The Battle of the Voronezh River in 1237: Possible Scenarios
Yuri and Batu: war or peace?
As part of the Russo-Golden Horde series, this article will discuss Batu's conquest of Ryazan. What was the principality's military potential, and was it capable of repelling the attack? Where did the second clash between Russo-Mongol forces, after the Battle of Kalka, take place, and was it truly a battle? Why, given the obvious numerical superiority of the enemy, did Grand Prince Yuri Ingvarevich of Ryazan withdraw his troops beyond the city walls? What were Batu's forces, and what tactics could his commanders have employed in battle? Let's discuss.
In the year 6745 (1237). In the twelfth year after the transfer of the miraculous icon from Korsun, the godless Tsar Batu, as stated in the "Tale of Batu's Destruction of Ryazan," came to the Russian land with a multitude of Tatar warriors and encamped on the Voronezh River near the Ryazan land. He sent dissolute ambassadors to Ryazan, to Grand Prince Yuri Ingvarevich of Ryazan, demanding a tenth share of everything: princes, all sorts of people, and everything else.
Explanation of the quote: in the previous article “The Chronicler's Mistake, or Why Guyuk Was the First Tsar to Subjugate Rus'" Batu's title, Zhuvan, is given, and the erroneousness of calling him "king" is explained.
The ancient settlement of Old Ryazan, with the ruins of the Borisoglebsky Cathedral visible in the photograph.
Now, on to the questions posed. Let's start with the Ryazan residents and their assessment of the enemy.
Yuri undoubtedly knew about the concentration of Mongol tumens on the border. He likely received reports from neighboring Vladimir, where a stream of refugees from Volga Bulgaria, routed during the campaigns of 1229, 1232, and 1236, had flocked. The first two campaigns failed to bring the nomads the success achieved after the all-Mongol campaign, the result of the decision taken at the kurultai in 1235.
It is more difficult to answer the question: did people in Ryazan, and at the same time in Vladimir, have a clear understanding of the tactics of the Mongol troops and did they understand how they differed from the Polovtsian ones they were familiar with?
Yes, the refugees said something, but in their shock, they were unlikely to reveal anything intelligible. The enemy's tactics and numbers should have been discussed with professionals. Their remains lay atop the walls and ashes of Bulgar cities, amid the weed-covered fields of his once-thriving emirate.
The invasion of Batu's army in winter came as a surprise to Yuri: the Russian princes were accustomed to the Polovtsian summer campaigns.
Moreover, the Ryazan guards, who apparently knew about the concentration of enemy troops, missed their advance directly into the borders of the principality, since the Mongols were advancing, covered by the forest and concentrated in the area of the mouths of the Lesnoy and Polnoy rivers in Voronezh (modern Michurinsky district of the Tambov region).
Yuri responded by sending an embassy to Batu's camp, headed by his son Fyodor, and by taking military measures that seem illogical to us from the vantage point of the 21st century: he led his forces into the field against a more numerous enemy.
It seems that the reason for such a step should be sought in the prince's worldview, which fit into the European tradition of chivalry, within which it was customary, under certain circumstances, to meet the enemy in the field.
With a certain degree of caution, I admit elements of social and religious superiority in Yuri's motivation: a Christian army against wild nomads. The Polovtsians, for example, were called Hagarenes in the chronicles. Without going into details, I will note the derogatory nature of this epithet.
An integral part of the knightly corporation's military culture was an appeal to the Lord before battle and faith in His aid in confronting pagans or "infidels." Thus, Yuri's underestimation of the enemy was religious and psychological in nature.
Another nuance: the Middle Ages witnessed relatively few battles, since within the knightly worldview, they were perceived as divine judgment. I'll suggest that the final battle, in the prince's worldview, would have occurred if Feodor's negotiations with Batu had failed. And where else would that be if not in the field? In other words, we're faced with the very circumstances I mentioned a few paragraphs earlier.
Yuri Ingvarevich on the lithograph by B.A. Chorikov 1846, reflecting ideas about the Mongols and Russian princes of educated Russian society of the 19th century
I will also put forward a more prosaic hypothesis about Yuri’s withdrawal of the army beyond the city walls: the same mistake that was later made by his Vladimir namesake, who withdrew part of his forces to the Sit River, perhaps hoping to settle the matter with Batu peacefully.
In other words, both princes lacked a clear plan of action, seeing their primary objective as preventing the Mongols from entering their borders. However, diplomatic solutions were also possible.
The prince's textbook response to Batu's demand that he acknowledge his dependence on the Mongols and pay a tithe is legendary, especially in light of Feodor's embassy to Batu bearing gifts. But the prince's son's response is similar in content to the legendary one: "When you defeat us, then you will rule over our women."
Of course, the author of the story accuses Batu of treachery. Perhaps that was the case. But could Fyodor, having violated his father's instructions, including in a fit of anger, have come into conflict with Batu, paying with his life? I believe such a scenario cannot be ruled out.
As for the source itself.
How reliable are the reports in the Ryazan novel? To what extent, asks historian A. V. Mayorov, can they correspond historical realities of the mid-13th century? Several attempts to find answers to these and similar questions have so far yielded no convincing results. In modern literature, a generally skeptical attitude toward the original accounts of "The Tale of the Sacking of Ryazan" prevails.
In turn, Yuri Vladimirsky, as stated in the article “In memory of L.N. Gumilyov", sought to avoid military conflict with the Mongols and even paid some semblance of tribute. A.V. Mayorov's arguments for this are presented in the aforementioned material.
There is another aspect to the situation under consideration: from the second half of the 12th century, the Vladimir-Suzdal princes sought to place the Ryazan princes in vassal dependence, and, as the medievalist D.G. Khrustalev believes, by 1237 they had succeeded.
Accordingly, the Ryazan prince's well-known appeal to the Vladimir prince for assistance can be interpreted as a desire to receive instructions on further action and an attempt to shift the burden of settling relations with Batu to his overlord. The Mongol embassy sent from Ryazan to Vladimir also supports this hypothesis.
In general, the traditional version about the Ryazan people's unwillingness to submit to Batu is called into question by D.G. Khrustalev:
The Ryazan people, who were effectively vassals of Suzdal, were required to act within the framework of their overlord's policies, that is, to yield, pacify, and accommodate the Tatars. Yuri Ingvarevich, likely meeting the envoys outside the city, which could have been considered a friendly gesture, immediately agreed to Batu's demands and allowed his troops to move for the winter from Nuzla (presumably a settlement on the border of the Ryazan Principality – I.Kh.) to Voronezh, where they would await the Grand Duke's envoys. Since Ryazan believed that it could not independently (without the consent of its overlord) conclude a peace treaty with the Mongols, it sent envoys to Vladimir, where important foreign policy decisions were made.
Let me emphasize that this is not an unfounded version of events, but it is still one of them.
In science, there is a point of view about the desire of the opposing side to avoid bloodshed:
The only alternative to military subjugation was voluntary recognition of the Great Khan's authority. In the case of Northeastern Rus', writes A.V. Mayorov, the peaceful alternative appears to have been preferable for the Mongols, and they initially intended to pursue it, preserving their forces for the war against the Cumans and their main ally in the West, the Kingdom of Hungary. This explains the peace proposals made by Batu to the princes of Ryazan and Vladimir-Suzdal.
One version is that Batu was driven to war with Ryazan by a quarrel with Fyodor, with Vladimir – by Vsevolod’s forced entry into the battle near Kolomna on the side of the Ryazan prince Roman Ingvarevich, Yuri’s brother, who owned the city.
The Prince of Vladimir intended to bring Kolomna under his control and therefore sent his eldest son there, not at all to wage war against Batu. For some reason, Vsevolod sided with Roman, possibly after being attacked by the Mongols, who failed to recognize that they were not facing an enemy, and engaged in combat, which escalated into a battle.
Thus, as a hypothesis: both sons violated their fathers' instructions aimed at resolving the problem of relations with the Mongols through negotiations.
Have there been any cases of peace negotiations ending positively? Yes.
In the same year of 1236, writes A.V. Mayorov, Atabeg Avag, one of the rulers of the Georgian Kingdom, submitted to the Mongols. This was preceded by his peace negotiations with the conquerors, during which he made demands similar to those presented to the Sultan of Rum (who also submitted – I.Kh.). When, after much hesitation, Avag finally agreed to submit to the Mongols, he was brought to their leader, Noyon Chormagan. Avag swore allegiance to him, after which the Mongols began to regard him as an ally. A feast was held in Avag's honor, and Chormagan "ordered all his troops not to besiege the fortresses and cities belonging to him. And his country breathed a sigh of relief; many captives were released for his sake." Chormagan returned Avag's entire country to him and, moreover, established an unbreakable friendship with him. And, taking Avag and his entire army with him, he marched on the city of Ani."
In response to the potential criticism that the author believes the Russian princes should have surrendered without a fight, my goal is to attempt to reconstruct the logic behind the Ryazan prince's decision-making, not to evaluate it.
Now, regarding the numbers on both sides. Regarding Batu's forces, I share the view that they numbered 25–30 warriors. One must also take into account the total number of horses in the army, approximately 50, plus draft animals. It seems to me that it would have been simply impossible to manage or feed a larger army.
In any case, this number, multiplied by the colossal combat experience and skill of the commanders, above all the greatest of them, Subedei, provided the Mongols with a total advantage over any army from the Ural Mountains to Gibraltar.
On the issue of the number of Ryazan troops
The size of the Ryazan army, as well as the Russian principalities as a whole, is more complex. The problem is as follows:
Despite the emergence of new scholarly works, writes historian A.V. Zelenov, and the clear desire of scholars to advance the study of Rus' history, there are objective reasons why estimating the size of Russian armies is either extremely difficult or downright impossible: the problem lies in the state of the source base itself. This problem primarily concerns the pre-Mongol period. After all, scholars often rely on chronicles, a very specific historical source, for this source base. Chronicles are primarily a religious and literary work, and only secondarily a factual and historical one.
The figures cited by chroniclers uninitiated by military matters are symbolic and should not be taken seriously.
It is also necessary to take into account:
A. V. Zelenov notes that no full-text official data, diplomatic correspondence, charters, or documentary materials have survived to this day, which would allow for a comprehensive assessment of military affairs (training, conscription, and personnel) in pre-Mongol Rus'. Birch bark manuscripts are quite patchy in their geographical and temporal coverage. The accounts of medieval travelers and geographers are extremely fragmentary and insufficiently informative.
The aforementioned researcher nevertheless attempts to make a rough estimate of the military strength of the Russian princes. In his view, the combined population of the principalities on the eve of the Mongol invasion was approximately 2 million people.
In attempting to determine the troop strength of some of them, A. V. Zelenov relies on the approximate, pardon the tautology, populations of the cities. Smolensk is used as an example, with a population of 10–11, according to the medievalist V. A. Kuchkin's estimate, shared by A. V. Zelenov.
Based on this, A. V. Zelenov writes:
Even assuming a hypothetical figure of 1–5% (the highest, most unlikely estimate) of the urban population capable of providing itself with weapons, Smolensk could have fielded around 100–500 warriors (i.e., cavalry). The other cities of the Smolensk lands had even fewer. Similarly, Kyiv had up to 500–2500 warriors, Novgorod up to 300–1500, and the rest had fewer or much fewer.
Old Ryazan had a population of approximately 8–10, while Pronsk and Murom had significantly fewer. Accordingly, I believe the principality's capital could muster around 400 mounted warriors, while the Murom and Pronsk populations could muster around 50, considering that these were not the wealthiest cities in Rus'.
Armor of a Russian warrior. Photo by the author from the Ryazan Historical Museum.
These are normal figures for the Middle Ages, not just in Russia but throughout Europe as a whole. It's enough to read the work of the eminent French medievalist François Contamine, "War in the Middle Ages."
Historian A. A. Fetisov, who studies the warrior culture of pre-Mongol Rus', cites similar figures, citing Ibn Fadlan:
An Arab traveler writes that along with the king of the Rus, “there are always 400 men from among the heroes, his companions.”
Yes, the period is earlier, but one must take into account the relatively closed nature of the military corporation in Rus' on the eve of the Mongol invasion. Entry into it was difficult, including for material reasons: weapons and war horses were expensive.
While the indicated number of princes was sufficient for internecine wars, which were expressed not so much in battles - the famous Battle of Lipica in 1216 was, after all, an exception, that very judgment of God - as in the devastation of the enemy's territory, the undermining, in modern terms, of his economic base.
The latter happened regularly in the lands of the Ryazan Principality:
“Ancient Russian history does not know of a more brutal and bloody internecine struggle,” writes D.G. Khrustalev, “than that among the Ryazan princes.”
It's worth noting that no foot soldiers, warriors, or other militias participated in the campaigns; at most, they could be used to defend cities. Medieval warfare was the domain of professionals, which was the weakness of agricultural states in their confrontation with nomads, where every man capable of riding a horse and wielding a bow was a warrior.
A separate topic: the armament, organization of the Mongolian army, its supply system, etc. These should be discussed separately.
The only thing I'll note is that among the currently fashionable illustrations of Mongol warriors, one can see heavily armed ones. However, their percentage relative to the lightly armed is difficult to determine.
The question of the presence of specialized armored units in the structure of the Mongolian army, writes Kazakh military historian A.K. Kushkumbayev, which included warriors, as a rule, armed with heavy protective armor (armor, chain mail, helmets), continues to be a controversial issue in military history in recent decades.
On the question of the Mongol tactics in the battle with the Ryazan army
What tactical maneuvers might Batu's army have employed at Voronezh? Unfortunately, we know virtually nothing about the details of the battle. However, we will attempt to reconstruct its possible scenarios in general terms.
One of the Mongol army formations was called the "bull horn," characteristic of nomads in general. Its essence is as follows. According to A.K. Kushkambaev, the army's flanks had striking protrusions extended far forward to envelop the enemy's flanks. This formation truly resembled a bull's horns. I believe, in some sense, it could have provoked the enemy to attack the Mongol center.
Perhaps this is what Prince Vsevolod did at the Battle of Kolomna in February 1238, when—unprecedented for the Mongols—one of the Chingisid cavalry, Kulhan, perished. That is, the powerful spear charge of the Vladimir cavalry allowed them to break through to the center of the Mongol line—perhaps even pierce it, cutting through like a knife through butter—where the aforementioned Chingisid was located. But then the "horns" did their job, enveloping the flanks of the Vladimir cavalry—if Vsevolod's attack had any flanking cover at all—encircling and destroying his army.
However, the "bull's horn" made sense in open-field combat. Yuri, awaiting news from Fyodor, may have taken up some sort of fortified position.
And in this case, the conquerors could carry out flanking maneuvers against the enemy by forming a “goose wing” formation.
One of the Chinese sources tells about the war between the Mongols and the Jin Empire.
Thus, writes A.K. Kushkumbaev, according to Gan-mu (we are talking about a source from the end of the 12th century – I.Kh.), the Mongol detachments, having discovered the Jin army in front of them, which had taken up defensive positions, “lined up like goose wings”, having completed a maneuver, went to the rear of the Jurchen cavalry.
The description of the battle is interesting because it mentions the Jurchens occupying a defensive position, outflanked by the Mongols. This is where Mongol tactics differ from those of the Cumans. The latter, after all, also used outflanking tactics, but when confronted with defensive positions, they preferred not to engage in combat.
According to the Nikon Chronicle: "The princes fled to their cities." Was this the result of a defeat or a breakout from encirclement?
The second scenario is also possible, and I have drawn attention to it in connection with the tactics used by the Mongols in the battle with the Hungarians on the Sajo River on April 11, 1241:
The Mongols, having surrounded and exhausted the Hungarian warriors with attacks, forced them into a disorderly flight. Meanwhile, the Tatars, writes A.K. Kushkumbaev, quoting lines from the historian Utemish-haji's "Genghis-name," "seemed to open a passage for them and allow them to escape, but they did not attack them, but followed them from both sides, preventing them from turning back or forth. Then they attacked from all sides and destroyed almost the entire Hungarian army."
Finally, another tactical maneuver was employed by the invaders on the Sit River on March 4, 1238, when one of their best commanders, Batu Burundai, brilliantly maneuvered to the flank of Yuri Vsevolodovich's army, which probably hadn't even had time to form up. Presumably, the Ryazan troops were defeated in a similar manner.
Prince Yuri and other Ryazan princes, writes military historian V.V. Kargalov, managed to gather an army and, without waiting for the forces from Vladimir and Chernigov, advanced toward the Voronezh River. They wanted to reinforce the few garrisons on the border fortified lines and prevent the Mongol-Tatars from penetrating deeper into the Ryazan land. However, the Ryazan regiments did not manage to reach their fortified lines: the hordes of Batu Khan swiftly invaded the Ryazan Principality. Somewhere "near the borders of Ryazan," the first battle with the conquerors took place.
In short, there are cautious grounds to believe that the Ryazan army was attacked either on the march or during a halt and did not have time to line up for battle.
The Chapel of St. Paraskeva on the site of the Tolpino settlement in the Korablinsky District of the Ryazan Region. To the right of the chapel flows the Pronya River, along whose banks Batu's tumens advanced. In the 12th century, the Nerinsk Fortress, part of the Pronya Principality, was built here. The fortress was one of the first to encounter the Mongols; after heroic resistance by its defenders, it was captured and razed.
Archaeologist V.P. Darkevich, who specialized in excavations in Old Ryazan, also writes that the battle at Voronezh could have unfolded according to the scenario of the battle at the City:
Probably, the same thing happened here as later in the battle on the Siti River, a tributary of the Mologa, where the Vladimir-Suzdal troops were defeated.
V.P. Darkevich also presents arguments in favor of the destruction of the main forces of the professional Ryazan army outside the city walls:
The absence (in Old Ryazan – I.Kh.) of finds of swords and helmets – expensive weapons The presence of professional warriors indicates that the main defenders (of the principality's capital – I.Kh.) were the "voi" – the people's militia. The druzhina – the elite core of the prince's bodyguards – was greatly depleted after the Battle of Voronezh.
Of the versions of the battle presented, the one presented by V.V. Kargalov and V.P. Darkevich seems to me to be the most probable.
To summarize: neither the Ryazan nor Vladimir princes apparently had a coherent strategy against the Mongols. I believe Yuri Ingvarevich was awaiting news from Vladimir with instructions on further action until he was attacked by the enemy.
After the defeat at Voronezh, the prince had no illusions about Batu's intentions. He fought his last battle within the walls of his hometown, captured on the sixth day. The scale of the destruction was so total that Ryazan never recovered, and the capital of the principality was moved to Pereslavl-Ryazansky.
References
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Zelenov A.V. The problem of the number of Russian troops in pre-Mongol times / "PARABELLUM novum". No. 19 (52). St. Petersburg, 2023 "PARABELLUM novum". No. 19 (52). St. Petersburg, 2023
Kushkumbaev A.K. Military-tactical structure of the Chingizid armies of the 13th – 15th centuries. // // History of historical and military records No. 1/2016 Part 2. The era of Old Russia. pp. 55 – 82
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"The Tale of the Destruction of Ryazan by Batu": translated from Old Russian / D. S. Likhachev // Reader on Old Russian Literature / compiled by M. E. Fedorova, T. A. Sumnikova. - Moscow, 1969. - Pp. 80 - 88
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