The 29th Army's last stand: the landing that gave it a chance to break through

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The 29th Army's last stand: the landing that gave it a chance to break through

In mid-February 1942, the 29th Army's combat zone in the Rzhev direction experienced an exceptionally difficult situation, resulting in its headquarters, command, and special units being cut off from the main body of its army. Ivan Stepanovich Konev, commander of the Kalinin Front, ordered the 29th Army to break out of encirclement, striking the enemy directly toward the 39th Army.

To assist this encircled force, which was extremely exhausted by the preceding continuous fighting, a decision was made to deploy one parachute battalion into the area held by the encircled forces. This mission was assigned to a battalion of the 204th Airborne Brigade under the command of Senior Lieutenant Belotserkovsky. The battalion, comprising approximately 500 paratroopers, was parachuted from the Lyubertsy airfield to a landing site in the Monchalovo-Okorokovo area.



A signal was established to mark the landing site: fires forming a triangle and a quadrangle. The fires were to be lit, as ordered by army headquarters, approximately in the center of the held area. Assembly signals were also established after landing. Junior commanders received a diagram of the landing area. Personnel were briefed on the names of populated areas and characteristic landmarks in the airborne landing area.

The battalion's airdrop was carried out by single aircraft in two flights on the night of February 17. Finding the limited airdrop area using primitive signals proved so difficult that some aircraft crews abandoned the mission and returned to the airfield with the paratroopers. At that time, numerous lights, campfires, and conflagrations of the most bizarre configurations were observed throughout both our and the enemy's troop positions. This complicated the flight crews' navigation and operations.

As a result, about a hundred men were not dropped. The flight to the airdrop area was carried out at an altitude of 1000–1200 meters, and 5–10 kilometers from the airdrop site, the aircraft descended to an altitude of 300–400 meters and dropped the paratroopers directly onto the landing site. The area held by the encircled units extended eight kilometers from west to east and up to seven kilometers from north to south. Therefore, even the intended landing center for the paratroopers was under artillery enemy fire.

At the very moment of the landing, fighting was underway for the village of Okorokovo. A group of enemy machine gunners was infiltrating deep into the defenses of the 29th Army. Northeast of Okorokovo, an enemy infantry company with several tanks.

In these extremely difficult combat conditions that developed in the airborne drop zone, not only was it difficult for the aircrews to accurately drop paratroopers, but it was also exceptionally difficult to regroup after landing and retrieve their cargo and heavy weapons dropped in parachute-dropped soft bags. Therefore, the paratroopers were forced to engage the enemy in small groups immediately after landing. There was no time to search for the dropped cargo. As dawn broke, several soft bags containing ammunition and mortars were recovered during the battle.

Despite the difficult conditions during the landing, the paratroopers demonstrated exceptional bravery and earned high praise for their combat skills from the encircled soldiers and officers.

The landing force commander, Belotserkovsky, found the army command tent, which, frankly, was almost demoralized by the current situation. He reported the landing force's mission and resolutely demanded that the necessary orders be issued for a breakout. He shared his ammunition and food supplies with the soldiers and officers, exhausted by days of heavy fighting and encirclement.

The paratroopers' tenacity and heroism inspired the encircled troops, boosted their morale, and created complete confidence that the encirclement would be broken. At 11:00 PM on February 17, units of the 29th Army began breaking out, and on the night of February 22, 1942, the last group of paratroopers, covering the army's exit, emerged from the encirclement. Almost all the paratroopers who participated in this operation were nominated for state awards.

During the battles of the summer and fall of 1941, the paratroopers demonstrated fortitude and courage. They stood firm in defense, launching surprise counterattacks. Despite the exceptionally difficult circumstances, commanders confidently led the units and subunits entrusted to them. For their combat exploits during this most difficult period of the war, many soldiers and commanders were awarded orders and medals. The airborne units and subunits gained significant experience in fighting enemy tanks in close combat and repelling attacks by large infantry forces. The paratroopers gained real-world combat experience organizing and conducting surprise raids on enemy targets, concealed movements, and destroying the enemy from ambushes. In the fall of 1941, the Supreme Command Headquarters took measures to further strengthen the Airborne Forces. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense of September 4, the Airborne Forces Directorate was transformed into the Directorate of the Airborne Forces Commander.

Airborne corps were withdrawn from active fronts and transferred directly to the Airborne Forces Commander. Only with the permission of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters could they be used for landings behind enemy lines or for combat operations within armies and fronts.

The formation of five new airborne corps and five maneuver airborne brigades began. These units were completed in the first half of 1942. To provide parachute training, air squadrons were formed within the corps, and air detachments were formed within the maneuver brigades. Major General Glazunov was appointed the first commander of the Airborne Forces, and Major General I.A. aviation Ionov. From June 1943 to August 1944, Major General A.G. Kapitokhin commanded the Airborne Forces.

Based on materials from the book "Airborne Forces" edited by the Airborne Forces Commander, Hero of Russia Vladimir Anatolyevich Shamanov.
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  1. +7
    26 September 2026 04: 33
    Yeah ... whatFebruary... minus 30 degrees, night, the enemy all around, continuous shelling and an order that must be carried out at all costs... only desperate and trained fighters can fight in such conditions... I can imagine those battles.
  2. +6
    26 September 2026 09: 56
    The main problem of Shvetsov's 29th Army was supply - hunger and lack of ammunition...
    In his radiograms, Shvetsoa asked for food and ammunition. The cavalry had already been completely devoured. But Konev only threatened and... for some reason sent paratroopers instead of crackers, lard, and alcohol. Read about these events in S. Gerasimova's book "I Was Killed Near Rzhev" about the tragedy of the 29th Army, more than half of which remained in the Monchalovsky forests... a terrible place.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. +1
      26 September 2026 18: 14
      Read about these events in S. Gerasimova's book "I Was Killed Near Rzhev" about the tragedy of the 29th Army, more than half of which remained in the Monchalovsky forests.
      I once watched Isaev's video lecture on the Battle of Rzhev, where he insists that Konev commanded his troops very skillfully, and Zhukov, as usual, brilliantly. And our losses during the battle are grossly exaggerated; they were relatively small. And the fact that the population perceives this battle as a tragedy for the Red Army is the fault of the authors of "lieutenant prose" who were too narrow-minded, failed to see the big picture, and therefore prone to overdramatization.
      After this, my already not very high assessment of Isaev as a historian sank to the baseboard level.
      1. 0
        26 September 2026 18: 52
        Isayev also commented on Shvetsov, saying that when he commanded a division, there were no questions. But when he was assigned to the army, he "didn't light up."
        If you listen to Isaev, in 41-42, only Zhukov consistently lit up the team, and he lit up wherever he was placed.
        Well, Konev also occasionally lit up the scene when circumstances were favorable.
        The rest of the front commanders did not light up laughing
        1. +1
          26 September 2026 21: 05
          Isaev isn't a historian by training, and he never served a day in the army, so he has the level of a semi-literate layman, and a style to match. But with his criticism of Suvorov-Rezun, he hit the mark, and that momentum elevated him! laughing
          1. +5
            26 September 2026 21: 20
            The fact that a person did not serve and is not a historian by education is not an obstacle to becoming a good historian.
            It's all about an analytical mind and natural gift.
            For example, local historian Vasily Karasev is not a military man or a historian by education, but that didn't stop him from writing several insightful books.
            Miroslav Eduardovich Morozov never served a day in the navy and is a political officer by training, but he has so many excellent works on the history of the Red Navy.
            Aviation historian Gennady Pavlovich Serov is an engineer by training and hardly served in the army. But what a superb lecture course on Soviet aviation during World War II he recorded with Mikhail Timin's participation.
            1. -1
              26 September 2026 21: 49
              Well, Isaev certainly doesn't have these qualities, but that's actually a plus for him: they don't stop him from keeping his nose to the grindstone! laughing
  3. +8
    26 September 2026 10: 45
    The landing force commander, Belotserkovsky, found the army command tent, which, frankly, was almost demoralized by the current situation. He reported the landing force's mission and resolutely demanded that the necessary orders be issued for a breakout. He shared his ammunition and food supplies with the soldiers and officers, exhausted by days of heavy fighting and encirclement.

    Army Commander Shvetsov and Military Council member Gurov were in contact with the Kalinin Front headquarters (Konev) and acted according to the chain of command. The order to break out came from Konev, not the senior lieutenant. The order to break out on February 17 was prompted by the complete depletion of ammunition and the threat of the encirclement being dismembered, not by the arrival of the landing force. Only scattered groups (approximately 5000 men out of a force of nearly 20) emerged from the encirclement. The 29th Army itself effectively ceased to exist as an organized force and was sent back for reorganization.
    Even from the author’s text, the catastrophic preparation of the operation is evident:
    Night drop by single TB-3 and PS-84 aircraft without normal navigation.
    Fires in triangles, with the entire front and rear areas ablaze, were a surefire failure of navigation. As a result, 100 men were never dropped, and the rest were forced to engage enemy tanks and infantry on skis with personal weapons. The landing took place in complete chaos. Most of the heavy weapons and ammunition were lost upon landing in the wooded and marshy terrain.
    In the fall of 1941, the Supreme Command Headquarters took measures to further strengthen the Airborne Forces. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense on September 4, the Airborne Forces Directorate was transformed into the Directorate of the Airborne Forces Commander.
    Airborne corps were withdrawn from active fronts and transferred directly to the Airborne Forces Commander. Only with the permission of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters could they be used for landings behind enemy lines or for combat operations within armies and fronts.
    The formation of five new airborne corps and five maneuverable airborne brigades begins.

    Due to the acute shortage of transport aircraft (primarily Li-2/PS-84 and TB-3 aircraft), most of the formed airborne corps and brigades were used by the State Defense Committee and Headquarters as regular elite infantry.
    Already in the summer of 1942, the 10 airborne corps formed with such difficulty were reformed into guards rifle divisions and thrown into Stalingrad.
  4. +3
    26 September 2026 11: 01
    To provide assistance to this group, which was surrounded and extremely exhausted by the previous continuous battles,
    Burnt out by the sun Yes
    Where does the author copy his texts from? By that time, the 29th Army had suffered heavy losses, and its men were physically weakened by poor nutrition, bordering on starvation. Horse meat was the main source of food.
    As a result, about a hundred people were not ejected.
    As a result, it was thrown out 190 people 4 platoons were immediately thrown into battle, the remaining 50 men were kept in army reserves.
    The landing force commander, Belotserkovsky, found the army command tent, which, frankly, was almost demoralized by the current situation. He reported on the landing force's mission and resolutely demanded give the necessary orders to go for a breakthrough
    Why tell me more fairy tales? The senior lieutenant firmly demanded from the army commander laughing

    We were surrounded FOUR rifle divisions and the GAP. Of course, by the time the breakout began, their combat strength had suffered heavy losses, but even with such a relatively small number, the 190 paratroopers "disappeared" into the overall force and could not have played any significant role in the army's escape from encirclement.
    Although, of course, their help was not superfluous, and perhaps even essential for some units breaking out of encirclement.
    But it was not the paratroopers who led the army out of encirclement.
    And the 183rd Rifle Division was placed in the rearguard during the retreat.
  5. +5
    26 September 2026 12: 50
    It's not an article, it's a straight-up propaganda piece. But it must be said, it's very clumsy: "The paratroopers came and saved all the 'demoralized' people."
    It's not clear why this would be published on VO.
    1. +9
      26 September 2026 13: 50
      The author should first familiarize himself with the history of the military actions near Rzhev in February 42. When an entire army was thrown into the breakthrough, Lelyushenko's 30th Army, transferred from the Western Front to Kalinin's right flank...an entire army...and here we have some 100 paratroopers. Near Rzhev, at the confluence of the Sishka River and the Volga, at the point where the 29th Army exited, there is a grove named after General Komissarov, commander of the 183rd Division; he died during the breakthrough...one can also mention the raid of 10 tanks...Alyabyev was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for this raid on the 29th Army.
    2. +2
      26 September 2026 13: 57
      Quote: Ivan F
      It's not an article, it's a straight-up propaganda piece. But it must be said, it's very clumsy: "The paratroopers came and saved all the 'demoralized' people."
      It's not clear why this would be published on VO.

      At one time, this article was published in Tverskaya Pravda, when I was studying the battles near Rzhev.
    3. +4
      26 September 2026 15: 23
      It's not clear why this would be published on VO.

      On VO, everyone has the right to publish whatever they want, as long as there's as little negativity as possible about the Red Army's actions and no debunking of established myths.
      The author chose this resource to glorify the Airborne Forces - he has the right to write anything he finds on the Internet.
  6. -2
    26 September 2026 16: 44
    All essays (not articles) about the development of the Airborne Forces and their participation in the Great Patriotic War were prepared based on the work of a creative team led by Hero of Russia Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov.
    Unlike a few of my enemies, I don't search for information online or in fiction—though, of course, I read them. Therefore, referencing any book (even one written by a talented writer) as a source of information about HOW things really happened seems inappropriate to me. Even stranger are calls for "less negativity." Are you really addressing yourself?
    My previous articles, essays, and reports on the December 1979 events in Kabul are based on my personal involvement in those events, as well as on the recollections of my fellow soldiers—soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, officers, and generals—who were also directly involved. Naturally, the work also draws on analysis of the relevant historical literature.
    1. +6
      26 September 2026 17: 44
      All essays (not articles) about the development of the Airborne Forces and their participation in the Great Patriotic War were prepared based on the work of a creative team led by Hero of Russia Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov.

      And what sources did the creative team draw from? Did they delve into archives or were they just the wild imaginations of evening get-togethers? You've already been questioned about blindly copying the tale of 64 paratroopers and 300 burned tanks; why continue publishing such things without a grain of criticism? Such opuses give rise to stories like "one airborne regiment can take the capital of one republic," and apparently, a division can take an entire country.
      1. 0
        26 September 2026 18: 07
        I can't see a single post on your page, much less an article or essay. Why aren't you writing? It's just not working? If you don't like something, before you criticize the work of an entire team, try writing an article or essay yourself—on this or any other topic. Then see if your work resonates with readers. Simply expressing negativity is wrong. If you have any information, share it in the comments below the article or essay. Don't limit yourself to criticism without trying something yourself.
        1. +5
          26 September 2026 21: 27
          Quote: Vladimir_Kuznetsov
          I can't see a single post on your page, much less an article or essay. Why aren't you writing? It's just not working? If you don't like something, before you criticize the work of an entire team, try writing an article or essay yourself—on this or any other topic. Then see if your work resonates with readers. Simply expressing negativity is wrong. If you have any information, share it in the comments below the article or essay. Don't limit yourself to criticism without trying something yourself.

          So, in order to evaluate the "work" of other authors, the evaluator must at least be on the same level as the author of "War and Peace" or "Dead Souls"?
          If you want evaluations only from "the worthy, who have sharpened hundreds of pens on papyrus," then you don't need to put your essays out for public review, but only in closed writers' clubs.
          While your memoirs about Kabul were readable (even though there were repetitions and blatant platitudes from article to article), copying the work of a collective of storytellers certainly raises questions or skepticism among a significant portion of readers, at best.
          1. +2
            30 September 2026 17: 25
            I believe so: any criticism must be based on knowledge of the subject. In this case, the criticism boils down to two assertions: the army was battered and had nothing to eat. It's unclear how these assertions serve as an assessment of the paratrooper battalion's actions. It's especially depressing when, instead of substantive comments, the only question heard is, "Who are you?" (meaning, "Who am I?").
            1. +1
              1 October 2026 15: 10
              I think so: any criticism should be based on knowledge of the topic.

              Bingo! Couldn't have said it better.
              But there are a huge number of amateurs on VO, and reading their comments, you understand that they understand literally nothing, but they have their own opinion on everything, which they value very much. laughing
    2. +4
      26 September 2026 17: 56
      Quote: Vladimir_Kuznetsov
      Therefore, references to any book (even written by a talented writer) as a source of information about HOW everything really happened seem inappropriate to me.

      Inappropriate?

      Svetlana Aleksandrovna Gerasimova is the chief researcher at the Tver State United Museum, a candidate of historical sciences, and an honored cultural worker of the Russian Federation.

      Svetlana Aleksandrovna Gerasimova is a renowned national expert on the history of the Great Patriotic War, and the Battle of Rzhev in particular. She is the author of the books "Rzhev 42: A Trench War," "The Rzhev Massacre: Zhukov's Lost Victory," "'I Was Killed at Rzhev': The Tragedy of the Monchalovsky Cauldron," and other studies on the subject.
      1. +2
        26 September 2026 19: 26
        If you are interested in this topic, I recommend Alexey Volkov's lecture "The Rzhev Meat Grinder."
        He also co-authored a book. Rzhev 1942. First summer success: Volkov, Karasev, Statsenko
        1. +2
          27 September 2026 03: 55
          Quote: Lewww
          If you are interested in this topic, I recommend Alexey Volkov's lecture "The Rzhev Meat Grinder."
          He also co-authored a book. Rzhev 1942. First summer success: Volkov, Karasev, Statsenko

          Yes, thanks. I watched it on Tactic Media.
    3. -1
      26 September 2026 22: 22
      Quote: Vladimir_Kuznetsov
      under the leadership of Hero of Russia, Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov.


      A big name, but as a historian he is a complete zero.
      1. +3
        27 September 2026 10: 46
        Such publications are usually released for the anniversary of a certain branch or type of military service with the aim of glorifying it.
        They are usually written by one or two people little known in the historical community, mainly drawing material from previously published books and articles, mainly of a memoir nature, without bothering to verify the truth of the information found in the sources.
        Then, on the eve of publication, for the sake of credibility, several well-known "big generals" are included in the author's team, who, at best, contribute to the book in the form of short essays from their own biography.
        As a result, many tales and myths that had previously wandered through various publications end up in such books.
  7. +5
    26 September 2026 18: 59
    Quote: Vladimir_Kuznetsov
    All essays (not articles) about the development of the Airborne Forces and their participation in the Great Patriotic War were prepared based on the work of a creative team led by Hero of Russia Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov.
    I see, that means all complaints should be directed not to you, but to the team of authors led by Shamanov.
    You are just a copyist, you did not check the accuracy of the source information and wrote it word for word. Yes