A little over a year later, in mid-May 2013, a meeting of President Vladimir Putin with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense took place at the residence of Bocharov Ruchei, at the center of which was the development of the anti-missile system of Russia - the most important component of the aerospace defense program.
The creation of the Military Space Defense Forces was an important and reasonable step in the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In April, the 2011 of the year at the board of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, it was decided to create military space defense forces on the basis of the Space Forces, which was fixed by presidential decree in May 2011.
The program for the development and deployment of space defense systems has become the largest section of the State Armament Program until 2020 (GPV-2020), which is planned to allocate up to 20% of the allocation, that is, about 4,6 trillion. rub. ($ 150 billion). This is about as much as the United States spent on missile defense over the period from the 80s of the last century. Of the main sections of GPV-2020, only the Naval Program fleet exceeds East Kazakhstan on financing (5 trillion rubles), but it is distributed between the marine component of the strategic nuclear triad of the Russian Federation and the general fleet.
In the context of the aerospace program, in addition to upgrading the existing and creating SPRN elements as part of ground-based radars and spacecraft, it was planned to deploy 28 anti-aircraft missile regiments equipped with C-400 "Triumph" complexes (around 450-670 launchers (PU) and 1800-2700 anti-aircraft guided missiles - missiles), as well as 10 divisions of the advanced system C-500 "Vityaz" (around 80-120 PU and 320-480 SAM). Subsequently, the C-500 program was expanded to 38 divisional complexes (300-460 PU and order 1220-1820 SAM), for which it was decided to build three new plants. In addition, the creation of a new integrated control system for aerospace defense and a significant modernization of the Moscow ABM system (А-135) are planned to give it the potential of non-nuclear (contact-impact) interception of ballistic targets.
Although doubts have been expressed in the realistic implementation of these plans before 2020, there is reason to consider aerospace defense on the scale of weapons purchases and allocations as the main priority of the unprecedented technical re-equipment program of the Russian Armed Forces, embodied in GWV-2020.
DOCRINAL FOUNDATION OF EKO
The organizational structure of the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region, the technical and operational aspects of the program for the development of its forces and means are actively discussed and criticized by authoritative independent Russian specialists. But with the undoubted usefulness of such a discussion, it often seems to be “hanging in the air”, since the debate on certain particular attributes of the EKR system, no matter how important they are, cannot replace the definition of its fundamental tasks. Both guiding documents on the system and the program of aerospace defense - the “Concept of aerospace defense” of April 2006, and the “Concept of construction and development of the Armed Forces” of April 2010 - remain secret. It is possible that they have clear objectives for the troops of the East Kazakhstan Oblast and target installations for their technical re-equipment. However, individual signs of inconsistency in decisions on the organizational side of the East Kazakhstan region, as well as contradictory assessments of the technical characteristics of its systems, do not give grounds for such confidence.
Doubts are not dispelled by the open section of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation from 2010 of the year. Among the main tasks of the Armed Forces and other troops in peacetime (paragraph 27) directly to the aerospace defense are, firstly, “Timely warning of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation about an aerospace attack ...”; secondly, “Ensuring air defense of the most important objects of the Russian Federation and readiness to repel attacks of aerospace attacks”.
This raises serious questions. To begin with, both tasks are rather related to tasks not in peacetime, but during the period of the immediate threat of aggression and even its beginning, although it is clear that the material and operational base for their implementation must be created in peaceful conditions. WKO is also referred to in paragraph 30 ("The main objectives of the development of the military organization"), where among other things referred to "the improvement of the air defense system and the creation of an aerospace defense system of the Russian Federation."
Since in two places the reflection of the attacks of the aerospace attack (SVKN) and the aerospace defense system are mentioned along with the air defense (AD), it can be assumed that the air defense is not part of the aerospace defense. Then another question arises: what is related to the concept of “means of aerospace attack”, with which the “aerospace attack” can be realized, about which the aerospace defense should “warn the commander-in-chief” and the “readiness to repel” of which it should have.
According to the logic of the 2010 Military Doctrine, ICS do not include aerodynamic offensive weapons (Aviation and cruise missiles), from which the air defense system is designed to protect. According to the same logic, ICS cannot include ballistic missiles (BR), which fly through airspace in the initial and final sections of the trajectory and through space in its middle phase, but which were never considered to be either air or space strike means.
Then it remains to assume that, according to the Military Doctrine, a specific representative of SVKN are systems brought into space from launchers of any type of home base, but then (and this determines their qualifications) diving into the atmosphere from the space and attacking the target as an aerodynamic or ballistic warhead carrier.
The development of such systems really goes on, while in the experimental stage, within the framework of the American program “Fast Global Impact” (BSU). They can be put into service after the 2020 year, although the current cuts in the military budget entail a postponement of this moment and doubts have been expressed in their expediency in the United States, since no clear objectives have been formulated to justify their high cost. Such means include missile-planning (or aeroballistic) systems with hypersonic vehicles HTV-2 (Hypersonic Technology Vehicle), AHW (Advanced Hypersonic Vehicle) and intercontinental ballistic missiles CSM (Conventional Strategic Missile). The first two use ballistic carriers and highly maneuverable guided hypersonic planning devices, in the future - warheads. The HTV-2 test launches took place in April 2010 of the year and August of 2011 using Minotaur IV Lite media (a combination of MB stages of the MX). Although launches were unsuccessful, experiments with these systems continue.
In Russia, similar developments, apparently, are also underway. Back in the past decade, the Defense Minister of that time, Sergey Ivanov, repeatedly spoke about the project of creating a ballistic missile with a planning and maneuvering combat unit ("bird") to break through the American missile defense system.
However, the most authoritative Russian experts question the validity of attributing rocket-planning systems to the category of aerospace attack weapons. For example, General Vladimir Dvorkin (former head of the 4 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense) writes: “Not a single state has and in the near future will be armed with the so-called aerospace means capable of solving combat tasks simultaneously in the atmosphere and in space ". As for the experimental systems of the “Fast Global Impact”, the main part of the flight path of such devices (more than 70%) will take place in the atmosphere, therefore, protection against them must be carried out by air defense systems.
Of course, the hypersonic speed of offensive means will place increased demands on defense. “At least in the next 10 – 15 years,” emphasizes General Dworkin, “the means of airborne attack (aviation and cruise missiles of various types of bases) and ballistic missiles will remain the means of“ aerospace attack ”.” Accordingly, he points out, the tasks of aerospace defense "clearly fall into independent tasks of air defense and missile defense and practically do not overlap either in combat or in information means."
The X-37B unmanned orbiter, whose purpose is classified, is still being tested, although in theory it can be a carrier weapons. Recall that similar suspicions in the past were associated with reusable spacecraft such as the Shuttle, but they turned out to be a “bubble”. In the foreseeable future, the orbital systems for space strikes on Earth (taking into account the laws of astrodynamics and other factors) will not be able to compete with ground-based, sea-based and airborne ballistic and aerodynamic rocket systems according to cost-effectiveness criteria. If they nevertheless appear once, then they can theoretically be hit in orbit with the help of anti-satellite systems (PSS), and after entering the atmosphere - with air defense or missile defense.
Thus, it is impossible to single out special aerospace systems that are different from aviation, cruise and ballistic missiles, which traditionally were designed to reflect air defense and missile defense systems, as an object of action of the aerospace defense. Therefore, the formulations of the Military Doctrine, which persistently distinguish between air defense and air defense, but do not mention either missile defense or missile defense, seem to be not entirely logical and rather clouded rather than clarify the issue.
Another recognized military authority, General Victor Esin (former chief of the General Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces), puts forward a capacious definition of the SSBF: “By means of an aerospace attack, it is commonly understood to be a combination of aerodynamic, aerobalistic, ballistic and spacecraft operating from the ground (sea), from the airspace , from space and through space ". Since there are no space weapons and is not foreseen in the foreseeable future, in essence, aerospace defense is nothing but a set of modernized information control and combat systems of well-known types: air defense and missile defense. Moreover, their new versions, intended to reflect the BSU rocket-planning systems, will be needed later than the 2020 of the year. So far, there is no clarity about what these systems will be and whether they will be created in general. Meanwhile, the aerospace defense program is an essential part of the State Armaments Program before 2020, and can hardly be entirely focused on uncertain future means of attack, which are in the experimental phase of development.
STRATEGIC DEFENSE DILEMMAS
So far, there is no clarity about the specific tasks of the aerospace defense yet, at least in official sources and most of the expert work. In particular: whether the aerospace defense should repel the attacks of ballistic or aerodynamic means of attack and in what equipment (nuclear or conventional); whether it is aimed at intercepting intercontinental missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) or medium-range missiles (MRBDs), aviation and cruise missiles; whether it is designed to fend off massed or single and group attacks; Should it protect the objects of military-political management, strategic nuclear forces (SNF) or administrative-industrial centers and economic infrastructure?
It is obvious that one or another answer to the questions posed presupposes completely different defensive systems and costs, and also implies different opponents. So, NATO countries do not have MRBDs, and Iran and the DPRK do not yet have ICBMs and SLBMs. But China is actively developing all these classes of percussion weapons, while Israel, India, Pakistan, Iran, the DPRK and a number of other countries are focusing on medium-range missiles.
Within the limits of the specified range of shock systems and protected objects, the most ambitious defense of the industry and the population from the massive (many hundreds of warheads) impact of nuclear ballistic missiles would be. It is clear that the current program of aerospace defense (including the Moscow A-135 missile defense system and its intended modification for non-nuclear interception) cannot even come close to accomplishing such a task, no matter how loud (“repel”, “parry”, etc.) encourage the uninformed public and politicians official documents and statements. Even if the entire HPV-2020 in 23 trillion were directed to this goal. rub., and then it would remain unattainable.
At the other end of the range is the defense of the defended command posts of the military-political leadership, the mine and ground-mobile launchers of ICBMs from single strikes of third countries and even from a massive attack using non-nuclear high-precision cruise missiles like the American Tomahawk naval systems and AGM cruise missiles. -86 C / D. To accomplish these tasks, the intended aerospace defense program and the sums allocated to it are redundant and not quite optimal.
All other tasks and variants of systems are located between these two extreme points. For example, the defense of these protected objects from the strike of the nuclear warheads of US ballistic missiles would be immeasurably easier to achieve (and the requirements for their effectiveness less stringent) than missile defense and air defense to protect industry and the population from nuclear aggression. Protection of administrative and industrial centers from single and group nuclear strikes using missiles or airplanes by third countries or terrorists would be in some aspects more, and in others less resource-intensive than defense of the SNF. Anyway, the feasibility, cost and achievable effectiveness of different options for EKR in the complex requires the most serious analysis, so that significant financial resources and scientific and technical resources are not wasted on repelling improbable and contrived threats, without leaving the opportunity to effectively protect what is needed and you can cover up from the really predictable hazards.
I would not like to think that the VKO program is developing on the principle of “finger to the sky”: we will do everything we can and we will protect what we can. Russia undoubtedly needs effective defense as part of information management systems and missile defense and air defense systems, but it must meet realistic objectives, not patriotic slogans, and organically fit into the ideology of strategic stability, which is presented to other powers.
DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC STABILITY
Until the beginning of the last decade, the understanding of strategic stability agreed upon by Moscow and Washington was based on the ideas of former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Almost half a century ago, he formulated the concept that deployment of missile defense systems (on one or both sides) could create the illusion of the possibility of preventing unacceptable damage from an enemy retaliatory strike, weakened by a sudden counter-force (disarming) strike. This will increase the incentive for the first strike, in other words - the threat of nuclear war will increase. In addition, the destabilizing role of missile defense lies in the fact that it forces each side to build up an offensive capability in response and thereby spurs an arms race.
In 1972, the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and the SALT-1 Interim Agreement was concluded, brilliantly translating the concept of McNamara into a contractual-legal form and a material limitation of armaments. Subsequent 40 years of negotiations and six treaties and agreements on strategic arms reduction of the USSR / Russia and the United States were based on this foundation.
But as time went on, the cold war ended, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in the world accelerated, military technological progress made possible the non-nuclear (contact-impact) interception of ballistic missiles. Nevertheless, the military-strategic relations of Russia and the United States are still based on mutual nuclear deterrence - the mutual possibility of delivering a crushing retaliatory strike. Their essence has not changed since the time of McNamara, although their political role in the relations of the two powers has noticeably decreased, and the quantitative levels of strategic forces over the past 20 years have decreased five to six times. The Prague Treaty of START of 2010 of the year once again consolidated this state of strategic balance.
At the same time, the United States began a review of McNamara’s philosophy and from the middle of the past decade, together with its allies, began to deploy a global missile defense system with regional segments in Europe and the Pacific. According to the official version - to protect against hypothetical single or group rocket attacks of the DPRK, Iran and other likely possessors of nuclear and rocket weapons. However, Russia took the missile defense program as a threat to its nuclear deterrence potential, which became the main bone of contention between the two powers. In response to the US missile defense system, Moscow has taken steps to improve its strategic nuclear forces and develop the aerospace defense program.
The dialectic of missile defense systems and strategic stability has now become much more complex and controversial than in the days of McNamara. In principle, any missile defense system to protect the territory from single or group strikes by third countries could weaken the nuclear deterrence potential of the two nuclear superpowers. The whole question is how significant.
To protect the country from the blows of hundreds and thousands of nuclear warheads, such a defense is needed as it has never been and will not be achieved in the foreseeable period. First, the task of intercepting such a number of ballistic targets creates insurmountable technical difficulties. Secondly, even the ability to bring down the overwhelming majority of offensive weapons is not able to prevent hundreds of nuclear warheads from exploding in their territory, which would still mean a national catastrophe (unacceptable damage) for any modern power - in other words, the game is not worth the trouble.
And this is the main reason why over the past 40 over the years, despite the huge costs and scientific and technical efforts, large-scale missile defense systems in the territory of the USSR / Russia and the United States have not been deployed to protect against each other. This reality will remain for the foreseeable future, no matter how defensive systems are deployed by the military-industrial complexes of the leading powers and whatever promises they lull their political leadership and the public.
However, with respect to third countries, a different logic works. Reflection of single or small group nuclear missile strikes of third countries gives the missile defense system a great sense. For a large state, there is a big difference in whether a nuclear warhead has reached its territory 10, 5 or 1. Although the loss of even one city, of course, would be a huge disaster (like the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), but still it would not have become an irreparable national catastrophe - here the game is worth the candle.
Improving anti-missile systems with an increase in their speed and range could theoretically give them the potential for intercepting ICBMs (as with the notorious project of the American SM-3Block IIB system with a speed of more than 5 km / s for the recently canceled fourth stage of the deployment of the American missile defense program in Europe). In the same way, the Moscow A-135 PRO has a theoretical possibility of repelling the impact of several ICBM warheads — in any case, it is assigned such a task. But the contribution of these systems to the defense against a massive nuclear missile strike is negligible.
They could demonstrate significantly higher efficiency in defense against a single or small group attack of missiles from third countries. It is unlikely that Russia or the United States will refuse such an opportunity.
Since Russia insists on US legally binding guarantees of “non-directional” US missile defense to weaken Russia's nuclear deterrence potential, the question of the impact of WKO on strategic stability also logically arises. The answer to this question depends on what is meant by SVKN, the blow of which is intended to reflect the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation, and what is the achievable military-technical potential of the system in carrying out this task.
If ballistic and aerodynamic nuclear weapons carriers of the US SNF are referred to as SVKN and we are talking about repelling a massive strike, then the aerospace defense of the territory of Russia can also be regarded as aimed at weakening the American nuclear deterrence potential. It will theoretically become destabilizing, although such an opportunity for EKR is unattainable in the foreseeable future. Following the logic of Moscow, the United States would also have the right to raise the issue of "non-directionality" at the talks and, if necessary, take retaliatory measures in the field of offensive weapons. So far, they do not do this, apparently believing that the East Kazakhstan region will be ineffective.
If the Russian system will protect the objects of government, the MNS and the SNF from the impact of high-precision aerodynamic and ballistic carriers of conventional and nuclear weapons, then it will be an important element in strengthening strategic stability, especially when the quantitative levels of the SNF decrease.
Also, covering administrative-political and industrial centers, vital infrastructure from single or group air strikes using non-nuclear and especially nuclear weapons from irresponsible regimes and terrorists will certainly have a stabilizing effect.
Both of these objectives, if they are set, would guarantee the stabilizing effect of the Russian EKO and in principle would be economically and technically achievable. First, protection against aerodynamic systems can be provided, and later, as technology improves, and against ballistic carriers of various types of warheads.
Agreeing on the delimitation of stabilizing and destabilizing characteristics of defense systems and coordinating their respective technical, geographical parameters and confidence-building measures is the most important task of future negotiations between Russia and the United States on the issue of anti-missile defense, as a key to unblocking other channels of the arms control dialogue. And in the more distant future, the possibility of cooperation may emerge on certain operational and technical aspects of missile defense and air defense systems.
In the light of the above, we would like to hope that the May meeting of the highest political and military leadership in Bocharovoy Ruche raised fundamental issues of strategic defense, and not just discussed the progress of work on the C-400 and C-500 anti-aircraft missile systems. After all, the VKO program is gaining momentum and absorbing more and more budget funds, the development of its various information and shock systems is in full swing. Although some of them are indisputably needed in any case (for example, new satellites and radar stations), for many other elements, making serious corrections in the future will result in enormous costs and loss of resources needed to create the kind of defense that Russia really needs. The same applies to the infrastructure of the basing of forces and facilities of aerospace defense.
Returning to the theme of the “philosophy” of the East Kazakhstan region, which Vladimir Putin spoke at a meeting with experts in Sarov in February 2012, we have to note that the Ministry of Defense and its strategic institutes have not yet fulfilled this wish and have not presented such a philosophy - in any case the professional community is not aware of it. Perhaps President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu should repeat this instruction in order to achieve the maximum effect of the enormous national resources allocated to the East Kazakhstan region.