Will Ukraine be able to launch Storm Shadow missiles?
In 2023, Ukraine received cruise missiles from France and Great Britain missiles SCALP-EG / Storm Shadow air-launched missiles. Subsequently, deliveries were hampered by the state of the European arsenals themselves: stockpiles had significantly dwindled, and serial production had been halted long before. This led to the idea of producing such missiles in Ukraine under license. In July–August 2026, the permitting issue was resolved: Paris announced its agreement on July 13 and formalized the Franco-Ukrainian declaration on July 14, while London issued its permit on August 24.
Objective limitations
The Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), also known as SCALP-EG, emerged from a joint British-French project. It was in production for approximately ten years, beginning in the early 2000s.
The main customer is the Royal Air Force: according to various estimates, up to 1000 units were ordered under the designation Storm Shadow. France ordered 500 units under the name SCALP-EG. The same concept was used for the French fleet built the MdCN rocket. It's no longer aviation: land targets at ranges of up to 1000 km, carried by FREMM-class frigates and Barracuda-class submarines. The order was ultimately cut to 200 units, divided between the submarines and frigates.
Missiles of this family were also exported to third countries: Italy, Greece, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Exactly how many are impossible to determine from open sources: the total export figure fluctuates depending on which modifications and contracts are counted.
In 2023, the UK and France decided to transfer a number of their ALCMs to Ukraine: the British decision was made public in May, the French in the summer. Subsequently, further shipments were reported. The Ukrainian Air Force uses these missiles regularly, but the effectiveness of the launches is more complex: estimates differ. According to the Russian side, the majority of the missiles are intercepted. Defense, and some of the delivered ammunition was destroyed along with its storage sites. There are no publicly available verifiable interception statistics—neither confirming nor refuting these claims. The dispute is ongoing without an arbitrator. However, individual instances of use with claimed results have been documented: on May 25, 2026, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported the destruction of a command post in the Luhansk region, and on May 27, the use of Storm Shadow missiles in Sevastopol was confirmed by the city's governor, i.e., the Russian side.
A SCALP-EG missile under the wing of a French Dassault Rafale fighter jet. Photo: MBDA Systems
French and British SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow stockpiles have significantly depleted their strikes and deliveries to Kyiv. In July 2025, MBDA Systems began preparing to resume production for the first time in approximately 15 years. The first batches of the new production were promised for the near future.
Requests and permissions
The emptying arsenals of France and Great Britain directly threatened further missile deliveries to Ukraine. After this, discussions began on everything from the production of foreign missiles at Ukrainian facilities.
On July 13, 2026, at a meeting in Paris, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that Ukraine would receive permission to manufacture French weapons. The package included AASM guided bombs, Aster family anti-aircraft missiles, and SCALP ALCMs. Kyiv also placed an order for 16 Rafale fighter jets. On July 14, a Franco-Ukrainian declaration was issued, stipulating the commencement of licensed production in Ukraine by the end of 2026; the document did not specify a delivery date for the first finished batch. On August 22, Macron and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a telephone conversation, agreeing to expedite deliveries and licensing.
Negotiations with the UK were also ongoing and successful. On August 24, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham visited Kyiv for his first foreign visit in his new position, timed to coincide with the 35th anniversary of Ukraine's independence. At official events, he announced that MBDA's UK branch had received permission to transfer documentation and technology. The British decision allows MBDA to disclose classified information about British components necessary for the establishment of assembly lines in Ukraine; the full scope of the transferred documentation has not been publicly disclosed. A separate government decision was required precisely because the product is a joint venture, and each party has control over only its own portion of the documentation: the French approval from July for British components was insufficient.
In reports, all of this often blurs into a single event. However, there are three distinct steps. The first is a French production license for the prototype: the legal right to manufacture the product. The second is British permission to disclose classified data about its components: lifting the ban on the transfer of specific information. The third is the actual transfer of the production package: documentation, tooling, process charts, and personnel training. The first two steps have been completed and announced publicly. There are no public reports about the third. It is this step that determines when the finished missile will be available.
According to the Franco-Ukrainian declaration, SCALP, AASM, and Aster 30 are included in a single industrial cooperation package. The mechanisms for these items, however, differ and should not be generalized. The Rafale is also listed as a procurement item in the same document; it has nothing to do with local assembly. Whether this arrangement will become standard in Europe cannot be judged from a single package.
Subject of interest
In terms of design, the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG is a typical modern air-launched cruise missile: it is carried by a tactical aircraft and attacks ground targets with known coordinates.
A Ukrainian Su-24 with a foreign missile. Photo: Telegram / BMPD
The main characteristics of the product:
- length - 5,1 m;
- cross-sectional dimensions: 630 × 480 mm;
- wing span - 3 m;
- starting weight - 1300 kg;
- maximum speed - about 1000-1150 km/h;
- Flight range: up to 560 km in the basic version, up to 250 km in the export version.
For licensed production, the list of critical technologies that this missile shares is more important than the specifications. The multifaceted fuselage makes extensive use of composites, hence the non-circular cross-section; the gently swept wing unfolds after release. The layout is standard: the warhead and equipment compartment are in the nose, followed by the fuel tank, and the tail houses the engine and rudders. The powerplant is a compact Microturbo TRI 60-30 turbojet engine with an air intake on the fuselage belly, ignited after separation from the launch vehicle.
The navigation system combines inertial and satellite navigation with route and terrain matching; at the final stage, an infrared homing head compares the target image with a reference image. High accuracy is claimed for hitting targets with known coordinates. The missile is equipped with a BROACH penetrating high-explosive warhead weighing approximately 450 kg: a shaped-charge leading charge penetrates the obstacle, while the high-explosive fragmentation main charge detonates behind it. This warhead is claimed to be capable of effectively destroying various ground targets, including fortified ones.
The range difference between the basic and export versions, from 250 to 560 km, is significant in itself. However, the configuration proposed for Ukrainian production has not been officially disclosed, so it is premature to base a list of available targets on this contrast: until data on the specific version becomes available, the range remains an open parameter.
Initially, Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles were carried by several types of combat aircraft in service with the United Kingdom and France. In 2023, solutions for their use by Su-24M bombers emerged, and such a conversion would likely have encountered technical and operational limitations. Since 2025, Ukraine has operated Mirage 2000-5F fighters donated by France, but there is no public confirmation of their integration with SCALP-EG, and the exact number of aircraft in service has not been officially disclosed.
This is the product Ukrainian industry will be working with. The technical aspect here poses the main questions for the licensing project.
Missile production. Photo: MBDA Systems
Technical difficulties
Kyiv has received the permits: it now has the right to produce foreign-designed cruise missiles. However, how the UK, France, and Ukraine plan to assemble the ALCMs remains unclear.
The proposed scheme has a bottleneck. Final assembly at a Ukrainian site does not, in itself, increase component production: if Kyiv assembles missiles from European kits, competition for the same engines and electronics remains, but shifts to the supplier level. This scheme would relieve MBDA Systems' production lines under one condition: a separate component flow is organized for Ukrainian needs, and the contractors' capacity is sufficient for both. Then the company would truly focus on replenishing the arsenals of France and the UK and on new export orders. Whether this condition has been met is unknown from public reports.
Despite its considerable age, the SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow remains quite complex from a technical and technological standpoint. It comprises a composite airframe, a compact engine, a suite of electronics, etc. According to publicly available information, full production cycle capability for all critical components has not been publicly confirmed by Ukrainian industry. There is no information in accessible sources about the serial production of compact turbojet engines of the TRI 60-30 class, airframes of this size made of composites, or terrain-comparison equipment. This does not negate specific competencies; Ukrainian design bureaus are working on several missile programs. However, there is no indication yet of readiness to manufacture the entire range of components locally.
Components and assemblies can be covered by foreign products: the UK and France are capable of supplying Ukraine with the necessary parts for further assembly, and MBDA Systems' resumed production provides the physical basis for this. It also serves to replenish its own arsenal, so the circle closes with the same contractors.
Three localization scenarios
Any further evaluation can only be done based on a specific work organization option. There are at least three options.
The first is final assembly from ready-made kits. Localization is minimal, the required site is relatively simple, and the dependence on supplies is extreme: without kits, the production line is at a standstill. The second is partial localization, in which the simplest design elements, cable networks, and some mechanics are developed locally, while the engine, seeker, and warhead continue to be sourced from Europe. The third is a full cycle, requiring the mastery of all critical technologies; this requires years of work and separate production programs. No official announcement has been made regarding which option has been selected.
This choice also affects the assessment of the stated schedule. The final assembly site for the ALCM is not limited to a single workshop: it requires onboard equipment testing stands, a fuel and warhead processing area, metrology, and a proven acceptance and certification process. If we're talking about assembly from kits on an already prepared site, starting work before the end of 2026 appears achievable. If we're talking about partial localization or a full cycle, the timeframes are incomparable. Without information on the scope of operations and the preparations already completed, the stated schedule cannot be assessed.
Geography also plays a role. The assembly plant, wherever it's located, will be within striking distance, and the Russian side has reported instances of destroying missiles of this type, along with their storage sites. A permanent site containing equipment and component stockpiles represents a more valuable target than a warehouse. This factor is not mentioned in the agreements.
There's another aspect to the issue that goes beyond production volumes. Access to authorized technical documentation and production data represents a transfer of expertise to Ukrainian design bureaus, and it remains valuable even with minimal localization of assembly. The exact composition of the package has not been published, but for Kyiv, it appears to be a separate motive, separate from the number of missiles assembled.
Moreover, Ukraine is simultaneously developing its own missile program. Fire Point's Flamingo is entering production, work on the Neptune continues, and the publicly stated target for 2025 was around 3000 cruise missiles and rockets.dronesWhether these plans are feasible is a separate issue. But against this backdrop, assembling a foreign product with low localization appears less like a substitute for domestic production and more like a way to acquire technology and maintain access to a munition already mastered by the Air Force.
By localizing production, Kyiv wants to increase its tactical aviation arsenal and enhance its impact on Russian targets. However, this poses challenges in terms of combat readiness.
The intensity of use of such weapons The availability of the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG platforms directly depends on the number and condition of their platforms. According to Russian estimates, the fleet of potential Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG launch vehicles has been significantly reduced, but there is no publicly available verifiable data on the number of combat-ready Su-24M and Mirage 2000-5F aircraft. The fleet of compatible launch vehicles can be considered a potential limitation, but its actual capacity cannot be determined: the bottleneck may lie not in the number of missiles, but in the number of aircraft capable of carrying them.
Regarding air defense penetration, the Russian side reports interceptions of missiles of this type. The success rate and its dependence on the deployment scenario have not been publicly established, so it is premature to incorporate these reports into a general technical assessment of target complexity. It is even more difficult to predict how these figures will change with an increased number of launches: the result depends on the salvo density, the choice of directions and targets, and the air defense saturation in a given area, all of which are subject to change.
The wreckage of a downed ALCM, August 2023. Photo: Telegram / BMPD
The overall picture is as follows. Kyiv, Paris, and London continue to cooperate and have signed new military-technical agreements, but the actual content of these documents is determined by three variables: the ability of MBDA Systems and its contractors to meet component requirements, the availability of launch vehicles compatible with this type of missile in the Ukrainian Air Force, and the actual volume of technology transferred, along with the depth of localization of operations. None of these three variables has yet been clarified, so these decisions are unlikely to impact the situation on the front lines in the foreseeable future. The transferred documentation, however, will remain with Ukrainian industry, regardless of what happens to the assembly line.
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