Why the Red Army and Wehrmacht Comparison Doesn't Add Up

On July 29, 1941, the State Defense Committee ordered that the partisan's average salary at his previous place of work be retained. In March 1942, the German commander received the right to recommend the soldier for a special sleeve insignia. танк, destroyed in close combat. The two countries counted their combat contributions, but translated them into different amounts.

The six previous articles in this series began with Soviet orders. A medic was promised a commendation, a sniper a higher salary, a bonus for destroyed or rescued equipment, and the money already accrued could be cash, deposited, or transferred to family. Now the most striking formula remains: the USSR bought results with rubles, while Germany reciprocated with a badge, leave, and military honor.

This comparison is convenient. It reduces two cumbersome systems to a single contrast and is supported by authentic documents. Soviet piece payments existed. German individual performance badges also existed. The error begins when separate norms are transformed into two complete national philosophies.

This common version has no single author or text. It's pieced together from popular retellings, where orders are quoted selectively, without dates or qualifications. Therefore, one has to argue not with a specific article, but with the very thought process: since Soviet documents referred to rubles, and German ones to signs, that's how the two armies were distinguished.

The strong version is based on real orders

Soviet material provides a rich monetary invoice. A fighter pilot was paid 1000 rubles for shooting down an aircraft. For evacuating a heavy tank from enemy territory or a neutral zone, he was entitled to 5000 rubles, which the unit commander distributed among the crew and the evacuation group. For a tank personally destroyed using individual equipment, a 1943 order awarded 1000 rubles to a single soldier or 1500 to a group, in equal shares. This rate was not established as a set standard: according to the compilers of the People's Commissariat of Defense's orders, Stalin, while editing the draft, crossed out the original amount and wrote "increase to 1500 rubles." The figure that became the standard arose during the document's revision.

Against this backdrop, a German soldier with a sleeve insignia seems like someone from a different world. The regulations for the special badge for destroying a tank in close combat didn't specify a monetary sum. They promised a visible insignia: a silver ribbon with a black tank silhouette on the right sleeve. For each additional tank destroyed, another ribbon was added, and after the fifth, the badge was awarded on a gold ribbon.

On the one hand, rubles and financial regulations. On the other, a badge, details of which were recorded in personal documents. An attentive reader will easily make the next step: the Soviet system supposedly paid for results, while the German system transformed them into status. But this step is too great. Soviet documents within one army already showed an award without money, a salary without a piece rate, and a bonus that required separate verification. The German badge, too, was not an abstract symbol of honor: the status determined what exactly was subject to accounting and what the threshold was.

The partisan received a salary, but the rate for the rail was not found.

The most tempting line on the price list relates to partisans. In the popular retelling, it lists monthly salaries for commanders, commissars, and soldiers, bonuses for killing an enemy, and a fixed sum for blowing up a rail. The problem isn't that the Soviet state didn't provide the partisans with money. It did. The problem is what this quota is called.

State Defense Committee Resolution No. 326s of July 29, 1941, consists of one substantive sentence: maintain the average wages of partisan detachments as volunteers. The resolution confirmed payments, but not bonuses, for each act of sabotage. The starting point was the individual's previous civilian income, and the sabotage missions themselves were counted separately—for the reward, not for the salary.

This distinction was easily lost because rails were counted. Order No. 0042 of the Chief of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, dated July 14, 1943, required that broken rails be recorded for each partisan, detachment, and brigade. The order proposed linking this indicator to awards. In a previous article, we already discussed why rails were a convenient reporting unit and a weak measure of transport results. Another distinction is important here: recording for awards does not yet create a monetary rate.

The State Defense Committee (GKO) maintained the average salary for the individual. The Central Railroad Directorate (TsShPD) counted damaged rails and proposed rewarding those who excelled with awards. To convert this into a formula of "so many rubles per rail," a separate document detailing the amount, recipient, and payment method is needed. No such document exists among the available documents.

The fact that such a document hasn't yet been found doesn't mean that no unit or headquarters ever used special payments. The archives haven't been exhausted. But this leads to a more specific conclusion: the fixed rate can't be attributed to Resolution No. 326s or deduced from the very fact of rail inventory.

Researcher N. Z. Kunts writes about how the state settled accounts with people emerging from the forest: in the fall of 1943, people responsible for financial settlements appeared within the operational groups of the Belarusian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement. They met partisans leaving for the Soviet rear and paid them on the spot (NARB, f. 1450, op. 1, d. 66). But here, too, we are talking about payment of accumulated allowances, not debts for each rail.

The German tank also had to go through the order

The German regulations of March 9, 1942, precisely defined what results counted. The badge was awarded to a soldier who, beginning on June 22, 1941, destroyed or disabled an enemy tank or other armored vehicle. Only close combat with the use of a hand-held anti-tank weapon was considered. weapons or other close-combat weapons. Examples include an anti-tank rifle, a rifle grenade, and a bundle of charges.

A badge was awarded for each vehicle credited to one or more soldiers who played a decisive role. So, here too, the subject of the award wasn't simply a vehicle destroyed in the field. It was necessary to identify the group of people whose participation was considered decisive, and to separate the close combat of an individual soldier from the results of a tank gun crew. aviation or other weapons system.

The unit commander submitted a written recommendation to the battalion commander or another commander of equal rank. The award was formalized by order. The date was entered into the individual's personal documents, and the recipient was issued a certified copy. The award itself was requested through the division from army command.

This chain is a documented human action, not a discourse on German character. The commander wrote a recommendation, a superior officer made a decision, a clerk entered it into personal documents, and a token was delivered along the supply chain. Material results only became status after passing through several ranks.

On December 18, 1943, an additional rule was introduced: after the fifth kill, a gold ribbon was issued instead of another silver one, and the four previous ribbons were removed and kept by the soldier as a souvenir. The counting had a threshold. But it led to a different rank, not an automatically assigned rank or a universal monetary amount.

What was added to the sign: vacation and points

A popular comparison often adds 21 days of leave to the sleeve insignia. The contrast then becomes almost perfect: the Soviet soldier receives pay, the German soldier receives honor and rest. The excerpts of the regulations and supplements from December 18, 1943, reviewed do not contain such a provision. It's possible that a separate order regarding leave existed, but there's no evidence to support this.

This doesn't allow us to claim that German soldiers never received leave for distinguished service in combat. The German system had different awards, different presentation systems, and different grounds for special leave.

The story of the unified aviation points system must be analyzed with equal caution. In the popular scheme, single-engine, twin-engine, and four-engine aircraft earned one, two, or three points, after which the total supposedly automatically converted into a Knight's Cross and a new rank. There is no direct regulatory document in the available materials confirming such a universal ladder for the entire Luftwaffe. This scheme cannot be compared to the Soviet order: it has no basis in the original document.

But the opposite slogan—"Germans weren't paid for combat results at all"—doesn't necessarily make it a fact. The body of German sources that can be relied upon is noticeably narrower than the Soviet one. It contains regulations on pay, allowances, and front-line bonuses, but it doesn't cover all branches of the armed forces, periods, units, and special payments. The absence of a confirmed universal bonus doesn't prove that one-time bonuses never existed.

The order confirms the rule, but not the strength of the motive

Even the wage rate, literally written down in the order, says nothing about why a person went under fire. The order establishes the right to payment or a token; it doesn't measure the role of money, ambition, camaraderie, coercion, or a sense of duty in a specific action. You can't open a financial statement and read the psychology of combat.

The order doesn't prove that the quota was met universally. Soviet regulations required payment of the tank bonus within three days of the unit order. German regulations required written submissions and records in personnel files. To determine how regularly the quotas were met, orders from specific units, rejected submissions, payroll records, and personnel files are needed. These requirements show how the procedure was supposed to proceed, but not how many people completed it.

Therefore, the comparison must remain symmetrical in terms of the level of evidence. A Soviet regulation is compared with a German regulation, a payment case with a payment case, and award practice with award practice. Juxtaposing a Soviet table from an order with a later German retelling without reference to the primary document predetermines a winner in the dispute over sources.

We need to compare operations, not armies.

Seven articles showed that the calculation of results—for a destroyed tank, a downed aircraft, or a wounded soldier carried out—passed through four stages: the action was determined, the result was confirmed, the form of reward was determined, and the individual's right was documented. Salary worked differently: it was a condition of service, not a reward for a specific incident.

A medic kept track of the number of wounded carried out with weapons, and this count led to a recommendation for a state award. The state increased a sniper's salary based on his specialty and rank, but the documents did not establish a universal rate for each enemy killed. Monetary standards were in effect for destroyed tanks, aircraft, and ships; a report, order, and command decision stood between the claim and the payment. A partisan retained his civilian salary, and rails were counted for the award, but a fixed rate for each rail has not been confirmed. A German tank destroyer received a sleeve insignia—a personal, credited achievement, documented; a Soviet sleeve insignia denoted affiliation with a special unit, not an individual tank destroyed.

What emerges are not two opposing worlds, but several methods of state accounting. Both the USSR and Germany used salaries, official status, awards, badges, and promotions. Direct bonuses for a given unit of performance are also clearly visible in Soviet documents. This is sufficient to indicate a difference in the documents themselves. It is not sufficient to deduce from it a permanent distinction between cash and honorary armies.

At the beginning of the series, Stalin's price list looked like a long table of prices. After a literal reading of the orders, it became a map of inconsistent transactions. A number could lead to an order, a salary, a bonus, an entry in a personnel file, or simply to the next inspection. The state rewarded equally measurable actions differently; similarly named rewards were documented in different forms.

The Red Army did pay money for a series of verified results. The German Army did turn individual results into visible status symbols. But the line wasn't drawn between the ruble and honor. It was drawn between action and the administrative process by which the state decided what to count, who to believe, and how to respond.

Literature

• State Defense Committee of the USSR. Resolution No. 326s on the financial provision of partisan detachments. July 29, 1941. RGASPI. F. 644. Op. 1. D. 5.
  
• People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. Orders No. 281 and No. 0299. August 1941. // Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2–2). M.: TERRA, 1997.
  
• People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. Order No. 0357 on the evacuation of armored vehicles. May 7, 1942. // Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War. Vol. 13 (2–2). Moscow: TERRA, 1997.
  
• State Defense Committee of the USSR. Resolution No. 1744ss on snipers. May 13, 1942; announced by order of the NKO No. 0387 of May 17, 1942. // Ibid.
  
• People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. Orders No. 0528 and No. 0387 on bonuses for the destruction of tanks. 1942–1943. // Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War. Vol. 13 (2–2) and Vol. 13 (2–3). Moscow: TERRA, 1997.
  
• Order of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement No. 0042, signed by P.K. Ponomarenko. July 14, 1943. (The publication's imprint is incomplete.)
  
• Merkblatt 15/5 "Orden und Ehrenzeichen." Regulations on a special badge for the destruction of a tank in close combat. March 9, 1942; additional announcement December 18, 1943. (Edition and pages unconfirmed.)
  
• Kunz, N. Z., "Guerrilla Warfare and Financial Support." Research Center for National Security Problems, 2019. (The exact publication details have not been confirmed.)
  

Comments

[traveler 63]

Honestly, this series of articles is impressive! But honestly, what's a fighter's main goal in the LF? It's simple: SURVIVE! The rest is derivative and bonuses!

[Aggle]

I wonder why the ribbon says "T-IV"? It seems to me that if our army had similar insignia, they probably wouldn't have depicted a T-34. A German girl designer?

[solar]

The absence of a confirmed universal bonus does not prove that there were no one-time bonuses at all.

The author is casting bullets. No evidence has been found in 80 years, but in his opinion, that means nothing.
The facts of military payments in the Soviet Union were carefully concealed. Sure, my grandfather's medal booklet had records of monthly payments, but it wasn't about thousands, and not everyone saw those books. The truth was, our people were fighting for an idea, and the Germans for a plot of land in the occupied USSR. Propaganda liked to portray this in the style of "he went for two hectares, but found two square meters." After all, they had to somehow explain to the people why the Germans were fighting in the first place.
But the fact that the payment was made to the common man turned the entire propaganda upside down. Volunteered for the front? You'd be called up any minute now anyway, and now it was your family's salary, not the few rubles due to the common soldier. This would fundamentally undermine all the propaganda's claims of lofty patriotism. The same goes for cash payments. You can tell them a thousand times that this isn't what they fought for, but any ordinary person would immediately relate it to their own everyday experience. So such information was carefully concealed.
As for the Germans, it's simple—they had a system of identifying each soldier or officer. A commander would look at their stripes, and immediately know what kind of subordinate they've been assigned. Simple and straightforward.

[Lewww]

And so, ours fought for an idea, and the Germans fought for a plot of land in the captured USSR.

I believe most Germans also fought for an idea; their propaganda organs thoroughly brainwashed them.

It was necessary to somehow explain to the people why the Germans fought at all.

The explanation was simple: if we don’t attack, the Untermenschen will definitely attack us first.

[solar]

I believe most Germans also fought for an idea; their propaganda organs thoroughly brainwashed them.

Their idea was this: if you're ordered to go into battle, you have to obey it; it's a matter of honor. The traditions of the old German military school were very strong in Germany at that time. Propaganda, of course, was also present; how could it be otherwise?
From Hitler's speech on September 1, 1939

As always, I have tried to achieve a revision and change of this intolerable situation by peaceful means. It is a lie when the world says that we want to achieve change by force. <...> In the same way, I have tried to resolve the problem of Danzig, the corridor, etc., proposing a peaceful discussion of the problems. <...>... I am especially happy to be able to tell you one thing. <...> I no longer see any reason for confrontation between us [Soviet Russia and Germany]. This opinion is shared by both our sides. Any confrontation between our peoples would be beneficial to the other. Therefore, we have decided to conclude a treaty that will forever eliminate the possibility of any conflict between us. <...>
Russia and Germany fought against each other in World War I. This will not happen again....

This is from Hitler's speech on June 22, 1941. He says that true socialism was only built in Germany. He accused the USSR of conspiring with England to strangle the world's first socialist state. Hitler always considered England, not the USSR, Germany's main enemy.

In the summer of 1939, it seemed to England that the moment had come to begin this newly conceived destruction by repeating the large-scale policy of encirclement of Germany.

The systematic campaign of lies which was organised for this purpose was aimed at convincing other nations that they were under threat, at first trapping them with English guarantees and promises of support 3), and then, as on the eve of the World War, forcing them to fight against Germany....
Under these circumstances, aware of my responsibility to my conscience and to the history of the German people, I deemed it possible not only to assure these countries and their governments of the falsity of the British assertions, but also, moreover, to specifically reassure the most powerful power in the East with solemn declarations about the boundaries of our spheres of interest.... Over the past two decades alone, the Jewish-Bolshevik rulers of Moscow have sought to inflame not only Germany but all of Europe. It was not Germany that attempted to transplant its nationalist worldview to Russia, but the Jewish-Bolshevik rulers in Moscow who relentlessly attempted to impose their domination, not only spiritual but, above all, military, on our people and other European nations.

But the results of this regime's activities in all countries were only chaos, poverty, and hunger. In contrast, I spent two decades trying, with minimal intervention and without disrupting our production, to build a new socialist order in Germany. This order not only eliminated unemployment but also ensured, through higher wages, a constant flow of people into creative work.

The successes of this policy of new economic and social relations among our people, which, systematically overcoming class and estate contradictions, have as their ultimate goal the creation of a genuine national community, are unique throughout the world.... Never have the German people experienced hostile feelings towards the peoples of Russia. ...

[Lewww]

Hitler always considered England, and not the USSR, to be Germany's main enemy.

Doubtful statement.
All sources state that Hitler was a staunch anti-communist and perceived the USSR primarily as a communist state.
And for him, although the English were bastards, they were still “socially close” capitalist bastards.

[solar]

All sources say so

Which ones? It's long been known that the attack on the USSR was a means of pressuring England, as Hitler believed England was only holding on because it believed the USSR could act on its side. Hitler, however, was prepared to accept the USSR into the alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan as a fourth member, which is what the USSR proposed.

The Four Axis Powers Pact was a draft treaty of friendship and economic support with the possibility of conducting joint military operations against other countries, which was planned to be concluded between the USSR and the Axis powers at the end of 1940. The pact was aimed at creating a powerful military-political alliance and the actual military division of the Eastern Hemisphere of the planet between the signatory countries.

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Пакт_четырёх_держав
There were quite serious negotiations on this matter—in the photo, Comrade Molotov is discussing it in Berlin. The pact fell apart when Hitler concluded that we were secretly negotiating with England behind his back. We always strictly prohibited the existence of these negotiations, as they completely upended our official version of our pre-war policy.

And for him, although the English were bastards, they were still “socially close” capitalist bastards.

Hitler considered himself a socialist. The National Socialist Party, remember? And in general, the ideological component of Nazi policy was greatly exaggerated. The Nazis viewed the Japanese as second-class citizens, or at best third-class citizens, which didn't stop them from building an alliance with them. "In my Luftwaffe, I decide for myself who is Jewish and who is not!"

[ex_paragon]

And do Christian Social Democrats also grow from there?

[solar]

Which ones, for example? CDU?

[Lewww]

Is it in which?

In particular, historian Konstantin Zalessky spoke about this on the program "The Path to Victory"

Hitler believed that England was holding on only because it believed that the USSR could act on its side.

Is it held on by the fact that England believes that the USSR can act on Germany’s side?
Where exactly is it located?

Hitler considered himself a socialist. National Socialist Party, remember?

The fact that he called himself a National Socialist does not mean at all that his ultimate goal was to build socialism in Germany as a transitional stage to communism.
First, understand the simple things, and only then start talking about the complex ones.

[solar]

This does not mean at all that his ultimate goal was to build socialism in Germany as a transitional stage to communism.

Of course it doesn't. What you wrote is a communist invention. Socialism existed on its own without any communists; they were the ones who co-opted it to their ideology, since communism was clearly failing. They invented the idea that socialism was a transitional stage to communism. Pierre Leroux was not a communist.

First, understand the simple things, and only then start talking about the complex ones.

Is it held on by England's belief that the USSR could side with Germany?
Where exactly is it located?

Learn history. Hitler believed that England was refusing to sign the peace agreement with Germany he sought because England hoped the USSR would enter the war with Germany. What a fool, what could you expect from him. It's now known that the USSR had no such plans; Putin wrote about this in his article, for example. The third major mistake in Hitler's series.

In particular, the historian Konstantin Zalessky spoke about this on the program

And what did he say about the Four Power Pact?

[Lewww]

What you wrote is a communist invention.

I have no desire to argue with you, consider what your heart tells you to be right.

[solar]

No problem. In the future, try using your head, not your heart.

[Seal]

Quote from solar

The Japanese, according to the Nazis, were not only second-class citizens, but at best third-class citizens.

Well, this approach was mutual. While instilling the ideology of the divine origin of the Japanese people, the ruling circles of Imperial Japan viewed other peoples as second- or even third-class citizens, to be ruled by the "sacred nation of Yamato." And the Germans were no exception. Of course, for tactical reasons, official Japanese propaganda treated the Germans with decorum and dignity: allies, a joint struggle....
But fundamentally, for the Japanese, the Germans were no different from the British, the French, or the Americans. They were just as barbaric.

[ex_paragon]

I do not agree

You'd be drafted any minute now anyway, and your family would be getting a salary, not the few rubles a common soldier is entitled to. This would fundamentally undermine all the propaganda talk about high patriotism.

Liberal nonsense. People were going to beat the enemy, to the death. Oh yeah, the militia had a very high percentage of workers and intellectuals. They had BOOK RESERVATIONS! And the temporary detention center wasn't exactly thrilled.
In general, this is all you need to know about informers and others

[solar]

He had ARMOR!

Most didn't. From the average person's perspective, it all seemed logical—go for a paycheck to a place where you'd be drafted anyway. At least, that's what our leadership thought, so the fact that volunteers were paid average wages wasn't publicized during Soviet times. Just like bonuses for the military.

And the temporary detention facility wasn't very happy.

Well, then he should have stopped this practice. He had more than enough authority.

[Seal]

Quote from solar

Did you volunteer for the front?

Volunteer straight to the front? How's that possible? No, I understand that if a frontline passes through a town or village (no matter which direction), a certain number of civilians might flock to one military unit or another. But in the mainland, volunteering was only possible by going to the military registration and enlistment office and asking to be called up to the front. Maybe even by refusing a reservation (if, of course, the military registration and enlistment office agreed to remove it). That's the procedure for volunteering.
That is, there were two paths to the army.
- Conscripts. These are those who reported to the military registration and enlistment office or assembly point upon receiving a summons or, when mobilization was declared in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 22, 1941, in the presence of a mobilization order, without waiting to receive the summons.
Volunteers. These are those who came to the military registration and enlistment office without a summons or a military order, with a written or verbal statement expressing their desire to be drafted into the army.

[belost79]

It turns out that the Red Army was more, how can I put it, capitalistic than the Wehrmacht...

[ex_paragon]

So, the Oval Sect will tell you that if the Red Army was in alliance with the Mattresses and Limes, then it's one of their own, bourgeois. That's for sure.

[Monster_Fat]

The author has overlooked the most important thing: what happened after receiving the award. For example, after going through all the bureaucracy, where did the cash payments go, and what happened to the status awards? Regarding German status awards, everything is simple and clear: a soldier received distinctive stripes and/or was sent on leave, regardless of travel time. In the Soviet Army, leave was sometimes granted, but for a limited period—including travel time. The consequences of this are well illustrated in a famous film, where a soldier only traveled to his mother's house to see her for a couple of minutes. Now, regarding cash payments. In Drabkin's well-known book series "I Fought...," veterans recall that those entitled to cash certificates were always sent to their families, but payments for destroyed enemy equipment were always sent to the defense fund—political officers monitored this, and even among the military personnel, it was an unwritten rule. Thus, it turns out that the German status system benefited the individual soldier, while the Soviet system benefited the state.

[Lewww]

The partisan received a salary, but the rate for the rail was not found.

The author's task of translating everything into monetary equivalent sometimes reaches the point of absurdity.

At that time there were 4 main types of partisan detachments:
1) created by party bodies (for example, detachments of Kovpak and Fedorov);
2) organized by the NKVD from the employees of this department;
3) formed by the intelligence departments of the Red Army;
4) spontaneously formed and consisting of fighters and commanders of the Red Army who fell into the environment and activists from among the local population who joined them and escaped from the camps of Soviet prisoners of war.

The fighters of the 4th category and 1st category detachments formed in 1941 were not and could not receive any salary.
In Belarus, practically all the partisans were local residents who joined the units after the occupation.
Even an accurate count of the people participating in the partisan movement has not yet been made and it is not possible to do so due to the lack of documentation.

Regarding payments for downed planes.
I happened to read the memoirs of one pilot.
He told me that I go to the financial department to receive payment for the downed plane, and the financial officer gives me two statements.
In the first, I signed for receiving the money, and in the second, for transferring it to the Central Fund for Aid to the Red Army. And the same thing happened next time. So, throughout the entire war, I never saw the money in person.

I can assume that this practice was widespread in the Red Army; back then, people fought not for money, but to defend their homeland.

[solar]

The fighters of the 4th category and 1st category detachments formed in 1941 were not and could not receive any salary.

Category 1 employees were paid the average salary. Category 4 employees were paid only partially, to some. Category 2 and 3 employees received salaries as employees of their respective departments.

detachments of Kovpak and Fedorov

Kovpak, Fedorov, and Saburov had general ranks and corresponding salaries.

I can assume that such a practice was widespread in the Red Army.

Not everywhere

[Lewww]

Category 1 was the one that was paid the average salary. Category 4 was paid only partially.

Also write that you saw with your own eyes the money transfers sent to former collective farmers who found themselves under occupation and joined partisan detachments.

Kovpak, Fedorov, Saburov had the rank of general

More precisely, we received it in 1943.
Their deputies also received military ranks. But most of the partisans in their units fought as civilians.
However, consider as truth what your heart tells you, I have no right to dissuade you from the truth of your beliefs.

[solar]

Also write that you saw with your own eyes the money transfers sent to collective farmers who found themselves under occupation and joined partisan detachments.

Money was paid to families during the evacuation. I don't see the point in discussing the nonsense you wrote with you.

[Lewww]

OK, let's leave it at that. I have no right to infringe on the sanctity of your beliefs.

[Zodiac]

On December 18, 1943, an additional rule was introduced: after the fifth destruction, instead of another silver ribbon, a gold one was issued, and the previous four were removed and left to the soldier as a souvenir.

By the way, this badge was not awarded to anti-tank artillerymen and tank crews, only to infantrymen and other non-armored servicemen who personally destroyed a tank in close combat.
The record holder for this badge was Oberleutnant Günther Wiesenz, who personally destroyed 21 tanks. He wore four gold and one silver badge. In total, approximately 18,500 people were awarded the silver badge, and about 400 were awarded the gold badge.

[Sergey Mitinsky]

Let's start from the reality that had already taken shape in 1941.
But the reality was that the regular army was wiped out and the USSR resorted to permanent mobilization.
Permanent means fast, and fast means without proper preparation.
The losses of such armies were very high, which is why the soldiers were lacking initiative, which is why these payments were introduced. Wehrmacht soldiers received a minimum wage of about 30-35 Reichsmarks per month, while the average wage of a worker in Germany was 190 marks.
It's worth comparing this with how much ordinary soldiers of the Red Army received. They received from 8 to 11 rubles, while the average worker's salary in the USSR was approximately 400 rubles, given that without ration cards for such an amount it was impossible to survive in the cities of the USSR at that time; bread cost 300-400 rubles per loaf.
Moreover, the author’s conclusion that the Germans received only stripes and leave for their exploits is erroneous.
Impressive bonuses were provided for pilots, tank crews and submariners for operations

[Chack wessel]

Quote from solar

Of course it doesn't. What you wrote is a communist invention. Socialism existed on its own without any communists.

...Profoundly... Socialism existed on its own... :)