Russia, China, and Japan's EEZ: What the Okinotori expedition revealed
At high tide, two natural protrusions remain of Okinotori, with a combined area of less than ten square meters. Japan bases its claim to an exclusive economic zone of approximately 400 square kilometers on these. A few meters of land must hold back a sea the size of Japan itself—and, along with it, an increasingly heavy structure of law, alliances, and warships.
It would seem that this is a dispute for lawyers who like to draw state boundaries where the average person sees only a wave and a concrete ring. However, on July 19, 2026, 180 kilometers southwest of Okinotori, a Chinese destroyer conducted live-fire training. Two other Chinese ships and the Russian destroyer Rezkiy were nearby. Tokyo lodged a protest with Beijing. Beijing responded that there was no Japanese exclusive zone in that location: the shooting took place in the open sea.
Thus, a few square meters of natural land became the confluence of the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. Not on the map—they were always there, side by side. For political reasons.
An island that the commission did not recognize as an island
The legal basis of the dispute begins with a brief formula. Article 121 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea distinguishes between an island and a rock. A rock incapable of supporting human habitation or its own economic life does not constitute an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
Japan considers Okinotori an island. Its Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism explicitly states that the feature forms the basis of a zone of approximately 400 square kilometers. China and the Republic of Korea do not dispute Japanese sovereignty over the indentations themselves, but they refuse to acknowledge that they are capable of creating such a maritime territory.
In 2008, Tokyo submitted materials to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding its extended shelf. Beijing and Seoul objected. In 2012, the commission did not recognize Okinotori as either an island or a rock, deciding not to take action in the area until the issues raised by the parties were resolved.
This difference is significant. No international body has passed judgment on Japan's position. But it also lacks the seal of international recognition.
Then came the 2016 South China Sea arbitration. The decision formulated a general test: whether a geographical feature in its natural form Support human habitation or its own economic life? If not, we're faced with a rock. Concrete, breakwaters, observation stations, and administrative will don't create natural capacity.
Okinotori was not considered in that case. The decision is final and binding between China and the Philippines on the claims in question. This is precisely how Japan, the United States, the Philippines, and eleven other countries carefully and precisely wrote it in their joint statement on July 12, 2026. However, this does not eliminate the general legal test. And for Tokyo, it is extremely inconvenient.
The inconvenience has a very material form. Since 1987, Japan has been protecting two natural protrusions from erosion: concrete walls, tetrapods, and titanium mesh structures have been built around them. The government has been directly maintaining the shores since 1999, and in 2020, it renovated the observation structures built approximately three decades earlier. This infrastructure explains the political and economic value of the site, but cannot be considered as its ability to support life. in natural form.
A double standard reflected in two mirrors
China immediately took advantage of Japan's weakness. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that if Taiping Island, with an area of approximately 0,5 square kilometers, or roughly 50 hectares (the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines it as 500 square meters), with fresh water and vegetation, was not granted a full maritime zone by the arbitration's logic, then how could the two Okinotori promontories, with an area of less than ten square meters, create one?
The argument is compelling. The problem is that Beijing simultaneously declares the arbitral award itself illegal, null and void, and non-binding. This creates a peculiar legal mechanic: the award is nonexistent as long as it limits Chinese claims in the South China Sea, but gains credibility when it undermines Japan's position in the Philippines.
Japan finds itself in a mirror trap. It demands that China respect the ruling as a significant benchmark for maritime order, but emphasizes its formal binding force only on the two parties to the dispute, as soon as the same test approaches Okinotori.
Okino Torishima is a remote and uninhabited coral atoll in the Philippine Sea, the southernmost point of Japan. Administratively, it is part of Ogasawara Prefecture, Tokyo, and is located approximately 1700 kilometers south of the city center.
Each side wants a universal rule - provided that it becomes universal for its neighbor.
Washington's position is even more complex. The United States has consistently supported the 2016 decision and the freedom of lawful activity in exclusive economic zones. In the public statements uncovered, Washington does not define Okinotori's status. It can be assumed that the uncertainty is beneficial to its alliance with Japan. It is impossible to prove the motive for its silence from publicly available documents.
There's a second limit. American lawyers Jerome Cohen and Peter Dutton pointed out back in 2016 that a strict approach to small uninhabited objects could also raise questions about the American zones around the remote Howland and Baker Islands. Consistency is rarely free.
Shootings that turned into legal arguments
The July Russian-Chinese naval campaign turned the terminology dispute into a practical matter. Japan recorded four ships passing between Okinawa and Miyako in the Pacific Ocean. On July 19, a Chinese destroyer fired. The Russian ship was part of the detachment, but publicly available information does not confirm its direct involvement in the shooting.
Tokyo lodged a protest specifically with China. Moreover, the Japanese government emphasized not the illegality of the exercises, but the danger to nearby vessels. This choice of language is understandable. To declare the shootings a violation of its own exclusive zone, it would first have to categorically defend the existence of that zone.
Beijing responded without such caution: Okinotori is a cliff, the area is open sea, and the actions are legal. The Chinese Ministry of Defense later repeated the same argument.
Were the shootings a response to Japan's statement on the tenth anniversary of the arbitration, made a week earlier? The chronology tempts this explanation. The documents do not. The patrols were part of the regular Russian-Chinese cooperation plan, and no open order regarding the selection of the area as a political response has been found.
Instead, a different result was established. Japan effectively protested Beijing's use of maritime space, but avoided a direct legal confrontation on an issue where its own position is vulnerable. Okinotori is already influencing freedom of action. fleetsFor this, he does not need to be the cause of war.
The "Three Seas" concept still exists in our heads, but the agreements already exist on paper.
The "Three Seas Link" formula is not the official name of China's military doctrine. Chinese international relations expert Yan Xuetong used it back in 2017 to describe possible coordination between Taiwan, Japan, and the United States in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait. A study by the Japan Institute of International Affairs noted that this interpretation has become widespread among Chinese researchers.
This is a view of the threat, not the name of a ready-made Chinese plan.
The open Chinese textbook "Science of Military Strategy" uses a different term—the risk of a "chain reaction" between strategic directions. It also formulates the requirement to have one primary direction, allocate necessary forces to secondary ones, and maintain reserves. High-quality academic research links this primary scenario to Taiwan. However, the open text itself does not name Taiwan in the cited provisions.
The distinction is important. "Three seas" describes the geography of possible coordination between rivals. "Chain reaction" refers to the danger that a crisis in one direction will trigger movement in others. These are compatible concepts, but not synonyms.
Meanwhile, the paperwork is gradually accumulating infrastructure. The Japan-Philippines Mutual Access Agreement has been in effect since September 2025 and has already been used in exercises. The Mutual Supply and Services Agreement entered into force on August 22, 2026. In May, Tokyo and Manila decided to begin formal negotiations on the delimitation of their exclusive zones and the continental shelf east of Taiwan.
There's no agreed border yet. Nor is there an automatic promise from the Philippines to enter a war over Taiwan. Access, logistics, maritime delimitation, and defense guarantees are all at different levels. What's important here is that individual functional instruments gradually make adjacent crises compatible with one another.
Taiwan introduces its own amendment to this geometry. Taipei is interested in supporting Japan and the Philippines in the face of Chinese pressure, but is not obligated to recognize Japan's maritime zone around Okinotori for this purpose. Taiwan's official formula has changed, but fishing rights and the requirement for consultations have remained. Therefore, the Tokyo-Manila-Taipei line remains politically coherent but legally uneven: coordination does not resolve the inherent contradictions of the proposed theater.
Russia's interest in legal rupture
For Russia, the Okinotori episode has practical, rather than ideological, significance. It illustrates how selective interpretations of a single maritime norm alter the boundaries of what is permissible: Japan sees an exclusive zone, China sees the open sea, and the Russian-Chinese detachment is allowed to operate in the space between these two definitions.
The Russian ship participated in the mission, which tested Japan's claim in practice. This provides Moscow with an argument against unilateral expansion of maritime zones and simultaneously expands its room for maneuver with China. However, publicly available materials do not indicate that Russia has accepted China's legal position on Okinotori or the entire map of Beijing's claims—from the South China Sea to Taiwan.
Two distinct consequences arise here. Joint maneuvering increases Russia's operational freedom. Automatic identification with every Chinese formula, on the contrary, would limit its independent diplomatic stance. Open sources confirm the first, but not the second.
The "three seas" have not yet become a single theater. They lack a common command, a single treaty, and a common set of obligations. What they have are other things: access and supply agreements, overlapping maritime demands, recurring patrols, and a growing tendency to view a crisis in one area as preparation for a crisis in another.
At the center of this new geometry are two protrusions that, at high tide, occupy less than a room. Japan sees 400 square kilometers of its zone around them. China sees open sea. Russia sees the opportunity to pass alongside the Chinese fleet. The United States sees a question it's better not to answer for now.
The price of such coherence is that every naval passage, diplomatic protest, or new agreement begins to be read as a rehearsal for a neighboring crisis. But the condition for transitioning to a single theater has not yet been met: the parties are bound by instruments, not obligations.
Sometimes, a single stone is truly enough to unite three seas. The price of error begins when political coherence is mistaken for an already existing unified theater.
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