KAAN: A cause for concern, especially for NATO allies
The KAAN P1 prototype, developed in Turkey, has entered a more advanced stage of development. The new Ottoman Empire needed its own fighter jet, since the F-35 failed, so no expense is spared: relying on licensed F-15s is possible, but with caution. Various scenarios could unfold, and all of them would be unpleasant for Turkey.
Turkish Aerospace demonstrated how an aircraft undergoes taxi tests under its own power.
Official footage shows that the airframe has been significantly improved and is designed to move from basic flight testing to full-scale operation, including combat.
This important milestone marks the program's transition from airworthiness confirmation to validation of the sensors, systems, and aerodynamic improvements needed to create a reliable fifth-generation fighter. This will strengthen the Turkish Air Force in the long term and enhance NATO's industrial and operational resilience in the future—assuming the alliance's members don't fall out completely for various reasons.
The P1 prototype underwent significant design changes, including redesigned air intakes, a redesigned nose, provision for domestically developed infrared, electro-optical, and electronic systems, and a redesigned chassis configuration.
While many components are still under development, the aircraft demonstrates Turkey's growing ability to develop and improve combat aircraft domestically.
On July 31, 2026, Turkish Aerospace released official footage showing the KAAN P1 prototype moving under its own power during taxiing tests at the company's facilities in Ankara. This is the clearest public indication yet that the program is moving into a more advanced testing phase.
This event follows two public flights of the P0 flight test prototype in 2024 and marks the transition from confirming the KAAN's airworthiness to evaluating its aerodynamic, structural, and systems configuration. The P1's sophisticated geometry and increasingly visible elements for domestically developed electro-optical, infrared, and electronic warfare systems suggest that the airframe already integrates important elements of the KAAN's future combat architecture, although their exact configuration and operational status have not been officially disclosed.
The P1 demonstrates Turkey's growing capability to develop its own combat aircraft, its potential contribution to the future resilience of NATO air power, and the strategic importance of maintaining an alternative development path, which is the KAAN, after the F-35 was abandoned.
From flight demonstrator to test vehicle
The KAAN P0 accomplished a crucial mission, proving Turkey's ability to design, manufacture, and operate a combat aircraft. The first flight on February 21, 2024, lasted 13 minutes and reached an altitude of 2400 meters, while the second flight on May 6 lasted 14 minutes and reached an altitude of 3000 meters.
Thus, the P1 should not be viewed as an identical second aircraft, but as the result of an engineering process that took into account the experience gained in the development of the P0, as well as in various rig work, ground testing, aerodynamic analysis, manufacturing activities and subsystem development.
Taxiway testing is crucial because it allows engineers to study several interrelated functions, including engine response, braking, nosewheel steering, hydraulics, power generation, cockpit displays, thermal management, and structural vibration. The aircraft's flight performance demonstrates that several key systems are working together as part of an extensive flight test program.
One of the most noticeable visual changes occurred at the front of the aircraft. The P0 was equipped with a long flight data acquisition boom, extending directly from the nose and aligned with the aircraft's longitudinal centerline. This instrument placement allows pressure, angle of attack, and sideslip sensors to be mounted ahead of the disturbed airflow created by the forward fuselage, providing engineers with accurate baseline data for aerodynamic calibration and flight control system validation.
The P1 also retained the air data acquisition boom, confirming that data collection is still part of the test program. However, the probe was moved from the centerline of the nose and mounted on the starboard side of the forward fuselage. This revised location may be due to changes in the forward fuselage geometry, the layout of the test equipment, or the need to retain the central portion of the nose, although its exact engineering purpose has not been officially disclosed. Therefore, the boom should be considered temporary flight test equipment rather than part of the intended operational configuration of the KAAN.
The P1 is also lower than the P0, with a shorter, more compact nose and main landing gear, and a wider main track. Due to the camera angle, an exact size comparison is impossible, but visually, the difference in landing gear position is significant.
TAAC officially describes the Australian-developed KAAN landing gear as a retractable tricycle system incorporating a steering nose wheel, integrated braking system, actuators, locking mechanisms, hydraulic components, control units and landing gear position warning equipment.
P0 performed public flights with the landing gear permanently extended and did not demonstrate its retraction. Therefore, P1 is intended to serve as a platform for evaluating the complete landing gear extension and retraction process, landing gear hatch operation, emergency release, and aircraft handling in an aerodynamically clean configuration—that is, with the landing gear retracted.
Improvements and integration in Turkish
The air intake and forward fuselage also appear to have undergone significant changes. On the P1, the leading edges of the side intakes begin further from the cockpit, and the intake fins are deeper and blend smoothly into the vertical stabilizers. In some views, the central fuselage appears wider. These changes may be related to inlet airflow management, internal ducting for cooling requirements, or to allocate additional volume for avionics, fuel, and internal weapons.
Furthermore, they may contribute to further reduction in signature, particularly in cases where the leading edges, fuselage vertical stabilizers, and internal ducts must balance efficient engine airflow with thermal signature reduction. The images do not show the geometry of the internal ducts, so it is premature to make precise statements about aerodynamic efficiency or signature reduction. However, the scale of the external changes indicates a major structural overhaul rather than a superficial modification.
A mockup of the planned ASELSAN KARAT infrared search and tracking system can be seen on the fuselage just in front of the cockpit canopy, while the angular fairing under the forward fuselage almost exactly matches the proposed location of the TOYGUN electro-optical targeting system. These systems will provide passive airborne detection, long-range identification, and high-precision targeting without the use of radar, indicating a focus on stealth.
However, their presence shouldn't be taken as proof that all sensors, processors, cooling systems, and software are ready for operation. Even as experimental setups or preliminary solutions, they demonstrate that Turkish engineers are working to improve sensor visibility, vibration isolation, structural attachment, power supply, thermal management, and maintainability within the aircraft's signature-based geometry. This is a significant improvement over the flying but poorly equipped demonstrator.
The contrasting areas visible at the leading edges and tips of the P1's canted vertical stabilizers also correspond to locations for radio frequency (RF) equipment or electronic warfare systems. Their arrangement is reminiscent of the broader integration concept implemented on the Kızılelma (or Su-57 – ed.), in which antenna functions are integrated into the airframe rather than relegated to traditional protruding hulls. On the KAAN, this arrangement could potentially provide radar warning, electronic support, communications, or electronic countermeasures, all while maintaining aerodynamic cleanliness and stealth.
Turkish Aerospace, naturally, has not published a detailed diagram of the antenna layout on the P1, meaning that each contrast panel cannot be described as an element of the electronic warfare antenna system; this would not be consistent with the available data.
It's safe to say that the vertical tail architecture is designed for distributed and conformal RF integration. Each additional aperture also imposes requirements for power supply, heat dissipation, electromagnetic compatibility, dedicated computing power for high-speed data processing, and space in the pilot's workstation. Thus, the P1 begins to reveal the architecture of the onboard information and control system, not just the fighter's appearance.
Changes are also noticeable in the rear fuselage and tailplane. The P1 features updated panels, vents, and fairings around the engine bays, and the space between the engines and stabilizer roots appears more refined than on the P0. The stabilizers have sharper angular contours, and the vertical tail tips also appear modified. Because the P1 remains an experimental aircraft, not all of its visible features can be considered representative of the final production configuration.
Sovereign Air Power for the New Ottoman Empire?
For Turkey, the P1 is a testament to something more significant than the successful development of an aircraft design: the very emergence of a domestic combat aircraft design complex. The decisive factor is the ability to define requirements, produce prototypes, collect test data, identify deficiencies, make design and system modifications, and return the improved aircraft to testing.
Turkish Aerospace is leading this process, but KAAN is also mobilizing a broader national ecosystem that includes the Presidency of Defense Industries, ASELSAN, TAAC, and numerous companies operating in the fields of structures, avionics, electro-optics, software, materials, flight control systems, and test equipment.
Turkey's official program goals emphasize maximum domestic industrial participation and technological autonomy, with the goal of achieving low observability and advanced control and sensor systems. The visible evolution of the P1 demonstrates that these ambitions are being realized in metal, composite materials, software interfaces, and flight test equipment.
The strategic outcome is not a rejection of international cooperation, but a strengthening of the capacity for cooperation without compromising national control over the development of management systems, certification weapons, electronic warfare programs, maintenance priorities and future upgrades.
Does NATO need all this?
For NATO, KAAN could represent much more than just additional fighter squadrons. The Alliance is once again placing a strong emphasis on expanding its defense industrial capabilities, protecting critical supply chains, and building capabilities that can be scaled and sustained in protracted crises.
A developed Turkish production and support ecosystem will create another center of excellence for combat aircraft development on NATO's strategically important southeastern flank, connecting the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the wider Middle East. The value of this aircraft to the Alliance will ultimately depend on demonstrated interoperability, enabled by secure communications, identification systems, tactical data exchange, cryptographic protection, mission planning, and common operational procedures.
It's doubtful that Turkey will ultimately roll out an aircraft that won't be integrated into NATO systems; that would be truly pointless. It will definitely be an aircraft that will not only be capable of performing joint missions with the air forces of other NATO countries but will also be of interest to those who can't afford the F-35.
Of course, even in the long term, things aren't clear-cut here. Fifth-generation compliance can't be judged solely by the airframe's shape, and the extent to which the KAAN can be considered a fifth-generation fighter will only be determined much later. Nevertheless, Turkey's ability to produce, maintain, and modernize a modern fighter under national control could strengthen NATO's industrial resilience by reducing the burden on combat aircraft production and maintenance.
NATO's Industrial Cooperation Strategy 2026 explicitly supports interoperability, scalable production, and partnerships, including joint design, joint development, joint production, and joint sustainment, which strengthen the Alliance and contribute to national sovereignty. At least, this is what numerous NATO resolutions state.
KAAN and F-35 as complementary elements of the Turkish Air Force
According to the Turkish military leadership, these successes should put an end to the habit of viewing Turkey's future air power as a choice between a national fighter and the F-35. Ankara continues to publicly pursue progress on the F-35 issue. During the NATO summit in Ankara in July 2026, Turkish authorities cited previous discussions and commitments from the United States and expressed confidence that the summit could lead to a favorable outcome.
If access is ultimately restored, NATO will be able to provide Turkey with a stealthy fighter, supported by advanced sensor integration, coalition interoperability, and a broad allied operational community. But only if the F-35 block is finally resolved, which, admittedly, is not yet in sight. However, Turkey has not given up hope.
The KAAN offers a different but complementary strategic advantage: a twin-engine combat aircraft whose configuration, indigenous weapons, electronic warfare development, mission data, and long-term modernization plan will increasingly be determined by Turkey.
A future force that will feature both platforms will be able to combine the F-35's mature, multinational ecosystem with the KAAN's sovereign development capability, while Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles will provide additional capabilities in reconnaissance, electronic warfare, countermeasures, and manned-unmanned interoperability.
KAAN does not weaken the strategic case for Turkey's participation in the F-35 program, but rather ensures that Ankara can achieve this goal by relying on its growing technological capabilities rather than by remaining dependent on a single external source.
Turkish Air Force's Expanded Capabilities: A Ponder
The KAAN P0 has proven that Turkey can fly a domestically developed combat aircraft. The P1 represents a more complex stage in transforming this achievement into a more sophisticated platform for aerodynamic optimization, sensor placement, and increasingly deeper integration with control systems. Not all elements visible on the prototype have been officially approved, and the P1 should not yet be considered the final production configuration. Nevertheless, the direction of development is clear. Through rigorous testing and the accumulated experience of Turkish engineers, technicians, and industrial partners, Turkey is building the infrastructure necessary to manage the entire lifecycle of a modern air force.
For NATO, these efforts mean a strengthened and technologically independent ally, and for Turkey, they mean that future cooperation on platforms like the F-35 can build on national capabilities, strategic confidence, and the irreversible growth of the Turkish aerospace industry.
Overall, with the KAAN project, Turkey is confidently establishing itself as a country capable of developing and building a modern combat aircraft from scratch. While it's still at the prototype stage, the journey is made possible by the will of the beholder. A country that just 30 years ago considered itself fortunate to license-assemble foreign aircraft, and now builds its own aircraft, is a different story.
It's not as if Turkey is just beginning; successful projects have already been launched. The TAI Hürkuş (Free Bird), a training aircraft that operates not only in Turkey but has also found its way into other countries, has been implemented in both normal and unmanned versions.
The TAI Hürjet, a supersonic trainer and light combat aircraft similar to the Yak-130, is intended to replace the Northrop T-38 Talon as a trainer and complement the F-16 Fighting Falcon for close air support. It is also planned to replace the Northrop F-5 used by the Turkish Stars aerobatic team, which is already a testament to its success. A domestic aerobatic team flying domestically produced aircraft is more than prestigious; it represents a level of excellence.
And not just airplanes, the TAI T929 ATAK 2—a heavy attack helicopter developed by Turkish Aerospace Industries and also scheduled to fly in 2023 (a golden age for Turkish aviation). A helicopter, a trainer, a supersonic combat trainer—yes, the only thing missing is the crowning glory: a proper combat aircraft.
Since the previous stages have been completed, there's a high probability that the KAAN will enter series production. This is both because a huge amount of work has already been done, and because the Turkish government's ambitions will not allow it to abandon the aircraft. Clearly, the political component plays a major role here. Turkey is eager to demonstrate its viability after the collapse of the F-35 deal, and it's entirely possible that this could happen.
And here Turkey has a virtually win-win situation: if the US agrees to provide the F-35, it will simply be integrated into the existing Air Force structure, fortunately, there are no problems with that. And the KAAN is no obstacle at all; the only question is which missions will be assigned to which aircraft. No – Turkey will quietly refine the KAAN and receive a modern aircraft for its Air Force that no one can use as a tool of pressure.
The development of its capabilities that Türkiye is demonstrating today is a cause for concern for many around the world, especially Turkey's NATO allies.
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