On the suitability of the armored cruiser Bayan for its tactical role
The armored cruiser Bayan was conceived as an armored reconnaissance vessel for squadron service, while still "remaining a combat vessel." And the experience of the battles at Port Arthur demonstrated that, under the circumstances of 1904, the Bayan was fully capable of fulfilling its intended purpose.
On the tasks of a reconnaissance cruiser during the Russo-Japanese War
What was required of a scout? Establish contact with the enemy's main forces, observe them for a while if necessary, then retreat and report to his commander. Or not retreat at all, but maintain surveillance and report information about the enemy squadron to his admiral once he got close enough to the cruiser.
Generally, a reconnaissance vessel conducts its search from somewhere between its own and the enemy's main forces. But the enemy does the same. Therefore, during reconnaissance, our cruiser must be prepared to meet its counterpart.
If so, combat is possible. But the objectives of a reconnaissance engagement are subordinate to their function: for a cruiser, the primary objective is to carry out reconnaissance and prevent the enemy from doing the same. Destroying an enemy reconnaissance aircraft is secondary and important only to the extent that it contributes to achieving key objectives.
The Battle of Jutland provides a good illustration, although it took place much later than the events described. It is generally accepted that the Germans won this clash of vanguards, as the British suffered far greater losses. However, it is often overlooked that, at the cost of two battlecruisers, John Beatty succeeded in locating the enemy's main force (the third British battlecruiser and the Lützow were lost later), while Frederick Hipper did not. Another issue is that John Beatty failed to inform his commander-in-chief of his "discovery," so his apparent success led to no result.
Nevertheless, it was D. Beatty who managed to both reconnoiter the Germans' main forces and prevent them from reconnoitring his own, while F. Hipper failed in both these tasks. Yet, if information about the Germans had reached D. Jellicoe in time, he could have "encountered" the dreadnoughts. Fleet open sea so that the final score of the battle would not be in favor of the Germans.
From this follows three main tasks of a reconnaissance cruiser in a squadron:
1. Conducting reconnaissance to determine the location and composition of enemy forces and promptly informing the command;
2. Observation of enemy forces for as long as required by the assigned combat mission;
3. Ensuring the secrecy of the deployment of our squadron by preventing the actions of enemy reconnaissance cruisers aimed at fulfilling points 1-2 in relation to our forces.
It's easy to see that points 1 and 3 are closely intertwined. Before assessing the Bayan's performance characteristics for its intended role, it's worth taking a moment to consider the adversary it faced.
A little about the Japanese fleet
The main forces of the Combined Fleet were represented by two classes of warships—battleships and armored cruisers, grouped into the 1st and 2nd Battle Divisions, respectively. The Japanese considered it necessary to have six warships in each division, so after the destruction of two battleships by Russian mines, they added the Nisshin and Kasuga to the 1st Division. The 1st Battle Division typically operated at 12–15 knots (at Tsushima, the Mikasa's engines ran between 76 and 100 rpm). As for H. Kamimura's cruisers, according to the respected A. Rytik, they maintained a speed of 15–17 knots in the same battle, and when necessary, accelerated to 18 knots. During the pursuit of the Admiral Ushakov, achieving this speed was already proving problematic.
The Japanese relied on armored cruisers for reconnaissance, and here they relied on quantity rather than quality. The best Japanese ships of this class were the four "doggies," but the normal displacement of the Takasago and Yoshino was only 4150 tons, and only the Kasagi/Chitose pair had it increased to 4760-4900 tons. The attempt to squeeze powerful armament, including two 8-inch guns (except for the Yoshino), and high speed into such modest dimensions resulted in these cruisers being unseaworthy and relatively unstable as platforms for artillery.
Nevertheless, at least on paper, the "dogs" were excellent cruisers, achieving a speed of 22,5–23,4 knots during trials. How long they could sail in everyday service without forcing their boilers is another matter. Based on data from other Japanese cruisers, it can be assumed that they were capable of sustained speeds of 20 knots, perhaps even 21 knots.
Overall, the "doggies" had a very moderate, if not questionable, combat potential, while other Japanese armored cruisers were even slower and weaker. The next six ships of this subclass—the Tsushima, Otowa, Suma, and Akitsushima classes—had a very moderate speed of 19-20 knots with a normal displacement of 2,667-3,366 tons.
But it's important to keep in mind that this speed was only achieved with forced propulsion, and even then only during trials. Under natural propulsion, the same Suma reached only 15 knots during trials in 1903, and only when forced did it reach 16 knots.
Armored cruiser "Suma"
The Akashi, which reference books list as 19,5 knots, only achieved this speed during trials with afterburners, and only 17,8 knots under natural thrust. In 1903, the cruiser only reached 17 knots without afterburners. The Niitaka, which according to its tactical logbook listed as 20 knots, only reached 17,294 knots during trials on January 16, 1904.
The next six armored cruisers (the Matsushima, Naniwa, and Izumi classes) were obsolete ships at the start of the Russo-Japanese War, with speeds of 16-18 knots, often closer to 16 than 18 knots. For example, the Takachiho, under natural propulsion, could only reach 16,3 knots in 1903. The formally armored cruiser Chiyoda, with a normal displacement of 2400 tons, should also be included in this group. Its speed, according to its data sheet, was 19 knots, but in 1903, the cruiser achieved 17,3 knots without forcing.
The armament of Japanese armored cruisers was quite adequate for their displacement. The "dogs" had quite respectable 2 x 8-inch guns (4 x 6-inch guns on the Yoshino) and 10 x 120-mm guns, but after that, things varied. There were 6 x 6-inch guns, or 2 x 6-inch guns with 6 x 120-mm guns, or 11 x 120-mm guns on the Matsushima-class cruisers, since their 320-mm main battery was of no practical use, and 8 x 6-inch guns on the Naniwa and Takachiho...
On the balance of cruiser forces in the theater
The Japanese armored cruisers were frankly weak and slow, but including the Chiyoda, the Japanese had 17 of them. By the start of the war, we had only eight cruisers (including the Bayan) fit for squadron service—half that number. And we immediately worsened this ratio by abandoning the Varyag to the Japanese, personally destroying the Boyarin, and, through our own oversight, sending the Bogatyr into repairs for the entire war.
As a result, the Pacific Squadron was left with only five cruisers, each of which had three Japanese cruisers. And given that of the five available cruisers, two "goddesses" weren't particularly fast, and the Novik was inferior in combat capabilities to virtually any Japanese "classmate," Japanese quantity turned into quality: on any combat sortie, N.K. Reitzenstein's cruiser detachment risked encountering overwhelming enemy forces.
In other words, Port Arthur's cruisers transformed from expendable war material into an extremely valuable resource, worth using only where the risk of loss was justified by the result achieved. These considerations, coupled with the general passivity of the Port Arthur squadron, led to the cruisers being used with extreme caution. The only squadron commander willing to take risks, S.O. Makarov, died a month after arriving in Port Arthur. I'm not saying that under his leadership our cruisers would have necessarily achieved glory in battle, but without him, they never had a chance.
It's very difficult to conduct reconnaissance with a squadron when for every one of your armored cruisers there are two or three Japanese ones, and for every single armored cruiser there are four. It's even more difficult to distinguish yourself serving with a squadron that is determined to remain unwilling to go to sea. Therefore, the reason Bayan failed to fulfill its reconnaissance duties with the squadron in 1904 had nothing to do with its performance characteristics, but was due to the timidity of our admirals and the vastly superior number of cruisers the Japanese had.
Therefore, the Bayan project should be assessed not so much by its successes in the Russo-Japanese War (although by that too), but also by modeling what it could have achieved with a more or less adequate balance of forces and an active position of our naval commanders.
Let us now consider the capabilities of the armored cruiser Bayan, taking into account the above facts and considerations.
Intelligence service
To carry out reconnaissance operations, a cruiser must, at a minimum, outperform a squadron of battleships, but ideally, it must be faster than the enemy's stronger ships, and stronger than those that are faster. Furthermore, a reconnaissance cruiser must have significant coal reserves, allowing it to maintain high speed for extended periods.
According to the available evidence, which I cited earlier, the Bayan was quite capable of sustained speeds of 20 knots. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that practically identical cruisers with similar propulsion systems—the Bayan II, Pallada, and Admiral Makarov—during World War I, operating in pairs or brigades, easily maintained a speed of 19 knots—and division speed is usually assigned slightly below full speed. But even if the Bayan had only reached 19 knots instead of 20, she would still have been significantly faster than the Japanese battleships, somewhat surpassing their armored cruisers, and, most interestingly, she was also faster than the vast majority of the armored cruisers of the Combined Fleet. Thus, the Bayan was faster not only than those stronger than her, but also than many of those inferior in combat power. Of all the Japanese battleships, armored cruisers, and armored deck cruisers, only the "dogs" were perhaps equal to the "Bayan" in speed, or at least slightly superior to it.
Taking the above into account, it can be concluded that the Bayan's designed speed—21 knots during long-term trials without overclocking—was optimally chosen against a specific adversary, such as the Japanese fleet. Its 20 knots in everyday operation were sufficient for reconnaissance, although further increase in speed would have required greater engine power and, consequently, greater weight, which would have been detrimental to the ship's combat capabilities. Furthermore, an additional knot or two of speed would not have given the Bayan any significant tactical advantage: 20 knots were necessary and sufficient for its intended mission.
The Bayan didn't carry much coal, however—750 tons at normal displacement and 1020 tons at full displacement. The coal reserves of the Port Arthur Squadron's only armored cruiser were roughly equivalent to those of the Askold, which carried 720 and 1050 tons at normal and full displacement, respectively. However, the Askold was noticeably lighter—6000 tons at normal displacement versus the Bayan's 7805 tons. Therefore, the Bayan's cruising range was inferior to both our armored-deck cruisers and the Japanese British-built armored cruisers, although this disadvantage wasn't fatal. At 10 knots, the Bayan's certified range was 3900 miles, while the Askold's was 4300 miles. Of course, the rated range won't tell you much, because during a combat mission, the cruiser will keep all boilers running, which will increase coal consumption even at 10 knots, and reduce range. But this is true for any cruiser.
However, it's worth remembering that the Bayan was built not for ocean raiding, but for combat operations in a very limited theater: for example, the sea distance from Port Arthur to the Japanese naval base at Sasebo is less than 560 miles. So, yes, the Bayan's relatively small coal capacity is a drawback, but for the theater in which it was to fight, it was a tolerable drawback: it in no way interfered with the Bayan's reconnaissance missions in the waters of the Yellow Sea.
As I wrote above, during reconnaissance there is a high risk of encountering enemy cruisers, but I will return to this a little later.
Observation of the enemy's main forces
In the realities of the Russo-Japanese War, even with good visibility, the enemy was detected even before it broke the horizon. Its approach was signaled by the smoke from its ships' funnels, visible when the ships themselves were still obscured. But, of course, to determine the composition of the enemy squadron, its course, and speed, it was necessary to approach significantly closer, and how much closer depended on visibility and weather. For example, on the day of the Battle of Tsushima, both weather and visibility left much to be desired. Nevertheless, the Izumi observed our squadron from a distance of 55-65 cables; according to other sources, around 50 cables.
Armored cruiser Izumi
Our scout should have kept roughly the same distance when establishing contact with the enemy's main forces. What could threaten the Bayan at that distance?
Experience showed that in January-March 1904, Japanese battleships and armored cruisers were unable to effectively fire at ranges of 40 cables or more. This was particularly evident on February 12, when the Bayan, Askold, and Novik found themselves under fire from six Japanese battleships, and then six armored cruisers, at a range of approximately 40-45 cables, even though at one point the range may have been even slightly shorter. The exchange of fire lasted half an hour, and only one hit was scored on the Russian ships: a 12-inch shell struck the Askold's 6-inch gun barrel. However, given the completely unusual damage pattern, it can be assumed that no hits were made, and that the Askold's shell exploded in the gun barrel.
The second incident occurred on March 31, when Japanese cruisers approached to within 40 cable lengths of the Bayan and, while it was rescuing sailors from the destroyer Strashny, opened fire. The exchange of fire lasted 20 minutes, and again the Bayan suffered no hits. It should be noted, of course, that the Japanese transferred their best gunners to battleships and armored cruisers, and in this combat episode, the "dogs" took the lead, while the Asama and Tokiwa brought up the rear. Accordingly, the distance from the Bayan to the best gunners of the Japanese column was significantly greater than 40 cable lengths.
In fact, and contrary to popular belief, the Japanese weren't particularly adept at long ranges in the Battle of the Yellow Sea, although their battleships demonstrated good accuracy at 40-45 kbt. But during the entire first phase of the battle, which lasted 2 hours and 40 minutes, with the ranges being longer for most of the time, they scored 20 hits with 10-12 inch shells. Moreover, the hits weren't evenly spaced, but rather came in bursts.
Thus, 30% of all hits in this phase, or six 12-inch shells, were received by the Poltava in just 10 minutes—from 13:50 to 14:00. Or take the Tsarevich—at the very beginning of the battle on July 28, from a very long range (the distance could have been up to 80 kbt), the Japanese zeroed in on it with exemplary speed and immediately, around 12:20, scored a hit with a 12-inch shell. However, then, from 12:20 to 13:00, i.e., over the course of 40 minutes of battle, they managed to "add" only one 12-inch shell to the Russian flagship. Therefore, it can be concluded that, although the Japanese sometimes managed to demonstrate exceptionally high accuracy at ranges over 45 kbt, overall the effectiveness of their fire at such a distance was random.
The same can be observed in the Battle of the Korea Strait on August 1, 1904, when H. Kamimura's armored cruisers clashed with the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. There, the Japanese ships' fire was effective at ranges of 30–40 cables, where the Russian cruisers suffered the bulk of their damage. Again, there's no reason to believe that the 8-inch guns of the Nissina and Kasuga performed any better in the Yellow Sea: of all the shells that hit our ships, only two were 8-inch caliber and two more were 8-inch or larger. Of course, there could have been more hits, as in many cases the caliber of the Japanese shells could not be determined, but still.
Therefore, I must state that, while performing reconnaissance missions and located at a distance of over 45 cables from the enemy's main forces, the Bayan could not have been exposed to a hail of shells: only isolated and, essentially, random hits threatened her. And the Bayan was very well protected from such hits. Its main armor belt, 167 mm thick at the waterline at normal displacement, could be penetrated by 12-inch, 331,7 kg armor-piercing shells at a range of no more than 48 cables—and this was with an ideal hit angle of 90 degrees. If the deviation from the normal were 25 degrees, the range would be reduced to 42 cables.
Moreover, due to the characteristics of Japanese shells, it can be argued that the Bayan's vertical armor, except for 60mm sections, could not be penetrated even by 12-inch shells. In the best-case scenario for the Japanese, their shell could knock out the plug, similar to what happened to the Pobeda in the Battle of the Yellow Sea, but such a strike could not inflict decisive damage to the cruiser or significantly slow her speed. And even 50,8mm of armor, as demonstrated by the Retvizan, was capable of stopping a large-caliber shell, limiting its damage to light shrapnel damage in the compartment immediately behind the plate.
The Bayan's horizontal armor deck provided better protection at such distances than the carapace deck, simply due to the lack of slopes, as a shell hits a horizontal deck at a significantly smaller angle than a slope.
Comments to previous articles in this series have repeatedly raised concerns about the Bayan's exposed stern, unprotected by an armor belt and therefore vulnerable to enemy shells. The tragedy of the armored cruiser Rurik, which was lost due to a steering failure, is cited as an example. Sometimes one reads that the Bayan was literally doomed due to this armor deficiency...
Those who write this way miss five very important aspects.
At first, the slopes of the Rurik's carapace deck were more vulnerable to the impact of Japanese shells than the horizontal deck of the Bayan.
Secondly, the reason for the failure of the Rurik's steering system was not a lucky hit, but a whole complex of factors that overlapped each other:
1. In total, not one, but four shells struck the Rurik's stern. The "fatal" third hit, which destroyed the rudder drive, did not disable the cruiser at all—it did not lose control and continued to fight as if nothing had happened;
2. The steering compartment was flooded by the fourth hit to the stern. The water could not be pumped out, not because of the size of the hole, but because the bilge turbine burned out completely inappropriately and without any help from the Japanese;
3. When it became clear the rudder would be flooded, the rudder was locked in the "straight ahead" position to allow steering. For a while, this worked, and the cruiser remained under control. But then something happened, causing the lock to fail.
In fact, it can be said that in the case of the Rurik, the stars aligned extremely favorably for the Japanese. There was no "golden" hit, which are rare in themselves; rather, it was a combination of coincidences, each of which worked in their favor. But even "golden" hits are rare, and the likelihood of such a scenario repeating itself should be considered extremely low.
Third, For there to be any hope of the Rurik scenario coming to fruition, the Bayan would have to be peppered with hits, as was the case with the Rurik. However, for the reasons stated above, no "hail of shells" could fall on the Bayan, which was observing the Japanese main forces from five miles away.
Fourth, For reasons unknown to me, the armor belt in the stern is perceived by some commentators as a panacea, along the lines of, "Have a piece of paper—clean as a pigeon. No paper—lost as a Swede at Poltava." But it's important to understand that neither the 60mm belt in the Bayan's bow nor the 89mm armor on the Samoid's ends offered any protection against classic 10-12 inch armor-piercing or semi-armor-piercing shells. In fact, even a 10-12 inch high-explosive shell, loaded with a normal explosive charge that's not prone to detonation on impact with an obstacle and a base fuse, had an excellent chance of penetrating such armor.
Finally, fifthly, a very common mistake in judgment is that a naval enthusiast stories He takes the design of the armored cruiser "Bayan" and searches for vulnerabilities. And when he finds them, he concludes: "If there are vulnerabilities, then the cruiser is unfit for its intended purpose."
This reasoning forgets that everything is relative. During the Russo-Japanese War, reconnaissance missions were usually assigned to armored cruisers, but here we have a cruiser, after all, an armored cruiser. Let's put the same Askold, or, if you prefer, the Kasagi, in the place of the Bayan, which observed enemy battleships from a distance of 45-50 cables and came under their fire. And let's ask ourselves: would they perform better?
The answer is obvious: of course not. Because while the Bayan's stern is relatively vulnerable to 12-inch Japanese-style shells, the Askold and Kasagi's entire waterline—132,5 meters and 114,1 meters, respectively—is vulnerable. And this is despite the Askold and Kasagi having a much higher chance of sustaining serious damage than the Bayan, due to the sloped armor decks.
Of course, the lack of even 60mm of armor on the Bayan's stern should be considered a weakness and a vulnerability. A 10-12-inch high-explosive shell, striking this vulnerable spot and detonating on the deck armor, could, with luck, penetrate it and damage the steering system. Meanwhile, the presence of vertical armor, even 60mm thick, would have detonated the shell before impact, and it would undoubtedly have been able to withstand the impact of shrapnel.
However, it's important to keep in mind that Japanese-type shells tended to detonate immediately upon impact, meaning the likelihood that even a 12-inch shell would explode upon penetrating the plating was very high. The likelihood of a 12-inch shell exploding before impacting the armored deck upon striking the cofferdams was even higher. At the same time, even 60 mm of armor didn't provide absolute protection from Japanese shells—in one case, a Japanese shell penetrated a 102 mm armor plate and exploded behind it.
In view of the above, it remains to be seen: as a scout, the Bayan had incomparably greater combat resilience than armored cruisers. This was achieved not by the Bayan being invulnerable to enemy shells, but by the fact that she had far fewer vulnerabilities than any armored cruiser.
Invulnerable cruisers didn't exist, as the Asama at the Battle of Tsushima clearly demonstrated. This cruiser was larger than the Bayan and better armored. But two 10-inch shells that struck her stern passed over the 89-mm belt and exploded above the armored deck, causing the Asama to list 1,5 meters by the stern, losing speed, and rendering the cruiser incapacitated.
The Russian squadron, suffering defeat, was unable to build on its success and destroy the Japanese cruiser. But in the hypothetical situation I discussed above for the Bayan—that is, if the Asama had been on reconnaissance, separated from the main force, observing the enemy squadron from a distance of 4,5-5 miles, and had suddenly sustained such damage—its fate would have been sealed. Neither its larger displacement nor its superior armor would have saved it.
It's time to move on to the Bayan's ability to counter Japanese cruisers. I've already written extensively on the subject of the Izumo-Bayan confrontation, but that was only in a hypothetical one-on-one encounter. Now I'd like to consider the consequences of Bayan engagements with Japanese armored and armored-deck cruisers in the context of possible combat situations, and also evaluate the Bayan on a cost-effectiveness scale.
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