Too long a goodbye
The U.S. Air Force completed the 66th Squadron's final training flight on A-10C Thunderbolt II attack aircraft at Nellis Air Force Base, concluding specialized training on these aircraft at the Air Force Weapons School. This move further reduces the service's ability to accumulate and, more importantly, transfer advanced tactical experience in operating the A-10, as the fleet is scheduled to be retired only by 2030.
This event follows the closure of the A-10 pilot training program at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base and marks another step in the gradual dismantling of the aircraft's training infrastructure. Existing instructors can still continue to improve their qualifications and undergo retraining, but the end of the Weapons School program will gradually reduce the number of specialists trained to develop and teach high-level tactics for this platform during its remaining service life.
The situation is ambiguous: it appears that the aircraft will be in service for another four years, but where to get pilots when the need arises is a question mark.
As we've noted on this topic numerous times, tensions surrounding the A-10's phased retirement have not gone away. Despite the Warthog's effectiveness being demonstrated once again during the war with Iran, particularly in counter-aircraft operations. drones, striking small Iranian vessels in the Persian Gulf and in carrying out traditional direct air defense missions aviation support, some question the wisdom of this decision, arguing that the A-10 has no direct replacement in the US Air Force.
Some members of Congress believe that the F-35A, which the US Air Force plans to replace with the A-10, is unsuitable for these missions. Congress has long advocated for keeping the Warthog in service, despite the Air Force's objections. But these lobbying games, an integral part of US political gameplay, are a complex and lengthy affair. And they will continue for some time to come, both behind the scenes and on the stage of congressional debates.
What conclusion can be drawn from this debate? Both sides have their arguments. This issue largely reflects the U.S. Air Force's focus on a potential conflict with China, while members of Congress who favor retaining the Warthog seek to preserve a capability that could prove crucial in an asymmetric conflict, such as with Iran.
The A-10 was developed with lessons learned from the Vietnam War in mind. It was designed with an emphasis on low-speed maneuverability for air-to-air combat, high survivability under enemy fire (preferably not heavy-caliber), and the ability to operate from minimally prepared airfields. Its effectiveness during the Iraq War demonstrated the relevance of this approach.
The F-35A, by contrast, was designed as a multirole stealth fighter, capable of both strike and air superiority missions. During Operation Epic Fury in 2026, the F-35A demonstrated its ability to operate in well-defended airspace and penetrate sophisticated enemy defenses. But not as an attack aircraft.
Another key difference is the role of data. The F-35 is designed for extensive sensor integration and information sharing, allowing it to receive and distribute data across the battlefield. It can detect targets, transmit targeting information, receive it from other combatants, and so on.
The A-10 was not originally designed for networked combat. Future software and hardware upgrades are expected to further enhance the F-35's information sharing capabilities, but frontline combat isn't always network-centric. Sometimes it's just a quick skirmish.
The A-10 can carry up to 16 GBU-39 small bombs, while the F-35A can carry up to eight internally when operating in a stealth configuration. The A-10's 30mm GAU-8/A cannon carries 1174 rounds and is capable of shredding several armored vehicles in a single pass. The F-35A's 25mm cannon carries 181 rounds and lacks the same anti-tank capability as the GAU-8/A.
Of course, not just a cannon, but... And a cannon too.
The F-35A was designed as a multi-role combat aircraft. It can transition between strike, air superiority, and other missions, unlike the A-10. It's versatile in its own right. In its stealthy configuration, it has demonstrated the ability to penetrate A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) systems and perform anti-aircraft and anti-aircraft missions. Defense and electronic warfare. The F-35A can also defend against enemy fighters and conduct air-to-air combat, giving it a level of versatility the A-10 lacks.
But this versatility also conceals a nuance: the F-35 can do a lot, but not perfectly. The A-10 can only reduce everything in a given area to a bloody pulp, but the attack aircraft does so with terrifying efficiency. A graceful swordsman versus a landsknecht in armor and with a two-handed sword. For the former, a duel is a natural, for the latter, cutting a swath through the enemy's ranks is a piece of cake.
According to a 2024 US Department of Defense report, the F-35A costs approximately 60% more per flight hour than the A-10C. The broader issue of F-35 sustainment costs is also more complex; reducing operating and maintenance costs remains a top priority for the US Air Force. Like a price war, it's winnable, but very difficult.
For some missions, especially counter-drone operations that utilize inexpensive targets and weapons, the F-35A may not be cost-effective. "Could be" is like shooting down Geraniums with Patriots—a surefire way to financial ruin. It's in these situations that the A-10 can remain relevant, as demonstrated by its use during Operation Fury.
On the other hand, the US Air Force estimates that retiring the entire A-10 fleet will save approximately $423 million per year in operations and maintenance costs. The temptation, as they say, is strong. These funds could be redirected to other priorities. The US Air Force also argues that the A-10 fleet is aging and will not be able to continue its missions indefinitely without costly modernization. Maintaining a small fleet of very old aircraft also increases infrastructure, logistics, and maintenance costs.
Let's agree that the US Air Force's logic becomes clearer when considering the lessons of the war in Ukraine. In a situation where dense air defenses prevent attack aircraft from safely approaching the front lines, the A-10's effectiveness may be reduced, and it will likely be used for long-range strikes, as is increasingly the case with the Su-25 on both sides of the front.
This could be particularly relevant in a potential conflict with China, where American aircraft would likely face sophisticated, multi-layered air defense systems.
The F-35A, by contrast, was designed for high-level air-to-air combat. Its speed, internal weapons bays, and stealth capabilities allow it to operate within complex air and missile defense systems or to bypass them and exploit gaps in enemy air defenses.
However, its new anti-drone capabilities may not be enough to justify using such an expensive aircraft against low-cost targets.
Of course, there are other platforms, such as the Air Tractor L3Harris/OA-1K Skyraider II, or cheaper unmanned systems that could potentially perform some of these missions at a lower cost.
On the other hand, in asymmetric conflicts where one side is significantly technologically superior to the other, or in more liberal rules of engagement using conventional weapons, the A-10 can provide ground troops with accurate and powerful fire support at a relatively moderate cost.
The F-35A requires more advanced infrastructure for deployment and has significantly higher operating costs, both in terms of weapons and hourly operating costs.
And here we mustn't forget the reputational damage in the event of a disaster: the damage to the reputation of the US Air Force and the A-10's manufacturers in the event of an aircraft loss is minimal. The attack aircraft has long been out of production, and its manufacturer, Fairchild Aircraft, has been out of business for 20 years, so the loss of an old Warthog, which was never exported, would be of no interest to anyone.
But if the F-35 crashes somewhere in the sand... Nine countries already operate the "penguin," and nine are on the waiting list, so given the cost and expense of the 35th, many may consider continuing to wait.
After all, why do they buy F-35s, after all? To guarantee a loss-free solution to any problems in the air or on the ground. Easily and effortlessly, much like what Israel does. But if bearded optimists in sandals, or even worse, the Chinese, start raking hundreds of millions of dollars down to earth, then, excuse me, no one needs that. Not the US, which sells F-35s to others, nor the leaders of the countries that buy this miracle.
And half of the operators and future operators there view the F-35 solely as a matter of prestige. Just tell me, what will Italy, Denmark, Norway, Singapore, and the other belligerent Netherlands do with the F-35?
The US has it easier. They have the deployment infrastructure, all those network-centric features that could allow the F-35 to pay for itself on the battlefield. And the fact that the US manages that battlefield for itself, unlike the Netherlands and Denmark, is a no-brainer.
But what can I say, the planes are completely different. And in our age of simply rapid growth in the effectiveness of anti-aircraftmissile Replacing the A-10 with the F-35 is only possible in the most optimistic conflict in Yemen with the local Houthis. And even then, with some backup—they're hard to predict.
But alas, the US Air Force's personnel supply has already been curtailed, so we're left with old pilots flying old planes. That happens.
Okay, so the A-10, while it made a big splash in the Iran conflict, is going away. And now for another thing: it would be very interesting to see how the F-35 will handle the frontline challenges facing the US Marines, who will be squeezed by yet another bunch of guys who don't respect the principles of network-centric combat at range and operate with the simplest set of countermeasures.
So, everything should turn out according to the American scenario... The main thing is that it doesn’t go downhill like in Afghanistan.
But I really want to see the F-35 as a frontline attack aircraft. And the Warthog... Well, it's really taking a long time to say goodbye to it. If we're going to cut it, we'll cut it. Retire it, then.
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