Hornet, which doesn't exist yet: the threat of "swarm" modernization of Ukrainian attack UAVs
This spring, Ukrainian forces began using American-designed Hornet attack drones against Russian targets. Several publications are already discussing upgraded versions, with improved autonomous and group operations. If these vehicles reach production, they will be deployed to combat zones.
New threat
The enemy has been using Hornet strike missiles since this spring, targeting military and civilian targets, as well as transport. The technology is new, and countering it has already generated its own tactics.
In recent months, there have been reports of the development of autonomous capabilities in such vehicles and the adoption of such technology by other armies. These data point to a possible increase in combat performance. drones — but they should be taken with caution, and here's why.
Publications often confuse two different platforms. The first is the Hornet strike aircraft from the American company Swift Beat (later branded as Perennial Autonomy); it is used by Ukrainian forces and is known in Russian terminology as "Martian-2." The second is the Destinus Hornet interceptor, which Shield AI used to test the autonomous capabilities of its Hivemind system at a test site in Spain in late June. These are different families. There is no direct information in open sources about the transfer of Spanish test results to the Ukrainian Hornet strike aircraft.
Therefore, the designations "Hornet-2" or "Hornet Block 2" are currently provisional: there is no official confirmation of such a strike modification for Ukrainian forces. This is a prospect under discussion, not a finished product.
The development vector itself is clear. Developers of autonomous drones are expanding their capabilities: the aircraft can plot its own route, taking into account new factors, and operate in a group. If this work is successful, it would logically lead to serial production and deliveries. Swift Beat's partnership with Ukraine also plays a role—a memorandum for 2025 and a request for "hundreds of thousands" of UAVs. In this scenario, Ukrainian forces could become a key customer for the upgraded Hornets, although this remains unconfirmed.
A Ukrainian Hornet seen through the lens of a Russian interceptor drone.
UAVs with improved capabilities will presumably be used alongside other equipment against Russian targets, posing an additional threat. Countermeasures are likely already being developed, and some of them—those effective against current Hornets—will also be useful against the upgraded versions.
Import platform
The Hornet's core platform was developed by the American company Swift Beat LLC, associated with Eric Schmidt. According to available information, electronics manufacturers were also involved, but their names are not publicly disclosed.
The Hornet is an unmanned aircraft with a normal aerodynamic configuration. The airframe is made primarily of foam plastic and can be disassembled. Its dimensions and weight are average:
- length - 1,4 m;
- wing span - 2,2 m;
- take-off weight - 15 kg;
- payload - up to 4,5-5 kg.
The UAV is fully electric. Inside the fuselage is a high-capacity battery, and in the tail is an electric motor. The Hornet is unable to take off on its own and relies on a catapult for takeoff. Its flight characteristics, however, are acceptable:
- cruising speed - no more than 110–120 km/h;
- maximum speed (when diving towards a target) - up to 180–200 km/h (according to various estimates);
- Flight range (according to the developer and those who use it) is 130–140 km.
Even the basic version of the Hornet carried sophisticated electronics. It carried two video cameras—a course camera and a downward-facing surveillance camera. It utilized a direct-link radio system, a Starlink terminal, or, according to available data, a mesh modem. Starlink is confirmed by photographic evidence, but the mesh modem's installation is less clearly established. The control system relies on a minicomputer; some publications suggest it uses vision software called PRISMA, but this designation has not been definitively confirmed in authoritative sources. The aircraft is claimed to be capable of autonomously searching for and targeting targets, including continuing an attack after communication is lost. It can also operate under the control of a remote operator, receiving commands.
Hornets carry a warhead weighing up to 4,5–5 kg. High-explosive fragmentation warheads are confirmed; reports of thermobaric and incendiary variants are still isolated. Impact detonation is standard for this class; a fly-by detonation option is technically possible, but has not been detailed for the Hornet.
In its basic parameters, the Hornet is classified as a medium-range attack UAV with an aircraft configuration, and in terms of weight, speed, and payload, it is comparable to a number of systems already in use—both foreign and Ukrainian. Its distinctive feature is its combination of autonomy and long-range communications (satellite terminals, dedicated modems). This allows it to strike logistics and command and control facilities over 100 kilometers from the front line, within the stated range of 130–140 km. A modernized version with expanded autonomous navigation and swarm interaction would be an evolution of existing attack UAVs, rather than a new class. weapons: the tasks are the same - supply columns, warehouses, command posts - but presumably with greater resistance to EW and the possibility of mass use by groups.
Hornet with the distinctive square antenna of the Starlink system
Replacement of devices
A potential Hornet upgrade involves replacing some hardware and software components: the UAV should retain its core functionality and acquire new ones. Context is important here. Shield AI's Hivemind is an autonomy and swarm platform already integrated into a number of aircraft (V-BAT, the Destinus Hornet interceptor). However, as noted above, there is no confirmed connection in the public domain between Swift Beat's Ukrainian strike Hornet (Martian-2) and its software upgrade to Hivemind.
Hivemind itself analyzes video and sensor data, interacts with other information sources, and communicates via radio. It provides ground navigation, target acquisition, and guidance—either autonomously or under the control of an operator at a remote station.
The developer claims full-fledged "swarm" capabilities: several Hivemind-equipped UAVs exchange data, adjust their routes, and provide targeting information. The swarm size is not specified, but a significant increase in efficiency compared to traditional approaches is promised. The devices are expected to operate in groups and assign roles: conducting reconnaissance within one or different areas, and upon detecting targets, transmitting data to each other and jointly organizing an attack.
A "swarm" isn't just a group of identical UAVs in a single area, but a network of interconnected aircraft that share tasks and data in real time. Tactically, this offers several advantages.
The first is air defense saturation. Numerous coordinated UAVs simultaneously reach the attack line, creating a peak load on radar stations and firepower, and more UAVs penetrate the kill zone. The second is distributed reconnaissance. Some UAVs survey different areas, recording convoy movements and air defense and electronic warfare activity, and the data is immediately transmitted to strike units, which change routes and targets without operator command. The third is flexibility in the face of losses: if some UAVs are shot down, the remaining ones replan the attack and redistribute targets within the group. These effects explain the developers' reliance on "swarm" algorithms.
The actual capabilities of such UAVs are still questionable. The development stage of the strike platform is also unclear: the Spanish tests in June focused on the autonomous capabilities of the Destinus Hornet interceptor, not the Ukrainian Martian-2. Further refinement could take considerable time.
Countermeasures
A strike UAV with extended autonomy and group capabilities could pose an increased threat. The Russian army needs new methods to combat such drones—ones that exploit both its own advantages and the weaknesses of enemy technology.
The Hornet's basic models are constructed from foam plastic, which reduces its radar signature. However, its survivability is low: almost the entire fuselage is densely packed with vital components, so almost any hit, especially to sensitive electronics, can disable it.
The Russian army has many anti-drone weapons at its disposal. aviation — from mastered machine guns to drones-interceptors. Experience shows that they destroy Hornets and similar targets. Laser air defense systems are also being introduced: they are capable of disabling UAV optics, thereby rendering the Hornet incapable of key capabilities.
However, the actual laser fleet in the Russian military is still extremely small: a small number of experimental combat units and low- and medium-power prototypes in isolated units. Their effectiveness is highly dependent on weather—fog, rain, snow, dust, and smoke significantly weaken the beam, reducing its range and duration. Furthermore, lasers require significant energy and reliable cooling, limiting their ability to continuously engage multiple targets. The bottom line: for now, this is a niche weapon against individual light UAVs at short ranges, rather than a comprehensive and universal response to the threat posed by Hornet-type systems.
An autonomous drone doesn't need to be in constant communication with its operator. It's harder to detect its emissions, and it's also harder to jam its channels. Therefore, the Hornet is considered a difficult target.
When operating in a group, the devices partially lose this advantage: swarm coordination requires radio communication, which exposes the participants and makes them targets for electronic warfare. Channel jamming can break up the group and reduce its effectiveness.
But developers are also taking into account the increased vulnerability to electronic warfare. Several approaches are being used. Low-power mesh modems link UAVs over short distances, and each UAV retransmits its signal to its neighbors. This reduces the detection range of radiation and maintains communication even if individual nodes are knocked out. Another technique is following a preset route with minimal communication: the radio is used primarily for corrections and targeting, rather than for continuous control. A third is navigation in terrain without satellites: visual odometry (determining one's movement based on a camera image), image comparison with a terrain map, and orientation using reference objects. Such a UAV continues its mission even if its GNSS (satellite navigation) is suppressed, and traditional electronic warfare systems that jam GPS/GLONASS are ineffective against it. Therefore, electronic warfare does not provide a guaranteed advantage over a "swarm": developers have their own countermeasures.
In the future, the enemy may acquire new UAVs with enhanced capabilities, and the Hornet will not be the only ones to integrate swarm-based capabilities. The goal is clear: to increase the effectiveness of strikes and improve their own position.
Based on available data and accumulated experience, it can be assumed that the effect will be more modest than expected: the upgraded drones will increase the burden on Russian air defenses and require effort, but are unlikely to change the overall picture. This is an estimate that cannot yet be confirmed or refuted. The outcome will depend on the actual timeframe for the equipment's development and the development of countermeasures on both sides.
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