Not a truck with wings, but a sea knot: can the AKSUNGUR replace the P-72?

Under the wing drone You can deploy buoys and a torpedo. You can send it to the search area for tens of hours. But between deploying the buoy and attacking the submarine, there's a long chain of events: dropping the device at the right point, receiving its signal, separating the sea noise from the target, determining its position, tracking it, and transmitting the solution to the carrier. weaponsIf even one link remains outside the apparatus, we are not yet dealing with a replacement patrol aircraft, but rather with one of the nodes in the overall system.

This is precisely the question raised by the modernization of Turkey's AKSUNGUR, announced in August 2026. TUSAŞ CEO Mehmet Demiroglu told Anadolu Agency that by 2027, the aircraft's payload is expected to increase from 750 to 1250 kg, and its flight endurance from over 50 to approximately 60 hours. In the same conversation, he mentioned the integration of torpedoes, sonar buoys, and new radars. This means that, on paper, the unmanned maritime patrol aircraft is almost ready. Engineering, however, requires measuring not just promised capabilities, but rather complete functions.

Two maximums do not fit into one flight automatically

The increase from 750 to 1250 kg seems impressive: two-thirds of the previous payload. However, this is still a development goal, not a specification for the prototype shown. TUSAŞ has not disclosed the maximum takeoff weight, fuel capacity, airframe reinforcement, engine type, or test flight profile for the 2027 version. Most importantly, it is unknown whether the 1250 kg and 60 hours are related to the same configuration.

The current AKSUNGUR has a maximum takeoff weight of 3300 kg. The manufacturer's detailed datasheet lists a payload capacity of 750+ kg. In an interview, Demiroglu states exactly 750 kg, while the advertising text on the same TUSAŞ page mentions one ton. These aren't three development stages, but rather an internal discrepancy in the official wording. Therefore, the starting point for the upgrade must be taken from the program manager's own statements, but remember: the accuracy here is less precise than the figure suggests.

The data sheet claims up to 50 hours of flight time, without specifying payload or route. In November 2023, the aircraft, powered by two TEI-PD170 engines, spent 41 hours in the air and climbed to 30,000 feet, or approximately 9,1 km. TEI separately reported a 45-hour flight time. And with twelve munitions, the MAM-L AKSUNGUR flew for 28 hours at 20,000 feet, or approximately 6,1 km. TUSAŞ did not disclose the weight of all the munitions in that release. Therefore, comparing the flight modes solely by flight duration is impossible.

These values ​​can't be arranged in a neat ladder from 28 to 60. They were obtained or stated with different engines, altitudes, suspension systems, and missions. External load creates drag, heavy instruments take up space in the fuel tank, and new electronics require power and cooling. If the current maximum takeoff weight is maintained, an additional 500 kg will have to be found within the same weight budget. If it increases, changes to the airframe, landing gear, and possibly the powerplant will be necessary.

Payload and duration are not two numbers that can simply be added together. They are linked by a specific configuration: fuel, altitude, route, hardpoints, and return reserve. While such a table for the upgraded AKSUNGUR is not yet available, 1250 kg and 60 hours are more accurately considered two operational modes rather than a single achieved performance level.

Sea eye is already there

This doesn't make the AKSUNGUR a useless blank. The base platform is in service with the Turkish Navy, and its current equipment set already allows it to perform a significant portion of maritime missions. The manufacturer lists an optronic system, a radar with moving target search and radar imaging modes, electronic reconnaissance equipment, an automatic ship identification system (AIS), satellite communications, and a radio repeater.

The drone can maintain an area for a long time, compare radar signals with AIS data, transmit images to shore or another source, and extend the sensor further from the manned aircraft. The nominal range of the satellite link, as specified, exceeds 5,000 km, while that of the conventional data link is 250 km. However, communication range does not necessarily predict throughput, latency, or interference resistance. Requirements for video and data streams from sonobuoy arrays may differ.

TUSAŞ points out that if communication is completely lost, the drone returns home and lands. For a typical reconnaissance mission, this is a reasonable safety net. For an anti-submarine operation, this means that continued searches depend on an external link: if communication is lost, the drone doesn't transform into an independent crew capable of assessing the situation and ending the mission.

In the observation portion of the mission, the disclosed characteristics of AKSUNGUR already look convincing: the aircraft could serve as a long-term naval surveillance and relay station, potentially replacing the P-72 for some routine surface surveillance and maintaining contact while a more sophisticated carrier is busy elsewhere. Here, its longer endurance truly works—not as a replacement for the entire system, but as a technical opportunity to use the manned aircraft less frequently for the simpler portion of the mission. There are no publicly available statistics yet on this sortie distribution.

After the buoy is dropped, the work is just beginning.

A sonobuoy is not an underwater mine or a ready-made target indicator. Once deployed, it listens to the sea and transmits an acoustic signal. This stream must be received, processed, compared with data from neighboring buoys, the contact classified, its coordinates determined, and a tracking path constructed. The information must then be integrated into the overall tactical picture, and a decision made to reach the torpedo carrier.

Publicly available materials from TUSAŞ and Turkish government agencies do not yet provide such a complete cycle for AKSUNGUR. In 2022, Anadolu Agency reported that the integration of hydroacoustic capabilities was ongoing. In August 2026, Demiroglu chose a two-pronged formula: torpedoes, buoys, and various radars "we are integrating, we will integrate." This confirms the direction of the work, but does not provide any information on which subsystems have already been installed, which have been tested, and which are still planned. Information on the buoy test release, the number of simultaneously received channels, the acoustic processor, operator workstations, underwater target localization, and the torpedo release has not been published.

The American experience is useful for comparison—not as a ready-made characteristic of the Turkish device, but as a threshold for proof. General Atomics, in its published demonstration of the MQ-9A, demonstrated more than just one pod: the device carried buoys, released them, received and processed data, and the computer tracked the target in real time. It's precisely this sequence that turns the advertising of compatible equipment into a proven feature.

The Turkish P-72 has a much more complete system. The aircraft integrates radar, electronic support systems, acoustic processing, Link 11 and Link 16 data links, and MK46 and MK54 torpedoes. The mission system integrates sensors, identification, tracking, tactical imagery, and weapons. By October 2022, the fifth P-72 completed acceptance testing. This is not a proposal to install a single device, but rather a fully operational system.

The crew doesn't disappear, it moves

The unmanned aircraft has no crew on board, but that doesn't make its anti-submarine mission unmanned. The standard ATR 72MP configuration includes two pilots, two mission system operators, and two observers. This complement can be expanded as the system expands. These personnel not only control the aircraft: they operate sensors, correlate signals, monitor the sea, and make decisions all in one unit.

With AKSUNGUR, this work is transferred to ground stations and distributed among the participants. In a possible setup, one crew operates the drone, another processes the images, a third processes the acoustic data, a ship or patrol aircraft confirms the contact, and the command post assembles the overall picture. The exact composition of this configuration for AKSUNGUR has not been published. The benefit is obvious: the crew doesn't have to spend dozens of hours in the air, and the loss of a drone doesn't mean the loss of specialists. The cost is also clear: the system depends on channels, data formats, transmission latency, and command structure.

From this, an analytical model can be constructed that is more realistic than simply replacing the P-72. The drone conducts long-term optical and radar surveillance, identifies surface targets via AIS, and functions as a transponder. In the future, after testing, it could deploy part of a buoy field. The P-72 retains its role as the mission center: it integrates sensors, manages acoustic search, and weapons deployment. A ship or helicopter receives contact for localization and attack, while a shore-based center stores the data and distributes tasks. This is a functional diagram, not a published Turkish doctrine.

In such a scenario, 60 hours truly becomes crucial. They allow for maintaining a long-term air post in a location where a manned aircraft would have to change crews or return to base. But even this requires knowing not the rated duration in general, but the time directly over the area. The SeaGuardian methodological equivalent has a declared standard sea profile of over 18 hours, but eight of these hours are spent operating in the area with a mission radius of 1,200 nautical miles—approximately 2,222 km. No such route profile has been published for AKSUNGUR.

Therefore, when applied to Russian equipment, it's more useful to evaluate not the record-breaking duration, but the completeness of the tested mission: whether the buoy release was tested, how many acoustic channels are received, where the data is processed, how the system behaves when satellite communications are lost, whether it has sufficient power supply and cooling, and whether the weapon is integrated into the same circuit. Without this data, a long flight remains a characteristic of the carrier, but not yet a characteristic of the anti-submarine system.

AKSUNGUR can already serve as a long-term maritime observer and relieve the P-72 of some of its monotonous work, but it cannot yet replace it. The next real milestone isn't a time record or a torpedo mockup under the wing, but published results of a full-cycle test: from buoy release to stable target tracking and weapons release. Once the cycle is complete, the maritime unit will become more independent; until then, its strength lies precisely in the connection.