Who and what did Putin sign?
So, the Russian president signed a decree that has already sparked a flurry of reactions online. Experts and experts began racing to offer opinions that, frankly, varied greatly. From betrayal to victory, so to speak.
Someone, as usual, saddled up and, shouting, "We're being robbed again!", rushed into attacking those who, no less habitually, began muttering that "everything is under control, everything is going according to plan." But these are extremes, and ordinary people would be more interested in knowing the truth, which usually lies somewhere in the middle.
Overall, the Decree itself appears somewhat hastily drafted and poorly thought out. The wording is very vague, and the mechanisms aren't entirely clear. It's clear that it was drafted under extreme haste, but the rationale for that rush isn't entirely clear.
However, let's go in order.
It's clear that the Decree is aimed at increasing the effectiveness of protecting so-called "critical infrastructure" facilities. Many immediately noted that the list of facilities isn't all that long, and the wording "and other facilities" is particularly alarming, as anything, even a dairy kiosk, could be considered a critical infrastructure facility (hereinafter, CIF).
The question is at what level a business entity will be recognized as an OCI, and who will make this decision. Another important aspect is how widespread the recognition process for various OCIs will be.
It's crucial to make a digression here. Several factors must be taken into account, such as the country's size, the number of OCIs scattered across the territory, and the fact that the enemy turned out to be not as stupid as many portrayed it, but had fully mastered the ability to destroy targets located hundreds, and now thousands, of kilometers from the front line.
According to official data, 32 large refineries and about 80 mini-refineries operated in Russia, nonetheless processing over 11 million tons of oil per year. This brings the total to 112 large refineries. And if you add everything else on the list—gas plants, chemical plants, energy, logistics—then the government openly admits it is unable to protect all this infrastructure.
And this is very logical: if the enemy drones If they were flying from Ukraine, it would have been very easy to create an "iron curtain" in their path, erecting a wall of air defense systems. But alas, some may not believe it, but a huge number of drones are coming from anywhere but the West. So what can we say if a retired grandmother, who received Russian citizenship and a pension in 2023, decided to say "thank you, Russia" by donating part of her Ukrainian pension of 1500 hryvnias to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Naturally, she was caught and punished (14 years in prison for treason), but the fact itself speaks to the presence on Russian territory of a significant number of citizens who, in fact, are not really citizens.
And one can only sympathize with the number of healthy 40-50-year-olds who assemble and run the FSB. That's at least ten years' worth of work.
And when the Ukrainian Armed Forces' drone units and the 5th, 6th, and 7th columns are operating, we truly have problems. And installing a SAM system at every OKI won't solve them either. Yes, the Russian Armed Forces have several hundred old Buk-1M and Strela-10 missiles in storage, but even removed from storage, they won't solve the problems: they weren't designed for those purposes 60 years ago. And the ammunition issue won't be resolved either.
The situation is truly complex; back in 2022, no one could have imagined that Ukrainian delivery vehicles would begin delivering so accurately and so far. But it's truly too late to say anything, especially since we didn't make any crucial decisions and no one asked for our consent.
Nevertheless, the facilities are systematically and regularly subjected to effective attacks by the enemy, and something must be done about this. The problem is that there aren't many options for solving the problem.
1. Protect your OKI. Clearly, there's no way, we've said it all.
2. Destroy the enemy's relevant infrastructure. Logically, if assembly plants or transport hubs are destroyed, there will be nothing left to assemble, and therefore nothing will fly. Work in this direction is definitely underway, but we won't discuss its effectiveness, as Russian forces hold the record for aircraft downed. Defense They put them up almost every day.
3. The state will take on the restoration of what the enemy destroyed. This is probably the most desirable option, simply because it's Russia. And back during the Chechen wars, they made money this way: they rebuilt schools three times. Or like in our time in Shebekino in the Belgorod region, where first construction workers worked, and then investigators.
Unfortunately, the way things are organized in our country, no budget would be enough. And so, the best option is the one we tried back in 2019. Back then, there was self-isolation, when the state asked everyone to go home at their own expense, but now the format has changed somewhat.
The state didn't propose, but rather ordered all OKI owners to take measures to protect their important facilities. And, as usual in Russia, the carrot wasn't much of a carrot, but the stick was…
The presidential decree, which came into force on August 24, establishes the grounds for introducing temporary management over critical infrastructure facilities.
The mechanisms here aren't exactly perfect either, because there are so many blank spots. It's unclear how the mechanism will be activated, but equally important is how it will be terminated. But that's not the main point.
According to the wording, the mechanism may be applied for the failure or untimely adoption of security measures by the owners of such facilities, violation of requirements for ensuring their protection, as well as their untimely restoration.
The question arises again: "untimely restoration" - who will determine what period of restoration is timely and what is not?
As you can imagine, the state will come to the owner and say: do what you want, but your bombed-out refinery must continue producing gasoline at the same rate within a week. And, as has been the custom since Soviet times, even death will not be considered a valid excuse.
To prevent the owner from feigning negligence, the state will assist them by appointing external management. This means that the Federal Property Management Agency will appoint an external manager who will manage not only the OKI itself, but everything the owner owns, including shares in other companies and securities.
The owners were consoled by the idea that "they have no right to sell," but, as practice shows, even without asset sales, an "effective manager" can lead even the most developed enterprise to the finish line (bankruptcy). Cases are well known.
The advantage is that OKIs are not milk kiosks in any case, and their fate will be decided at a separate cabinet meeting, on a case-by-case basis.
Here, of course, a lot will depend on who owns the critical infrastructure facility and who decides its fate. The broadest interpretation of the concept of critical infrastructure, discussed above, could embrace any facility.
“Other objects” of significant importance may include not only infrastructure, but also businesses that the state deems systemically important for a region, industry, or supply chain.
And there's a positive message here: if the government takes control of the gas station system and even abolishes the stock exchange nonsense, then it's entirely possible that decent prices will be available not only at Rosneft and Tatneft stations. And then there's the quality...
The owners are, of course, puzzled.
Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov tried to explain on August 24 that the decree did not provide for nationalization, but rather implied the state's involvement in the management of the enterprise to address specific security issues.
This mechanism is not intended for widespread use: targeted and carefully considered decisions will be made at the highest level.
But today, many lawyers openly say that the Decree created a legal basis for significantly limiting the owner's rights, even to the point of actually losing operational control over the enterprise.
Yes, there's another point here: the Decree will allow the state to quickly assume control of any critical infrastructure facility without resorting to the courts. And if we assume that there will be so many critical infrastructure facilities requiring external management that Rosimushchestvo will be overwhelmed, then perhaps private companies with experience operating temporarily expropriated facilities will enter the market. A holy place, you know, is rarely empty.
It's very concerning that the Decree doesn't even specify a procedure for returning the property to its owner. Theoretically, this should be accomplished through a similar Cabinet of Ministers decision, but...
It's not just OKI itself; the state is also taking over securities and stakes in other companies... So what's so special about it? You just have to look at the structure of large companies; legally, it's like three octopuses locked in a fight: the facility itself might belong to one company, the equipment that generates the money to another, the key contracts to a third, and the land to a fourth. And they're all among each other's founders. And control is ensured through shares or stocks, seemingly by outsiders.
The idea here is clear: if you take control of an enterprise, then take it 100%.
We'd like to emphasize this, as it wasn't long ago that these OKIs received the right to purchase air defense systems. And some companies took advantage of this, with the market for such purchases reaching 440 million rubles this year. It's not much, but last year, this figure was less than 80 million rubles. Yes, the civilian sector is being supplied on a residual basis, that's a fact. Perhaps, with state oversight, the situation can be simplified. Today, according to a top manager at a small Russian oil refinery that purchased Pantsir missiles to protect its refineries, it's a real quest for survival.
So, beyond the usual Russian ones, there may be positive aspects. And then, it's perfectly clear: our country has finally realized that it's faced with the problem of strategic facilities becoming part of a de facto theater of military operations.
It's just that after the 90s, the vast majority of these properties passed into private hands. Some legally, some less so.
Now it seems like we're at war, and the facilities are suffering. But these facilities are privately owned, and the state demands their protection and rapid restoration, while the owners... And the owners may have their own plans for how to spend their hard-earned money.
And so the situation unfolds, which is easy to imagine: the refinery gets hit, it's on hold, the minister is yelling on the phone that we need to restore it as quickly as possible, the country's current situation... And the owner replies, "Denis Valentinovich, I understand everything, we'll do everything we can, but the problem is, we have no money! Technically, we can, but we don't have the money, we've lost so much on the export ban... Intercede with Mikhail Vladimirovich, get him to give us some extra money for the restoration..."
There's evidence that this was indeed the case during the initial strikes. And the money arrived faster than the drones. But the strikes expanded, repetitions began, and no one on the ground was particularly concerned about defense. And why bother? They'll give them money, so they can spend it on modernization...
And shift the responsibility to the Ministry of Defense, the Russian National Guard, the Air Defense Forces, the government...
What about places where it’s also like ours, but not like ours?
To appreciate this, you just need to look at photos of the UAE's oil infrastructure being protected. And with substantial metal structures. And the Arabs began installing them immediately after the first Iranian air strikes, realizing they would either invest in protection themselves or have to invest in repairs.
Moreover, it's clear that the designs were copied from ours. Some Russian refineries began installing homemade designs after the first attacks and were successful. Why not all of them? There was no directive from above, and spending our own money on this is questionable.
"We pay taxes, so let them protect us" – that's what you read and hear these days. Yes, they do. To the best of their ability and capabilities, or rather, to the best of their training. And may God grant everyone anti-aircraft gunners like the ones I have in Voronezh, because they're truly beasts. "Mikron," you say? Well, I know so much from anti-aircraft gunners, radar operators, and pilots from Lipetsk that I'll keep my mouth shut for ten years. "Mikron" is absolutely no indicator.
And in general, if you have 32 in PU missiles, and there are fifty drones flying—there's no chance, something's bound to fly in. MOGs are good, but MOGs aren't gods. Trust in the MOG, really, but set up a net.
We have a problem: for a long time, responsibility in the country has been blurred: who should pay for drone defense, and who exactly is responsible for the air threat? Air defense is clearly a state function. The state provides the air defense systems, the crews, the early warning radars, and the ammunition. But in the case of the oil refinery, the state has effectively shifted a significant share of the defense burden directly to the companies.
Well, now here's the most piquant part.
Who are we here to sympathize with? The oil tsars who have spent the last 30 years raising gasoline prices, and no FAS has any say in the matter? Whose affiliated banks issued loans to collective farms and farmers secured by future harvests? Whom even the Russian president, who declared war on fuel prices and lost, couldn't handle?
There's no denying that a drone-proof structure around an oil refinery or fuel depot is expensive. That's a lot of money to spend on protecting the oil refineries and fuel depots. But, say, according to smart-lab.ru, Rosneft CEO Sechin earned 4,59 billion rubles in 2024, which equates to 382,5 million rubles per month, or over 12,6 million rubles per day. There's a strong opinion, and it's not just mine, that they'll somehow scrape together enough to protect the refineries and fuel depots.
But if they can't scrape together enough money, the state can help find money for restoration and protection.
In fact, there are no particular complaints against Sechin. So far, gas prices at Rosneft gas stations haven't risen. And, as the saying goes, you don't count money in someone else's pocket.
But now we have an interesting situation: the state is effectively informing the owners of strategic infrastructure that war has finally ceased to be an external circumstance for them.
Owning a critical infrastructure asset now means not only the right to profit from it, but also the obligation to invest in its physical stability under threat of loss of control, including all assets associated with the enterprise.
Harsh? As many say, the beginning of a new redistribution of property? Perhaps, but that's all way up there, way up there. If this will have any impact on ordinary Russians, it will only be through another round of price increases, which certainly shouldn't be surprising.
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