"Kind" Khan Janibek: at the height of his power
Portrait of Khan Janibek on the Catalan Atlas of 1375
At a historical crossroads
This article will discuss one of the most controversial figures of the Golden Horde stories – Khan Janibek: simultaneously bloody and "good." His reign coincided with the peak of the Jochi ulus's power. After the khan's death, the rust of the "Great Turmoil" began to visibly corrode the Horde's gold.
But in order.
In 1330, the firstborn of Khan Uzbek, his favorite Timurbek, died, and the next in eldest, Tinibek, became the heir.
In the fateful year of 1341, he led a campaign into the lands of the Chagatai ulus, which by then was already torn apart by internal strife. It was there, far from the Volga, that Tinibek learned of his father's death, apparently sudden.
Otherwise, it is unlikely that Uzbek, for example, suffering from an illness heralding the approach of his end, would have sent his heir on a long campaign. In turn, Tinibek, having received news, hurried to the capital in order to legally take the throne.
Let me clarify regarding the Golden Horde capital. Strictly speaking, it should be called Saray al-Jedid – unlike the Old City, founded by Batu, this one was built by order of Khan Uzbek shortly before his death and became the capital of the Golden Horde.
The Selitrennoye settlement is a museum and archaeological complex on the site of what, according to a number of scholars, was the capital of the Golden Horde built by Khan Uzbek.
So, Tinibek is rushing to the capital. However, his path is blocked by his own mother, Taidula, who has placed her bet on her second son, Janibek. The question remains unanswered: did Tinibek know about his mother's intrigues in favor of his brother? In my opinion, he did not, since he failed to take appropriate measures to eliminate them: he did not execute him or send him into exile.
The powerful and decisive Taidula is well known to us from school, thanks to the story of her healing from an eye ailment by Metropolitan Alexy of Moscow, as described in his life. Furthermore, the image of this extraordinary woman was brought to life on screen by Roza Khairullina in the film "The Horde," whose creators offered their own, purely personal, perspective on the era.
Taidula and Metropolitan Alexy as presented by the creators of the film "The Horde"
Please note, dear readers, that once again in our story a woman plays a key role in the game of thrones of the Genghisids, which was already discussed in another article of the Golden Horde cycle “Find a woman in Mongolian", when, contrary to the will of the late Khan Ogedei, his widow and regent Turakina began to promote her son to the throne, about which see: "The Chronicler's Mistake, or Why Guyuk Was the First Tsar to Subjugate Rus'».
According to one version, Taidula and the emirs who supported her sent assassins to meet Tinibek, who stabbed him to death in the city of Saraichik, located in what is now Kazakhstan, on the right bank of the Ural River. Janibek also dealt with his younger brother, Khadyrbek.
We will discuss the relationship between Janibek and the Grand Prince of Vladimir, Simeon the Proud, later. For now, let us note that the events in the Golden Horde were closely followed in Rus', and were recorded in the Rogozhsky Chronicle:
And for the winter, Janibe [k] obi two brothers Tinibek and Khydyrbek, and he himself sat on the kingdom
Naturally, the murder of Tinibek attracted close attention not only in the quiet cells of Russian scribes, but also in the boyars’ towers and princely citadels.
In V.G. Tiesenhausen's collection, citing Arab authors, the tragedy is described in more detail:
Having come to him (Tinibek - I.Kh.), they (the conspirators - I.Kh.) all gathered to kiss his hand, then they hit him and killed him when he was in front of them.
This is one version. There is another, Persian one, which the Soviet historian M.G. Safargaliev was inclined to believe:
The "History of Sheikh Uvays," compiled in the 70s, states: "Uzbek Khan died and was succeeded by Dinibek, who had two other brothers: Janibek and Khizrbek. Janibek launched a rebellion against his brother Dinibek, and a battle ensued between them, in which Dinibek was defeated and captured. Janibek executed him and ascended his father's throne, but he also killed Khizrbek."
He gives the following arguments in favor of this interpretation, which, in my opinion, are convincing:
Considering that Tinibek had troops with him who were sent to conquer Central Asia, it can hardly be assumed that they remained passive when their commander was killed by Janibek's supporters.
Before discussing Janibek's reign, let me take a step back and look at some historical parallels: the death of Ivan the Young in 1490, the death of Tsareviches Ivan in 1581 and Alexei in 1670, and Tsarevich Nikolai Alexandrovich in 1865 occurred at a fork in Russia's historical path.
All of the listed figures, especially the last one (see about him “Tsarevich Nikolai Alexandrovich: how justified were the hopes associated with him?”), are non-trivial individuals who, if they had found themselves in power, could have shaped a different future for the country.
With a certain degree of caution, I would suggest that Tinibek was one of them:
The Arab traveler Ibn Battuta, who personally interacted with him, writes historian R. Yu. Pochekaev, who reported that he "was in appearance one of the most beautiful creations of Allah." From his youth, his father trained Tinibek in the affairs of government and military leadership. At the same time, the prince was no stranger to the arts and patronized cultural figures: Qutb, a renowned poet of the time, dedicated his Turkic translation of Nizami's poem "Khosrow and Shirin" to him, reflecting in his work many aspects of Tinibek's court during his stay in Khorezm.
Who knows, perhaps Tinibek, had he retained power, would have succeeded in halting the centrifugal processes in the Golden Horde and taken a step toward forming a bureaucracy from the sedentary population of the cities, destroying the last relapses of nomadic chiefdom – to follow the terminology of the historian N.N. Kradin, although applied by him to the Mongol state as a whole: a super-complex chiefdom – in the administrative structures of the ulus, turning it into an empire, as Shah Abbas I did, replacing the nomadic Qizilbash elite with a Persian bureaucracy, about which see: "The Safavids from Dusk Till Dawn: Between the Death of Tahmasp I and the Accession of Abbas I"?
And it's not as if such experience was absent in the vast expanses of the Great Mongol Empire. Take one of Genghis Khan's outstanding descendants, his grandson and founder of the Yuan Dynasty, Kublai Khan, who relied on Chinese bureaucracy.
Likewise, the ruler of the Ilkhanate, neighboring the Golden Horde, Hulagu's great-grandson, Ghazan Khan, also saw bureaucracy as his support, albeit a Persian one. His vizier was the historian and statesman Rashid ad-Din, mentioned repeatedly in the articles in this series.
Yes, the Yuan and Hulaguid dynasties, due to unfavorable objective reasons, were short-lived: the former, being foreign, was hated by its subjects, which cannot be said about the elite of the Golden Horde and the population subject to it, at least the inhabitants of Dasht-i-Kipchak.
The reasons for the demise of the Ilkhanate of the Hulaguids are more complex in terms of ongoing internal processes and aggression from neighbors. Janibek himself dealt a powerful blow to the state, which will be discussed later.
Khan Janibek, played by Innokenty Dakayar, next to his mother, a still from the film "The Horde"
Moreover, in the mid-14th century, the Golden Horde did not have such a serious foreign policy adversary as the Mamluk Sultanate was for the Hulaguids.
In short, if Tinibek really corresponded to the characterization given by Ibn Battuta, I believe he had a chance to engage in internal reforms while avoiding military adventures, and Sarai was not threatened by anyone during this period.
Why did the emirs support Janibek, bypassing the legitimate heir, taking a significant risk: the outcome of the struggle could have been in favor of Janibek, who, judging by the "History of Sheikh Uweis," briefly managed to seize the throne?
I believe the reason is this. Tinibek was a proponent of centralization and thought in the same terms as his father: a khan and subjects who obeyed him unquestioningly. This hardly suited the Golden Horde elite, who had hoped to gain greater freedom and, most importantly, control over the state's financial and economic resources under Janibek's reign.
Here, I believe, the centrifugal tendencies inherent in the elite manifested themselves: the aforementioned preferences seemed only possible if the Golden Horde was fragmented into uluses, transforming it into a semblance of a confederation. Let me clarify regarding the uluses: I'm talking about them gaining greater independence.
Taidula, apparently, also expected to receive economic preferences from Janibek and was rewarded:
As a reward (Taidula - I.Kh.) received - according to R.Yu. Pochekaev - from her grateful son several significant sources of income - in particular, the city of Tula came into her possession, which was governed by her, Taidula's, baskaks, and she was also granted the right to receive for her own benefit some trade fees in Azov.
Plus, it should be taken into account: the above positive characterization of Tinibek was given by an Arab - I will clarify: in cultural terms, an Arab, Ibn Battuta was of Berber origin - author, but Muslim chroniclers also wrote in enthusiastic tones about his cruel and capricious father, about which see: "Passions for Uzbek: Loyalty to Tradition or the Triumph of Islam? '.
Perhaps the image of Tinibek painted by Ibn Battuta did not quite correlate with reality, and the emirs feared a new wave of repressions carried out by Uzbek, considering it a blessing to see Janibek on the throne, who, as cynical as it may sound, limited himself to shedding the blood of brothers, but refrained from repressions against the elite.
From dress code to copper coins
The new khan continued the process of Islamization of the Golden Horde, which, in addition to building mosques, included requiring emirs to adhere to a dress code: wearing a turban and a farajiyat—a long Muslim robe—which was at odds with Turkic-Mongol customs. However, those noyons who opposed these innovations were either exterminated by Uzbek or fled, including to Rus' and Lithuania, which would later play against Sarai.
Like his father, Janibek surrounded himself with scholars and theologians, built mosques, one of which, erected in Chufut-Kale, is now an architectural monument.
The mosque in Chufut-Kale, built during the reign of Janibek
I will note in passing: this kind of patronage, also characteristic of Berke - about him, see: “The Golden Horde on the Path to Traditional Islam: From Batu to Berke” - and Uzbek, could not compensate for the damage inflicted by the Mongols on Muslim culture and, I would venture to suggest, religious thought.
If the campaigns of the tumens of Genghis Khan and his successors into Central and Asia Minor, Mesopotamia and the Volga region had not happened, perhaps Islamic theology would have been able in the future to neutralize the influence of Salafism, which brought so many troubles, including to Muslim civilization.
At the same time, the khan did not prevent Taidula from patronizing the Orthodox. The recently deceased eminent medievalist V.V. Trepavlov related an interesting story on this matter:
It can be assumed that this "queen" felt a special affection for her Russian subjects. According to the official Moscow version, she was grateful to Metropolitan Alexy for healing her from blindness. However, some early versions of the chronicles retain echoes of another, more dramatic story: Alexy helped her son, Khan Janibek himself, overcome his mental illness.
Among Janibek's domestic political actions, I note an unsuccessful attempt at financial reform, driven by the desire to mitigate the crisis that, although not yet in an overt form, was already corroding the economy of the Golden Horde.
Among the reasons for this was Uzbek's generally unsuccessful foreign policy: his punitive campaigns against Rus'—for example, against Tver in 1327—only destroyed the tax base of his own state; the war against the Iulaguids also failed to bring victory to the Golden Horde; in addition to all this, control over Southwestern Russia, which was increasingly falling into the orbit of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was effectively lost.
It must be assumed that Uzbek left behind a disorganized financial situation. In particular, the treasury was suffering from a shortage of silver. It was then that Janibek carried out the aforementioned reform, which involved minting copper coins.
The result looked predictable:
These coins, writes R. Yu. Pochekaev, were lighter in weight than those issued previously, and therefore did not inspire much confidence: in the early 1360s, the Horde khans returned to issuing coins of the previous weight.
In this case, analogies, familiar from school days, come to mind with the also unsuccessful monetary reform of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich.
Italian affairs
Nevertheless, despite financial difficulties, Janibek remained active on the international stage. The results cannot be assessed definitively. Strategically and economically important for Sarai was control over the Black Sea region, where the trading posts of Genoa and Venice, key players on the Eurasian chessboard during this period, were located.
The former controlled Kafa, while the latter, together with the Genoese, had trading posts in Tana. Both served as gateways of sorts for the Golden Horde to the Christian and Muslim worlds. The cultural and political center of the latter during this period was the aforementioned Mamluk Sultanate.
Above, we discussed the advisability of forming a bureaucracy from the sedentary population in the Golden Horde, which would have allowed the transformation of the khanate from a chiefdom into an empire, as well as the development of a production base in the Volga cities.
All of this required the appropriate personnel, and it seemed possible to obtain them through Kafa and Tana, that is, if for the first Russian emperor, St. Petersburg was seen as a window to Europe, then, I admit, for Janibek the aforementioned trading posts could have become such a window.
However, the opposite happened: the khan allowed himself to be drawn into a conflict with both Italian republics for a reason that could be easily resolved at the diplomatic level: a quarrel between the Tatars and the Italians.
In 1343, Janibek led troops into Tana, but the following year he stumbled upon Kafa, the siege of which did not bring him success, but cost him financial costs and military losses, which, according to some sources, amounted to 15 thousand people.
It seems to me that this figure is exaggerated, since this was approximately the size of the armies of Sigismund I and Bayezid I in one of the largest battles of the 14th century - at Nikopol in 1395. The second siege of Kafa also did not bring success to the khan.
In this case, the reputational losses suffered by Sarai are more important: two unsuccessful sieges of Kafa demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the Golden Horde troops in, forgive the tautology, besieging a well-fortified and competently defended city, and most importantly, the myth of the Tatars' invincibility was gradually destroyed.
Part of the wall that once surrounded Kafa
In political and economic terms, the confrontation between Sarai and the two leading Italian cities, which were at odds with each other, was disadvantageous to neither side and brought only losses to everyone.
The Golden Horde was the main exporter of grain to Greece and southern Italy, so the disruption of supplies triggered a food crisis in these regions and simultaneously hit Janibek's treasury. Ultimately, the Venetians and Genoese concluded a mutually beneficial peace with the khan in 1347.
It is important to note that the conflict with Genoa and Venice also revealed some of the clumsiness of Sarai's diplomacy, which failed to adequately exploit the contradictions between the two Italian states.
I believe that the confrontation in the Black Sea region partly caused a chain reaction in Eastern Europe, and the Polish king Casimir III made his move on the chessboard, attempting to seize Galician Rus, which was within the Golden Horde's sphere of influence.
In 1349, as historian R. Ya. Pilipchuk notes, he managed to secure most of the territories of the Galicia-Volyn principality for Poland.
However, the Polish king wisely decided not to further escalate relations with Sarai, especially in the context of tense relations with Vilnius:
"Kazimierz III," writes historian R. Ya. Pilipchuk, "proved to be a far-sighted ruler. He agreed to pay tribute from Galicia and thereby secured the favor of Khan Janibek."
The Grand Duke of Lithuania, Olgerd, well known to Russian readers and who waged three wars with the Grand Duke of Moscow, Dmitry Ivanovich, was also drawn into the orbit of the Golden Horde's politics. However, the former also saw Simeon the Proud as his adversary.
The bone of contention was the Tver Principality, weakened as a result of the aforementioned punitive campaign, but, due to its important trade, economic and strategic position, retaining political weight on the Eastern European chessboard.
But the relationship between Janibek and Moscow and Lithuania, as well as the centrifugal tendencies in the Golden Horde that served as a harbinger of the khan's death in the war with the Hulaguids, will be discussed in the next article.
References
Adygamov R.K. Bulgar and Golden Horde theologians and theological sources through the prism of "Mustafad al-akhbar..." by Sh. Marjani // Golden Horde Review. 2021. Vol. 9, No. 2. Pp. 336–350
Gorsky A.A. Rus and the Horde. – M.: Nauka. 2000
Kuchkin, V. A. Rus' under the yoke: how was it? / V. A. Kuchkin – M.: Panorama, 1991
Maslyuzhenko D.N. The Shibanids in the Golden Horde affairs of the second half of the 14th and early 15th centuries
Petrov P.N., Atygaev N.A., Beltenov Zh.M. Money on the “Silk Road” (territory of Kazakhstan, XIII - XIV centuries) - Almaty: Central State Museum of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023
Pilipchuk Ya.V. Khan Janibek and Prince Lyubartas-Dmitry
Pochekaev R. Yu. Tsars of the Horde. Biographies of the Khans and Rulers of the Golden Horde. – St. Petersburg: EURASIA, 2012
Pochekaev R. Yu. Mamai: The Story of an "Antihero" in History (Dedicated to the 630th Anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo). – St. Petersburg: EURASIA, 2010
Pochekaev R.Yu. Economic sanctions as an instrument of political struggle in the conflict between the Golden Horde, Venice and Genoa in the 1340s.
Safargaliev M.G. The Collapse of the Golden Horde. – Saransk: Mordovian Book Publishing House, 1960
Sabitov Zh.M. Emirs of Uzbek Khan and Janibek Khan
Seleznev Yu.V. The Golden Horde between governance and doctrine: reflections on the dilogy by A.G. Yurchenko (The Golden Horde: between Yasa and the Koran. The beginning of the conflict. St. Petersburg: Eurasia, 2012; Khan Uzbek: between empire and Islam (structures of everyday life). A book-summary. St. Petersburg: Eurasia, 2012)
Seleznev Yu.V. Elite of the Golden Horde. – Kazan: Publishing House "Fen" of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan, 2009
Tiesenhausen V.G. Collection of materials relating to the history of the Golden Horde... / [Comp.] V. Tiesenhausen. Vol. 1. Extracts from Arabic works / 23. – St. Petersburg: Publishing house at the expense of Count S.G. Stroganov, 1884
Trepavlov V.V. The Golden Horde in the 14th Century. – Moscow: Quadriga, 2010
Shpuler B. The Golden Horde. The Mongols in Russia. 1223–1502 / Translated from German and commented by M.S. Gatina. Kazan: Sh. Marjani Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan, 2016
Information