Turkey's Tactical Lessons: How Suvorov Wasted His Enemy's Time
Painting by the artist F.I. Usypenko "Actions of the Russian artillery during the storming of the Izmail fortress in 1790"
The fortress hadn't yet been attacked, but its replica was already being stormed. Away from Izmail, the Russians dug a ditch and built a rampart as tall as the one in Izmail, and at night, Suvorov himself demonstrated to the troops how to set up ladders and use bayonets; the role of the simulated enemy was played by bundles of fascines—thick bundles of brushwood that replaced enemy formations in training exercises. The real assault began later. But they prepared for it as if working from a precise blueprint.
In the previous article, "The Syntax of Combat: How Suvorov Combined Infantry, Cavalry, and Cannons"The discussion focused on how Suvorov linked the branches of the armed forces into a unified system. This system wasn't developed in a cabinet. The Russo-Turkish Wars of 1787–1791 became its testing ground: they had to capture fortresses, defeat field armies, and deal with an enemy with a different structure. And almost everywhere, the outcome was decided by one single factor— time.
Izmail: An assault prepared in advance
Suvorov arrived near Izmail on December 2 (13), 1790. The fortress formed an irregular triangle facing north: to the south, it was protected by the Danube, while on the other three sides ran an earthen rampart over 6 km long, 6–8 m high, with seven bastions. In front of the rampart was a ditch approximately 12 m wide and up to 10 m deep, filled with water in places. Within were 265 guns and a garrison, which tradition estimates at 35,000 men under the command of Serasker Aydoslu Mehmed Pasha. Suvorov had approximately 31,000 men and over 500 guns, almost half of which were irregular and poorly armed units.
Having circled the approaches, Suvorov concluded that there were no weak points in the rampart. He didn't abandon the assault—he simply changed his plan: since the fortress's layout offered no vulnerable point that could be exploited, it had to be taken with speed and a simultaneous attack. The troops formed a semicircle approximately two versts (about 2,1 km) away, flanking the river; de Ribas's flotilla and the batteries on the island closed the circle from the water.
On December 7, an ultimatum was sent to the fortress: a day to consider it, then an assault, and an assault meant death. Seraskir asked for a ten-day truce. Suvorov refused and set the deadline until the morning of December 10. There was no response. The garrison was forced into a situation where surrender promised no more mercy than battle: according to legend, the defenders had a sultan's decree behind them, threatening execution for anyone who abandoned Izmail. In any case, the Turks had no intention of retreating.
On December 9 (20), the military council decided to launch an immediate assault. Suvorov recalled that the Russian army had already retreated from Izmail twice and offered a choice: victory or death with glory. The assault was scheduled for the early morning of December 11 (22), around 5 a.m., two hours before dawn: darkness would cover the approach and capture of the rampart, but would not interfere with command and control of the day's battle.
Diorama "The Storming of Izmail by A.V. Suvorov's Troops in 1790." Authors: Artists Evgeny Danilevsky and Veniamin Sibirsky
The troops were divided into three wings, each with three columns. De Ribas's river landing force came from the water, Potemkin's wing attacked from the west, Samoilov's wing from the east, and Westphalen's cavalry (around 2,5) formed part of Suvorov's general reserve on the land side. Three wings, nine columns, a landing force from the water: everything was scheduled according to location and time.
The assault went according to plan, though not smoothly. Lassi's rangers were the first to scale the rampart; Lvov's column captured the batteries and opened the Khotyn Gate for cavalry; Kutuzov captured the bastion at the Kiliya Gate. Meknob's column had the hardest time of all: at the northern bastion, the rampart proved higher than expected, the long assault ladders couldn't reach it, and they were tied together in pairs under fire. In the city, Suvorov brought his artillery into play: light guns were brought into the streets and cleared passages with grapeshot. By midday, the outcome was decided; by four o'clock, resistance ceased.
The Russians lost 1879 men killed and 2703 wounded, a total of 4583. Ottoman losses are more complex: tradition places them extremely high – around 26,000 killed and up to 9,000 captured. These figures are based on reports and are disputed in modern historiography, but they accurately convey the order of the defeat. All 265 cannons, up to 400 banners, approximately 3,000 poods of gunpowder (approximately 49 tons), and tens of thousands of cannonballs were captured from the fortress. The decree regarding power in the as-yet-uncaptured city also reflected this confidence in the outcome: Suvorov appointed Kutuzov commandant of Izmail. According to a well-known legend, when asked what to make of this appointment, he replied that the capture of Izmail had already been reported to St. Petersburg – and this answer acted as an order to consider the battle won.
Rymnik: Speed as a weapon
A year before Izmail, on September 11 (22), 1789, the same calculation decided a field battle. To join up with the Austrian corps of Prince Coburg, Suvorov marched his troops about a hundred kilometers in about two and a half days—a march after which the enemy, not yet expecting the Russians, stood alongside their ally.
The balance of forces was glaringly unequal. Against 7,000 Russians and 18,000 Austrians—25,000 combined—stood the Grand Vizier's army, which sources put at 100,000 men (an upper and debatable estimate, but the gap is enormous by any calculation). Suvorov ordered a night movement and a flank attack, leaving the Austrians in the center and left wing, maintaining contact with mounted patrols, forming a two-line formation, as before at Focsani.
The vizier spotted a gap between the allies and threw his cavalry into it, again and again. The dense infantry formation held: the maneuverable cavalry was shattered by bayonets and volleys, unable to find a breach. And when the Turkish attacks fizzled out, the allies advanced on the main camp. Here, the true weakness of the defense was revealed—an unfinished section of fortifications on the flank, through which the cavalry, followed by the infantry, had broken through. The weak point wasn't the thinnest point of the rampart, but rather the enemy's inability to complete it: Suvorov struck again where the enemy was unprepared. Yusuf Pasha lost at least 15,000 killed that day, and about 400 captured; the allies lost approximately 600 men.
An engraved portrait of Generalissimo Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov. The engraving depicts Suvorov surrounded by scenes from the Battle of Rymnik in 1789.
Kinburn: Time Given to the Enemy
Sometimes the same logic worked in reverse. On October 1 (12), 1787, a Turkish force of up to five thousand men, supported by a squadron, landed on the Kinburn Spit. Suvorov forbade any interference with the landing. The Turks landed unhindered on the narrow spit and began digging trenches, advancing toward the fortress.
The attack was deliberately delayed—a calculation directly opposed to the one at Izmail. At Izmail, Suvorov wasted the enemy's time; at Kinburn Spit, he gave the enemy time—so that they would be drawn into a situation from which there was no escape. The spit offered no room: the further the Turks advanced, the less room they had to maneuver and retreat to the ships. The battle raged until nightfall, the landing force resisted desperately, and Suvorov himself was wounded. By nightfall, the landing force was thrown back into the sea. Russian losses, according to reports, were 138 killed and 300 wounded, although other estimates are significantly higher; a dispute over the exact numbers does not change the outcome.
"The Rescue of General-in-Chief A. V. Suvorov by Grenadier Stepan Novikov in the Battle of Kinburn on October 1, 1787." The painting was created by K. I. Keppen in the 1850s.
An enemy who had no single time
The enemy's structure helps us understand this method. The Ottoman army of the late 18th century consisted of units of varying nature: kapikulu corps with janissaries, landed cavalry, fortress garrisons, militia, mercenary and irregular units, and Budjak and Crimean Tatar cavalry. Such an army could be formidable in its individual elements—in a cavalry charge, in the defense of a rampart—but it was slow to assemble into a cohesive whole, requiring time to deploy and coordinate.
This was precisely the time Suvorov was seeking. A rapid march, an early assault, a strike on an unfinished flank: all this deprived the disparate army of the opportunity to form a single fist. And the price for such speed was paid in advance: six days at Izmail, night exercises on the embankment, and maneuvers honed to the point of automatism.
This contrast has a downside. Suvorov's corps itself, with its large proportion of Cossacks and militia, was partly "irregular" in this war. The heterogeneity of the troops wasn't a problem in itself; it became a problem when there wasn't enough time to organize the various units into a unified action. Suvorov took this time from the enemy and bought it for his troops through drill.
In 1795, he distilled this experience into a two-part instructional work, "The Science of Victory": "Watch Parade" and "Talking to Soldiers in Their Language." Three martial arts are paramount: eye, speed, and attack. The order is no accident. First, see where and when to strike; then, manage to strike; and only then, strike with full force. The book was published only in 1806, after the author's death, but its logic had been established much earlier, in the Turkish steppes and beneath the ramparts.
The fortresses of these campaigns did not hold out for long: by the Treaty of Jassy in 1791, Izmail was returned to the Ottoman Empire. The experience remained with the Russian army.
The next article in the series, "A mountain that is not climbed frontally", will continue the conversation. The conversation will focus on Italy and Switzerland: mountains, marches, and a coalition ally, where a single assault no longer decided anything, but rather the coherence of movement across a large theater.
Literature
- Bogdanov A. P. A. V. Suvorov: the birth of tactics.
- Suvorov A. V. The Science of Victory; reports, orders and letters.
- The Great Russian Encyclopedia: articles "Storm of Izmail 1790", "Battle of Rymnik", "Battle of Kinburn".
- Materials from the Presidential Library on the capture of Izmail.
- Militaryhistorical research into the Russo-Turkish War of 1787–1791.
- Research on the military organization of the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century.
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