What does the American deficit change for Russia?
A single Patriot interceptor now serves two purposes. For the Pentagon, it's a reserve in case of another strike on an American base or a crisis in Asia. For an ally, it's an undelivered security guarantee. Rocket One, several obligations. It is here that the question of "the US's ability to wage three wars" ceases to be a debate about percentages and becomes a discussion about the structure of the American alliance system.
The strategy came before the shortage
It was already released on VO news based on material from The Wall Street Journal about the doubts of American allies. Even earlier, Alexander Marx had analyzed in detail, Why are missiles used up in weeks, but produced in years?There's no point in repeating the percentages and once again declaring American warehouses empty. It's more important to look at what response Washington had prepared before the war with Iran.
The US National Defense Strategy 2026 was published in January. A separate section examines the possibility of coordinated or opportunistic actions by adversaries across multiple theaters. The answer is formulated not as a return to the old norm of two wars, fought primarily by America alone. The unit of measurement is the coalition.
The United States maintains its priority of defending its homeland and the Indo-Pacific region. Europe must assume primary responsibility for the continent's conventional defense. Regional allies are obligated to contribute more forces and resources, while American support is becoming more limited, although it remains indispensable in certain functions. The strategy asserts that if allies truly create the required forces, their combined strength will be sufficient even against multiple adversaries acting simultaneously.
This is a fundamental caveat. Washington isn't promising to hold three fronts on its own. It's promising to organize three coalitions.
The war with Iran began later. This means that the missile expenditures didn't trigger a shift toward load-sharing. The program was already on the table. Judging by the sequence of decisions, the Iranian campaign became a material accelerator: delaying the implementation of the strategy and continuing to speak to allies in the language of old guarantees became noticeably more difficult.
One interceptor, two duties
In a July model by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS; the organization's activities are considered undesirable in the Russian Federation), the American remaining stock of modern and older PAC-3 missiles was estimated at 759–827. Several hundred older PAC-2/GEM-T missiles were not included in the schedule, so converting "around eight hundred" into the entire Patriot family arsenal is impossible. The THAAD picture is different: out of an estimated 452 pre-war interceptors, 234–278 remained by July 27. The exact stockpile is classified, and the CSIS figures are an open model, not a Pentagon inventory list.
But even a model fork is sufficient for a political mechanism. A single PAC-3 can't be simultaneously left to an American battery, transferred to Ukraine, and sold to an ally in the Gulf. A new interceptor also doesn't appear at the budget signing time. In CSIS's April calculation, the full production cycle of a typical lot—from funding to final delivery—took 42–53 months for critical systems.
Political time is shorter. The government demands a battery for the next crisis, the army demands reserves for the next campaign, and an ally demands the fulfillment of an already paid order. The factory responds with a calendar showing the result in three to four years. Therefore, shortages begin before the physical warehouse reaches zero. They begin with the queue.
American industry has already responded to this challenge with multi-year agreements. The target capacities of the PAC-3 MSE, THAAD, and Tomahawk are expected to increase significantly. A separate VO article has already shown How Tomahawk production is planned to increase to more than a thousand per yearThis is a serious counterargument to talk of the irreversible decline of the United States.
But capacity doesn't equal delivery. The new line requires engines, electronics, specialists, and subcontractors. Some future production is already tied to allied orders. The missile the plant will one day be able to produce isn't yet in the launcher. Between these two states lies the American problem of simultaneity.
An ally becomes part of the arsenal
From Washington's perspective, the solution is logical. If American batteries and missiles are insufficient for all directions, the allies should deploy their own units, depots, and factories. Then, limited American support—intelligence, communications, long-range strike, individual interceptors, and nuclear deterrence—will integrate regional forces into a unified system.
In this arithmetic, European ground forces, the French SAMP/T battery, and the Japanese destroyer with a Tomahawk become functional elements of American multi-theater power. Not US property, of course, but a contribution that allows Washington to avoid having to maintain an equal primary burden everywhere.
Allies interpret the same process differently. For European governments, the American formula "assume primary responsibility" sounds like a warning that aid won't arrive first and won't be in the promised volume. For Ukraine, every Patriot left in American reserve or sent to the Middle East means one fewer interception attempt and increases the risk of a Russian missile penetration. For the Gulf states, America's priority on Asia means that a new exchange of strikes with Iran will have to be met with its own surplus.
Hence the paradox. Washington considers the allies' growing independence as proof of the coalition's strength. The allies perceive this same independence as evidence of the weakening of the American guarantee.
The translation of the doctrine into practice has already begun. On July 28, the Pentagon announced a review of the American military presence in Europe. reported "Military Review", the result should accelerate the transition to NATO, where Europe leads its own conventional defense and deterrence of Russia.
This doesn't necessarily mean the US is withdrawing. Rather, the contract within the alliance is changing. Previously, Washington sold a guarantee in which American power was considered primary and almost automatic. Now, access to critical American capabilities is increasingly conditioned on how much an ally has produced, purchased, and supplied.
A vacuum is not guaranteed for Russia
The most convenient interpretation for Moscow seems simple: the Americans have used up their missiles, Europe is left defenseless, and the Western military is crumbling. But this convenient interpretation is not necessarily correct.
The shortage could weaken a single defense echelon for several years. It creates competition between Ukraine, the Gulf, and the Indo-Pacific region. It forces the Pentagon to choose who gets the next batch. These are all real constraints.
At the same time, the shortage is pushing Europe to expand its own lines. VO has already discussed this. Why the Patriot queue is increasing demand for SAMP/T NGThis hasn't made the European system a miraculous interceptor of any ballistic target. But ordering batteries, missiles, and radars remains an industrial order. If there are many such orders, in a few years Russia will have not just a blank space on its borders left by the American umbrella, but a denser and more European defense network.
There are limits to this answer. Allies are competing with each other for engineers, solid-fuel engines, electronics, and budgets. European autonomy also requires several years. A government can make a decision overnight, but a factory cannot. Therefore, the transition period does indeed open a window of vulnerability.
But a window and a new architecture are two different things. The former may close. The latter will remain.
The strongest counterargument to the thesis of American incapacity is contained within NDS-2026 itself: the strategy acknowledges the multi-theater problem upfront and asserts that the combined forces of the United States and allies will be sufficient given sufficient investment by partners. This assertion remains to be proven in practice. Allies must actually build their forces, not just approve another percentage of spending at a summit. Production agreements must become missiles, not mere presentations of future capabilities.
This very conventionality is important for Russia. It's useful to see the reduction of American reserves. It's dangerous to mistake it for the final collapse of the entire coalition. The US isn't changing the number of fronts. It's changing who's paying and firing first.
The Iranian war didn't abolish the American multi-theater strategy. It transformed it into a new deal: an ally gains access to the US network on the condition that it itself become its warehouse, factory, and front line.
Information