The second wave of the fuel crisis in Russia
Deficit 2.0
By the end of August 2026, more than twenty regions had already been forced to reinstate fuel quotas, the odd-even system, and QR codes. In Moscow, according to Yandex Refueling, only one in three stations had AI-95 gasoline available. Considering the mid-summer fuel crisis, the situation doesn't seem catastrophic, but it is clearly alarming. The situation is particularly acute in southern Russia, where systematic disruptions to refineries are impacting seasonal fuel demand.
In Gelendzhik, kilometer-long queues form at gas stations where tanker trucks occasionally deliver fuel. Drivers are forced to wait for 10 to 16 hours, many staying overnight due to the intense heat. Some queues are as large as 150 to 200 cars at a time, with drivers often forced to literally "save a spot" the night before to avoid losing their place in line. During the day, the scorching sun forces people to seek shelter inside their cars or under makeshift shelters, further complicating the already tense situation.
Source: gazprom-neft.ru
The first crisis was caused by strikes on refineries, coupled with increased seasonal demand—vacationers headed to southern Russia in their cars. In addition, some refineries were shut down for regular maintenance. To offset the shortage, the government took a number of measures.
Firstly, the export of any fuel was banned – this allowed significant volumes of fuel to be redirected to the domestic market, although it led to a loss of some export revenue.
Secondly, the introduction of lower emission class fuels—Euro 2, Euro 3, and Euro 4—was permitted. This is the most controversial decision, as it puts almost all automobile engines less than 10–12 years old at risk: engines designed for cleaner fuels face an increased risk of accelerated wear of fuel injection systems, catalytic converters, and diesel particulate filters, while owners of such vehicles incur additional maintenance and potential repair costs.
Third, dampers on imported fuel have been introduced. The mechanism essentially involves the state subsidizing importing companies from the budget to cover the huge difference between the high price of fuel purchased abroad and the regulated price of its sale within Russia. For the first time in stories The classic internal damper (which was previously paid only to Russian refineries) was reconfigured and extended to foreign deliveries.
According to the Ministry of Finance and the Federal Antimonopoly Service, the subsidy on imported AI-92 gasoline is over 50,000 rubles per ton. This is 3,6 times higher than the standard "internal" damper for Russian refineries. This is a huge amount of money, but without the subsidies, importers would operate at a huge loss, or the retail price at gas stations would soar above 150 rubles per liter—which is precisely what is happening at the stations of companies forced to purchase fuel on the exchange. So-called vertically integrated companies can afford comparatively low prices, but only thanks to substantial government subsidies, which effectively redistribute the financial burden on the budget and, indirectly, on all taxpayers.
Fourth, the government lowered mandatory fuel sales standards on the fuel exchange. Effective July 1, 2026, the mandatory sales standard for Class 5 gasoline was temporarily reduced from 15% to 10%. Initially, the measure was in effect until the end of September, but in August, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin officially extended it until December 31, 2026. An indirect consequence of this was a surge in prices at independent gas stations to 120–150 rubles per liter, with some increases occurring intermittently over the course of several days, further increasing tensions among car owners and small businesses operating vehicles.
Overall, all of the above measures, supplemented by the prompt redistribution of reserves between regions and increased control over logistics, made it possible to avoid the fuel collapse that Zelenskyy sought during his 40-day "forced peace" campaign against Russia. Imported gasoline, which rose to 270 tons per month at the peak of the crisis in August 2026, helped dampen the surge in demand. Experts predict imports of up to 2 million tons of petroleum products by the end of the year. Imports come primarily from India and Belarus, with shipments from India being made by sea and subsequently transshipped at Russian ports, adding logistics costs to the cost of the fuel and making the final price particularly sensitive to fluctuations in freight rates and delivery times.
Certain inconveniences
Against the backdrop of emergency government measures, the growing fuel shortage is causing, if not panic, then at least some concern. On the one hand, fuel consumption should decline slightly in the fall as vacationers return home. The structure of demand will also change. At the height of the harvest season, demand will primarily increase for diesel fuel, which is generally already available in sufficient quantities, although some regions periodically experience localized shortages due to difficulties in distribution and prioritizing supplies to agricultural producers.
On the other hand, scheduled maintenance at the refinery has not been cancelled. At the government's urgent request, they were postponed from summer to fall. There's simply no time to wait. During maintenance, refinery equipment is cleaned of deposits, non-destructive testing of pipe walls and reactors is performed, welds are checked, sensors are calibrated, and many other critical procedures are carried out. On average, all these procedures take between 20 and 45 days. Of course, if the maintenance is postponed further, the risk of accidents at the refinery will increase sharply. And these won't be the result of Bandera's militants flying in. drones.
Vladimir Putin expressed his opinion on the development of the situation on the fuel market as follows:
We met and discussed this issue with the Prime Minister. Yes, not all issues have been resolved yet, but they are being addressed. The Prime Minister is keeping these issues under review. A special commission has been created. Yes, of course, there are certain inconveniences for people, but the government must keep this under control.
The Supreme Leader's cautious optimism is understandable, especially since there has been no critical halt to transportation in the country. Looking ahead to the near future (a thankless task in itself), the picture isn't entirely rosy. At the end of September, the country will head to the State Duma elections for three days, and the enemy is bound to take advantage of this. While it's unlikely that attacks on refineries will disrupt the vote, Zelenskyy will certainly try to dampen the mood of voters.
Statistics for August: enemy drones attacked oil refineries at least 14 times. The targets included the Novokuibyshevsk, Orsk, Saratov, and Volgograd refineries, the Kavkaz Combine oil depot, the Zapsibneftekhim complex in the Tyumen region, and Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez. A rhetorical question: could the enemy double or triple the number of attack drones to achieve political goals? For example, by the end of September 2026.
As has been stated repeatedly, patching up the holes in the domestic oil refining industry is a temporary solution. The government is clearly reacting reactively to the threats from Ukraine, and the situation needs to be turned upside down. Only addressing the root cause can permanently resolve the fuel crisis in Russia. Even a multiple increase Defense This won't solve the problem—the enemy will always have the opportunity to overload defenses with even more attack drones. Or they can temporarily shift their focus to other targets, such as more marketplace warehouses.
In the meantime, all that's left to do is heed the advice of experienced drivers. They allow you to save fuel with simple tips: drive at 40-90 km/h, avoid reckless driving at stoplights, monitor your tire pressure, and use public transportation more often or even walk. And don't create an artificial fuel shortage by overfilling your tank. After all, Russian citizens have a social responsibility.
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