six-thousanders, instead of the EBR (another Retvizan and Tsarevich).

From what, just one "Retvizan"??? Four!!!

[Ragnar]

Quote: Ragnar

From what, just one "Retvizan"??? Four!!!

If you want, I can find you money for 7 or 8 Retvizans...

[Ragnar]

Quote: Ragnar

If you want, I can find you money for 7 or 8 Retvizans...

And the shipyards in the USA that will build them...

[Jura 27]

Quote: Ragnar

Quote: Jura 27

useless cruisers like Bayan and six-thousanders, instead of the EBR (another Retvizan and Tsarevich).

From what, just one "Retvizan"??? Four!!!

"The Naval Ministry does not have the necessary funds to build ships in excess of the program abroad."

[Ragnar]

Quote: Jura 27

"The Naval Ministry does not have the necessary funds to build ships in excess of the program abroad."

What if I find it???

[Jura 27]

Quote: Ragnar

Quote: Jura 27

"The Naval Ministry does not have the necessary funds to build ships in excess of the program abroad."

What if I find it???

I'm not against it. Witte was against it. I estimate the defeat in the Russian Navy at 25 million rubles in hard currency (the cost of two fast-moving cruisers), or the transfer of the same amount from the construction of useless cruisers to the construction of those same two fast-moving cruisers.

[Ragnar]

Quote: Jura 27

I'm not against it. Witte was against it.

Okay, let's dance... I won't even take all your "six-thousanders" from you. I'll take three "Goddesses," "Varyag," "Oleg," "Ochakov," "Kahul," and, well, "Oslyabya" for good measure... How much do you have? Around 60 million... Enough for four "Retvizans"? And I'm not even getting to the bottom of this...

[Jura 27]

I'm taking three "goddesses", ........ and "Oslyabya" for good measure...

This is all very early, we need to start from the beginning of 1898.

[Ragnar]

It's not too early, it's not too late... and not that late...

[Jura 27]

Quote: Ragnar

It's not too early, it's not too late... and not that late...

Considering that the Russian Revolutionary War was lost at the end of 1895, then....
On the other hand, the decision to order ships en masse from overseas was made at the beginning of 1898.

[Ragnar]

I meant that "sawing up" "Pallada and Co." in favor of "Retvizan" is "more correct" than sawing up "Andrew the First-Called."

[Jura 27]

Quote: Ragnar

I meant that "sawing up" "Pallada and Co." in favor of "Retvizan" is "more correct" than sawing up "Andrew the First-Called."

In the retvizans/tsesy it was necessary to saw up everything that came to hand.

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura 27,
The RIF had an advantage in battleships; even the 1st TOE had one. There was no shortage of battleships, though.
The bibliography includes articles from the "naval-manual" channel. Why didn't you check out the contents of these articles, such as "We Need More Cruisers" and the following one, before writing your opinion?
Is it really possible to approach every question with "everyday logic"? Then the Earth must be flat, because it seems so.
When it was believed that there should be two or three cruisers for every battleship, that conclusion was reached by people who had spent 20 years on warships. And you argue with that.
Okay, you're entitled to your opinion. But go out there and fight blindfolded, and you'll understand the true value of your mighty fists.

[Alexander Iloev]

By the way, Yura, you didn't read the theoretical part. If your reconnaissance is knocked out, you'll be fighting under unfavorable conditions and, as a result, you'll lose. Your forces will likely be scattered and broken into pieces. Or you'll be stuck at your base, which means it doesn't matter whether you have a fleet or not.
For whom am I posting these quotes and bibliography?

[Jura 27]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

By the way, Yura, you didn't read the theoretical part. If your reconnaissance is knocked out, you'll be fighting under unfavorable conditions and, as a result, you'll lose. Your forces will likely be scattered and broken into pieces. Or you'll be stuck at your base, which means it doesn't matter whether you have a fleet or not.
For whom am I posting these quotes and bibliography?

Your reconnaissance is useless if you have three EBMs and the enemy has six. The only benefit is avoiding combat and defeat—meaning the enemy, taking advantage of their superiority in line forces, will accomplish their mission, while you won't (except for hiding from the enemy).

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

By the way, Yura, you didn't read the theoretical part. If your reconnaissance is knocked out, you'll be fighting under unfavorable conditions and, as a result, you'll lose. Your forces will likely be scattered and broken into pieces. Or you'll be stuck at your base, which means it doesn't matter whether you have a fleet or not.
For whom am I posting these quotes and bibliography?

I agree with you. Your words actually reminded me of Nelson before Aboukir, when, having lost all his frigates (they had scattered to catch prizes), he simply had no idea where the French were and was forced to send his battleships on reconnaissance missions.
Of course, you could say, "But he ultimately won." Absolutely. But he failed to accomplish the task of intercepting the French army and stopping it.
So yes, without intelligence you are blind and deaf.

[Alexander Iloev]

Trapper, this isn't my opinion, but Kolchak's, and by 1908 he was already considered a recognized military theorist. Otherwise, they'll write about "my wild theories" again.

[Jura 27]

The RIF had an advantage in battleships; even the 1st TOE had one. There was no shortage of battleships, though.

It is not a matter of the number of battleships, but of the number of ships of the line, in which the RIF was inferior to the YIF.
In the 1st class EBR, by the way, the 1TOE was also inferior to the Japanese - 5 against 6.

When it was considered that there should be 2-3 cruisers for every 1 battleship,

Under those circumstances, this was foolishness, for which the Russian Navy had to pay with defeat. It turns out that history teaches nothing, even to modern authors who approach the situation from a formalistic standpoint—"that there should have been two or three cruisers for every one battleship."
Even the Japanese didn't have such a ratio with the ships of the line - and they won the war almost single-handedly.

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura, I beg you not to make up anything of your own: the article contains a list of references, from Kolchak's article to the "naval-manual" channel; I think I'll also add reductor111, which cites historical sources.
As far as I understand, you have no connection to the navy. Especially not to the navy of that time. It's very presumptuous of you to express your opinion without first consulting the sources.
And in Tsushima the number of ships in the line was 12 by 12 - the main condition according to your logic.

[Jura 27]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Yura, I beg you not to make up anything of your own: the article contains a list of references, from Kolchak's article to the "naval-manual" channel; I think I'll also add reductor111, which cites historical sources.
As far as I understand, you have no connection to the navy. Especially not to the navy of that time. It's very presumptuous of you to express your opinion without first consulting the sources.
And in Tsushima the number of ships in the line was 12 to 12.

You have a pedantic and scholastic way of thinking - if something is written in some article, then it must be so - as a result, the RYaV will lose.
Unfortunately, you don't understand the fleet of that time, not at all - at Tsushima, the Russians didn't have 12 ships in a line, that is, you are confusing ships of the line with various ships lined up in a single column.

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura, I think we should stop arguing with you: you "read nothing, but know everything." There were four Japanese battleships at Tsushima, and eight Russian ones, not counting the coastal defense battleships and the armored cruiser. Your condition has been met.

[Jura 27]

Yura, I think we need to stop discussing this with you: you “don’t read anything, but you know everything.”

It is not enough to read theory - you need to know the situation at that time and understand the fleets of that time.

There were four Japanese battleships and eight Russian ones at Tsushima, not counting coastal defense battleships and an armored cruiser. Your condition has been met.

This is a level eighty facepalm - we really need to end this conversation - you are not on my level with such statements.

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura, that's perfect: "The professor thought he knew nothing, the student was sure he knew everything." Why waste time on my article "if it's not your level?" Get to your level.

[Jura 27]

Go to your level.

"Aviso Fuso - there are no words to describe your level of basic knowledge.

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura, there's a comma there, everything is written correctly in the bibliography - you should have at least taken a quick look.
But instead of getting acquainted, you'll nitpick. That's your true level.

[Jura 27]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Yura, there's a comma there, everything is written correctly in the bibliography - you should have at least taken a quick look.
But instead of getting acquainted, you'll nitpick. That's your true level.

There is no comma there - "Aviso Fuso" was copied from your comment.
These two words clearly indicate that the person is completely out of touch with the Russian Navy and the fleets of that time.

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura, take a look at the bibliography. You're nitpicking—a well-known tactic.

[Jura 27]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Yura, take a look at the bibliography. You're nitpicking—a well-known tactic.

This isn't a triviality—it's another planet. I can confuse the names of Japanese destroyers with each other or 150-ton ships, but confusing a battleship with an aviso is a level below what's best left unmentioned.

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura, when you waste time on pointless debate, you sometimes miss something. Please refer to the bibliography for this article.
By the way, I have the fleet composition listed. Fuso is not an aviso there.

[Alexander Iloev]

And I compiled and checked this list personally.

[Alexander Iloev]

After the war, for the cramped Baltic, the following ratio was established: 8 battleships, 4 armored cruisers, 8 (with a ninth destroyer leader). That is, 1,5 cruisers per battleship.
In the real Russian fleet this ratio was smaller, although the Pacific Ocean, as an immeasurably larger theater, required a larger ratio of cruisers.
A fleet isn't a collection of ships, it's a structure, and war isn't a one-on-one sports tournament. And a war can be lost even before the final battle if your scouts, your mine defenses, and so on are knocked out.
I kindly ask you to refer to the article "Aviso Fuso and other ships of the Japanese victory" - the exact title is in the bibliography.

[Jura 27]

After the war, for the cramped Baltic.....

Can you answer the question of how the Japanese were able to almost completely win the RYAV, having a ship of the line/cruiser ratio that was worse than the first TOE and at the same time far short of your theoretical 1/2-3?

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura, the articles on naval-manual, those listed and those not. Kolchak's report. People have been working especially for you—for decades, I'll add. It's pointless to say anything to someone who's confident "in their own level."

[Jura 27]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Yura, the articles on naval-manual, those listed and those not. Kolchak's report. People have been working especially for you—for decades, I'll add. It's pointless to say anything to someone who's confident "in their own level."

So there won't be an answer. Incidentally, the 1st TOE has a much better ship-of-the-line/cruiser ratio than the Japanese (and close to pre-WWI plans – around 1,5). So why didn't your theory work?

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura, you haven't even read my article, so what "my theory" are you talking about? I don't have a theory; I'm just acting as a historian.
According to “my theory,” or rather according to historical data, neither 1 TOE nor 2 TOE were balanced in the number of cruiser forces - this is enough for defeat.

[Jura 27]

You didn't even read my article.

I read it briefly, but a long time ago—when it came out, and I even gave it a thumbs up. And I don't recall you claiming that the RYA was lost because the ratio being discussed didn't match the theoretical one.

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura, then you didn't read carefully. Correlation is not cause, it's effect. And the cause is in the epigraph, Admiral Kolchak's opinion.

[27091965]

Good afternoon.

Naval-manual, those listed and those not. Kolchak's report.

Dear Alexander, perhaps it would have been worthwhile to include excerpts from a lecture course on tactics for cadets during that period. After all, Kolchak's report is the opinion of one person. But you are the author, and you decided how to present the material and which sources to use.

[Alexander Iloev]

At that time, in 1908, there were no lectures on tactics yet. What there were: there were officers—enthusiasts who gathered around Kolchak. He was their acknowledged leader. But no one challenged his leadership; he was already considered the navy's leading expert on the subject.

[Alexander Iloev]

That's the problem: many things progressed without any help from above, simply through enthusiasm. So you shouldn't judge things by lectures—even Makarov's book was published, if I remember correctly, only during the war, and with his personal intervention.
What they taught at the General Staff can be found out in the book "50 Years in the Troops"

[27091965]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

At that time, in 1908, there were no lectures on tactics yet.

[Alexander Iloev]

Yes, Klado, thank you. Please send me the link.
I'm wary of him. For example, when he tries to compare the power of weapons, he uses roughly this ratio (not literally, but roughly):
120mm 1
150mm 2
203mm 3
305mm 4
According to this ratio, it would be advantageous to use only light artillery that couldn't penetrate armor. This has been written about before. I think this was purely an armchair scholar. However, I could be wrong.
What we needed was a theory written by practitioners. But they were certainly taught something. I'd read that work of his.

[27091965]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Yes, Klado, thank you. Please send me the link.

There is no link, I can send this course by email.

I have a cautious attitude towards him.

I agree with this, since I am familiar with his works not only published in Russia, but also in France.

[Alexander Iloev]

Email
[e-mail]

[Alexander Iloev]

To be honest, I was disappointed with Makarov's book. I'm speaking from the perspective of our times, of course. However, I read it a long time ago, so maybe things would have changed now.

[27091965]

I'll send them, but our internet is "more dead than alive"; we'll have to wait for it to load. I've added two more publications; you might find them interesting for further work.

[Alexander Iloev]

Please send it, but I probably won't continue about the RYAV. Firstly, I've expressed the main idea that the errors were systemic, and secondly, who wants to get into a fight and argue? I don't have the desire.
Maybe if I get around to it I’ll write about 1812, “but that’s not certain.”

[27091965]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Firstly, I expressed the main idea that the mistakes were systemic, and secondly, who wants to get into trouble and argue?

Don't pay attention, AlexanderA and I are just good-naturedly making fun of each other, and nothing happens.""So many people, so many opinions."

[Alexander Iloev]

You see, “we are being ironic without malice.”
Thanks for your support, and to AlexandraA too.
But I write when I think someone needs it. Basically, I don't think we've overcome our past mistakes, and if we had to do it again, we might do the same thing.

[27091965]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

In principle, it seems to me that we have not overcome our previous mistakes, and if it were to happen again, we might do the same thing.

I was a ground soldier, and I have my own opinion on what's happening now. But, as they say,the army is a tool in the hands of politicians”, so I try to look at what is happening now calmly.

[Alexander Iloev]

Maybe I'll get to 1812: I suspect that politicians and the socioeconomic system change, but much in the army remains the same. For example, General Langeron wrote that Russians aren't afraid to die, but they are afraid to disobey their superiors. My opinion is that this is partly tradition and partly a cultural code. I'm not saying it needs to be changed, but rather that sometimes things don't serve their purpose.

[Alexander Iloev]

Again, Rozhdestvensky wrote after the war about his lack of civic courage when he did not express his opinion.

[27091965]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

For example, General Langeron wrote that Russians are not afraid to die, but they are afraid to contradict their superiors.

That's an accurate statement. I don't know how it is now, I'm retired, but that's how it was during my service. However, it's important to clarify: everything depends on the situation; sometimes it's simply better to pretend there's no communication. This isn't about refusing to obey an order; it's about assessing the actual situation on the ground and making a slightly different decision that allows you to complete the assigned task in a more reasonable manner.

[Alexander Iloev]

What I really mean is this: I assume Kuropatkin was reporting what his superiors wanted to hear. Then, a few months before the war, he "woke up" and wrote something like this—I'm exaggerating, but the full text seems to be in the bibliography of the previous article: "Your Majesty, our capture of Port Arthur is a tremendous achievement; we've gained incalculable advantages... but you know, let's give it up completely, for any scrap of land in Manchuria."
The question arises, how to perceive this, and can it be taken seriously?
But it was impossible to write “I lied to you or didn’t tell you the whole truth.”

[27091965]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

The question arises, how to perceive this, and can it be taken seriously?
But it was impossible to write “I lied to you or didn’t tell you the whole truth.”

I think it's worth taking seriously when the outbreak of war becomes inevitable, and then the truth is revealed. It may not be the full truth, but it requires a decision from the "higher" command. A reprimand or demotion in position or rank is better than prison or execution.

[Alexander Iloev]

Yes, but the expressed position is twofold: one cannot simultaneously call a point successful, providing great advantages, then move on to criticism, and propose abandoning it.
This duality is understandable from the point of view of a courtier, but for an interested party it is enough to read “the point is successful” and then ignore the criticism.
I also think his report that the Japanese pray little and are inferior to the Russians in this regard is clearly intended for the intended audience. This is my pure assumption.

[27091965]

It's been sent, I hope it arrives faster than it took to load.

[Alexander Iloev]

27091965
Thank you very much Igor, I haven't gone very deep yet, but I can already see a list of our mistakes and how we could have done things differently. What's especially valuable is that it's all in one place, along with the tables for entering service with ships, so you don't have to search for it in different places.

[27091965]

Please, I was glad to help.

[Ragnar]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Firstly, I expressed the main idea that the errors were systemic, and secondly, who wants to get into a fight and argue? No one wants to.

And talk ???

[Alexander Iloev]

"Even the Japanese didn't have such a ratio."
The Japanese had 6 armored cruisers and 17 light cruisers for every 6 battleships. Total: (6 + 17) / 6 = 3,8

Perhaps armored cruisers should be called battleships?
Unlike battleships, they were capable of cruising operations.
That is why the collection "Russia in the First World War" lists them as cruisers, not battleships - the table is given in the article.
Russia lacked similar courts.

[Alexander Iloev]

All you have to do is go to the "naval-manual" channel and read it. No, arguing with me and discussing your own "level" is certainly easier.

[Alexander Iloev]

By the way, this is an ugly demagogic ploy: to replace my word “battleships” with your “ships of the line,” and then start arguing with it and debunking it.
The ratio between cruisers and battleships in the Japanese fleet is 3,8.
And Kolchak calls not only battleships but also ships of the line “ships of the line” - if you read the theoretical part of the article, of course.

If studying sources is "pedantic," the question arises: where does (your) knowledge come from? Is it really from the Earth's information field? No, rather, it's simply your perception of that time.

[Alexander Iloev]

Guilty: Kolchak calls lines courts
1) armadillos
2) armored cruisers.
This text is reproduced in my quote.
As for the ratio of cruisers to battleships, which I mentioned, in the Japanese fleet it reached 3,8, and a little less, but around 3,5 in the English fleet.

[Jura 27]

The Japanese had 6 armored cruisers and 17 light cruisers for every 6 battleships. Total: (6 + 17) / 6 = 3,8

Oh, my goth! That complete "northern furry animal" again!
Japanese armored cruisers are only in name, but in reality they are poor man's battleships, also known as battleships.
What kind of cruisers can these be with a normal coal reserve of 603 tons or less?
Even the Russian six-thousanders weigh a hundred or so tons more.
The Japs traded quality (EBR) for quantity (BrK/battleships for the poor).
Where did those 17 cruisers come from? At the start of the Japanese War, the Matsushima-class cruisers were cruisers only in name, but were actually coastal defense ships. Furthermore, only 12 light cruisers were in service—Otowa and Tsushima were still under construction and joined the active fleet after the war began.
In total, we have 12 ships of the line and 12 light cruisers - a ratio of 1:1.
Later, at different times, the ratio fluctuated slightly, but within insignificant limits.
The 1st TOE has seven ships of the line and 11 cruisers, a ratio of 1:1,6, which is even better than what was expected for the construction of the Baltic squadrons before WWI.

the question arises: where does (your) knowledge come from?

From reading sources of that time (mostly).

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura, thank you for your opinion, but sources call them "armored cruisers," not battleships. Specifically, I was referring to the collection "Russia in the First World War."
And in the article, I, along with some admirals, proposed that Russia also have similar ships.

[Alexander Iloev]

But deliberately substituting your opponent's points is, to put it mildly, unsportsmanlike.
The ships of the line are not battleships, but also armored cruisers - if, of course, you read the theoretical part.

[Alexander Iloev]

And in addition to the 600 tons of normal coal reserves, the total reserve is 1400 tons, which is modestly kept silent.

[Jura 27]

Sources call them "armored cruisers" rather than battleships.

Do you doubt they wore belt armor? If not, then they were certainly battleships.
But the cruising component is a major problem, due to the small normal coal reserve. No real cruisers of the time had such a small normal coal reserve; even six-thousanders had much more.
But they could not be called squadron battleships (even of some “third” rank) because of their cruiser main caliber of 8”.
This is the reason why all reference books were forced to use the name "armored cruiser" - they couldn't possibly write there the unofficial, offensive term for the owners - "battleship for the poor", which most accurately corresponded to their performance characteristics.

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura, then in your opinion, Chiyoda is also an armadillo. Because he also wore belt armor.
Asamoids are considered armored cruisers everywhere.
Reference books were written when they could no longer offend anyone, after many years had passed.
The poor man's battleship was the Garribaldian, the Assamoid was more maneuverable and could be used in cruising operations.
The Asamoids do not have a "low coal reserve" - ​​their coal reserve has been moved from a normal reserve to a full reserve to meet the strict requirement: "normal displacement up to 10.000 tons." Their full reserve is 1400 tons.
"Three cruisers per battleship" was the theoretical requirement of the time, and I cited two Pacific Ocean fleet designs drawn up in accordance with this theory: 1) Admiral Alekseyev's 1897 design and 2) VK Alexander Mikhailovich's design. They consist largely of armored cruisers. This doesn't mean they "consist of battleships."

[Jura 27]

Chiyoda is an armadillo.

In a broad sense, yes, just like the "Grozashchy" type of CL.

Asamoids are considered armored cruisers everywhere.

But in fact they are not cruisers.

The poor man's battleship is the Garribaldi,

I agree.

The Assamoid was more maneuverable and could be used in cruising operations.

There are many ships that can be used in cruising operations, for example Retvizan with its 2250 tons of total coal reserves.
But you wouldn't call it a cruiser, would you?

They consist largely of armored cruisers. This does not mean that they "consist of battleships."

If they carry armor (in this case, belt armor), then they are definitely armadillos.

[Alexander Iloev]

Yura, there's a Russian proverb: "Call them a pot, but don't put them in the oven." If you like, consider the Asamoids and Chioda armadillos.
Let me use a more traditional classification, for example, Chiyoda - according to the Japanese, and I adhere to it, a 3rd class cruiser.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

The fleet's objective was not formulated, but most admirals considered it to be countering the landing operation, thereby giving the initiative to the enemy.

Actually, it was: to contain the Japanese fleet. This, according to the admirals, required a fleet equal to or slightly superior to the Japanese.

The theater's conditions dictated an increase in the fleet's cruiser component to a ratio of no less than 2,5 cruisers per battleship, and preferably 3. This included armored cruisers whose combined strength was comparable to that of the Japanese. Otherwise, the initiative at sea would shift to the enemy.

Dear author, you are writing a review article and cannot help but know that according to the 1895 program we were supposed to concentrate in the Far East 10 battleships, 8 armored cruisers, taking into account the Vladimir Monomakh, Dmitry Donskoy and Pamyat Azova, and 20 armored deck cruisers.

It was necessary to develop the naval infrastructure on the ocean, because the situation in which English ships were delivering coal to the Russian fleet during the war was intolerable.

How can we fix this? :))) And what does infrastructure have to do with it? How will the docks in Vladivostok help with coal? And anyway... 1 TOE generally had enough coal to fight—the issue was resolved by having an adequate reserve.

Due to a lack of repair capacity, projects with increased reliability had to be selected.

There are no such things, and there is no such definition. At all. There were no more or less reliable ships; they were all designed with the goal of making them as reliable as possible.

The mission of the fleet in the Pacific Ocean should have been defined by the words of the naval agent in Tokyo, Lieutenant I. I. Chagin in September 1897: “...Only by defeating or... destroying the main naval forces of Japan,

That's exactly why our forces wanted 10 EBMs. All other things being equal, such a core of the main force would have been far more powerful than the Japanese's 6 EBMs and 6 large cruisers.

The changes were to begin no later than 1895.

Late

[Alexander Iloev]

Dear Andrew.
What I “can’t help but know” is something I write about in the article, so is it worth reminding you about?
I've had experience with you for seven years now, and I know you're good at picking words and twisting them. When someone responds with a quote, you say something like, "What do I care about this Kofman?" So, arguing with you is impossible: you seek personal victory, not the truth. I once quoted Mark Twain to you, and I wouldn't like to repeat it.

The concept of "infrastructure" includes many things, and a fleet is not only ships, but also ports, port facilities, and repair facilities - many things without which a fleet cannot exist.
You say there are documents, but there are few documents.
Now you will start arguing that this is not so.
As for coal, the Suchan coal mines, not the docks, will help with it. You're deliberately exaggerating.

"Reliability—there's no such definition"—it exists. You think about it when you go shopping for household appliances.
Under these conditions, this meant paying increased attention to the armoring of ships, for example, like the Germans, but not only.

Regarding the navy's mission and the 10 battleships. Should I repeat the article for you?
I ask you to contact the channel "naval-manual" regarding the articles listed in the bibliography.
Regarding Chagin's opinion. This is the opinion of a man who understood maritime affairs more than you or I.

[Alexander Iloev]

Andrey, I could go through your articles in exactly the same way, with exactly the same criterion: “what could I find fault with?” I simply don’t need that.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

I have experience communicating with you 7 years ago, I know that you know how to find fault with words and turn them inside out

And over these 7 years you still haven’t understood that you need to talk to me using the language of facts, and not resort to personal attacks?

Quote: Alexander Iloev

When they answer you with a quote, you say something like, “What do I care about this Kaufman!” Which means it’s impossible to argue with you.

For you, absolutely. Because I don't accept answers like "it's true because Kofman said so," and judging by your comment, you can't imagine anything else. I simply don't remember you, so I can only judge based on this comment.

Quote: Alexander Iloev

The concept of "infrastructure" includes many things, and a fleet is not only ships, but also ports, port facilities, and repair facilities - many things without which a fleet cannot exist.

There was no answer to the question of how this would help supply the fleet with coal. Instead, there were accusations of distortion.

Quote: Alexander Iloev

As for coal, the Suchan coal mines, not the docks, will help with it. You're deliberately exaggerating.

Please clarify since when the cardiff needed by the fleet was mined in the Suchan mines.

Quote: Alexander Iloev

"Reliability—there's no such definition"—it exists. You think about it when you go shopping for household appliances.

There is no such thing for ships. No one has ever created ships that are specifically "less reliable" or "more reliable," so your thesis

Due to a lack of repair capacity, projects with increased reliability had to be selected.

It doesn't make sense. Regardless of repair capacity, the Naval Ministry strove to build ships of maximum reliability. That's what the MTK was for.

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Under these conditions, this meant paying increased attention to the armoring of ships, for example, like the Germans, but not only.

It's scary to ask what reliability has to do with it... Oh well.
Is it true that the RIF paid particular attention to this and switched to Krupp armor faster than England (and Japan)?

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Regarding the navy's mission and the 10 battleships. Should I repeat the article for you?
I ask you to contact the channel "naval-manual" regarding the articles listed in the bibliography.

I have no idea where exactly in these articles you went wrong in coming to the conclusions stated in the article.

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Regarding Chagin's opinion. This is the opinion of a man who understood maritime affairs more than you or I.

You didn’t even understand that my remark refutes you, and not Chagin?
Regrettably

[Alexander Iloev]

Andrey, it turns out you're always on the forum?
If Kofman's opinion doesn't matter to you, I can certainly say the same about yours. It's reversible.
I avoid articles by authors I don't trust. I wish the same for you.
Who switched over? To Krupp armor earlier - deliberate talk, a demagogic tactic.
You like a fleet of 10 battleships – so be it. But in 1904 it didn't exist.
And it would have some shortcomings—figure them out for yourself, if you like. If not, then freedom to the free.
Regarding Nogi's letter - the topic is being talked down.
If I write an article on a land-based topic, perhaps it will be appropriate there.
What do you mean there aren't enough facts in my article? Do yours have more?
I'm simply quoting these articles directly in many places, especially in places you don't like. Unfortunately, the links were removed during editing. So I don't think you read these articles.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Andrey, it turns out you're always on the forum?

Now yes.

Quote: Alexander Iloev

If you don't care about Kofman's opinion, I can definitely tell you about your opinion too.

I care about facts, not opinions.

Quote: Alexander Iloev

I avoid articles by authors I don't trust. I wish the same for you.

Well, I believe it's important to let readers know when an author is fantasizing. That's why I don't avoid such articles.

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Who switched over? To Krupp armor earlier - deliberate talk, a demagogic tactic.

Ah, right. When you explain your thesis about more reliable ships by saying they should have been better armored, and I tell you that's what they did—that's just empty talk and demagoguery.
I see you're trying to dismiss any objection as blather and demagoguery. It's a convenient position, of course, but it won't add credibility to your arguments in the eyes of your readers.

Quote: Alexander Iloev

You like a fleet of 10 battleships – so be it. But in 1904 it didn't exist.

The question isn't what you or I like. It's about historical facts. You managed to write "the navy's goal wasn't formulated," and that's untrue, because the goal was indeed formulated—but it wasn't achieved. You, however, apparently managed to confuse the existence of a goal with the results of achieving it.

Quote: Alexander Iloev

I simply quote these articles directly in many places, especially in those places that you don’t like.

And it turns out like with Chagin. He writes the right things, but you don't understand them and misinterpret them.

[Alexander Iloev]

Andrey, my article is based exclusively on various sources, which, as an expert on this topic, you should know.
It's not my opinion. But even if it is? I'm not interested in your opinions, and there are plenty of them.
My article isn't about who was the first to switch to Krupp. This knowledge didn't help Zhemchug or Novik. My article is about the concept.
When I give full quotes that you haven't read or seen, and that you don't like, I don't interpret them. I don't comment on them, and I don't accompany them with my own opinion. If you were even slightly familiar with them, you wouldn't argue.

[Alexander Iloev]

"Containing the Japanese fleet" is too broad a phrase to be a naval objective in war. It shouldn't be an empty declaration, but a course of action. The phrase "contain" doesn't mean anything; it can be done in a variety of ways.
If a goal was set, name the document, for example, Admiral Vitgeft's "Naval War Plan," and the specific place in that document, in this form: "The goal of our fleet is..."

[Alexander Iloev]

The opponent writes that the Russian fleet "needed Cardiff." Cardiff was just one type of coal mined in England, which could compete with Donets coal, Ruhr coal, and coal from certain seams of the Suchan coal mines.

[Alexander Iloev]

The "fleet's objective" must be reflected in a regulatory document that guides the fleet's training and combat operations. Without this, a set of phrases is not a goal.
It shouldn't be declarative, like "to resist," but concrete, like "to be able to defeat the enemy in a pitched battle," or something else.

[Adrey]

3 Peresvets and 3 armored raiders (Rurik, Rossiya, Gromoboi) against 6 Japanese armored cruisers.
But the Peresvets and the raiders were inferior in their different types, in the rationality of their armor, and in speed (the weakest and slowest of them was the Rurik, with 18 knots). The two Peresvets had weakened main guns. Therefore, 6 Russian ships would be weaker than 6 Japanese ones.

The author's point of view is strange. If Peresvets are registered as BRKs, then Asamoids are legitimate "fodder" for them, unless they manage to escape, which is quite difficult.

[Alexandra]

Are "Asamoids" "legitimate fodder" according to pre-war subjective domestic perceptions, or according to objective criteria?

The objective reality of the war demonstrated that, since "By the time of this war, the difficult task of developing good armor-piercing shells was far from being solved" (V.I. Rdultovsky), ships with inferior armor-piercing shells served as "fodder" for ships with a full waterline belt and the first generation of modern high-explosive shells (with a sufficiently high filling factor of high explosive and a detonator cap and intermediate detonator made of high explosive). And ships with unprotected ends served as an appetizer in squadron artillery battles.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

Are "Asamoids" "legitimate fodder" according to pre-war subjective domestic perceptions, or according to objective criteria?

By objective criteria, of course. The same ones that prevented four Asamoids from consuming Russia and Gromoboy.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

By objective criteria, of course. The same ones that prevented four Asamoids from consuming Russia and Gromoboy.

Well, in that case, according to your objective criteria, four Russian cruisers, two Bayans and two Bogatyrs, were unable to swallow the minelayer Albatross, with a displacement of 2,5 thousand tons.

P.S. I wonder if the witnesses of the third most powerful Russian Imperial Fleet in the world, Nicholas II, will prevail over me before the Sejant?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

Well, in that case, according to your objective criteria, four Russian cruisers, two Bayans and two Bogatyrs, were unable to swallow the minelayer Albatross, with a displacement of 2,5 thousand tons.

Yes, as if they could - no matter how they covered him with smoke screens, he threw himself onto the rocks.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Yes, as if they could - no matter how they covered him with smoke screens, he threw himself onto the rocks.

Sorry, what could you do? The Albatross was hoisted from the rocks on July 24, 1915, towed to Farösund, and then transferred to Oskarshamn for minor repairs, where she remained interned until the end of the war.

What an interesting "death of a ship".

On August 1, 1904, the Asamoids could have closed in and fired their remaining ammunition at the Gromoboi and Rossiya, which were already weakly returning fire, but Kamimura made a mistake. Apparently, he hadn't remembered the British adage: "Keep shooting, keep shooting, and maybe the last shot will bring you victory!"

Kamimura was, as they say, "no eagle." In June 1904, an angry crowd in Tokyo accused the admiral of cowardice and pelted his house with stones, while newspapers openly called for him to commit hara-kiri.

As is well known, the admiral never committed hara-kiri. Unlike General Nogi, for example.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

Sorry, what could you do?

Commit suicide. After 21-22 minutes of firing, the Russian sailors observed extensive damage to the Albatross—damaged superstructures, a downed foremast, and a fire. The Bayan ceased firing. Incidentally, the Albatross had been hit by between 6 and 12 8-inch shells.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Commit suicide

It's strange, but they should have "eaten" it.

By the way, Albatross was hit by 6 to 12 8-inch shells.

I can't recall a single other ship with a displacement of up to 2,5 tons that was hit by 6-12 high-explosive 203mm shells and survived. What about you?

It is interesting that some witnesses to the power of the Russian Imperial Navy during the time of Nicholas II write: “The burnt-out mine cruiser stood on the sandbank throughout the war and was dismantled for scrap metal in 1921.”

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

I can’t remember a single other ship with a displacement of up to 2,5 thousand tons inclusive that was hit by 6-12 high-explosive 203 mm shells and survived.

Name the ships that were hit by 6-12 8-inch shells with a displacement of up to 2,5 tons.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: AlexanderA

I can’t recall any other ship with a displacement of up to 2,5 tons inclusive that was hit by 6-12 high-explosive 203 mm shells.

The Akagi at Yalu received exactly eight large-caliber shells, if I remember correctly. They probably weren't all 210mm, but then again, the gunboat was only 600 tons.
It happens.

[Zodiac]

Quote: Senior Sailor

Probably not all of them were 210mm

There are three hitting calibers: 12", 8" and 6". But there is no exact proportion between the calibers.

[Senior seaman]

Oh my God, why did they give you so many downvotes?)))
No, I also have "fans", but I have been building them up for years.

[Zodiac]

I also have two fans who go through my history and downvote every message without even reading them. These are psychologically worthless people, known in life as "losers." For them, this is a way to at least assert themselves, because they haven't achieved anything in life but believe they deserve more. Friends bully them, their children laugh at them, their wives despise them, and they bully them at work. This is usually associated with depressive personality disorder. This type of disorder can only be treated in a hospital, but they believe they are fine and completely mentally healthy. But they're wrong.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Senior Sailor

It happens.

It happened.

These were shells of a bygone era. Typically, Palliser armor-piercing shells (or their equivalents) had an inert filler, while "high-explosive" shells had black powder inside.

P.S. As is well known, Russian coastal artillery met the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 with armor-piercing shells with inert filler made of a mixture of sand and sawdust.

[Jura 27]

As is well known, Russian coastal artillery met the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 with armor-piercing shells with inert filler made of a mixture of sand and sawdust.

Rumors about this are somewhat exaggerated.
Yes, for example, there was a steel BBS weighing 344 kg for an 11"/35 gun in inert ammunition.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Jura 27

Rumors about this are somewhat exaggerated.

So, what rumors? Let's open Cherkasov V.N.'s "Notes of an artillery officer of the battleship Peresvet":

https://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/cherkasov_vn/01.html

"Another interesting fact, undeniable, is that in fortress artillery, in addition to cast-iron grenades and segmented shells or shrapnel, for firing at armored ships there are also armor-piercing shells (there are no high-explosive shells at all), but these shells are not filled with pyroxylin or gunpowder, as in the navy, but are packed with sand and sawdust, [23] like our training shells. When I asked the commander of Camp Battery No. 16 why this was so, he answered me that they were taught at school that if an armor-piercing shell was loaded with an explosive, it would not fulfill its purpose, since it would explode not by piercing the armor, but from the impact with its surface, and that he only recently heard that in the navy armor-piercing shells are loaded with pyroxylin. There was nothing to be done, we had to release the required number of 6-inch and 10-inch armor-piercing and high-explosive shells, but, in any case, in the battle of January 27, armor-piercing shells filled with sand or cast iron were used."

It was with such sawdust in shells and heads that domestic thought approached the Russo-Japanese War.

[Jura 27]

Unlike the same General Nogi.

The reason is not the great losses and the length of Arthur's siege.

[Zodiac]

Quote: Jura 27

The reason is not the great losses and the length of Arthur's siege.

And in them too, but the main reason is probably the death of both sons.

[Jura 27]

Quote: Zodiac

Quote: Jura 27

The reason is not the great losses and the length of Arthur's siege.

And in them too, but the main reason is probably the death of both sons.

The reason was the death of the overlord, Emperor Meiji.

[Zodiac]

Quote: Jura 27

The reason was the death of the overlord, Emperor Meiji.

In fact, during his report to the Emperor about Port Arthur, Nogi asked Meiji's permission to commit seppuku. The Emperor granted his permission, but only after his death. After Emperor Meiji's death, the time had simply come to keep his word.

[Jura 27]

asked Meiji for permission to commit seppuku.

Source of the request.

[Zodiac]

Doris G. Bargen "Suicidal honor: General Nogi and the writings of Mori Ogai and Natsume Soseki"

[Jura 27]

Quote: Zodiac

Doris G. Bargen "Suicidal honor: General Nogi and the writings of Mori Ogai and Natsume Soseki"

"On September 13, 1912, the day of Emperor Meiji's funeral, General Nogi Maresuke committed ritual suicide by seppuku (evisceration). It was an act of deferred atonement, repayment for a debt of honor accrued thirty-five years earlier."
Perhaps there was an episode with a request for permission to commit seppuku after Arthur, but Meiji refused.
Therefore, the main and fundamental reason is the act of junshi ("following one's master into death").

[Zodiac]

Quote: Jura 27

It was an act of deferred atonement, payment for a debt of honor accumulated thirty-five years ago."

Here's the reason. You quote it yourself and don't understand what you wrote.

Quote: Jura 27

Perhaps there was an episode with a request for permission to commit seppuku after Arthur, but Meiji refused.

And these are your thoughts. There are no "possibly" in the original.

All historians cite Nogi's suicide note. In it, he explicitly stated two motives: atonement for the loss of the flag in the Satsuma Rebellion (1877) and for the deaths of thousands of soldiers at Port Arthur.

[Jura 27]

Here's the reason. You quote it yourself and don't understand what you wrote.

Thirty-five years and seven years are two big differences.

And these are your thoughts. There are no "possibly" in the original.

Do you have a transcript of the conversation? Otherwise, it's fiction.

And all historians refer to Nogi’s suicide note.

So please provide the original (photocopy) of the letter.

and for the death of thousands of soldiers near Port Arthur.

And Arthur was supposed to take Nogi by bloodless assault?
Leaving aside the topic, the losses in killed and wounded were not that great (excluding the sick, of whom there were indeed many), and the duration of the siege from the first assault was also nothing outstanding.
There is only one thing left to do - "follow your master into death."

[Zodiac]

Quote: Jura 27

Thirty five years

The year of Emperor Meiji's death was 1912. Let's calculate: the year of his death (1912) minus 35 years equals 1877. This is the year of the loss of the flag in the Satsuma Rebellion, for which Nogi blamed himself. What's wrong?

Quote: Jura 27

Do you have a transcript of the conversation?

Quote: Jura 27

So please provide the original (photocopy) of the letter.

Are you serious right now? What will you ask for next time? A video of Nogi committing hara-kiri?

[Adrey]

Quote: AlexanderA

Are "Asamoids" "legitimate fodder" according to pre-war subjective domestic perceptions, or according to objective criteria?

According to performance characteristics Vitgeft's battle, when Peresvet and Pobeda faced off in a 12-inch EBM line, are clear examples. The damage to Izumo from 8-inch shells in the Korea Strait and to Asama from 12-inch shells at Tsushima are also examples.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Adrey

According to performance characteristics

In addition to the tabular performance characteristics of ships, there are tabular characteristics of projectiles, sights, rangefinders, fuses, etc., etc.

In fact, the Russian 12" shell, at the artillery battle distances typical for the Russian Navy, penetrated no more than 6" Krupp armor with a rupture in the first compartment behind the armor, or exploded while passing through 7" Krupp armor.

The after-armor effect of the Russian 12" shell was such that 40 minutes after the explosion of the Russian 12" shell in the aft 12" turret of the battleship Fuji, the turret again opened fire from the right gun.

According to the table characteristics, the Peresvets were better than the As, but due to the outdated armor scheme, which did not provide protection for the sides at the ends, construction and operational overload, shells, sights, rangefinders, and other "little things" they were objectively technically inferior.

[Adrey]

Quote: AlexanderA

In addition to the tabular performance characteristics of ships, there are tabular characteristics of projectiles, sights, rangefinders, fuses, etc., etc.

Can you say anything about the examples I have given?

[Alexandra]

Quote: Adrey

Can you say anything about the examples I gave?

Only that the real damage to the Izumo from 8" in the Korean Strait, and to the Asama from 12" in Tsushima have nothing to do with the real or hypothetical battle between the Peresvets and the Asama-class cruisers.

There is such a calculated value as a minute salvo.

[Adrey]

Quote: AlexanderA

Only that the real damage to the Izumo was from 8" in the Korea Strait, and to the Asama from 12" in Tsushima do not relate in any way to the real or hypothetical battle between the Peresvets and the Asama-class cruisers.

Sorry, but they are related to real battles and damage.

Quote: AlexanderA

There is such a calculated value as a minute salvo.

But this is a pure theory that depends on many variable factors, and is, by the way, quite dubious.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Adrey

But this is a pure theory that depends on many variable factors, and is, by the way, quite dubious.

The weight of a minute volley is a completely "tabular value", which, if I remember correctly, they began to calculate precisely at the end of the 19th century.

To point to "there was another such case" and at the same time ignore the weight of a minute volley is to rely NOT on the Osipov-Lanchester laws, but on "God grants victory."

In fact, Russian artillery fire during that war fighting Mikado's fleet was unable to sink anything larger than numbered destroyers. Such was the destructive power of Russian shells.

[Adrey]

Quote: AlexanderA

To point to "there was another such case" and at the same time ignore the weight of a minute volley is to rely NOT on the Osipov-Lanchester laws, but on "God grants victory."

What did the Japs sink with artillery fire before Tsushima?

[Alexandra]

"The Guardian", "The Terrible", "Rurik".

You won't write back that these warships didn't perish as a result of an artillery battle with the enemy, but that the crews themselves sank them?

You know, you could write about the battleship Bismarck that its crew sank it themselves, and that the artillery battle with the British ships had absolutely nothing to do with it.

[Adrey]

Quote: AlexanderA

"Guardian", "Scary",

"Loose change", consumable material.

Quote: AlexanderA

"Rurik"

The only first-rank ship sunk by artillery fire during the entire period, despite a significant superiority in forces (according to your estimates, the weight of a minute broadside should be three times greater on the Japanese side), not without serious damage on its side.
It's a so-so example, but yes, such a fact exists.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Adrey

"Loose change", consumable material.

Japanese "expendable material," even of this displacement, was never sunk by Russian artillery fire during the entire war. Only numbered destroyers with a displacement of less than 100 tons were sunk. You can draw conclusions from these historical facts, or you can ignore them. You are free to do as you see fit.

The only first-rank ship sunk by artillery fire during the entire period, despite a significant superiority in forces (according to your estimates, the weight of a minute broadside should be three times greater on the Japanese side)

I could quote from the book "Rurik Was the First" what superiority it had, according to the esteemed Rafail Mikhailovich Melnikov. Would you like that?

For now, I'll make a correction in the opposite direction. A calculation using a formula for the destruction of thin metal barriers, which I no longer remember where I found, previously showed me that Japanese shells never produced the kind of holes in the unarmored sides of Russian ships that they should have produced with the full detonation of the picric acid explosive charges assigned to them. In other words, Japanese shells almost always demonstrated incomplete detonation of their explosive charges upon explosion. In other words, from a scientific and engineering perspective, Japanese shells, or more precisely, Ijuin fuses, were far from ideal. This is hardly surprising. It's no wonder that, starting in 1906 in Germany and in 1910 in Russia and England, they began using tetryl in intermediate detonators of fuses.

In general, the Japanese high-explosive shells of the Russo-Japanese "shimoza" high explosive, like almost everything of the first generation, were far from the reliable destructive effect that Soviet naval historians, such as the respected Rafail Mikhailovich Melnikov, attributed to them.

But what was not ideal, but reality, was enough. First, to sink the Rurik, and then to sink the Oslyabya, the Emperor Alexander III, and the Borodino at Tsushima.

One could point to the highly destructive power of Japanese shells. One could point to serious design flaws and construction errors, or to the failures in the survivability of Russian armored ship crews. One could point to all of these, or even a third. It's just a matter of proportion.

My point is simply that, given the technical context, there was no chance of a Russian naval victory in the Russian Navy. Not with the state of Russian naval artillery, especially its ammunition, as it actually was.

I should note, however, that the Spanish were worse off in 1898, much worse. It's no surprise that the Spanish suffered a disastrous, completely unbeaten defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898. The US Navy didn't lose a single warship. The loss of US sailors was isolated. Such was the price of technological inferiority in naval warfare in the age of steam and electricity.

[Adrey]

Thanks for the detailed comment.
Maybe I'll answer later.

[rytik32]

Quote: AlexanderA

I'm simply saying that with such a technical context there was no chance of a Russian victory at sea in the Russian Navy.

And how did the Wehrmacht tanks stage blitzkriegs with their "poppers" in 1939-41?
Maybe it's not just about technology? ;)

[Alexandra]

Due to the significantly smaller number of "units," the qualitative superiority of an individual "unit" is far more significant in naval warfare than in land warfare. In land warfare, inferiority in unit quality can be offset by resource superiority, better logistics, and better coordination, including between different branches of the armed forces, and, of course, the simple concentration of forces and resources at the decisive point of battle. In the artillery era of naval warfare, it was better to have fewer, but better, artillery ships. Japan, for example, needed only six first-class battleships, two of which were senselessly lost to mines on May 2, 1904, to defeat the Third Fleet, which by early 1904 consisted of 19 battleships. Here in the comments, comrades write that there weren't enough battleships, not enough. More were needed. And armored cruisers are just "a luxury in a squadron." A strange, incomprehensible thing with a bow on the side, which could have been done without. Following this logic, there was no need for a single "Bayan" to be as good as a single "Asama" even in terms of its specifications.

[hohol95]

And how did the Wehrmacht tanks stage blitzkriegs with their "poppers" in 1939-41?

Just tanks?
Without aviation, artillery, motorized infantry?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

According to the table characteristics, the Peresvets were better than the As

And two 10-inch shells that hit the stern of the Asama and knocked the cruiser out of the battle, giving it a 1,5 m trim by the stern, perfectly demonstrated what awaited a cruiser of this type in the event of a duel with a Peresvet-class battleship.

[Adrey]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

And two 10-inch shells that hit the stern of the Asama and knocked the cruiser out of the battle, giving it a 1,5 m trim by the stern, perfectly demonstrated what awaited a cruiser of this type in the event of a duel with a Peresvet-class battleship.

Moreover, there were 10 of those who arrived from the BBO that were “shot”.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Adrey

Moreover, there were 10 of those who arrived from the BBO that were “shot”.

Indeed, it is so:))) Although, to be fair, at the beginning of the battle they were not so shot, they were shot during the battle.

[Adrey]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Although, to be fair, at the beginning of the battle they were not so shot, they were shot during the battle.

The fate of the guns of the "practical squadron"

[Adrey]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

They were shot during the battle.

By the way, Andrey, do you have data on the consumption of 10" BBO shells in Tsushima, without the Ushakov, of course?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

There was something there... I'll look for it:))))

[Adrey]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

There was something there... I'll look for it:))))

By the way, there's very little information on these particular participants in Tsushima. It's all about the First Squadron's EBR. Could you take up the topic of the "Imperator," "Sisoy," "Navarin," "Nakhimov," and the like? The fate of these ships is certainly known, but their contribution to the battle is only so-so.

[rytik32]

Quote: Adrey

Do you have data on the consumption of 10" BBO shells?

Senyavin - 160 (was 320, remains 160 - the readings and the Japanese report matched)
Ushakov - 285 (according to the survivors)

[Adrey]

Quote: rytik32

Senyavin - 160 (was 320, remains 160 - the readings and the Japanese report matched)

Thank you

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Adrey

Moreover, there were 10 of those who arrived from the BBO that were “shot”.

And even those very “light” guns, similar to Peresvet.

[Alexandra]

No one is claiming that the Asama, with its 2,13-meter high main gun, was a masterpiece of shipbuilding. It was simply a relatively well-built cruiser with a full armor belt along the waterline, a powerful seven-gun broadside from its 6-inch guns partially concealed in casemates, and two turrets with twin 8-inch guns, which would have been better replaced by 10-inch single-gun turrets.

In a duel, the Peresvet would fire 60% more metal and an order of magnitude more explosives at the enemy than the Peresvet would fire at the enemy. Quantity translates into quality. And even the "golden hits" tend to be higher for those firing significantly more metal and explosives.

Now we multiply the gross firepower by rangefinders, sights, the visibility of explosions and more advanced methods of organizing fire (in particular, zeroing) and we understand that in reality the Peresvets had no chance, although it would seem, according to the tables from Jane's of that time, that they were powerful artillery ships.

You're wrong to point to "golden hits." Mikado's fleet fared much better in terms of "golden hits." Those who demonstrated greater firepower, fired more accurately, and whose shells contained significantly more explosives, won all the significant naval artillery battles of the war.

The largest warships sunk by Russian artillery fire during the Russo-Japanese War were apparently Japanese destroyers No. 34 and No. 35, each displacing 83 tons. This was a complete technical failure for Russian naval artillery at the time.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

In a duel, the Peresvet would have been flying at 60% more metal in the shells and an order of magnitude more explosives in these shells than the Peresvet would have fired at the enemy.

In the tedious reality of the battle, Nisshin and Kasuga fired 307 8-inch shells and 33 10-inch shells in the Yellow Sea. Pobeda fired 115 10-inch shells in the Yellow Sea, and Peresvet fired 109 10-inch shells. In other words, in terms of the mass of metal fired from their main guns, Peresvet and Pobeda fired about 20% more than the pair of Japanese cruisers.

Quote: AlexanderA

Now we multiply the gross firing performance by the rangefinders and sights

Which have nothing to do with ship projects

Quote: AlexanderA

It’s in vain that you point to “golden hits”.

No problem, nod your head too. Can you list the golden hits 8-inch shells have scored on our armored ships?

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In the boring reality, Nissin and Kasuga fired 307 8-inch and 33 10-inch shells in the Battle of the Yellow Sea.

Be consistent, compare the "boring reality" of the Oslyabya and Nissin with the Kasuga at Tsushima. I'll accept any realistic number of 10" shells that the Oslyabya's gunners managed to fire at the enemy before the ship sank.

Pobeda expended 115 10-inch shells in the main battle, while Peresvet expended 109. This means that, in terms of mass of metal, Peresvet and Pobeda fired roughly 20% more from their main guns than the pair of Japanese cruisers.

Not counting the mass of metal released by the average caliber is like: "We play here, we don't play there, we wrapped the fish here."

Which have nothing to do with ship projects

I agree. The number of barrels per broadside, the number of barrels per thousand tons of displacement, and, of course, the projectile weight per minute are all relevant to the designs.

By analogy with Grabin's "A tank is a carriage for a cannon," I would formulate it as: "An artillery ship is a boat for cannons."

What golden hits with 8-inch shells on our armored ships can you list?

First, we need to define the term "golden hits." As far as I remember, nothing larger than 8" ever hit "Rurik"? Do you think there were any "golden hits" in "Rurik," or did quantity simply turn into quality, meaning there were no such hits?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

I will accept any realistic number of 10" shells that the Oslyabya's gunners managed to fire at the enemy before the ship sank.

Which resulted from 12-inch shells. Remind me, which Japanese cruiser exactly had a 12-inch caliber?
But it's always funny to watch how you ignore precisely known data (the consumption of shells in combat in ZhM) in favor of eventual ones.

Quote: AlexanderA

Not counting the mass of metal released by the average caliber is like: "We play here, we don't play there, we wrapped the fish here."

Yes, please. Togo's 1st Detachment expended 3592 shells, or (if counted per firing side) roughly 90 shells per gun. It's impossible to be more precise, as data for individual ships is lacking.
In total, we have 14*90 = 1,260 6-inch shells for Nissin and Kasuga.
Pobeda and Peresvet together expended 1,313 6-inch shells.
Thus, the total weight of the 6-inch and higher shells for Peresvet and Pobeda is 104,7 tons, and for Nissin and Kasuga - 99,4 tons.
How much more time must I waste on your unbridled fantasies?

Quote: AlexanderA

As far as I remember, nothing larger than 8" ever hit "Rurik"? Do you think there were any "golden hits" in "Rurik," or did quantity simply turn into quality, meaning there were no such hits?

You know my point of view on this issue:))))

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In total, we have 14*90 = 1,260 6-inch shells for Nissin and Kasuga.

There are precise data on the consumption of 6-inch shells in the liquid metal.
Kasuga - 532 shells,
Nissin - 398

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Then things are even worse for the Japanese cruisers: 84,4 tons of metal versus 104,7 tons for Pobeda and Peresvet. And this despite the Pobeda's 10-inch gun being damaged after 21 shots, while Peresvet's main battery turret was inoperable—not to mention the broken arcs on the 6-inch gun...

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Which resulted from 12-inch shells. Remind me, which Japanese cruiser exactly had a 12-inch caliber?

I remember that in your reality, dear Andrey, the victory of the Mikado's fleet was brought about by four battleships and their 12-inch guns. Everything else was just extras and support. From the perspective of the subsequent all-big-gun era, it all makes sense. Only the Russian Navy was not yet a war of that era.

But it's always funny to watch how you ignore precisely known data (the consumption of shells in combat in ZhM) in favor of eventual ones.

In fact, it was funny to watch how you elegantly proved that the "Bayan", having approached (apparently teleported) to a distance of 15-20 cables, had a good chance of destroying the "Kasuga" or "Nissin".

But these optical sights, rangefinders, high-explosive shells and the more than twofold superiority of the said cruisers in the mass of shells fired per minute of intensive fire from the main and secondary guns - this is all from the evil one.

How much more time must I waste on your unbridled fantasies?

Forgive me, dear Andrey, but your imagination is running wild. At Tsushima, Russian ships sank two Japanese numbered destroyers, No. 34 and No. 35, with artillery fire. And in the battle of May 14 alone, Japanese ships sank the battleships Oslyabya, Alexander III, and Borodino with artillery fire, battered the battleship Knyaz Suvorov with artillery fire so badly that by evening its crew was fighting off the Japanese destroyers with a single 75mm gun, and battered the battleship Oryol with artillery fire so badly that only the surviving 12-inch gun on the main battery turret and one 6-inch turret were able to fire properly.

But according to your imagination, everything should have turned out the other way around. All you had to do was get closer to a distance of 15-20 cables, and then everything would have worked out.

You know my point of view on this issue:))))

If only I could remember all your points. I just want to clarify: is a "fatal hit" the same as a "golden hit," just reversed? Well, then, in your opinion, a "fatal"/"golden" hit on the "Rurik" did occur. As you requested, it was hit by a projectile no larger than 8" caliber.

Can you recall any "golden hits" by Russian shells on Japanese armored ships, and how exactly were they "golden"/"fatal"?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

From the point of view of the subsequent era of all big guns, everything is logical

From the point of view of damage to the Oslyabya - the same.
As for the rest, I give you numbers, and you respond with lengthy discussions about nothing. But I wanted to show everyone that yours

Quote: AlexanderA

In a duel, 60% more metal would fly into the Peresvet shells.

It's worth nothing. And he showed it.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

From the point of view of damage to the Oslyabya - the same.

Remind me, how many 12" Japanese shells do you think quickly disabled the battleship Oslyabya and then sent her to the bottom? I'd like to compare that with the number of hits from Russian 12" shells that never sent a single Japanese battleship, armored cruiser, or even a single Japanese ship to the bottom.

As for the rest, I give numbers.

Strange, I gave some numbers. A whole little table, according to which the Asama outperformed the Peresvet in terms of shell mass fired per minute of intense broadside fire by ~60%.

And then you showed up and started "giving figures" about "two 10-inch shells that hit the stern of the Asama and knocked the cruiser out of the battle, giving it a 1,5-meter trim by the stern."

Well: "...and, most importantly, the starboard hull. Shell fragments tore 16 holes in it between the middle and lower decks (Fig. 3). Water entered the ship through these holes during rough seas, and as a result of the flooding, the Asama's trim by the stern was up to 1,5 meters..."

Do you know what happened to the severe damage to the cruiser's starboard side? Did the damage control crew plug it with wooden plugs? As far as I remember, the cruiser's 1,5-meter trim by the stern disappeared somewhere during the battle. Apparently, further water infiltration was stopped, and the water that had entered through those holes was pumped out. No?

Compared to the holes in the side of some Russian ships that were "a carriage could drive into," the Asama certainly had very severe damage to the unarmored side plating.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

Strange, I gave some numbers. A whole little table, according to which the Asama outperformed the Peresvet in terms of shell mass fired per minute of intense broadside fire by ~60%.

I provided the actual main battery shell consumption in the battle in ZhM, and Alexey, respectfully, helped with the secondary battery. And somehow, it turns out that the Peresvet outperforms the Nissin-class cruiser by 24% in terms of ejected metal, even despite the damage from artillery.
So, you didn't give me numbers, but nonsense, intended to misinform readers. After which, unable to provide a substantive answer, you again began diligently diverting the conversation to other topics, hoping I'd be distracted by them and your latest gaffe would be blathered on in the comments.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

And for some reason it turned out that the Peresvet surpasses the Nissin-class cruiser by 24% in the mass of ejected metal, even despite the damage from artillery.

"Somehow it worked out" (C)

I've given the superiority in projectile mass based on the maximum practical rate of fire. This is a "tabular" characteristic.

You gave real released metal in the battle in the Yellow Sea.

In response, I can note that the battle in the Yellow Sea took place mainly at those distances where the main role was played by large-caliber guns, which were simply not available on the cruiser Nissin (this is why I write that the best main battery for the Garibaldi were clearly two 10" single-gun turrets).

The second technical feature of the artillery of both sides: the 6"/45 Kane had better ballistics than the 6"/40 Armstrong mounted on the ships of the Mikado's fleet.

It’s trivial that if the Russian casemate 152 mm Canet gun, at an elevation angle of 15 degrees, fired at a range of 53 cables, then the British casemate 152 mm Armstrong gun, at an elevation angle of 15 degrees, fired at a range of 43 cables.

Only the 152 mm deck guns of the cruiser Nissin, at a maximum elevation angle of 20 degrees, fired at a range of 49 cables.

In fact, at the distances at which the Peresvet could already fire ten 152 mm guns, the Nissin could only respond with two 152 mm guns.

And so on until they approached a distance of 43 cables or less, which was not typical for the battle in the Yellow Sea.

If we take this feature into account, it becomes completely clear why the Nissin, whose artillery, during intensive fire at Tsushima combat ranges, released 60% more shell metal than the Peresvets, in a real battle in the Yellow Sea released 24% less shell metal from its guns than the Peresvet.

But as I understand it, you were NOT interested in explaining this technical feature of the artillery of the SC sides to your readers?

Well, I explained it for you.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

In fact, at the distances at which the Peresvet could already fire ten 152 mm guns, the Nissin could only respond with two 152 mm guns.

Thank you, you made my day:))))))
That is, the Peresvet's gunners could easily move 5 guns from one side to the other and fire all 10 6-inch guns at once from one side:)))))) Truly, this is a new word in the history of the RYaV:)))
Of course, the poor Japanese didn't know about this, and with four open guns on deck, they could only fire on board from two:))))))

Quote: AlexanderA

Only the 152 mm deck guns of the cruiser Nissin, at a maximum elevation angle of 20 degrees, fired at a range of 49 cables.

Who told you that the casemate guns of the "Italians" had a reduced elevation angle?

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Thank you, you made my day:))))))
That is, the Peresvet's gunners could easily move 5 guns from one side to the other and fire all 10 6-inch guns at once from one side:)))))) Truly, this is a new word in the history of the RYaV:)))

So much joy from a trivial slip of the tongue. I even sinfully thought that when communicating with you, I should slip up more often, so that you could have more joyful days.

Who told you that the casemate guns of the "Italians" had a reduced elevation angle?

Said? Written. Do you need sources? The 6" deck and casemate elevation angles were cited in an article in Engineering magazine on April 21, 1905.

But in general, this is a commonplace: the casemate 6"/40 Armstrong guns had an elevation angle of 15 degrees, while the deck guns had an elevation angle of 20 degrees.

https://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_6-40_mk1.php

ICC:
Deck mountings: -3 / +20 degrees
Casemate mountings: -3 / +15 degrees

https://navweaps.com/Weapons/WNJAP_6-40_EOC.php

Range with 100 lbs. (45.4 kg) HE
Elevation 20 degrees Range about 10,000 yards (9,140 m)

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

But in general, this is a commonplace: the casemate 6"/40 Armstrong guns had an elevation angle of 15 degrees, while the deck guns had an elevation angle of 20 degrees.

Very good. We'll open your link.

Quote: AlexanderA

https://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_6-40_mk1.php

And we are surprised to discover that
Range of 100 lbs. (45.36) HE Shell
Elevation Distance
15 degrees With Cord 30: 10,000 yards (9,140 m)
That is, at 15 degrees the range was almost 50 kbps.
Compared to the 53 KBT you mentioned for the Russian gun (in reality it is about 55 KBT).
Open the second link

Quote: AlexanderA

https://navweaps.com/Weapons/WNJAP_6-40_EOC.php

And we understand that it's a simple typo. Actually, you could have guessed for yourself that if Armstrong's guns fired at 43 kbt at the same elevation angle where Canet's was 55 kbt, no one would ever buy Armstrong's guns.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

And we discover with surprise

You may be surprised to find that the 10,000 yards (9,140 m) range of the 6"/40 (15.2 cm) QF Armstrong is quoted for the British and Italian guns with Cord 30 propellant at 15 degrees elevation, and for the Japanese at 20 degrees elevation.

Let's just check with the American 6"/40 Mark 4:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/6-inch/40-caliber_gun

9,000 yd (8,200 m) at 15.3° elevation

And how did they buy them with a firing range of 44 cables at an elevation angle of 15.3°?

where Kane had 55 kbt

Well, you see, there was a significant range within which it was already possible to fire from the casemate 6"/45 Canet guns, but it was not yet possible to fire from the casemate 6"/40 Armstrong guns, at which the same Nissin could respond to the fire of five 6" Canet guns from the Peresvet with only two 6" Armstrong guns.

But it didn’t help.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

You may be surprised to find that the 10,000 yards (9,140 m) range of the 6"/40 (15.2 cm) QF Armstrong is quoted for the British and Italian guns with Cord 30 propellant at 15 degrees elevation, and for the Japanese at 20 degrees elevation.

I'm not at all surprised to discover that you're spouting nonsense again. Because the Japanese gun is given a higher muzzle velocity, and anyone familiar with the basics of ballistics understands that with a higher muzzle velocity, the same aiming angle, and firing the same projectile, the Japanese gun's range cannot be shorter.

Quote: AlexanderA

Let's just check with the American 6"/40 Mark 4:

You're frankly a mediocre inspector. Does it matter that we're talking about a different gun? Does it matter that we're talking about a different projectile, weighing 48 kg, not the Japanese's 45,4 kg? Does it matter that we're talking about a muzzle velocity of 660 m/s, not 701 m/s?

Quote: AlexanderA

Well, you see, there was a significant area of ​​distances within which

...Alexander missed again by a mind-boggling distance...

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I am not at all surprised to find that you are talking nonsense again.

You're being rude. I already gave you a link to the firing chart. Didn't you bother to study it?

Basically, everyone was lying to you about "almost 50 cable lengths" at an elevation angle of 15 degrees. According to navweaps.com, they were certainly lying. It's just over 46 cable lengths according to the firing table.

Unfortunately, regular rudeness is your standard behavior.

701 m / s

Who lied to you about 701 m/s on a 13,25 lb (6,01 kg) Cord 30 charge? Can you provide a link?

I finally understood the reason for your urge to construct entertaining theories that have nothing to do with reality, based on isolated episodes like: "Bayan" came within 19 cables of "Mikasa" on January 27th.

For some reason, you can't see the forest for the trees. You're not getting the overall picture from historical episodes.

As is well known, the Novik closed 17 cable lengths with the Mikasa during the battle of January 27. Based on your "I see the tree, but I don't see the forest" logic, one must conclude that Admiral Makarov and his "unarmored ships" were absolutely right! As Makarov envisioned it in 1895, the Navy should have added 33 of Makarov's 4000-ton cruisers (and no battleships or armored cruisers) to the Pacific Fleet, and then we would have certainly defeated the Mikado's fleet!

...Alexander missed again by a mind-boggling distance...

Everyone is deceiving you, but not Alexander.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

You're being rude.

I'm being rude. And yet I'm telling the truth.

Quote: AlexanderA

Who lied to you about 701 m/s on a 13,25 lb (6,01 kg) Cord 30 charge? Can you provide a link?

And who told you that the Japanese fired a 13,25-pound charge? Alexandra, you're back in the woods again, and you're trying to dig yourself out of it. It won't work. I said that the Japanese shells had a velocity of 701 m/s (though in reality, there's no clarity on that; the velocity could have been higher). But I never claimed anywhere that they had that velocity when loaded.

Quote: AlexanderA

13,25 lb (6,01 kg) Cord 30 charge

The guns obviously achieved this speed with a different charge.
You are again trying to change the subject of the dispute from one to another, which will be convenient for you to defend.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I'm being rude. And yet I'm telling the truth.

"It's easy and pleasant to be rude with impunity." (C)

And below there will be a truth unknown to you.

And who told you that the Japanese fired a 13,25 pound charge?

There was no other propellant charge made of Mark I cordite for these guns.

https://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-100.php

Japanese Propellants

Before 1893 the Japanese Navy used brown prismatic powder which was purchased from Britain, Holland or Belgium. In 1888, the Japanese Army, which was responsible for procuring propellants both for itself and for the Japanese Navy, tested the French Poudre B propellant. The tests results were acceptable, and the Japanese purchased a production plant in 1893.
British Mark I Cordite was introduced to Japan the same year when the British-built cruiser Yoshino entered service. On 19 March 1903, Cordite Mark I, which the Japanese designated as C and called Jinjô Chûjô ("common cord like powder"), was adopted for all QF-type guns then in service with the Navy.
Until after the Russo-Japanese War, all naval propellants were imported but in 1907 the Japanese let a contract to the Sir William Armstrong Co. to build a factory at Hiratsuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture, for the manufacture of British MD cordite. The plant was completed in December 1908 and produced both MDC cords and MDT tubular propellant. In 1919, the Japanese Navy purchased this factory outright and renamed it the Kaigun Kayakukô (Naval Powder Plant).
In 1912, the Japanese developed and produced their first naval propellant, known as C2 for Type 2 Cordite. Officially adopted on 12 September 1917, this consisted of 65% nitrocellulose, 30% nitroglycerine, 3% mineral jelly and 2% jara jara (beta naphthol methyl ether). This propellant was also made in a tubular form (tubite) and in this form was known as T2. In 1920, centralite was introduced as a gelatinizer, a technique used by the Germans in their RP C/12. By 1924, this had become the standard naval service propellant and was known as DC (for Doku = Deutsch or German Cordite)."

If you find a historical source indicating that the Armstrong 6"/40 QF gun actively used a propellant charge of Mark I cordite weighing more than 13,25 pounds, please let me know.

I know how to search for digitized sources, but I couldn't find any. You try.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

The guns obviously achieved this speed with a different charge.

With a propellant charge of tubular cordite grade MD (Cordite MD) weighing 6,67 kg.

https://navgunschl.sakura.ne.jp/koudou/ijn/buki/gun/gun_data/6in_40cal.html

薬種 ＭＤ紐状 薬量 （瓩) 6.670 初速 （米／秒) 700

In this case, look at the English text above:

"British Cordite Mark I appeared in Japan the same year that the British-built cruiser Yoshino entered service. On March 19, 1903, Cordite Mark I (designated "C" in Japan and called *Jinjô Chûjô* - "ordinary cord-type propellant") was adopted for all QF (quick-firing) guns in naval service at the time.
Until the end of the Russo-Japanese War, all propellant charges for the navy were imported. However, in 1907, Japan contracted with Sir William Armstrong to build a plant in Hiratsuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, to produce British MD cordite. The plant was completed in December 1908 and produced both MDC cordite (in cord form) and MDT propellant (in tube form).

The story of how the Japanese fired their 6"/40 (15.2 cm) QF Armstrong guns during the Russo-Japanese War using MD tubular cordite propellant charges, apparently produced by the Hiratsuka Powder Factory, which only began producing any grades of MD propellant in December 1908, is certainly fascinating. But I'm sure you can easily relate such a story to the public.

During the First World War, the conservative British used only propellant charges made of MD26 cordite for these guns, along with Mark 1 cordite charges, which gave a muzzle velocity of 2243 feet per second (684 m/s) for a 100-pound projectile.

You are again trying to change the subject of the dispute from one to another, which will be convenient for you to defend.

I simply illustrated to you what happens when a person simply doesn’t notice that a particular fact doesn’t fit into the overall picture.

Then the Japanese 6"/40 guns in the Battle of Tsushima fired using propellant charges of tubular cordite grade MD, which in Britain was simply not used to make propellant charges for guns of this type, and in Japan the production of which was mastered only a few years after the Russo-Japanese War.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

This is all brilliant, of course, but I still haven't seen any reference to the charge and initial velocity of the projectile for the Armstrong gun in Japan.
You are now again constructing logical constructions - like, since there is a reference to the fact that the Japanese had 700 m/s with an MD, and the Japanese did not use an MD, then this means the initial velocity was lower because the Japanese used the same charge as the British.
The problem is that these are your assumptions, not facts. For some reason, you've decided that the size of the propellant charge is essentially immutable. The Japanese could use more C-25 than the British, that's all.

[27091965]

Good morning.

The Japanese could use C in greater quantities than the British, that's all.

When testing the 6-inch Armstrong gun in 1891, using Chilworth Special Powder, the charge weight was 12,7 kg, the projectile velocity was 692,2 m/s, weighing 45,450 kg.
During the testing of the 6-inch Armstrong gun in France in 1892, the following propellant powders were used: B10; B16; B19; charge weight from 6,5 to 9 kg, projectile weight 45,100-45,600 kg. The highest velocity obtained was 707 m/s.
It is worth remembering that the chamber volume of this gun is 16,680 cubic meters.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Good afternoon, dear Igor!

Quote: 27091965i

During the testing of the 6-inch Armstrong gun in France in 1892, the following propellant powders were used: B10; B16; B19; charge weight from 6,5 to 9 kg, projectile weight 45,100-45,600 kg. The highest velocity obtained was 707 m/s.

Thanks for the information. I'm very curious, of course, what the Japanese have come up with.

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Thanks for the information. I'm very curious, of course, what the Japanese have come up with.

Translations from Japanese are not mine. Regarding the English translations, I can add that after increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898, projectile velocity increased. According to the Royal Artillery Handbook, a 9,2 kg cordite charge was introduced, but it had one peculiarity: the full charge was fired only when using armor-piercing projectiles.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: 27091965i

Translations from Japanese are not my thing.

I have something pretty good, I can figure it out from the picture. But I haven't mastered the Japanese search yet.

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

But I haven't mastered searching in Japanese yet.

This is for the respected Alexey, who, it seems to me, is already very well versed in translations from Japanese.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: 27091965i

This is for the respected Alexey, who, it seems to me, is already very well versed in translations from Japanese.

You just need to learn how to work with the jacar a little; it requires personal practice. But Alexey gave me some tips and helped me out.

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

You just need to learn how to work with the jacar a little; it requires personal practice. But Alexey gave me some tips and helped me out.

I can only wish you success in studying these “strange signs” (hieroglyphs).

[Alexandra]

Quote: 27091965i

Translations from Japanese are not mine. Regarding the English translations, I can add that after increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898, projectile velocity increased.

I'm afraid you've got it all mixed up. horses, people and the volleys of a thousand guns the 6"/40 QF EOC Mark I, II and III family from Armstrong, also known as the licensed 15 cm/40 Type 41, and the Armstrong 6"/50 (15.2 cm) BL Marks IX and X, known in American service as the 6"/50 (15.2 cm) Mark 5. Those actually had a muzzle velocity of 2300 fps (701 m/s) for a 100-pound projectile.

But it seems that it's not just you who have them mixed up, but a whole crowd of historians who attributed the ballistics of the 6"/50 (15.2 cm) BL Marks IX and X to the Japanese licensed 15 cm/40 Type 41. No wonder. The 6"/50 (15.2 cm) BL Marks IX and X had a muzzle velocity of 701 m/s, and for the 15 cm/40 Type 41, the Japanese, according to this page:

https://navgunschl.sakura.ne.jp/koudou/ijn/buki/gun/gun_data/6in_40cal.html

They invented a charge made of MD cordite that provided an initial velocity of 700 m/s.

In principle, this was technically possible with the use of tubular cordite with a constant burning area. But only long after the end of the Russian Nuclear War. Because by the end of 1908, the Japanese simply didn't have their own gunpowder factory producing cordite for naval artillery. After all, British propellant charges
For the 6"/40 QF EOC Mark I, II and III, only a degressive propellant burn was achieved, and therefore even a 7,23 kg propellant charge of MD26 cordite only produced a muzzle velocity of 2243 fps (684 m/s).

So, "increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898" is another Vickers export gun, dear Igor:

https://web.archive.org/web/20151008011759/http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_6-50_mk5.htm

The barrel length increased by 1,52 meters, or 10 calibers. But yes, it was indeed put into service in 1898.

[27091965]

Quote: AlexanderA

So the "increase in barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898" is another Vickers export gun,

What does export have to do with my comment?

Regarding the British, I can add that after increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898, projectile velocity increased. According to the Royal Artillery Handbook, a 9,2 kg cordite charge was introduced, but it had one peculiarity: the full charge was only fired when using armor-piercing projectiles.

I'm afraid you've got horses, men, and the salvoes of a thousand guns mixed up in a heap: the 6"/40 QF EOC Mark I, II, and III family of guns from Armstrong, also known as the licensed 15 cm/40 Type 41, and the Armstrong 6"/50 (15.2 cm) BL Marks IX and X, known in American service as the 6"/50 (15.2 cm) Mark 5. Those guns actually had a muzzle velocity of 2300 fps (701 m/s) for a 100-pound projectile.

But it seems that it's not just you who have them mixed up, but a whole crowd of historians who attributed the ballistics of the 6"/50 (15.2 cm) BL Marks IX and X to the Japanese licensed 15 cm/40 Type 41. No wonder. The 6"/50 (15.2 cm) BL Marks IX and X had a muzzle velocity of 701 m/s, and for the 15 cm/40 Type 41, the Japanese, according to this page:

Apparently, Captain Honner, when he sent a report on the trials of the 45-caliber 6-inch gun to the Admiralty in 1898, was unaware that, scientifically speaking, the cordite used in England could not produce a projectile velocity greater than 700 m/s. Nor was the British Admiralty aware of this, but an 8,2 kg cordite charge gave a 45 kg projectile a muzzle velocity of 762 m/s.
Just find the testing and commissioning procedures for the British navy's guns, and everything will become clear. These procedures are available at https://web.archive.org.

[Alexandra]

Quote: 27091965i

What does export have to do with my comment?

You named a certain cannon whose barrel length was increased by 0,85 meters in 1898. Please name the model and modification of this cannon and provide a link to your source of information about the cannon.

Apparently, Captain Honner, when sending a report on the tests of the 45-calibre gun to the Admiralty in 1898

Please specify the gun model. If you are referring to the BL 6-inch Mk VII, it is a different gun with different ballistics, not part of the 6"/40 QF EOC Mark I, II, and III export gun line.

It simply had a cartridge rather than a case loader and an initial projectile velocity of 770 m/s.

It had no relation to the export 6"/40 QF EOC Mark I, II and III (except that it was also a Vickers) or to the licensed Italian and Japanese copies of the 6"/40 QF EOC.

I didn't know that, from a scientific point of view, the cordite used in England cannot give a projectile a speed of more than 700 m/s.

You know better what Captain Honner knew and didn't know. I see you're lumping together various lines of Vickers 6" guns—case-loading, cartridge-loading, 40-caliber barrels, 45-caliber barrels, deck mounts providing a maximum barrel elevation of 20 degrees, deck mounts providing a maximum barrel elevation of 14 degrees, Cordite Mark I, Cordite BL—it all seems the same to you.

Just find the methodology for testing and accepting into service the guns of the English fleet and everything will become clear.

Handbook for the 6-inch BL guns, marks VII and VIIv (land service). London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1911

https://archive.org/details/HandbookForThe6-inchBreechLoadingMarkXiiGun1917.G.2111717.pdf/page/n3/

Perhaps you wouldn't confuse the different guns? I think it would be easier that way.

[27091965]

Quote: AlexanderA

You named a certain cannon whose barrel length was increased by 0,85 meters in 1898. Please name the model and modification of this cannon and provide a link to your source of information about the cannon.

Please specify the gun model. If you are referring to the BL 6-inch Mk VII, it is a different gun with different ballistics, not part of the 6"/40 QF EOC Mark I, II, and III export gun line.

Is this an exam?

If you are talking about the BL 6-inch Mk VII, it is a different gun with different ballistics, and was not part of the 6"/40 QF EOC Mark I, II and III export gun line.

For those who are visually impaired or have poor understanding, I will write it again.
Andrey's question;

Thanks for the information. I'm very curious, of course, what the Japanese have come up with.

My answer;

Translations from Japanese are not mine. Regarding the English translations, I can add that after increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898, projectile velocity increased. According to the Royal Artillery Handbook, a 9,2 kg cordite charge was introduced, but it had one peculiarity: the full charge was fired only when using armor-piercing projectiles.

I am writing about the 6-inch guns being considered by the Admiralty for use on ships of the British Navy, and the results of their trials. This does not in any way pertain to exports of these guns to other countries. The trial results are relevant for subsequent types of guns, and they demonstrate that increasing the velocity of projectiles using cordite is entirely acceptable.

[Alexandra]

Quote: 27091965i

Is this an exam?

Please specify the model and modification of the gun. So far, we've been talking about nothing. I'm writing about specific models and modifications, and you're talking about some "cloud in pants" from 1898.

Translations from Japanese are not my thing.

Send me the link, I'll translate it myself. I'm really curious about how the Japanese increased the barrel length of the 6"/40 QF EOC in 1898, and what Captain Honner has to do with it. I'm starting to get really curious.

I am writing about the 6-inch guns being considered by the Admiralty for use on ships of the British fleet, and the results of the trials of these guns.

Did the British Admiralty address this issue in Japanese? Once again, I suggest you provide the gun models and modifications.

After which we will discuss the relationship between these guns and the 6"/40 QF EOC Mark I, Mark II, Mark III gun line, which was distributed around the world in quantities of almost a thousand copies, and its Italian and Japanese licensed copies that were in service with the Mikado's navy.

[27091965]

Quote: AlexanderA

So far our communication has been about nothing.

I didn't actually plan to talk to you. You contacted me, and I responded. If you're not happy with my answers, just don't contact me, that's all.

[Alexandra]

Quote: 27091965i

I didn't actually plan to communicate with you.

This is a public forum. What did you expect when you voiced information that doesn't correspond to historical reality? I noticed this discrepancy and wrote to you.

You contacted me, I answered you.

Model and modification of the gun "After increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898, the projectile speeds increased." Name it. Or just admit that you've realized that the BL 6-inch Mk VII gun has nothing to do with the 6-inch QF EOC Mark I, II, III line of guns and their licensed Italian and Japanese copies, except that it's also designed for firing at ships, also 6" and also a Vickers. And let's leave it at that.

If you are not satisfied with my answers, just don’t contact me, that’s all.

DO NOT publicly state anything that does not correspond to historical reality. I will NOT point out this discrepancy. Consequently, I will not be forced to point out that you have publicly voiced misleading, erroneous information.

[27091965]

Quote: AlexanderA

DO NOT publicly state anything that does not correspond to historical reality. I will NOT point out this discrepancy. Consequently, I will not be forced to point out that you have publicly voiced misleading, erroneous information.

First: who are you to tell me what to do and evaluate what I have written after reading two instructions?

"After increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898, the projectile speeds increased" name it.

Secondly, this applies primarily to testing guns with different barrel lengths. Six-inch guns with different barrel lengths were tested, using a projectile weighing 45 kg, with barrel lengths of 40; 45; 50; 75; 100 calibers.

and their licensed copies of Italian and Japanese production, except that it is also for shooting at ships, also 6" and also Vickers. And let's stop there.

And thirdly: a table of naval guns of the Italian fleet in 1898.

[Alexandra]

Quote: 27091965i

First: who are you to tell me what to do?

I was the one who knew how the BL 6-inch Mk VII differed from the QF 6-inch EOC Mark I.

That’s why you couldn’t pass off these two different artillery systems as one, which "the barrel length was increased by 0,85 meters in 1898".

By the way, the BL 6-inch Mk VII was not developed in 1898.

Now you also know that the BL 6-inch Mk VII and the 6-inch QF EOC Mark III have in common only their purpose, caliber and manufacturer.

Your level of historical knowledge has increased. Good.

after reading two instructions?

You don't know how much or what I've read. But that's not important. What matters is that your historical knowledge has grown thanks to my help. This is a positive result of our communication. Of course, there was a negative result, too. Your pride was hurt. In that regard, I'm certainly an unpleasant person.

And thirdly: a table of naval guns of the Italian fleet in 1898.

It is a pity that this table was no longer relevant at the start of the Russo-Japanese War.
The table gives (though not all) the characteristics of the Cannone da 152/40 A Modello 1891, an Italian licensed copy of the QF 6-inch/40 Mark I produced by the Armstrong-Pozzuoli factory.

However, since the initial velocities for the other guns are given with propellant charges of brown prismatic powder, from which both the Italians and the Japanese had already switched to smokeless powders by 1904, respectively, to ballistite and cordite, the initial velocity column would still not have written anything interesting for the history of the Russian Nuclear Forces.

By the way, do you realize that the 5800 kg you emphasized is the barrel's mass without the breech? The entire deck-mounted artillery system was actually heavier than the 6"/45 Canet gun on a deck-mounted mount.

[27091965]

Quote: AlexanderA

I was the one who knew how the BL 6-inch Mk VII differed from the QF 6-inch EOC Mark I.

It's funny, me too.

That's why you couldn't pass off these two different artillery systems as one, which had a "barrel length of 0,85 meters in 1898."

What's even funnier is that I don't know if I should repeat it a third time. But I probably will.

For those who are visually impaired or have poor understanding, I will write it again.
Andrey's question;
Thanks for the information. It's very interesting, of course, what we came up with. Japanese.

My answer;
Translations from Japanese are not mine. Regarding the English translations, I can add that after increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898, projectile velocity increased. According to the Royal Artillery Handbook, a cordite charge weighing 9,2 kg began to be used, but there was one peculiarity: the full charge was fired only when using an armor-piercing projectile.

I wonder how a gun with a barrel lengthened to 45 calibers can be compared to a 40-caliber gun during testing? In which comment did I say these are the same gun? I'm waiting for a quote.
You are certainly a lousy sophist; you persistently try to draw your interlocutor into “your” topic, trying to ignore what he has written and not paying attention to the fact that the explanations have nothing to do with Italy and Japan.

By the way, the BL 6-inch Mk VII was not developed in 1898.

I didn't write that, that was a mistake.

It is important that the level of your historical knowledge has increased thanks to my help.

Well, "Genius No. 2" has appeared on the site.

Your pride was hurt. In this regard, I am certainly an unpleasant person.

This is not for me; after so many years of service in the Armed Forces and military “miracles,” I have ceased to be receptive to such individuals.

By the way, do you realize that the 5800 kg you emphasized is the barrel's mass without the breech? The entire deck-mounted artillery system was actually heavier than the 6"/45 Canet gun on a deck-mounted mount.

This was put up for informational purposes only and nothing more.

[Alexandra]

Quote: 27091965i

What's even funnier is that I don't know if I should repeat it a third time. But I probably will.

Please name the model and modification of the gun you wrote about: "Regarding the British, I can add that after increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898, the projectile speed increased."?

After which, I would like to know why you mentioned this particular gun in the thread discussing the ballistics of the QF 6"/40 EOC and their licensed copies in the Russo-Japanese War?

Why didn't you remember, for example, the 6" BL Mark IX with a 50-caliber barrel adopted by the Brazilian and US navies in 1898, namely this gun with a 45-caliber barrel?

Because that's how memory works?

Your information about firing a 6" Armstrong with Chilworth Special Powder propellant charges in 1891, or French B10, B16, and B19 propellant charges in 1892, is certainly interesting. However, these propellants were not used during the Russian Nuclear War.

Well, "Genius No. 2" has appeared on the site.

A long-standing user on this site, "Attentive to Detail," still doesn't understand why you've put your memory to the test and clogged your attempt to understand the actual ballistics of the Mikado 6"/40 QF EOC guns used by the navy during the Russo-Japanese War with "0,85m-longer barrels" and other stories from 1891-1892. Not in 1891-1892, not in the final years of World War I, but specifically during the Russo-Japanese War.

This was put up for informational purposes only and nothing more.

Got it. I've read it. Thank you. The only thing I still don't know is the gun model. "After increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898, the projectile speeds increased.".

[27091965]

You've asked questions that require a long answer, so I'll try to condense it into a short space. But tomorrow's the deadline, and right now it's Nations League football.

[27091965]

Quote: AlexanderA

Your information about firing a 6" Armstrong with Chilworth Special Powder propellant charges in 1891, or French B10, B16, and B19 propellant charges in 1892, is certainly interesting. However, these propellants were not used during the Russian Nuclear War.

What you've written, first of all, shows that you don't fully understand the purpose of gun trials. In addition to the charge weight, the propellant used, and the projectile weight, there's also the pressure created by the charge. This is one of the important variables considered when determining a gun's capabilities. At that time, there were three types of pressure determined during trials. Normal pressure was 2400, but the terms "design" and "combat" were also used. Maximum allowable pressure, which typically exceeded normal pressure by 150-200 units, was also used, and a maximum of 3000 units or more was used to determine the strength of the gun and mount. All of this applies to the 6-inch gun models 1-4.
If we exclude French gunpowder, ballistite was recognized as the best gunpowder for charges based on the ratio charge (6,8 kg) + projectile (45,5 kg) + initial velocity (674,8 m/s) + pressure (2207).

Because that's how memory works?

Memory works differently.

A long-time user on this site, "Attentive to Detail," still doesn't understand why you've put your memory to the test and clogged your attempt to figure out the actual ballistics of the Mikado 6"/40 QF EOC used by the Navy during the Russo-Japanese War with "0,85m-long barrels" and other stories from 1891-1892.

Didn't the AI ​​you use to find flaws in articles and comments give you the answer? I think you should change "Attentive to Detail" to something more modest.
Now, let's get down to business. In 1897–1898, the British Admiralty considered penetrating 6-inch armor with a 6-inch armor-piercing shell at a range of 1500 yards. This is the range at which a gunner can aim a gun at a specific part of a ship: a casemate, a turret, etc. Firing tests showed that this required a muzzle velocity of at least 770 m/s. This required a gun with a longer barrel to reduce the negative impact on the gun. This is how this gun was created, and I think you can find out the model and modification from AI, so it's not worth sitting idle.
The answer regarding the Japanese guns is likely only available from the esteemed Alexey, who specializes in translations from Japanese. The rest of the information is unconfirmed.
I, in turn, wrote about the capabilities of British guns, without attempting to speculate on which guns, with what design modifications, were purchased by Japan. Since I have come across information that the Japanese were supplied with guns with enlarged chambers, but since this information did not reference any documents, I will not use it.

Why didn't you remember, for example, the 6" BL Mark IX with a 50-caliber barrel adopted by the Brazilian and US navies in 1898, namely this gun with a 45-caliber barrel?

The answer is above.
Wow, I've written so much, and that's not all.

[Alexandra]

Quote: 27091965i

What you wrote shows, first of all, that you do not fully understand the meaning of testing weapons.

What specific words of mine led you to this conclusion? Please quote them.

If we exclude French gunpowder, ballistite was recognized as the best gunpowder for charges based on the ratio charge (6,8 kg) + projectile (45,5 kg) + initial velocity (674,8 m/s) + pressure (2207).

Did you forget to add "the best gunpowder for the Italian navy's cannon charges"? The British navy chose cordite. British Cordite Mark I was also chosen by the Mikado's navy in 1903.
"Cordite is a double-base propellant powder made using a mixture of a volatile and a non-volatile solvent. It was first produced in England by F. Abel, with the assistance of the chemist Dewar, in 1880, and has been in industrial production since 1889. Cordite is superior to ballistite in power and cost, but produces even greater barrel flare." : Dik V.N. "Explosives, gunpowder and ammunition of domestic production"
For example, in the US Navy in the late 1890s, pyrocollodion powder was recognized as the best. If you wrote specifically about the QF 6"/40 EOC and its licensed copies, then the US also purchased QF 6"/40 EOC guns in 1898.

So, ballistite, under the pseudonym Filite, was chosen only by the Italians for propellant charges in naval guns. And even then, only before the transition to C-series propellants in the mid-1900s. Filite was extremely damaging to barrels.

If I have not described the situation with the British and Italian produced QF 6"/40 EOC smokeless powder propellant charges before the Russian Nuclear Forces in sufficient detail, or if you have noticed any errors, please add or correct them.

Didn't the AI ​​you use to find flaws in articles and comments give you the answer?

Didn't I tell you that modern AIs are constantly hallucinating, and that to ask an AI questions correctly, you need to know most of the answer? I wrote that after you told me the AI's hallucination about Argentine admirals wanting to abandon the Rivaldia and Moreno ships being built in Italy and instead purchase a pair of improved Brooklyn-class armored ships from the US. As far as I remember, you were unable to provide me with any references to the sources. Right?

I generally remember commentators who clutter historical discussions with such "alternative history." I remember you, dear Igor. And you continued, cluttering the discussion with "after increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898," a gun whose model and modification you can't name. It turns out you're still unable to correctly ask AI questions about the history of world navies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

That's how this weapon came into being, and I think you can find out the model and modification from the AI, so it won't stand idle.

Dear Igor, you CANNOT find out from the AI ​​the model and modification of the cannon "after increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898", but do you think I can?

That's not how it works, Igor. The burden of providing arguments lies with the party that put forth the thesis.

However, I have already mentioned the 6"/45 gun with a muzzle velocity of 770 m/s (in good weather) - the BL 6-inch Mk VII. However, it was developed in 1899.

Apparently, I will never get from you the model and modification of the cannon from 1898 that you wrote about, just as I have not received from you a link to a historical source that mentioned the desire of the Argentine admirals to buy two improved armored "Brooklyns".

In my humble opinion, you need to better master working with generative AI and verify information before making public those cool stories that generative AI generates based on your requests.

[27091965]

Quote: AlexanderA

If we exclude French gunpowder, ballistite was recognized as the best gunpowder for charges based on the ratio charge (6,8 kg) + projectile (45,5 kg) + initial velocity (674,8 m/s) + pressure (2207).

Did you forget to add "the best gunpowder for the Italian navy's cannon charges"? The British navy chose cordite. The Mikado's navy also chose British Cordite Mark I in 1903.

I admire your "resourcefulness", so I will simply repeat the comment;
You wrote;

Quote: AlexanderA
Your information about firing a 6" Armstrong with Chilworth Special Powder propellant charges in 1891, or French B10, B16, and B19 propellant charges in 1892, is certainly interesting. However, these propellants were not used during the Russian Nuclear War.

My answer;

What you've written, first of all, shows that you don't fully understand the purpose of gun trials. In addition to the charge weight, the propellant used, and the projectile weight, there's also the pressure created by the charge. This is one of the important variables considered when determining a gun's capabilities. At that time, there were three types of pressure determined during trials. Normal pressure was 2400, but the terms "design" and "combat" were also used. Maximum allowable pressure, which typically exceeded normal pressure by 150-200 units, was also used, and a maximum of 3000 units or more was used to determine the strength of the gun and mount. All of this applies to the 6-inch gun models 1-4.
If we exclude French gunpowder, ballistite was recognized as the best gunpowder for charges based on the ratio charge (6,8 kg) + projectile (45,5 kg) + initial velocity (674,8 m/s) + pressure (2207).

Are you saying that you didn’t understand what I wrote?

I wrote after you recounted to me an AI hallucination about Argentine admirals wanting to abandon the Rivaldia and Moreno ships being built in Italy and instead purchase a pair of improved Brooklyn-class armored ships from the US. As far as I remember, you were unable to provide me with any references to the sources. Right?

Don't jump off topic, I already wrote that you are a lousy sophist.

Dear Igor, you CANNOT find out from the AI ​​the model and modification of the cannon "after increasing the barrel length by 0,85 meters in 1898", but do you think I can?

However, I have already mentioned the 6"/45 gun with a muzzle velocity of 770 m/s (in good weather) - the BL 6-inch Mk VII. However, it was developed in 1899.

This is the future BL 6-inch Mk VII gun. Anyway, enlighten me as to the designation of the experimental gun being developed, which is supposed to undergo testing and be accepted into service. And, if you don't mind, could you also point out the designations of the 6-inch 50-caliber gun and the 6-inch 75-caliber gun? These guns were developed and tested simultaneously. Just don't get off topic again.

[Alexandra]

Quote: 27091965i

I admire your "resourcefulness"

You are experiencing psychological projection. Psychological projection is an unconscious defense mechanism in which a person attributes their own thoughts, feelings, motives, character traits, or desires to other people or external objects that they find unacceptable or undesirable.

"If we exclude French gunpowder, ballistite was recognized as the best gunpowder for charges based on the ratio charge (6,8 kg) + projectile (45,5 kg) + muzzle velocity (674,8 m/s) + pressure (2207)."

Let me repeat the question: who and when recognized ballistite as the “best powder for charges”?

The British? The British chose cordite.

The Italians chose ballistite. But "if you take away French gunpowder," you didn't write about the Italians. That's why I asked: "Did you forget to add 'the best gunpowder for the Italian navy's cannon charges'?"

After all, "if we exclude French gunpowder," you only wrote about "during the 1891 Armstrong 6-inch gun test using Chilworth Special Powder, the charge weight was 12,7 kg." But Chilworth Special Powder is a brand of brown powder. This is actually clear even from the weight of the powder charge.

So who and when recognized a 6,8 kg ballistite propellant charge as the "best powder for 6"/40 QF charges?

Are you saying that you didn’t understand what I wrote?

How can we understand you if you clearly write about Italians, but don’t mention Italians?

Don't jump off topic, I already wrote that you are a lousy sophist.

You wrote: "Didn't the AI ​​you use to find flaws in articles and comments give you an answer?"

Firstly, I don’t use AI to find other people’s mistakes; I can already see them and have the attention span and knowledge to do so.

And since you brought up AI, I wrote that I've already noticed you've twice published AI hallucinations disguised as real historical information. The first time was about the Argentine admirals' desire to buy two improved Brooklyn-class guns from the US instead of the Rivaldia and Moreno. The second time was about a certain 6"/45 gun developed by Vickers in 1898, which fired a 9,2 kg cordite propellant charge, "According to the Royal Artillery Handbook," the model and modification of which you were unable to specify. Everything seems to point to the 6"/45 BL Mark VII. But all the facts and figures are slightly inconsistent: the year of development, the weight of the propellant charge, the fact that this Mark I cordite propellant charge was only used for firing armor-piercing shells (no).
Once again, as in the case of the two improved American armored "Brooklyns" - the desire of Argentine admirals, instead of real historical information, a hallucination of generative AI?

That's why I suggested that you first verify the historical information that the generative AI "finds" for you, and only then make it public.

After all, there are few people who are so attentive and meticulous, and also familiar with the topic, whose eye will catch all of this.

And your armored "Brooklyns" for Argentina, which never existed in the plans, and your 6"/45 gun with a cordite propellant charge of 9,2 kg, not 20 pounds (9,071 kg), which never existed, will live their lives on the forums, as if they existed in reality.

This is the future BL 6-inch Mk VII gun. Anyway, enlighten me as to what the designation is for the experimental gun being developed, which is supposed to undergo testing and be accepted into service.

Did the "Royal Artillery Handbook" include a prototype gun and its prototype propellant charge weighing 9,2 kg? Please provide a link to this handbook. I'll show the actual propellant charges of the BL 6-inch Mk VII in the attached image below.

Specify the designations for the 6-inch 50-caliber gun and the 6-inch 75-caliber gun. The development and testing of these guns took place simultaneously.

You wrote about these guns, so you should cite the historical source for your knowledge of them. Will there be another link to the historical source?

https://archive.org/details/6-inch-bl-mk-7-hdbk-1916/page/38/

[27091965]

Quote: AlexanderA

You are experiencing psychological projection. Psychological projection is an unconscious defense mechanism in which a person attributes their own thoughts, feelings, motives, character traits, or desires to other people or external objects that they find unacceptable or undesirable.

Let me repeat the question: who and when recognized ballistite as the “best powder for charges”?

How can we understand you if you clearly write about Italians, but don’t mention Italians?

Based on the results of tests in France.

And your armored "Brooklyns" for Argentina, which never existed in the plans, and your 6"/45 gun with a cordite propellant charge of 9,2 kg, not 20 pounds (9,071 kg), which never existed, will live their lives on the forums, as if they existed in reality.

This is nonsense and I don’t want to answer, because you forget or don’t know how weapons are tested.

You wrote about these guns, so you should cite the historical source for your knowledge of them. Will there be another link to the historical source?

"Ammunition Handbook". BY AUTHORITY OF THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF THE ADMIRALTY.
Don't post army instructions for this weapon, especially since the first such weapon appeared in 1898 for coastal defense. How can you include this in army instructions? It's not ours.
It's enough for today.

[Alexandra]

In the vast majority of cases, people don't realize they have a psychological projection. The mechanism is unconscious. But I noticed your projection, informed you, and now you're aware. Independent awareness of a projection is possible, but it requires a high level of reflection.

Based on the results of tests in France.

Understood. However, the French Navy did not use ballistic smokeless powders during the period in question. The French Navy used pyroxylin (single-base) smokeless powders.

https://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-100.php

This is nonsense and I don’t want to answer, because you forget or don’t know how weapons are tested.

You're being rude. Provide a link to the page in the "Royal Artillery Handbook" that mentions a 9,2 kg cordite propellant charge for the gun you mentioned, or simply admit that you wrote: "According to the Royal Artillery Handbook, a 9,2 kg cordite charge was introduced." - at the behest of generative AI, without checking anything. We also didn't see a page in the "Handbook of the Royal Artillery" that would mention a 9,2 kg propellant charge for the BL 6-inch Mk VII.

"Ammunition Handbook". BY AUTHORITY OF THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF THE ADMIRALTY.

If you want to hide the reference link from the general public, then simply publish the page that lists the 9,2 kg propellant charge you mentioned.

Do not display military instructions for this weapon.

Why is that? Because, in addition to the propellant charges used on ships, coastal guns had heavier propellant charges?

The Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, produced guns and ammunition for both the British Army and the Royal Navy.

https://archive.org/details/6-inch-bl-mk-7-hdbk-1911

by Chief Inspector Royal Arsenal, Woolwich

And yes, by the early 20th century, only one full propellant charge of smokeless powder was adopted for the BL 6-inch Mk VII: 20 pounds of Mark I cordite. Your attempt to describe a certain 9,2 kg charge... can you write down 20 pounds and how many ounces of cordite according to the "Ammunition Handbook"? BY AUTHORITY OF THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF THE ADMIRALTY?

Moreover, the first such weapon appeared in 1898 in coastal defense

Development of this gun began when, in November 1895, DNO stated that it was time to develop a higher-velocity 6in QF. The existing gun had been designed before the use of Cordite was fully established, and the chamber size was not therefore well adapted to that propellant. Director General of Ordnance Factories proposed a 6in/45 with a muzzle velocity of 2650ft/sec, to fit the existing service mounting. DNO suggested that EOC also be asked for a design, and Controller and then First Naval Lord (ie, First Sea Lord) agreed. EOC was asked for alternative 45- and 50-caliber designs. The company had already made QF guns of both lengths. DirectorGeneral of Ordnance Factories later offered two 45-caliber and two 50- caliber designs, the extra 5 calibers adding 75ft/sec. Vickers also submitted designs. By April 1896 DNO had decided that anything longer than 45 calibers was unacceptable, unless its advantages could be shown to outweigh the significant disadvantages of mounting so long a gun on a ship. The Ordnance Committee recommended the Vickers design, which offered a
simpler breech mechanism, and would also probably be ready much sooner. A test gun was ordered in December 1896.

In November 1897 Inspector General of Ordnance asked whether it would be practicable to replace metal cartridges with silk cloth ones (ie, bags, as in BL guns).

Committee suggested trials to decide whether guns should take metallic or silk cloth cartridges. In December 1897 the Board approved ordering fortyeight guns, and it was also adopted for land service. However, it was also decided that the gun should use silk cloth cartridges ('bare charges'), which made it a BL rather than a true QF gun.

The only reservation was that the gun appeared to have a high rate of erosion (muzzle velocity was reduced from 2700ft/sec to 2400ft/sec after 235 full service charges), but that was considered acceptable in view of the advantages of a higher-velocity gun.

The new high-powered 6in gun was BL Mk VII. The first gun was
received at Woolwich on 21 July 1897, and fired on 23 July. Rated lifetime (1915) was 1200 rounds using Cordite MD (29lb charge). With a 20lb or 23lb charge it was 900 rounds with Cordite Mk I and 1800 rounds with Cordite MD. The standard muzzle velocity was 2562–2573ft/sec, but some guns (in the King Edward VII and Iron Duke class battleships, Tiger, the Hampshires and Swift) could fire with heavy charges to achieve 2770–2775ft/sec. With the supercharges, at 20° elevation a 4crh shell could reach 14,600yds.

It's enough for today.

You've reached a new level: "I don't want to answer," "BY AUTHORITY OF THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF THE ADMIRALTY," but I can't specify or provide any links. Also: "Do not post army instructions for this weapon."

Please provide at least some instructions for this weapon that confirm the AI ​​hallucinations that you have already presented to the public about it.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

This is all brilliant, of course, but I still haven't seen any reference to the charge and initial velocity of the projectile for the Armstrong gun in Japan.

You were unable to follow the link:

https://navgunschl.sakura.ne.jp/koudou/ijn/buki/gun/gun_data/6in_40cal.html

And see a propellant charge made of MD cordite weighing 6.670 kg?

Without a doubt, the "crazy" hieroglyphs are complex.

You are now again constructing logical constructions - like, since there is a reference to the fact that the Japanese had 700 m/s with an MD, and the Japanese did not use an MD, then this means the initial velocity was lower because the Japanese used the same charge as the British.

The Japanese didn't have their own MD cordite until the end of 1908. And then another N number of years were spent developing their own propellant charge from their MD cordite.

If we assume that the Japanese had a propelling charge of their own design made of MD cordite weighing 6,670 kg, which provided an initial velocity of 700 m/s for a hundred-pound projectile, then this could only have been a propelling charge made of their own tubular cordite, whereas the British, by the First World War, along with a charge made of Mark I corded cordite, used for these guns a charge made of MD26 corded cordite weighing 7,23 kg, which provided an initial velocity of 684 m/s for a hundred-pound projectile.

All corded propellants are degressive, meaning the grain's surface area decreases during combustion. However, tubular single-channel propellants were continuous-burning—the burning surface area remained virtually constant. Later, they learned to make multi-channel tubular progressive propellants. However, the conservative British, along with the Mark I corded propellant during World War I, used a propellant charge made of a modified MD26 corded propellant, which reduced barrel flare at 7,23 kg. Even with its increased mass due to its degressive combustion, this propellant only achieved a muzzle velocity of 684 m/s.

With the propellant charge weight of 6,67 kg stated in the Japanese source, a velocity of 700 m/s could be achieved solely through the use of continuously burning tubular propellant. But, once again, the Japanese did not have their own tubular cordite in 1904-1905. They didn't even have their own cordite for naval artillery until the Hiratsuka propellant plant opened in December 1908.

Thus, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese could only use imported propellant charges. There were no British propellant charges for the 6"/40 QF, capable of delivering a velocity of 701 m/s. None at all. Not by 1904-1905, nor later.

Japanese propellant charges made from their own cord, tape, tubular, or any other cordite of their own production could only appear after December 1908.

Therefore, dear Andrey, you will have to accept the fact that in 1904-1905 the Japanese did not have propellant charges for the 6"/40 QF guns that could provide a muzzle velocity of 700 m/s or 701 m/s.

I'll write more, the propellant charge for the Japanese 6"/40 QF EOC or the licensed 15 cm/40 Type 41 is a phantom.

The Japanese were switching to the metric system, and, as the Japanese source above suggests, after 1908 they could have developed a propellant charge for the 15 cm/40 Type 41 made from tubular cordite MD of their own production, which would have provided an initial velocity of 700 m/s, but certainly not 2300 feet per second (701 m/s).

Most likely, at some point due to an error or typo, the Japanese 15 cm/40 Type 41 was given the characteristics of the export 6"/50 (15.2 cm) BL Marks IX and X in some source, known in the American service as the 6"/50 (15.2 cm) Mark 5 (Armstrong).

This gun actually had a muzzle velocity of 2300 pounds per second (701 m/s) for a 100 pound projectile:

https://web.archive.org/web/20151008011759/http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_6-50_mk5.htm

Well, then the naval historians simply thoughtlessly copied 701 m/s from this source, and later from each other.

To think that the figure of 2300 feet per second is strange, not typical either for the ballistics of the 6"/40 QF EOC Mark I, II and III family of guns, which sold around a thousand copies worldwide, or for Japan, which diligently switched to the metric system - you have to think about it.

The Japanese could use C in greater quantities than the British, that's all.

Oh, these inventive Japanese. Do you understand that there is absolutely no historical basis for this speculation of yours?

So, the book TREATISE of AMMUNITION 1915, page 457 is attached.

https://rnzaoc.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/treatise-on-ammunition-1915.pdf

If you find any historical source describing any other full propellant charge of Mark I cordite other than the 6,01 kilogram (13 lbs 4 ozs) Size 30 charge for the 6" QF Mark I, II, and III gun family, please let me know. It's interesting.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

If we assume that the Japanese had a propellant charge of their own design made of MD cordite weighing 6,670 kg,

That's your assumption. But I'm telling you that the Japanese could have used a charge of a different mass, which, in general, happens with guns.

[Alexandra]

You can base your argument on any assumptions you like. For example, having adopted Cordite Mark I as the "standard corded propellant" for all QF naval guns in service at the time on March 19, 1903, by 1904 the Japanese had not only developed their own "barrel-burning" propellant propellant made of Cordite Mark I of significantly increased mass for the 6"/40 QF EOC guns, but had also established mass production of both this propellant propellant made of imported Cordite Mark I and increased-capacity cartridges for it.

But your hypothetical assumption requires at least some documentary historical evidence, markings and characteristics of such charges, ballistic tables, and even just a photo of cartridges with Japanese markings from the time of the Russian Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area War, which could confirm that the Japanese themselves produced these cartridges.

I'm not going to engage in "proof of absence."

Until you prove that the Japanese produced their own propellant powder charges for 6"/40 QF EOC guns from imported cordite during the REW years, Occam's razor forces us to believe that during the REW years the Japanese used imported British propellant powder charges Cord 30 for these guns, weighing 13 pounds 4 ounces (6,01 kg), which provided an initial velocity of 2154 feet per second (~656,5 m/s) for 100 pound 6" projectiles under standard conditions.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

I'm not going to engage in "proof of absence."

You don't need to. All you need to prove is that the Japanese used British-style charges and that the muzzle velocity of their 6-inch guns didn't exceed the British one.
Then you should prove that it is the navveps who is right, giving the elevation angle of the Japanese 6-inch as 15 degrees, and not the source you cited, according to which the elevation angle is still 16 degrees.

最大仰角（度）１６

Otherwise, even if you are right about the charge, it turns out that the Japanese could still shoot at 9,700 yards or 48,5 cables.
Next, you will have to prove that the Japanese fought for a long time in the ZhM within the range of the Russian 6-inch guns, but outside the range of their own guns, and that this difference significantly limited the firepower of the Japanese.
Then you will have to make an adjustment for damage, since Peresvet could only fire 3 6*dm guns per side for a long time, and Pobeda had 2 guns on the firing side out of action for 1,5 hours - this does not include minor breakdowns, which were dealt with relatively quickly.
After you prove, calculate and take all this into account, you will not even reach the equality of the metal ejected into the liquid metal by the Japanese missile cruisers and the Pobeda and Peresvet.
And you need to justify your fantasies about 60% superiority.
Good luck

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

I'm not going to engage in "proof of absence."

You don't need to. All you need to prove is that the Japanese used British-style charges and that the muzzle velocity of their 6-inch guns didn't exceed the British one.
Then you should prove that it is the navveps who is right, giving the elevation angle of the Japanese 6-inch as 15 degrees, and not the source you cited, according to which the elevation angle is still 16 degrees.

最大仰角（度）１６

Otherwise, even if you are right about the charge, it turns out that the Japanese could still shoot at 9,700 yards or 48,5 cables.
Next, you will have to prove that the Japanese fought for a long time in the ZhM within the range of the Russian 6-inch guns, but outside the range of their own guns, and that this difference significantly limited the firepower of the Japanese.
Then you will have to make an adjustment for damage, since Peresvet could only fire 3 6*dm guns per side for a long time, and Pobeda had 2 guns on the firing side out of action for 1,5 hours - this does not include minor breakdowns, which were dealt with relatively quickly.
After you prove, calculate and take all this into account, you will not even reach the equality of the metal ejected into the liquid metal by the Japanese missile cruisers and the Pobeda and Peresvet.
And you need to justify your fantasies about 60% superiority.
Good luck
P.S. If it's any consolation, I think your theory about using British ammunition is quite realistic – it could have happened. But it also might not have, unfortunately.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

You don't need to. All you need to prove is that the Japanese used British-style charges.

Do you doubt it? That the Japanese used shells and propellant powder supplied by England for their naval guns during the Russian Revolutionary War? Why do you doubt it?

Then you should prove that it is the navveps who is right, giving the elevation angle of the Japanese 6-inch as 15 degrees, and not the source you cited, according to which the elevation angle is still 16 degrees.

Well, on the Nissin and Kasuga, it was definitely 15 degrees for casemate guns. Or are you still doubting the information in the 1905 Engineering article? And deck guns had mounts with both 19 and 20 degrees maximum elevation. But that's beside the point. Would one degree really save the father of Russian democracy?

Next, you will have to prove that the Japanese fought for a long time in the ZhM within the range of the Russian 6-inch guns, but outside the range of their own guns, and that this difference significantly limited the firepower of the Japanese.

Why? If the Peresvet's 6" guns could, as you wrote, fire to a maximum range of 55 cable lengths, while the Kasuga and Nissin casemate guns could only fire to a maximum range of 46 cable lengths, then any sane person familiar with the ups and downs of the Yellow Sea battle doesn't really need an explanation as to why the Nissin fired less of its 6" guns in the Yellow Sea than the Peresvet.

And for those who have lost their common sense to explain anything counterproductively, it’s a waste of time.

P.S. If it's any consolation, I think your theory about using British ammunition is quite realistic – it could have happened. But it also might not have, unfortunately.

I'm glad you have no doubt that the Japanese in the RYA definitely used British-made shells and, apparently, foreign-made propellant charges to a much greater extent. The shells are fine, but having adopted British smokeless "ordinary corded propellant" for QF guns in 1903, it was practically impossible by 1904 to develop their own propellant charges using this propellant, distinct from the British ones, for this family of guns and establish their mass production.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

Do you doubt it?

Конечно.

Quote: AlexanderA

Well, the Nissin and Kasuga definitely have 15 degrees for casemate guns. Or are you still doubting the information in the 1905 Engineering article?

What about the Japanese source? :))) Alexandra, you're surprisingly straightforward in your desire to cherry-pick the sources that support your version and ignore anything that contradicts it. You liked the data on the propellant charge, so you declare it correct; you didn't like the elevation angle, so you declared it false. But it could also be the other way around—that the Japanese source was mistaken about the propellant charge, but gave the correct elevation angle.

Quote: AlexanderA

Will one degree save the father of Russian democracy?

Does it need saving? Don't you understand that even if you're right about the charges, that doesn't prove you're right about the amount of metal released by the ships?

Quote: AlexanderA

then any sane person familiar with the ups and downs of the battle in the Yellow Sea doesn't really need any explanation

I hasten to disappoint you. The first phase of the battle was largely fought at ranges over 60 kbt, but there were also encounters at 30 kbt, and the second began at either 45 or 42 kbt.

Quote: AlexanderA

I am glad that you do not doubt that the Japanese in the Russian Navy definitely used British-made shells.

I'm not at all sure about that. I don't know who made the shells for Nissin and Kasuga, and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that the Italians did. And that the propellant charges were Italian.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

What about the Japanese source? :))) Alexandra

The Japanese source clearly rounds the maximum elevation angle from the firing table to the nearest whole number. If you didn't notice, the firing table listed an elevation angle of up to 16 degrees 57 minutes (10,000 yards), even though casemate mounts only provided a maximum elevation angle of 15 degrees, while deck mounts provided 19 or 20 degrees, depending on the model.

Your attempt to connect 16 degrees from the Japanese page and the maximum elevation angle of the casemate installations stems from your carelessness.

For one reason or another, you very often multiply entities beyond what is necessary (Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem). Does this explanation satisfy you? The question is, of course, rhetorical.

You liked the data on the powder charge and you declare it to be true; if you didn’t like the data on the elevation angle, you declared it to be false.

You lied about my allegedly false statement about the 16 degrees. I made no such statement. I explained to you where the 16 degrees of elevation on the Japanese page came from. They were simply taken from the firing table, rounded to the nearest whole degree. Whoever copied the figures onto the page apparently copied them from the Japanese version of the Handbook of the 6-inch QF Gun, not from the description of the casemate or deck mounting of this gun. If you had bothered to study the British version of the Handbook of the 6-inch QF Gun at the link I provided earlier, you would have noticed that the elevation angles in that reference book are only listed in the firing table.

Don't you understand that even if you turn out to be right in the dispute about the charges, this in no way proves that you are right in the question of the amount of metal released by the ships?

If you do not agree that the combat distances in the Yellow Sea were such that the gunners of the same Peresvet were more often given the opportunity to begin firing from the casemate 6" Canet gun than the gunners of the Nisshin were given the opportunity to begin firing from the Italian version of the casemate 6" QF EOC, then what can I prove to you?

I won't even ask you where you got 55 cables for the 6" Canet, although S.O. Makarov in his "Reasonings on Naval Tactics" indicates 52,4 cables for an elevation angle of 15 degrees.

And I am certainly not surprised that you did NOT correct me and did NOT write that in the casemate installations of the Peresvet the maximum elevation angle was 20 degrees, and accordingly the maximum firing range was 62 cables.

However, V.N. Cherkasov, apparently taking into account the wear of the barrels and the quality of the propellant charges, somewhat underestimated the figures.

Appendix III. Memorandum after the battle of July 28 from the senior artillery officer of the squadron battleship Peresvet to the flagship artillery officer of the headquarters of the Detachment of Ships in Port Arthur

"16) The maximum range for 6-inch guns is 50 cables, but if necessary they can fire from 60 cables, for which it is useful to break the sights to 60 cables.

[...]

6-dm:

a) Zeroing. Cast iron.

b) On armored ships. From 60 to 50 cables - cast iron; from 50 to 25 cables - high-explosive; with 25 cables and less - armor-piercing. Order one cannon from 35 cables to start firing armor-piercing ones.

c) By non-armored ships. From 60 to 40 cables - cast iron; with 40 cables and less - high-explosive.

d) At destroyers. Cast iron or high-explosive."

Signed by: Lieutenant Cherkasov

Still don't understand how a ship with a maximum firing range of 62 cables for its casemate 6" guns could, in the battle in the Yellow Sea, significantly outspent a ship with a maximum firing range of 46 cables for its battery's casemate 6" guns in terms of 6" shells?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

The Japanese source clearly rounds the maximum elevation angle from the firing table to the nearest whole number. If you didn't notice, the firing table listed an elevation angle of up to 16 degrees 57 minutes (10,000 yards), even though casemate mounts only provided a maximum elevation angle of 15 degrees, while deck mounts provided 19 or 20 degrees, depending on the model.

The point is that shooting tables are compiled
1) For their practical application
2) Firing data is often given for a reduced initial velocity, taking into account some barrel runout and a drop in the initial velocity of the projectile relative to the rated one.
And now for a moment of black magic. I took a closer look at the handbook and...

The front face of the bar is furnished with a rack, gearing with.a pinion and hand-wheel fitted to the carrier. Fitted to the pinion spindle is a dram, to which is attached the yard seale graduated to 10,000 yards for a full charge, with a muzzle velocity of 2,200 feet secs. A reader is attached to the rear end of the carrier to indicate the range. A removable aluminum range strip, graduated to 90 degrees, is fitted to the rear face of the sight bar.

That is, the initial velocity was not 2,154, but 2200 ft/s with a full charge, while the firing range was 10,000 yards.
We check on a ballistic calculator - at what elevation angle this gun fired at 10,000 yards with a muzzle velocity of 2200 fps with a 100-pound projectile with a ballistic coefficient of 0,9689 calculated according to the firing table for a velocity of 2,154 fps and we get... 16,39 degrees.
That is, this gun, in rounded figures, at its rated muzzle velocity, fired at a range of 10,000 yards at an elevation of 16 degrees. This is what we see in the Japanese source.
That's all

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

That is, the initial velocity was not 2,154, but 2200 ft/s with a full charge, while the firing range was 10,000 yards.

The table shows a muzzle velocity of 2154 feet per second at a charge temperature of 60 degrees Fahrenheit and a muzzle velocity of 2200 feet per second at a charge temperature of 80 degrees Fahrenheit (at the very bottom of the first page of the table).

That is, this gun, roughly speaking, at its rated muzzle velocity, fired at a range of 10,000 yards at an elevation of 16 degrees. This is what we see in the Japanese source. That's all.

As I already wrote above, I believe that the Japanese page was filled with the Japanese equivalent of HANDBOOK OF THE 6-INCH QF GUN.

The firing table for the Japanese equivalent was for a 6,670 kg propellant charge of MD cordite, which provided a muzzle velocity of 700 m/s under normal conditions. Given the smaller propellant charge weight and simultaneously higher muzzle velocity compared to that of the British charge made of degressive-burning MD26 cordite, the Japanese charge was likely made of tubular MD cordite with a constant burning area.

The Japanese table was in the metric system, with range and speed not in yards and feet per second, but in meters and meters per second.

I believe this table was valid for distances up to 9500 meters. In this case, with a muzzle velocity of 700 m/s, the elevation angle in the table was estimated at 16° 04'. It was this rounded 16 degrees from the table that the Japanese transferred to his website as the maximum gun elevation angle.

The author of the page had no information about the actual machines and the actual elevation angles of these machines.

Unfortunately, the Japanese had sights on imported QF 6" EOC guns that were marked up to 10000 yards (up to 49,37 cables), while in our country, according to the historical testimony of V.N. Cherkasov, with a real ballistic range at an elevation angle of 20 degrees for 6" Kane guns of 11523 meters (62,29 cables), they were not marked up to 60 cables.

"The maximum range for 6-inch guns is 50 cables, but if necessary they can fire from 60 cables, for which it is useful to break the sights to 60 cables."

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

The Japanese source clearly rounds the maximum elevation angle from the firing table to the nearest whole number. If you didn't notice, the firing table listed an elevation angle of up to 16 degrees 57 minutes (10,000 yards), even though casemate mounts only provided a maximum elevation angle of 15 degrees, while deck mounts provided 19 or 20 degrees, depending on the model.

The point is that shooting tables are compiled
1) For their practical application. That is, no one will just randomly generate data there.
2) Firing data is often given for a reduced initial velocity, taking into account some barrel runout and a drop in the initial velocity of the projectile relative to the rated one.
And now for a moment of black magic. I took a closer look at the handbook and...

The front face of the bar is furnished with a rack, gearing with.a pinion and hand-wheel fitted to the carrier. Fitted to the pinion spindle is a dram, to which is attached the yard seale graduated to 10,000 yards for a full charge, with a muzzle velocity of 2,200 feet secs. A reader is attached to the rear end of the carrier to indicate the range. A removable aluminum range strip, graduated to 90 degrees, is fitted to the rear face of the sight bar.

That is, the initial velocity was not 2,154, but 2200 ft/s with a full charge, while the firing range was 10,000 yards.
We check on a ballistic calculator - at what elevation angle this gun fired at 10,000 yards with a muzzle velocity of 2200 fps with a 100-pound projectile with a ballistic coefficient of 0,9689 calculated according to the firing table for a velocity of 2,154 fps and we get... 16,39 degrees.
That is, this gun, in rounded figures, at its rated muzzle velocity, fired at a range of 10,000 yards at an elevation of 16 degrees. This is what we see in the Japanese source.
That's all

[Alexandra]

HANDBOOK OF THE 6-INCH QF GUN LAND SERVICE. 1898

https://archive.org/details/6-inch-qf-mk-2-hdbk-1898/page/22/

On pages 21-22 there is a shooting table.

At a muzzle velocity of 2154 feet per second and an elevation angle of 15 degrees 6 minutes, the range is 9400 yards (8595 meters, 46,4 cables).

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

At a muzzle velocity of 2154 feet per second

That is, at 656 m/s. While the Japanese had 701 m/s.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

That is, at 656 m/s. While the Japanese had 701 m/s.

Honestly, you should have figured out when the Japanese developed gunpowder charges that gave 701 m/s and what the projectile weight was.

I understand that it is difficult for a person for whom the trees obscure the forest to understand why all users, even with the 15,94 pound (7,23 kg) MD26 propellant charge that became widespread after the Russian Nuclear Forces, have 684 m/s for a 100 pound projectile, while the Japanese immediately and invariably have 701 m/s.

After all, navweaps.com and Friedman's Naval Weapons of World War One list 701 m/s for the Japanese, so that's what it was by 1904.

I'm completely serious about everyone. This time, the US:

Instructions for mounting, using, and caring for the 6-inch rapid-fire gun, Armstrong, May 1903, revised 1908, 1917 edition:

https://archive.org/details/instructionsfor16statgoog/page/n19/

The shooting table on pages 18-20 is still the same.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

Honestly, you should have figured out when the Japanese developed gunpowder charges that gave 701 m/s and what the projectile weight was.

Very funny.
So you're putting forward the thesis that the Japanese 6-inch guns weren't firing very far because... well, here, as usual, you've come up with a lot of different versions: you cited the navveaps - I laughed at you - and then you immediately changed your tune, declaring the navveps a Murzilka.
Finally, you came up with something that even remotely resembles a theory—you referenced firing tables. Very good.
But, you should know, a cannon can fire projectiles with different muzzle velocities. It's also possible for cannons to differ slightly, especially if they're manufactured under license. Another interesting point, and one you probably didn't know, is that the methods for compiling firing tables vary, including using a lower muzzle velocity than the one the cannon specifies for the projectile.
Because of this, the firing table you presented only says one thing - the navveps data for the British navy gun is +- correct in terms of initial velocity, but incorrect in terms of range.
However, this table in no way serves as a justification for the firing of Japanese guns. And if you want to prove that the Japanese fired precisely this charge and with this muzzle velocity, then go ahead and prove it.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Very funny.

It's really quite funny. The Japanese only acquired tubular cordite grade MD after the Hiratsuka gunpowder factory (Kanagawa Prefecture) opened in December 1908. Meanwhile, the British used only Mark I corded cordite, and later MD26 corded cordite, for the propellant charges of these guns (MD26 propellant charges provided a muzzle velocity of 684 m/s for a 100-pound projectile).

Will you describe how the Japanese, in 1904-1905, sent themselves tubular cordite grade MD from the Hiratsuka plant from the future? I want to laugh too.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

Will you describe how the Japanese, in 1904-1905, sent themselves tubular cordite grade MD from the Hiratsuka plant from the future? I want to laugh too.

Answered above

[27091965]

Good evening.

And we understand that it's a simple typo. Actually, you could have guessed for yourself that if Armstrong's guns fired at 43 kbt at the same elevation angle where Canet's was 55 kbt, no one would ever buy Armstrong's guns.

Dear Andrey. It's not just the elevation angle, although that does matter, but also the propellant powder used in the charge and its weight. The Armstrong 6-inch gun was designed with propellant powder charges of 6 kg; 9 kg; 13,7 kg; 6 kg cordite; 8,2 kg, and 11,4 kg. The 11,4 kg cordite charge was abandoned because its accuracy began to decline after 100 shots. The 8,2 kg cordite charge was adopted because accuracy began to decline after 390-400 shots; the projectile velocity with this charge was 760 m/s. Now it remains to be seen what charge the Japanese used when firing their 6-inch guns.

[Victor Leningradets]

In fact, it was funny to watch how you elegantly proved that the "Bayan", having approached (apparently teleported) to a distance of 15-20 cables, had a good chance of destroying the "Kasuga" or "Nissin".

It's more flowers!
Ahead of us is the "invincible" Des Moines, which will teleport to a distance of 75 cables and shoot the "shameful Soviet" Project 66.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

Ahead of us is the "invincible" Des Moines, which will teleport to a distance of 75 cables and shoot the "shameful Soviet" Project 66.

"Please include this in the minutes!" (c)

Quote: Victor Leningradets

In fact, it was funny to watch how you elegantly proved that "Bayan" "having approached (apparently teleported) to a distance of 15-20 cables

Well, Alexandra, it's clear that I "forgot" how "Bayan" converged with "Mikasa" at 19 kbt, but you...

[Victor Leningradets]

I am a sinner, I repent, I am biased.
I personally haven't encountered any apology for "Bayan," as my opinion disagrees with either Voevodsky or Grigorovich. But I consider your sending him to be shot alongside the Japanese line of armored cruisers an undeserved form of execution, even considering the stature of Robert Nikolaevich.
As for Des Moines, we'll see, maybe I'll be pleasantly mistaken.
Then I will apologize, don't doubt it.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

But the fact that you sent him to be shot at by the Japanese line of armored cruisers,

I've never sent anyone alone to the line. We were talking about a one-on-one duel situation. Which, in theory, could have happened—for example, if the Japanese had sent the Yakumo along with the "dogs," or if there were several Japanese ships, but some of them were engaged.

Quote: Victor Leningradets

As for Des Moines, we'll see.

It won't be long now, the article will be on the main page this week.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Well, Alexandra, it's clear that I "forgot" how "Bayan" converged with "Mikasa" at 19 kbt, but you...

So, for a minute or two, I found myself 19 cables' lengths away from the Mikasa, so what? "In the battle of January 27, 1904, the Japanese demonstrated superior marksmanship to the Russians." (C) Andrey Kolobov

And all thoughts on the topic: “If only we could agree with them on 15-20 cables, we would give them a run for their money” - are from the evil one.

[Alexandra]

We know that our esteemed Andrey is a stern Chelyabinsk patriot who always extols everything domestic, be it the Bayan vs. the Izumo, or the Project 66 cruiser vs. the Des Moines.

Therefore, in the calculations of the respected Andrey, I think the Project 66 cruiser will be run valiantly Do not allow the "Des Moines" to get within range from which the "Des Moines" could "stuff" the Project 66 cruiser with its 203 mm "machine guns."

However, during a 1954 simulation (a research tactical game), it was determined that a Project 66 cruiser would not be able to score enough hits to guarantee the American cruiser's incapacitation, much less its sinking. Therefore, after the research tactical game, Project 66 was abandoned.

But respected Andrey loves to refer to "fatal"/"golden" hits, and I think we will definitely see a reference to such in respected Andrey's article "On the hypothetical duel between the Project 66 cruiser and the cruiser "De Moines".

Just kidding

[Victor Leningradets]

Let's not anticipate (I'm a sinner, I repent).
And the games are a simple rig. I've simulated several combat scenarios, so I promise to tell you honestly how it could have played out. It's pure black magic, but it's still debunked.

[Jura 27]

We know that our respected Andrey is a stern Chelyabinsk patriot who always extols everything domestic, be it "Bayan"

Then you are a Francoman!

[Alexandra]

Quote: Jura 27

Then you are a Francoman!

I need to read how the respected Andrey compared the "Tsarevich" and "Battleship Retvizan. The best battleship of the Russo-Japanese War" (C) respected S.A. Balakin, in order to fully agree with your amendment, or at least present some objections to it.

[Ragnar]

Quote: Adrey

3 Peresvets and 3 armored raiders (Rurik, Rossiya, Gromoboi) against 6 Japanese armored cruisers.
But the Peresvets and the raiders were inferior in their different types, in the rationality of their armor, and in speed (the weakest and slowest of them was the Rurik, with 18 knots). The two Peresvets had weakened main battery guns. Therefore, six Russian ships would have been weaker than six Japanese ones.

And it doesn't matter that the "Rurik" achieved 18,8 knots during trials, even with its copper plating "lifted up," while the "Oslyabya" only achieved 18,3... So who's the slowest?

[Adrey]

That's not mine This is a quote from the article.

[Alexander Iloev]

Andrey, what's not clear here?
We're looking at a 6-on-6 battle. Of the 6 Russians, 3 are raiders, who are objectively weaker than the Amoids, because they're raiders.
They only have two 203mm guns firing at their ships, compared to the enemy's four. 152mm guns don't sink ships. This isn't my opinion, it's the opinion of the British naval commander at Pekingham. You can find more details in the bibliography, if you're interested.
We dealt with 3 raiders.
Now the Peresvets. Of them, only Pobeda is stronger than Izumo. Yes, I also once thought Peresvet was stronger.
But Peresvet and Oslyabya have weakened main guns. And of the 152mm guns, only five are available versus seven. The Peresvets' 254mm gun fires twice as slowly as the 203mm. (This is approximate; you can find the exact data.) And given the weakened Russian gun, it doesn't have a fundamental advantage, especially since Japanese shells for the 203mm were much more powerful than the Russian ones.
The Russians only seem to have stronger armor. But the Japanese have better coverage. Izumo has Krupp, Peresvet has Harvey. Peresvet may be slightly stronger than Asamu (but that's not certain), but not Izumo.
The Japanese simulated a battle between Asamoids and Peresvets and believed the Asamoid could win. The problem is that the Asamoid is designed for combat, while the Peresvet, an interspecies hybrid, is poor at both its intended uses.
If we consider 3 Peresvets equal to 3 Asamoids, there are 3 Asamoids left that are stronger than 3 Raiders.

[Adrey]

Although, the article as a whole, as a review, is quite worthy

[Alexander Iloev]

Andrey, thanks for the feedback, but I won't elaborate further. It answers my question.
It can be developed for a very long time:
- about the fleet's personnel policy
- about shells
- about personalities.
- about the deference to rank in the Russian navy and army, when people were afraid to express their opinions

But my opinion, I am not imposing it on anyone, there are main things, and there are secondary ones.
When there are many reasons for an event, this means that there is one reason (it is often outside our consideration), and all the rest are consequences of this reason.
So, Kolchak stated the reason in the article's epigraph. I cut out the phrase; it also mentions the admiral general, but that's also a consequence.

[Trapperxnumx]

A good review article. My respect to the author.
Although some of the author's assertions raise questions. Let's assume the assertion that Peresvet is equal to Asama... Or

The raiders based in Vladivostok could not cause serious harm to Japan, since all the sea routes important to it passed to the south and east.

History has shown that basing the raiders on Vladik was absolutely the right decision – they not only managed to inflict damage on the enemy, but most importantly, they drew off Kamimura's strong detachment, giving our 1st TOE a real chance to defeat Togo. The fact that Vitgeft failed to do so is not the raiders' fault.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Trapper7

Although some of the author's assertions raise questions. For example, the assertion that Peresvet is equal to Asama...

As far as I understand, in this case the author is citing Klado's opinion.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Senior Sailor

As far as I understand, in this case the author is citing Klado's opinion.

True. Kostenko echoes this, and, it seems to me, the Author agrees. The Author, after all, writes his article based, among other things, on an analysis of extensive material (which, by the way, commands enormous respect).

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Trapper7

The author agrees

Well, the author, in general, is inclined to trust authorities or those whom he considers to be such.
But be that as it may, such an opinion existed and it must be taken into account.

[Alexander Iloev]

stairs
These are different things - "drawing away forces" and "causing damage with a cruiser war."
But I'd like to point out that the Japanese could always combine their forces, while the Russians could not. In other words, the Japanese operated "along internal operational lines." The separation of the FOC was inevitable, if only because the entire squadron wouldn't have fit in Port Arthur. After all, the point isn't to fit all the ships, but to ensure they could maneuver freely. To avoid this, to remove one ship, you have to move ten others.
In those conditions, all decisions were bad.
Let's see when this 1TOE could have defeated the Japanese fleet - only after the destruction of two Japanese battleships.
At the beginning of the war, let's say the Russian fleet avoided the attack of two battleships.
Then the Russians have 7 battleships, and the Japanese have 6.
Superiority? Nothing like that. Of the seven Russian battleships, five were either obsolete or of the second class. The Japanese had only two. The three Poltavas, according to Klado, were then rated at 0,8 times the Mikasa's. The Peresvets were even weaker, but there's no precise coefficient. Let's say Peresvet had 0,7, and Pobeda, like Poltava, had 0,8. In reality, Tsarevich and Retvizan were slightly worse than Mikasa.
So, for Russians: 2 + 3 x 8 + 0,7 + 0,8 = 5,9, if I’m not mistaken?
For the Japanese: 4 + 2 x 0,8 = 5,6

But this is if the Japanese send all 6 of their armored cruisers against the FOC.
But they only need to send two armored cruisers against them, leaving two with the main force. Then the Japanese have 5,6 + 2 x 0,65 = 6,9 (note, I'm giving the Asamoids more than Peresvet!)

The Japanese have the overall advantage: 6,9 against 5,9.
And where is the Russian victory here?
Moreover, as I already said, they can transfer their forces, but the Russians cannot.
The Russians have no chance of victory without a lucky coincidence.
By the way, I didn't even take into account the Garribaldians.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

The Japanese have the overall advantage: 6,9 against 5,9.

Of course, you're right. Even without playing with the odds, but simply using logic, common sense, and a basic understanding of the ships' technical specifications, the Japanese navy clearly has the advantage—otherwise, they wouldn't have started the war.

But I would like to point out that the Japanese were always able to combine their forces, while the Russians were not. In other words, the Japanese operated "along internal operational lines."

Where was Kamimura's detachment on July 28th? Why didn't it join the main force in the battle? Perhaps you're exaggerating the importance of the "inner operational lines" and the capabilities of Mikado's fleet at that time?
This is of course my purely IMHO, but considering how Togo maneuvered on July 28.07.1904, 4, if our gunners had been better prepared, a breakthrough could well have taken place (at least with part of the forces) and defeated the Japanese fleet. What would Kamimura have done then, against, say, our four newest EBRs and a FOC?

The Russians have no chance of victory without a lucky coincidence.

There could only be one happy coincidence: Kuropatkin does not allow a long blockade of Arthur, 2 TOEs arrive from the Baltic, after which, even without a general naval battle, Japan asks for peace on any terms.
But based on Kuropatkin's actual command abilities, it's easier to believe in the arrival of the Jedi and the entire fleet of the Galactic Republic.
I really enjoyed your article; your logic is clear and well-reasoned. Thank you very much!

[rytik32]

In my opinion, the main mistake was underestimating the strength of the Japanese fleet. Most admirals, including Alekseyev, Avelan, and Rozhestvensky, believed before the war that the First Pacific Fleet was no weaker than the Japanese fleet. Given this approach, there's no point in discussing any theoretical strengthening of the First Pacific Fleet. They could have simply left the Sisoya, Navarin, and Nakhimov in the Far East, and the balance of power would have been different.

[faiver]

It would have been possible to simply leave the Sisoes, Navarin and Nakhimov in the Far East

- I think the only difference would have been that they would have died not at Tsushima, but in the Port Arthur puddle....

[rytik32]

Quote: faiver

- I think the only difference would have been that they would have died not at Tsushima, but in the Port Arthur puddle....

The Japanese would most likely not have attacked in 1904. The Japanese tried to avoid fighting in conditions where they did not have a numerical advantage.

[faiver]

Controversial, I'll note that during the entire Russian Empire, the Japanese lost only FOUR large ships of combat value: three of them to mines, one they rammed themselves, and not a single one in actual combat. That's what the Imperial Russian Navy was worth overall. There were some good officers, there were some good ships, but the fleet as a combat unit didn't exist.

[rytik32]

Quote: faiver

I'll note that during the entire Russian War, the Japanese lost only FOUR large ships.

This is afterknowledge.
Or are you suggesting that instead of one battleship, we build a time machine before the RYaV?

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: faiver

Controversial, I'll note that during the entire Russian Empire, the Japanese lost only FOUR large ships of combat value: three of them to mines, one they rammed themselves, and not a single one in actual combat. That's what the Imperial Russian Navy was worth overall. There were some good officers, there were some good ships, but the fleet as a combat unit didn't exist.

Then perhaps you know the statistics of losses of large ships of the Russian Imperial Navy from artillery fire before Tsushima, the reasons for these losses, and also the circumstances under which they occurred.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Most admirals, including Alekseev, Avelan and Rozhestvensky, believed before the war that the 1st Japanese Navy was no weaker than the Japanese fleet.

Well, why not? The desire to concentrate 10 battleships against the Japanese 6+6 program was approved by everyone, but they only had 7. Another question is that they hoped to achieve victory with such forces, but since 1897 they were striving for more.

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Well, why?

Perhaps they thought that 10 battleships would be needed for offensive operations, but 7 battleships would be enough for coastal defense.

[Jura 27]

In my opinion, the main mistake was underestimating the strength of the Japanese fleet. Most admirals, including Alekseyev, Avelan, and Rozhestvensky, believed before the war that the First Pacific Fleet was no weaker than the Japanese fleet.

This is an epic devastation in the heads of admirals - how can seven ships of the line be equal to twelve.

It would have been possible to simply leave the Sisoes, Navarin and Nakhimov in the Far East and the balance of power would have been different.

Unfortunately, this is an excellent coastal defense unit, almost unsuitable for squadron combat (with the exception of ground forces).

[rytik32]

Quote: Jura 27

Unfortunately, this is an excellent coastal defense unit, almost unsuitable for squadron combat (with the exception of ground forces)

So, look at the ships the Japanese used in the squadron battle, much older and weaker than the Navarin and Nakhimov.
There is little data on the Navarin, but the Nakhimov withstood the blows in battle well, even withstanding a couple of 12-inch shells.

[Alexandra]

What ships did the Japanese use in the squadron battle, much older and weaker than the Navarin and Nakhimov?

I don’t remember the Japanese placing Chin-Yen ships in the battle line during squadron battles.

[rytik32]

Quote: AlexanderA

I don’t remember the Japanese placing Chin-Yen ships in the battle line during squadron battles.

How then did he receive two 12-inch hits in the Yellow Sea?

[Alexandra]

He was lurking nearby and that's what he got.

BATTLE LINE, abbreviated name for the combat formation of a squadron or its individual units, especially those on which the outcome of the battle depends (see Combat formation and Combat order of the fleet).

Military Encyclopedia. — St. Petersburg: I.D. Sytin Company. Edited by V.F. Novitsky et al., 1911–1915.

The "fate of the battle" in the Yellow Sea did not depend on the part of the Japanese battle formation in which the Chin-Yen was jackaling.

[rytik32]

Quote: AlexanderA

He was skulking nearby and that's what he got.

No, he was actually in the battle line, fighting our battleships.
So, to say that it wasn't placed in the battle line is incorrect. What is true is that it wasn't placed alongside the new battleships.

[Zodiac]

Quote: rytik32

No, he was just walking in the battle line.

The Chin-Yen was sailing north of the main line, 80-85 cables' lengths from the Russian battleships. This was the 5th Battle Detachment, acting as a support force.

[rytik32]

Quote: Zodiac

"Chin-Yen" was moving north of the main line, at a distance of 80-85

According to the report of the Chin-Yen commander, the distance to the enemy reached 6500 meters and he was fully engaged in combat.

[Zodiac]

Quote: rytik32

According to the report of the Chin-Yen commander, the distance to the enemy reached 6500 meters and he was fully engaged in combat.

In the memoirs of Poltava's senior officer, S.I. Lutonin, there's a line: "I found him fighting on both sides—the Chin-Yen and its cruisers were coming at us from the left." But as far as I understand, this happened after the Russian squadron had lost control.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: rytik32

According to the report of the Chin-Yen commander, the distance to the enemy reached 6500 meters.

What was the range of his guns? They were 20-caliber, weren't they?

[rytik32]

Quote: Senior Sailor

What was the range of his guns? They were 20-caliber, weren't they?

I couldn't find the exact data. Anyone with a ball calculator can do the math. The maximum angle is 16 degrees. Weight is 329 kg, muzzle velocity is 500-530 m/s (all from Ishibashi). Barrel length is 25 calibers.

[Zodiac]

Quote: rytik32

Max angle 16 degrees. Weight 329 kg, muzzle velocity 500-530 m/s (all from Ishibashi). Barrel length 25 calibers.

Calculation result
Parameter/ In vacuum/ With air (Cd=0.15–0.25)
Max. range at 16°, V₀=500 /13,5 km /10,5–11,5 km
Max. range at 16°, V₀=530 /15,2 km /11,4–12,6 km
The sighting range of 7800 m is achieved at / ~10° / ~10–11°

[Alexandra]

25 caliber.

https://ru.ruwiki.ru/wiki/Чин-Иен

"The main caliber artillery - four short-barreled 12-inch guns from the Krupp company with a rate of fire of one shot every 4 minutes and a range of 44 cables - remained the same."

"At about 19:45 (around 19:00 Russian time), the battleship Chin-Yen was hit by two shells. The caliber of the shells that hit and the nature of the damage are not known, but judging by the events during this period of the battle (the breakthrough of the first-rank cruiser
"Askold"), these could have been shells of caliber up to 152 mm." E.V. Polomoshnov

In fact, he didn't hit anything (English-language sources say he did, but it doesn't say which Russian ships), but he did get hit by two shells. That was also useful.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

How then did he receive two 12-inch hits in the Yellow Sea?

So it was around 19:00 our time, when the squadron battle was practically already over. And that's if the shells were 12-inch

[rytik32]

The Chin-Yen appeared at 18:25 and opened fire on Poltava's main battleship, immediately after the Tsarevich was disabled.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

At 18:25, Chin-Yen appeared at the Poltava railway station and opened fire.

I meant the time when the shells hit him.

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I meant the time when the shells hit him.

At 19:50, an enemy shell hit the middle section of the starboard upper deck. Six people were wounded.

[Jura 27]

There is little data on the Navarin, but the Nakhimov withstood the blows in battle well, even withstanding a couple of 12-inch shells.

Taking a hit is one thing, but inflicting serious damage on an opponent is another matter entirely.

[rytik32]

Quote: Jura 27

but inflicting serious damage on the enemy is another matter entirely

Do you assess the damage to the Iwate from the Rurik's 8-inch shell as serious?

[Jura 27]

Quote: rytik32

Quote: Jura 27

but inflicting serious damage on the enemy is another matter entirely

Do you assess the damage to the Iwate from the Rurik's 8-inch shell as serious?

No. The ship was not damaged, the fire did not stop, and there was no significant flooding.
Moreover, the eight-inch size of the projectile is just one of the versions.

[rytik32]

Quote: Jura 27

No.

40 people were killed and 36 were wounded - this is a huge loss among the team, which clearly affected the combat effectiveness

Quote: Jura 27

Besides, the eight-inch size of the projectile is just one of the versions

This is what the ship's commander wrote in his combat report. The Japanese didn't always list the shell's caliber, and you can count the number of "authors" on one hand. Apparently, in this case, there were compelling arguments...

[Jura 27]

40 people were killed and 36 were wounded - this is a huge loss among the team, which clearly affected the combat effectiveness

The loss of even one weapon affects combat effectiveness, but does not lead to the factors I have already listed.

This is what is written in the ship's commander's combat report.

There were no compelling arguments, due to their complete absence due to the almost complete destruction of the casemate.
Except for one thing—a big bang—only from a big shell. And to write that the casemate was blown apart by a 47mm shell, or even a 120mm one, hitting the embrasure is somehow not feng shui.

[rytik32]

Quote: Jura 27

There were no compelling arguments, due to their complete absence due to the almost complete destruction of the casemate.

There were no arguments or you don’t know about them?
I suspect the Japanese noticed the shot from the Rurik and then attributed it to a hit. The shell's caliber could have been determined from the large fragment they found.

[Jura 27]

There were no arguments or you don’t know about them?

Science still knows nothing about them. Abe, for example, in his lecture in England, expressed himself more accurately: an 8" or 6" projectile.

The Japanese noticed the shot from the Rurik and later associated it with a hit.

Well, it’s good that you didn’t measure the diameter of the projectile in flight with a caliper!

[rytik32]

Quote: Jura 27

Abe, in his lecture in England, for example, expressed himself more correctly

But Abo was not on the Iwata or even in that battle...

Quote: Jura 27

Well, it's good that they didn't measure the diameter of the projectile in flight with a caliper.

You're being sarcastic, but the Japanese even wrote down which ship the shell that damaged the 12-inch turret came from.

[Jura 27]

But Abo was not on the Iwata or even in that battle...

If it had been a shell fragment, he wouldn't have said that.

[Ragnar]

Quote: Jura 27

Unfortunately, this is an excellent coastal defense unit, almost unsuitable for squadron combat (with the exception of ground forces).

What is this from???

[Jura 27]

Quote: Ragnar

Quote: Jura 27

Unfortunately, this is an excellent coastal defense unit, almost unsuitable for squadron combat (with the exception of ground forces).

What is this from???

How can it fight Mikasa ships? But chasing small cruisers and all sorts of Chin-Yen and Matsushima ships is just the thing, without involving EBRs.

[Ragnar]

Quote: Jura 27

How can it fight Mikasa ships? But chasing small cruisers and all sorts of Chin-Yen and Matsushima ships is just the thing, without involving EBRs.

Well, not with the Mikas, of course... But against the As... Even the 8/35 shell from the Rurik didn't please some people...

[Non-fighter]

But the opinion of the Minister of Finance Witte prevailed, according to whom his personal sources of information said that the Japanese would not be ready before 1905.

He had no intelligence, but the financier's desire was to pay later. Or not pay at all.

[Konnick]

I'd like to point out that all these studies miss the point... 100 percent of the Japanese navy's sailors had at least a sixth-grade education... that's the answer to all the questions. And what kind of weapon... armor... personnel decide everything!

[Panin (midshipman)]

Quote: Konnick

I'd like to point out that all these studies miss the point... 100 percent of the Japanese navy's sailors had at least a sixth-grade education... that's the answer to all the questions. And what kind of weapon... armor... personnel decide everything!

And many of them were fishermen and knew the sea. And let's not forget the Japanese mentality. Can you imagine a Japanese sailor playing the role of fireman Baklanov, for example? Did the Japanese live better than the Russian Empire? Did they carry out terrorist attacks against high-ranking officials? Did they stage revolutions?

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Panin (Michman)

Can you imagine a Japanese sailor in the role of stoker Baklanov, for example?

What do we even know about Japanese sailors to compare them with a literary character, albeit a fairly accurately depicted one?

Quote: Panin (Michman)

Did the Japanese live better than in the Russian Empire?

Absolutely not. It was probably much worse, but... you have to understand that Japan was a very poor country at the time.

Quote: Panin (Michman)

Did you organize terrorist attacks against high-ranking officials?

Well, all sorts of things happened. The Meiji era was a turbulent time.
Okubo Tashimichi was hacked to death. Admiral Kamimura's house was set on fire...

[Panin (midshipman)]

Quote: Senior Sailor

Quote: Panin (Michman)

Can you imagine a Japanese sailor in the role of stoker Baklanov, for example?

What do we even know about Japanese sailors to compare them with a literary character, albeit a fairly accurately depicted one?
...

Well, you can't compare Baklanov specifically. You can compare the life on the second toe during the campaign, its mood, with the mood of the Japanese on the day of the Battle of Tsushima. So, Novikov described life quite vividly, with all the hardships.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Panin (Michman)

Well, you can compare it to something other than Baklanov.

What I'm saying is that we don't know much about Japanese society at the time. After a (rather superficial) examination of some materials, I got the impression that wealth inequality in Meiji-era Japan wasn't as glaring as it is here.
Let's say, a large landowner was considered a person with a plot of land of more than 50 hectares.
Officers were the only ones in the world who received less salary than their Russian colleagues, and so on.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Konnick

And what kind of weapon...armor...personnel decide everything!

You write as if during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet soldier or officer en masse was more educated than the German one.

[Konnick]

Quote: AlexanderA

Quote: Konnick

And what kind of weapon...armor...personnel decide everything!

You write as if during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet soldier or officer en masse was more educated than the German one.

It's good that at least everyone was literate...if they had been more educated, there wouldn't have been such losses...

[Alexandra]

So you agree that a minimum 6-grade school education for sailors of the Japanese fleet does not provide a comprehensive answer to all the questions about the reasons for the defeat of the RIF in the Russo-Japanese War?

By the way, the phrase: "The Franco-Prussian War was won by a German schoolteacher" - Otto von Bismarck never wrote or said.

The author of this saying was Bismarck's contemporary, the geography teacher Oskar Peschel. The words, which appeared in a newspaper article in the summer of 1866, referred not to the Franco-Prussian War but to the Austro-Prussian War: "When the Prussians beat the Austrians, it was a victory for the Prussian schoolteacher over the Austrian schoolteacher."

Victories and defeats in wars almost always depend on so many factors that it is impossible to give an exhaustive answer about the causes of defeat or victory by pointing to just one "main" reason.

[Grossvater]

Hmm! Honestly, I'm writing this under the influence of a recent book I read, "On the Main Line," by General Antipenko, the chief of logistics for the 1st Belorussian Front. If we apply the patterns described in the book to the situation in the Russian Navy, the main material cause of the RIF's chronic failures appears to be the catastrophic lack of basing support, with any ship malfunction rendering it indefinitely unusable.
You can compare the personal qualities of the commanding officers and the technical specifications of the steamships until you're blue in the face, but what's the point if the ships were out of order longer than they were in good condition? Especially considering that the technology of the time dictated that ships sail "from repair to repair."

[Konnick]

Quote: Grossvater

The main material reason for the RIF's chronic failures appears to be the catastrophic lack of basing security, when any malfunction of a ship would take it out of combat service for an indefinite period.

I completely agree...amateurs discuss tactics, armchair generals discuss strategy, and professionals discuss logistics...

[Senior seaman]

Well, the article, although not without flaws, is overall not bad.
Let's see what will happen next.

[Grossvater]

Quote: Senior Sailor

Well, the article, although not without flaws, is overall not bad.
Let's see what will happen next.

Yes!
The role of the Russo-Japanese War in world history is generally significantly understated. Personally, I consider the Russo-Japanese War the defining event of the 20th, and perhaps even the 21st, century. Not central, but defining.
The unprecedented defeat of Russia in modern history largely determined the future configuration of the First World War, and since many historians consider the First and Second World Wars to be two episodes of a single World War, it turns out that, I will allow myself to repeat, the unprecedented and shameful defeat of Russia led it to one of the camps of the fighting and certainly deprived it of the opportunity to trade on its neutrality.
People simply stopped being afraid of Russia.
Thanks to the author, we look forward to the continuation.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Grossvater

The role of the Russo-Japanese War in world history has generally been significantly underestimated.

Backyards of the World)
Whatever one may say, Russia wasn't the only one who treated the Japanese with disdain. That's why there was such a great deal of bewilderment at Russia's defeat—"losing to some..."
35 years later, these guys cheerfully took down two of the world's leading powers.

[Panin (midshipman)]

Quote: Trapper7

Quote: Grossvater

The role of the Russo-Japanese War in world history has generally been significantly underestimated.

Backyards of the World)
Whatever one may say, Russia wasn't the only one who treated the Japanese with disdain. That's why there was such a great deal of bewilderment at Russia's defeat—"losing to some..."
35 years later, these guys cheerfully took down two of the world's leading powers.

Well, actually, they didn't bend over. They took advantage of the moment when England was busy with the Germans and America was introspective.
But then everything fell into place.

[Alexander Iloev]

Senior seaman.
There will be no continuation. The author has said all he wanted, and he wanted to illustrate the words of his article's epigraph. You can say a lot, or you can just say the main thing.
Moreover, everyone sees in the article what they are ready to see.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

There will be no continuation.

Maybe it's for the best

[27091965]

Thanks to the author for the work done and the selection of information.

In 1900, an article entitled “On the Question of Types of Military Courts” was published, but it is not available online.

It's a little unclear which article the author was referring to. If it was an English one, then it could, in principle, be called an article, although it was a proposal from the British Admiralty to naval officers to express their opinions on the further development of ship types in the British Navy. If the author is referring to the work that won first prize and was granted permission for publication, then it is available online.

[Alexander Iloev]

The author was referring to a Russian article in the Marine Collection in 1900.

[27091965]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

The author was referring to a Russian article in the Marine Collection in 1900.

Thanks for the reply. I mentioned in my comment that it's available online. I've seen it in English and German.

[MCmaximus]

To outshine the Japanese while based at Port Arthur, a fleet twice as large would have been necessary. One at Artur, the other at Dalny. It would also need adequate repair facilities and coastal defenses. But that was impossible. Which meant the war was already lost.
The conclusion is simple: the war should have been delayed by all means necessary. Or better yet, prevented. But Russia did nothing to prevent it from starting.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: MCmaximus

And Russia did nothing to prevent it from starting.

Or, as the respected Alexey wrote above

Quote: rytik32

In my opinion, the main mistake was underestimating the strength of the Japanese fleet.

If they had taken this more seriously, their actions would have been completely different. Either they should have negotiated from the start and divided Korea with China, or they should have built up their muscle.

[Alexandra]

Quote: MCmaximus

To outshine the Japanese, based at Port Arthur, a fleet twice as large would have been necessary. One at Artur, the other at Dalny.

Ideally, only light forces should have been based in Port Arthur. But that would require so much work to support the 1st Pacific Fleet's main forces in Dalny and to ensure Dalny's defense from both sea and land. Dalny as a main base is unrealistic, precisely because of the funding available, which Witte certainly wouldn't have had for establishing a naval base.

As a result, the Japanese broke through the Jinzhou line with a vengeance and "on a silver platter" captured a major port for the close siege of Port Arthur, the development of which, according to various estimates, had already cost between 30 and 40 million gold rubles as a commercial port.

An adventure is just that - an adventure.

[Grossvater]

Quote: MCmaximus

And Russia did nothing to prevent it from starting.

I would put it differently: Russia did everything to start the war!

[Cartalon]

The best solution would be not to keep battleships in the Far East, but to have the ability to transfer them there at any time.

[faiver]

How is that?........................

[Cartalon]

The fleet is in the Baltic, and there are defensive bases in the Far East that can receive it.

[faiver]

How long did it take for 2TE to arrive at Far East? And what condition did it arrive in?

[Cartalon]

The threat is more dangerous than the action; the fleet exists and must be taken into account. If the Japanese know that a fleet far stronger than anything they have is coming to visit them, they simply won't dare to attack. If they do decide to attack, they will have to act as aggressively as possible and, accordingly, suffer losses from the actions of Russian mine forces.
And the second squadron arrived in no such bad shape, and if such a voyage had been planned before the war, it would have arrived faster and in better condition. Incidentally, we wouldn't have had to wait for the wrecks of the third squadron.

[Grossvater]

Quote: Cartalon

The best solution would be not to keep battleships in the Far East, but to have the ability to transfer them there at any time.

The best solution would have been to take a closer look at the map. Recognize that hostility with Japan would, in any case, hamper our military and, more importantly, merchant fleets. We should have sought other ways to ensure the smooth and affordable export of Russia's only export commodity at the time—grain. All other Russian interests in the region had no bearing on national interests.
Incidentally, the Russian Far Eastern diplomacy of that time can be considered the most epic in world history.
Despite having good relations with all three local centers of power: China, Korea and Japan, not a single clear attempt was made to use this.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Grossvater

To realize that hostility with Japan, in any case, would lock our military and, more importantly, merchant fleet, and to look for some other ways to ensure the trouble-free and cheap export of the only Russian export commodity of that time – grain

Where do we get grain from in the Far East?

[Grossvater]

The development of Siberia. You'll laugh, but just as the fall in oil prices crippled the USSR, the fall in grain prices caused by the entry of cheap Australian and Canadian wheat into the market seriously undermined the finances of the Russian Empire.
The basic plan for the whole mess looked like this: In Altai and Southern Siberia, settlers from central Russia grow grain. Then, via the CER (and why the hell was that even necessary?), it's transported to the ice-free PA, or more precisely, Dalny, and then on by steamship around the world.
Vladivostok was freezing, and building an icebreaker flotilla was deemed unprofitable and too extravagant, so they settled on the PA and its surroundings.
And then it was a circus with horses and bells. The Chinese were bribed. The Japanese were forced out of the PA, quite rudely, I must admit, they went to Korea with the Tsar's personal money.
They even figured out how to guarantee a loan to China to pay off the indemnity, pocketing a couple of percent of the amount (currently, a bank guarantee costs between 1 and 5% of the loan amount).
The Japanese, not being fools, built a fleet with the money guaranteed by Russia.
This entire story is described, if I'm not mistaken, in part one of Kalashnikov and Kugushev's trilogy, "The Third Project." The part is called "Immersion," and it's not exactly a pleasant read.
The plan was to later create a "Yellow Russia" on the ruins of China. Apparently, the abscess of Poland wasn't enough.
So ...
P.S. Rafail Mikhalych wrote about the export purpose of Dalniy, as the final destination of the CER and the squadron guarding it in the PA, in almost every one of his books.

[K-50]

We were not allowed to bring the war to a victorious conclusion. As soon as the Russian Empire had amassed sufficient forces to march to victory, all sorts of "conciliators" rushed in to prevent, God forbid, that from happening.
And all because these “peacekeepers” themselves acted as sponsors of this war, supporting Japan.
And how would they repay the loans if the Japanese lost? Slowly, with difficulty, and even then not all of them?
So they took all measures to prevent Russia from winning.
A striking analogy with today.
They raised a "fighting hamster," urged him on, supporting him in every possible way, and when Russia started to break through, they immediately started running around with reconciliation and the like.
Heh! Even the countries are the same.
Only Russia has changed.

[Grossvater]

Quote: Trapper7

Quote: Grossvater

The role of the Russo-Japanese War in world history has generally been significantly underestimated.

Backyards of the World)
Whatever one may say, Russia wasn't the only one who treated the Japanese with disdain. That's why there was such a great deal of bewilderment at Russia's defeat—"losing to some..."
35 years later, these guys cheerfully took down two of the world's leading powers.

Yes, the Japanese certainly surprised the world, but that's not what I was writing about.
Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia had known no defeat. The Crimean War, however, was a different story. It was a battle between a lone, backward Russia and the world's most powerful nations, even with the Allies' decisive technological superiority. And despite the still very much in doubt as to who breathed a greater sigh of relief after concluding peace: Russia or the Allies. For them, the situation was reminiscent of the Russian proverb:
I caught a bear!
Lead here
He's not coming!
Well then go yourself.
He won't let me in!!!
After its "defeat" in the Crimean War, Russia's prestige and that of its armed forces rose to unprecedented heights. The value of an alliance with Russia or its neutrality was extraordinarily high.
After the RYAV...
In politics, everything is very simple. Either they fear you, or they lead you by the trunk as they please.

[Trapperxnumx]

I completely agree with your assessment.

[solar]

In 1898, Nicholas II approved a special shipbuilding program "For the Needs of the Far East." One of the reasons for the failure of the war was undoubtedly the misguided implementation of this program.
Let's see how this looked using the example of Bogatyr-class cruisers.
In total, five cruisers were planned for construction within the framework of the program for the promising project proposed by the Germans: Bogatyr, Oleg, Kagul, Ochakov, Pamyat Merkuria, and Vityaz.
"Squadron-based long-range reconnaissance cruisers" were supposed to not only conduct reconnaissance but also participate in squadron battles and operate independently on communications routes. Just what our fleet needed in the coming war.
Let's see what came of it.
The first of these, Bogatyr, is being built in Germany. Construction took two and a half years. It would seem, why not order the remaining cruisers in this series from the Germans? Time is running out, we're feverishly scooping up ships from all over the world; war is looming, and we've created an entire program just to get there. But no, it's more important to us that our local contractors, not some Germans, receive the construction fees—more important than delivering the ships on time. As a result, of the four ships planned for construction in Russia, only one—Oleg—made it to war, with a ton of unfinished work. Another burned on the slipway, and two weren't completed before the war. Bogatyr was damaged before the war and spent the entire war undergoing repairs. The result: of the five planned cruisers, only one saw combat.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote from solar

It would seem, why not order the remaining cruisers in this series from the Germans? Time is running out, we're frantically pulling ships from all over the world; war is just around the corner, and we've created an entire program to get there.

But we were sure that we would make it in time and that it would not start before 1905.

In total, five cruisers were planned for construction within the framework of the program for the promising project proposed by the Germans: Bogatyr, Oleg, Kagul, Ochakov, Pamyat Merkuria, and Vityaz.

As far as I remember, the Program for the needs of the Far East provided for the presence in the Pacific Ocean of 6 cruisers with a displacement of 6000 tons, including 3 goddesses.
Oleg was built to replace Vityaz, which was destroyed in a fire.
Ochakov, Kagul, Memory of Mercury - in fact, two ships) And Ochakov himself "aka Gosha, aka Zhora")

[Senior seaman]

Quote from solar

5 cruisers - Bogatyr, Oleg, Cahul, Ochakov, Memory of Mercury and Vityaz.

Colleague, you're confused by the names))
"Kahul", "Ochakov", "Memory of Mercury" three the names of which were borne two ships. And what's interesting is that none of them could have been used in that war, since they were built for the Black Sea Fleet.

[solar]

Yes, thank you, I saw it myself later, but it was too late to fix. There were five ships, of course, but the names were a mess, you're right.

because it was built for the Black Sea Fleet

According to the program for building ships for the Far East :((...

[rytik32]

Quote from solar

It would seem, why not order the remaining cruisers of this series from the Germans?

The construction of the fleet became the driving force behind the development of many areas of Russian industry: metallurgy, mechanical engineering, the chemical industry, etc.
New factories, new equipment, new technologies, new personnel appeared...
Later, during the First World War, all this came in very handy!

[solar]

Fleet construction became the driving force behind development

Do we need a taxi or a checkered flag? We're facing war, and instead of preparing for it at an accelerated pace, we're busy handing over weapons money to the right people.

Later, during the First World War, all this came in very handy!

It came in handy, and it did. Not only did the empire cease to exist as a result, but the emperor was also killed by good people.

[Senior seaman]

Quote from solar

We have a war on our nose,

Afterglow.

Quote from solar

We transfer money for weapons to the right good people.

Yes, basically, state-owned shipyards and factories.
No, colleague, I understand your reasons and to some extent I even agree, but our ancestors had reasons to act exactly this way.

[Jura 27]

Afterglow.

Absolutely not. The Japanese naval construction program was known long before. The construction timeframes were also well known from similar projects.
Couldn't think of it.

[solar]

Afterglow.

Reread Andrey from Chelyabinsk's series about the frantic construction of the Varyag—they didn't have a plan as such, they just made it up as they went along. They were in a hurry, knowing this was what was happening. Oleg was also a hastily constructed project.

Yes, basically, state-owned shipyards and factories.
No, colleague, I understand your reasons and to some extent I even agree, but our ancestors had reasons to act exactly this way.

Life, in the form of Japan's loss of the war, showed the fallacy of these reasons. :((

[Senior seaman]

Quote from solar

Reread Andrey from Chelyabinsk's series

I read.
We're talking about slightly different things. We were rushing to order ships to choose the best design. And once we'd chosen...

Quote from solar

Life, in the form of Japan's loss of the war, showed the fallacy of these reasons.

I don't think that this was any major reason for the loss.

[solar]

If the fleet had been prepared as planned, by ordering ships abroad, everything might have turned out differently. Perhaps the empire would have survived the reign of Nicholas II. Although, most likely, it wouldn't have survived World War I even then.

[rytik32]

Quote from solar

We have a war on our nose

Most generals and admirals in 1903 believed Japan would not attack. Therefore, they were in no hurry.

We transfer money for weapons to the right good people

They tried to place orders at state-owned factories. What they couldn’t do was then left to private owners. If private owners couldn’t do it, then go abroad.

It came in handy, so it came in handy.

Without the existing industry, the war would have ended in 1915.

[Jura 27]

Most generals and admirals in 1903 believed Japan would not attack. Therefore, they were in no hurry.

The result of their "calculations" is obvious - a scribe of a 300-year empire.

[rytik32]

Quote: Jura 27

The result of their "calculations" is obvious - a scribe of a 300-year empire.

But the Obukhov and Putilov factories are still standing. And it's unclear whether we would have survived the Great Patriotic War without the factories built under the Tsar...

[Jura 27]

Quote: rytik32

Quote: Jura 27

The result of their "calculations" is obvious - a scribe of a 300-year empire.

But the Obukhov and Putilov factories are still standing. And it's unclear whether we would have survived the Great Patriotic War without the factories built under the Tsar...

And what did they produce during WWII? Besides mortars and other things, what could they have produced in a more or less equipped factory?

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Jura 27

And what did they produce during WWII? Besides mortars and other things, what could they have produced in a more or less equipped factory?

For example, the KV tank was developed at the Kirov (Putilov) Plant in Leningrad. And until mid-42, it was arguably the most formidable vehicle on the battlefield.

[Konnick]

Quote: rytik32

Quote: Jura 27

The result of their "calculations" is obvious - a scribe of a 300-year empire.

But the Obukhov and Putilov factories are still standing. And it's unclear whether we would have survived the Great Patriotic War without the factories built under the Tsar...

So they didn't work during the siege, they only repaired equipment...there was no electricity or metal. They managed without them.

[Victor Leningradets]

Your information is not accurate.
Back in the spring of 1942, KV tanks were being assembled from stockpiles at LMZ.
And the regimental cavalry of 1927 model were sent for the needs of the front, including by air (on return flights)

[Konnick]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

Back in the spring of 1942, KV tanks were being assembled from stockpiles at LMZ.

What does LMZ have to do with it? It seems to be about the Obukhov and Putilov factories.

[Victor Leningradets]

And all the factories on the left bank evacuated their existing production to the right bank, including the Kirov plant at LMZ.
During the years of the fleet's development, the metal plant underwent a complete technical re-equipment, and it was not forgotten during the five-year plans.

[rytik32]

Quote: Konnick

We did without them

During the war, the Kirov Plant supplied the front with 18 tanks and self-propelled guns, 48,5 tank engines, 85 sets of fuel equipment, and more than 17 million shell blanks.

[Zodiac]

Quote: rytik32

During the war, the Kirov Plant supplied the front with 18 tanks and self-propelled guns, 48,5 tank engines, 85 sets of fuel equipment, and more than 17 million shell blanks.

This is true, but there is a nuance.
Part of the plant was evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where "Tankograd" was created using ChTZ and the evacuated facilities. This resulted in two production sites: the Kirov Plant in Leningrad and the Kirov Plant in Chelyabinsk. Almost everything you listed was produced at the Kirov Plant in Chelyabinsk.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Zodiac

Part of the plant was evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where "Tankograd" was created using ChTZ and the evacuated facilities. This resulted in two production sites: the Kirov Plant in Leningrad and the Kirov Plant in Chelyabinsk. Almost everything you listed was produced at the Kirov Plant in Chelyabinsk.

How does this negate the usefulness of the Putilov factory? Here's proof that it was enough for two.

[Zodiac]

Quote: Trapper7

How does this negate the usefulness of the Putilov factory?

I don't want to argue, but I'll ask anyway: what did Chelyabinsk have left over from the Putilov factory of the Russian Empire? Equipment? Technology? Personnel? Promising developments? Experience? In Leningrad, at least the grounds and workshop walls remained from the Putilov factory, but in Chelyabinsk there was nothing like that.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Zodiac

What was there in Chelyabinsk from the Putilov factory during the Russian Empire?

The same as in Leningrad itself - competencies, people, technologies.
Agree that if you have a large plant that has the expertise to create technologically complex products, which can be developed and modernized, then this is worth doing.
The same thing happened with Putilov. Thanks in part to tsarist orders, the plant became one of the largest in Europe, employing experienced engineers and workers, and their expertise, which the Soviet government continued to develop, made it possible, among other things, to begin production of KV tanks.
As for the machines and equipment, at our plant, for example, we still have some German trophy stuff))) And it works.

[Zodiac]

Quote: Trapper7

In Leningrad itself - competencies, people, technologies.

This is a tricky subject, because tank building requires completely different competencies than the production of what the Putilov Plant produced in the Russian Empire. Tank building is an acquired skill set from the Kirov Plant, and there's no direct inheritance of these skills. There are no engineers in Chelyabinsk who worked at the Putilov Plant. Workers acquired their tank building skills during the Soviet era. Essentially, there's no direct inheritance of these skills. You're a naval officer with your own competencies. What competencies do you have in railway management? The same applies here.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Zodiac

What are your competencies in railway management?

I had a railroad when I was a child...

[Zodiac]

Quote: Trapper7

I had a railroad when I was a child...

Good joke.

[Zodiac]

Quote: Trapper7

I had a railroad when I was a child...

I just remembered how Admiral Posyet, having graduated from the Naval Corps and Officer Classes, became Minister of Railways. So, you still have a lot ahead of you.

[solar]

I remember how Admiral Posyet, with the formation of the Naval Corps and Officer classes, became the Minister of Railways.

Posyet was a member of the emperor's retinue, the leading nomenklatura of the time, and the personal tutor of the imperial offspring. He was even given a rude awakening for the frigate he sank due to carelessness, with sailors killed. The story ended with the crash of the imperial train, in which Emperor Alexander III personally had to hold the roof of the carriage to save his family, after which Posyet was finally dismissed.

[solar]

What expertise? Shipbuilding? Ships and tanks aren't the same thing. It's easier to build from scratch, like in Chelyabinsk, than to rebuild an old one.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote from solar

In shipbuilding? So ships and tanks are not the same thing.

The Krasnoye Sormovo plant disagrees with you.

[solar]

He was always multi-functional. The first Soviet tank, "Freedom Fighter Comrade Lenin," is aptly named. Although "Comrade Lenin" also had suspiciously French origins.

[Senior seaman]

Quote from solar

He has always been multidisciplinary.

All major factories under the Tsar were multi-purpose. They could simultaneously produce ships, steam locomotives with wagons, and much more.
Well, if there's a factory, there's a workforce. While it's not so easy for a designer to switch from a ship to a tank, it's not that a turner or mechanic wouldn't care, but the difference isn't that great.

[Zodiac]

Not always. For example, the Kolomna plant, instead of producing Su-series steam locomotives, began producing P-36-series steam locomotives. It seemed like a steam locomotive, and the difference was minor. However, there was such a commotion with reconfiguring the production process, retraining workers and engineers, and replacing equipment—it was a real nightmare.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Zodiac

There was such a mess with the reconfiguration of the technological process

That's true. But if there had been no personnel or machinery there, nothing would have happened at all.

[Zodiac]

Logically, yes. In fact, it's easier to create from scratch than to adapt the old to the new. Let's say Petya, the stamper, pulled this handle for 10 years, but now, with the new process, it's absolutely forbidden. The bastard will just pull it out of habit and ruin the part. Well, that's just a rough approximation. Retraining workers is always a big challenge for a plant. Here, experience is a real handicap.

[Zodiac]

Quote: Trapper7

How does this negate the usefulness of the Putilov factory?

The minus is not mine.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Zodiac

The minus is not mine.

In principle, I am indifferent to them.
But thanks anyway

[solar]

Most generals and admirals in 1903 believed Japan would not attack. Therefore, they were in no hurry.

They frantically, hastily, and chaotically bought and ordered whatever they could from all over the world. This is described in the article. Some ships were ordered without any design at all, like the cruiser Varyag, for example.

The history of the cruiser Varyag began in the most strange way: the contract with C. Crump (signed on our side by Vice-Admiral V.P. Verkhovsky, head of the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding and Shipbuilding) was concluded on April 11, 1898, outside of the official tender process and before the competitive designs of other foreign firms had been reviewed. Crump, in fact, submitted no cruiser design at all: the contract stipulated that the American industrialist would create such a design based on specifications, which, however, were to be agreed upon after the contract was signed. The contract itself contained only preliminary specifications of a very general nature, and these contained numerous defects: discrepancies in the English and Russian texts of the documents, unclear wording, and arithmetic errors.

https://topwar.ru/150291-krejser-varjag-boj-u-chemulpo-27-janvarja-1904-goda-ch-21-zakljuchenie.html
And at the same time, we ourselves are delaying the construction of the Bogatyr cruisers.

[rytik32]

Quote from solar

They frantically, hastily and chaotically bought and ordered wherever and whatever they could all over the world.

And what did they buy?
I only know "ordered." In the end, they ordered two battleships, four first-class cruisers, and some other small stuff from abroad. They ordered them primarily to obtain the design and technology.

Quote from solar

And at the same time we are tightening it ourselves

What exactly was delayed? "Oleg" was built in two years—an excellent result compared to the goddesses.

[solar]

And what did they buy?

China, Argentina, Chile, the United States, Germany—everywhere we see rushed attempts to buy something, sometimes even without a blueprint. And you say there was no rush. A competition for the best design is hastily held, and the German Askold is chosen as the winner. Almost simultaneously, they frantically decide to build the German Bogatyr without any competition, and hastily order the Varyag without any blueprint at all, let alone a competition—as it was presented at the time, a state-of-the-art beauty of a ship, a technological marvel of its time, on which even the meat grinder in the galley is state-of-the-art, electric.

"Oleg" was built in 2 years - an excellent result compared to the goddesses.

Oleg wasn't fully completed, they didn't have time, and so he fought. And this is only one of four that could have been built.

[rytik32]

Quote from solar

Everywhere we see hasty attempts to buy something

I didn't see a single rush purchase, only orders )))

Varangian has no project at all

The contract contained specifications, and that's enough. The project is a technical component, and one that's constantly changing.

Oleg wasn't really finished

And what was left unfinished on it???

[solar]

none urgent purchase

You read selectively, not all the words.

we see it everywhere hasty attempts

And what was left unfinished on it???

The cruiser led Dobrotvorsky's so-called "catch-up detachment," which, after sailing through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, joined Admiral Rozhdestvensky's main forces on the island of Madagascar. The newly launched vessel had many defects, with engines constantly breaking down at first, but later demonstrated excellent seaworthiness during this voyage.

[rytik32]

Quote from solar

You read selectively, not all the words.

I read everything correctly. This is your quote:
They were frantically, hastily and frantically buying up

the ship had many defects

I still haven't received an answer to the question "was the construction on it unfinished?"

[Zodiac]

Quote: rytik32

Answer to the question "didn't they finish building it either?"

I think the word "unfinished" means solar He meant defects that emerged during operation. Or maybe he meant that the cruiser didn't pass all the tests.

[rytik32]

Quote: Zodiac

due to defects that emerged during operation

This is a common occurrence for long-term construction projects. And the tests weren't completed for an obvious reason—they were in a hurry.
I was struck by the fact that the Oleg's construction, which took just over two years, was called a "drag." In reality, this is a fantastically short timeframe compared to the construction times of cruisers at domestic shipyards!

[Zodiac]

Quote: rytik32

This is simply a fabulous timeframe compared to the construction times of cruisers at domestic shipyards!

Looking at the date of commissioning of the cruiser Aurora, it is difficult to disagree.

[Ragnar]

Quote: rytik32

I was struck by the fact that the Oleg's construction, which took just over two years, was called a "drag." In reality, this is a fantastically short timeframe compared to the construction times of cruisers at domestic shipyards!

We realize, right? "Oleg" is the Vityaz's successor. And the fact that the latter's hull burned down in the fire at the Bolshoy Wooden Slipway on Galerny Island didn't slow down the production of its engines, boilers, armor, guns, and everything else at other factories. And assembling a hull isn't such a labor-intensive task. "Slava," for example, just jumped off the slipway in 11 months!

[Jura 27]

I still haven't received an answer to the question "was the construction on it unfinished?"

The main steam engine cylinder, which had cracked during testing, was not replaced, so it was extremely dangerous to exceed speeds of 20 knots.

[Zodiac]

Quote from solar

They frantically, hastily and chaotically bought and ordered wherever and whenever they could all over the world.

However, Russia rejected Krupp's proposal, conveyed through his official representative in Russia, State Councilor M.V. Anichkov, to build two battleships and two cruisers at the Germania shipyard in Kiel. This is somewhat illogical.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Zodiac

on the construction of two battleships and two cruisers at the Germania shipyard

The big question is what they will build there.
As far as I understand, at that time it was a small shipyard, without much experience in building, much less designing, ships.
Of the battleships, by that time they had built the "Werth" and laid down the "Wilhelm der Grosse", both of which were quite so-so...
Ordering a second "Askold" is still a piece of cake considering the rather attractive price, but anything bigger...

Quote: Zodiac

Which is somehow illogical.

Perhaps our people knew something that we don’t?

[Zodiac]

Quote: Senior Sailor

Perhaps our people knew something that we don’t?

The official response from the Navy Department is in the archive. I quote it:

Your proposal cannot be accepted, as the Naval Ministry already has an established shipbuilding program, which must be fulfilled by state-owned ports and private Russian factories. The Naval Ministry does not have the necessary funds to build ships beyond the program abroad.

[Jura 27]

Of the battleships, by that time they had built the "Werth" and laid down the "Wilhelm der Grosse", both of which were quite so-so...

What do you mean, so-so? What was so fundamentally worse there than, say, Sisoes or Sevastopol?

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Jura 27

So-so - what does that mean?

Bad.

Quote: Jura 27

What was fundamentally worse there than, for example, in Sisoes or Sevastopol?

Who exactly?
The "verts" simply don't have a SC, and the GK is not a masterpiece either.
The Kaisers are better, but their armor layout is outdated, despite the armor being modern. The main gun is frankly pathetic. The secondary gun seems powerful, but the broadside is weak. Only the turret guns have decent firing angles.
Well, in terms of the time of laying the "big willie", we should compare it not with the "Poltavas", but rather with the Borodinos.
Something like that.
It's clear that when the VTE was being formed, our people wouldn't have abandoned it, but in 1898...

[Jura 27]

The "verts" simply don't have a SC, and the GK is not a masterpiece either.
The Kaisers are better, but the armor scheme is outdated,

So the project is most likely not theirs, but handed down from above - if they had ordered it with the necessary weapons, they would have built it, like Askold, for example.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Jura 27

So the project is most likely not theirs, but was handed down from above.

That's probably how it was. But...
That was precisely the problem. The company had no experience developing large ships on its own. So, while we could order them, the results weren't guaranteed.

Quote: Jura 27

like Askold, for example.

A smooth-deck vessel with a three-shaft crane... it seems to me that in a certain sense it is a "Kaiserin Augusta" modified with a file.
Will it be possible to improve the Kaiser in this way?

You are probably right, it was worth a try, because even if it is not the best ship, it is better at the beginning of the war than a wonderful one after.

By the way, weren't there any political restrictions? It's just that during that period, Deutsche didn't build anything larger than a cruiser for anyone... I read something like that at Tsushima about ten years ago, but I can't remember where now.

[Jura 27]

Will it be possible to improve the Kaiser in this way?

Askold turned out quite well.

By the way, were there any political restrictions?

So Krupp himself proposed building two battleships, and another cruiser to go with them.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Jura 27

Askold turned out quite well.

It is also not without its shortcomings, although they are forgivable for a light and relatively cheap cruiser.

Quote: Jura 27

So Krupp himself proposed building two battleships, and another cruiser to go with them.

But I don't remember anything like that...
I mean, I haven't come across it in literature.

[Jura 27]

Quote: Senior Sailor

Quote: Jura 27

Askold turned out quite well.

It is also not without its shortcomings, although they are forgivable for a light and relatively cheap cruiser.

Quote: Jura 27

So Krupp himself proposed building two battleships, and another cruiser to go with them.

But I don't remember anything like that...
I mean, I haven't come across it in literature.

So you responded above to the comment with information:
"However, Russia rejected Krupp's proposal, conveyed through his official representative in Russia, State Councilor M. V. Anichkov, to build two battleships and two cruisers at the Germania shipyard in Kiel. Which is somehow illogical."

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Jura 27

But you responded to the comment above.

A comment is not a source.

[Jura 27]

So ask the author of the comment for the source.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Jura 27

So ask the author of the comment for the source.

Well, I didn't realize it right away.

[Ragnar]

Quote: Senior Sailor

The Kaisers are better, but their armor layout is outdated, despite the armor being modern. The main gun is frankly pathetic. The secondary gun seems powerful, but the broadside is weak. Only the turret guns have decent firing angles.
Well, in terms of the time of laying the "big willie", we should compare it not with the "Poltavas", but rather with the Borodinos.

Are you serious???

[Ragnar]

And as you already read above... This is already the third building of the project...

[Ragnar]

1895... what the hell are "Borodinets"??? The Peresvets are still 8 months away...

[Ragnar]

Or is this how you plan to build our fleet?

[Ragnar]

What if our battleships and cruisers were there???

[Senior seaman]

As can be seen from the excerpt, the ship my colleague plans to clone for our fleet was laid down in 1898. Therefore, the comparison with the Borodino-class ships is entirely justified.

[Ragnar]

Quote: Zodiac

However, Russia rejected Krupp's proposal, conveyed through his official representative in Russia, State Councillor M. V. Anichkov, to build two battleships and two cruisers at the Germania plant in Kiel.

At that time, Krupp had TWO operating slipways, what's not logical?

[Zodiac]

Quote: Ragnar

At that time, Krupp had TWO operating slipways, what's not logical?

In his note, Anichkov reported 11 boathouses, which means there are not 2 slipways. Oh well.
Better yet, tell me, is this author trustworthy? Is the book worth reading or should I forget it?

[Ragnar]

Quote: Zodiac

Nichkov reported in his note that there were 11 boathouses, which means there were not 2 slipways. Oh well.

Are we talking about debating??? Or just comparing drools???

[Zodiac]

I have no desire to discuss this, and I am not an expert on naval affairs.

[Ragnar]

Quote: Zodiac

In his note, Anichkov reported 11 boathouses, which means there are not 2 slipways. Oh well.

The thing is that this question is not at all simple...

Quote: Senior Sailor

The big question is what they will build there.
As far as I understand, at that time it was a small shipyard, without much experience in building, much less designing, ships.

However, financial difficulties continued under the new owners. In November 1882, the shipyard and machine building plant were merged into the Germania Shipbuilding and Machine Building Joint-Stock Company, with a share capital of three million gold marks.
From 1896 the shipyard was initially leased to Friedrich Krupp AG, then taken over by the company in 1902 and its name changed to Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft.
And then...

[Ragnar]

And Askold was built on an old, antediluvian slipway, located right on the sand...

[Ragnar]

Do you see any boathouse above it???

[Ragnar]

So Krupp had boathouses... Just "a little" later than we needed for the RYAV...

[Ragnar]

But I have good news for you... There were enough shipyards in Germany and the USA even without Krupp and Kramp...

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Zodiac

However, Russia rejected Krupp's proposal, conveyed through his official representative in Russia, State Councillor M. V. Anichkov, to build two battleships and two cruisers at the Germania plant in Kiel.

Colleague, would you mind indicating the source of this?
I don't think I've come across anything like that.

[Zodiac]

Hello. I've encountered this quite often. Try following this link:
https://memo-randum.net/katalog/interesnye-stati/s-v-fedulov-sankt-peterburg-voenno-tekhnicheskoe-sotrudnichestvo-rossiyskoy-imperii-s-zarubezhnymi-s/?ysclid=mv3fpwlx4e89364897

[Victor Leningradets]

Yesterday I couldn't answer - the internet was down.
Thank you, Alexander, for a job well done!
Thanks to all Russian patriots who joined the debate.
But all these phantom pains of that war in the style of “oh if only...” are meaningless.
I will disappoint all fans of the theory that we did not have enough (cruisers, battleships, bases, admirals, etc.) to VICTORY in that war.
There were two components to that war: the tactical (which everyone discusses) and the strategic, which only a few people touch upon.
The main component was the strategic one, and its driving force was the British Empire, whose interests Nicholas II's father, Alexander III, so short-sightedly encroached upon.
As a result, measures were taken to restrain Russia in the Far East in the form of a local war with a British proxy in the form of Japan.
The British, having pumped up the young but helpless predator with modern weapons, trained its sailors in military affairs at the most modern level, and by cleverly turning the Japanese ruling elite against Russia, managed to put an end to both Russia's claims in the Far East and, in general, deprive the Tsar of an independent foreign policy.
The evidence is:
- militarization of Japan with the help of incredible loans;
- testing of all new means of warfare at this testing ground (radio, long-range torpedoes, testing of artillery shells and firing methods);
- US mediation in curtailing the campaign and concluding a very compromise peace on terms that suited Great Britain.
So Russia had no chance in this war. If a miracle had happened and we had repeated the victory at Sinop in the Yellow Sea, we would have immediately found ourselves at war with the Great Britain-USA-Japan coalition, but with a far more crushing defeat than in the Crimean War.
Unfortunately, political ambitions must always be based on the actual balance of power at the point of application. So Russia alone could not have carried out the Far Eastern Adventure.

[Jura 27]

So Russia alone could not have carried out the Far Eastern Adventure.

It was just possible to pull it off, if we put some thought into how to turn the adventure into a meaningful action. And it was precisely in the Far East that we could "play" with the fleet.
Or give up Korea - the Japanese suggested that "Korea is theirs" and "Yellow Russia is ours."

[Arhat109]

The main component was the strategic one, and its driving force was the British Empire, whose interests Nicholas II's father, Alexander III, so short-sightedly encroached upon.

That's exactly it. But the alternative (what the Tsar should have done) depends heavily on returning to the starting point in time—"when?" And, if we go back and study the politics of that time, no matter how much I try, including with AI models, I inevitably come to 1877: the introduction of the gold customs duty. The bifurcation point. That moment of truth when the Russian authorities chose "who they were on"—with England, not Germany. Everything else is a consequence of the Russian Empire's bullying from 1877 onward.

[Alexander Iloev]

Victor Leningradets.
You know, this issue isn't what's bothering me in and of itself. I have a feeling we haven't drawn the proper conclusions, and perhaps "some shortcomings remain," and they've been repeated, and perhaps will be repeated again, not in the same form, of course. That's my opinion. And it didn't start with the Russian Revolution, but earlier.

[Arhat109]

In fact, it began immediately after the death of Peter the Great. Even then, they tried to prevent Sklyaev himself from completing the 100-gun ship. Immediately afterward, the "English method" prevailed, although Peter implemented his own method, which was 50-150 years ahead of its time. The Vyborg Teken, identified by Ivanov, is correct, although it lacks a stern at the waterlines. Or perhaps a piece was torn off by Peter himself, as the Vyborg, Riga, and Pernov series was being built simultaneously by different builders. Perhaps that's why it was torn off—each ship was sawing off its own stern. And after the famous Pallada, there were also Archangels.
This is a shitty teken, right? )
But on that drawing (I made a copy for myself) it was not at all the “English method”, I even superimposed a projection of the corpus and an English textbook.

[Grossvater]

Quote: K-50

We were not allowed to bring the war to a victorious conclusion. As soon as the Russian Empire had amassed sufficient forces to march to victory, all sorts of "conciliators" rushed in to prevent, God forbid, that from happening.
And all because these “peacekeepers” themselves acted as sponsors of this war, supporting Japan.
And how would they repay the loans if the Japanese lost? Slowly, with difficulty, and even then not all of them?
So they took all measures to prevent Russia from winning.
A striking analogy with today.
They raised a "fighting hamster," urged him on, supporting him in every possible way, and when Russia started to break through, they immediately started running around with reconciliation and the like.
Heh! Even the countries are the same.
Only Russia has changed.

The war was lost on the very first day. Peace negotiations could have begun immediately after the destruction of Retvizan and Tsarevich. Naval supremacy hadn't been secured, and that was that. They were just sparring, sparring district after district, out of boredom. War always makes economic sense. After the PA squadron lost its freedom of action, that economic sense vanished.
Now regarding the attempt to draw analogies with today.
How old are you? Don't you remember the 1990s at all? Didn't even go to kindergarten? How could Russia, hanging on the brink of collapse, influence the wreckage of the Soviet Union?

[Grossvater]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

served the British Empire, whose interests were so short-sightedly encroached upon by Nicholas II's father, Alexander III.

I completely agree. Geography should also be considered. Even if the Japanese were defeated, the Mikada was caged, and the harem was fucked, all exits from both the PA and Vladik would still be blocked by the Japanese islands, with Shanghai to the south.
The only thing that could and should have been done was to hand over China and Korea to Japan and England and establish an icebreaker flotilla in Vladivostok. It would have been cheaper than building battleships to sink.
Having given England a slap on the nose in Central Asia, it was necessary to sweeten the pill in China.

[Arhat109]

A huge thank you to the author for this second article, which clearly demonstrates the inability of RIF's wedding admirals to even create a concept and follow it, much less manage anything. Every other sentence can be quoted as proof that a social ladder "for insiders only" leads to the inevitable collapse of the country.
To the question of the article: what kind of ships should have been built?
After much analysis and debate on various resources at the time (Tsushima is a very sore spot for Russians to this day), I came to the conclusion that if our MTK were a little smarter, it would have reached the following conclusions:
1. Due to the interdependence of performance characteristics for a given displacement, the highest standards of design and production are required. Struggling for every kilogram of displacement is the primary requirement in the specifications.
2. An increase in artillery caliber and quantity per ship, requiring both an increase in displacement and operational range (the Germans reached this conclusion back in the 1890s)
3. Increased speeds, requiring more steam and more powerful machines.
Therefore, by strictly demanding from designers even the typical 1895 40-60 kg/hp specific power of the entire crane manoeuvre, and by differentially limiting armor protection, it would have been entirely possible to create a "universal" ship for the Russian Imperial Fleet. And specifically for the Russian Imperial Fleet, it could have been of great value, provided there was no design or construction overload:
10-12 kiloton displacement, speed from 25 knots, range from 8000 miles and autonomy from 30 days or more, armor from 6" shells from 20 KB, main caliber equal to squadron, albeit in smaller quantities and lighter armor only from 6" (medium caliber of the enemy).
And a carrying capacity of up to 1000 tons. The latter would ensure "versatility" as a cruiser: additional fuel doubling the range and endurance; additional ammunition; reconnaissance assets (airships, airplanes); landing forces, including mini-submarines, mine-laying equipment, etc.
But alas, and ah... even Rodionov's Rurik was a "breakthrough" and was met with hostility and given over to Kuteinikov for "reworking".

[Alexander Iloev]

Arhat109. Versatility is always a bad thing. A versatile ship can do everything, but it does everything poorly. Like the Peresvet, which was supposed to be both a battleship and a cruiser, but ended up being neither.
Moreover, universality is excessive and uneconomical.
Yuri Mukhin has some good articles on the topic of versatility, comparing Soviet and German weapons. For example, the regimental cannon. The Soviet one is superior in almost every way. But it turns out that all of this is overkill for a regiment, especially in terms of range. The German one, on the other hand, is seemingly inferior, but several times lighter, easier to roll, and therefore more optimal in specific conditions.
Our armed forces often wanted to create something universal, and if so, there was no need to think about organizing joint actions. But for the Germans, this was essential: each type of weapon supported the other, so no one had such cooperation. This allowed them to win even when outnumbered, and sometimes even with inferior weapons. Universality only comes to the fore when cooperation between troops (navies) breaks down, but it's hardly worth betting on that.
Another way to explain it is that versatility is like the Canadian hockey team of the late Soviet era: each player was excellent, but the Soviet team beat them for 10 years in a row thanks to team play.
Therefore, we must strive not for universality, but for a structure that allows us to organize this team game.

[Arhat109]

Versatility is always a bad thing. A versatile ship can do everything, but it does everything poorly. Like the Peresvet, which was intended to be both an armored cruiser and a battleship, but ended up being neither.

True. The more universal, the wider the applicability, but the worse it is for each specific case. I completely agree here, and Peresvet's example is as relevant as ever.
The variant proposed above isn't a cross between a battleship, a cruiser, and an aircraft carrier. It's a cruiser. All the cruiser objectives outlined in the 1882 program are fulfilled here, and even "with a surplus." Peresvetov's mistake is precisely here: both in line and on its own are two completely different applications and purposes.
If you think about it thoughtfully:
1. Speed, speed, and range—implemented. 25+ knots, 8000+ miles (oil-fired boilers), 23 to 26% of the displacement at the crane, out of approximately 50% remaining after the hull, crew, and supplies. About half, as this is the most important thing a cruiser needs, as she's usually a solo vessel.
The rest is roughly split in half, with the balance going to armor, as it is heavier than artillery.
The additional cargo capacity is needed precisely for the cruiser's specialization, as it has a very wide range of tasks, from convoying its own transports to hunting and reconnaissance.
And here, a main caliber comparable to an EBR is very appropriate, as it would be easy to run into an ambush, for example, in fog. Being able to fire back with the same caliber, even without the ability to take a hit, is still useful.
A cruiser shouldn't sail "in line"—that's not a royal job. And it was precisely this attempt to merge a hedgehog with a snake that fell to the Peresvets.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Arhat109

1. Speed, speed and range - implemented. 25+ knots 8000+ miles (oil heating boilers)

If we're talking about the Russian Revolutionary War, triple-expansion steam engines couldn't have produced such speeds for large ships. Even light cruisers had to work their tails off to achieve those figures. Only turbines. And that's a completely different era.

[Arhat109]

It's a common misconception, but it's not true, at least because the first Parsons turbines were brazenly inferior to the cylinder, which is why the Germans were the last to switch to turbines, and the British later, when necessary, returned to the PM.
A turbine starts to outperform a cylinder only at pressures above 40-60 atm. Below that, there's a net loss in specific dimensions. Find the weight of the turbines and their power, and the total power of the PM without the boiler and condenser, since they're identical (the cycle is the same – Rankine).
For example, the PM BRP Novik is around 4.5 kg/hp. 1900. Just don't compare it to the Russian PMs, whose weight reflected the scale of corruption.
It's entirely possible to create a marine engine with a specific gravity of 2-3 kg/hp and a specific volume of 1 liter/hp at a saturated steam pressure of 18 atm, ignoring the condenser. It's also completely balanced to the first order. A US patent from 1883. USA 278841A, I think, appears on Google patents. A 1904 book also lists it as Well's Marine Engine (the company is still active and is part of the Babcock & Co. concern—a familiar name). This company simply didn't participate in military contracts.
This is what the MTK should have been doing: digging up all the best that was accumulated in civilian life, and not hanging around pubs in Paris. :(
With modern CAD, solutions and materials, you can have something like this with scaling up to 9000 hp per rod (oops).

[Arhat109]

I'll continue with Mukhin. Comparing the FW190A and Bf109 models from 1941 with those from '43 is certainly cool, but it's haphazard. The I-15b, I-16, and even the LaGG-1 and Yak-1 were hopelessly inferior to the FW190A. The same goes for the T-34 and its Pz3 and 4 variants. The main tanks in '41 were the T-26, BT-5, and BT-7.
In fact, it clearly follows from the 1882 program that a cruiser, in terms of its tasks, is an analogue of a modern main battle tank.
Somehow I understood her like this...

[Alexandra]

Quote: Alexander Iloev

Versatility is always a bad thing. A versatile ship can do everything, but it does everything poorly. Like the Peresvet, which was intended to be both an armored cruiser and a battleship, but ended up being neither.

In those days, a versatile armored cruiser for limited theaters of war was possible at half the price of a squadron battleship. An example is the Garibaldi-class armored cruisers.

A versatile armored cruiser for open-ocean theaters of war was also possible at the price of a squadron battleship. An example is the British Cressy-class cruisers.

https://sergiovillaggio.livejournal.com/393865.html

"In addition to purely cruising tasks, the technical specifications include a clause on the possibility of using these cruisers in battle between linear forces, but without placing them in a line..."

Even Great Britain could not afford the truly massive construction of universal armored cruisers of the Cressy type for ocean theaters, and supplemented them with truly massive armored cruisers of the County type.

Since the clash with the Mikado's fleet was to take place in the vast expanses of the Yellow Sea and the Sea of ​​Japan, as part of the "Special Shipbuilding Program for Strengthening the Pacific Ocean Squadron," our admirals not only could but should have approved the construction of several universal armored cruisers for limited theaters of operation, for example, along the lines of the improved Garibaldi-class cruisers with 24-water-tube boilers. These were built in place of the large armored cruisers, which had proven their uselessness during the war.

But it wasn't approved. Only one "neither fish nor fowl" armored cruiser, the Bayan, was built, as a sort of "luxury for the squadron." Our admirals had no understanding of the role of an armored cruiser detachment in battle as the fast wing of an armored squadron. So, enormous resources were wasted on useless armored deck ships and on battleships, whose column, keeping pace with the lagging one, demonstrated a squadron speed of 13 knots in the Battle of the Yellow Sea.

[Arhat109]

Quote: Jura 27

Even if you give ZPR twelve mikas, he will still lose the battle.

Exactly so, thank you.

[Evgeniy SP]

A pointless juggling of numbers and terms. The main and fundamental weakness of the Russian fleet in the theater of operations is a shortage of 40 tons (and, taking into account the imminent Garibaldian invasion, 55 tons) of tonnage in the main classes of ships (battleships and cruisers).
Against this backdrop, ship types and their performance characteristics are deeply secondary. Simply put, the Russian fleet missed the concentration of forces equal to the enemy's at the start of the war and therefore lost.