From the army depot to the battery: the last section of the supply line in 1944–1945
In the previous article of the series (From the main station to the army: automobile supply during the offensives of 1944–1945) We delivered the cargo from the main station to the army and received a unit of truck delivery: a ton, which the serviceable column managed to deliver before the next battle. Now this ton is in the troops. It would seem there's nothing more to count.
This is where the arithmetic of the warehouse diverged from the real-world one. The formula "ammunition available" could refer to an army depot, a divisional exchange point, an old firing position, or a crate in a niche next to a gun. In the documents, all of this was considered troop reserves. For a battery, the difference was quite material.
Who should go pick up the cargo?
The pre-war system assigned the final responsibility to the lower echelon. The regiment would use its own transport to retrieve equipment from the division, while the division would retrieve it from a supply station or army depot. This arrangement was called "self-service" delivery. At the junction of divisional and regimental transport, a divisional exchange point (DEP) was established.
The plan seemed reasonable. The subordinate commander knew best what he needed and where to send the vehicle. Furthermore, the superior transport didn't waste time searching for a regiment or battery that had already moved to a different location.
The war revealed the price of this convenience. In the spring of 1943, bases and warehouses lagged behind the advancing troops, and divisions and regiments were unable to cope with the trips to retrieve allocated equipment. Official story The Soviet rear services reported that in June, responsibility for the delivery of material resources downstream was assigned to the senior rear services commander.
The change was more important than the name of the new agency. With the "in-house" delivery system, a regiment's shortage of transport translated into a shortage of ammunition, even if the divisional or army depot was full. After the reform, a senior commander had to see both sides of the equation: the subordinate's needs and the transport that could meet them. The rear headquarters became the place where requests, cargo, and available vehicles were combined.
The divisional exchange office itself predates this reform and outlasted it. An order issued by the 281st Rifle Division's rear services in October 1941 required that equipment be delivered to the divisional exchange office centrally by army vehicles, upon request, 24 hours in advance. This is a single document from a different period, but it illustrates the key point: the idea of centralized delivery to the divisional exchange office was in place a year and a half before the general shift in responsibilities in June 1943.
The 1943 reform shifted the direction of responsibility but did not replace one ideal system with another. In 1944–1945, both methods were in effect. Divisional and regimental transport picked up cargo; army vehicles reinforced units; when necessary, they went to exchange points and directly to the troops.
Alexey Radzievsky cites his experience tank In armies where direct delivery eliminated some of the congestion, battalion rear units followed the combat units, and some ammunition and fuel were stored in the front echelon of brigades and corps' rear units. Fast-moving units had to be tracked down: a truck might bypass a depot and still be late for delivery. A rifle battery's pace and transport were different, so the experience of tank armies suggests a highly mobile last-ditch approach.
In both cases, the DOP shouldn't be thought of as a small army depot. Its purpose was to transfer cargo. A divisional vehicle delivered the cargo to the line, where it was picked up by regimental transport; under different circumstances, an army column would pass this line without reloading. The same point could be a mandatory link in the plan, an alternate rendezvous point, or a landmark that the column passed on direct orders.
A still from the film "The Fate of a Man"
Four ammunition units in depth
On December 13, 1944, the command of the 1st Belorussian Front issued instructions artillery to support the upcoming winter operation. The document was not signed for theoretical purposes: a huge amount of artillery was to be deployed on the bridgeheads, and positions, roads, and supplies were to be prepared.
The following ammunition distribution was established for the main line: up to 2,5 ammunition loads directly in the troops, another 0,5 at divisional exchange points, and 1,0 at army depots and on the approaches to them. In total, this amounts to up to four ammunition loads.
The objection is obvious. If 2,5 rounds of ammunition are already in the hands of the troops, the last bottleneck seems to disappear: the bulk of the supply is located near the user.
But in the directive's layout, "in the troops" was a reference level, not a precise address. The ammunition had to be dispersed, covered, and protected from moisture and air strikes. The directive permitted no more than one train car of ammunition to be kept in a single stack at a depot, and two train cars at an army depot; 35–40 meters were required between stacks. The boxes were placed on pads, and the pits were dug with drainage.
Storage became part of the delivery process. A warehouse that was too dense was convenient for loading, but vulnerable. A dispersed warehouse conserved ammunition, but delayed the work of men and machines. Therefore, the document also specified a time limit: arriving transport was to unload within three hours, and the cargo was to be transported to the storage area within another hour.
Headquarters had demanded in advance that the roads between the field army artillery depots and the fortified positions be determined to be difficult to navigate and that supplies be moved closer to them. The planned requirement of four ammunition loads did not negate the latter section. It existed precisely because Headquarters was attempting to spread the risk across the entire area.
This arrangement had another property. The ammunition transferred downwards became more accessible to the battery, but more difficult for the entire system to maneuver. It could no longer be quickly collected in one place and transferred to another division. The closer the shells were to the firing positions, the more their fate depended on the regimental tractors, wagons, personnel, and the order for the next movement; the position in the arrangement changed the operational value of the same ammunition load.
Short kilometers, heavy tons
In the Belorussian Operation, the geometry seemed almost reassuring. The main army depots were located, on average, 20–40 kilometers from the front line. Divisional exchange points were 8–12 kilometers away, and regimental rear areas were 5–8 kilometers from the troops. Army roads branched off to corps and divisions and reached artillery positions located 1–1,5 kilometers from the front line.
These distances cannot be added together: the figures are measured from different lines and do not form a single route, and the source's expression "from the troops" does not specify the reference point within the battle formations. But the order of magnitude is clear. After hundreds of kilometers of the army's shoulder, there remained comparatively short stretches.
Now, a separate military case. A study by Vyacheslav Vorsin and Vladimir Zhumatiy cites data from the 65th Army: on the first day of the operation, ammunition consumption was approximately 45 percent of the plan for that day, and from June 24 to July 2, it was 25-30 percent of the plan for that period. Subtracting these figures from 100 and declaring the remainder underdelivered is impossible. Consumption was influenced by the progress of the battle and enemy resistance.
And yet, the source records an independent logistical failure. A large amount of ammunition was lying on the ground. Limited troop transport, swampy terrain, and sandy soil prevented the artillery from retrieving the entire supply when changing positions. According to Vorsin and Zhumatiy, horse-drawn transport assisted road transport, although the proportion of carts on the DOP-regiment-battery route is unknown. The boxes remained at their initial positions, old firing positions, and en route. While the fronts and armies had sufficient ammunition, the troops were beginning to experience shortages.
This episode is important precisely because of its awkward ambiguity. It doesn't prove that the supply system in the Belorussian Operation failed: the fronts advanced, the artillery fired. At the same time, it demonstrates the local limits of a mature system. The success of the offensive quickly transformed yesterday's firing position into a depot, located no longer ahead, but behind the desired direction.
The shell didn't disappear. It wasn't lost in the records, nor was it necessarily abandoned forever. A new transport cycle was required: assemble, load, transport forward, or obtain a replacement from a new depot. Until this cycle was completed, the unit remained in existence, but its firing capability was reduced.
This is where the new measurement line is drawn. The inventory count answers the question of how much the army has. The distributed inventory shows how much has already been transferred between the army depot, the depot, and the troops. The available mobile inventory shows how much can be immediately delivered to the gun and how much will be transported with the battery to the next position.
Soviet soldiers next to an American Ford G8T truck (known in the USSR as the Ford-6), supplied under the Lend-Lease program during the Great Patriotic War.
last meters
The staff diagram ends with the word "troops." The physical delivery didn't end there.
The collection "Actions of Artillery Units in the Great Patriotic War" contains a report by Sergeant Zimirov. On June 20, 1944, his battery near the village of Novaya near Pushkin Hills set up a position within 24 hours: gun trenches, ammunition recesses, ditches, and the trenches between them. Then the battle began.
The enemy blanketed the battery with flanking fire. The crews worked on their knees. The ammunition carriers crawled, dragging crates to the guns. This is an isolated example, not the average Soviet artillery performance. But it does demonstrate something that neither the tonnage of the front nor the division's ammunition load reveals: the final sector could be measured not in kilometers or vehicle-days, but in the movements of a few men under fire.
The strong vision of a mature Soviet rear system did not collapse after this. On the contrary, the December 1944 directive demonstrates the meticulous preparation of the final sector: distributing supplies by depth, rationing unloading, dispersing stockpiles, and studying difficult roads. Army transport could go directly to the troops, the divisional exchange point received and transferred cargo, and the regimental rear services followed the units.
The unit of result is being clarified. Four ammunition loads in the plan are not yet four ammunition loads for the guns. The result of the last section is the supply that was preserved, reached the required unit, was available to the crew, and did not remain in the same position after the next march order.
The next article in the series is "The empty body was no one's."The same exchange offices and roads will be turned in the other direction.
Literature
- Vorsin V. F., Zhumatiy V. I. Organization of rear support of troops in the Belarusian strategic offensive operation // Military History Journal. - 2020. - No. 3.
- Actions of artillery units in the Great Patriotic War. Collection 2. Combat examples / under the general supervision of S. A. Krasnopevtsev. - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1947.
- Order for the rear of the 281st Rifle Division dated October 9, 1941, on organizing the supply of units of the division during the offensive south of Oranienbaum // Collection of combat documents of the Great Patriotic War. - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1954. - Issue 22.
- Radzievsky A. I. Tank Strike: Tank Army in the Front's Offensive Operation Based on the Experience of the Great Patriotic War. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977.
- The Rear of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 / edited by S. K. Kurkotkin. — Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977.
- Instructions of the Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front on Preparatory Period Measures for Providing Artillery Support for a Breakthrough of Enemy Defenses. December 13, 1944 // Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Patriotic War. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1948. Issue 4.
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