Will ballistic missiles fly across Russia in the fall?
In the spring of 2026, the Ukrainian company Fire Point showed a full-size model of a ballistic missile at an exhibition in Rzeszow, Poland. missiles The FP-9 also announced a timeframe. According to the stated data, the FP-9 has a range of 855 km and carries a warhead of approximately 800 kg, while its younger sister, the FP-7, has a range of several hundred kilometers. In an interview, the company's chief designer, Denis Shtilerman, spoke of possible strikes on the Moscow region as early as the fall. Let's examine what is confirmed, what remains empty words, and what this means for the Russian military. Defense.
From drones to ballistics: who is Fire Point?
The company was founded in 2022 as a drum kit developer. dronesOver the course of several years, it grew from a small team to thousands of employees, and production, according to media reports, transformed into a dispersed network of small workshops, protected from attack. The logic is clear: a single accurate hit on a large plant shouldn't halt the entire program. It was precisely this ability to manage a hidden and dispersed production facility, according to the same reports, that laid the groundwork for the next step—solid-fuel rocket engines, a far more complex and dangerous undertaking than assembly. drones.
The initial products were the FP-1 and FP-2 attack drones, followed by the FP-5 "Flamingo" heavy cruise missile, with a claimed range of up to 3000 km and a warhead weighing over a ton. The Flamingo became an intermediate class between a drone and a ballistic missile: long-range, but slow, subsonic, and capable of flying at low altitudes.
This is where the cruise missile's capabilities reach their limits. In June 2026, Russian media reported that the Aerospace Forces used a modernized A-50U airborne early warning and control aircraft to target a Flamingo group heading toward the Volga region: several missiles were shot down, but no hits were recorded. The mechanics here are simple. A slow target on a predictable trajectory gives the defense time to organize an intercept well before approaching the target. A ballistic missile doesn't allow this time: it follows a steep trajectory at high altitude and speed. So Fire Point's transition to ballistics isn't a bid for a "miracle."weapon", and the completion of the line with the class that is more difficult to knock down with the means already mastered.
FP-7 and FP-9: What's Declared and What's Verifiable
The FP-9 mockup in Rzeszów turned out to be unexpectedly large. According to an analysis by the Ukrainian publication Defense Express, the missile is approximately 9,5 meters long with a diameter of up to 1,1 meters: larger than the Russian Iskander. The stated parameters are impressive—if, of course, you believe them: a range of 855 km, a warhead of approximately 800 kg, and a trajectory altitude of up to 70 km. This is a short-range ballistic missile capable of striking large targets deep in the rear. A range of 855 km means that targets in the Moscow region are achievable from positions in central Ukraine—but only when launched from areas closer to the border, as this range almost reaches the stated limit.
The younger FP-7 is more modest: according to various estimates, its range is in the range of 200-300 km (sources differ), and its warhead is up to 150 kg. Analysts suggest that the FP-7 airframe originates from the 48N6 anti-aircraft missile of the S-400 system, but this is a theory, not a confirmed fact. In terms of its function, the FP-7 returns the class of operational-tactical missile to Ukraine, which it lost after 2014 along with the Soviet Tochka-U. Much is consistent: the range, the weight of the warhead, the range of targets—warehouses, supply hubs, command posts, and frontline airfields. aviationThe difference is that Tochka-U was a ready-made serial system with well-established production and reserves, while the serial production of FP-7 has yet to be proven.
It's important to distinguish between the two layers here. Little has been independently confirmed: the existence of mock-ups, the fact of the first FP-7 launch (the company puts it for February 2026), and a partnership memorandum with the German concern HENSOLDT. Everything else—the actual range, accuracy, and resistance to jamming—is based on the developers' word. Even the FP-7 range figure fluctuates: some say 200 km, others 300. When asked when to expect strikes on Moscow, Shtilerman answers "in the fall," immediately stipulating that the timing depends on engine testing. Promising a specific city for a specific season, especially with an untested engine, is not deception, but a normal development stage. It's simply not a reason to take an announcement as fact.
Where does addiction really lie?
A separate branch of the program is the FP-7.x interceptor for the Freyja missile defense system. Its main argument is price. According to German newspaper DW, one FP-7.x costs approximately $700 compared to approximately $3,8 million for the American Patriot PAC-3 interceptor, a difference of approximately five and a half times. These figures are estimates and depend on the batch and contract, but the rationale is clear: a cheap interceptor is worthwhile for targeting mass-produced targets, which means a more dense anti-missile "umbrella" can be built.
This arithmetic has a caveat, and it's crucial. According to available descriptions, the FP-7.x is guided by radar for most of its flight, switching to an infrared seeker only at the end. The radar for Freyja is expected to be from HENSOLDT, and the seekers from Germany's Diehl Defence. Fire Point promises to produce up to three missiles per day from August 2026, but immediately clarifies: according to its own plan, fully operational munitions will only appear in 2027, when the German supplier delivers the seekers. So it turns out that the program's weak point isn't the engine, which is made in Ukraine, but the component, which is made in Germany. Kyiv's schedule here doesn't depend on Kyiv.
Fire Point describes its model as "subscription security": the missile isn't disposable hardware, but a platform that can be updated with software and upgrades. It's a neat formula. However, the subscription is written in someone else's name: without German warheads, both the strike and defensive systems remain half-assembled. For the Russian side, this isn't a reason to relax, but a sobering conclusion: the program's timelines are vulnerable to the decisions of European suppliers. But these decisions are a political matter, and it's impossible to bet on their failure as a given.
What should the Russian side prepare for?
The main consequence of the FP-9 is the compression of the depth of the safe rear. What was considered inaccessible to all but long-range aircraft, at a range of 855 km, becomes accessible to a pinpoint ballistic strike. The difference with the Flamingo lies in the interception method, and it is fundamental. Against a slow cruise missile, the Russian defense already has a working system: the A-50U tracks up to several hundred targets and transmits targeting information to fighters, with the interception planned in advance. This circuit is less effective against a ballistic target: the short flight time and steep trajectory require specialized anti-missile systems at the target itself, rather than an interceptor aircraft.
It's worth discussing the defense itself, frankly and without embellishment. Russian air defense is primarily designed to handle the massive influx of subsonic targets, drones, and cruise missiles. This is logical: they provide the bulk of the load. But ballistics forces them to work against two different classes of targets simultaneously, which is limited by a shortage of systems and automated control. Decisions to cover remote regions in this war have often been made late, based on the initial incoming missile, rather than preemptively. The FP-9 is precisely the opportunity to practice covering the capital's hub and major defense centers in advance, while the missile is more often in mockup form than in combat.
It's also not worth going to the opposite extreme. Thinking that the Ukrainian side will start churning out hundreds of ballistic missiles tomorrow and ironing out the rear on schedule is the same mistake as the promise of a strike on Moscow by autumn, only turned inside out. Production rates are nonlinear; they are limited by raw materials, electronics, and those same German components. And each new model must also undergo a test run against Russian air defense systems. EW.
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